l . Cunent Co6cioLness

III. Cunent Consciousness

Where Are We No*?

We would be o,etl served to pause for a moment and reflcct upon where we

have come and whrt we havc accomplished. Part I explored (he subject of conscious

ness in mosl gcneral terms. The inlenl wa\ Io establish a common ground for undcr-

standing this rather complex topic. The imp()nanc€ that the subject has for us as indi

viduals and collective (the human race) was emphasized. A brief review of history

revealed how our most common undersknding of the topic has been structurcd and

whnt it has yicldcd for our undcrstanding ln Pan tr, wc took a iadically differ€nt

approach. ln some dctail, we explorgd lhc cmergence (some ur'ould call it cvolulion,

bul this does not quitc circumscribe the jdca as I perceive it) of consciousness in man.

This has led, I beliere, to a distincrly differenl insight in regard lo the subject. Jusl

how different this may be will be reviewcd in this final section of this papcr.

The fumultuousness of currcnt times cannot be ovcrcmphasiT€d. The pace of

lcaming. the explosion of knowledgc thal has (xcurrcd since World War II is almo5(

ovcrphelming. lt is irteresting to nole thal the ium of the decade from the 40s lo thc

50s marked a decisive point in this developrnent. Gcbser penned his major work in

1949, Neumann also wmte his primary contribulion to the field, Thc oigins and historyoJ consciousnzss in the same year. Canpbell Evitalized m)4hology at this time with his

Herc wift a thousaidrfaces, and Immanuel Velikovslf shook the scientific world with

his series of books depicting his catastraphe theary.'' Shortly thereaier we experi-

cnced (at least in the west) the Economic wonder of the late 50s and the turbulence of

the 60s. The Civil Rights, Anti-waq ald Hippie Movements caused us to reexamine

the most fundamenral b€liefs that we had held up unril rhat rime. Since then a decade of

inflation and a decade of gr€ed have contributed to tbe virtual bankruptcy of most of the

instirutions we hold dea.. We are fiving on the thrcshold of a nec (omorrow, but we

Throuqh o Ctass Da*], PoBe 5 )

Ill. Cunenl Coat(irunass

often have little, if any, idea of what thal tomonow may be.

At tie he{t of this change and at the heafl of the stability we seek is our con-

sciousness. How we think, notjust what we think; how we feel about things; what we

ale, and what we value ar9 all tie lesult of our own percsptions of what is and should

be. The resurgence of irterest in consciousness over tie past few years is an encourag-

ing sign. Having be€n provided whal I consider lo be a comprehensive framewort for

evaluatinB our movement in this area, it woDld be well to examine some of the othcr,

more Dcent contributions to our understandin8 of consciousness. We will take a lool

at a fee, of thc mors reprEscntative models and evaluate them in light of our understand-

ing of the part they may play in the developmental scheme proposed by Gebser Afier

this review we will take a lq)k at whal consequences these models, in particular, and

the study of conlciousness, in geneml, have for the future.

What Oiher Approach€.i Are Available?

As has becn rcpcaledly staled, there arc a variely of *riters who have addresscd

themselves lo the subjecl of consciousncss. Like Gebser, some. such as Erich Neu-

mann (195'1/19,19) and Anhur Young (1976). havc dealt wilh the emergcnce ofconyiiousness in a direct manncr. Others have only dealt with it in more limited formars.

We will now rcview a rcprcsentative sample of thcsc idcas to tet a feel for what else

has been contributed in lhis area of study.

Pdppel

Poppel (1988/1985) has done some serious Fork in the ar€a of con sc iousness,

s?ecializing in panicular on the conc+t of tinre. Although the notion of time is quite

imponanl in undcrslanding the cunent transition of consciousness that we arE cxperi-

encing at this time, it was not for this r€ason that he llas chosen for revieu Rather,

Poppel is reprcsentative of those rEseaichers who emphasiz€ the role of the brain in tie

study of consciousness. ln fact, he belongs to that grcup of scientists who subscdb€ to

the materialist philosophy that the bmh gives rise to consciousness ard Dot vice ve6a.

Firmly ir the traditioD of Aristotle and Hume, il is his contention that without percep-

PoK 52 Th.ough a Gta^ts Da r"

III Cutrcnt Cotsciausess

tion therg is no consciousness at all; mgr€over, only communicable petceprual events

are considered "coDscious' in the sense liat P6pp€l us€s the telrn.

Irt us first consider the rclationship b€tween perception and consciousness for it

will play a very imponant rcle in much of what is to follow we ar€ confronted with

myriad sensory impressions every day, every minute, every second of our waking lives.

Were we to rcact to each and every one of thes€ stimuli, we would be simply over-

whelmed. Nature, however, has provide/ us with a protective mechanism, namely

selective perc€ption. b some way or anothcr, we are constartly filtering, sorting.

classitying, and evaluating thg sensory inpul we arc receiving. Although pe have r€-

stricled this description to purely physical, extemal phenomena, il is. as we shall se€ a

little later when we review the model from MahGxl (1991), that this is just as applica

ble to thc iDtemal, non-physical world of the individual as well. Nelenheless, this

filtcring and evaluating must talc place in refercnce to some framework, rvithin some

conlcxt. Ttus conlexl, as Poppcl and o(he.s point out, is unique to erch individual. It

is based on the knowledge and experiencr of each pcrson. In the terms of ihis paper,

we would say this framework is individually founded. bolh onlologically and epistemo-

Iogically. The conscquence of these thooghrs is, however, lhat each person's fixlily (ot

what he pcrocivcs to be realily is unique lo that individual. As Poppel pDls it:

Irrespective of which solution to lhe mind-body problem one prefers, themonislic or dualistic, the picture of the world arising out of the categories of perception rcrDains, however, only a coutruct. We are rEceptiveonly to quite panicular stimulus constellations, which means thal ourjudgrncnt ofthe world, r€sting on sensory comprshension, is au(omati-cally ̂ preconception. What we can experience of the world is only thatwhich. on account of our catetories adapted to nature, we impose uponthe world. What se€ms reali() to us, is a construcl of realjty detemlinedby ou$elves. The inherited condirions of our sensory experience -- andthis hold for all our senses ' define ri8id limits to our experience of theworld. What we experienc€ as reality is the r€ality only of tbe human."

This is not a new position in psychology and philosophy, but it finds a rather stlong

expression in P6ppel's work and is one of primary foundations of his r€search into thephenomenon of consciousness.

Poppel bases his conclusions on the wo.k he has done into the individual'sp€rcsption of simulraneity and sequentialily. TSo ensory signals are presentgd to a

subject al irlervals less than 0.030 of a second. The subje{t's task is lo delermine if the

Through a Gla\s DaflJ Pase 53

lll Cuft. Con-\.tousness

signals oc4ur at the same time gr one afier the other. He has found that the window of

simultaneity lies at about 0.005 seconds for auditory, 0.010 for tactile, and arouod

0.020-0.030 secands for visual stimuli.'r with s€quentiality, though, it is a different

maner Tbe subject's task in these exp€riments is to determine which of the stimuli

occurs first. lntercstingly enough, the window of sequentialily is rcughly the same,

regardless of which sensory modality is tested, aDd lies at arcund 0.030-0.040 seconds.

The combination of these two wirdows pmvides us tlen with a horizon of "now" This

means tlat al aboul l0 yaJds around the individual, there is a horizon, outside of which

the simuluneity and sequentiality of sensory input can be reliability dete.mined. Now

is that which occurs within this time-space; other evenls arc either fuiurc or past-

Popftl's detenninatior places a new emphasis on that which we considcr lo be

consciousness. Having dctermined, in contradistinction to other post'Newtoniar think-

ers, such as Heidegget that now is not simply a lhreshold, but is, in fact. a time-area,

we arc forced to consider our undcrstanding of consciousncss, and our tclalionship to

time in new lighl. We saw ir Part tr thal lhc conc€pl of and our r€lationship lo lime

was a cnicial faclor in the developrnenl of the intcgrd structure of consciousncss idenli-

ficd by Gebser. Now, in Pdppcl's w('rk we have a rcf(using of our anention in a ncw

way. Consequently, memory plays an imFx)nant role in his thinking. Mcmory is

where we accunulate past experience and knowlcdge 1o preparc us for future activity:

in this manner we can transcend time.s In fact. it is memorv itself that gives us our

s€nse of identily."

In sum, then, Poppel conceivos consciousness to b€ an active cognition, rather

than a passive registering of sensory data.' Wilhin lhis active sys(em, the indivjdual

gains and maintains his identiiy through the time'transcending function of his memory.

Future-oriented b€havior is effected through the inte.action of memo.y with fte cun€nt

state of awaEness of the individual, which is, in tum, determined by the no$ horizon

unjque to that individual. Reality is a construcr generaled by the individual based on

his own unique knowledge and experienc€, yet this experience is shared to a great

extenl with other members ofthe community. ln fact, Poppel goes so far as to main-

tain that withoul thjs communicalion, withoul the social conlext, one cannot speak of

consciousness at all." Whether this is an accunte characterization remains to be s€en.

Il does poirt out, however, from which perspective Pdppel is approaching the subject.

Finally, it should be noted that Pdppel belongs to the school of thinling thar postulates

Page 54 Through a Ghss Dafi,

I I L Cv-ent Con:ciou:ness

consciousness arising fram the biochemical proc€ss€s of the brain. Tb him, conscious-

ness is not a metaphysical entity, but a puEly physical one.

Onstein

Omstein (1972, 1976, 1986) has a number of points in common with Pdppel,

yet is distinctive in a number of ways.{ whereas the former writer conceives of

consciousness as being somewhat uniform and almost monolithic, at least within the

individual. Omstein Dostulates a more varied construction of consciousness. He slates:

Il is illusory to think thal a person has one mind, good or bad. Thcrc rsno single mind but many; we are a coalition, nol just a single person.The unity we exp€rience -- it is the same me that loves as rcasons; it isthe same me that is the father as the son: it is the same me who goes towork and plays games -- is simply an illusion. I( is a needed bul fundamental illusion about ourselves and others because we are not consistent.We are not coherent. We do nol always decido things reasonably. Weare unaware of how we decide and even "who" is deaidine for us.*

This collection of sclvcs is a construction. to Omstein. Accordin8 to his view, we ate

not bom with any real, individual self, rather we construct one oul of the many

"selves" of vhich we are made, and these, in tum, are based on the different kinds of

information available to us. This integration and compilation ta-kes place most lilely in

the frontal lobcs of the brain.a Here, he moves into the vicinity of Poppel, since thcy

both assume thal consciousness arises in the brain. Omstein is not quite as explicit on

this point, but his postulation rcgarding lhe locus of integration cenainly intimates as

much.

