The Taqlīd al-Ijtihād Paradox: Challenges to Qurʾanic Hermeneutics

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The Taqlīd al-Ijtihād Paradox: Challenges to Qurʾanic Hermeneutics

Abdulla GaladariMasdar Institute of Science and Technology, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, Al-Maktoum College of Higher Education, Dundee, Scotland

[email protected]

Abstract

Ijtihād has been extremely important throughout Islamic history and seen as such by many Muslim scholars, both Sunni and Shiʿi, in early, medieval, and contemporary Islam. However, the phenomenon of ijtihad, in both traditional and contemporary Islam, is restricted to a set of rules that were outlined by earlier mujtahids. This poses a challenge in Qurʾanic hermeneutics as to whether contemporary mujtahids are per-forming ijtihād or merely imitating (taqlīd) the method of ijtihād. The purpose of this study is to investigate the following question: is ijtihād in the Qurʾanic Sciences today merely an imitation (taqlīd) of ijtihād? The paper opens with defining imitation (taqlīd) according to classical Muslim scholars, starting with the arguments that accepts imitation in Islam and then compares it with various scholars’ stances on ijtihād. The paper employs arguments from the Qurʾan, prophetic tradition (ḥadīth), and acts of the Companions (ṣaḥābah) that are typically used by Muslim scholars to argue in favor of ijtihād over imitation (taqlīd). It compares the stance of both Sunni and Shiʿi scholars on the roles of both mujtahids and sources of jurisprudence (marājiʿ) and muftīs. It shows that, in Qurʾanic Sciences, although the role of ijtihād is highly recommended, it continues to be part of a larger paradox, in which ijtihād may only be performed through a set of rules outlined by early scholars. This brings us to a paradox that to be a mujtahid, one needs to imitate (taqlīd) rules outlined by earlier mujtahids, which poses the challenging question on whether scholars today are truly performing ijtihād, or simply taqlīd al-ijtihād.

Keywords

Qurʾan – imitation – ijtihād – exegesis – hermeneutics

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1 Introduction

Modern Muslim scholars typically look at Western scholars of the Qurʾan with suspicion, while Western scholars of the Qurʾan tend to be skeptical about the traditional ideas surrounding the sources and interpretation of the Qurʾan. While Muslim scholars tend to interpret the Qurʾan through a set system of criteria as outlined by the Qurʾanic sciences, Western scholars remove them-selves from the chains of a specific methodology for the interpretation of the Qurʾan and are instead more open to all kinds of methods. In other words, Western scholars attempt to perform ijtihād using their own methods that Muslims would find unconventional. The question is, what is conventional and what is unconventional when it comes to Qurʾanic hermeneutics? Are Muslims attempting to carry out ijtihād in their interpretations of the Qurʾan or are they simply imitating the method of ijtihād (taqlīd al-ijtihād) that was outlined by previous scholars (mujtahidīn) who provided the bases of the Qurʾanic sciences? In this paper, ijtihād is not restricted to the definition of extracting rulings from the Qurʾan (takhrij), but a more general method of Qurʾanic interpretation.

Many scholars of Qurʾanic Studies, such as Angelika Neuwirth, use Muḥammad’s biographies (sīra) in an attempt to interpret the Qurʾan, a method that classical exegetes followed.1 Gabriel Reynolds convincingly suggests that the sīra is just exegesis in disguise, a later extrapolation through storytelling, an attempt to contextualize the Qurʾan and provide it with meaning,2 and sug-gests that it is more appropriate to understand the Qurʾan through Biblical literature.3 John Wansbrough revolutionized Qurʾanic studies by releasing it from the shackles of historical contexts as presented by Muḥammad’s biogra-phies or related by classical exegetes (mufassirūn).4 Taken together, this does not necessarily say that post-Qurʾanic literature does not contain facts, but that we should not take them for granted in every detail, as they may con-tain more opinions than facts. Notably, classical exegetes (mufassirūn) such

1 See Angelika Neuwirth, “Qurʾan and History – A Disputed Relationship: Some Reflections on Qurʾanic History and History in the Qurʾan,” Journal of Qurʾanic Studies 5 (2003): 1-18. Also see Angelika Neuwirth, “Structure and the Emergence of Community,” in Andrew Rippin (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to the Qurʾan (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 140-58.

2 Gabriel S. Reynolds, The Qurʾān and Its Biblical Subtext, (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2011), 17-19.

3 Reynolds, The Qurʾān and Its Biblical Subtext, 36.4 John Wansbrough, Qurʾanic Studies: Sources and Methods of Scriptural Interpretation

(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2004).

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as al-Ṭabari (d. 923), al-Rāzī (d. 1209), and Ibn Kathīr (d. 1373), among many others, gave various possible meanings and background stories for many parts of the Qurʾan, suggesting that these narratives were more opinions than solid facts of the actual meaning of any specific Qurʾanic passages.

The field of Qurʾanic studies has seen various theories on the authorship of the Qurʾan. Some scholars attempt to make historical assumptions about possible Jewish or Christian influences on the authorship of the Qurʾan, while neglecting the literary analysis of the Qurʾanic discourse in its attempt to interpret the Bible. Undoubtedly, Abraham Geiger (d. 1874) revolutionized Islamic studies by showing how Muḥammad, who according to Geiger was a pious religious man, borrowed much from Judaism to shape the community of his believers.5 This not only started a new movement in the field of Islamic Studies, but also a movement that viewed Muḥammad’s borrowing from other sources. William St. Clair Tisdall (d. 1928) considered pagan myths as possible sources for Muḥammad, who, he believed, borrowed their stories.6 Charles Torrey, in The Jewish Foundation of Islam, tried to highlight the borrowings that Muḥammad had made from the Jews.7 These are but a few examples of the borrowing movement. However, the Qurʾan is not a mere borrowing from other sources that was etched together to make a book that becomes a cen-tral point of the making of a nation; instead the Qurʾan’s authorship seems far more sophisticated than a simple borrowings as the text appears to be fully engaging with the religions and faiths that surrounded it. In many ways, the Qurʾan is actually attempting to interpret the Bible, as it so declares itself when it states, “Verily this Qurʾan does explain to the Children of Israel most of the matters in which they disagree” (Qurʾan 27:76). The Qurʾan is thus part of the reception to the Bible, demonstrated by the fact that this verse makes a direct claim that the book is fully engaging with the faith that is surrounding it, i.e. Christianity.

2 Imitating (Taqlīd) Ijtihād

I will suggest that although the Qurʾanic Sciences have been studied for many centuries, a different approach to Qurʾanic exegesis is necessary, although I am

5 Abraham Geiger, Judaism and Islam: A Prize Essay (London: Forgotten Books, 2012).6 William Tisdall, The Original Sources of the Qurʾan: Its Origin in Pagan Legends and Mythology

(Alev Books, 2014).7 Charles C. Torrey, The Jewish Foundation of Islam (New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1967).

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not at all suggesting that the current methods currently utilized by Qurʾanic Sciences are incorrect.

