Ignorance In Power:The Rupture of Cold War Détente

Robert Ladov

Modern US History26 February 2014

Ladov

In 1954, after having weighed the benefits and risks of

intelligence through Espionage, President Eisenhower and his staff

ignorantly authorized the U-2 program and disregarded facts that

would have otherwise prevented the destruction of Cold War détente.

Although seemingly in agreement with his staff’s view on the program,

Eisenhower remained skeptical of its security and reliability. As the

Cold War intensified, so did the need for intelligence on the Soviet

Union’s military and weapons capabilities. “Authorization was sought

from the President to go ahead on a program to produce thirty special

high performance aircraft at a cost of about $35 million. The President

approved this action.”1 The 30 high performance aircraft were

manufactured by Lockheed and branded as the U-2 spy plane. After

much debate, President Eisenhower ordered a ground stop on all U-2

flights. “The President’s request, I advised General Twinning that the

president has decided to disprove any additional special flights by the

U-2 unit in the present abnormally tense circumstances.”2 The tense

circumstances that Eisenhower referred to were the deliberations with

Nikita Khrushchev and the impending Paris Summit scheduled for May

of 1960, which if successful, could have ended the Cold War. Despite

his strong feelings towards the security of the overflights and the

interference that they could have with the summit, he made the blind

decision to allow one final mission. “After checking with the President,

I informed Mr. Bissell that one additional operation may be undertaken,

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provided it is carried out prior to May 1. No operation is to be carried

out after May 1.”3 That ill-fated overflight scheduled for May 1st, 1960

would soon alter the course of the Cold War and both governments

involved. President Eisenhower and his administration’s ignorance

towards the planning, running and handling of the U-2 program proved

pivotal in the rupture of Cold War détente between Soviet Russia and

the United States.

Upon its completion, Lockheed considered the U-2 the most

technologically advanced and tactically capable aircraft in known

existence. The aircraft had a maximum service ceiling of 70,000-

80,000 feet and had a range of about 3,000 nautical miles enabling it

to fly long distances over enemy territory at what had been thought to

be a safe and otherwise unreachable altitude.4 The aircraft, outfitted

with the most advanced espionage equipment, housed extremely

accurate and sensitive cameras, which were used to photograph Soviet

missile launch sites, radar networks and other radio technical

equipment.5 The aircraft’s design also played a large role in its

capabilities. The U-2, painted all black, had a flat, non-reflective

bottom, producing very low radar visibility as seen in appendix 1. The

aircraft also underwent a series of weapons and defense testing, which

did not include the aircraft’s ability to dodge Intercontinental Ballistic

Missiles and Surface to Air Missiles. Because of the ignorance of the

president’s staff in thinking that once at altitude, the aircraft would be

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unreachable, no Surface to Air missiles were ever tested against the

aircraft.

1. The F-104 can attain co-altitude, but the difficulty in visually acquiring the target makes any single attack a low probability of successful intercept. 2. The F-102 with its radar can acquire the U-2 and possesses the performance to solve the fire control problem, however, air-to-air missiles of outstanding performance and long range are required to accomplish airborne intercept. There is no known operational deployment of air-to-air missiles by the Soviets. 3. Successful intercept of the U-2 by Soviet defensive fighters for the next few months is unlikely.6

The aircraft, tested against air-to-air missiles, proved venerable.

Despite the conclusive results, they were disregarded seeing as it

would derail the program.

The aircraft’s significant flaw, discovered in testing, proved to be

that if it were to descend to a lower altitude, it would become blatantly

visible to both radar and the naked eye. If this were to happen, Soviet

fighters could engage the unarmed aircraft. If Francis Gary Powers

were to have been ambushed by soviet fighters he would have stood

no chance because he was a supposed civilian pilot employed by

Lockheed and had no flight combat training.7 The various high

intensity and high-resolution cameras onboard the aircraft had

previously captured photographs of guided missile launch sites

throughout the Soviet Union. “Recent analysis (sic) shows a guided

missile associated activity in the vicinity of VERKHNAYA SALDA just off

major rail lines 75 miles north of SVEDLOVSK.”8 The government

admitted to knowing about the active Soviet missile launch sites, yet

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failed to alter the flight paths of U-2 aircraft to avoid them, as seen in

the map in appendices 2 and 3. These maps show the known missile

launch sites and the flight path of the U-2.9 The United States

Government, despite the photos that prove otherwise, claimed

unknowing of the Soviet weapons’ capabilities and their placement.