We should be wary at this point, however, for Omstein is not always real clear

on what he regards consciousness to be. The above quotation is directed toward the

conc€pt of'self.' The aspects of self which b€come its constiruent elements are char'

acterized as "mhd.' There are c€rtainly a number of similarities, even overlappings

between consciousness and mind, bul they arc still not congmenl concepts. He says:

Consciousness is the toD Dan of the mental oD€ratine svstem and is sensi-tire lo transient change's in our circumsuncei. our t6oi suppl). innerstates, extemal threats - its contents carcen from one emergencv toanorher. from emergency to necessiry, conslanrly noring ani sig;ficanl

Ihrough a Gtass Da I Pase 55

I I I. Cuftent Co6ciiLrness

changes h the world. It embodies the policy of "Don't call me unlesssomething new and exciting happens.'')'

And ts,o imponanl pohts arise from this statemenl. First. we can see that conscious-

ness, even as the organizing aspect of mind and self is selective in natur€. Secondly,

this statement implies aJl active nature to consciousness. As we saw i! rcgard to Pdppel

above, consciousness is an active mechanism, nol a passive registerirg of sensory

input. There is a definite activity that takes place that we call consciousness. It is

outward-oriented and it is intimately related to our ability to survive. Still, the process-

es involved are both active and selective;t two irnponant poirts for underslandingwhere Omstein has fnritioned hinrsclf in this matt(r.

Associaled with the multiplicity that he sees in relation to consciousness in

Eieneral, Omstein identifies two prirDary mqles of consciousDess as well, onc linear and

rational. the o(hcr int!i(ive and aiational.'r These two modcs ofconsciousness arc

closely associated with the left brd,in/right brain metaphor introduced by Roger Sperry

some time ago. AlthoDgh many pmfroncnts of lhis theory fell into the pitfall of ascribing a dominance lo lhe lefl. or rational. hemispheB. Omslcin avoids this prublematic.

It is his contention lhat consciousness must be seen in its entirety; one should not f(xus

on one aspecl to the exclusion of the other. Both modes of consciousncss are needcd to

adcquatcly describc thc phenomenoD, for as he iniimates wilhout statinfi expressly,

consciousness is actually mor. than thc sum of these t\ro pans. In facl. it is Omslein's

conlention (and here he aligns mnre closely with Gebser) that we ar€ witncssing a ncvt

synthesis which will result ir an expanded understanding of man. Of course, this

concept is coDsciousness'based and encompasses al leasl the fo))owing four primary

features:

l Ttr'o major modes of consciousness exisl in man, and function il acomplementary manner. Since the dominant mode in our cukure isvcrbal and rational, recognition of their existence i.!olves us in a culti-vation of the seJond mode, the irruitive ard holistic. Thefirst mde isactive, associated with our biological sun,ival, the dry in our metaphorThe second mode is recepive, and conslitules the dark, subtle area ofconsciousness, the n/g/r/-2. Our personal and scientific anention is b€ing shifted hward, to theirnponanct of consciousness itself as an objecl of inquiry. and to ttes€lf-control of intemal states. Physiological fe€dbacl research thusinvolves a fundamental redirgction of lechnolosv toward the intemal.ather than the extgmal cnvircnmert.

Paee 56 Through o Cl'1ss Dafl}

lll Cune Co^'.,ru-,n?:s

3. Man is Dot so clos€d a system as the westem scientific communityonc€ thoughl. We are sensitive and permeable to subtle sourc€s ofene.gy from geophysical and human forc€s which often lie unnoticed inthe brilliance of the day.4. The conc€pts of "normal" and 'paranormal" are in proc€ss of change.It was, for instanc€, pleviously considered "pararotrnal" lo claim self'contml of the "autonomic" nervous svstem or to claim sensitiviw tosublte geophysical stimuli. I

It can be seen, then, that for Omstein, consciousness will b€come the foundation for a

new apareness of ourselves, of what it meals to be human.

Consciousness seems to be tie orgaiizing principle for rercring to and assimilat-

ing our exFrience so thal we may function and sunive in the sorld. In coDtrast lo lhe

uniform idea of consciousness presentcd by P6ppel, Omstein sees lhe self composed of

a multiplicity of minds organized aJound a central core idea. Allhough Omslein's con'

ception has a sttung biological component, he leaves the door open for an expandcd

understanding of the term and prcvides an accounting for the unquantillablc aspects of

tle functioning of mind. In thc formcr point. he is similar to Poppcl; in thc lancr hc

divergcs from P6ppcl in a signilrcant asfr,ct. It is interesting to nore Omslein's rccog

nition and dcscriplion of the changc of consciousness he sees in modcm man.

tulletier

Pelletier (1978) tales Omstein's position a step funher, *hile anticipaling

Neumann and Young. who wc wil l rEvie$'a l inle latcr.55 It is Pelletier's atlempt to

inlegiate a number of positions on consciousncss in a prolegomenon of sciencc of

consciousness. He altempts to overcome the dualislic discussions that characterize

much of what is written on this subject. While many adherc to lhe physio-biological

view proposed by Poppel, there is growing numb€r of res€archers and writers who tend

toward the other end of the spectrum, almost abandoning the flrm ground of science far

the mther uncritical accephnc€ ofEastem ihought io rEgard to mind. Both Capra and

Omstein have addrcssed this panicular issue in reaso$able terms. There is sornething

to be learned frorn the East, to be surc, but il cannot occur ir ar uncrirical maffier.

Funher, there is also a group of writers who approach the subject flom a purely psy-

chological p€Np€ctive, and these two tend toward throwing the baby out with the bathwater. As Gebser has pointed out, integration is Decessary, and while trot rcferring to

Thtough a cLrts DarrJ\

I I L Cuncnt Corrscinusness

him sp€cincaly, Pellelier males a strong case for tra.nscending the dualism chamctedz-

ing the current discussian in favor of rgconciliation and integ"ation of the oppgsitions

involved.s

Pal of this difference in approach has bcen driven by developments in the ar€a

of quantum physics vhich have had notic€abje iDfluenc€ on thinking in the area oi

consciousness- We will not dwell on the specific influences now nor tie attitude quan

tum physics takes toc'ards the phenomenon of consciousness for this is the topic of the

next subs€ction. For now it should suffice to note that the differcnt understandhg of

the relationship berween the observer and thc observed and the consequent rrvised view

of ihc interaction between mind and maner that form a primary focus of quantum

physical considcrations is whal has prompted the gencral rc-evaluation of our undcr-

standiDg of consciousness as presented by Pellctier.s'

This is nol to vy, however, thal Pelleticr discards any nolions of thc im;xrnancc

of neurophysiological activily, in fact he takes quite an expanded view of the rclc ofphysicality in thc area of consciousness. He stales:

Recognition of lhc inlerconncclion\ bclween statcs of consciousncss andvariations in neurophysiological activiry supports an expanded concept ofawarencss thal contends that the entirE orranism is an exDr€ssion ofconsciousness and various components of-ar individual'i to|al consr.ious-ness are localed throughoul the body.s

This stand brings Pcllcticr quite close lo the position held by most F-astem religions ard

the westem esoteric tradition.t'

Of course, this view strikes righl at thc hean of the current scientific parddigm.

There are simpl' limits to what this pa-radigm can ascenain and understand. Theselimitations can no longer restrain (he advance of thinking and are b€ing called iotoquestion. As Gebser has shown and others have maintained, lhe deterministic view ofscience is brcakin8 down; Pelletier contends that he nexr level of rcality beyond this is

consciousness itself, which by its very natur€ demands different methods ofobservation

and an extension of the current ptu"digms. The limitations, it should be remembered,

he ttr the interpreta or of the data ascenained thmugh science and not in the datathemselves. Derivirg its interpretations as il does from a panicular spac€-time concepr,science soeks to observe phenomena located at panicular space-time coordinates. Pelle-tier maintains that such observations should be qualified by the observer's particulat

tuq" 58 Through o Gktss DorkJr

I I L Cuftent Co^'cio6ness

$ate of consciousness. which is itself characte.ized by its owrl space-time rchtionship

10 the events observed; different strate of consciousness, different variables to be ob-

sorved and interpreted. The cons€quence of this apprcach js that we must bring

c€nsciousngss itself to bear upon our observations; morp sophisticated and finely tuned

instrumentation will not suffice. The ramifications fora wide variety of areas of study,

fiom tie mind body interaction to psychosomatic disorders to leaming.d'

These charges in our understarding of the phenomenon of consciousness aJ)d its

rale in scientific inquiry are demanded, in pan, fmm a Evised understanding of the

concept of evolution. Pelletier poirls out thal classical evolutionary tlreory lacks a

complete explanation of biological evolution and in no way addresses nonmaterial

phcnomena, such as aspiiations, values, or man's ability to Eflect upon himselt- Thc

conclusion general)y dnwn, then, is that man is an extraordinarily clevcr animal lhal

arose in the course of a randomly geneErled pnrcess. Recent developments in guantum

physics, for examplc. as well as the devclopmenls in related aEas arc now calling this

vicw very much inio question.6' Pclleticr would like very much to see an evolutionary

theory thal addresses both mental and biological evolution.d AlthouSh Gebser was

unlnown to hirn at the time, he does rel) on the work of Arthur Young lo pnrvide ai

leasr an initial approach in this area. Inasmuch as wc will be reviewing Young's work

a linle later, we will not pu.sue this panicular aspect of Pellelier's conception right

now.

