The Warplane Crisis Between Turkey and Russia and the Issue of ‘Apology’

ORSAM REVIEW OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS NO.35, DECEMBER 2015

The Warplane Crisis BeTWeen Turkey and russia and The issue

of ‘apology’erdem Özlük

Erdem Özlük is an assistant professor in the Department of International Relations in the Faculty of Economic and Administrative Science, Selçuk University. He had his B.A., M.A., and PhD at the same university on International Relations. He is studying International Relations theories, foreign policy analysis and U.S. Foreign Policy. In addition to his published articles in national and international journals, he published a book titled “State in International Relations”.

Turkey-Russia relations are undergoing a serious crisis since the downing of the Russian warplane by Turkey for the violation of the Turkish airspace on 24 November 2015. Both sides present arguments through reciprocal statements in order to justify their actions. The future and the overall course of the relations are now thought mostly to depend on a statement of apology by Turkey to Rus-sia. Russia particularly states that for the normalization of the relations Turkey has to make an apology, otherwise the sanctions that have been introduced on various sec-tors will continue increasingly. Then, does Turkey really have to apologize? Why and on which grounds do states apologize? And what would be political and legal conse-quences of apologies. How will the demand for apology affect the future of the relations and what should be done in order to deescalate the crisis? This study tries to an-swer these questions.

ORSAM REVIEW OFREGIONAL AFFAIRSNo.35, DECEMBER 2015

2

The Warplane Crisis BeTWeen Turkey and russia and The issue of ‘apology’

Introduction

Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet on November 24, 2015 in the Yayladağı district of the city of Hatay along the Syrian border. This incident sparked the most serious crisis in the last century for the two countries that had been ad-versaries during the Cold War and has been on the opposing sides of the Syrian civil war. Particularly, Turkey’s action as a NATO ally caused a contro-versy, reproducing discourses and symbols that originated in the Cold War, since it is the first time in the 66 year-old history of NATO that an al-lied nation downed a Russian warplane.

From the warplane in-cident onwards, both sides present arguments to justify their actions through recipro-cal statements. Turkey seeks to prove the airspace viola-tion of the Russian warplane by publishing radar images, whereas Russia seeks to justify its arguments utilizing its rela-tive power and capacity com-pared to Turkey. Though, the future and the overall course

of the relations are thought mostly to depend on a state-ment of apology by Turkey to Russia. Russia particularly states that for the normaliza-tion of the relations Turkey has to make an apology, oth-erwise the sanctions that have been introduced on various sectors will continue increas-ingly. Then, does Turkey really have to apologize? Why and on which grounds do states apologize? And what would be political and legal consequenc-es of apologies. How will the demand for apology affect the future of the relations and what should be done in order to deescalate the crisis?

The Age of Apology

In the last quarter-century of international relations, on the occasion of approximate-ly fifty different events, states apologized for past events, some policies or practices and the usage of particular dis-courses.1 Witnessing an in-creasing number of occasions involving apologies deemed ‘diplomatic apology’ or ‘inter-national political apology’, the International Relations disci-

3


particularly, Turkey’s action as a naTo ally caused a controversy, reproducing discourses and symbols that originated in the Cold War.

pline started to discuss wheth-er this is an ‘age of apology’.2 Making apology is actually used to define a situation fol-lowing a development such as expressing gratitude or field-ing complaint. Thus, resem-bling individuals in their daily lives apologizing for similar situations, states prefer one of the following four courses on occasions that may require apology.3

Firstly, states may refuse the past events, claim that no wrong act has been committed in practice or discourse and avoid apologizing. Secondly, states may admit that some wrong practices have been committed in the past, yet may claim that there is no necessity to make an apology. In such situations, states express sor-row rather than making apolo-gy. Thirdly, while states admit that there have been erroneous practices and unjust suffering, they also require that some conditions must be fulfilled before making apology and redressing the suffering. This is a kind of conditional apol-ogy. Lastly, states may admit the wrong practices of the past

without any conditions and make apology. Among these four options, only the last is a ‘genuine apology’, since it im-plies regret and seeks pardon-ing with regard to past events.

Russia’s demand for apolo-gy with regard to the warplane incident of November 24 falls into the fourth category, as far as the statements of President Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov are concerned. Turkey, on the other hand, remarks that there is an undesired re-sult at hand, and expressed sorrow about the incident by the President, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. In ad-dition, from the first moment onwards, Turkey has sought to prevent the damage that the incident might cause to the re-lations, though it has stressed that the situation at hand definitely does not necessitate apology.