“The major threat to the security of the United States and the West,

stems increasingly from Soviet guided missiles. Intelligence is ignorant

as to whether or not any are now deployed or are soon to be deployed;

we know nothing of the pattern, method or location of deployment.”10

The government did later form a committee led by Dr. Killian and

tasked it with creating an acoustical system for detecting launched

missiles, however this technology, operable up to 70,000 feet, had a

suggested operation height of 30,000-40,000 feet.11 Due to the soviet

discovery of several acoustical balloons in the area, Dr. Killian had no

choice but to discontinue the venture.12

The Eisenhower Administration’s disregard of the reality of the

program’s flaws caused little precaution to be taken and no procedure

to be put in place in the event that the missions were to be

compromised. Aside from a clearly phony cover up story, no plan had

been established in case of the program’s exposure other than the

blatant denial of its existence. “It was agreed that, in case of protest,

we would defend ourselves with an absolute disavowal and denial on

the matter.”13 The administration’s unpreparedness for the event of

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exposure proved senseless because they knowingly flew the aircraft

over active missile launch sites.14 Heads of state admitted to the large

risks involved in these missions, but justified their thinking with the

nation’s inherent need for foreign intelligence. “The threat to the

security of the United States and the West stemming from our

ignorance of Soviet guided missile production and deployment is

judged to be a more serious risk than that attendant on overflight

operations to obtain the information we sorely need.”15 All documents

written by those in the Eisenhower administration and in charge of the

U-2 program were declassified but with no, or very minor deletions,

except for this one. This significant detail proves the ignorance of the

administration and their unwillingness to heed the warnings of those

who knew best. The mysteriously deleted information would have most

certainly put the administration at fault for the rupture of détente.

The Eisenhower administration and those heading the U-2

program were aware of the serious repercussions associated with the

Russian’s obtaining evidence of the overflights. “The state department

was aware that the failure of such a flight would have serious

repercussions on the Summit Conference to meet in Paris on May 16,

1960.”16 The President and his staff admitted to knowing that

Khrushchev could easily discontinue negotiations, yet continued with

the overflights.17 This decision to continue the flights had been made

on the naiveté that the U-2 would be virtually untouchable and as long

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as the program went undiscovered, the President’s sterling reputation

for honesty would be upheld. “The President said that he has one

tremendous asset in a summit meeting, as regards effect in the free

world. That is his reputation for honesty. If one of these aircraft were

lost when we are engaged in apparently sincere deliberations, it could

be put on display in Moscow and ruin the President’s effectiveness.”18

President Eisenhower’s reputation for honesty would soon be tarnished

after the crash and subsequent Soviet capture of the U-2 spy plane and

its pilot, Francis Gary Powers.

On May 1st, 1960, President Eisenhower ignorantly authorized the

final and ill-fated U-2 overflight, which went missing over the skies of

Soviet Russia affirming the worst fears of those associated with the

program. “But, with a record of many successful flights behind us, the

intelligence people became more and more confident that the outcome

of each venture was almost a certainty. Furthermore, the information

obtained was important. So when a spring program for 1960 was

proposed, I again approved.”19 When the final overflight had been

proposed, Eisenhower simply agreed with his narrow- minded staff and

failed to recognize the impending and earth-shattering repercussions.

Despite the misinformation commonly associated with the

downing of the 51st U-2 mission, Francis Gary Powers’ son, Francis Gary

Powers Jr. confirmed the cause of the crash in an interview conducted

via e-mail.