In summary, then, we can say that Pelletier proposes a broader and more

comprehensive understanding of consciousness than thosc reviewed before. Hc scas

consciousncss as an all encompassing phenomcnon thal conlribules to its own undcr

sunding as it contribules to our unde6tardin8 of the world in which we live. He cites

the lecent developments in quantum physics, for example, a rcason to re-evaluate our

approach to scientific understanding and as a possibility for transcending the limitations

of the current scientific world view Pelletier goes beyond the purely biophysical

understalding of consciousness to irclude tie "awareness" of tbe body as well as the

mind. The previously clea y defined line between mind ald mafter is thereby erased

ard we aJ€ forced to rcconsider the nature of this relationship in rggard to the role it

plays in the functioninS of consciousness. To Pelletier, then, consciousness is not a

pu.€ly humar phenomenon, but human consciousness is pgrhaps the most highly

evolved examDle gf il that we hoe,

Through a GLL,S DarH) Pose 59

L Cuftent Consciot tness

Wlf snd Quo$un Physics

It is clear that quantum physics has nothing dircctly to do vith consciousness.

Or does it? What is clear, however, is that the developments in this branch of sciencehave had a signilicanl impact on thinking in regard to consciousness from both psy-

chological and philosophical perspectives. In this subsection, I e,,ill not anempt to justi-

fy tie connections between the manifestation and observation of subatomic phenomena

and the consciousness of man (or the universe, for that matter), rather I will restrictmyself to those ideas and notions that bear directly on the matter at hand.

Thc leading spokesman for the consciousness conne.tion is perhaps Fred AlanWolf(1981, 1984, 1988). Fundamentally, the role quantum physics plays in the studyof consciousness is spistemological: how can we know what we know? The wor* of

the quantum physicists revealed that the obscrver by the very act of obsewation, at leastat the subatomic level. influences the outcome of his observations. This has far-reaching ramifi€tions for our undeastanding of oursclves and the universe we in}abit.Il the observation changes what has been observcd, how can we ever be surc of whatwe observed? How can we predict oulcomes ofobscn'ations when we cannot know

ahead of time what those outcomes could be? How can we gain certainty in our studies, if therc are certain things we simply cannot know? These arE crucial questions andthey must be addressed. Al(hough il has not been demonstrated beyond any and allreasonable doubt that quantum physical laws apply to macfilcosmological phenomena,

therc is a gmwing body of evidcnc€ thar rhis is the case.The similarities become even stronger when one conside.s that the notions that

play a crucial .ole in quantum physical thinking are exactly those that Gebser idenrifiesas critical to undeNtanding the transition of consciousness states that *e are experienc-ing at the present time. These ar€ the notions of "space" and, of even more impor-tanc€, "time. " Our understardings of these conc€pts changed drastically with the inuo-duction of Einsteir's Theory of Relativity, to be surc, but as we pointed out earliet thiswas just the begiming of a much more radical redirection of our undentandhg in whatwas to come. Associated with these concepts is another that plays a sigrfficant rcle ir|Wolf's work, namely "parallel universes.' Through the introducrion and exploration ofparallel universes, Wolf is able to demonstrate more clearly how consciousness can or

tuge & Thtough a Class Da r

I. Cunent Cotaciousness

cannot come into e)dstence. The reader is dirgcted to wolf's books themselves for a

more detailed explanation of this interaction. For now, however, it is merely my intent

to introduce the fundamental concepts involved Egarding consciousness.

Yet, bow does consciousness fit into the whole scheme ofthings? According to

wolf, the key to underslanding this question lies understanding the rcle of interaction.

Quantum physics deals primarily with the probabilities of outcomes in rpgard to events.

The various 'states" in which system may b€ in relation to an event are expressed in

terms oftiese probabilities. The idea of "memory" can be int(duc€d when the idea of

time and the probability of re occurrence of panicular slates in any of the probable

parallel universes. It can be secn that alRrady, in order to explain the phenomena, we

have had to resort to the use of such anlhropocentric terns as "memory." But, this is

exactly what is requircd. By having thc subsystcms interact, lheir combined probabili

ties change acrcss the various potential and possible universes in unique and special

ways. In order to keep track of prcvious (and subsequent) states, various memones

have to be collected and stored. Inthe ordering and sto.ing ofthe knowledge of thesc

states, it can be seen how some ordering principle is r€quircd. This is the role that

consciousncss plays. Here we recognize thc influence this thinking has had on Pelleti

er, for example. Continual inteiaction of the subsystems give rise to resonarces of

pmbabilities; her€ various stales have influences on other states within the total system

and bnnches thereof. These resonances are what give rise to feelings and, later, io

knowledgeable stales * when pursued in some detail similaritics to Gebser's sequence

of consciousness development begin to mate themselves known.

wolf is convinced that quantum pbysics has much to offer other disciplines,panicularly psychology, in regards to the understaoding of consciousness. ln panicu

lar, his second work, Stat\|ave, was, in fact a preliminary aftempt to establish a true

humanistic psychology based upon the principles of quantum physics. lt is Wolf's

contention that we could leam much and unde.stand a great deal about the workings of

the mind were we to have a more universal and firm grasp on quantum physical princi

ples. In that consciousness is that which arises from the intenction of various subsys-

tems within the total system, and e3ch of us experienc€s these interactrons in our own

way, it becomes clear thal what we rsfer to as "reality" is really an agreed upon prem-

ise based upon our individual and collective understandings of what it is we have

observed (that is, experienced). Herc we see an overlap with both Pdpp€l and Omstein

Throuth o Gt&rs Da ! PaK 61

I I L Cunent Consciou-tness

vho postulated tle development of the individual constructs of self, othe.s, and

consciousness in general.

Mahood

Another model of consciousness that varies somewhat from those prcs€nted thus

farhasbeendevelopedbyMahood(1991).'Hisintentwasloclarifywhattakesplace

when we dre and when we leam. Inthe first pan ofhis aflicle, he pres€nts an ex-

tremely sirnplified model of mind, as rbown ir Figure 10.

[9MMr]NrcAroN I

I N T T R P R ! l A I L O I !

Fitur. lO

At every momenl of our waking livcs we are confronted witb and bombarded by

a multitude of stimuli, as was also pointed out by Poppel, Omstein, and Pelletler

above. We aJe constantly busy filtering. soning. selecting, paying atlention to and

ignoring these stimuli in o.der not to become overwhelmed by them and so that we can

make senso of whgre we aJe and what we aJe doing. In other words, our p€rception is

selective in its assimilation of input-Once the perceplions arc therD, some kind of deci

sion has to be made. This decision making phase is characterized by two basic ques-

tions, namely: what is il? and what does it mean? we continually try to make s€nse

oul of the impressions we arc receiving. In olher words, we interprel these perc€p-

tions. Since we are human beings, however, we are quite often overcome by the desire

to let othen know about the things we have s€en, felt and done; we strive for "agrge-

ment," in wolf's terms. !n othe. wo.ds, we try to 9e[!ID!!!@]!9 our perceptions ard

interpretations to others. we have to ask ourselves, however: what is it lhat we ate

communicating to othen? If we take our model seriously, we see that what we

communicate to others, thruugh Inng]lage, is, at best, or y out interp.etation of someth-

ing els€. Now, this is ilne for extemally present, physical phenomena, but what of

those things unseen?

In times of unwaking, such as ir sleep and dreams, and, perhaps, intense, deep

Page 62 Throush a Gl'1:s Dad'

L Cun€nt Conscou-rness

Deditation, communication with this mosl inner mind occu.s. Impressions, thoughts,

flashes of irsight, colors, smells, or any number of a vafiety of combinations of these

are prEsented to our generdl consciousness, often without our full understanding of their

significance. It is only after we have continued to meditate and reflect upon these

communications that they make complete sense to us. This is not always the case but is

often enough so. Il is Mahood's contention that the process which occurs as a result of

this communication which allows us to be aware of tle thought or impression is a form

of p€rc€ption. It is not the physical perception spoken of above, it is not the conscious,

analyical selection and i tering of sense data, rather it is a becominli awaJe of someth

ing that was not recognized beforc. Perc.?tion is a gft)d name for this since we are not

always aware of the presence of such a stimuli, just as in waking we arc not fully

cognizant of the multitudinous impressions reaching our sensations every s€cond. It is

s€lective in that we must have conditioned ourselves to b€ing receptive to them. We

have learned to be awarc of their prusence. Although not so analyticrlly structured as

thc similar proccss which takcs placc ir our conscious mind, we do, in a manner,

analyze and examine the impressions given to us. We allempt io integrate thcm into thc

complete fabric of our existence and being we do this on the basis of things we knoq,

things we have leamed, and socialir.ation prmesses lo which we have been exposed.

Consequently, I would likc to expand the model pmposed above to includc the

unconscious realm and utilizc "inlcrprctation" as thc bridge between them. Our model

would tlen look like this:

coN5crouS UNCONSCIOUS

O B J E C l V I {:'rrFrr'!, , , \, \

su{Jl tclvt

- >f ** u""^ I,,4

5 U B J E C ] I V EoS l t cT rvE

Throueh a Glass DorH) PoSe 63

I 11. Cuftent Consciousr.:s

It is Mahood's p.imary purpose to ircrease the awareness of the proc€ss al|d

elements involved in understandinS the world in and around us. It is a help in our

understanding if we have a notion rEgardil|g whal is irvolved ir that undcrslanding. It

is the interrelationship of these thr€€ elements - percsption, interprotation, and

communication -- that provides us with a basis for leaming, knowledge and comprehen-

sion. ll should b€ remembered thar this process, lhis movement through the interrela-

tionships of tiese thre€ elements is something that is clnrinually happening. It happens

during our waling and during our unwaking hours. There is no conceivable instrncc

when we arc not enga8ed in this process. Neverthsless, the proc€ss does not control

us, as Mah(rd points out; we control the proccss, if we desirc to.