The Qurʾan has been studied in detail from the beginnings of Islam until the modern day. There are various perspectives in the study of the Qurʾan, which have been developed through the lenses of multiple traditions. A whole array of studies, known as Qurʾanic Sciences, has been developed and employed throughout the history of Islam in an attempt to provide a system-atic methodology of interpretation. Early Christian polemicists often argued that there were Jewish or Christian sources to the Qurʾan.8 Orientalists have studied the Qurʾan in an attempt to gain a scholarly understanding of its ori-gins from and roots in Judeo-Christian traditions. Within Qurʾanic Sciences developed by early scholars, there developed a systematic set of methodolo-gies for understanding the Qurʾan through a process known as ijtihād, which is an umbrella term that encompasses Islamic Studies more widely, and not only Qurʾanic Sciences.9

According to traditional Islamic Studies, a scholar (mujtahid) needs to be qualified to perform Qurʾanic interpretation and to extract rulings from it. A mujtahid needs to be competent in understanding the Arabic vocabu-lary, terminology, literature, and philology in order to distinguish the differ-ent morphologies of the same word (al-ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir), circumstances of Qurʾanic revelation (asbāb al-nuzūl), abrogating (nāsikh) and abrogated (mansūkh) verses, general (ʿām) and specific (khāṣ) verses, comprehensive (mujmal) and explicit (mubayyan) verses, along with clear (muḥkam) and vague (mutashābih) verses. Besides the Qurʾanic Sciences, an exegete also needs to possess sufficient knowledge of prophetic tradition or the sciences of ḥadīth (ʿilm al-ḥadīth), including understanding the chains of narration (isnād) and content (matn). A mujtahid also needs to have adequate knowl-edge of various sources based on consensus (ijmāʿ), particularization (takhṣīṣ), and restriction (taqyīd) of legal rulings, and proper methods of extracting rul-ings from the evidence (takhrīj). It should be obvious that becoming a mujta-hid is not an easy endeavor, and perhaps that is the reason it is called a struggle (ijtihād). Even in Twelver Shiʿi Uṣūlī thought, to be a mujtahid a person must

8 Such as the Apology of al-Kindī. The work shows two pseudonymous individuals, ʿAbdul-Masīḥ ibn Isḥāq al-Kindī, a Christian polemic exchanging letters with ʿAbdullah ibn Ismaʿīl al-Hāshimī. Al-Hāshimī invites al-Kindī to become a Muslim, while the latter invites the for-mer to become a Christian.

9 Ijtihād is the endeavor of a Muslim scholar to derive rules, theology, exegesis, etc.

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possess knowledge of Qurʾan, ḥadīth, Arabic language and grammar, logic, the-ology, and rational reasoning.10

In this paper, I attempt to construct a different perspective of Qurʾanic exe-gesis. I argue that although the majority of Muslim scholars, past and present, favour ijtihād over imitation (taqlīd), there is unfortunately a paradox that is created. If to perform ijtihād one needs to adhere to certain rules that were developed by previous scholars, then are we actually performing ijtihad, or are we merely imitating the method of ijtihād (taqlīd al-ijtihād)? This argument is the premise for introducing different methodologies for Qurʾanic interpreta-tion, while not necessarily refuting the current established methods.

I argue that although the methods of Qurʾanic exegesis seem to be com-prehensive and exhaustive, they are not necessarily Qurʾanic. By this, I mean that the Qurʾan does not necessarily state that there are certain qualifications required for people to understand it. It does, on the other hand, relate that God teaches the Qurʾan (e.g. Qurʾan 55:2) and that the Arabic language is cen-tral to the Qurʾan (e.g. Qurʾan 12:2, 13:37, 16:103, 20:113, 26:195, 39:28, 41:3, 41:44, 42:7, 43:3, 46:12). Linguistics, philology, and semantics are the major points that seem to be sanctioned by the Qurʾan itself as keys to its own understanding. As such, I emphasize understanding semantics and the nature of polysemy in the Arabic language to further interpret the Qurʾan, without necessarily resorting to other methods of exegesis, such as the circumstances of revelation (asbāb al-nuzūl) or exegesis based on the reports of early companions or later indi-viduals, known as tafsīr bi-l-ma ʾthūr. I am in no way suggesting, however, that other methods of Qurʾanic exegesis are unfounded, as if one needs to study Islamic history, then a historical understanding of the Qurʾan, such as the cir-cumstances of revelation (asbāb al-nuzūl), internal chronology, and transmis-sion history would be imperative.

2.1 The Case against ImitationMy argument is based on the notion of imitating ijtihād (taqlīd al-ijtihād). Interpretation comes in various forms, and there are many challenges when try-ing to interpret the Qurʾan or understand the reasons that rituals or laws of the Sharīʿa are prescribed as they are. Much of jurisprudence and interpretation, whether in religious or even secular contexts, is based on imitation (taqlīd), which in secular jurisprudence may be considered the role of precedent in legal

10 Al-Samāhijī (d. 1723), Munyat al-Mumārisīn, cited in Andrew J. Newman, “The Nature of the Akhbārī Uṣūlī Dispute in Late Ṣafavid Iran. Part 1: ʿAbdallah al-Samāhijī’s ‘Munyat al-Mumārisīn’,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 55 (1992), 27 and 33.

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decisions.11 One of the arguments in favor of imitation is the prophetic tradi-tion (ḥadīth) on the ritualistic method of prayers, in which, when asked how to pray, Muḥammad told his companions, “Pray as you have seen me praying.”12 The basis of following the footsteps of Muḥammad’s sunna (tradition) is imita-tion. However, I interpret this prophetic tradition differently, and do not regard it as the basis of imitation. On the contrary, because it appears Muḥammad did not want people to adhere to a specific set of rituals, he left the method of prayer open. If the methodology of the prayer rituals were very important, Muḥammad would have outlined how it is supposed to be done when he was asked. Since he kept it open, this implies that Muḥammad meant the intention of prayer is more important than the actual set of rituals. This is similar to how, when Muḥammad was asked about the rituals of the Ḥajj, he was very open about it and allowed variations, where people were not instructed to strictly follow the method of rituals.13 Nonetheless, early Muslims attempted to pro-tect themselves from religious innovation (bidʿa), which is frowned upon. Ibn Waḍḍāḥ (d. 900) was one of the early Muslim scholars who wrote a book against innovations in favor of following prophetic tradition and precedence based on the traditions of those who followed Muḥammad.14 Islamic scholars and jurists have subsequently used the method of precedence or imitation as a means of protecting Islam against innovation.15

Nonetheless, this has to be taken in the full context of Islam. Islam started its mission against Arab idolaters, who believed and did what they did because they were imitating their forefathers. Their system was also based on prece-dence. This shown many times in the Qurʾan, to not only highlight the men-tality of the pre-Islamic Arabs, but also all the people to whom God had sent messengers (e.g. Qurʾan 2:170, 5:104, 21:53, 26:74, 43:22-23). Such an argument

11 For more on the role of precedent in secular law, see D.N. MacCormick and R.S. Summers (eds.). Interpreting Precedents: A Comparative Study (Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth Publishing Co, 1997). See also R. Lupu, “Sources of Law – Judicial Precedent,” Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice 5 (2013): 375-81 and J.J. Eisenhower, “Four Theories of Precedent and Its Role in Judicial Decisions,” Temple Law Review 61 (1988): 871-78.

12 Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, ed. Muḥammad al-Nāṣir (Riyadh: Dār Ṭawq al-Najāh, 2002), 1: 128 (#631).13 Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, 2: 173 (#1721), 2: 173 (#1722), 2: 173 (#1723), 2: 175 (#1734), 2: 175 (#1735), 8:

135 (#6666).14 Ibn Waḍḍāḥ (d. 900), al-Bidaʿ wa-l-nahy ʿanha, ed. ʿAmro ʿAbdul-Munʿim Salim (Cairo:

Maktabat Ibn Taymiyyah, 1996).15 Ṭ.J. al-ʿAlwānī, “Taqlid and the Stagnation of the Muslim Mind,” The American Journal of

Islamic Social Sciences 8 (1991): 513-24.