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Me: ‘Is it true that there was an engine flame out that forced the plane to a venerable altitude?’ Powers: ‘No, at first Allen Dulles and others thought that a flame out was the most likely cause because they could not bring themselves to believe that the Soviets had that capability. When Powers returned home and was debriefed that is when they learned that he was hit at his assigned altitude of 70,500 feet by the near miss of an SA-2 missile, one of eight fired.’20

Surface-to-Air Missiles, which brought down the U-2, should have but

were not tested against the aircraft. Even if the aircraft had been

tested against Surface-to-Air missiles, the flight likely would have been

brought down regardless because of the administration’s ignorance

towards the capabilities of the Soviet weapons. The missiles that

brought the aircraft down were fired by Soviet rocket troops in the area

of Sverdlovsk, where an operable SAM Launchpad had been

photographed one month prior to the incident on April 4th by a U-2.21 In

response to the disappearance of the overflight, the State Department

issued an official cover up story.

Following is the cover plan to be implemented immediately: ‘U-2 aircraft was on weather mission originating Adana, Turkey. Purpose was study of clear air turbulence. During flight in Southeast Turkey, pilot reported he had oxygen difficulties. This last word heard at 0770Z over emergency frequency. U-2 aircraft did not land Adana as planed and it can only be assumed is now down. A search effort is under way in Lake Van area.’ FYI normal procedures for search for aircraft will be initiated by Adana Base Commander and initial press release will be from Adana. Pilot’s name being withheld pending notification from next of kin.22

The publication of this clearly doctored and inaccurate statement

sparked the end of Eisenhower and his Administration because it

discredited their honesty, which deterred Khrushchev from

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deliberations and postponed Cold War détente nearly 30 years. “The

President responded that the people closely associated with the flight

were sure that their cover story would hold and that was the only

reason he told them to put it out…”23

Once the feigned cover up story was exposed, Eisenhower’s

credibility and seemingly honest appeal dematerialized in front of the

American public, sparking a degrading and politically murderous series

of fated events.

No one is so naïve as to demand that official statements always contain ‘the whole truth,’ whatever that may be. Nevertheless, respect for the truth remains a meaningful and distinctive characteristic of free societies and democratic governments. Whatever weakens the confidence of our own citizens and those of other countries in the integrity and veracity of our government is to that extent destructive of one of our most valuable national assets in the ‘cold war’.24

This New York Times letter to the editor regarding the government’s

response to the U-2 incident displays the American people’s lowered

standards in the Eisenhower Administration as well as their knowledge

of its damage to Cold War détente.

Because of the President’s inability to truthfully address the

American People on the nature of the U-2 crash, Khrushchev’s later

speech exposed the Eisenhower Administration and outlined their lies

for the world to see. When Eisenhower first heard the news about the

downing of the U-2, he did not believe it because he thought the

Soviets were aware of the flights and up until that point, he had chosen

not to take action.25 In a meticulously timed press conference by

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Khrushchev just five days after the downing of the 51st mission, he

successfully disproved the cover stories and displayed the malicious

intentions of Eisenhower’s Administration.

These aggressive activities were demonstrated by the fact that the United States of America has sent their airplanes on missions for the purpose of spying on our country. These airplanes have crossed our State boundaries and invaded the Territory of the Soviet Union…As a rule, the United States of America has denied any acts of aggression on their part, although the proof which they used to support their denial was not reliable.26

After the release of this text by Khrushchev, Eisenhower knew that he

had to begin the process of assuming responsibility for his actions. “I

accepted the recommendations of my associates and instructed Acting

Secretary Dillon to have the State Department prepare immediately an

appropriate statement harmonious with the previously designed ‘cover

story’”27 Eisenhower’s press statement explains his reasoning for

permitting the U-2 flights. “No one wants another Pearl Harbor. This

means that we must have knowledge of military forces and

preparations around the world, especially those capable of massive

surprise attack. Secrecy in the Soviet Union makes this essential.”28

Had the President been truthful to the world about the nature of the

press release and his true reasons for allowing the missions, then

Khrushchev’s later speech would have caused less of an impact on the

Administration.

Because of Khrushchev’s attainment of the U-2 aircraft and its

pilot, he successfully denounced Eisenhower’s previous statements

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and revoked the Administration’s reputation for honesty. After the

Eisenhower Administration released their phony press releases,

Khrushchev made a second speech which dissipated Eisenhower’s

honesty in the public eye and proved the Administration’s falsifications

to the world.