Erich Neumann (1954/1945) is the irnt of those wc are rcviewing who deals

specifically with thc origins and history of consciousness. which is, incidonl2lly, thc

title of the English trinslation of his work. This he docs frum the pcnpectivc of anal)'l

ical psychology, in thc t.adition of Carl Gustnv Jung. Ar Feuerstein poin(s out, it is

noteworthy that both Neumann and Gebser werc associated with the Erdnos Circle

which has formcd amund Jung. both were bom in 1905, ard both develop(, paJ'allel,

seminal works which uere publishcd in l94q; ncilhcr, howe|er, reterred lo otbe.*Nevertheless, each had a unique approach and (|nderstanding which was bmught to txrr

upon this most centrdl topic.Neumann describes the evolulion of consciousness fralr| two primary poinls of

view: the evolution of consciousness itself, and, true to his analytici -psychological

background, the development of individual p€rsonality- The ilrst of these deals primar-

ily with the mythological stages in the evolution of consciousness. He examines this

d€velopmenl in terms of three groups, or t)pes, of mFhs: cr€ation mtths, hero m).ths,

and transformation myths. The first of these Foups deals not only with the creation of

the world, or universe, per sd, ralher deals witb the initial stirrings of self in the indi,vidual as wetl. There is a cenaiD similarify lo Gebser's description of the transitionfrcm the archaic to magical structure of consciousness in thal Neumann describes thenebulous, alnost dr€€Jn-like realization of a rudimentary s€ns€ of self. The pimary

image, or archetlpe, to be de€lt wirh at this stage is the Uroboros, or s€rpent who biles

PaSe 64 Throuth o Glass Dora,

L Cunent Cotrsclousness

its own tail. This archet]?e, according to Neumann, rspresents the totality of existence

out of which all arises. Closely associated herewith and developing soon ther€afler, of

course, were the cults of the Eanh Mother from which all life sprung.

Through a process of htrojection and projection, though, the individual, panicu-

larly the male (or the rnale aspect of self) leams to confront this primal archeq?€.

There is a consolidation of awarcness, an ircreased egoification that takes place. The

individual slowly acquires a more defrned sense of individuality over and against the

primary, originat focus of his awareness, the Great Mother. It is this focusing of self

and a awaJeness of the requirements levied upon it if it is to be frw and conscious. It

must rise up and slay both mother and father (archetlpically spcaking); the hero ls

bom.* It should bc kcpt in mind, howcvcr, that "the hero m).th is never concemcd

with the private history of an individual, but always wilh some prototypal and transp€r-

sonal event of collcctive significance. ""'

This last point is imponant for il brings us to thc last stage of evolulion repre

sentcd by thc transformation m),th. In this stagc, thc hcm acquires the treasure held

caplive by the dragon (umboros). oflen rcpresenled by grcal wcalth or a virgin. The

hero frccs himsclf from his duty, hc liberates himself by overcoming thal which has

hcld him back and has captivated him ir its own way. Here he complete overcomes the

unconscious aspects of himsell and is transformed into a conscious, aware individual

who is free to come and go as he pleases, who can make his own choices in life. The

hcro bccomcs his own person, to usc thc modcrn dcscription of this phenomenon.

Whal is true in the collective is, in Neumann's view, true for the individual as

well. He writes:

The evolution of consciousness bv slaees is as much a collective humanphenomenon as a panicular individuaiphcnomenon. Ontogenetic devel-opmenl may therefore b€ regarded as a modified recapitulation of phylo-Senetic development.d

Just as the unbom individual rr arero rslr€ats the phylogenesis of its kind, at least inpdnciple, so too does the development of the consciousness of the individual recapitu-late that developmenl of all other people.a This idea is only implied, at best, h theother models of consciousness that ee have considered tbus far: no wher€ is the issue

specifically addressed. This idea takes on a sp€cial significatc€ in Neumann's work for

Throush o Ctass Da.al tu8e 65

IIL Cutent Consciow4s

he anempts to sbow the odgins of consciousness itself. Most of the other writers wehave reviewed have shned with the assumption that consciousness just is. Petletier, attl|e end of his book includes a chapter on the evolution of consciousness, but it is takenalmost wholly from Young, whom we will review next. The r€al significance of theootogeny-phylogeny connection lies in its addrcssing of the universality of the phenom-enon of consciousness, an idea thal is becoming ever more central to the thinking ofmany in regard this subject.

In sum, then, Neurnann views consciousness as an ever-incrcasing internaliza-tion of awarcness and objective analytical ability that leads to an awareness of self andthe ability to choos€ and act with frcedom in the world. The process is one of recognition, struggle, overcoming, and eventual victory through thc incr€asingly intensifiedintroje.ction of experience with extemal factors and intemal archctypal images. Hisanalytical psychological approach seems less limiting than the more biologically oriented approaches we reviewed earlier

Young

The lasl researcher whose ideas on consciousness we will examine is ArrnurYoung (1976). Like Neumann and Gebscr, his concem is with the genesis and development of consciousness in man ir general, as well as in thc individual in panicular.Young apparcntly has no knowledgc of (al least he did nol consider) Neumann norGebs€r, bul pr€sents a model lhat drcs justice to the breadlh and deplh of the phenome-non under investigation.

Young's model of consciousness evolution is cosmological in scope. It also hasvery p|actical consequenc€s and applications. He begins wilh an assumption that b.ingshim very clos€ to both Gebser and Neumann in thal he postulates all of creation, thcuniverse, arising out of a single point, which he terms the morud. ll is this singular,unitary oneness that is the sourc€ of everything else. Gebser temed this monad Spirit;to Neumann, it was the greal unconscious, the Urcborus.a This characteristic alonedifferentiate Young from many orher witers on the subject, for they are often loarhe toaddrcss this panicular idea for fear of the conclusions thal may have to be drawn, orthe facton $at may have to be included in theL models. In my opinion it is a falsesense of security thar arises from the rcjection of this imponant poim. yet, given rhis

Pos. 66 Throuth a Cllzts Do l

111 Cun?at Co^clo\qss

slarting point, there are then a number of criteria that describe the model as a whole.

These cal be sunrmarized ir: tbe followine list;''

l. The universe is a process thar is put into motioo by putpos€.

2. Tbe developmenl of this process occurs in stages, of which thete arc

seven; and each stage develops a new power

3. These pnwers are cumulative; that is, the powers at ary one stage

rBtain all the powers developed in pr€viols stages.

4. Tbe powers evolve in what nray be called kingdoms, and these may

bc summarizcd as follows:

fuwer

a. Potential

b- Substance

c. Form (iden(ity)

d. Combination

c. Organizationf. Mobil ity

Kingdont

Light

Nuclear Panicles

Atoms

Molocules

Plants

Animalsg. Dominion Man

5. These kingdoms can be aranged on what may be tcrmed an arc of

pn)gress in which the early slage\ tale on more and morr constminl

until this is mirximized, at *,hich point there is a tum: subscquent

stages see the overcoming of thesc constraints and the development

of frEedom. This freedom is actuallv random in the firsl half and

controlled in lhe sscond.

6. The descent and ascent of the kingdoms pass through four levelswhich correspond to the concepts ofp!?oJe, rolue, concept, and

narciol universei also, tlere is a fundamental asymmetry to the

model i! thal the stages on the Ieft and righr of the arc should be

considered the inverse of one another.

7. Each stage of the overall process is itself a process ir which itsassociated power develops in ar anaiogous manner

A graphical tepresentation of this model is provided in Figure 12.

Throush a Glass Datkb PaEe 67

11 l. Cudcnt Cot\sciousn"ss

This is a most elegant, yet powerful model. What is more, tieE are particular

aspects of it that arc quilc rcminisc€nt oI Gebser's. For instance, th€re is the idea ofprogressing through clearly defined, discrstc, cumulativc stcps. Each stage in Young'smodel, as *ell. could bc undcrstood in tenns of iltensity: on the left side il could be

considcrcd a densificalion, in fact. The ever incre3sing tendcncy toward manifcstalion

is also refloctcd in both. Another imponant feature of thc t$o models is thc tendcncy

toward lib€ration, the increase of frecdonl. As Gebser bas poinled out, the "a " prefix

in his terminology - such as arational, apenpeclival, and acausal - should be consid-

ered u alpha pivatiyrrn (from the l-atin pivare meaning "to libcrate") as opposed loan alpha negativum.r EmMied in this idea aJe the notions of overcoming, transcen-dencc, and supercession.

Young presenls us with a teleological model thal addresses the full spcctrum ofconsciousness. Action, activity, purpose, direction, but above all cognition are keyterms lo describe Young's understanding. He finds strcng confirmation of the teach,ings of ancient myh and religion in the model he has developed from his understandingof mathematics and quantum physical theory as well as the theory of relativity. Helmds that the model he developed provides a paradigm that describes "a dynamic,reflexive universe wherein science and mysticism, data and values, structurs andpurpose equally coe)dst. "R Consciousness is the ubiquitous, organizirg principle, so tos?eak, that allows us to be, io know, and to value; ard if provides as pell a basis forexploration and undentanding which car bring a good dose of c€rtainty into ar other-wise uncenain world.

Page 68 Through a Gtess Da r"

L Cunznt Conscit(tness

What Do€s It AII Meao?

Up until now I have r€frained fmm making maly evaluative statements rcgard-

irg the vaious models and th9ories I have presented. My reluctance to state categori-

cally what I believe consciousness to be has been a conscious act on my part. I felt it

would be best to allow the various writers to sp€al( for th€ms€lves first before puning

my own interpretation on them. The bias toward Gebser, howeve!, is obvious lnas

much as one clearly stated purpose of this paper has been to make him mor€ well

known in this country. Still, Gebsef too, can only be properly understood in context,

and the additional information on both the history and currEnt state of thinking in regard

to consciousness has served to provide that context.variety Tb do this, I should like to

firsl summa.ize what we have covered thmugh oul this paper And so, the time has

come to tie up thc loose ends and p€rhaps coalesce the scveral ideas and imprcssions

that have arisen into a coherent whole. After this an evaluation and consolidation of lhe

ideas, notions, and apprcaches will take placc. Finally, I would like to at leasl iaise

sone questions regarding wherc our newly found understandinll can talie us.