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against imitation is also used by Manṣūr al-Bahūti (d. 1641), where he states that at some points the Qurʾan forbids imitation.16

Al-Bāqillāni (d. 1013) argues that the imitation of one scholar by another is not allowed.17 He gives as an example the case of the first two caliphs, Abu Bakr and ʿUmar; neither imitated the other, but both resorted to ijtihād.18 However, it seems evident from the opinions of early scholars that among this group ijtihād is important, while the general masses are to imitate those scholars. Ibn Ḥazm (d. 1064) cites al-Shāfiʿī’s (d. 820) opposition to imitation, considering it forbidden by early scholars of Islam. Al-Baghdādī (d. 1071) does not permit taqlīd in the sources (uṣūl), but allows it in the branches ( furūʿ), as he says that it is not reasonable for a person to be fully knowledgeable in the branches of religion ( furūʿ al-dīn).19 The general consensus of both Sunni and Shiʿi jurists is that a layperson who is imitating (muqallid) a jurist must be knowledgeable in the fundamentals of belief (uṣūl al-dīn).20 Imām al-Ḥaramayn, al-Juwayni (d. 1085), defined the imitator as someone who simply imitates without hav-ing knowledge of the evidence behind it. Such type of imitation is, he states, not permissible.21 He also reports that taqlīd in branches of religion ( furūʿ al-dīn) depends on whether or not the scholar is imitating someone who is more knowledgeable than he himself is,22 and reports that al-Shāfiʿī did not allow one scholar to imitate (taqlīd) another.23 Abu al-Muẓaffar al-Samʿānī (d. 1096) also agrees with al-Juwayni’s understanding of the impermissibility of imitation.24

Moving along the same lines of Imām al-Shāfiʿī and prominent Shāfiʿī schol-ars, al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) also did not permit one scholar to imitate another.25

16 Manṣūr al-Bahūti (d. 1641) Kashshāf al-qināʿ ʿan matn al-iqnāʿ, ed. M.A. al-Ḍinnāwī, (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyyah, n.d.), 6: 306-7.

17 Al-Bāqillāni (d. 1013), Tamhīd al-awāʾil fī Takhlīṣ al-Dalāʾil, ed. I.A. Ḥaydar, (Beirut: Muʾassassat al-kutub al-thaqāfiyya, 1987), 515-6.

18 Ibid.19 Al-Baghdādī (d. 1071), Al-Faqīh wa-l-mutafaqqih, ed. A. al-Gharāzī, (Dammam: Dār Ibn

al-Jawzī lil-nashr wa-l-tawzīʿ, 2001), 2: 131.20 L. Clarke, “The Shīʿī Construction of Taqlīd,” Journal of Islamic Studies 12 (2001), 40-64.21 Al-Juwayni (d. 1085), al-Ijtihād – from Kitāb al-talkhīṣ, ed. A. Abu Zanīd (Damascus: Dār

al-qalam, 1988), 95-105. Also see the main book, al-Juwayni, Kitāb al-talkhīṣ fī uṣūl al-fiqh, ed. A.J. al-Nibāli and B.A. al-ʿAmri (Beirut: Dār al-bashāʾir al-Islāmiyyah), 3: 424-56.

22 Ibid., 105-21.23 Ibid., 10824 Abu al-Muẓaffar al-Samʿāni (d. 1096), Qawāṭiʿ al-adillah fi-l-uṣūl, ed. M.H. al-Shafiʿi (Beirut:

Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyyah, 1999), 2: 340-5.25 Al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), al-Mustaṣfa (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyyah, 1993), 368-72.

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He allows imitation for the general public, as long as the things imitated are dependent on the verifiable evidence of a scholar (mujtahid), an approach similar to al-Juwayni’s.26 According to al-Ghazālī, any member of the general population who does not have the knowledge to perform ijtihād is permitted to imitate a scholar, as long as the matter being imitated (tuqallad) includes evi-dence and argument based on the opinions of Imām al-Shāfiʿī and his school’s scholars.27 Many scholars have argued such a\\gainst imitation in Islamic jurisprudence. Al-Ghazālī had the concept of not believing in something just because of what others do or say, which is known as imitation, in favor of a logical rationale known as ʿaql.28 He even specifically argues against the imita-tion of parents and teachers in his al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl.29 In al-Mankhūl, al-Ghazālī states that knowledge from narrations (samʿiyyāt) is the final kind of knowledge, and equated it with imitation.30

Al-Rāzī agrees with al-Juwayni’s arguments against imitation (taqlīd).31 Ibn Qudāma al-Maqdisi (d. 1223), in his refutation of philosophers, stated that the general public is not expected to perform ijtihād, but is instead expected to imi-tate the scholars.32 In one of his arguments, he suggests that imitation (taqlīd) is sanctioned by the Qurʾan: “. . . ask the people of the remembrance, if you know not” (Qurʾan 16:43, 21:7).33 This Qurʾanic passage is prominent among traditional and contemporary scholars who also argue the same.34 However, there is a paradox while using this verse to affirm imitation (taqlīd) of scholars. In its context, this verse is describing the people of remembrance (ahl al-dhikr)

26 Ibid., 372-3.27 ʿAbdul-Salām ibn Taymiyya (d. 1254) (first author), ʿAbdul-Ḥalīm ibn Taymiyya (d. 1283)

(added to it), and Ahmad ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) (completed it), al-Muswaddah fī uṣūl al-fiqh, ed. M.M. Abdul-Ḥamīd (Beirut: Dār al-kitāb al-ʿarabi), 458-60.

28 Q. Maḥmūd, Madhhab al-Ghazālī fi-l-ʿaql wa-l-Taqlīd: Muḥāḍarah ʿāmma (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat Mkhaymer, 1967).

29 Al-Ghazālī, al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl wa-l-mūṣil ila dhil-ʿizzati wa-l-jalāl, ed. A. Maḥmūd, (Cairo: Dār al-kutub al-ḥadīthah, n.d.), 110.

30 Al-Ghazālī, al-mankhūl min taʿlīqāt al-uṣūl, ed. M.Ḥ. Hītu (Beirut: Dār al-fikr al-muʿāṣir, 1998), 105.

31 Al-Rāzī (d. 1209), al-Maḥṣūl, ed. Ṭ. al-ʿAlwāni (Damascus: Muʾassassat al-risala, 1997), 6: 84.32 Ibn Qudāma al-Maqdisī (d. 1223), Taḥrīm al-naẓar fī kutub al-kalām, ed. ʿAbdulrahmān

Dimashqiyya (Riyadh: ʿĀlim al-kitāb, 1990), 49.33 Ibid. See also Ibn Qudāmh al-Maqdisī, Rawḍat al-nāẓir wa jannat al-munāẓir fī uṣūl al-fiqh

ʿala madhhab al-Imām Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (Beirut: Muʾassassat al-rayyān lil-ṭibāʿah wa-l-nashr wa-l-tawzīʿ, 2002), 2: 383.

34 Al-Rāzī (d. 1209) discusses the use of this verse by those debating the permissibility of a scholar imitating another scholar; see al-Rāzī. Mafātīḥ al-ghayb (Beirut: Dār iḥyāʾ al-turāth al-ʿarabī, 2000) (Qurʾān 16:43), 20: 210.

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as a reference to the People of the Book.35 I doubt that Muslim scholars would therefore infer from this verse that they are to imitate (taqlīd) the People of the Book, although the context refers to them. If the apparent interpretation of this verse does not suggest the imitation of anyone, I wonder why it continues to be used to suggest Muslim scholars should be imitated.

A movement against imitation is not a contemporary issue within Islam. In the past, conservative Islamic scholars, such as Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) and Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 1350), argued against imitation, considering it to be unau-thorized and harmful.36 Like Ibn Ḥazm and al-Ghazālī, Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭi (d. 1505) also cites al-Shāfiʿī’s stance against imitation.