Comrades, I would like to tell you one secret. When I made my first report, I purposely withheld information to the effect that the pilot is alive and healthy, and parts of the airplane are in our hands. We have done this, consciously, because if we had reported the entire truth at once, then the Americans would have come out with a different version of their story. You can see for yourself now what stupid statements the Americans have made—Van Lake, scientific investigations, etc. Now, when the Americans learn that the pilot is alive they will have to think of a different story, and they will.29

The speech continued for almost three hours, in which Khrushchev

addressed every statement made by Eisenhower’s administration and

NASA and backed his accusations with evidence from both the aircraft

and Francis Gary Powers himself.30 Khrushchev, with the help of

Powers, determined that the aircraft experienced no difficulties until it

received fire and that it had been flying along a set course, carrying

out its orders.31 “Their statements to the fact that the pilot blacked out

saying that his oxygen equipment was faulty, was obviously created by

the State Department of the USA and the Pentagon, due to the result

of the sudden shock which took place there, when the unsuccessful

bandit- like invasion on the Soviet territory became known to the entire

world.”32

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After the Soviet government successfully brought the truth of the

U-2 incident to light, President Eisenhower and his administration were

left with no option but to come clean.

The next morning Secretary Herter called me again, this time to recommend a statement admitting the essential truth of the Soviet allegations. It would, on the part of the administration, disclose the fact that I had directed information-gathering by every possible means to protect the United States and the Free World against surprise attack. Several of my colleagues emphasized and I fully agreed that any statement should be utterly and meticulously accurate. I approved a draft after changing some of the wording to eliminate any phrase that seemed to me to be defensive in tone. I felt anything but apologetic.33

Eisenhower decided to expose the true intentions of the flights in an

effort to salvage the peace talks between the two nations, which were

scheduled to continue in Paris on the 16th of May.34

The Paris Peace Conference scheduled for May of 1960 had been

expected to make great strides towards the end of the Cold War,

however when Eisenhower’s administration forbade the President from

apologizing, Khrushchev stormed out and didn’t return. “On May 14,

Khrushchev awaited in Paris and, in a meeting with President DeGaulle,

indicated that he would not attend the conference unless the United

States accepted his demands.”35 Eisenhower wanted to apologize,

however, Herter sternly said no and then proceeded to leave the

room.36 In response, Khrushchev stated that, “If Eisenhower had

followed his own good instincts and used his considerable intelligence,

he would have done the right thing…”37 Over the proceeding 36 hours

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Khrushchev awaited an apology that never came and shortly thereafter

departed for Moscow.38 “The Senate Foreign Relations Committee

agreed with Secretary Herter’s testimony that the U-2 Incident and the

United States’ handling of it were contributing factors to the breakup of

the Summit Conference… ‘it would probably have been held had it not

been for these circumstances.’”39

After the failed attempt to mend relations in Paris, Eisenhower

gave up trying to end the Cold War and completely severed his

administration’s ties with the Soviet government. “Eisenhower

probably decided to foreclose the possibility that the Cold War would

be ending during his tenure.”40 Eisenhower likely decided to halt

détente because he lost the ability to communicate with Khrushchev

and the Russian Government as a whole. “His ability to deal with the

Russians on any basis other than by means of the traditional Cold War

modalities had ended…Eisenhower’s personal credibility with

Khrushchev had been shattered by the U-2 incident.”41 With

Eisenhower’s inability to communicate with Russia came the

impossibility of resolving Cold War tensions during his remaining

months in office.

The U-2 incident shocked the United States to its core by the fact

that the President, his Administration and the State Department were

as benighted as they were towards such a fragile international conflict.