Sumnuiing Transirion

We began ourjoumey ir Part I by posing the question, "What is

consciousness?" This is a difficult question to answer. The association of conscious

ness with our objeclive, thinkin8 faculties, with "mind" is an casy one to make. Yet,

there is another dimension to consciousness that could be connected to the emotions, to

spirit, or soul, or other dimensions of the individual that do not always receive adequate

attention within the paradigms of our current scientific thinking. Of coune, some maynol even care whether we know exactly whal consciousness is, for they may associatethe concept with the physio-chemical processes thal occur in the brain whenever we (or

any animal with a brain for that maner) engages is "mental" activiry. Yet, we showed

that consciousness is an imponant concepl, since it is the foundation, the underpinning

to all our functionirg, hence it was determined that a more adequate framework for

understalding consciousness should be established.Tb structure our explorations, I posed the thrge mosl fundamental, meaningful,

and perennial questions for man: Who am I? Vr'hence did I come? and Wither am I

Thtouth a Class Da y Page 69

L Cunc CntL\ciasess

going? we related these to three Primary aspects of eteological?' inquiry, oamely the

ontological, cpistemological. and a^iological This led us thmugh an irvestigation of

what it is about "man" that males him sp€ciat, unique' and distinctive of all the

creatur€s of the earth. Biological-a.natomical chardcteristics such as walkirg upright

artd opposable thumbs were considered as were more cognitive characleristics, such as

his ability for la.nguage. While all ofthese were seen to be imPonant in their own

right, they *ere not sufficieDl lo exPlain maD's disiinctive status His t€asoning abili-

ties in general werc also considercd, but thes€ two were lacking However, man's

awaEness of self - his awareness of his being : Pas identified as a contributing factor'

Ir| addition, his abilily to gain knowledge and experience oot only through his five

senses ard in actual parlicipation in expcriential events bul also via abslract media time

and space displaced fmm theit ori8iDal occuttence was also idenlificd Finally, his

ability to al|ticipatc, to structure and influence his future was added in as well- This

abiliry lo val e and evaluate plays an imfnrtant mle as well. Yel, all of thcsc abilitiei

do nol exisl independent of onc another, and it was postulated thal consciousness,

manifesting f.om lhe three dimensions jusl identified' accounted for man's uniqucnes\

in thc $otld.

In our historical oveniew, we found thal prior (o lhe Greels we have little

knowledgc of how man thought (that is. until Gcbscr's opus addcd a stronE light on the

maner). We did se€, however, thar enrly on little distinclion was made belween p'DchP

arrd pneum{t, trtwecn soul and spirit, and it was thesc aspcats of malr thal accounted for

his uniquc status. The church, onc€ il became established, did much (o perpcruatc this

approach, but around the Renaissance a far reaching and significanl charge iook place'

Man's r€orienlation loward himself, the more rigorous punuit of knowledge through

systenatic inquiry gave rise. eventually, lo lhe emPiricisls and Descartes who essential

ly banned the unseen from that inquiry. The relegation of matters of the spirit to the

private, perhaps teligious, sphere enabled science (o esiablish itself as the vlle acqulsl

tor of knowledge. The scienlific method and the assumptions upon which il was found-

ed maiched euphorically fort'ard until the tum of the curtent century when its very

foundations began ro crumble.

The contributors to this shakeup of the scientific world came from a variety of

disciplines: Freud from psychology and psychoanalysis; Husserl and Heidegger from

philosophy; Einstein, Planck, Heisenberg, ar|d othen fmm physics. Both fmm within

tug.e 70 ThtouSh a G|tss Da j

111. Cunen, Conscio6ness

and from without our undentarding of the univeNe based on the Newtonian notion of a

finely tuned clockwork was called into question. Quantum physics i.n paflicular, along

with rslativity theory r€vealed newly required and rEvise concepts of spac€ and time;

they showed that tierE were things that man simply could not know. The hop€ and

aspirdtion of science to provide mankind one day with complete knowledg€ disappeared

and werc r€placed by uncertainty.

ln Pan n, then, the work of Jcan Gebser was prcsented. Gebser offers a

comprehensive, insightful, and in{epth examination of the nature and state of con-

sciousness and where it has come over tie course of man's existence on eaith. Prefac

ing this review with a brief review of what constitutcs a theory and making a dislinction

between traditional and evolutional approaches to the subject, we spenl so re tine

outlining Gebser's thought. We provided some biographical background as well in

ordcr to provide a b€tter fmmework for understanding Gebser as a person. Wc saw

that Gebser proposes a developmental scheme of emergent consciousness that encom

passes five states, or structurcs, thal have occurfed via four discontinuous, quantum

likc mutations throughout man's history. These arc nol simple paradigm shifts, rathcr

lhey constilute radically different ways of experiencing ieality- These stmctures were

identified as the A.chaic, Magical, Mythical, Mental, and Integral (to which we are

transitioning at this time). A funhcr key elemcnt of Gebser's thinking involved the

concepts latency and tmnsparency- Whal manifests is Spirit, as il is identified by

Gebser, and through the various structures it is this which bccomcs evor less latenl

lcadin8 to a greater tr:rnspaEncy (as seeing thmugh, not in the sense of seeing through

a pane of glass, but rather a seeing through to the hean, or essence, of somethinS). We

also saw thal each of these slructures of consciousness (except the Archaic) encompass-

es an efficient and deficient mode. The rise and fall of each sttucture parallels thecyclical chaiacter of nature itself.

Each of the structures is chaidcterized by particulal features. The Archaic

structure of our most arcient a-nceston can be likened to a state of de€p, dreamless

sleep. Man is hardly differentiated fIom nature in afly sense, and consciousness is in

total unity with the environment. A shift occurred perhaps some 750,000 or moreyears ago, and a rudimentary sense of self emeryed. This led to the egoless, s?aceless

and timeless Magical structure. In later, mlthological times, this would b€ remem-

bered as tbe Fall. Consciousness here is collective, we-based, tribal and barely differ-

Thtou9h a GIa-'s Da r

L Cunent Consciou:ness

entiated in legard to the individual. It is a one-dimensional, pre-perspectival existence

thal occun in a slcep-like state. Around 40,000 8.c., another shift occutred which

brought about a rapid advance in tool-making ability and the development of elementary

cultur€. The experienc€s of Magical man werc crdified and developed through

m]'thology. Ilrlguage b€comes ever morc imponarl and the oral tradition develops.

Man shifts from an emotional to imaginalive mode of consciousness that has a dream

like quality to it. This is a two-dimensional, unperspectival structure of consciousness

characterized by polar ambivalence rather than unitary oneness as earlier With the

coming of the Greeks, though, another shift occurred whcrcby the mental faculties of

man became mor€ irnponant. Man stepped out of the mythical circle, so to speak into

three dimensional awarcness. Space b€came an important notion, even if this notlon

was not fully mastcrcd until thc Rcnaissancc. Hcre we find the developmenl of per

spective in its true sense, as we understand it today. Conccptual thinking, ideation, and

philosophy become imponanl aspects of man's activilies. In a s€nse, man has awak-

ened fmm his previous slumbers and dreaminS and he b€comes awarc of himself as

wcll as othcrs. Thc individual is txrm. Man was not to sbp there, however, even if it

was this structure thal gave us the scientific method and thc progrcss of scicnce. In

stead, Gebser identifies a significant transformation thal we are undergoing right now.

A new shift is occurring frcm the cenainty and perspoctival, rdtional thought of the

Mental structure into the arational, aperspectival Integral stnrcture of consciousness- In

this stagc transparency rcaches its maximum point whilc latency recedes to a minimum.

Timc is concept to master now and the dcvelopmcnts in rclalivity theory, quanlum

physics and philosophical inquiry are incrcasing in importance and intensity. Gebser's

work can provide us with much-needed understanding of our current slate so that this

tran\ition can be madc most effecli\ely.

Gebser, however, is not the only one to have pointed out thal we are i-n a transi-

tional state, oeither is he the only one to address the subject of consciousness. With the

sudden increase in anention given to the transitional naturc of the world today, there

has been a simultanmus intensification ofthe hquiry into consciousness. Renewed

interest has been spa*ed in this aEa, both from researchers fi.rmly entrenched in thepassing paradigms and from those seeking new methods ard approaches. ln Pan m,

we took the time to review a number of approaches to the subject of consciousness.

Only one rspres€ntative insisted on a purcly biophysical explanation of consciousness,

Page 72 Thrau|h a do:s Da l

lll Cunenr Cortsciousess

ard this eas P6ppel. Inlerestingly enough his own approach centered around lhg clar'

iJication of our consciousness of time- Though unwilling to acknowledge an immate.ial

element to consciousness, his work provides solid, empirical evidence in supporl of

other work. Omstein shares a physical staning point with Pdppel, bu( was willing to

introduce concepts and appmaches bas€d on esoterism and Eastem philosophy and

religion. His primary postulate was the presenc€ of many minds, not a single unified

entity as generally assumed for the individual. Pelletier, on the other hand, vent even

funher in anempting !o integrate Frst and West and made an initial run at developing a

science of consciousness- Rather than strc5s the purely physical aspects of conscious

ncss, Pelletier, calling upon the work of Young, adv@ated an op€n approach to thc

study of this phenomenon. Ncxt, we t(nk a brief look at the quantum physical conlri

bution to the subject, in pa(icular the work of Wolf. Here, in particular, the concepts

of space and timc play a very imponant rolc. Mah(Xrd's model pointed to a tnune

slructure of lhc mcchanism of consciousness which accounted for both objective and

subiective thinling. Neumann offcrcd u\ ar analytical psychological interpretation of

the evolution of consciousness in general and thc dcvolopment of personality in the

indiridual. Based largcly or thc worl ofJunS, Neunratu)'s approach was far broader in

scope than any of ths other rEsearchers .eviewed lo that point. Finally, thc theory of

consciousness evolution pmposed by lbung was presented- Young prtsenls a seven

stage model of increasing order and powcr that has applicability outside the lleld ofpsychology or philosophy itsclf. His mdlel addrcsses consciousness as a universalphenomenoD that app€ars in all stalles of developnrcnt, fro the tiniesl particlc to the

largest organism.

E|aluatiw Sumn@o

Each of the approaches presenled has something to bring to the table of con

sciousness. Pdpp€l's focus on thg consciousness of time is paniculaily signilicant in

light of the impofiance it has in the Cebserian scheme of things. The changes identified

by Gebser have intensified in recent yqrs. and the imponance of the concept of timehas increased as well. The fact that a materialist such as Poppel would devote as muchenergy as h9 does lo this panicular facel of consciousness is sigdJicanl ir aDd of itself.

