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Analysis of Milton’s God’s Dark Side in Paradise Lost

and in De Doctrina Christiana

Master Thesis

submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree

Master of Arts in European Literatures

Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin

Philosophische Fakultät II

Submitted by: Laura de Andrade Ruas

Enrolment number: 537210

Supervisors: Prof. Dr. Verena Lobsien

Prof. Dr. Wolfram R. Keller

Berlin, 20.01.2014

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Analysis of Milton’s God’s Dark Side in Paradise Lost and in De Doctrina Christiana

1. Introduction

Paradise Lost has been often referred to as a theodicy, i.e., an attempt to explain or

conciliate the existence of a benevolent, almighty and omniscient God in face of evidential

evil in the world. Although this aspect has been wearily analysed by Milton’s critics, I believe

this discussion is far from over, especially considering the recent contributions of the New

Milton Criticism and the analysis of Michael Lieb in Theological Milton, among others.

This paper proposes that the epic is a defence, rather than a theodicy, since the

existence of evil does not bring Milton to question God’s existence or to attempt to make it

probable. He is sure that God exists, as he states in De Doctrina Christiana:

Though there be not a few who deny the existence of God, for the fool hath said in

his heart, There is no God, Psal. xiv. 1. Yet the deity has imprinted upon the human

mind so many unquestionable tokens of himself, ad so many traces of him are

apparent through the whole nature, that no one in his senses can remain ignorant of

the truth … There can be no doubt but that every thing in the world, by the beauty

of its order, and the evidence of a determinate and beneficial purpose which

pervades it, testifies that some supreme efficient power must have pre-existed, by

which the whole was ordained for a specific end. (25; Book 1 ch. 2)

For the author, God’s existence is an empirical truth whose proofs are not only in nature, but

also in human’s minds. In Paradise Lost, I assume the same may be said: God’s existence is

not being called into question; his being does not need to be justified, only his ways. Milton is

trying to explain God and his modes of action – but why would he do so?

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In the first section of the first chapter, I discuss Milton’s notion of God’s ways to men,

since this is the poet’s aspiration with the poem: “I may assert Eternal Providence, and justify

the ways of God to men.” (PL 1. 25-6) Why is he trying to understand these ways? It is

important to mention that these aspects do not concern only Paradise Lost, but also Paradise

Regained and Samson Agonistes. His theological treatise De Doctrina Christiana, also

written in this period, confirms the relevance of these questions. I assume that he was deeply

concerned with God’s ways and other theological matters while writing these three great

poems.

Regarding the theological treatise, I assume it to have been written by Milton,

although its authorship has been questioned by William Hunter in August 1991 in the Forth

Milton Symposium in Vancouver, along with the publication of the article “The Provenance

of the Christian Doctrine”. Since then many scholars have been engaged in this discussion,

such as John Shawcross, Barbara Lewalski, Gordon Campell, and Thomas N. Corns.1

Although Hunter’s considerations are plausible and should be taken into account, one of his

issues – the contradictions between the treatise and other works by Milton – is something

that, from my point of view, rather confirms its authorship. These contradictions between and

even within Milton’s works are a significant pattern of his writing and, as the New Milton

Criticism proposes, should not be accommodated, explained or made coherent, but analysed

in their complexity and ambiguities. I strongly agree with this position and intend to analyse

Milton’s works from this same perspective.

Lieb’s position in Theological Milton is more conclusive: he considers the

uncertainties of the authorship as an opportunity to reflect about the relations between the

1. Many articles have been written discussing the authorship of the manuscript in the last two decades, see Lieb, Michael. “De Doctrina Christiana and the Question of Authorship.”, Lewalski, Barbara et al. “Forum: Milton’s Christian Doctrine.”, Campbell, Gordon, et al. “The Provenance of De Doctrina Christiana.”, Lewalski, Barbara. “Milton and De Doctrina Christiana: Evidences of Authorship.” And also: Fallon, Stephen. “Milton's Arminianism and the Authorship of De Doctrina Christiana.”

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treatise and Milton’s poetry. He also analyses both texts considering their discursive contexts,

and what kind of approach one should give to the language of theology and the language of

poetry. The treatment given to the theological matters is different in both texts – also because

of distinct discursive contexts – but this would not suffice to put the authorship of the

manuscript into question according to Lieb.

To Hunter’s further assertions concerning the state of the manuscript and other

external evidence, I believe the arguments presented by Kelly in “The Provenance of John

Milton’s Christian Doctrine: A Reply to William B. Hunter”, along with his palaeographic

analysis of the manuscript, give enough proof of Milton’s authorship. For these reasons, I

assume that Milton is the author of the treatise, and will relate its views to the ones presented

in Paradise Lost, especially those concerning God’s character, sin, punishment, death, and

hell.

Further questions to be discussed in this section are: Why do God’s ways need to be

justified? Why would the Creator need to be defended? What is Milton defending God? What

makes Milton think that God needs to be justified? In order to explain what may have

motivated Milton to defend God, I analyse historical context he lived in so as to search for

possible motivations.

The greatest of these motivations is surely English Revolution and Milton’s further

disillusionment with the Restoration: the experience of defeat is of extreme relevance in the

motivation to write a defence of the divine ways. To discuss the role the Revolution played in

Milton’s writings, I work with Christopher Hill’s arguments in Milton and the English

Revolution and in The Experience of Defeat as well as to other later analyses that support and

complement this point of view, such as the ones presented by Terry Eagleton in “The god that

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failed”, by Barbara Lewalski in “Milton and the Culture Wars”, and also by David

Loewenstein in “From Politics to Faith in the Great Poems?”, and in “The Interregnum.”

Following the analysis of Milton’s motivations to write his defence of God’s ways, I

analyse the origin of evil in Paradise Lost in order to describe Milton’s defence, the free will

defence. Here, God has no responsibility for the existence of evil in the world, since it derives

from the misuse of free will by his creatures. God wants us to obey, but to freely obey. Thus,

one can still transgress: disobedience is a possibility, and if God were to intervene in these

acts, he would restrict human’s freedom. Therefore, the existence of evil is a direct

consequence of the transgressions and, thus, its origin is the first transgression, the rebellion

of the angels.

Although coherent, free will defence is just a partial answer to this problem, since it

fails to explain the victims’ side. It is easy to understand how the transgression generates evil

on the transgressor: Lucifer is a very good example of this argument. In Paradise Lost

(11.423-60), the story of Abel and Cain is retold, and it is clear that Cain’s transgression

generates evil. But what about Abel? Why does he have to pay with death because of a

wrong-doing of his brother? To investigate this kind of defence in a comprehensive approach,

I will also refer to recent theological articles that inquire whether free will defence is a

possible solution to this problem.

Regarding this kind of defence, I criticise the fact that free will is nothing but ‘free’

obedience. The will is not free: people can choose whether to obey or not, but are not free to

choose what is right or wrong, since the laws are given by God. Humans are not free to will,

but to obey the divine laws.

Are people even really free to obey? I would say no, since punishment exists. We

would be freely obedient if there were no damnation. But there is. This is an important point

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to be considered: If one is given two possibilities, but will be punished eternally in case she

chooses the second, is this a choice or a threat? On the one hand, God does not intervene in

actions that could bring evil to innocent people, like Abel, but on the other hand, he is very

effective in punishing the ones that disobey his laws. Thus, punishment is God’s intervention

on free will.

In the second chapter, I analyse the relations between Augustinian and Miltonic

concepts of evil, and how Augustine explains the origin of evil, since Milton was deeply

influenced by his theology. Next, I refer to Stephen Fallon’s remarks in Milton among the

Philosophers regarding metaphysical evil – the loss or privation of God - and moral evil – the

corruption of the fallen creatures - as well as their genealogy to discuss how these concepts

can be applied to Paradise Lost. My argument is that God cannot be, for logical reasons, the

origin of metaphysical evil, but is not completely unrelated to moral evil.

One may argue that God’s creation is necessarily good, or at least its purposes are.

One should not forget, however, that Hell is also one of his creations. Hence, I would not

assume that all God’s ways are good: maybe this is one of the reasons why Milton wants to

justify them. My main argument is that God is not only good, but good and evil. Milton is

clear about this ambivalence, as shown in some passages of De Doctrina Christiana.

Nevertheless, the question remains: If free will defence cannot completely explain the

genealogy of evil, what is the origin of evil in Paradise Lost? I propose that, as God is both

good and evil, he also produces evil in his creation: he creates Heaven in all its beauty, but

also Hell in all its torture and suffering. In order to investigate God’s dark side, I refer to

various Miltonists’ view on this topic, namely, God’s negative feelings, his severity against

his enemies, his irony, his lies and his tyrannical nature, God’s negligence in human’s fall,

and the use of violence.

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In the third chapter, in order to contribute to the recent discussions on God’s dark side,

I examine two specific topics, namely, creation of hell as a place of punishment, and God’s

justice and penalties. Both topics are crucial in the analysis of this other face of the deity and

have not received enough attention in my opinion. In order to make a comprehensive

approach while discussing the creation of Hell, I analyse first the etymological origins of the

word hell and its former meanings. Furthermore, I investigate how the concept is presented in

the Old Testament and how this concept evolves in the Intertestamental period, turning to a

different idea in the New Testament, considering especially the various words associated with

it previously. My argument here is that Milton’s hell is much more complex than the one

described in the Scriptures, apart from being much more relevant in Milton than in the Bible

itself. Although Milton regards the Holy Texts as the highest authority in religious matters,

his hell is much greater in relevance and complexity than the Biblical one.

To explain the importance of hell in Miltonic thinking, I analyse how hell is

understood in medieval times and how this view changed during the Reformation, in order to

clarify how its role changes and how its importance evolves from the Church Fathers to the

Protestant reformers. I also consider how hell was understood in the seventeenth century, and

how Milton’s hell was influenced by these views. To discuss the role of hell in Christian

theology, I include some considerations of recent theological articles on eschatology, the

problem of hell, and universal salvation.

Moreover, I work with Milton’s considerations in De Doctrina Christiana in relation

to sin, punishment, and hell to going to discuss the fairness God’s penalties, taking into

account Jillisa Brittan and Richard Posner’s arguments in the article “Classic Revised: Penal

Theory in Paradise Lost. My argument here is that the divine punishment in Paradise Lost is

neither fair nor effective. I also work with the concept of justice and of deity that the idea of

divine punishment implies – and what kind of God is being represented in Paradise Lost.

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Finally, I discuss the complexity of the Miltonic hell, considering Duncan’s arguments

in “Milton's Four-in-One Hell” and relate the different hells described by the him to the

different degrees of death described in De Doctrina Christiana. To conclude, I investigate

how Biblical and other traditions are present in the depiction of hell in the epic and how they

contribute to the complexity of Milton’s hell.

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2. Defending God and Free Will

2.1 Why writing a defence?

Before investigating Milton’ defence it is important to consider what could have

motivated him to justify God’s actions. What made this topic so relevant? Kerrigan notes:

“Seventeenth-century Protestants did not ask about God’s justice (…). Milton reanimated

theodicy because he felt that good men, in the current or future state of the world, would be

compelled to enquire into the moral vision of deity.” (260) Considering doctrines such as

predestination or even the Calvinistic claims that the Fall had been planned by God, I argue

that God’s justice was not exactly fair at that time – at least not in the sense one attributes four

centuries later. Thus, the statement that Milton felt that good men – like him – a “Fit audience

(…) though few” (PL 7.31) needed this justification is a possible motivation. But what

brought this need? Kerrigan proposes that this “need for theological assurance” (261) is the

greatest motivation for writing the poem. This need is, in Milton’s case, “an argument taken

up in the heat and sorrow of disappointment, in the face of apparent evidence of divine

injustice” (261). What can this evidence of divine injustice be?

Christopher Hill claims that Milton’s ideas were more directly influenced by the

events of the English Revolution than it is usually recognized, a point I strongly agree with.

Paradise Lost is not a withdrawal from politics into faith, as proposed, for example, by Blair

Worden. A better argument is provided by David Loewenstein, who stresses “The responses

in Milton’s great poems to the trauma of the restoration are more conflicted – imaginatively

and emotionally – more varied than we often acknowledge” (“From Politics to Faith” 272).

According to Christopher Hill, religious and political events were not unrelated to Milton: he

understood the context of the revolution as a conflict between good and evil and believed that

England was favoured by God, “who was about to use the English people for great deeds on

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his behalf. It was a rational being, with whom free men would co-operate” ( Milton and the

Revolution 244). Thus, God had a plan for his country – England had a special role to play in

the seventeenth- century, but the English failed.

Important as it is, the lost rebellion appears already in the beginning of the first book,

although it is not one of the first events in the epic, if analysed in a chronological order

He trusted to have equalled the most high

if he opposed; and with ambitious aim

against the throne and the monarchy of God

raised impious war in heaven and battle proud

with vain attempt (PL 1.40-44).

Remarkably, whereas it refers to an event which occurred in heaven, its description abounds

political and military terms, such as, throne, monarchy, battle, and war. Thus, the relation

between political and religious events is here also to be seen.