Although Muḥammad ibn ʿAbdulwahhāb (d. 1792), founder of the Salafi movement, preferred ijtihād to imitation, he still allowed those who cannot otherwise perform ijtihād themselves to resort to imitation, as long as there is a mujtahid available.37 He is, nonetheless, adamant that imitation is not at all pref-erable, and not permissible for those who can do ijtihād. However, from a Salafi

35 Al-Ṭabari (d. 923), Jāmiʿ al-bayān fī ta ʾwīl al-Qurʾān, ed. Aḥmad Shākir (Damascus: Muʾassassat al-risāla, 2000), (Qurʾān 16:43), 17: 206-7; al-Zamakhshari (d. 1144), al-Kashshāf ʿan ḥaqāʾiq ghawāmiḍ al-tanzīl (Beirut: Dār al-kitāb al-ʿarabi, 1987), 2: 607-8; al-Qurṭubi (d. 1273), al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān (Cairo: Dār al-kutub al-miṣriyya, 1964), 10: 108. Ibn Kathīr (d. 1373) suggests the possibility that al-dhikr could be interpreted as People of the Book, as suggest by Ibn ʿAbbās (d. 687), or interpreted as people of the Qurʾan. It must be noted that Ibn Kathīr is somewhat biased against using Israelite traditions (isrāʾīliyyāt) in his exegetical works, and perhaps as such attempts to reduce the importance of under-standing this verse as a reference to the People of the Book; see Ibn Kathir, Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿaẓīm, ed. M.H. Shams-ul-Dīn (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 1999), 4: 492. Ibn Kathīr also implies that Abu Ja ʾfar (Imām al-Bāqir, the fifth Imam of Shiʿi Islam) suggested that the household of the Prophet (ahl al-Bayt) are the ahl al-dhikr. This is also related by the Shiʿi Qurʾanic exegete al-Ṭabarsi (d. 1153), in Majmaʿ al-bayān li-ʿulūm al-Qurʾān (Beirut: Muʾassassat al-aʿlami lil-maṭbūʿāt, 1995), 6: 158-9. Another Shiʿi discussion in which ahl al-dhikr is taken to be a reference to ahl al-Bayt, as claimed by Imām al-Bāqir, is found in Nāṣir Makārim al-Shīrāzī, al-Amthal fī tafsīr kitāb Allāh al-munazzal (Madrasat al-Imām Amīr al-Muʾminīn), 8: 199-201.

36 S.W. Akhtar, “The Islamic Concept of Knowledge,” al-Tawhid 12/3 (1991), (online: http://www.al-islam.org/printpdf/book/export/html/22999, accessed 24 Sept. 2015).

37 Muḥammad ibn ʿAbdulwahhāb (d. 1792), Uṣūl al-Īmān, ed. B. al-Jawābreh (Riyadh: Ministry of Islamic Affairs, 2000), 139. He states that ijtihād is a conditional obligation ( farḍ kifāyah); as long some are doing ijtihād then the remaining public, who cannot learn and verify for themselves, do not need to. This concept is also similar to that stated by Abu al-Ḥasan al-Māwardi (d. 1058) in his commentary to Imām al-Shāfiʿī in al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr fī fiqh madhhab al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī, ed. A.M. Muʿawwaḍ and A.A. ʿAbdul-Mawjūd (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 1999), 1: 20.

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point of view, there is greater tendency to limit the scholarly process (ijtihād) and reason (ʿaql) in favor of adherence to the text and transmitted tradition (naql) or, in other words, imitation.38 Although Ibn Taymiyya and Muḥammad ibn ʿAbdulwahhāb both favored ijtihād over taqlīd, in Salafi ideology the doors of ijtihād remain open only to jurists who meet demanding requirements.39 Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ al-ʿUthaymīn (d. 2001),40 a prominent recent Saudi scholar, conceptualized the qualifications he believed a scholar must possess. In his idea, the qualifications for a mujtahid must include Qurʾanic sciences (ʿulūm al-Qurʾan) and knowledge of prophetic tradition or ʿilm al-ḥadīth. Al-Atawneh argues that this qualification in today’s Salafi’s ideology differs from that por-trayed by Ibn Taymiyya, who encouraged ijtihād of the laymen.41 Al-Shawkāni (d. 1834), a strong opponent of imitation, also narrates earlier scholars’ stance on imitation, showing that the majority have preferred ijtihād.42

During the reformation period of Islamic thought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there was a resurgence of many Islamic scholars calling for the abandonment of imitation. This ideology was heavily influenced by Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī’s (d. 1897) reformation.43 Abu Zayd gives examples of the reformation process that took place during that period,44 stating that the ideology of Muḥammad ʿAbduh (d. 1905), who was himself a student of al-Afghānī, inspired the publication of the journal al-Manār, along with other reformist journals, such as al-Imām and al-Munīr, which emphasized the need to reinterpret the Qurʾan and sunna and purify it from the taint of imitation.45

38 M. al-Atawneh, “Wahhābī Legal Theory as Reflected in Modern Official Saudi Fatwās: Ijtihād, Taqlīd, Sources, and Methodologies,” Islamic Law and Society 18 (2011): 327-55.

39 W. Hallaq, “Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?” International Journal of Middle East Studies 16 (1984): 3-41.

40 Muḥammad S. al-ʿUthaymīn, al-Uṣūl min ʿilm al-uṣūl. (Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Islāmiyya, 2001), 97-104.

41 Al-Atawneh, “Wahhābī Legal Theory”.42 Al-Shawkāni (d. 1834), Irshād al-fuḥūl ila taḥqīq al-ḥaqq min ʿilm al-uṣūl, ed. A. ʿInāyah

(Beirut: Dār al-kitāb al-ʿarabi, 1999), 2: 243-6; al-Shawkāni, al-Qawl al-mufīd fī adillat al-ijtihād wa-l-taqlīd, ed. A. ʿAbdul-Khāliq (Kuwait: Dār al-Qalam, 1976); al-Shawkāni, Al-sayl al-jirār al-mutadaffiq ʿala hadāʾiq al-azhār (Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, n.d.).

43 C.J. Christie, Ideology and Revolution in Southeast Asia 1900-75 (Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001), 11-12.

44 Naṣr Abu Zayd. Reformation of Islamic Thought: A Critical Historical Analysis. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 41-2.

45 A. Al-ʿAjlān. Ḥarakat al-tajdīd wa-l-iṣlāḥ fī Najd fi-l-ʿaṣr al-ḥadīth (Riyadh: unknown pub-lisher, 1989), 173.

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In the early stages of Shīʿī jurisprudence, there was significant emphasis placed on imitation over ijtihād for the simple reason that the Imāms were interpreting Islamic law for the laypeople, and there were no notions of muj-tahids, as the Imāms are considered infallible and the source of all jurispru-dence. However, for Twelver Shīʿī jurisprudence, this had to be changed during the occultation period of the Twelfth Imām, as there was no source of jurispru-dence to make recourse to beyond the jurists (ʿulamāʾ). As such, Twelver Shīʿī jurisprudence had to evolve in the same way that Sunnī jurisprudence did after the death of Muḥammad. In nineteenth century Iran, the Shīʿī community witnessed the transformation of an institution known as marjaʿiyyat al-taqlīd, where the mujtahid is considered the deputy of the Imām, and the laypeople would imitate them.46 Although taqlīd existed early in Shīʿī jurisprudence, in that people were imitating Muḥammad or the Imāms, it became further sys-tematically institutionalized in nineteenth century Iran as laypeople became imitators (muqallidīn) of jurists.

Although Uṣūlī Twelver Shīʿī jurisprudence emphasizes the use of logical rationale (ʿaql) and encourages ijtihād over imitation, it still is common to per-mit the imitation of scholars (mujtahidīn) in the various branches of religion. In Twelver Shīʿī Uṣūlī principles, a jurist who is socially renowned by his peers and allowed to have followers becomes what is known as a source of jurispru-dence (marjiʿ) and his followers would imitate (taqlīd) that form of it.