Omslein's insis(enc€ on multiplicity is another facror thar plays Pell *ith lhe rone sel

Thtouth a Ct,Lss Da ) Poge 73

IIL CUnc Co^.ciou-rress

by Gebser Diversity, decentralization, nerworking, and the imponance of relation-

ships arong things rather than the things themselves are significant characteristics of

both Gcbser's approach and Omstein's model. Time, as well, plays an imponanl pan

in Omstein's thinking, which is a further confirmation of the imponance of this concepl

at this time. The same applies fo. Pelletier's more integrative approach as well as for

the quantum physical considerations offered by Wolf. The latter. of cou6e. is very

much concemed wilh the space-time dimensions of consciousness, but in tlal Pelletier

builds on Youn8's work brings him closer to this pay ofthinking as well. Young

empbasizes lhe physical, biological, scienlific approach, but not in the traditional

underslanding of this way of thinking. Onc of Young's objectives is lo transcend the

limitations of cudenl thinking and enable a more opcn, flcxible comprehension of

consciousness- This he accomplishes well, il must be rcpcatcd. Evcn Malood's model

which do€s nol address the subjcct of time or space in any spccific terms implies apersonal rea.tion to b()th categories of though( duc to the inte.prctive centerpiece of hi5

modcl.

Implicit in my prcsentation but explici l in Gebser's r*ork is his characteruatronof lhe e rt'rgcnce of Spiril as an aclile. dirsctcd pR)ccss. None of the \I rilers re,viewgd, excepl Maho(d, appear to have ary knowledge of Gebscr's work. Slill. cachiD his o*n way has comc to the same conclusioD as Gcbser in this regard. Cons.lous

ness is an active, individual, directed prqjess and product. The uniformity of rcalilythat we sharc with others is an agrced upon lcaliry. In the Magical structure, and to agrcat extent in the M),thjcal as well, "reality" was experienced in a more uniform ald

collective manner With the cryslallization of the e!io, of the individual (and her€Neumann offers cogent suppon), our understanding of reality b€comcs ildividual aswell. What rcsearchers such as Pdppel, Omstcin, Pelletier, and Mahood have shown isjust how corutructcd reality is for the individual- Neumann. Wolf, and Young, on theother hand. have suce'eeded in pointing out how true this is in a collective sense as well.Pan of the lncenainty we experience and wilh which we musl deal in our lives. tlen. isof our own rnaking, and it arises because *e are often una$/are of the fact thal it is we

ourselves eho is making the reality that we experience. This thought has far-r€achirgramifications for our functiorLing in the world, panicutarly our everyday, pragmatic

dealing with the experiences of our lives. What rve are begiruing to experience,however, is that even though we construct our individual realities, our interrelatedness

Throuth d Glass Da r

IIl. Cufta1! ConscioMss

to others demands that this reality be constrained in some manner We s€€m to beconfronted with a paradoxical situation. That which has liberated us se€ms to hold usback as well. The arrival at such a paradoxical point, though, should give us courage.Just as the struggle with the wave-panicle duality of ljght led to the necessary insightsinto uncenairty and the inte.relatedness of nature, so too could our struggle with theparadox of lib€ration,restraint yield insights thal could move us quickly into the nextstrucfu re 0f consciousness.

Fwure htentiak

Thc task that lies beforc us is lo integrate lhe various understandings of consciousness into a synarstic whole. Ncxt to Gebscr, with whom hc shares some cogcntinsights, Young offers the mosl comprehensi!€ approach to the subject. Where Gebserestablishcs the product end of understanding, young addresses the p(x€ss asp€ct. Asynthesis of these two approaches could be very yielding for the funher study of con-scrcusness. Placed al the cenler of an eteological undcrstanding of consciousncss,other, morc tiaditional studies could be conductcd to clarify, verify, ard exemplifyaspects of the totality.

The results thus derivcd could havc imponant impacts in othcr areas ol sruoy.For example, in spite of thc rapid advances ir computer technology, we are .eally nocloser lo the "thinking" machine than we were 40 odd year.s ago when rhe crcation ofsuch was projected for the near futurr. The databases have gotten much larger and therlles for manipulation have gonen much more sophisticated, but where has the prugrcssremained? I believe that the difficulties that we exp€rience in this area are attributabledirectly to thc overly limited conception of consciousness that is acc€pted in the scien-tific and technological communilies. What we should have leamed from Gebser anorcsearche.s such as Neumann and Young is that consciousness has not been 'engi-

neered" in any sense of the term, rather it has emerged, if you will, according to itsowo precepts, according lo its own rules ard its own dynamic. The imposhion of struc_ture from without whilo not undersEnding the wo*ings within can only lead to failurern my estimation. Gebser offers us a radically needed backdrop against which to eval-uate our current effofts. He ma-kes his case convircingly and with conviction; he offenus a true altemative to our current limited way of thiJ iirg. Combined with young's

Through a Glats Da r Page 75

Ill Cune Co6tiou:n?\\

understanding of process, I believe thal new techrologies can be developed that may not

allow for the crcation of tluly thinliing machines. but *ili take us forsard by an order

of magnitude in the ability ro utilize technology for what it really is: a tool. we ne€d

nol rsplace ourselves (regardless of what devastating effecls we have bad on our envi-

ronment), but ve need to leam from ours€lves so as nol to mafte the sarne mistakes in

the future. The science fiction vision of desttuctive technology and computer systems

run wild is merely an outward projeclion of an irner fear: the fear thal we have Dol

mastercd ourselves, so how could we possible mastcr any oi our creations.

The potential benefit from these ncw technologics could be enorrnous. The

impacl it could have on sch(X)ling and lcarning is alDost incalculable. By the same

token, a fiml understanding of prcvious stnrcrurcs of cansciou5ness opcns up entircly

new vistas in our struggles with all manner of scnsory disorders. By stimulating otherasp€cts of consciousness better cornpensation could be made for deprivation ir any onc

a-rea. and the feedback to those with all sensory organs intact c{ruld bc trcmendour.The same applies, of course, to autistic individuals and othcrs suffering from a laricty

of mental dilorders. Il could be thal many forms of mental illncss we no\[ encountcra.e directly relatcd to the various stnrctures of consciousncis identificd hy Gebscr.

Given their qualitative differencc from our own, it is easy to imaginc how somc forns

of i l lncss are classified as such merclv due lo ihe intensity of difference fnrm our own.There seems 1() be no cnd to the arcas of pra.lical application that could be found for ab€tter understanding of the phcnomenon of consciousness, particularly one based on the

approach described in this paper.

What happens to us in the futurc is entirely up to ut. There is no othcr sp€cies

of creature, conscious or unconscious, that has the potential of man -- potential to good

or bad, it maners not. Our disadvanhge is that *e believe we know whal we ne€d to inorder to function mosr effectively in the rvorld. Our advantage is that we have thepolential to reach the state we beligve we are in alr€ady but ar€ not. We have se€n thatther€ are limitations to our ability to kDow, but therc is a furure b€fore us thar will

allow us lo reach heighls we could not imagine before. That there se€ms to be so muchturbulence, trouble and turmoil is, to my way of thinking, an indication of the binhpains that accompany the arrival of new life. We are standing on the threshold of anew tomorrow. Of course, we have il within our power mer€ly to p€rpetuate the oldone. if we so choose. A b€ner understanding of the Dhenomenon of consciousness and

Page 76 'Ihrough o Gl!$s DarH\

Itl Cuft? CotL'cbL',ess

the judicious application of that understanding in an axiologically positive and construc-

tive manner will enable us nol only to survive the transition, bul will provide us wilh a

foundation for a meaningful existenc€. Tomorrow will not se€ the end of anxiety,

dread, simple fears or phobias. 'Ibmorros will not b.ing usa utopia in which no effonis rcquired or nol conflict exits. Yel. an betrer understanding of our minds and whalgoes on there -- especialJy since it is so constituitive for our experience of reality cango fal to$ard making it morc tolerable.

Th.oush a ALa:s DorHj Pagc 77

Nor,es

Notes

(r ) Thmughout this paper, the term "he" and its derivatives arE used in their origr-nal, grammatical, gene.ic sense. Although rhcre is much talk and reaclron tiesedays in r€gard to equal opportunity and regard for women, I believe the forcedneulralization that is imprrsed uJnn our larguage is simply an overreaction lo amisunderstandrng of horl that linglage funZtio-ns. Coniequenrly, I would like lomakc the rcaderi*are that I havticoisciourll chosen my words and have notsimplv fallen prey to my own unconscious rnile biars.

Susannc K. lAnEer i^ Plilosopb'in o neu,ky (Canbndge, MAi Ha^,ardUniversity Prcss. 3rd F-rlition, 1957) develops rathcr convincing argumentation inr€gard to this differentiation bctween vrxal, verbal and language activitics. Herconclusion is lhal humans have an inner ne€d k) engage in aymbolization rl hich iswhat actually enables language in a broader sensc to functio;_ Humars foilowthis need and find a number of means to fullill it, such as q'la-*h, .itual, etc.This process of symbolizalion has not been ddumented in other sDeries olhcrthan man. Alrhou!:h sorne\r'hat ine('mplete, her distinction pmvid'es an excellcntstanrng pornt lor relonsidenng thc idca uf language and its Rrlc in hurntn ac(i! ity.

Marian G. Kinget in her On being hunnn fl-anham, MD: University pnjss oiAmerica, 1987/1975) even coincd thc term homo s\nbolicuJ to emohasize thisJrtint. See also the works of R.A. Sch\r'allcr dc t-uhr.r. such as Slmrol anl rle$nbolic. Ancient Eg!"pt, science, and the etolution oJ consciouJiess $,Je\York, I\fY: Inncr Tradil ions lnlemalional I ld.. l98l/t949). lvarure word:Wrbe noture fwc5r Sro.kbndgc, MA The Lindisfame press, 1982/1961). andly]ensn and rynbol (New York. Ny: Inner Tradirions Inlema(ional Ud.,1985/1960).

See Ferdinard de Sau ssure's Courte in gereral linguistics (las^lle, IL: OpcnCoun, 1986/ l9 l l ) .

See Ed Mahood. A question of que\tions (Unpublished DaDet Ne*pon Universr-ly. Newpon Beach. Calfomia. Novembcr t9a0) for oni dossible airswer.