This shock led to a formal investigation into the lies told by the

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Eisenhower Administration and whether the U-2 had in fact violated

international law, as the Soviets claimed. At the 1944 peace summit in

Chicago, both the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to laws

against aerial photography. “This sovereignty was fully recognized in

the domestic laws of both the United States and the Soviet Union and

these laws prohibited aerial photography, as provided in the Chicago

Convention. The flight was, therefore…a violation of international law

and of the United Nations Charter.”42 This therefore puts the United

States and, in particular, the Eisenhower Administration at fault and in

violation of the United Nations Charter. As agreed at the Paris

Convention (1919), the Havana Convention (1928) and the Chicago

Convention (1944), all before the creation of the United Nations,

“‘every state has the complete and exclusive sovereignty over the

airspace above its territory’ and consequently has the right to prevent

passage by civilian aircraft of other states except as permitted by

treaty.”43 In the Charter, it is mentioned that nations have the right to

prevent the passage of Civilian Aircraft, however makes no reference

to military or surveillance aircraft. Because of this technicality, it is

very possible that if the government had not lied about Powers’ civilian

employer, Lockheed, then the Russians would have been at fault for

the escapade. “While probably a violation of international law, the U-2

flight was not an act of aggression.”44

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Although the downing of the 51st U-2 overflight had a severe

impact on Eisenhower and his Administration, it took a large toll on the

American public, instilling within them a great sense of fear. “The

atmosphere of crisis which enveloped the U-2 incident also contributed

to a sense of unease in America; the Cold War would continue

indefinitely…”45 This sense of fear in the American public greatly

impacted the Republican Party in the 1960 election. “…a realization

which hurt the Republicans in the upcoming presidential election. As

Richard Nixon later recalled, because of the U-2, the Administration’s

use of the “peace issue [in the presidential campaign of 1960] was

tarnished.”46 The U-2 affair’s ignorant handling by the Eisenhower

administration instilled within the American public a sense of fear,

which drove them away from the Republican Party in the 1960 election

and towards the Democratic Candidate, John F. Kennedy.

Caused by the Eisenhower Administration’s ignorance towards

the U-2 program and its subsequent incident, Khrushchev left the

Peace Conference in Paris, severing Russia’s already fragile

relationship with the United States and postponing Cold War détente

nearly 30 years. Overall, the U-2 incident provided no gains to either

side involved and ended up tarnishing both Eisenhower and

Khrushchev’s political careers as well as the public images of those

involved. It wasn’t until 1989 when Gorbachev heeded the warnings of

Reagan to tear down the Berlin Wall, that the Cold War and its tensions

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ceased to exist. After nearly 46 years of antipathy between the Soviet

Union and the United States, the Cold War had ended. Had it not been

for the U-2 Incident, détente could have been achieved nearly 15 years

earlier, altering the histories of both nations. “The lesson for history

appears clear: one international controversy can destroy even the

most carefully laid plans and bring the super powers once again to the

verge of confrontation.”47 Due to the ignorance of Eisenhower and his

Administration, Cold War détente between the Soviet Union and the

United States ruptured, prolonging the war nearly 30 frigid and tense

years.

15

1  Memorandum by A. J Goodpaster, "Memorandum of Conference with the President on November 24, 1954; authorization by the President to produce thirty U-2 aircraft," November 24, 1954, http://www.eienhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/u2_incident.html.

2  Memorandum by A. J. Goodpaster, " Memorandum for Record regarding discontinuation of overflights, March 4, 1959," March 4, 1959, http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/-_incident.html.

3  Memorandum by AJ Goodpaster, " Memorandum for Record of April 25, 1960, authorizing one additional U-2 flight prior to May 1, 1960. If this flight had been cancelled, the U-2 incident may have been avoided," April 25, 1960, http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/-_incident.html.

4 U-2 Specifications, last modified August 31, 2004, http://www.blackbirds.net/u2/u2specs.html.5 Moscow to Secretary Of State, telegram, "#21 State Department telegram from American

Embassy in Moscow to Secretary of State transmitting translation of Soviet note concerning U-2 plane, May 10, 1960," May 10, 1960.

6 Letter, “CIA report on U-2 Vulnerability Tests, April 1960," March 31, 1959, http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/u2_incident.html.

7 NASA, "National Aeronautics and Space," news release.8 Letter, "CIA report on U-2 Vulnerability."9  Letter, “CIA report on U-2 Vulnerability."10 ibid.11  Memorandum by A. J Goodpaster, “Memorandum of Conference with the President regarding

recent progress in reconnaissance devices, February 13, 1959," February 13, 1959, http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/u2_incident.html.