Akhbārī Twelver Shīʿī jurisprudence, on the other hand, as promulgated by Muḥammad Amīn al-Astarābādī (d. 1627), denounces ijtihād. To Akhbārīs, the gates of ijtihad were closed by the occultation of the Twelfth Imām. They purely use the Qurʾan and ḥadīth for jurisprudence, and avoid all kinds of ratio-nalistic reasoning. This idea is taken so far that even the Qurʾan is not always considered a source of jurisprudence unless passages from it were interpreted by the Imāms, as Akhbārīs only consider the Imāms to have the authority to interpret the Qurʾan.47 As Uṣūlīs divide people between mujtahid and muqallid (imitator), Akhbārīs consider everyone a muqallid of the Imāms and so no one may claim to be a mujtahid or the deputy of the Imām.48 To Akhbārīs, a mujta-hid follows conjecture, which may certainly be fallible, while a muqallid of the

46 For more information on the history of the institution of marjaʿiyyat al-taqlīd and wilāyat al-faqīh see A.K. Moussavi, “The Establishment of the Position of Marjaʿiyyat-i Taqlid in the Twelver-Shiʿi Community,” Iranian Studies 18 (1985), 35-51.

47 Al-Samāhijī, Munyat al-mumārisīn, cited in Newman, “The Nature of the Akhbārī Uṣūlī Dispute”, 25 and 29.

48 Ibid., 26.

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Imāms would find a more assured ruling that does not follow any conjecture.49 Although there might be similarities between Akhbārīs and Salafism, they do differ on the issue of ijtihād, as Salafis do not denounce it, as has been shown. Nonetheless, even in Uṣūlī jurisprudence, where a greater weight is laid on rational reasoning (ʿaql), the concept of taqlīd of the mujtahids by laypeople is emphasized.

Reda makes various arguments in favor of imitation, as it allows for more consistency in society.50 He states that the role of jurists is important, espe-cially in interpreting scriptures. He then argues that everyone needs to be a jurist (mujtahid), but since this is not realistic, the jurists are doing the job of an unwilling majority in society, who would prefer to imitate those who they believe are more specialized in jurisprudence. Although jurists are fallible, fol-lowers would still find that the likelihood of jurists’ errors is far less than the likelihood of their own potential errors. Therefore, it is more probable that they will be right if they simply imitate a jurist (marjiʿ). Interestingly, Reda looks at it from an economic point of view, wherein there are many jurists engaged in a popularity contest in order to collect tithes, known as sahm al-imām or khums, from their followers. This raises the question of whether they are providing the best religious interpretation or they are interpreting to appease the majority in order to gain more followers, and therefore, more popularity and tithe collec-tions? This is a case that Floor has reported in the practice of jurists during the Persian Qajar era.51

Khomeini (d. 1989) wrote at length on the topic of ijtihād, where he goes into detail of when imitation taqlīd is permissible and when it is not, as well as including his opinions on the qualifications required by a scholar.52 It is appar-ent from both Sunnī and Shīʿī discourses on the matter that the preference is always on ijtihād over taqlīd, or interpretation over imitation, while a scholar is not himself allowed to be an imitator.53 Also, in both schools of jurisprudence, although ijtihād is preferred, it is not without specific qualifications.

49 Ibid., 25.50 A. Reda, “The Economics of Religious Interpretation: The System of Taqlid,” Canadian

Social Science 7 (2001): 30-47.51 W. Floor, “The Economic Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period,” in The Most Learned of

the Shiʿa: the Institution of the Marjaʿ Taqlid, ed. Linda S. Walbridge (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

52 Khomeini (d. 1989). Al-ijtihād wa-l-taqlīd, (Maṭbaʿat muʾassassat al-ʿurūj, 1998). For more Shīʿī discourses on the matter, see M.S. al-Ḥakīm al-Ṭabṭabāʾī, Miṣbāḥ al-Minhāj (Qom: al-Maṭbaʿa jawīd, 1994).

53 Many Sunnī sources had been referenced earlier. For some Shīʿī sources beyond those already mentioned, see al-Ḥillī (d. 1325), Taḥrīr al-aḥkām al-sharʿiyya ʿala madhhab

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Imitation is also a standard that many jurists use as a criterion for the law and its interpretation.54 Although using an unconventional method, al-ʿAlwani has firmly campaigned against the method of imitation in Islam in an attempt to show that although it was initially used to protect Islam from innovation (bidʿa), its method and technique is arguably in itself an innovation (bidʿa).55

In al-Ṭabari’s commentary on the Qurʾan for the verse, “And they have taken their teachers of the law and priests as their lords . . .” (Qurʾan 9:31), he pres-ents a case in which Muḥammad argues with a Christian convert to Islam, ʿAdī ibn Ḥātim, about what it means to say that the Jews and Christians wor-ship their teachers of the law and their priests. ʿAdī argues the following with Muḥammad.

“Oh Messenger of Allah, we do not actually worship them.” The Prophet replied, “Do they not make things unlawful what Allah had made lawful, and you obey them and do they not make things lawful that Allah had made unlawful and you obey them?” He said, “Yes.” So the Prophet responded, “This is worshipping them.”56

From the above prophetic tradition (ḥadīth), it seems that Muḥammad is neg-atively describing jurists or teachers of the law and the people who follow their way. Followers of teachers of the law and priests may be presented today in the Islamic context as those who follow jurists, muftīs, or marājiʿ, in which all such cases are shown to be followers in the same manner as they were within Judaism or Christianity, as they followed their rabbis or priests. Therefore, the spirit of this verse may apply as much to Muslims and their acceptance of some scholars’ verdicts as it does to the other religious traditions that this verse criticizes, although this cannot be generalized, as the Qurʾan also some-times attempts to not generalize its arguments against the Jews and Christians (e.g. Qurʾan 3:113-5).

In recent years, there have been several Muslim scholars who have attempted to reform Islamic thought by scrutinizing the Islamic method of interpretation

al-imāmiyya, ed. I. al-Bahādri (Qom: Iʿtimād, 2000), 1: 188; al-ʿĀmlī (d. 1811), Miftāḥ al-karāma, ed. M.B. al-Khāliṣī (Qom: Muʾassassat al-nashr al-islāmī, 1999), 5: 368-83; and al-Muẓaffar, ʿAqāʾid al-imāmiyya (Qom: Markaz al-abḥāth al-ʿaqāʾidiyyah), 14-19.

54 M. Fletcher, “Ibn Tūmart’s Teachers: The Relationship with al-Ghazālī,” al-Qantara 18 (1997), 305-30.

55 T.J. al-ʿAlwani, “Taqlid and the Stagnation of the Muslim Mind,” The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 8 (1991), 513-24.

56 Al-Ṭabari, Jāmiʿ, (Qurʾan 9:31) (my translation), 14: 209-11.

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and jurisprudence based on imitation. An example of that is Fazlur Rahman (d. 1988), a Pakistani-American Muslim scholar, whom Saeed has cited as hav-ing criticized the interpretation of the Qurʾan, especially from a theological perspective.57 Fazlur Rahman has adamantly opposed the principles of taqlīd in Islamic thought, advocating that the gates of ijtihād should remain open.58

Early scholars and jurists, both Sunnī and Shīʿī, have emphasized the roles of reason (ʿaql) and scholarship (ijtihād) over imitation (taqlīd). But we remain at the crossroads of what ijtihād is and how it can be produced. Does it depend on methodologies set by previous scholars? If so, is it considered ijtihād or taqlīd?