As far as its messages and discourse since November 24 are considered, Turkey takes great care to make a distinc-tion between being conscious-

4


ly sorry and apologizing. This is because being/to be sorry and to apologize are different con-cepts in terms of the technical, legal and political ramifica-tions they might incur.4 Yet, whereas ‘being/to be sorry’ ex-presses the sorrow of the state with regard to the relevant event, ‘to apologize’ implies and evokes direct responsibil-ity of the state for the relevant event. In this sense, to apol-ogize is not only an ordinary expression of regret but also an admission that state made a

mistake. It is the admission of the mistake that distinguishes to apologize from to be sorry. Furthermore, to apologize after an event implies; (i) describing the event, (ii) stating the justi-fications, (iii) assuring that the mistake will not be repeated, (iv) compensating and redress-ing the suffering. Likewise, to apologize means that the dis-course or practice that necessi-tated the apology is not right.5

A genuine, uncondition-al apology is a very effective instrument for redressing the

5


past wrongs in national and international scale, and for compensating for the mis-takes. This is because, the purpose of the apology, while being different from other ma-terial and legal compensation tools, is the pardoning of the apologizing side and assuring consensus. In this sense, an even symbolic apology might serve to normalize relations between sides.6 Furthermore, historic examples show that if the apology is configured to include compensation for the suffering and loss, it is more likely to resolve related problems. Therefore, how the apology will be configured is as serious as the apology itself.

States can apologize vocal-ly, in written form or through some material means (such as building monuments or holding ceremonies). It is particularly important that the apology must be made in a way that it will be adopted by the general public.7 For example, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov stated that “on the first days of Russia’s air operations in Syria, a Russian warplane accidentally violated

the Turkish airspace (October 3, 2015), Turkey informed Russia of the situation with a diplomatic note, and then Putin called President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and apol-ogized”.8 Yet, it is not clear whether Putin’s call was an ex-pression of sorrow or an apol-ogy, unless one of the sides ex-plains the details of the talks to the public. As a matter of fact, Israel’s apology from Turkey after the Mavi Marmara inci-dent was shared with the pub-lic through official channels.9

States actually admit re-sponsibility of the event by asking forgiveness, expressing regret and assuring non-rep-etition. Apologizing through admitting responsibility is not a widely agreed principle in international law, though it brings about some ramifi-cations in legal terms. For in-stance, in the UN International Law Commission document “Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts” that was completed in 2001 and sent to the UN Security Council, mentions the role of apology in resolving some disputes in international

from the first moment onwards, Turkey has sought to prevent the permanent damage that the incident might cause to the relations, though it has stressed that the situation at hand definitely does not necessitate apology.

6


relations. The draft regulates the principle that “Where injury results which cannot be made good by either resti-tution or compensation, the responsible State is under an obligation to give satisfaction for the injury caused via an official apology including the regret and recognition of the event that is in opposition to the law”.10 In addition, there

might be further instruments that include bringing the in-cident to an international or special court, forming a special commission, the trial of the officials who were responsible, paying compensations and restitution of the territories acquired if needed.11 As a mat-ter of fact, the Russian officials declared that they demand compensation for one of the

7


pilots and the warplane as well as an apology.

Should Turkey Apologize?

Following the evaluations above, the question is: “How should Turkey respond to the Russians’ demand for apolo-gy which is frequently stated and deemed a prerequisite for the normalization of the rela-tions?” Is there a situation that necessitate Turkey’s apology?

The issue that stands as the basis for the demand for apology and compensation is the downing of the Russian warplane. Turkey ‘deliber-ately’ intervened to halt the Russian combat jet for it vi-olated Turkey’s airspace and sovereign territory without responding to recurrent warn-ings. Since the pilot did not respond to the calls to alter its course, Turkish intervention took place regardless of the warplane’s country of origin. Indeed, the Turkish General Staff’s first official statement indicated that “a warplane of unknown origin has been sub-jected to intervention along with the rules of engagement on the grounds that it vio-

lated the Turkish airspace”.12 But the real issue at hand is not the origin and the pur-pose of the warplane. It is a military aircraft. As confirmed on different channels, Turkey warned the jet multiple times and did not receive a response. The action against the Russian warplane became a necessi-ty considering the level of Turkey’s perceived threat from the Syrian civil war, the similar violations in the past, and the current violation’s scale that surpassed Turkey’s rules of en-gagement.