How could England fail being favoured by God? I suppose Milton needed an answer

to this question – he needed to understand what went wrong with the revolution, to which he

and many contemporaries had devoted their best years. He had to “justify the ways of God to

men” (PL 1.26) in order to justify his own life, his ideals and aspirations, and to come to

terms with the restoration and his blindness. According to Hill: “The collapse of the

Revolution must have put a tremendous strain on Milton’s acceptance of God (…) The defeat

of these hopes meant that Milton no longer felt tuned into God, whose ways became

incomprehensible to human reason” (Milton and the Revolution 244). Paradise Lost, as well

as Samson Agonistes, and Paradise Regained are deeply related to the tensions set by the

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failure of God’s cause in England. As Hill states, probably his greatest question at that time

was “How do good men fall?”, or maybe “How do people with the right ideas come to make

the wrong choices?” For Milton, the defeat was a consequence of human sinfulness: political

failure was the result of moral failure.

By choosing the Fall as the main event in Paradise Lost, Milton goes back to the first

disobedience as a way to search for the origin of evil in the world: “Of man’s first

disobedience, and the fruit / of that forbidden tree, whose mortal taste / brought death into the

world, and all our woe” (PL 1.1-3). Nevertheless, the Fall also explains the origin of human

sinfulness, and, in Milton’s epic, also exonerates God of any responsibility with its existence.

Adam was free to stand or fall: the Fall was his own choice: “He and his faithless progeny:

whose fault? / Whose but his own? Ingrate, he had of me / All he could have; I made him just

and right / Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall.” (PL 3.96-9). Analogically, the

collapse of the Revolution was not God’s failure, since the English people were also free to

stand or fall. Their lapse was their own pride and ambition, which also caused the rebel angels

to fall and are characteristics of a post-lapsarian world.

Due to this failure, it is important for Milton to educate his nation about their own

imperfections as a fallen nation. The understanding of what caused Adam and Eve to disobey

God’s command for the first time is crucial, as it is the origin of human’s sinfulness: “ … Say

first what cause / moved our grand parents in that happy state … From their creator, and

transgress his will” (PL 1.27-28, 31). God states in the conversation with the Son: “So will

Fall; He and his faithless progeny” (PL 3.95-6), meaning the grandparents’ fall is also their

progeny’s fall. I argue that Milton was looking for individual/internal – and not

political/external – causes of the failure. Barbara Lewalski proposes that: “The epic

undertakes a strenuous project of educating readers in the virtues, values and attitudes that

make people worth of liberty, encouraging them to think again, and think rightly about

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monarchy and tyranny, religious and civil liberty, revolution and what true heroism is”

(“Milton and the Culture Wars” 34). Thus, Milton not only tries to explain God’s ways, but

also tries to make the readers aware of the consequences of the Fall to humankind.

Why the turn from prose to poetry? According to Lewalsky, Milton believed that

poetry could play an important role in the reformation of culture, because it had a more

universal reach than prose had. He considered poetry to be a very suitable form for doctrinal

purposes, as it can be seen in early works like Comus, for example. Christopher Hill in Milton

and the English Revolution also mentions the fact that his theological treatise could not be

published, “not even anonymously and overseas” and so, “the need to write obliquely may

have turned to Milton’s advantage” (355-56). Thus, although the treatise De Doctrina

Christiana (DC) was, in Milton’s own words “my best and most precious possession” (DC 7;

Book 1 Epistle), it was written in Latin and never published. In my opinion, poetry was the

way Milton found to expose these ideas, since he knew they would come in conflict with the

doctrines defended by the Church: “I shall seem to have brought to light many things which

will at once be discovered to conflict with some received opinions. I beg and beseech you all

who do not hate the truth not to start shouting that the church is being thrown into confusion

by this liberty of speech and enquiry.” (DC 7; Book 1 Epistle) In this sense, I argue that

through poetry Milton could bring these topics into light in a more obliquely way, which

turned to be an advantage, since it avoided direct confrontation with the Church.

Another interesting analysis regarding the doctrinal purposes of Paradise Lost is made

by Eagleton, who proposes that:

The past is that which we seem doomed compulsively to repeat. The revolution is a

neurotic symptom which at once conceals and reveals its true content in displaced

rhetorical form. The repetition, Marx insists, happens just when we think we are

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creating something new; Milton’s revolutionaries, in seeking to repair the fall, end up

by rehearsing it. This is what is known as original sin … History is the nightmare we

are trying to wake up from, but which in doing so, we merely dream again (344).

In analogy to Paradise Lost, I defend that the importance of the original sin is not only related

to the loss of Eden, but to the fact that, since it happened for the first time, humans are, since

then, condemned to sin again and again, in a parodic repetition of what happened in the

Garden. For Milton, it is clear that only by turning back would they be able to move forward –

the past had to be used in service of the present.

In short, I argue that the defeat of the Revolution plays a very important role as a

motivation to justify God’s ways, which could not be understood anymore by Milton.

However, the poem itself aims not only at defending God and free will, but, by bringing

reflection over these matters, to educate its readers and to promote the necessary individual

changes that would make a new revolution possible to be completed. Still, I agree with

Loewenstein; these responses are more varied than one acknowledges – and by exposing

some of them I do not mean to exclude other possibilities.

2.2 Free Will Defence and the Genealogy of Evil

After analysing some of Milton’s possible motivations to justify the ways of God to

men, I procede to analyse how this justification is made in the epic. How does Milton defend

God? I propose that the first part of his defence consists in exonerating God of any

responsibility for the existence of evil in the world. This defence is made by God himself,

who, while foreseeing the Fall, states that the fallen creatures are the only ones responsible for

it: “ … They themselves decreed / their own revolt, not I … ” (PL 3.116-7). This is because

they were created good and their fall was not predestined:

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… They therefore as to right belonged

and so were they created, nor can justly accuse

Their Maker, or their making, or their fate

as if predestination overruled (PL 3.111-4)

Thus, according to God “ … They themselves ordained their fall” (PL 3.128). Interestingly,

God is the one who defends himself, refusing, among others, the ideas of fate or

predestination. Hill states this to be a revealing instance of Paradise Lost: God’s

defensiveness about his responsibility for the fall. The poet, the one who proposes to “justify

the ways of God to man” (PL 1.26), is not the one who indeed justifies God, but God himself,

with excessive defensiveness. Why does God explain himself?

If the creation and the divine purposes are good, there should be no possibility of evil.

How can it exist in a world created and ruled by a benevolent, almighty and omnipotent God?

Where does evil originate in Paradise Lost? For Milton, evil comes from the misuse of free

will. Humans are free to choose; they can also choose evil. The fact that obedience is a choice

is of crucial importance to the author: if people could only obey and transgressions were not a

possibility, humans would be mere automats and obedience would then lose its value. Hence,

God wants us to obey, but to freely obey: “Not free, what proof could they have given

sincere / of true allegiance, constant faith or love” (PL 3.103- 104). An obliged obedience

would not satisfy the Father, since it would not serve him, but necessity:

What pleasure I from such obedience paid,

When will and reason (reason also is choice)

Useless and vain, of freedom both despoiled,

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Made passive both, had served necessity,

Not me … (PL 3.107-10).

Thus, it can be concluded that the existence of evil in Paradise Lost is explained as a

result of the misuse of free will by the creatures, “They trespass, authors to themselves in all”

(PL 3.122). This is an eventual consequence of the freedom God gave humans and comes to

existence with the first transgression to God’s law and with the original sin. This freedom has

to remain unrestricted: “I formed them free, and free they must remain,” (PL 3.125) otherwise

obedience and virtue would have no value. In this consists (roughly) Milton’s defence: by

exonerating God of responsibility with the existence of evil, he justifies his ways.

2.3 Criticism of Free Will Defence

Free Will or Free Obedience?

Because God respects human freedom, he does not interfere in their acts, even when

the consequences are abominable. God’s non-interventionist policy does not mean, however,

that people are free to do whatever they please. No, they are still supposed to obey God’s laws

and live according to his will. They are not free to choose which laws to obey or to define the

laws themselves. They can only choose whether to obey or not.

The laws are God’s will and not human’s will, as Milton states in his theological

treatise: “Hence, ‘the law’ is often taken (…) to mean ‘sacred teaching’ or God’s will” (DC

677; Book 1 ch. 26). So, I would say that only one will is free, God’s will, and he decides the

“right” will for the rest of his creation. Milton’s understanding of free will is that to act in

freedom is to act according to God’s will, not according to individual will. But should it be

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named free will? Humans are not free to will, only God has this freedom. Human’s choice is

only whether to obey or not: free will is no more than free obedience.

The concept of Christian freedom, as presented by Milton in De Doctrina Christiana,

is also important to be understood: “Christian freedom is that whereby, with Christ

freeing [us], we are freed from the slavery of sin (…), so that, having become sons after

being slaves (…) we may be slaves to God in charity” (717; Book 1 ch. 29). Therefore,

freedom, in Christian terms, means freedom from sin, which is defined as “sin (…) is anomia

or transgression of the law” (DC 413; Book 1 ch. 11). Thus, humans are effectively free when

they do not disobey God’s laws anymore and become slaves of his will – but if they are slaves

of God, are they free? In this sense, I think terms such as free will can lead to equivocations,

since freedom and will are understood in other terms, not concerning individual freedom, but

freedom from sin. To be free means, in short, not be a sinner anymore.

Are we free to obey?

Investigating the freedom to obey deeper, one will inevitably find some controversy in

it, and the greatest being, in my opinion, the existence of punishment. Obedience could only

be a completely free choice if disobedience were not liable. If one has two possibilities, but

will be rewarded for choosing the first and punished for choosing the second, the choice is not

free, but motivated by reasons external to the choice itself, namely, its consequences. One

cannot claim to be free to disobey national laws – s/he cannot, and if s/he does, s/he will

probably lose his freedom. One is obliged to respect these rules and will be punished in case

s/he does not. In many cases, the obedience to the laws is motivated by the fear of punishment

rather than being a rational choice, and this can be applied to the divine laws, too. Those who

disobey God’s laws will be punished and eventually also lose their freedom. Therefore, can

we really refer to obedience as a choice?

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Considering the existence of Hell and of eternal punishment, are we free to obey or in

some sense, forced to obey? My argument here is that obedience is not a choice, but a threat.

Some will act according to God’s will, not simply because of personal conviction or because

they have rationally chosen to, but because they are afraid of the damnation – not for love for

what is good, but for fear of what is evil.

Hence, on one side, God does not interfere on free will and allows even the most

abhorrent situations to happen for the sake of freedom, but, on the other side, he builds an

impressive punishment apparatus to penalize the first transgressors. Is not punishment an

interference on free will? I argue that, although free will defence may explain God’s lack of

intervention, the treat of hell is a proof of his constant obstruction in human’s choices. I

assume people are not given a choice, but a threat: the threat of eternal damnation.

The Victim’s side

Another relevant criticism of free will defence regards those who suffer the bad

consequences of these acts, which is not completely justified in this kind of defence. In

Paradise Lost (11. 423-60) the story of Abel and Cain is retold: Abel makes God an offering,

which is well accepted, as it was sincere and made with the necessary formalities. The one

made by his brother Cain was not accepted, for it lacked these qualities. Enraged, Cain

murders his brother. Here, one can perfectly assume that whatever happens to him due to this

action is deserved. Any punishment is well justified in free will defence, because the deeds

are people’s choices – they are the agents of them. But what about Abel? Could not God

interfer in his favour? One must consider also that God’s acceptance of the offering was the

main motivation of the crime. Could not he protect the one that made him a sincere offering?

Must he get killed, because his brother misused his free will?

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Michael, the narrator of the event to Adam, justifies it by asserting that “ … the bloody

fact / Will be avenged, and the other’s Faith approved” (PL 11.457-8). It may be – but in

which terms? First, the faithful has to be murdered and will be rewarded in the future, while

his murderer will live his life now and be punished only in the future. The question that arises

from this situation is: why does the innocent have to suffer, and has to suffer now, to be

rewarded only in the future while the transgressor can disobey now and will be punished only

in the future? And, of course, the transgressor can still be saved. It seems that the innocents

receive a worse treatment if they are unlucky enough, like Abel, or, in Adam’s words: “Is

Piety thus and pure Devotion paid?” (PL 11.452)

My argument here is that free will defence may suffice to explain transgression and

punishment, but it still does not explain the suffering caused to the victims of these actions.

Not every evil is deserved. For Milton, it may be enough to believe that evil will be defeated

in the end and the good will be rewarded: “ … man therefore shall find grace” (PL 3.131) but,

as Christopher Hill argues in The Experience of Defeat: “Milton’s thinking thus in a sense

represents a dead end, with its blind assertion that good would triumph” (318). This blind

assertion does not solve the problem of the victims, but simply postpones it to an after-life.