2.2 The “Imitation of Ijtihād” ParadoxA paradox exists in Muslim thought on the methods of ijtihād and taqlīd. Although Muslim scholars, both Sunnī and Shīʿī, predominantly value ijtihād and ʿaql over taqlīd, there is one major problem. The methodology of ijtihād is restricted to certain criteria that were built on the works of earlier scholars. In other words, there exists today what would be called imitation of ijtihād, meaning that people are imitating the methodology put forth for ijtihād by ear-lier scholars. The purpose becomes somewhat self-defeating in this paradoxi-cal loop. For example, al-Ṭabari produced an excellent work on the exegesis of the Qurʾan. As part of his method of exegesis, he used the method of circum-stances of or reasons for revelation (asbāb al-nuzūl), which today is consid-ered a major part of Qurʾanic exegesis. Nonetheless, al-Ṭabari was a historian who also wrote a comprehensive book called the History of Prophets and Kings (Taʾrīkh al-rusul wal-mulūk), also known as the History According to al-Ṭabari (Taʾrīkh al-Ṭabari). Since he was an expert in history, it was natural for him, in his commentary on the Qurʾan, to use a historical methodology for its inter-pretation, i.e. identifying the circumstances of revelation (asbāb al-nuzūl). However, this method of interpretation cannot be seen as absolutely necessary for a scholar to understand and interpret the Qurʾan. Otherwise, someone who engages in it cannot be called a mujtahid, but merely an imitator (muqallid) of the method of ijtihād.

57 A. Fazlur Rahman Saeed, “A Framework for Interpreting the Ethico-legal Content of the Qurʾan,” in Modern Muslim Intellectuals and the Qurʾan, ed. Suha Taji-Farouki (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 37-66.

58 Fazlur Rahman. Islamic Methodology in History (Karachi: Central Institute of Islamic Research, 1965), 149.

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3 Interpretation according to the Qurʾan

In order to perform some sort of “ijtihād,” it is important to understand what methods of exegesis have been qualified by scholars and what methods are actually sanctioned by the Qurʾan itself. I argue in this paper that the Qurʾan only sanctions two methods of Qurʾanic exegesis. The first is that God is the one who teaches the meanings of the Qurʾan; the second is a linguistic approach.

For centuries, the Qurʾan was studied to understand its meanings. Many schools of Qurʾanic exegesis have developed throughout history, ranging from literal to symbolic interpretations, from exoteric to esoteric, and from legal-istic to metaphorical.59 However, some of these methods are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, a literal interpretation of the Qurʾan does not necessarily mean that it disregards symbolism. This is because, looking at it from a linguistic perspective, language holds meanings. The words themselves are symbols, from which we derive meaning; they are not themselves the reali-ties. For example, the word “apple” is just a symbol of what an apple actually is. Language is a symbolic form of communication. Therefore, even if a literal interpretation of the words is employed, since words are themselves symbols, they can only be understood symbolically. The Aristotelian understanding of language is defined as “spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words.”60 As such, Aristotle (d. 322 BCE) thus implies an arbitrariness in the relationship between the lin-guistic symbol and the mental image formed by it; in Nature of the Linguistic Sign, Saussure states that a linguistic sign does not truly give a relationship between a thing and its name, but between a concept and its acoustic image.61

Identifying a word (symbol) with a specific meaning is not usually an easy task. In linguistics, a word in isolation usually has no specific meaning unless it is used within a definite context.62 However, in lexical semantics, words are defined independent of their context. The purpose of lexicons and dictionar-ies is to identify all the meanings that a word can be defined by regardless of its

59 For more information on various schools of Qurʾanic exegesis, see Hussein Abdul-Raof, Schools of Qurʾanic Exegesis: Genesis and Development (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2010). See also Hussein Abdul-Raof, Theological Approaches to Qurʾanic Exegesis (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2012).

60 From J. Derrida, “Linguistics and Grammatology,” SubStance 4 (1974): 130.61 S. Weber, “Saussure and the Apparition of Language: The Critical Perspective,” MLN 91

(1976): 919.62 M. Stubbs, Words and Phrases: Corpus Studies of Lexical Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell,

2001), 10.

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context. However, even when having a specific context, this does not imply that a word cannot have multiple meanings within that context. These concepts of understanding how to derive meaning from language and lexical semantics are important when analyzing any piece of literature, including the Qurʾan.

3.1 Qurʾanic ExegesisAs stated earlier, according to some Islamic religious scholars there are certain qualifications that a scholar needs to possess in order to be considered capable of exegesis.63 The qualifications required by scholars, both traditional and con-temporary, may seem intriguingly excessive, and they do not necessarily have a basis in the Qurʾan. According to the Qurʾan, there are two main criteria to understand the Qurʾan, and only one of them is tangible. The first criterion is that it is God who teaches the Qurʾan (e.g. Qurʾan 55:1-2), and this criterion is not necessarily very tangible. The second criterion, that is repeated several times in the Qurʾan, is that it is through a full understanding of its Arabic lan-guage (e.g. Qurʾan 12:2, 13:37, 16:103, 20:113, 26:195, 39:28, 41:3, 41:44, 42:7, 43:3, 46:12); to give just one example, the Qurʾan states “we have sent it down as an Arabic Qurʾan, in order that you may understand” (Qurʾan 12:2).

Many early methods of interpretation are heavily influenced by ḥadīth, whether referring to the sayings of Muḥammad, his companions, or other early individuals whom the author of the commentary deemed to have some knowl-edge of Qurʾanic meanings. Most traditional commentaries of the Qurʾan employ historical accounts of the circumstances of or reasons for revelation (asbāb al-nuzūl) as part of understanding the context of the verses. However, that method restricts the Qurʾan to a historic event. Although traditional commentators of the Qurʾan use history to understand the social and textual context of the Qurʾan, they not consider the Qurʾan as a history book,64 but a religious book with history.65

Al-Ṭabari was an early Qurʾanic exegete who used the circumstances of rev-elation (asbāb al-nuzūl) as a method of Qurʾanic exegesis. Since he himself was a historian, it was natural for him to view the Qurʾan through the lens of his-tory. Some scholars, such as John Wansbrough, have argued that the Qurʾan is

63 Al-ʿUthaymīn, al-Uṣūl min ʿilm al-uṣūl, 97-104.64 Abu Zahrah (d. 1974), Zahrat al-tafāsīr (Cairo: Dār al-fikr al-ʿArabī), 8: 4105-6, 9: 4491, 9:

4877; M.M. al-Ḥijāzi. al-Tafsīr al-wāḍiḥ (Beirut: Dār al-jīl al-jadīd, 1993), 2: 168, 2: 355, 2: 814.65 M.M. al-Shaʿrāwi (d. 1998), al-Khawāṭir: Tafsīr al-shaʿrāwi (Cairo: Maṭābiʿ akhbār al-yawm,

1997), 12: 7688; Ṣ.A. al-Khālidi, al-Qurʾān wa naqḍ maṭāʿin al-ruhbān (Damascus: n.p., 2007), 166; F. al-Rūmi, Ittijāhāt al-tafsīr fi-l-qarn al-rābiʿ ʿqshr (Riyadh: Idārāt al-buḥūth al-ʿilmiyyah wa-l-iftāʾ wa-l-daʿwah wa-l-irshād, 1986), 3: 971.

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not a reliable historic account, but one that which needs to be viewed as a liter-ary discourse.66 He suggests that the circumstances of revelation were mainly used by Muslim jurists to expound on juristic issues. Andrew Rippin attempts to shed light on the usage of the Qurʾanic historical context as defined by traditional scholars, where he argues that one of the fundamental usages of the circumstances of revelation is not necessarily for juristic purposes, but is rather connected to creating a narrative story around the Qurʾanic passages.67 Some early scholars of the Qurʾan, such as Muqātil ibn Sulaymān (d. 767),68 al-Wāḥidi (d. 1076),69 and al-Suyūṭi,70 wrote detailed accounts of the circum-stances of revelation in their Qurʾanic exegesis, and these have provided an understanding of the role of historic and social context in interpreting the Qurʾan. However, anyone trying to extract historical meaning from the Qurʾan would fall into the pitfalls of their own presuppositions. The reception of the Qurʾan in post-Qurʾanic literature would not even provide us with an objective understanding of the Qurʾan. As Rippin states,

A theory of the ʿ history reception’ always presupposes most centrally that any work needs a reader to create meaning and that each reader will extract meaning appropriate to his own time, presuppositions and expectations.71

Traditional methods of Qurʾanic exegesis, known as tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr, was the most common method of interpretation in early and medieval Islam. It usually depended on a related prophetic tradition (ḥadīth) or sayings of the prophet’s companions for an interpretation of the Qurʾan.72 Although traditional

66 Wansbrough. Qurʾanic Studies.67 See Andrew Rippin’s article on John Wansbrough’s Qurʾanic Studies: Sources and Methods

of Scriptural Interpretation. Also see Andrew Rippin, “The Function of Asbāb al-Nuzūl in Qurʾanic Exegesis,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 51 (1988), 1-20.