The works of Joseph Campbell, such as The herc \aith a thousaryl faces (P.rll|cc-ton, NJ: Princeron University Press. 1968/1919), Thz ma.sk oJ Gbd Ah]'.mondsworth, GB: Penguin Books, 1976), M!,hs to lite by 6New yori, Ny:Banum Books. 1912r, The nythic inuRe (Princeton, NJr

'pdnceron Universitt

Press, l9?4). Th€ irner reaches oI outir spoce New york, Ny: Alfred van derMarck Edil ions, 1985), and Thepoqerofn\h Ne,r York. Ny: Doubledar.la88t have been invaluable in rhis regard. However. otherwrircrs, such as'thosecoflecred by John Middleron leAl, Mrh & cosmos: Readings in mythology orul

(2J

(3)

(4)

(s)

(6)

Through a Gt,!\s DorH\ Poge 79

('t)

{lnbolism (Austin, fi: University of Texas Press, 1967), Hans Blumenberg,90rk on nlth (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1985/1979), and Giorgio deSantillana & Henha von Dechend, Hamkr's mill. An essoy on myth ond thefratne of tine (Boston, MA: David R. Godine. 1969) are well worth rcviewing.The classical treatment of m1,1h, of course. and the one that has led to much ofthe misunderstanding prevalent today is James GearSe Frazer's The gouenbough: A stu4 in rna,ic atd rcligion (Ne'r 'lbrk, l.IY: The Macmiiian Company, 1922).

In this r€gard, se€, for example, Marley P Hall The secret teachings of oll oges.'An encyclopedic outline oJ masonic, hcrmelic, qabbalistic and rosicruciatr sJm-bokcal philosophy (ltts Angeles, CAr The Philosophical Reserch Society, Inc.,191'l /1928) and, kctures on antient philosop/,) (I-os Angeles, CA: The Philo-sophical Research Society. Inc., 198411929). Also, a variety ofesotcric groupshave based thcir establishmenl and develoDmont on this idea as well: see H.PBlavat, 'k1. Iris anueiled {Pasadena. CA: i}rcosophical Uni\ersrl} Prc\s.197611811) and me secret doctine (Pavdcna, CA: Theosophical UniversityPress, 1988/1888); Paul Fostcr Case, nv ou and inisible Rosicrucian Order(York B€ach, ME: Samuel Weiser, Inc., 1985): Rend Cosscy, Five chisianpriacrple.t (Barbados: Public Publications. 198.1): Max Heindel, me rosicrucioncosno conceptiol (Oceanside. CA: The Rosicrucian Fellowship, 28th Edilion.l9?3/1909); H. Spcncer IJwis. Rosicrucian quesioru atrl arLsw.rs with conlplere liston of the Rosicrucian Order (S^n Josc, CA: AN'ORC, 1929); RoyNorvill, tsra.j lrveiled (Bath, CB: Ashgrovc Press l-ld. 1986): Ge.rgeWinslow Pfummcr, m( Rosi.ru.ion Philosophr; AccordinB to the RosicrucianClced (Xingston, i.IY: Smiety of Rosicrucians, Inc., 19.11); lsrael Regardie,The Cmden Dawn (St.Paul, I{N: Lle*ellyn Publications, 1986/1937); I-ouisClaudc de Saint Maflin, (Mon. His tru( ,nture and mlrrJtr). Barbados: OrdreManiniste et Synarchiquc, 1986/18ff): Rudolf Stcincr, Theosophy: An introducion rc the supersensible knowledge oJthe world and the desination of nan(l-ondon. GB: Rudolf Stcincr Prcss. 1975/190,t): and Thrcc Initiates, I/r x_rabalion. Hemetic philo.ropft) (Chicago, lL; The Yogi Publicalion Sociely, l9l2)for morc information in this area. Se€ ChristoDher Mclntosh. The rcricruciatreival and thc Crermoa counter enltgllernprl {Unpuhlished doctoral dissenalion, Christ Church, Oxford, GB, June 1989) and Fmnces Yares' The rosicru-cian enlightenment o-ondon, GB: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972) for morehistorical insighl inlo the rosicrucian phenomenon. It is this fundamental ideahowever, that gives rise to Gebser's dislinction between Traditionalists andEvolutionists which will be examined latcr in Pan L

One representative of this school of thought is Donna Lloyd,, The iew frouOl)"npus (Selona, AZ: Dellaran Publishing Company. l99l), although it ischaracterisitc of many involved ir tbe so-called Ne* Age movement.

Josc€lyn Godwin in his anicle, 'Priests, pmfessors, & gurus" (GnoJls, No. 2,Sprirg/Summer 1986), has pointed oul quite cogently that all we have done isreplace the Church with the University as the puleyor of "co[ecr thhking. "Where once dogma was the standard 6f rrurh, icieniiic standards establish-ed bythe universities and their degrc€ programs now determine what is good and right.It would seem, then, thal the old adage is quiie relevart: The morc things

(8)

(9)

PaSc 80 Ihtoush a cla:s Da*4

change, the more they stay the same.

(10) Sone who subscribe to this view ar€ Hoimar von Dirfufth, Der Geist fel nichtvom Einmel lconsciousness did nor fall from the sryl (Munich, FRG: DeutscheDschenbuchverfag. 19'16) and v,1r sind nicht von dieser wlt f9le atenotofthisworldl (Hamburg, FRG: Hoffmann & Campe, l98l)i Julian Jaynes, The oiginsof cotLscioryness inthe breallovn oJthe bicameral minal (Boston, MA: Hough-ton Miffun Company, 1977); E':.tst Poppel, Mindworkt: Time ond consciouse.x.peience (Boston, MA: Harcoun Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1988/1985);and Anthony Smith, 7fre mild (New York, irY: The Viking Press, 1984).

(l l) For more insight into the developmenl of hermeneutic thinking se€ AlwinDreme\ Ekmentarhtrs Pulosohpi? Hermenearik [Foundational cou.se in phi]os-ophy: Hermeneuticsl @usseldorf, FRG: Econ Verlag, I977): E.win Hufnagel,EinJuhnng in dic Hermrrprril Inlroduclion lo hermeneulics] (Stungart, FRGiKohlhamrncr vcrlag, 1976): and thc various selections collected by Xun Mucller vollmci n his The hermeneuucs recler (New York. tIl': Thc ContinuumPublishing Company, 1989). Richard Palrr.et's Hermeneutics Gvanston, IL:Nonhwestem Univcrsity Press, 1969) is perhaps the most lucid and understandablc introduction to ihe subjcct. Modern rcprcsentatives of lhis school of thoughlinclude Richard Bcmstein, Be!'ond objectivism and relntitism: Science, hemteneutics, anl prais ehiadclphia, PA: The University of Pcnnsylvania Pncss,1988); Hans Gcorg Gada-mer, Whrheit und Methode lTrulh ard mcthodl(Tibingen, FRG| J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 1975) and Philosophical hennenearics @crlclcy. CA: Universily of Califomia Press, 1976): Joseph Kockelmans' colleation Hennencuti. phe4omenologJ: l2cturc! ed €J.ra].r (14'ashington, DC: Center for Advanced Rescarch in Phgnomcnology & University Pressof Anerica, 1988); Sollace Mitchcll & Michael Roscn (dd.) The ncedlor int.rpretation. Contemporary concepliotLr of lhe philosopher's task (I4ndon, GB:The Athlone Press, 1983); Paul Rico€ur's The conJlict oJ iruerpretaions (Evanston, lL: Northwestcm Universily Prcss, 197411969) and Geschicfue undvtthrheit lHis!!ryand truthl O{unich, FRG: List Verlag, lq7,t); and StanlcyRosen, Henneneutics 4r poliri..i (New York, NY: OxJbrd Universily PrEss,1987) .

(12) Foundational works in phenomenology include Edmund Htrssc(l's ld?en :u et erreinen Phdaomenoloqie uul pfuinomenologischen PhiLosophie fldeas regarding apure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophyl (Iibingen, FRG: MtNiemeyer Verfag, 4th Edition, 1980/1913) and The cisis oJ European sciencesand tronscendenral phenomenologl (Evanston, IL: Nonhwestem UniversityPress, l9?0/1954); Manh Heidegger's Sein und Zeit [Being and rime] Clibin-gen, FRG: Max Niemeyer Verlag, l5th Fjition, 19'791192'7) is the most quali-fied extension of Husserl's work. Of course, phenomenology has enjoyedsomewhal of a resurgence iJl rDcent years (followinS another slrong quartitativethnst in mid-century), especially in psychology ald the social sciences; somecxamples are Fiward Casey, Inaqinin|; A phenometlological $!a1 @looming-ton, IN: Indiana University Press. l9?6); Amedeo Ciorgi's collenion, Pfunonrenolog\ aad ptlchological research (Pinsburgh, PA: Duquesne UniversilyPress, 1985); Alexarder PEnde., Phenomenologl; oJwilling and morivorion(Evanslon, IL: Nofthwestem Univenity Press, 1967); and the collection byKockelmans, Hermeneuic pfunonenolog! : l4ctures and rJJa.tJ, mentioned

Through a CLa:! Da '" Pos? 81

eartrer.

(13) Se€ Alben Einstei-'i,, Relaiitr-. Thc special and thc gervral rhcory (New York,l.IY: Bonanza Books. 1961).

(14) For.eadable hsights into the workings and consequences of quantum physicalthinking the followirg book by Fred Alan Wolf are quite helptul: Taking fiequantum bap: The ne\r physics [or nonsciertrJa.r (San Fmncisco, CA: Harper &Row, l98l), Star Wve. Mind, consciousness and quauwn physics (New York,NY: Macmillan Publishing Cornpany, 1984), alJ.d furalkl universes: Thesearch Jor other worLds (New York, NY: Simon and Schusler, 1988). See alsoJohn Horgan, Quantum philosophy (Scientifc Ameican,267, I,llly 1992\.

(15) See Frdncis Fukuyama, The end of history and the last nton (New York, l{Y:The Free Press. I992).