Theological Aspects

In order to make a comprehensive criticism of free will defence, I am going to

consider a theological approach to discuss the validity of this kind of defence as well as the

arguments that speak for and against it. Before discussing how these matters are analysed by

theology today, I propose first to make a short incursion into seventeenth-century theology to

investigate how these matters were explained at Milton’s time and to discuss why he decided

to write his own justification of the divine ways.

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There is an important change in how people dealt with evil and the responsibility for it

in the early modern period. With the Protestant doctrines, the way Christians related

themselves to God changes profoundly: now the individual has direct contact with God,

which does not need to be mediated by the Church. Still, doctrines like Calvinism and

Lutheranism did not approve free will defence, as they claimed that humans had no freedom

to determine or influence the choices God had already made for them. It was all predestined

and God’s will was fate.

About these theologies, Hermann Häring claims: “es gibt kaum eine zweite

theologische Theorie in der Neuzeit, die die Menschen gegenüber Gott so unversichert hat,

statt ihnen Freiheit zuzusprechen“ (88). For Häring, Calvinism other similar theological

theories of the seventeenth century, instead of assigning people freedom, contributed rather to

make them feel uncertain about God. I believe Milton was looking for a better God than the

Calvinistic one: a fair God who would judge people according to their deeds and that would

not intervene in their choices – in short, a God who would respect human freedom. By using

free will defence to explain the origin of evil, Milton not only takes God’s responsibility

away, but, at the same time, preserves human freedom. It is also a positive argument against

doctrines like Predestination and argues in favour of salvation. Another interesting aspect of

free will defence is the idea that humans are not only victims of evil, but mainly, agents of it.

In this context, the recognition of human sinfulness after Adam’s fall is of crucial relevance,

not only to Milton, but to the Protestant tradition in general.

But still, free will defence cannot be accepted as a plausible theory because it

contradicts the Christian principles. Häring states: “Nun ist in der christlichen Tradition

unbestritten, dass frei gewollte Bosheit nicht zu rechtfertigen ist, der Zweck hat noch nie die

Mittel geheilt. Christlich gesehen wäre es blanker Zynismus, wollte man im Blick auf ein

‚höheres‘ Gut das Opfer von Menschleben im Kauf zu nehmen” (83). Here, he defends an

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argument I strongly support: the achievement of a higher good does not justify the suffering

of the innocent, because the means do not justify the ends, whatever these ends may be. To

admit this argument in the context of Christian faith would be cynical, since it would induce

believers to accept the victimization of people in exchange for a higher good. Moreover, to

accept this argument would render the Christian God a rather Machiavellian picture – since it

would justify his immoral or evil actions.

The evils that cannot be justified through free will defence are analysed by Daniel

Howard-Snyder in The Argument of Evidential Evil2 and defined as Inscrutable Evil, i.e., all

kinds of horrific evil “or some other brutal, debilitating and undeserved evil” (285). One of

the main questions he proposes to investigate is how much horrific evil is necessary for the

realization of God’s purposes. Taking Abel’s tragic death as an example of horrific evil, I

propose a further question: Is horrific evil in any amount necessary for the accomplishment of

divine plans? Or even, can Abel’s brutal death be necessary to God’s realizations?

Authors such as Alvin Plantinga and Richard Swinburne would defend Milton’s

argument that the evils we find on Earth serve greater goods and, in the end, humans shall

find grace: “New heaven and earth, wherein the just shall dwell / and after all their

tribulations long / see golden days, fruitful of golden deeds” (PL 3.335-7). In his article,

Swinburne illustrates this premise with various examples of situations in which evil is

required for the existence of good states. He also argues that “evil is required for humans to

have the knowledge of how to do significant evil to their fellows. Without that knowledge the

choice between good and evil will not be available” (32). Milton also defended that evil is

necessary to attain the knowledge of good, as well as temptation is important to virtue (see

2. For this analysis, I am going to work mostly with articles of the publication The Evidential Argument from Evil. Although not the newest of its kind, its importance according to Dougherty regards the fact that it brought back the discussions on the problem of evil, after “a consensus began to emerge that Alvin Plantinga had buried the so called ‘logical problem of evil’” (560). Because it presents different views on similar topics, it provides a necessary dialogue that was not happening since the late seventies, since there was a consensus on these matters.

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Areopagitica). For him, they exist in a dialectic relation and real knowledge of good must

include knowledge of evil, as well as to be virtuous, one has to be tempted.

But still, Swinburne recognizes that “not all evil actions are actions of agents of free

will and so to be justified by free will defence. Yet these actions, like physical pain, provide

opportunities for good actions to be done in response to them.”(41) Now two problems arise

from free will defence: first, it does not justify the suffering of the innocents, and secondly, it

does not explain the origin of all evil actions – since not all of them are performed by free will

agents.

Nevertheless Swinburne, like Milton, justifies these problems with the assertion that it

is all for a higher good. However, I think Swinburne cannot sustain this premise in the

examples he presents: “God, who has rights over us that we do not have over others is not less

than perfectly good if he allowed the Jews for a short period of time to be subjected to these

terrible evils through the evil free choice of others in virtue of the hard heroic value of their

lives of suffering” (45). I strongly disagree with this statement: heroism can never be a higher

good than human lives lost in an undeserved and brutal manner. Thus, by using this example,

he actually shows a situation that cannot justify a higher good – and contradicts his own

argument.

Other authors, such as Richard Gale, also support the position that of free will defence

is not an acceptable justification, an argument I definitely agree with. He argues that no

version of this defence works and thereby the logical problem posed by moral evil is still

unsolved. To illustrate his argument he discusses the role of what he calls Gratuitous Evil,

and concludes that it is unnecessary for the realization of a higher good or for the prevention

of a greater evil. These non-justifiable evils render our communion with God impossible “in

opposition to the very purpose for which the theistic claims that God created us humans”

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(208). So, if the existence of gratuitous evil goes against the possibility of communion

between the Creator and his Creation, can it possibly achieve a higher good? Howard-Snyder

supports this position and claims that “victims and observers would have plenty of

opportunity to respond virtuously to the vicissitudes and hardships of a mundane life even if

God had prevented the Holocaust” (290). Inscrutable evil contradicts Christian doctrine and

cannot be required for a higher purpose.

To sum up, I conclude that free will defence presents some logical problems, the first

of them being the failure in explaining the victim’s side and the suffering of the innocent. A

second problem is its incapacity to clarify the existence of inscrutable evil, gratuitous evil and

also evil actions that are not performed by free will agents or choices made in an unconscious

way. The assertion that it is all for a higher good as ultimate explanation cannot be sustained

in face of the examples of inscrutable or gratuitous evil given. My conclusion is that free will

defence is only a partial response, which cannot fully account for the existence of evil in the

world, but can justify some of its occurrences, especially those involving the agents of evil

acts. In the next chapter, I am going to analyse these points that cannot be explained by free

will defence, for they require a comprehensive approach to God’s nature.

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3. A Possible Genealogy of Evil

3.1 Metaphysical and Moral Evil

Considering free will defence as a partial response to the existence of evil, it is

necessary to search for other possible origins of it in Paradise Lost. First of all, it is important

to mention that Milton’s understanding of evil is strongly related to Augustinian theology. In

his City of God, Augustine states that men were created good, although God foresaw their

corruption: “God's foreknowledge had anticipated both, - that is to say, both how evil the man

whom He had created good should become.” (Book 14, ch. 11). Evil is not created by God, he

creates only good. The first evil was not a positive work, but “rather a kind of falling away

from the work of God to its own works” (Book 14, ch. 11). What results from these acts is

evil, but not due to of a positive definition of their existence, but through a negative one; they

are acts without God. Thus, Augustine denies its existence as an entity and claims evil to

depend on the existence of good, although the opposite is not true:

Yet good can exist without evil, as in the true and supreme God Himself, … ; but

evil cannot exist without good, because the natures in which evil exists, in so far as

they are natures, are good. And evil is removed, not by removing any nature, or part

of a nature, which had been introduced by the evil, but by healing and correcting that

which had been vitiated and depraved. (Book 14, ch. 11)

Evil is the privation of good, or the corruption of it. In case something were completely

deprived of all good, this something would become a nothing, as he states in Confessions: “I

knew not that evil was naught but a privation of good, until in the end it ceases altogether to

be.” (Book 3, ch. 7) Hence, if something is, what is must be good, since evil is not a

substance – if it were it would be good, because it would have been created by God.

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Stephen Fallon names this concept metaphysical evil in opposition to moral evil. He

defines the first as “evil is nonentity, the negation rather than the expression of being” (Milton

among the Philosophers 170) and states that “metaphysical evil for both Augustine and

Milton is the loss or privation or entity; it is the measure of the negative distance between

created perfection and willed corruption” (Milton among the Philosophers 170-1). Moral evil

concerns the corrupted creatures, who, once corrupted, are always subjected to further

corruption due to their diseased will. In analogy to Paradise Lost, Fallon proposes that Sin

and Death are representations of metaphysical evil, while Satan would represent moral evil:

“The character Sin is the allegorical embodiment of Satan’s turning from God. Death

embodies the result of that turning, impaired reason and acquired physical grossness … Sin

and Death are the measure of the negative ontological distance between Lucifer and

Satan”(Milton among the Philosophers 185). In this sense, attributing metaphysical evil to

God would consist in a clear logical mistake, but I would still like to explore the concept of

moral evil further.

Although for Milton and Augustine moral evil is restricted to the corrupted creatures, I

propose to use this concept comprehensively, as I assume that God is not completely

unrelated to it. The fact that Satan is the main representation of moral evil in the epic does not

exclude the possibility that other characters may also share this trait. My argument is that,

since free will defence does not provide a complete explanation for all kinds of evil – for

example inscrutable evil – they do not, and cannot come from the Creation, but must have

their origin in the Creator.

How could evil have its origin in a wholly good God? I do not consider Milton’s God

completely benevolent, but to have an ambivalent nature. He is both: good and evil. He is, in

fact, good to his believers, but also hideous to his enemies. The claims that the Miltonic God

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is exclusively benevolent deny this part of his nature and cannot be sustained neither by the

epic poem, nor by his theological treatise.

Moreover, the Christian God of the seventeenth- century differs substantially to the

one found four centuries later. He was the God of Predestination, of wrath, and of

punishment. According to Christopher Hill: “Milton’s radical theology is far from conforming

to the sensibility of twentieth-century liberal Christians” (Milton and the English Revolution

1). Hence, though Milton was looking for a better God than the Calvinist one, his deity was

far from being a wholly good God. Hence, I believe it is necessary to invert C. S Lewis’s

assertion: “Many of those who say they dislike Milton’s God only mean that they dislike

God” (130). I would reformulate it thus: many of those who like Milton’s God do so because

they already like God.

In relation to this view of Milton’s God as an essentially good deity, Michael Lieb

states that:

Despite Milton’s reputation as the consummate poem of reason and logic, we must

acknowledge his intimate ties to the world of the hidden and the perilous. Milton is as

“dark” as any poet (or theologian) that the early modern period produced. His God is

the consummate embodiment not only of the light with which he is so often

associated but of a darkness in which he is said to reside (Theological Milton 5)

Like Lieb, I do not claim Milton’s God is the wicked deity William Empson described, but

the views of this deity as wholly good, such as the ones presented by Dennis Danielson seem

rather incomplete. In my opinion, Bryson was very accurate when he stated that: “None of

Milton’s characters (…) have proven more disturbing for readers than the Father. Both

characters read their critics as much as their critics read them.” (“Divine Evil and

Justification” 87) I perceive Milton’s God as both, as said before: good and evil. As his

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benevolent side has been widely analysed in Milton’s criticism and needs no further

argumentation, I propose to investigate the aspects concerning divine evil, since I consider

them to have been somewhat marginalized in the discussions about God’s character.

3.2 God in De Doctrina Christiana

In his theological treatise, Milton states that “nothing new is being taught: rather, I

seek only … things which are read in dispersal in the holy books, by bringing them together”

(DC 19; Book 1 ch.1). He accepts the Holy Scriptures as the ultimate authority, as the word of

God itself and proposes they should be used as the way to acquire knowledge about the

divinity: “our safest course is to encompass God with our mind as he shows himself and

describes himself in sacred literature” (DC 29; Book 1 ch.2). Hence, to know God is to know

the Scriptures. What Milton proposes to do is not to construct new knowledge about God, but

to interpret the knowledge already available in the Holy Texts, the highest authority in divine

matters for him.

The knowledge about God can never be complete; we are able to grasp some of it, an

accommodated knowledge: “God, as he really is, far outstrips human thought, let alone

perception. And so God has revealed as much of himself as either our mind can grasp or the

weakness of our nature can bear” (DC 27; Book 1 ch.2). In this sense, our knowledge of God

is always partial due to our own nature. Although Milton proposes to investigate and describe

God in his treatise, it is clear for him that this task cannot be completely accomplished.