68 See Muqātil ibn Sulayman (d. 767), Tafsīr Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, ed. A.M. Shaḥāteh (Beirut: Dār iḥyāʾ al-turāth, 2003).

69 See al-Wāḥidi (d. 1076), Asbāb al-nuzūl, ed. ʿI al-Ḥumaydān (Dammam: Dār al-iṣlāḥ, 1992).70 See al-Suyūṭi (d. 1505), al-Itqān fī ʿulūm al-Qurʾan, ed. M.A. Ibrahīm (Cairo: al-Hayʾah

al-miṣriyya al-ʿāmma lil-kitāb, 1974).71 Andrew Rippin, “The Qurʾan as Literature: Perils, Pitfalls and Prospects,” British Society for

Middle Eastern Studies Bulletin, 10 (1983): 44.72 Abdul-Raof, Theological Approaches to Qurʾanic Exegesis, 10-27.

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exegesis is considered mainstream, it still faces certain challenges, as the fol-lowing show:73

1. Although the Ashʿari and Muʿtazili theological schools of thought argued over whether the Qurʾan was created or is eternal, they both agree that, in its entirety, it existed in heaven in the Preserved Tablet (al-lawḥ al-maḥfūẓ) before its piecemeal revelation to Muḥammad.74 If, theologi-cally, that is the case, it brings into question whether the circumstances of revelation are even an integral part of the Qurʾan. However, it can be argued by Muslim theologians that God, in His foreseeing knowledge of the future, already knew the circumstances in which the Qurʾan would be revealed and this is part of the Qurʾan. However, it is equally possible that the circumstances of revelation are not an integral part of the Qurʾan and therefore not absolutely necessary for its interpretation. From an academic point of view, the reliability of the sources, which narrate the circumstances of revelation, must always be brought into question, whether or not this should be taken into account. If, to the early Muslim community, the circumstances of revelation were important, we have no extant evidence that either Muḥammad or his immediate compan-ions requested the community to always remember the circumstances of revelation. The circumstances of revelation apparently later became an integral part of Qurʾanic exegesis. As such, the early Muslim community seemingly did not consider them important in the process of Qurʾanic interpretation.

Therefore, the circumstances of revelation may not be an integral part of Qurʾanic exegesis. It may be used to understand the context, but it should not be taken for granted. The accuracy of the narrations may be brought into question. John Wansbrough and Gabriel Reynolds have sug-gested that the sīra corpus is exegesis in disguise.

73 Part of this list is based on the list published in A. Galadari, “The Role of Intertextual Polysemy in Qurʾanic Exegesis,” International Journal on Quranic Research, 3 (2013): 35-56.

74 See al-Shahrastāni (d. 1153), al-Milal wa-l-niḥal, ed. A.M. Al-Wakīl (Cairo, Egypt: Muʾas-sassat al-Ḥalabī, 1982), 1: 70, 1: 107; the footnotes of Yaḥya ibn Abī al-Khayr al-Shafiʿī (d. 1163), al-Intiṣār fi-l-radd ʿala al-muʿtazila al-qadariyya al-ashrār, ed. S. al-Khalaf (Riyadh: Aḍwāʾ al-salaf, 1999), 1: 160, 2: 544, 2: 571; citation from Muqātil ibn Sulaymān in al-Nawawī (d. 767) Juzʾ fīh dhikr iʿtiqād al-salaf fi-l-hurūf wa-l-aṣwāt, ed. A. al-Dimyāṭī (Cairo: Maktabat al-anṣār lil-nashr wa-l-tawzīʿ), 36; Shams al-Dīn al-Safārīnī al-Ḥanbalī (d. 1774), Lawāmiʿ al-anwār al-bahiyya wa sawāṭiʿ al-asrār al-athariyyah li-sharḥ al-durra al-muḍiyya fī ʿaqd al-firqah al-maraḍiyya (Damascus: Muʾassassat al-khāfiqīn wa makta-batha, 1982), 1: 136, 1: 164, 1: 167-8, and 2: 288.

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2. One of the tenets of Muslim belief regarding the Qurʾan is that it is for all times and places (li-kulli zamān wa makān),75 even though such a tenet has no Qurʾanic basis. If it is for all times, then it cannot be confined within a specific temporal context, and if it is for all places, then it cannot be confined within a specific social context.

Some contemporary Muslim scholars have already responded to this challenge by attempting to interpret the Qurʾan as if it were written for the present-time; one example of such is Muhammad Shahrur. Academically, we may look at what the Prophet Muḥammad intended with the Qurʾan; if Muḥammad intended that the Qurʾan be used by future generations, then perhaps he believed that the historical and social contexts were not important.

3. The Qurʾan may have meanings that are not always obvious. It spe-cifically describes itself as a veiled book (kitābin maknūn) (Qurʾan 56:78) and states that some people do not comprehend it (e.g. Qurʾan 6:25, 17:46, 18:57). Therefore, it cannot be assumed that Muḥammad explained the vague parts of the Qurʾan and any parts unexplained are to be assumed to have clear and direct meanings. If the Qurʾan was clear, then it would not describe itself as veiled. Also, if the Qurʾan was clear, this would imply that no-one would have difficulty in comprehending it. Historically, the main use of prophetic interpretation is for the juridical purposes of the sharīʿa. The prophetic traditions used for Qurʾanic interpretation do not always refer to a specific Qurʾanic verse, but usually expound on the theme of rituals or legal rulings, such as the method of prayer, almsgiving, marriage and divorce, etc.

This challenge is what gave birth to esoteric exegeses of the Qurʾan. The plurality of meanings that can be considered in esoteric exegeses is what in itself gave birth to different esoteric (bāṭini) schools and the vari-ous symbolic meanings found in Sufi exegesis. Orthodox Islam usually views these symbolic and esoteric interpretations with suspicion because they may be based on the presuppositions of the exegete, and so the exe-gete may be influenced by the teachings of his/her school. However, this may be true of any exegete, who, even within orthodoxy, would be influ-enced by the presuppositions of his/her school of thought or theology. Therefore, there needs to be ijtihād in understanding the symbolic mean-ings (tafsīr ishārī) of the Qurʾan that could differ from traditional approaches. There is no doubt that the Qurʾan alludes to the possibility of

75 M. al-Saḥīm, al-Islām uṣūluhu wa-mabādiʾuhu (Riyadh: Ministry of Islamic Affairs, 2001), 136.

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having symbolic meanings and, as such, there needs to be ijtihād on this sort of exegesis. A good example of such exegesis is that of Ibn ʿArabī.

4. On numerous occasions the Qurʾan asks people to ponder its mean-ings. If the interpretation of the Qurʾan was readily available or clear, there would be no reason to contemplate its meanings (e.g. Qurʾan 4:82, 47:24). Since the Qurʾan often states that people should try to understand it using reason,76 it opens the doors to multiple interpretations, some of which may not always be obvious.