(16) Scc, for examplc, William Anderson. The grat memory (Noetic ScicncesReiea, No. 2l, Sprirg 1992); Fritjof Capra. The Tao of physics Cforonto &New York: Bantam Bft)ks, 1983); Jane Clark & Alison Yiangou, Making abridge to the ur inown (Beslnra,Issue 10, Winter 1989/90); Janc Clark &Michael Cohen, The emporer's new mind (Br.rrorc, Issue I I, Spring/Summer1990); &lward Comish (cd.), The 19Xs ond beyond Gcthcsda. MD: WorldFuture Smiety, 1990); Marilyn Ferq\tson, Th. Aquaian conspiraq- Q.os Angeles, CA: J.P thrcher, Inc., 1980); Georg Feuerstein, Structures ofconsciouraes.r. The Benius of.lean Gebser An introduction aad ciique (:lawerl,alie, CA: Intcgral Publishing, 1987) and Toward a new consciousncss (Nocd.Scierces Reiew, No. 7, Summer 1988); Jean Gebser, Thc ever present oigin(Athons, OH: Ohio University Press, l9U6/1949);Will is Ha.man, Clobal mindc,ange flndianapolis, IN: Knowledge Systerns, Inc., 1988); PD. Ouspensky,,t,Ew model oJthe unive^e (New York, NY: vintage Books, 1971/1931); RogcrPenrose, me emperor's ne\t mind (New York, l.IY: Penguin Books, l99l);Eru'in Walermeyer, Tirward a ncw consciousncss: An apcrspcctivc view(Rescruciei Ditett, 63, 5, Ma! 1985); Nrd Atlh'r you.nl, The rell$ive Htivfrse(Mill Vallcy, CA: Robcrt Briggs Associatcs, 1976).

Thc prinrary advocate of this change was Thomas Kuhn in his seminal work. Ireslructure of scienti,frc revolutioru (Chicago, IL: The Universiry of ChicagoPress, 1970). The ramifications ofthis change are discussed in the various arti.cles incfuded in Egon Guba (e1,.), The paradign d.ialog (Newbury Park, CASage Publications, 1990).

See afso Ed Mahood, Where are we goirg? (erotetic times, f, 4, Summer l99l).

See Kuhn, Irr Jtni ctlre oJ scientifc revoluroru, Chapters VII and \rltr.

See Gebset Ever-preseru oigin, W. 65,'l'7, L3l-133 , 342, 349-350, and 542

Plnmmet, The Rosicrucian philosophy, p. 13.

Feuerstein, Struclures of cotlsciousness , p. 32.

( l7 )

(18)

(19)

(20)

(21)

Poge 82 Through a Glass Da \

(23) Gebser, Ever-presenj oigin, p. 6.

(24) Gebser, Ever-present oigin, p.6.

(25) Feuentein, Stru.tures o! consciolrzeJj, p. 5l.

(26) FeueBtein, Srru.rures oJ colsciousness, p. 57 _

(27) I have often wondered whethcr it would be appmpriate to allocate the nose as lhespiritual organ of this time. When we r€acl instinctivelJ-, we say thal B,e "smella rat", lbr inslanc€. The sense of smell must have played an iniponant role inthe daily life of our early ancestors, such as in distihgiishing edible from ined-ib-le-things. Gebser mentions no organ in this conteri. but as we will see, eachof the subsequenl struclures has a spiritua) organ associalcd wilh it.

(28) Feucrstrin, Structures ol consciotdre.rJ, p. 6l.

(29) Gustav Meyink. D?r Engel von rtcstlichen Ferlrr.r Grcmen: Schuenerlann.n.d.), p. 426, as quoled in Gebset, Everprcsent oigin, p. ({l).

(30) Cf. Gcbser, Evr-presen! oigin, pp. 56f.

(31) Feuerstein, Structures of con-tcioianeii.l, p. 75.

(32) Feuerstcin, S!tu.tures of cotrciaLt ess, p. 79.

(33) Fcuerslcin, Structures oJ conrcioarness, pp. 87f.

(34) Gebser. Ever-preseu ori!1in, p. 62.

(35) Feuerstcin, Structures of colrcioL(er?.1r, p. 98_

(36) Feuerstein, Structures ol conscio$xej.r, p. lJ0.

(37) Gebser, Everpretent oigin. p. 3Og.

(38) Kohlberg's model of moral development and piaget's model of leamins are rwoe\ample5of rh i5 See in lh is regdrdL. Koh lbcrp , Deve looment o f MbrarCharacter_ard Moral ldcology." ir M L Hoffman & L.W. Hoffman (eds..),Reiev oJchiu development research (Ne* york, Ny: Russel Sage Founoa,lion. 1964): L. Kohlberg. 'Suge and Sequenle: the Cosnirire DeieloomentApproach lo SocBlizarion. in DA. Goslin (ed.), Handbool on sociair-.tion,haoD and r*earch (Chicago. IL: Rand M(NaJl!, lq6Ql, L. Kohlb€rp, "MoralSuges and Moralizarion: rhe Cognirive De\elopment ADDroach..' in T:Lickona(ed.\. Moral devplopment atd morul beharror (Neu yoili., Ny: la76): and alsot. yra?et. The ongihs olimplligcnc? ia childre, (Neu york, l.,l]/: InrernalionalUniver\it ies Prcrs. 1952: originalJy publrshed l036).

(39, See Wolf. Toklnglhe quanlum kap, Ch^pter I for an illuminating discussion ollhis panjcular debate ard its conseeuences.

ThtoLgh a C,last DarA:- Pase 8J

(40) Cf. Georg Feuerstein. Jean (kbser: Vrhlt colot iJ,'-o!r cotbciot.JnesJ (MillValley. CA; Roben BrigBs Assffiales, 1989), Chapter Itr that folms the basisof the brief prcsenbtion that is lo follo*.

(41) See Immaruel velikovsky, gbldr /r coliirion (Garden City, NY: Doubleday &Company, lnc., 19501, iges in choos (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Compa-ny. Iic..-1952r. Eznh iniphcaval (Gatden City. NY: Doubleday & Compary,Inc., 1955), a\d koples of thr sed (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company,Inc . . 1977) .

(42\ Pdptf'l, Mindtuorlk, p. 158.

(43) No data is arailable for olfaclory or pslalory stimuli.

(41) Poploll. Mnd\r,trir , p. 9l.

(45) Poppcl, Mtidworts , p. I10.

(46\ P6ppel, Mindwortr , p. 65.

(4'7 ) Pdpftel, Minnuorkt, p. l'19.

(48) The folkrwing prerientation is based upon Roben E. Omstein. The prrchologr ofcontciou)nelt (Ne*' l'ork, NY: The Vi*ing Pr.-ss, lg?2); Th. nindJieLl (Ne\\'York, NY: Grossman Publishets. 19'76): ^nd Multinind (B{)slon, I{A: Ho!8hton ltt i ff l in Cornpany, 1986).

(49)

(50)

(51)

(52)

(5 i )

(54)

(55)

(56)

(57)

(58)

(59)

Not.s

ornstein, Mulimid, p. 21.

Omstein, Multinind, p. 155.

Omstein, Multimind, p. 102.

See Omstein. Ps.tchologv of consciousness. p. l'1: ̂ lso The mindfeA, pp. l2tt

Sec Ornstcir. PsychologJ' oI cot$cior{trejj, p. 12.

See Omstein, Prycholog'- of conscior.Arejj, pp. 184-185.

The followirg presentation is based upon Kenneth Pelletier, Toward o science ofcor.rcioilJzeJj (New Yotk, NY: Dell Publishing Co.,Inc., 1978).

Pelletie\ Tonard o science oJ coruciousness. p. 5.

Pelletier, Tb\$td a science of conscioustess , pp . l'7 -20 .

Peljetier. Tbu'ard o science of consciousaest, p. 2f.

See also Note 7, above.

Page 84 Thrcush a Ala:. DotU\

Notes

(60)

(61)

(62)

(63)

(61)

Pelletiet, Tohard a science of cowciouylcsJ, W. 52ff., 51 & 66.

See, for example, William Anderson, The 81e3t memory (Noetic kien esReuew. No. 21. Spring lga2) JaDe Clark & Alison Yiingou. Making a bridgeto the unlno$n: Jane Clark & Michael Cohen, The emporer's ne$ mind; RjcDard Di\ey. ScienLe: KDowledge through cause\ (Noctic Scir4ces Reieu,Number 15, Autumn l98qr: Roger Penrose. Th? emperor's rE* mind (NevYo.k ttY: Pen8uin Books, l99l): Rupen Sheldralie, Life in a living world(BeJltara, Issue 10, Winter 1989/90); ;nd fiennis Staccy, TFanscending sciencc(Orn t, December I988).

Pelletier, Touard o science oJ corsciou-rness, p. 241 .

See Woff, Slarvfa|e, p.249f; and also furallel Llnive rse s , Introduction.

Thc entire pr€sentat'on thal follows in this subscction is summarized from EdMahftd, Structures of mind and consciousness: A quest for understandinglRo\k ru.ian Digey.69. | 2, Summ(r leql)

Feuerslein, Sructutas of co\rciotl\ness, p. 22.

ln thrs panicrffar relard. Campbell s Th? hcro \ith a thousand Jacet, i,. verSwonnwnlle rgtomp.

Neunann, ,n-4iru and histon of rcnsciownpss. p. I97.

Ncumann. Ongiar ord hisrcry of coruciousness, p. xx.

See also, Feuerslein. Sffuctures of cotscior.rn ?J.r, pp_ 54f. and Wlwt color isJOUr COnsCiOU:neSS, chapter III

(70) Although he does not speali in such lemls, and nor do Gebser or Neumann forthat maller, this fundamental assumotion placcs hrm {lhem) l lrmlv within theHcrmeli( lrdJit ion. The arisirg ol biversiry from unir; is a fundimcnral prrmr5sof Hermetic thinting Other ststems of thirughl, sr-rch'as modem science alsopoJtulare a. singular occurance for lhe beginnin8, bul lhey diffcr in that they at-tnbute no inlell igence, no consciousness to this primal event or circumsrancc.As q ill b€€ome clear from the following prcsenration, young dcxs see con-sciolsness, il some form, as do Gebser and Neumann, at every stage of theevorullonary Process.

(71) See also Young, The releive uniwrse, Appendir L

(72 r Gebser. Ever-pre5sn1 s4gi4,p.2.

(73) Pelletier, Tbward a science of consciousness, p. 248.

(74) Allhough it was not characterized as such at lhe bepinnins of rhis DaD€r. rnereader is Efened to page 43f. above for a Eview of whai rhis renir 6nnils.

(65)

(66)

(67)

(68)

(69)

Through a GLlls Da.A! Pae. 85

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