In the second chapter, Milton proposes to investigate divine nature through God’s

attributes and names, because “the divine nature … cannot be encompassed by any definition

of ours yet some description of him can in any case be gathered from his names and

attributes” (DC 31; Book 1 ch. 2). By analysing these attributes, it is remarkable that,

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although Milton lists and explains nine different attributions related to the names given to

God, “those attributes which describe God’s nature” (DC 43; Book 1 ch.2), he does not

mention benevolence in any of them. Thus, it may be implied that benevolence is not an

attribution of God’s nature. The adjectives used to qualify the deity in this first part – eternal,

all-powerful, unchangeable, boundless and measureless, among others - are rather related to

his magnitude than to his good spirit.

Following this first description, Milton lists then a second group of attributes “which

show his divine strength and power: that is, typifying the idea of Life, or intelligence, or will”

(DC 43; Book 1 ch.2). Here God’s righteousness is finally mentioned, in the second topic of

the third idea (idea of will): “Secundò, est summè beatus”, translated as “Secondly, he is

supremely blessed”(DC 44-45; Book 1 ch.2). Beatus can also mean, apart from blessed,

blissful, prosperous, saint, righteous but the meaning differs slightly from benignus (kind,

friendly, generous) used by Sumner in the first transcription and translation of the manuscript.

It was later translated by John Carey, who kept the word benevolent as in Sumner’s version

without any further comment. The word beatus appears only in the latest translation of the

manuscript, which was transcribed and translated by Hale and Cullington and published in

2012.

In the proof-texts used by Milton words like mercy and kindness abound, while good

and love appear only once. Milton concludes this chapter by stating that God’s supreme

goodness is related to his supreme wisdom, which makes him unchangeable. Still, supreme

goodness does not mean solely goodness; it does not exclude the possibility of evil.

In short, in Milton’s whole presentation of God’s attributes (considering the two

groups presented), mercy and kindness appear in one of the fifteen mentioned attributes.

Other characteristics, such as omnipotence and oneness are discussed more extensively and

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seem to be more relevant in the understanding we are supposed to have of God. I assume

Milton knew this could disturb those “who never stop inventing nicer definitions of God” (DC

29; Book 1 ch.2) and proposes people should contemplate and mentally imagine God “as the

Scripture does, that is, in the way he offers himself to contemplation” (DC 29; Book 1 ch.2).

Milton concludes the chapter asserting: “Hence, finally, we must call him wonderful and

incomprehensible” (DC 47; Book 1 ch.2).

Michael Lieb, while analysing these attributes, concludes that the idea of omnipotence

“as essentially destructive or annihilative underlies Milton’s reflections on the Hebrew and

Greek names of God” (Theological Milton 95). To illustrate this destructiveness, Lieb

examines the implications of the use of the name El Shaddai: “There is no discernible sense

of grace or redemption in that name; rather it instills awe and even dread” (Theological

Milton 95). The Greek names, Kyrios pantokrator and monos dynastos are related to God’s

power and rulership, meaning the omnipotent Lord and the only ruler. Thus, God’s

characterization is more related to his power, which is also destructive, and to his ruling

function, which does not emphasize his paternal side, but rather diminishes it.

Lieb also highlights the frightening aspects of the hiddenness of God together with

Milton’s understanding of omnipotence and argues: “it is clear that Milton fully embraces the

concept of an omnipotent God in part because that concept is important to a full

understanding of how an essentially Hebraic God is to be appreciated, indeed worshiped, with

a mixture of love and fear, if not dread” (Theological Milton 93). Important to mention is that

the Christian God as presented in the Bible, especially in the Old Testament, is a God who

shows many signs of wickedness – many of them well illustrated in the Book of Job, for

instance. In this book, Satan has God’s permission to test Job’s faith in order to see if he

would remain loyal to God in case he lost everything and went through horrible suffering.

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Thus, Job, although righteous, has to suffer different calamities because of a bet made

between God and Satan.

In this sense, I share Lieb’s conclusion that “Nonetheless, at the heart of the very

conception of God in De Doctrina is a sensibility that is entirely receptive to what can be

called awesome, fearsome, and even bizarre aspects of the deity. Calling attention to those

aspects (beyond all others), Milton makes bold to declare that his God is not necessarily a

deity that all will accept.” (Theological Milton 117) Since this is the God presented especially

in the Old Testament, there is no reason why Milton should not accept the picture as it is

presented, no matter how inappropriate it may seem, as he states “to what is proper or

improper of God, let us not demand a weightier authority than God himself. If Jehovah

regretted having made humankind, Gen. 6:6, and [regretted] their groaning, Judg. 2:18, let us

believe he did feel regret” (DC 29; Book 1 ch. 2).

In the Chapter entitled “On God’s Providence”, Milton explains in which ways God is

related to evil: “Yet God either merely allows evils to occur, by not preventing natural

causes and free agents … or else he indeed brings them about by punishing, which they

call the evil of punishment: 2 Sam 12:11 I am going to raise up evil against you out of your

own house … Isa 54:16 I created the murderer for destroying … Amos 3:6 or will there be

evil in the city which God does not bring about?” (DC 323; Book 1 ch. 8). For him, it is clear

that God creates not only good, but also evil, for he is the Creator of all things. This passage

makes evident that the existence of evil in the world is not only caused by the misuse of free

will, but due to natural causes not prevented by God and also due to the evil the deity brings

about through punishment.

God is not only related to evil, but also involved in sin, though not its author: “In sins,

I say, we read that God’s providence is involved not just by permitting it, or else by

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withdrawing his grace, but also by frequently urging sinners on to commit sin, by hardening

and by blinding them.” (DC 323; Book 1 ch. 8) Hence, though “supremely good” (DC 323;

Book 1 ch. 8), he prompts the sinners to sin in different ways and furthermore, punishes them

for their transgressions.

3.3 God’s Dark Side in Milton Criticism

Regarding God’s feelings, especially the negative ones, important remarks are made

by Michael Lieb in his Theological Milton. He describes Milton’s God not only in De

Doctrina Christiana, but also the one in Paradise Lost, as a passionate God, who not only

loves, but also hates. Important to consider is that God’s emotions (love, hate, anger, regret

etc.) should not render him an “anthropopathically” image, as Milton states in his treatise:

“only let us not suppose that in God, as in mortals, the sorrow was born of inadvertency.” (DC

29; Book 1 ch. 2) To illustrate this statement, he presents various proof texts that show God’s

feelings. In no moment Milton denies that God feels – the difference is that his feelings are

divine and perfect. Lieb describes the Miltonic God “as a being who experiences indignation

and wrath on one hand, and pity on the other, the father is one in whom passible is divinized:

he is the source of emotion at its most perfect, indeed, at its most sacred.” (Theological Milton

160) One should not forget that the Biblical God is also passionate.

This God, apart from hating, also has enemies and wants his son to take revenge on

them “Thee only extolled, Son of thy father’s might, / to execute fierce vengeance on his

foes” (PL 3.398-9). To those, he is not merely just, but severe. In fact, God’s justice consists

basically in rewarding the faithful and punishing the transgressors. Divine love is for obedient

believers (and sometimes not even for those). The ones that insist in turning away from him

are going to acknowledge his power and wrath in Jesus’s second coming: this is his promise.

In this sense, he is not only the saviour – he is also the judge and the executioner. Salvation

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and eternal life will come to some or many, while others will face eternal punishment. This

should not be forgotten: while some will know God as their saviour, others will only see his

executioner’s face. As Lieb puts it: “Milton’s God is also the God of the other. To know him

is to see his contraries” (Theological Milton 6). I assume this God to be more complex than

one tends to assume.

Moreover, besides from hating his enemies, God expects us to hate them too. As the

Son says in Paradise Lost: “But whom thou hatest, I hate, and can put on / Thy terrors, as I

put thy mildness on” (PL 6.734-5). In De Doctrina Christiana, Milton defends the idea that

“Some, hatred, is even a holy duty, as when we regard as hateful God’s or the church’s foes”

(DC 1113; Book 2 ch.5) and also states that “we are commanded to curse, publicly too, both

the enemies of God and the church, or false brother-Christians, and anyone whatever who

commits certain major sins either against God or even against ourselves; and [the same] may

be done in private prayer, after the example of the holiest men.” (DC 981; Book 2 ch.4). To

be faithful, one must also hate and curse God’s enemies, as the deity and his son do.

The arguments presented by Lieb in relation to God’s feelings are also supported by

Richard Durocher, who states that “the character called God in Paradise Lost, who is at times

an angry God, a wrathful God, an ‘incensed deity’ (3.187) as well as a loving Father, is

always and everywhere a God of emotion” (23). Still, he highlights us that these emotions are

superior in quality to ours, since God lacks the imperfections of the fallen creatures.

Apart from emotions, I propose that God also has some sense of humour. One should

not forget how he mocks of the fallen angels, for example: “ … Mighty Father, thou thy foes /

Justly hast in derision, and secure / Laugh’st at their vain designs and tumults vain,” (PL

5.735-7). Remarkable is the fact that even God’s mockery is fair and probably also holy, as

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his hatred and his wrath are. Apart from derision, some irony can also be perceived in the

divine language.

Martin Kuester claims God’s language to be ambiguous and analyses what he calls

“God’s irony”. He refers specifically to the conversation between God and Adam in Paradise,

in Book 8, where Adam asks the creator for a companion. Kuester proposes that God’s first

negative answer was only a test, but not a true answer, as later assumed by God: “for trial

onely brought / To see how thou could'st judge of fit and meet” (PL 8.447-8). Hence, Kuester

states: “in seiner Rede weicht Gott scheinbar von der von ihm selbst autorisierten Eins-zu-

eins-Beziehung zwischen Wort und Sache ab, wenn er eine Sache sagt und eigentlich etwas

anderes meinte (…) Dies ist nicht der einzige Fall, in dem Gott zweideutige und der Mensch

eindeutige Sprache benutzt” (123). With further examples, Kuester illustrates situations in

which God himself does not use the language he endorses – the one that preserves the one-to-

one relationship between word and referent. This use of language makes it even more difficult

to understand God and what he expects of humans and, although we are supposed to believe

and obey the divine words, we can never be sure of what he meant.

Michael Bryson also analyses similar situations in Paradise Lost and states that “the

words of the Father cannot be relied upon as simple statements of truth” (“Divine Evil and

Justification” 88). By investigating the conversation between the Father and the Son in Book

3, Bryson concludes that “The Father, in short, lies” (“Divine Evil and Justification” 96). The

fact that Satan is portrayed as the Father of Lies does not exclude the possibility that God may

also lie, as Bryson states: “Plainly, Milton is at great pains to create a portrait of Satan as a

liar. This is a truism as banal as it is well known. This truism, however, does not necessarily

preclude the possibility that the Father may also lie” (“Divine Evil and Justification” 96). As I

argued before, the fact that Satan is the representation of moral evil does not eliminate the

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possibility that God may also be morally evil, and because of it, I support Bryson’s statement

that the fact that Satan is the one painted as a liar does not consequently constrain God to lie.

Bryson sustains his arguments using Biblical examples to show that Yahweh also lies

in order to achieve his ends and argues that: “The Yahweh of Job, working hand in hand with

Satan to ensure that the ‘Wicked’ shall be revealed: ‘And for this cause God shall send them a

strong delusion, that they should believe a lie’ (2 Thessalonians 2.11). A God pictured as a

liar, as a punisher of actions he has initiated, … is a portrait of divine evil, even if that god …

seems to act for good purposes” (“Divine Evil and Justification” 97). I agree with this point of

view and would add that the fact that God lies or has lied, also questions his morality, since

the ends do not justify the means. I also suppose God does not need to lie to achieve his goals.

Apart from it, Bryson also discusses “the father’s capacity for good and evil” (“Divine

Evil and Justification” 87) and refers to Raphael’s words in Book 8, where he casually

mentions the possibility that God might have mixed good and evil in the creation: “ … while

God was in his work / Least he incensed at such eruption bold, / Destruction with Creation

might have mixt” (PL 8.234-6). This is a very important point highlighted by Bryson: the

creation of evil by God – a point I strongly agree with as I propose that some amount of evil

must come from the Creator, since not all originates in the creatures, as discussed before.

Moreover he also analyses the tyrannical traits of the Father3 and states that Jesus in

Paradise Lost, as well as Moses in the Old Testament, are “pleading with God not to take an

action that will allow the enemy to question and blaspheme … both the Son and Moses are

trying to forestall ‘divine evil’” (“Divine Evil and Justification” 91). If the creation is good,

destroying it must be an evil act. Here resides God’s capacity for good and evil - he is the

3 God’s tyrannical traits are analysed by Bryson not only in the article already mentioned, but also in The Tyranny of Heaven: Milton's Rejection of God as King and in “’His Tyranny Who Reigns’: The Biblical Roots of Divine Kingship and Milton’s Rejection of ‘Heav’n’s King”. Blair Worden also investigates these traits in "Milton’s Republicanism and the Tyranny of Heaven."

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creator as well as the destroyer, for he is the one who proposes to eliminate his creation: “He

and his whole prosperity must die” (PL 3.209). Bryson concludes his analysis by stating that

“Milton creates a passible and morally ambitious character in the Father … The possibility of

divine evil may explain why an old, blind, disgraced poet would feel it necessary to ‘assert

eternal providence and justify the ways of God’” (“Divine Evil and Justification” 92).