As with the preceding point, there needs to be ijtihād on a multiplicity of meanings, which may or may not necessarily be symbolic. However, what is important in this case is that a methodology for contemplating or pondering the Qurʾan is not mentioned, suggesting that there is no need for a situation where certain qualifications and/or criteria need to be met by an exegete. Therefore, any person may perform ijtihād in trying to understand the meanings of the Qurʾan.

5. One very important point is that many of the traditions employed in classical Qurʾanic exegesis is not even prophetic, but related to Muḥammad’s companions or later followers. Interpretation through nar-ratives of tradition assumes the interpreters are knowledgeable on the parts of the Qurʾan that they are explaining. Ibn ʿAbbās, for example, is a widely celebrated companion who interpreted the Qurʾan. However, it must be important to recognize that the interpretation of the prophet’s companions or early successors may still be viewed as their own personal opinions, and should not necessarily carry any specific authoritative weight. As stated in the previous chapter, al-Bāqillāni showed that even the first two Caliphs, Abu Bakr and ʿUmar, disagreed with each other on many occasions.77 As such, it is important to understand that the com-panions never considered the things they said anything more their own personal opinions, which could certainly be fallible. Although some Muslims may claim that the prophet’s companions had firsthand knowl-edge of the Qurʾan from Muḥammad and, therefore, perhaps understood the Qurʾan better than anyone else, such a claim is unfounded. The com-panions still disagreed with each other many times, proving that what-ever opinions they had were just that, opinions. They cannot be taken for granted as “the interpretation” of the Qurʾan, but only their opinion of

76 The Qurʾan uses terms such as taʿqilūn, yafqahūn, yatadabbarūn, among others, many times as a way to ask people to use reason and contemplation in an attempt to under-stand the meanings of Godly signs and/or the Qurʾan.

77 Al-Bāqillāni, Tamhīd al-awāʾil fī takhlīṣ al-dalāʾil, 515-16.

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what they thought the interpretation was. Accordingly, their interpreta-tion is as fallible as that of any other scholar. Here, to provide a contrast, it will be useful to highlight Shīʿī dogma, which states the infallibility of their Imams; however, if this doctrine is accepted, there still exists the problem that the narrators themselves were not infallible, and therefore there could always be some doubt on the correctness of the narrations. Besides, the Muslims doctrine of infallibility of the prophets is not in itself necessarily Qurʾanic. The Qurʾan, as well as prophetic traditions, show that prophets have erred and committed sins.78

If the narrations that come from traditional approaches are problema-tized, then this opens the doors of ijtihād. A good example of this is John Wansbrough’s method of ijtihād, where traditional exegesis of the Qurʾan would not necessarily be taken into account in defining the literary his-tory of the Qurʾan. From this, perhaps it is necessary to consider whether the Qurʾan’s initial audience even were the Arabs of Mecca or Medina, as John Wansbrough has done.

6. The reliability of prophetic tradition is also brought into question.79 James Robson argues that prophetic tradition was not central to the early Muslim community at the time of Muḥammad. He suggests that though the tradition is presented as if it were preserved from early Islam, it actu-ally grew when the Qurʾan gave no or insufficient guidance about the various new issues that arose within the community.80 In this circum-stance, tradition developed to become an authority to the Muslim

78 The Qurʾan shows various example of sins and mistakes done by prophets, including disobedience to God’s commandments, such as the story of Jonah (Qurʾan 21:87). Other examples include the killing of a man by Moses (Qurʾan 28:15), Abraham declaring lords besides God (though some exegetes consider this to be part of Abraham teaching his peo-ple) (Qurʾan 6: 76-8), Abraham lying about not breaking the idols (though some exegetes also consider this to have been for the purpose of teaching his people) (Qurʾan 21:62-7), and in a prophetic tradition, Abraham lying about Sarah calling her his sister instead of wife, similar to the story in the Torah (though Shiʿi tradition would consider this as evi-dence of taqiyya or lying for the purpose of avoiding harm). Nonetheless, even the Qurʾan shows examples of mistakes done by the Prophet, such as his ignoring of a blind man (Qurʾan 80:1) or attempting to trick his wives (Qurʾan 66:1). In my opinion, if the doc-trine of infallibility has any legal standing, then perhaps it needs to be redefined. Possibly, prophets do err and commit sin, but that they are forgiven. In that sense they could be considered “infallible,” not that they never sin or make mistakes.

79 See J. Burton, “Notes towards a Fresh Perspective on the Islamic Sunna,” Bulletin of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies 11 (1984): 3-17.

80 J. Robson, “Tradition: Investigation and Classification,” The Muslim World 41 (1951): 98-112.

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community, something which was, perhaps, not even the intention of the authors who compiled the books on these traditions.81 Robson suggests that the traditions do not portray Muḥammad for what he truly was, but portray how his followers perceived him.82

Like the previous point, when the reliability of tradition and its narra-tions is brought into question, then the reliability of traditional exegesis becomes questionable as well. However, to respond to this challenge does not necessarily mean that we should completely dispense with tradition, as has been done by the Qurʾanists.83 However, the consideration of pro-phetic tradition (ḥadīth) for Qurʾanic interpretation need to be further scrutinized.

The Muslim community, facing challenges to traditional interpretations, has developed several schools of Qurʾanic exegesis beyond the mainstream, con-ventional approach, which have become known as rational approaches, and which include esoteric, linguistic, and scientific approaches.84 Although there are various methods of Qurʾanic interpretation, for the most part it is based on methods developed by scholars in the past, while contemporary scholars typically imitate the framework through which these exegeses are to be made. What this means is that although contemporary scholars may develop a new exegesis, they are still supposed to have the necessary qualifications set out by earlier scholars. As such, modern exegesis of the Qurʾan would continue to be held by the chains of older exegesis. If an exegete continues to require spe-cific qualifications in order to have any sort of exegetical authority, then that exegete may not be considered a scholar, but merely an imitator of the method of ijtihād (taqlīd al-ijtihād).

There needs to be further ijtihād in Qurʾanic interpretation. For example, when the Qurʾan makes allusions to other books, such as the Torah, the Psalms, and the Gospel(s), it will be important to find these allusions and their con-texts within the Bible, and to understand the Biblical sub-text of these allu-sions without taking the traditional interpretation of such verses at face value. For ijtihād in Qurʾanic interpretation to be truly formalize, there needs to be an open mind over the nature of exegesis.

81 J. Robson, “Tradition, the Second Foundation of Islam,” The Muslim World 41 (1951): 22-33.82 J. Robson, “The Material of Tradition I,” The Muslim World 41 (1951): 166-80.83 Quranists are those who hold the Qurʾan to be the only source of Islamic faith and reject

ḥadīth.84 Abdul-Raof. Theological Approaches to Qurʾanic Exegesis, 28-9.

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4 Conclusion

Throughout Islamic history, scholars give higher preference to ijtihād over imi-tation (taqlīd). However, in order for scholars to perform ijtihād, they needed to have certain qualifications and to adopt particular criteria in their method of Qurʾanic exegesis. Neither these criteria nor qualifications are sanctioned by the Qurʾan, and were instead invented by earlier scholars (mujtahidīn). As such, following these qualifications and criteria in performing any kind of Qurʾanic exegesis does not determine whether the scholar is making any form of ijtihād. As such, we are living in a paradox, where in one hand there needs to be ijtihād, but only by imitating the rules and regulations set for ijtihād. As such, we may only conclude that there is no ijtihād, but only taqlīd al-ijtihād. Thus, Western scholars of the Qurʾan may be seen to be more attentive in resorting to ijtihād, rather than simply imitating ijtihād. Hence, Muslim scholars need to also remove themselves from the shackles of inherited knowledge and exegesis and start to look at Qurʾanic exegesis with new eyes and innovative techniques in order to perform ijtihād, instead of simply imitating it.

Documents

The Taqlīd al-Ijtihād Paradox: Challenges to Qurʾanic Hermeneutics