Both the widely agreed-up-on principles of the interna-tional relations and the reg-ulations of international law present various standpoints that justify Turkey’s action against the Russian jet. In addition, Turkey contacted NATO and UN following the incident, laid down technical data about the violation and expressed its sorrow on various levels. Furthermore, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan voiced ‘sadness’ with regard to the incident in his two press state-ments. In the first statement, Erdoğan said “Had we known

in the un international law Commission document “responsibility of states for internationally Wrongful acts” that was completed in 2001 and sent to the un security Council, mentions the role of apology in resolving some disputes in international relations.

8


it was a Russian jet, we would have chosen different ways of warning”13, clearly stating that hostile intentions did not take part in the incident. And in a later interview, he told the press that he wanted to contact Mr. Putin to discuss the issue. In addition, Prime Minister Davutoğlu spent a great deal of effort for returning the body of the fallen Russian pi-lot to Russia.14 Furthermore, Mr. Davutoğlu stated on var-ious platforms that the action

aimed to preserve Turkey’s sovereign territory and securi-ty and therefore, the situation at hand does not necessitate an apology.

Looking at the growing scholarly literature on ‘apol-ogy’, International Relations and the general principles of International Law and more specifically the devel-opments since November 24, 2015; there is indeed no is-sue at hand that necessitates Turkey’s apology. Turkey’s

9


action against the Russian jet was not based on its unilat-eral rules of engagement, but rather on the violation of its sovereign territory, which is a self evident international legal principle. The Russian war-plane was noticed as required (ten times according to the of-ficial statement) and was shot down when no response was given. Records of the warning and radar images showing the violation were shared with the whole world. When all these considered, Turkey should maintain its policy towards the normalization of relations since November 24, though it should refrain from an apolo-gy which might incur both po-litical and legal consequences.

Conclusion

The normalization of Russia-Turkey relations in a short time is of utmost im-portance for the resolution of numerous conflicts in the Middle East, particularly the civil war in Syria and the fight against ISIS. Though, Turkey’s efforts for normalization are countered with statements by Russia, which goes against

diplomatic procedures and the objective of normalization. In addition to all these, Russia launched retaliatory sanctions and insisted on a formal apol-ogy as a condition for the con-tact between the two Heads of State. Furthermore, Russia worsens the overall course of the relations by claiming that Turkey initiates oil trade with ISIS, thereby contributing to the finances of the terrorist or-ganization.15

Both Turkish and Russian public demonstrate a great deal of interest at the warplane incident as a foreign policy problem. Concerning the con-tent of the messages by the two sides, the incident is no longer solely a foreign policy problem, but also a domestic policy material on many ac-counts. That is to say, the inci-dent has reverberated through the domestic politics since developments such as Russia’s warning to its own citizens that traveling to Turkey is dangerous, the ban on exports of Turkish products from January 1, 2016 onwards, the freezing of military relations and in return Turkey’s shelving

Turkey’s action against the russian warplane was not based on its unilateral rules of engagement, but rather on the violation of its sovereign territory, which is a self evident international legal principle.

10


of the Turkish Stream Project have taken place. The issue retains its urgency in the do-mestic agendas as no positive messages were given after the Foreign Ministers’ meeting that took place in the OSCE Summit held in Belgrade on December 3, 2015.

The most likely way for the resolution of the conflict is through the communication between the two countries on lower levels rather than mak-ing statements that involve the public. Reciprocal sanctions, retaliation and high level con-tacts are not useful to resolve the current tension. Similar to the Mavi Marmara crisis be-tween Israel and Turkey, the normalization of the relations will be the result of lower lev-el contacts, which are gener-ally held secret. Yet, Russia’s insistence on apology for a normalization in the relations and Turkey’s certain refusal to

apologize reduce the chances to achieve that in the short term.

Consequently, Russia’s in-sistence on Turkey’s apology, which will imply that it com-mitted a politically wrongful act and bring about various le-gal consequences such as com-pensations does not mean that Turkey is wrong and the con-ditions for making an apol-ogy has been fulfilled. Russia benefits from its relatively powerful position that arises from the disparity between the two countries’ capabilities and seeks to force Turkey for an apology and strengthen its expectations through various reprisals and sanctions. Turkey needs to maintain its position and rhetoric that it has adopt-ed since the onset of the crisis, seek normalization and find a solution without making an apology.