Considering this possibility, I analyse further arguments that exemplify God’s capacity for

good and evil.

Recognizing a possible divine responsibility in the fall, Peter Herman analyses the fall

by using seventeenth- century notions of liable negligence. According to him, the concept of

negligence already existed at Milton’s time and the author was probably familiar with the

term, since he was in permanent contact with legal affairs. Considering this concept, Herman

states that God could be considered responsible for man’s fall, as it happened after a series of

negligent actions performed by God – such as allowing Satan to escape from hell – that

contributed in some weight to man’s fall and probably, without these actions, the Fall would

not have happened. In my opinion, the argument about God’s negligence, especially

considering his excessive defensiveness in relation to the fall, supports my thesis that the

Miltonic God is good and evil.

Another topic related to God’s dark side is the use of violence4. In relation to it, Diana

Benet states “pain in Paradise Lost is a direct consequence of divine violence” (90) and was

God’s own invention against the rebels in the war of heaven. Apart from it, pain during

childbirth was the punishment given to Eve (and to the women to come) for her disobedience.

Chronologically, Lucifer is the one to first experience pain in the epic, when he conspires

4 God’s violence is also analysed by other critics, for example, Christopher Hill in his Experience of Defeat, and by Barbara Lewalski in “Milton and the Culture Wars”. Sharon Achinstein dedicated a whole chapter to analyse the role of violence in her Literature and Dissident in Milton’s England. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003.

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against God and Sin bursts from his head. Hence, the occurrence of pain in the poem is

directly related to divine punishment.

According to Benet, Milton tries to mitigate the image of a God who hates, but he is

still representing a punishing deity. This is a fact he acknowledges and that brings great

difficulties, but still “the Father’s passion and wrath are given concrete expression in hell”

(104), a point I strongly agree with and will discuss more extensively in the next chapter. In

her opinion, though, “Milton’s representation of the deity who inflicts pain on those he hates

is bound to fail because Milton cannot reconcile the God of love and the God of wrath …

comprehend the incomprehensible God can be made only by referring to divine attributes that

seem, to weak and imperfect human reason, irreconcilable” (106). I disagree, however; the

fact that the attributes seem irreconcilable to human reason does not mean that Milton’s

representation has failed. It is clear for him they will seem irreconcilable for human reason –

and maybe that is what prompts him to justify these ways, strange as they may be.

In this sense, Michael Lieb’s argument seems more appropriate: “If one is inclined to

speak of the ‘faces’ of God, those many aspects are certainly present in ‘De Deo’. In

accessing the nature of that presence, one must be receptive to the wide range of readings that

the treatise not only encourages but demands. If there are contradictions, then there are

contradictions; not all aspects must agree with one another” (Theological Milton 123). I

believe Milton has not failed in reconciling these aspects, for he has succeeded in

understanding that they are irreconcilable and also succeeded in representing them this way.

These contradictions are an important part of Milton’s thinking, and, as stated in the

introduction, cannot always be conformed to the expected coherence.

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4. Hell as a Depiction of Divine Evil

4.1 Hell in the Scriptures

To illustrate God’s dark side, I am going to analyse the how Milton defines sin,

punishment, and hell in De Doctrina Christiana together with the creation of hell in Paradise

Lost and its role as a punishment apparatus. Considering the importance of the Holy

Scriptures to Milton, I propose to analyse how hell is presented in the Bible, to investigate the

etymological origins of the word and concepts previously associated to it.

The word hell, as used in the King James Authorized Version (KJV) of the Bible, is a

word derived from the Old English form hel or helle, which means:

nether world, abode of the dead, infernal regions," from Proto-Germanic *haljo "the

underworld" (cf. … German Hölle) "the underworld," literally "concealed place" (cf.

Old Norse hellir "cave, cavern") … The English word may be in part from Old Norse

Hel (from Proto-Germanic *halija "one who covers up or hides something") …

Transfer of a pagan concept and word to a Christian idiom. In Middle English, also

the Limbus Patrum, place where the Patriarchs, Prophets, etc. awaited the Atonement.

Used in the KJV for Old Testament Hebrew Sheol and New Testament Greek Hades,

Gehenna. Used figuratively for ‘state of misery, any bad experience’ since at least late

14c. As an expression of disgust, etc., first recorded 1670s. (Harper “Hell”)

It is remarkable that the word hell in its original meaning made reference to an underground

world, a hidden place for the dead, but does not imply any form of punishment or suffering.

This “transfer of a pagan concept to a Christian idiom” happens when the word is used to

translate the words Sheol, Hades and Gehenna, since they do not share the same meaning.

Hades and Sheol may be considered as synonyms, similar in meaning to the Old English form

Hel and also to the Latin form “infernus ‘lower, lying beneath,’ from infra ‘below.’” (Harper

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“Infernus”) Nevertheless, only the word Sheol implies the idea of Atonement, an idea also

implied in the expression Limbus Patrum.

In the Old Testament (OT), the descriptions of Sheol are scarce: it is a dark place, with

no light, no sound, no remembrance, and its inhabitants are trembling shades. These attributes

can be found mainly in Job, Isaiah and Psalms. William B. Nelson, Jr. states that:

Through much of the Old Testament period, it was believed that all went one place,

whether human or animal (Psalms 49:12; Psalms 49:14; Psalms 49:20), whether

righteous or wicked (Eccl 9:2-3). No one could avoid Sheol (Psalm 49:9; 89:48),

which was thought to be down in the lowest parts of the earth (Deut 32:22; 1 Sam

28:11-15; Job 26:5; Psalm 86:13; Isa 7:11; Ezekiel 31:14-16; Ezekiel 31:18 )

(“Sheol”)

Thus, until the end of the OT, the word hell made reference to the realm of the dead

previously named Sheol and had no direct relation with the punishment of the wicked.

Nonetheless, according to Nelson, “this theology developed further in the intertestamental

period” (“Sheol”) and Sheol presents a different eschatological conception in the period

between both testaments, which also differs from how it is conceived in the NT.

In the end of the OT, precisely in Isaiah, it is revealed that there will be the

resurrection of the dead, where the faithful will be rewarded and the wicked punished. God’s

punishment is clearly described in Isaiah: “For, behold, the LORD will come with fire, and

with his chariots like a whirlwind, to render his anger with fury, and his rebuke with flames of

fire. For by fire and by his sword will the LORD plead with all flesh: and the slain of the

LORD shall be many” (66.15-16) and also in “And they shall go forth, and look upon the

carcases of the men that have transgressed against me: for their worm shall not die, neither

shall their fire be quenched; and they shall be an abhorring unto all flesh” (Isa 66.24).

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Interesting about these images is how the fire imagery is already present as well as the idea of

eternal torment (worm that never dies, fire that is never quenched). This imagery will remain

in practically all further representations of God’s punishment in the NT, although the worm as

a motif for everlasting torture tends to disappear in non-Biblical representations of hell.

Nonetheless, the place of punishment prepared by God is called Topheth: “For Tophet

is ordained of old; yea, for the king it is prepared; he hath made it deep and large: the pile

thereof is fire and much wood; the breath of the LORD, like a stream of brimstone, doth

kindle it.” (Isa 30.33) Although some theologians state that the king mentioned in the passage

is Moloch, I assume it to be Lucifer: first, because he is the one clearly punished by God in

the OT, and because he is previously mentioned in Isaiah chapter 14, which reports God’s

revenge against the Babylonians, the enemies of the Israel.

It is important to note that the Bible makes a clear distinction between Lucifer and

Satan. In the OT, the first is mentioned only in Isaiah: “How art thou fallen from heaven, O

Lucifer, son of the morning! how art thou cut down to the ground, which didst weaken the

nations! For thou hast said in thine heart, I will ascend into heaven, I will exalt my throne

above the stars of God’s of the clouds; I will be like the most High.” (14.12-13) Lucifer,

together with the epithet “son of the morning”, is, according to William Smith: “a symbolical

representation of the king of Babylon in his splendour and in his fall. Its application, from St.

Jerome downward, to Satan in his fall from heaven arises probably from the fact that the

Babylonian empire is in Scripture represented as the type of tyrannical and self-idolizing

power” (“Lucifer”). This king is probably Nebuchadnezzar II, who reined the Neo-

Babylonian Empire and destroyed the first temple, constructed under the rule of Solomon, the

king of the Israelites5.

5 Satan appears in the Old Testament mainly in Job and Zechariah, with a definite article preceding the name, literally “the satan”. Hence there is some discussion whether Satan is a proper name or rather a title “the accuser”. The association with Satan comes in the New Testament where Jesus “said unto them, I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven." (KJV Luke 10:18 ), repeating thus, the image formerly associated to Lucifer in

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Hence, the ones to be destroyed in Isaiah, whose king will be sent to Topheth, were the

Assyrians (who ruled the region before the neo-Babylonian empire), not Moloch: “For

through the voice of the LORD shall the Assyrian be beaten down, which smote with a rod.”

(Isa 30.31) In short, in the Bible, Topheth is a place first created by God to punish the king of

the so-called Assyrians, supposedly Nebuchadnezzar II, who destroyed the first temple of the

Israelites.

The word Topheth is not translated in the KJV and in many other versions of the

Bible, but may appear as burning place in some versions, while the word hell is used to

translate Sheol. Topheth initially refers to a place near Jerusalem, situated in the Valley of

Hinnom. According to Easton: “The cliffs on the southern side especially abound in ancient

tombs. Here the dead carcasses of beasts and every offal and abomination were cast”

(“Tophet”). Etymologically it may also mean: “Tophet =Topheth, from Heb. toph ‘a drum,’

because the cries of children here sacrificed by the priests of Moloch were drowned by the

noise of such an instrument; or from taph or toph, meaning ‘to burn,’ and hence a place of

burning, the name of a particular part in the valley of Hinnom.” (“Tophet”) Here, there are

two images associated with Topheth: a place of filth, worms, carcasses and decay; but also a

place of drums and fire, related to children sacrifice performed in worship of Moloch. This

imagery of Topheth is going to be further explored in the New Testament, under the name

Gehenna.

Gehenna is used in the New Testament normally in opposition to the term Heaven

and is translated in the KJV as Hell. It is the final destination for all the wicked humans after

the judgment; this will be their Second Death:

the Old Testament, where both are presented as distinct entities.

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I will give unto him that is athirst of the fountain of the water of life freely. He that

overcometh shall inherit all things; and I will be his God, and he shall be my son. But

the fearful, and unbelieving, and the abominable, and murderers, and

whoremongers, and sorcerers, and idolaters, and all liars, shall have their part in the

lake which burneth with fire and brimstone: which is the second death.(Rev.21.6-8)

This place is also mentioned in Mark, Mathew, Luke and James as the place “Where their

worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched.” (Mark 9.44) and where the body and the soul

will be completely destroyed by God.

The word Gehenna originates from the Hebrew form Ge bene Hinnom, which means

“the valley of the sons of Hinnom” (“Gehenna” Easton). In this place, precisely in the

Topheth, children sacrifices were performed, in which the parents had to “make his son or his

daughter to pass through the fire to Molech.” (2 Kings 23.10) The valley became afterwards a

place for all the rubbish in the city. According to Easton, “it thus in process of time became

the image of the place of everlasting destruction. In this sense it is used by our Lord [in the

New Testament].” (“Gehenna”) Thus, the use of the word Gehenna is not literal: Jesus is, in

fact, making an appropriation of the imagery of Topheth already had, and the Valley of

Hinnom, in order to describe the punishment the wicked would receive from God, since this

valley was associated mainly with filth, destruction, suffering, and death.

The further descriptions given about hell in the Bible explore basically the same

motifs associated with Gehenna – everlasting fire and worms that never die- but do not appear

very often and are not of crucial relevance for the kind of theology presented in the

Scriptures; salvation is a more relevant topic, for example. Considering the relevance of hell

in Christian faith, the imagery and the descriptions presented in the Scriptures are scarce and

repetitive. Apart from it, the word hell was used to translate different concepts, what made its

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meaning even more obscure, since it is not clear which hell is being mentioned: the place for

the dead or the punishment of the wicked.

The change of meaning from a neutral realm of the dead without punishment to a

place of fire, suffering and destruction happens in the period between the writings of the New

and Old Testament, known as the Intertestamental Period. The concept of punishment or

reward before the Judgment day appears very clearly in the non-canonical Book of Enoch,

which provides the basis for the concepts of Purgatory and Limbo and also Apocatastasis.

This conceptualization is especially relevant for the theological development of the Early

Church and also the medieval Church, being later rejected by the Reformation.