12 Michael R. Beschloss, MAYDAY: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 111.

13 Memorandum by A.J Goodpaster, "Memorandum of Conference with the President regarding overflight concerns, July 8, 1959," July 8, 1954, http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/u2_incident.html.

14  Letter, "CIA report on U-2 Vulnerability."15 ibid.16 Quincy Wright, "Legal Aspects of the U-2 Incident," The American Journal of International Law

54, no. 4 (October 1960): 1, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2195143.17 Memorandum by Goodpaster, "Memorandum of Conference."18 Memorandum by AJ Goodpaster, "#Memorandum for the Record discussing overflights,

February 8, 1960," February 8, 1960, http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/u2_incident.html.

19 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company Inc., 1965), 547.20 Francis Gary Powers, Jr, e-mail interview by the author, Montclair, NJ.21 Moscow to Secretary Of State, telegram, "State Department telegram."22 Memorandum, "Cover plan to be used for downed U-2 flight (the U.S. did not know that the

Soviets had the captured U.S. pilot), May 2, 1960," May 2, 1960, http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/u2_incident.html.

23Memorandum, "Memorandum of conversation, bipartisan leaders breakfast with the President, held in the State dining room, The White House concerning U-2 incident, intelligence and espionage, May 26,

24 Mark W. Leiserson, letter to the editor, New York Times (Hamden, CT), June 14, 196025 Memorandum, "Memorandum of conversation."

1960," May 26, 1960, http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/u2_incident.html.26 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, The U-2 Incident, trans. Joseph L. Zygielbaum,

publication no. 9 (Pasadena, CA: California Institute of Technology, 1960)27 Memorandum, "Memorandum of conversation."28 James C. Hagerty, "Statement by the President regarding U-2 incident, May 11, 1960," news

release, May 11, 196029 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, The U-2 Incident, 11.30 ibid.31 ibid. 32 ibid.33 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 550.

34  AJ Goodpaster to Moscow, telegram, "State Department telegram to American Embassy in Moscow regarding U.S. position with respect to U-2 incident, May 11, 1960," May 11, 1960.

35 Quincy Wright, "Legal Aspects of the U-2 Incident," The American Journal of International Law 54, no. 4 (October 1960): 4, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2195143.

36 James A. Nathan, "A FRAGILE DETENTE: The U-2 Incident Re-examined," Military Affairs 39, no. 3 (October 1975): 4, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1986900.

37 ibid.38 ibid.39 Quincy Wright, "#Legal Aspects of the U-2 Incident," The American Journal of International Law

54, no. 4 (October 1960): 5, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2195143.40 James A. Nathan, "A FRAGILE DETENTE: The U-2 Incident Re-examined," Military Affairs 39, no.

3 (October 1975): 7, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1986900.41 James A. Nathan, "A FRAGILE DETENTE: The U-2 Incident Re-examined," Military Affairs 39, no.

3 (October 1975): 6, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1986900.42 Quincy Wright, "Legal Aspects of the U-2 Incident," The American Journal of International Law

54, no. 4 (October 1960): 8, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2195143.43 Quincy Wright, "Legal Aspects of the U-2 Incident," The American Journal of International Law

54, no. 4 (October 1960): 10, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2195143.44 Quincy Wright, "Legal Aspects of the U-2 Incident," The American Journal of International Law

54, no. 4 (October 1960): 12, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2195143.45 E. Bruce Geelhoed, "Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Spy Plane, and the Summit: A Quarter-Century

Retrospective," Presidential Studies Quarterly 17, no. 1 (Winter 1987): 10, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27550396.

46 ibid. 47 E. Bruce Geelhoed, "#36 Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Spy Plane, and the Summit: A Quarter-

Century Retrospective," Presidential Studies Quarterly 17, no. 1 (Winter 1987): 11, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27550396.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Early U-2 In Flight, photograph, August 15, 2013, The National Security Archive, CIA, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB434/.

Appendix 2: 1. Letter, "#7 CIA report on U-2 Vulnerability Tests, April 1960," March 31, 1959, http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov

Appendix 3: 1. Letter, "#7 CIA report on U-2 Vulnerability Tests, April 1960," March 31, 1959, http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov

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