11


ENDNOTES

1 Renee Jeffery, “When is an Apology not an Apology? Contrition Chic and Japan’s (un)Apologetic Politics”, Australian Journal of In-ternational Affairs, 65(5), 2011, p.608.

2 Erdem Özlük, “Uluslararası İlişkilerde Özür Dilemek: Özrün Ku-ramı”, Uluslararası İlişkiler, 11(44), 2015, p. 51-78.

3 Raymond Cohen, “Apology and Reconciliation in International Relations”, Yaacov B. S. Tov (ed.), From Conflict Resolution to Rec-onciliation, (New York, Oxford University Press, 2004), p.186.

4 Michael Cunningham, “Saying Sorry: The Politics of Apology”, The Political Quarterly, 70(3), 1999, s.287-288.

5 Danielle Celermajer, The Sins of the Nation and the Ritual of Apol-ogies, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.14.

6 Kora Andrieu, “Sorry for the Genocide: How Public Apologies Can Help Promote National Reconciliation”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 38(1), 2009, p.5.

7 Mark Gibney ve Erik Roxstrom, “The Status of State Apologies”, Human Rights Quarterly, 23(4), 2001, p.927-937.

8 Nerdun Hacıoğlu, “Lavrov: Putin Erdoğan’dan Özür Dilemiş-ti”, Hürriyet, 9 December 2015, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/lav-rov-putin-erdogandan-ozur-dilemisti-40024868

9 “Basın Açıklaması”, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/site_media/html/bsbk-aciklama-israil.pdf

10 James Crawford, “Articles on Responsibility of States for Inter-nationally Wrongful Acts”, http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/rsiwa/rsiwa_e.pdf, (Accessed: 10 December 2015).

11 Roman David and Susanne Y. P. Choi, “Forgiveness and Transi-tional Justice in the Czech Republic”, The Journal of Conflict Reso-lution, 50(3), 2006, p.361-362.

12 “Türkiye’nin Suriye sınırını ihlal eden Su 24 tipi savaş uçağı düşürüldü”, Anadolu Ajansı, 24 November 2015, http://aa.com.tr/al/dunya/turkiyenin-suriye-sinirini-ihlal-eden-su-24-tipi-savas-uca

gi-dusuruldu/480268

13 “Erdoğan: Rus uçağı olduğunu bilseydik farklı davranırdık”, BBC

12


Türkçe, 26 November 2015, http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberl-er/2015/11/151126_erdogan_rusya_suriye

14 “Davutoğlu: Görevimizi yaptık, özür dilemeyiz”, Aljazeera Türk, 30 November 2015 http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/davuto-glu-gorevimizi-yaptik-ozur-dilemeyiz

15 “Türkiye-Rusya uçak krizi: 10 günde neler yaşandı?” BBC Türkçe, 4 December 2015, http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberl-er/2015/12/151204_rusya_krizin_10_gunu

Ortadoğu Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi (ORSAM)Süleyman Nazif Sokak No: 12-B Çankaya / Ankara

Tel: 0 (312) 430 26 09 Fax: 0 (312) 430 39 48www.orsam.org.tr

ORSAM is an independent think-tank specializing on Middle Eastern affairs. ORSAM seeks to diversify sources of knowledge on the region and establish a channel of communication between the local experts and Turkish academic and policy circles. Toward that end, ORSAM facilitates the exchanges of officials, academics, strategists, journalists, businesspeople and members of civil society from the region with their Turkish counterparts. ORSAM conducts studies on the regional developments and disseminates their results to the policy and academic circles as well as the wider public through various publication outlets. ORSAM publications include books, reports, bulletins, newsletters, policy briefs, conference minutes and two journals Ortadoğu Analiz and Ortadoğu Etütleri.

© Content of this report is copyrighted to ORSAM. Except reasonable and partial quotation and use under the Act No. 5846, Law on Intellectual and Artistic Works, via proper citation, the content may not be used or re-published without prior permission by ORSAM. The views expressed in this report reflect only the opinions of its authors and do not represent the institutional opinion of ORSAM.

Documents

The Warplane Crisis Between Turkey and Russia and the Issue of ‘Apology’