In the Book of Enoch, there is a clear distinction between the place where the fallen

angels are to be punished by their transgressions and the place where humans go after their

death. The first is translated by Charles as Tartarus (En. 20.2) while the second is named

Sheol. The angels’ prision (Tartarus) is not a destination for the dead – the angels did not die,

but were arrested due to their transgressions. The dead have another destination – they go to

Sheol, or the underworld, where the souls are to be divided in hollows according to their sins

or the absence of them. The first is for the children of men and the second is for the righteous,

where there is a bright spring of water (En 22.9)6. The other hollows are destined to the

wicked humans: “Here their spirits shall be set apart in this great pain till the great day of

judgement and punishment and torment of those who curse for ever, and retribution for their

spirits. There He shall bind them for ever.” (En 22.11)

Hence, in this book, the distinction between two important concepts is being made:

Tartarus, God’s jail for the fallen angels and Sheol, the realm of the dead. Remarkable is the

fact that here Sheol is not only the place where humans will wait for the final judgment, as in

the OT, but already a place of punishment of the wicked and reward of the righteous. Fire is 6 The spring of water is also mentioned by Jesus in Rev.21.6. See page 39 of this paper.

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not related to Sheol in the Book of Enoch, but rather with Tartarus and Heaven – the last is

extensively described as a palace of fire and crystal.

Thus, the word hell, as used in the KJV, may refer to the Hebrew Sheol in its different

nuances, and is also used to translate the Greek terms Hades and Gehenna. Tartarus, as it

appears in the Book of Enoch, is related to Topheth in the OT, both referring to the prison

created by God to punish his rivals – these terms, however, are not translated as hell. Because

of it, the word still maintains, in some degree, the original meaning of the Old English term

hel as “the abode of the dead”. In a linguistic level, the term also develops: its meaning is

extended and has been used as “’state of misery, any bad experience’ since at least late 14c.

As an expression of disgust, etc., first recorded 1670s” (Harper “Hell) what is also related to

this fusion of different concepts.

Milton, as one of the most read persons of his time, was aware of all these different

nuances and names, and explores all of them in Paradise Lost while framing his own hell. He

uses as well other traditions rather than the Biblical to depict it. Hell, in Paradise Lost, is

much more than a place of punishment created by God to be the destination or jail of the

transgressors.

4.2 The Development of Hell

The idea of hell as a place of punishment was not adopted by the Jews until 2 B.C,

when Sheol started to be imagined as a place of temporary suffering for the dead; it was also

not supported by early Christian eschatology, although the concept already existed in the NT.

The doctrine of Apocatastasis, normally attributed to Origen Adamantius (184/185 –

253/254), was preferred by the Christian Fathers. According to this doctrine, “the entire

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creation, including sinners, the damned, and the devil, would finally be restored to a condition

of eternal happiness and salvation” (Sachs 227).

According to Sachs, this doctrine implies a cyclic conception of time and of history, in

which the end is the return to the initial state of perfection. The Bible, on the other hand,

presents a linear conception of time that defines clearly the Creation (Genesis), the time

before the Fall in Paradise, the life on Earth, death, the wait for the last judgment and finally,

the end of world. There is no coming back to the initial state of perfection, implying that there

will be no restoration of the damned. If the damned cannot be restored, they need, thus,

another destination, where they could remain and be castigated after the end of the world.

This conception is adopted after 2 AC by the Catholic Church and rapidly gained

importance. Sachs states: “by the fifth century, the thread of eternal punishment is explicitly

mentioned in various symbols of faith” (230). This concept has also developed extensively

during the Middle Ages and has played, since then, a very important role in Christian

eschatology.

The medieval Church claimed hell to be a real place located in the middle of the Earth,

but also: “had come to recognize five distinct places or states which defined the location and

condition of the dead: in addition to heaven and hell, there was a purgatory for the souls of the

moderately sinful, a limbo for unbaptized infants, and a second limbo for the righteous

patriarchs and the prophets who have died, of necessity non-Christians, before the incarnation

of Jesus.”(280) Here, the dead have five different possible destinations, related to how sin is

conceived by medieval Christianity. It is divided into three categories: original sin, deadly

sins, and forgivable sins. The first – the original sin – may be taken away through Baptism,

while forgivable sins could be dealt with penance on Earth and would be cleansed in

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Purgatory after death. Only deadly sins were to be punished in Hell, but this appalling

consequence could also be avoided through penance.

Rasmussen states: “occupation with individual sin and forgiveness had evidently

increased since the twelfth century, and the sacrament of penance was the primary place to

deal with these matters. Since 1215, every adult Christian was obliged by church law to go to

penance at least once a year … along with an increased occupation with penance goes an

increased occupation with hell.” Here, the relation between penance and hell is made clear.

Important to add is that, what probably prompts the Church to put so much emphasis on

penance is the practice of indulgence, a very good deal to the Church itself that turned later to

be one of the principal motors of the Reformation.

In relation to the growing importance of hell in Christian faith, Sachs comments the

changes in the role salvation and damnation played:

Indeed, it would seem that since the middle Ages, the threat of eternal punishment

has played a more dominant role in Christian preaching and the popular piety than

the good news of the world’s salvation in Christ! By the time of the great scholastic

theologians, elaborate justifications for hell and its torments, usually based on

requirements of divine justice, appear as an answer to questions concerning their

relationship to God’s loving mercy and the final beatitude of the saved (231).

Here, it is clear how the concept of hell expands and surpasses the idea of salvation: the threat

of damnation becomes a more important issue than the promise of eternal life. An important

aspect to be mentioned is the context where these elaborate justifications of hell appear:

precisely answering questions concerning God’s mercy. In this passage, it becomes clear how

God’s mercy and punishments are closely related, compounding the concept of justice also

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presented by Milton in Paradise Lost and in De Doctrina Christiana: Justice means to punish

the bad and reward the good.

Considering this concept of justice, God would be unfair in doctrines that propose

universal salvation, such as Apocatastasis. For God to be just, he needs to punish, otherwise

his mercy would have no value for the righteous. This conception of God implies a deity who

is excessively juridical together with the idea of a God who should be feared. The first

attribute – a juridical God – is, without doubt, the strongest characteristic of Dante’s God in

Divina Commedia, whose Hell is precisely divided according to the deadly sins and the

correspondent punishment to be applied. This Hell is very well organized and horrible in all

its descriptions – a reflexion of God’s justice and rationality, but also, of a dreadful deity that

should be feared, because his punishments were appalling. God’s destructive powers are well

illustrated in Dante’s Inferno, which, as Milton’s hell, also appears in the beginning of the

epic, even before Heaven and Paradise. This confirms Sach’s statement that, since the Middle

Ages, hell plays a more dominant role in Christian faith than the salvation – and I believe this

to be true for Paradise Lost and Divina Commedia as well.

4.3 The Effects of Hell and of the Rejection of Purgatory on God

The different understandings of hell imply, from my point of view, a different

understanding of God and his attributes. To believe in hell means to believe in God’s

punishment – and to believe in a God that will punish the wrongdoers instead of restoring

them means, necessarily, that this is a God of Justice rather than a God of Love. My argument

is that Milton’s God is a God of Justice – his ways are not always good, but fair – that is why

they need to be justified. He is not trying to hide these ways – otherwise he would not make

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such a complex and rich description of hell – he is just trying to render these ways a

justification.

Although not an important theme in Reformation theology, the function of hell

changed substantially function by the rejection of Purgatory and penance by the Protestants.

In late Middle Ages, an ‘average Christian’ would have no reason to fear hell, as his destiny

would probably be the Purgatory, where there was punishment and fire, but with a different

function than in hell: “It was a fire for cleansing from sin. The logic was quite simple: either a

sin was so grave that it could not be removed by cleansing; such a sin belonged to the fire of

hell. Or a sin was lighter, so that it could be removed through cleansing.” (Rasmussen 370).

The punishment in Purgatory could be avoided or diminished by penance on Earth, which was

mediated by the Church.

The rejection of Purgatory and penance changed substantially the function of hell

because it turned to be the only sanction available. The parting of the sins in three kinds

(original, deadly and forgivable) is considered of little or no importance. The traditional view

that proposed that original sin could be removed by Baptism is rejected. Instead, Protestant

theology claims the original sin to be part of the human’s condition; it could not be removed.

Since it happened, humans are fallen and need to recognize this as part of their own nature – a

point of extreme relevance in Paradise Lost, as I argued in the first chapter of this present

paper.

Another important change in hell regards its image: it is no longer described in

topographical terms, but as a mental state, conceived in a rather figurative way. According to

Sachs: “hell, in essence, is the sinner, utterly alone, as one who has rejected God” (230).

These significant changes on how hell was perceived in the seventeenth- century contributed

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heavily to the so-called ‘decline of hell’. Nonetheless, Hell, as presented by Milton, is far

from being in decline, but, from my point of view, in its complete ascension.

4.4 Milton’s Conception of Sin, Divine Punishment and Hell

In De Doctrina Christiana, Milton describes sin as “Sin is either the common sin of

all humankind or each person’s own sin” (DC 413; Book 1 ch. 11). The common sin is that

“which the first parents, and in them all descendants, committed when they cast

obedience aside”(DC 413; Book 1 ch. 11). Hence, the medieval categorization of the sins is

not considered by Milton: each person’s sins may be the deadly or forgivable, and the

consequences of the original sin cannot be removed, but are now part of human nature: “This

first sin came from the devil’s prodding … next, it emanated from man’s very nature – one

quite liable to change – as a result of which he, like the devil earlier, has not persisted in the

truth, John 8:44, nor kept his original state, but has abandoned habitation” (DC 413; Book 1

ch. 11). Hence, the original sin – or common sin, as Milton names it – corrupts humans,

turning them into fallen creatures that are, since then, morally impaired.

Milton argues that it is proper and reasonable to punish all descendants “even those

not yet born are judged and condemned in them” (DC 415; Book 1 ch. 11) because Adam “the

common parent and head of all … stood or fell on behalf of the entire human race”(DC 415;

Book 1 ch. 11). This kind of punishment, apart from representing God’s justice, also derives

from a very ancient law: “But this is not only divine justice’s enduring principle, but also a

very ancient law among all races and cults of the Gods, that anyone who had violated a sacred

object (and that tree was sacred) should not only become liable for atonement and a marked

man, but so should all his posterity too.” (DC 415; Book 1 ch. 11) Thus, the fair punishment

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for violating a sacred object is not only designed for the violators, but also for their

descendants.

Other examples of these punishments are given, like the deluge, the incineration of the

Sodomites and even the destruction of Jericho, where “infants expiated their fathers’ sins, and

even the beasts of burden were being marked out for slaughter with their masters” (DC 415;

Book 1 ch. 11). To explain the punishment of the infants, Milton states that “they are all

God’s souls, yet born of parents who were sinners, and God saw that they would have turned

out like their parents” (DC 417; Book 1 ch. 11). Remarkable about this passage is the fact that

they are being judged because of God’s foreknowledge, before committing a sin. This raises

an important question: on the one side, it is believed that God does not interfere in human’s

actions because he respects free will: that is why he allowed Abel to be killed by his brother,

for example. On the other side, he does intervene directly in certain situations, as in the one

just mentioned: even before the children could sin, they were punished. Hence, he does not

avoid evil deeds against innocent and honest believers – like Abel – but punishes guiltless

children for the sins their parents committed: this is divine justice.

There are other arguments that speak against these punishments. According to Brittan

and Posner “to be justified, punishment must be shown to be the just consequence of a

transgression” (1051). In this sense, to punish the children or further generations for sins they

did not commit would not be justifiable. Another argument concerns the severity of divine

punishment: should the damned be punished eternally for finite sins? An important issue

concerning damnation is that it excludes, necessarily, any possibility of redemption of the

sinners and renders regret, faith, and regeneration - crucial aspects of Christian faith -

completely useless.

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God’s punishments are characterized by Brittan and Posner as extravagantly cruel,

serving first his power and not discipline: “for Satan’s exemplary punishment strengthened

God’s hand: when the loyal angels saw how Satan was punished, their loyalty to God ‘though

[already] firm, stood more confirm’d’ (XI, 71).” (1057) Nonetheless, they do not achieve

deterrence, an important – if not the most important – function of punishment: to stop

transgressions. In Satan’s case, it works in the opposite way: he is first punished with great

severity in an exemplary manner, but is soon is released from his chains:

Chained on the burning lake, nor ever thence

Had risen or heaved his head, but that the will

And high permission of all-ruling heaven

Left him at large to his own dark designs

That with reiterated crimes he might heap on himself damnation” (PL 1.210-15).

God knows he will practice further crimes and releases him precisely because of it: God’s

punishment here is not aimed at preventing crime but rather the opposite, it incites it to occur.

This sort of punishment exists to glorify his justice and his power – not to prevent crime or to

protect possible victims.

In Satan’s case, punishment has actually the reverse effect it should, as Brittan and

Posner comment: “The punishment of Satan, though it neither improves nor deters him, has

one effect on him: it causes him to switch tactics – with the paradoxical effect of making him

more dangerous” (1058). I wonder if God could not foresee this development or rather

accepted it – or maybe even expected it to happen: Satan’s punishment only makes him

stronger in his dark designs and he is perfectly free to commit his crimes. God releases him

from his chains, does not stop Sin from giving him the key of the gates and, in some sense,

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also allows the bridge between Hell and Earth to be built. The deity is clear of the

consequence of these acts, but there is still no intervention.

On the other side of God’s punishments, is his mercy. While judging Adam and Eve,

his motivations are clearly different: he wants to “deter further disobedient acts and

rehabilitate the offenders so that they and their descendants will become obedient subjects”

(Brittan and Posner 1059). This is justified by the fact that the angels were self-temped while

humans were deceived by a skilful adversary, but still, humans could not avoid punishment -

not even for their descendants. Brittan and Posner observe that “the combination of savage

punishment with unexpected remission is an especially powerful symbol of power, and

Milton’s God, as we know, is preoccupied in demonstrating his power” (1062). The creation

of Hell in Paradise Lost is an important reminder of the final destination of those who

disobey – and this is a further demonstration of God’s destructive powers.

Moreover, the article also argues that in the epic, “there is plenty of punishment - of

the fallen angels, of Adam and Eve and all their descendants, of the Son (who is going to be

executed by the Romans during his incarnation as a human being), of the hapless serpent, and

of the other animals (who become predator and prey after the Fall of man, after having been

vegetarian in the Garden of Eden)” (Brittan and Posner 1051). In just some of the cases

punishment may be justified; from my point of view, only the fallen angels, Adam, and Eve

are liable – although I am not very sure if the last two are completely responsible for their fall,

since they were deceived.7

Although Milton would have no difficulties in justifying the punishment received by

the next generations because of the transgressions committed by their ancestors, the

punishment received by the animals in the Paradise is problematic. These animals committed

7 See: Herman, Peter. “’Whose Fault, Whose But His Own?’: Paradise Lost, Contributory Negligence, and the Problem of Cause.”

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no sin, do not descend from Adam and Eve and have no moral responsibilities or even causal

relation with the Fall: why were they punished?

The serpent is the one who suffers the worst sanction: after being used by Satan for his

dark designs, it is victimized again by God: “Upon thy belly groveling thou shalt go, / and

dust shalt eat all the days in thy life” (PL 10.177-8). Besides, Eve’s descendants will also

bruise the serpent’s head: “Her seed shall bruise thy head, thou bruise his heel ” (PL 10.181).

Thus, the enmity between humans and snakes is also part of the punishment the serpent

receives – and it is justified so:

Serpent though brute, unable to transfer

The guilt on him who made him instrument

Of mischief, and polluted from the end

Of his creation; justly then accursed,

As vitiated in nature … ” (PL 10.165-69)

In this passage, it is clear that the serpent is not guilty of mischief, it is rather an instrument

used by Satan. However, as a ‘brute’, the serpent cannot defend itself from God’s accusations

and is punished for being now ‘vitiated in her nature’.

But how can the serpent be punished for an action it did not choose to perform – only

because it cannot defend itself from the accusation? Although it cannot speak, God is

omniscient – the serpent does not need to speak in order to relate what happened – God must

know it. If ‘brutes’ have no free will, no conscience and no right reason, how can they be

corrupted? And if corrupted against their will, should they be punished? In short, God allows

evil to occur not only by not preventing it, and in some cases – Satan’s, for example – the

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deity incites and provokes evil. On the other hand, he does not protect the guiltless and

innocent, and interferes, in fact, only to punish – never to protect.

It is important to highlight that death is also a punishment imposed by God – and,

according to Milton, the damned will experience more degrees of death than the saved. The

first degree of death is guilt and shame, consequences of the Fall. The second degree is named

“Spiritual Death”, defined as “privation of divine grace and ingrafted righteousness” (DC

433; Book 1 ch. 12), what leads to “the serious dulling of the right reason – aimed at

perceiving the supreme good” (DC 433; Book 1 ch. 12). The third degree is called bodily

death and is outlined as “the privation or annihilation of life” (DC 441; Book 1 ch. 13), what

does not mean the separation of body and soul, which, according to Milton, die together.

After the bodily death, the dead will receive no (further) punishment or reward while

waiting for Jesus’s second coming: they will be in a kind of slumber in their graves, waiting

to be resurrected and judged. This description is very similar to the concept of Sheol, as

presented in the OT. According to Milton’s treatise, in the last judgment Satan will be the first

to be judged, followed by the evil angels and finally, all humankind will be judged according

to their works in life; the wicked will be damned while the righteous will be reward with

eternal life in heaven. After it, the world will come to an end and “Christ is going to hand

over the Kingdom to God the father” (DC 889; Book 1 ch. 33).

The Creation of Hell

Apart from all divine punishment already described, God also created a place only for

eternal punishment: Hell. In De Doctrina Christiana, Milton describes Hell as the destination

of the fallen angels and of the wicked humans after the judgment. The punishment will be

their “Second Death”, which is the fourth – and last – degree of death for Milton. Regarding

this last and eternal death, Milton states: “the second death, the punishment of the damned,

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seems to consist in the loss of the supreme good (…) – which [loss] is commonly termed the

punishment of deprivation [damnum] – and in eternal torment, which is termed the

punishment of the sense” (DC 891; Book 1 ch. 33). Hence, the damned receive two kinds of

eternal punishment: privation of the supreme good – metaphysical evil in Augustinian terms –

and also punishment of the sense or poena sensus, in Latin. The word poena means “1.

indemnification, compensation, satisfaction, expiation, punishment, penalty. 2. Poena, the

goddess of punishment or vengeance; in the goddesses of vengeance, sometimes identified by

the poets with the Furiae. 3. hardship, torment, suffering, pain, etc. (postAug.) Poetic”

(“Poena”). Thus, the word refers not only to punishment, but also to pain; this reinforces

Benet’s argument that pain in Paradise Lost is a direct consequence of divine violence8.

Benet, in her article about God’s violence states that “the agonies of hell are, as Satan

declares, the ‘maker’s work’ (PL 4.380); the wounds inflicted during the war likewise have a

divine source” (107). She also mentions the pain caused by “ungoverned appetite” (PL

11.517) and concludes that “pain can be punitive or as affliction, beneficial discipline, but all

pain in Paradise Lost leads back to the deity and Milton’s poetic task is to mitigate the

violence, the ‘red right hand’ of God” (Benet 107). I consider she is right in her assumptions

regarding God, however I disagree with her statements concerning Milton. He is not trying to

mitigate divine violence; he is clearly aware of the destructive and frightening aspects of his

God, which are markedly illustrated in his epic. In my opinion, he is rather trying to show

them than trying to represent a wholly good God: Milton’s God is not a God of love, but a

God of Justice. The readings that claim this deity to be essentially benevolent may be a reflex

of the image the reader has of his own deity, but definitely do not correspond to the deity

presented in the Bible, nor to the God of the seventeenth- century. It is certainly also not the

8 See page 35 of this paper.

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almighty Ruler Milton describes in De Doctrina Christiana or the revengeful Creator of

Paradise Lost.

Concerning the creation of Hell in Paradise Lost and its finality, God has no good

intentions and Milton does not hide it:

A universe of death, which God by curse

Created evil, for evil only good,

Where all life dies, death lives, and nature breeds,

Perverse, all monstrous, all prodigious things

Abominable, innuterable, and worse (PL 2.622-26)

In this passage, it is clear that the creation of Hell has no good purposes – it is ‘for evil only

good’.

Regarding “the severity and duration of these punishments” in hell (DC 891; Book 1

ch. 33), Milton quotes several proof texts that evoke many images such as “the place of

destruction (…) Jehovah has made it very deep, very wide; his wood-pile has plenty of fire

and logs; Jehovah’s breath ignites it as if with a stream of sulphur (…) where the worm

never dies and the fire is never quenched (…) reproaches and eternal scorn (…) outer

darkness where there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth (…) wrath, flaming anger,

affliction, distress” (DC 891; Book 1 ch. 33). The images presented in this passage are

directly related to the imagery of the Valley of Hinnom, a place of fifth and rotting where the

worm never died – due to the bodies of dead animals and criminals thrown there - while the

fire refers to the fires of Moloch, used in children sacrifice. The passage quoted makes it clear

that the place of punishment was created by God – but its imagery is actually an appropriation

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of the one already associated with the Valley of Hinnom, made mainly by Jesus in the NT, as

argued before. Important to say about this passage is that although the imagery of fire is

borrowed from the fires of Moloch, ‘the worm that never dies’ is not an image used by Milton

in his Hell: there is fire, but no rotting of corpses.

Although Milton’s Hell is not divided in spheres and punishment is not given

according to the kind of sin, as in the Dantesque Inferno for example, the English poet

sustains that “the degrees of the punishments vary, however, in proportion to the sins” (DC

893; Book 1 ch. 33). The punishment is thus the same but the amounts will differ. Regarding

its location, Milton states that “Hell’s location seems to be outside this world” (DC 893; Book

1 ch. 33). One of the reasons for this affirmation is the fact that the world will be eventually

destroyed and if Hell were in the center of the Earth, as supposed in the Middle Ages, “it will

have to be burned up at the same time, and undergo the same fate as the earth. But if this

happened, it would be a really splendid finish for the damned” (DC 893; Book 1 ch. 33).

Furthermore, Milton argues that Satan’s fall precedes man’s fall; it is therefore unlikely that

Hell should be placed inside a world that was not yet cursed.

Concerning the name of this place, Milton declares that “the place of punishment is

called Hell: Topheth, Isa 30: 33: the Gehenna of fire (…) [in Greek Hades]” (DC 893; Book 1

ch. 33). Here, Milton puts together hell’s names in a very similar manner to the KJV.

However, the Greek form Hades is not a synonym of Gehenna and is originally not associated

to any idea of torment, but rather, the abode of the dead.

According to Raymond “hell is the history of the accumulation of a theological

concept, together with a set of imaginative imagery that represents ideal suffering, and it

cannot be narrowly defined.” In Paradise Lost this accumulation reaches a very high level,

since it puts together concepts and images that extrapolate not only the Scriptures, but also

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Christian religion and preaching, depicting an extreme complex hell, composed by different

hells that are illustrated with images from very different traditions combined in an unique

manner.

The discussions about Hell in Milton’s criticism concern mainly its topography and

whether it is a real place or a state of the sinner – a very frequent topic also in theological

discussions on eschatology. I argue that Milton’s Hell goes much beyond its geographical and

figurative aspects. It is a place, but it is also an internal state. What makes Milton’s Hell so

unique are not its topographical or psychological characteristics, but how he combines very

different elements that refer from oriental kingdoms to Greek Mythology, together with

biblical traditions, among others, some of them corresponding to real places and historical

people mixed to ancient myths from various cultures and different times.

Although chronologically not the first of God’s creation, Hell appears already in the

very beginning of Paradise Lost, being the scenario for the first two books of the epic. This

fact alone is remarkable considering Milton’s intended fidelity to the Scripture: the wide and

rich description of Hell seems rather exaggerated, since this topic is not so extensively

described in the Bible. However, it should not be forgotten that in the seventeenth- century

hell had, in fact, a much greater importance than in the Holy Texts, surpassing quite often

Heaven and eternal salvation itself. Thus, although respecting scriptural authority for almost

all of the religious topics discussed, Milton clearly follows the Zeitgeist of the seventeenth-

century in relation to the importance and relevance of hell. On the other hand, topics that are

crucial to Christian faith, such as Jesus’s crucifixion and resurrection, are simply mentioned

in the epic. They are not treated so extensively or given due importance.

In Paradise Lost, Hell’s first appearance is right after the invocation, in Book 1: “to

bottomless perdition, there to dwell / in adamantine chains and penal fire” (PL 1.47-8). This

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passage is clearly inspired in by the Scriptures: “For if God spared not the angels that sinned,

but cast them down to hell, and delivered them into chains of darkness, to be reserved unto

judgment” (2 Pet 2.4). But still, other influences can already be seen here. In the Bible, the

chains are chains of darkness, which are replaced by Milton by adamantine chains, an element

that is frequently found in Greek Mythology, which also appears in Vergil’s description of the

gates of Tartarus: “Blocking the entrance, a huge gate stands set in uprights of solid /

Adamant, such as defy any force that a human or even” (Virgil 6.558-9). Hence, already in

Hell’s first appearance in the epic, it presents elements both from Scripture and Roman

Literature.

The fall of the angels into Hell also explores images found in classical literature:

“hurled headlong flaming from ethereal sky … nine times the space that measures day and

night” (PL 1. 43/50). The rebels’ fall into Hell takes nine days – a reference that cannot be

found in the Bible, but in Hesiod, when he reports the fall of Cronus and the other Titans into

Tartarus after the battle between them and the new gods:

They sent them beneath; broad-wayed earth and bound them in painful bonds

having conquered them by hands, though they were bold

as far beneath the earth as Ouranos is above Gaia; so far from earth to murky Tartaros.

For nine days and nights a bronze anvil, that was going down from Ouranos,

would arrive at Gaia on the tenth (717-21).

Hence, Milton makes reference not only to the Roman but also to the Greek Tartarus, which

present specific and important differences. The references to hell as a political prison appear

also in Moloch’s speech: “the prison of his tyranny who reigns” (PL 2.59), who claims God to

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castigate them with “Tartarean suphur, and strange fire / his own invented torments” (PL

2.69-70)

The Greek Tartarus, in its origins, refers to the prison in a deep abyss were Cronus

and the other Titans were cast down by the Zeus. Other monsters and villains, such as the

Cyclopes, are also locked here. The word is used to indicate not only the place, but also one of

the primordial deities, together with Gaia and Chaos. The abyss is also mentioned in the

Scriptures: “And beside all this, between us and you there is a great gulf fixed: so that they

which would pass from hence to you cannot; neither can they pass to us, that would come

from thence” (Luke 16.26). This gulf is situated between Hell and Heaven, dividing them and

preventing the passage, though in Paradise Lost Satan has no problems in crossing the gulf

and flying to Earth. Earth and Chaos are also part of Milton’s cosmology in a very similar

way as it appears in Hesiod’s Theogony.

Interesting about the Greek Hades and Tartarus is their analogy to the Hebrew Sheol

and Topheth: while Hades and Sheol refer to the realm of the dead, Topheth and Tartarus

refer initially to a place of punishment created by God(s) to punish those who threatened

his/their powers, which turned later to be also a place of punishment for the wicked after the

judgment. The idea of a judgment of the evil ones and further punishment appears first in

Plato’s Gorgias:

… when they appear before the judge, those from Asia before Rhadamanthys, he stops

and examines them … Now it is fitting for everyone undergoing vengeance and rightly

suffering vengeance from another either to become better and be benefited, or to

become an example to the rest, so that when others see him undergoing whatever he

undergoes, they will be afraid and become better … for there is no other way to get rid

of injustice. (104)

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Tartarus turns to a place of destructive punishment – like Hell in Bible – for those

considered incurable, while the sufferings on Earth are a chance of rehabilitation for those

considered curable – like the medieval Purgatory. This new conception of Tartarus – as a

place both for ‘fallen gods’ and wicked humans – is also to be seen in Vergil’s Aeneid, where

the place is described as being a gigantic place, surrounded by a flaming river named

Phlegethon.

The relation between Milton’s Hell and the Greek Tartarus also appears in other

characteristics they share and is reinforced by Sin, who names her new residence: “this gloom

of Tartarus profound” (PL 2.658). Remarkable about this passage is that, although Milton

considers Hell not to be part of this world and hence, not to be in the center or in the depths of

Earth, it is still a profound place, beneath the Earth – as Tartarus was said to be. It was

created together with Heaven and Earth, when God “ … downward purged / the black

tartareous cold infernal dregs / adverse to life: then founded then conglobed” (PL 7.237-39).

After it, God places Earth in the middle and pulls Hell beneath it. Also, the same creatures

said to be locked in the Greek Tartarus are also found in Milton’s Hell: “Gorgons and hydras,

and chimeras dire” (PL 2.628).

The Hebrew and Greek words translated as Hell in the KJV also appear in Paradise

Lost in their original form and preserve their former meaning:

First Moloch, horrid king besmeared with blood

of human sacrifice, and parents’ tears,

though for the noise of drums and timbrels loud

their children’s cries unheard, that passed through fire

to his grim idol (…)

his temple right against the temple of God

On that opprobrious hill, and made his grove

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The pleasant valley of Hinnom, Tophet thence

And black Gehenna called, the type of hell. (PL 1.392-405)

Although the translations of the Bible merge these different concepts in one word, Milton is

clear about their origins and primal meanings.

In Paradise Lost diverse eschatological concepts may be found, even those Milton

would reject, such as Limbus: “Into a limbo large and broad, since called / the Paradise of

Fools, to few unknown” (PL 3.496-97). Remarkable about this passage is that, although

Milton rejects the idea of Limbo and Purgatory as presented by the medieval Church, he

represents it in his epic - but in a rather satirical and anti-Catholic manner. This place was

originally the destination of the unbaptized humans, i.e., the ones that died in the original sin.

Limbus Patrum was the place where the Patriarchs of the OT – of necessity non-Christians –

would wait for Jesus’s second coming, for they died in friendship with God. In Paradise Lost,

Limbo is called paradise of fools, a place to punish vanity, here heavily related to the Catholic

Church: “eremites and friars / white, black, grey, with all their trumpery ” (PL 3.474-75).

Furthermore he mentions the pilgrims, the Dominicans, and Franciscans, as well as “relics,

beads / indulgences, dispenses, pardons bulls” (PL 3.491-92).

The Hells within Milton’s Hell

In Book 1 another kind of hell is presented: the hell within: “But his doom reserved

him to more wrath; for now the thought / Both of lost happiness and lasting pain / Torments

him” (PL 1.54-56). Satan experiences what in De Doctrina Christiana is called Second Death.

In this passage, he is suffering both of its punishments: the punishment of deprivation – lost

happiness - together with the punishment of the senses – lasting pain.

Duncan affirms that in Paradise Lost “hell becomes a potent symbol in which the sin,

the sinner, the cause of sin, and the punishment of sin merge significantly.” (127) He states

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that Milton’s Hell is actually composed by four different hells that “may be regarded as: 1-

the external hell that is a place of punishment, 2 – the external hell that is the seat of sin and a

base of operations for the propagation of evil, 3 – the hell-on-earth, and 4 – the psychological

hell.” (127). This distinction is quite useful, although I regard Milton’s Hell to be even more

complex, since it is not a static structure. It appears first as a prison and place of punishment

for the rebels, but it starts losing its role as a prison already in the first two hundred verses,

when God allows the chains to be removed. As it loses this role, it turns gradually to be the

second kind of hell, not only the seat of Sin, but also where the Pandemonium9 is built (PL

1.710-19). Hence, already in the first book, Hell turns from a prison created by God to a

kingdom ruled by Satan and Sin and is further used to the propagation of evil on Earth.

This kingdom expands to the third kind of hell - the hell-on-earth - when Sin and

Death build a bridge between both worlds. By the end of the epic, the hellish monarchy rules

also on Earth, what can be seen specially in the future shown by Michael to Adam in the last

two books but also in Book 1, when the narrator tells how the fallen angels came to be the

pagan deities adored before Jesus’s coming (PL 1.369-530).

The psychological hell permeates all them: it is the hell within. This hell is different

from the other three since it cannot be avoided. Even when Satan escapes from Hell, he

cannot escape from the hell within:

… horror and doubt distract

His troubled thoughts, and from the bottom stir

The hell within him, for within him hell

He brings, and round about him, nor from hell

9 Pandemonium was a word created by Milton to refer to the capital of Hell.

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One step no more than from himself can fly

By change of place: now conscience wakes despair” (PL 4.18-23).

This hell can also be experienced by those who are not in Hell; this is what Milton names first

death, in De Doctrina Christiana, which is guilt and shame, felt, for example, by Adam and

Eve after eating the forbidden apple.

I propose that these four different hells correspond, in some sense, to the four degrees

of death described by Milton in De Doctrina Christiana: guilt and shame, the first death,

which appeared with the first transgression. This first degree of death brings the hell within to

life. The second degree, spiritual death, is to be experienced on earth – it is the impairment of

the right reason because of sin. This one is thus related to hell-on-earth, the expansion of the

Kingdom of Sin and Death beyond the boundaries of the initial Hell. The third degree –

bodily death – and the forth – the Second death, are merged together in the first and second

hells Duncan describes – hell as an external place – that actually should be divided in two

kinds of external places: Sheol, or the grave, where the dead will wait for the judgment after

the bodily death and Topheth or Gehenna, where the damned will be punished with second

death.

In short, this analysis tries to highlight the complexity of Milton’s Hell – and together

with its complexity, show its relevance for the author. Hell is important because it represents

divine justice: it is the conviction that the wicked will be eventually punished by their evil

deeds. To assert “divine providence and justifie God’s ways to man” (PL 1.25-26) is to assert

that justice will be done. After the Restoration, Milton had to assert himself and his “fit

audience though few” that all the unfairness they had experienced would be revenged; he

needed to assert that justice existed and that God was fair – but they would all have to wait for

Jesus’s second coming. Milton’s defence of God consists in attesting his justice and his

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respect for human freedom (although this last point may be questioned), but not his love and

benevolence as many critics would argue.

Why God has to be just? Considering Milton’s experience of defeat, to assume that

God is fair and will reward the rightful and punish the wicked is to believe that although the

cause was lost, it was not in vain. It was not in vain to be righteous, apart from all the

suffering it might have generated on Earth, because since God is just, the good will be

rewarded.

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5. Conclusion

In this paper, I proposed to analyse the dark side of Milton’s God in Paradise Lost and

in De Doctrina Christiana. Considering free will defence as a partial explanation to the origin

and presence of evil in the world, I argue that some evil does not come from the Creation, but

from the Creator. To illustrate this argument, I investigated the creation of Hell in Milton’s

Paradise Lost together with relevant passages of De Doctrina Christiana concerning sin,

punishment, the different degrees of death, and hell, in order to discuss the existence of divine

evil. These topics were analysed as examples of the wicked aspects of the Miltonic deity.

My starting point were Milton’s motivations to “justifie the ways of God to men” (PL

1.26). I assumed that the experience of defeat must have had a profound impact on how

Milton understood God. After the Restoration, he had to assert himself and his “fit audience

… though few” (PL 7.31) that all the years given to the Revolution – God’s cause in England

– had not been in vain. He had to assert divine justice in order to justify his own life: God was

just; he would punish the bad and reward the rightful.

Moreover, I proposed that Milton is also concerned with the causes that led to the

defeat. For the author, political failure was moral failure – they fell, because they were

already corrupted creatures. Because of this, Milton goes back to the origin of human

sinfulness – the Fall – in order to make the readers aware of these aspects of human nature.

Thus, the epic also undertakes a doctrinal function: by stimulating the reflection on these

matters and educating his nation, the epic attempts to promote necessary individual changes.

Milton’s justification of God’s ways consists in asserting his justice and his non-

intervention in human freedom. It is also an answer to doctrines like Predestination, for

example, where people’s choices would have no effect in their final destination and where

their deeds could not change what was already predestined by God. By using free will defence

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to explain the origin and presence of evil in the world, Milton exempts God of any

responsibility for it and preserves freedom. Although coherent, I argued that free will defence

is only a partial answer, since it fails to explain the victim’s side. Besides, not all evils have

their origin in free will agents. I also questioned the notion that evil may be necessary for the

accomplishment of God’s plans.

Furthermore, I examined the concept of free will according to how it is presented by

Milton in his theological treatise. Free will does not mean one is free to choose, but rather, to

obey or disobey God. Christian freedom, according to Milton, signifies freedom of sin, but

not individual freedom. Subsequently, I argued that people are actually not free to disobey,

since punishment exists. If disobedience will be heavily punished eventually, obedience is not

a free choice, but rather an imposition of God, carried out with the threat of Hell. In this

sense, punishment is God’s intervention on free will. Hence, on one hand, God does not

intervene in situations where he could avoid evil to righteous and guiltless believers but, on

the other hand, does intervene in free will with the threat of eternal punishment. Apart from it,

as Milton shows in his treatise, some evil is brought about by God himself through

punishment, and also when he prompts the sinners to sin.

In order to explain how evil – and what kind of evil – may be attributed to God, I

investigated how evil is conceptualized and how its origin is explained by Augustine, since

his theology strongly influenced Milton’s thinking. Here, I assumed that although God cannot

be, for logical reasons, associated with metaphysical evil, he is not totally unrelated to moral

evil. In order to illustrate this argument I first referred to views proposed by Milton’s critics

that investigate different aspects of God’s dark side.

Moreover, I analysed the fairness of God’s punishments in Paradise Lost and how the

concept is developed in De Doctrina Christiana. The existence of Hell as part of the

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punishment apparatus created by God is the next topic analysed. In order to show how Milton

appropriates from the different ideas and words related to this place of punishment, I

investigated how hell is presented in the Scriptures and how this concept develops and

changes until the Reformation, as well as the different ideas related to it. My main argument

here is that the belief in divine punishment implies the belief in a God of Justice, but not

necessarily a God of love.

Milton’s Hell is, however, much more complex than the Biblical one and presents also

other traditions that are not related to the Scriptures – although he considered them to be the

highest authority in religious matters. Because of this, I also analyse the presence of classical

elements in Milton’s depiction of hell in order to establish how Hell in Paradise Lost is also

related to the Greek Tartarus and to classical literature.

In conclusion, I argued that the complexity of Milton’s Hell, together with the

privileged position it has in the epic, is an indication of its relevance to the author. To

illustrate this argument, I investigated the different hells that constitute Hell in Paradise Lost.

Furthermore, I considered hell’s importance as a representation of divine justice. A deity who

castigates the sinners is, for Milton, a just God, since justice concerns not only the reward of

the righteous, but also the punishment of the disobedient. Hence, by asserting God’s justice,

Milton is, in fact, justifying the divine ways and asserting his providence.

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6. Works Cited

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