Trade union responses to workplace restructuring: exploring union orientations and actions

Trade union responses to workplacerestructuring: exploring union orientations andactions

■ Nicolas BaconNottingham University Business School, UK

■ Paul BlytonCardiff Business School, UK

ABSTRACT

In this article we identify four distinct types of union responses to workplacerestructuring on the basis of different combinations of ideological orientations andactions in collective bargaining. Four union branches are described, each makingone of these different types of response when required to negotiate the intro-duction of teamworking in two steel plants. We report a wide variation in the sub-sequent outcomes from teamworking for management and workers in eachdepartment according to union response. However, no single type of responseoptimized all types of outcomes, suggesting union strategies involve important andpurposeful trade-offs in outcomes.

KEYWORDS

bargaining / militancy / moderation / negotiations / trade unions

Introduction

ver the past 25 years managers have initiated significant and far-reachingchanges in working practices, generating a debate about how trade unionshave responded. Initially this debate explored the effectiveness of union

moderation or militancy when faced with such changes (Bacon and Storey,1996; Kelly, 1998). In this article we further develop this area of study present-ing four types of union responses to negotiating changes in working practices.

749

Work, employment and societyCopyright © 2004

BSA Publications Ltd®Volume 18(4): 749–773

[DOI: 10.1177/0950017004047962]SAGE Publications

London,Thousand Oaks,New Delhi

O

047962 Bacon & Blyton 17/11/04 9:46 am Page 749

at City University Library on April 1, 2015wes.sagepub.comDownloaded from

www.sagepublications.com

http://wes.sagepub.com/

We suggest that it is important to understand the relationship between both theideological orientations and actions of union branches during negotiations toexplain the impact of workplace restructuring. A longitudinal study is reportedof four union branches that negotiated the introduction of teamworking in theUK steel industry at two blast furnaces and two steel mills. Each branchadopted a different type of response and the impact on worker outcomes andworkplace performance is assessed.

Union responses to workplace restructuring

Kelly (1996) has argued that militant trade union policies, in contrast to mod-erate policies, are more likely to secure union survival and recovery. This argu-ment has been developed into a more wide-ranging critique of socialpartnership between labour and management and a renewed theoretical focuson mobilizing trade union members (Kelly, 1998). In a recent contribution,Kelly (2004) suggests that union moderation has several detrimental effects forunions: it inhibits the growth of union activity in the workplace because an ide-ology of common interests erodes the willingness and capacity of union mem-bers to resist employers; union officers are co-opted into the decision-makingprocess on agendas controlled by employers; and managers take advantage ofunion moderation to restructure employment at the expense of workers’ termsand conditions, especially by undermining job security. Fairbrother (2000) hasalso argued that union renewal requires a shift from the centralized unionismthat underwrote ‘bureaucratization, incorporation and economism’ (2000: ix)to ‘active, engaged and participative forms of unionism’ (2000: 18). Whereasbureaucratic unionism is thought to involve accomodation of employers’ poli-cies, participative unionism constitutes a direct challenge to management. Thisemphasis on union organizing, democracy and representative participation isalso a key aspect of organizing successful union recognition campaigns in theUS, where union militancy is part of a broader political mobilization of labour(Bronfenbrenner, 1997).

Kelly (1996: 83–7) initially relied on evidence of the negative impact forunions of no-strike, new-style agreements in the UK during the 1980s. Morerecently his evidence on British social partnership agreements using matchedcomparisons reveals no discernable impact of partnership on either wage set-tlements or union density. Further, whilst partnership firms shed jobs at a fasterrate in declining industries they created jobs at a faster rate in expanding sec-tors (Kelly, 2004). Although this casts doubt on the value of partnership agree-ments for union revitalization and suggests such agreements are a staging postfor managers as they de-emphasize the role of unions (Bacon and Storey, 2000),it also suggests that employees may not fare better outside partnership arrange-ments.

An empirical test using Kelly’s militancy–moderation scale revealed mixedresults in the UK iron and steel industry (Bacon and Blyton, 2002). Militancy

750 Work, employment and society Volume 18 ■ Number 4 ■ December 2004




was associated with stronger union workplace activity and greater engagementwith management in solving operational problems and long-term businessstrategies. However, there was again no evidence that militancy significantlyaffected many terms and conditions and moderate trade unionists were no morelikely to hold a unitarist frame of reference. The approach taken in collectivebargaining by a union appeared to be at least as important as mobilizing unionmembers in securing gains for workers. Other studies of partnership agreementsfurther indicate that unions may continue with traditional adversarial collectivebargaining (Geary and Roche, 2003) and unions often cooperate with managerson tactical issues without relinquishing an ideology of competing interests(Bacon and Blyton, 2002).

Although Fairbrother (2000) asserts the desirability of local militancy hepays little regard to the requirements of employers, although the evidence hepresents indicates the critical importance of the willingness of management tobargain in good faith (Charlwood, 2002). The choice for many union branchesis not between partnership or militant active unionism; it is ‘forced compliance’(Kelly, 2004: 286) and a choice between partnership or ‘de facto de-recognition’(Marks et al., 1998: 222). Strong participative local unionism may be impor-tant to union renewal but this tells us little about the bargaining tactics unionbranches need to employ taking into account employer strategies and power.Furthermore, Fairbrother regards participative workplace unionism as an endgoal in itself (Gall, 1998) with scant details provided on outcomes such aschanges in terms and conditions where unions pursue workplace militancy(Kelly, 2001; Vernon, 2001). In a recent paper, Frost (2001) goes some way todeveloping the debate on local union responses to restructuring by providing amore detailed analysis of bargaining processes. A focus is placed more on whatunions do rather than the orientations that unions exhibit (for example,whether they had militant or moderate ideologies). The argument is that theprocess by which unions engage with management over restructuring is criticaland Frost distinguishes between ‘interventionist’ and ‘pragmatic’ responses bythree union locals in the North American steel industry. Unions making aninterventionist response entered into negotiations at an early stage and fullyinvolved employees in reorganizing work, and this produced outcomes that‘met the needs of all stakeholders: management, workers and the local union’(Frost, 2001: 556). In contrast, the pragmatic union response allowed manage-ment to make proposals that the union subsequently negotiated and the out-comes were less impressive for managers and employees. Frost places greatstore by the order of intervention and response: early union engagement withrestructuring gave workers a voice in ‘how and by whom alternative models ofwork organization were generated, the process by which an alternative wasselected, and how the selected model was then implemented’ (2001: 540). Thisfinding emerges from her study and she classifies union responses as ‘interven-tionist’ and ‘pragmatic’ according to the stage at which unions become involvedwith management and the depth of their involvement (2001: 556).

751Trade union responses to restructuring Bacon & Blyton




Frost’s paper represents a useful counterweight to the focus on militant andmoderate union ideologies and she also presents more convincing evidence thanmost by linking the process of negotiations to outcomes. What unions actuallydo is clearly important and recent Marxist studies of trade union responses(Fairbrother, 2000; Kelly, 1998) that stress ideology and a tendency just to lookat attitudes, downplay consideration of both trade unions and their members asrational social actors making choices to pursue certain courses of action duringnegotiations with management (a critique previously made of Marxist accountsby Crouch [1982: 12–13]). However, it is important not to conflate unionresponses to either what unions do or union ideology and in this article we willdemonstrate that the interaction between both is important and produces differ-ent patterns of outcomes from workplace change for employees and managers.

Trade union actions in the negotiation process and the orientation of a unionare both important, separate but related resources for responding to workplacerestructuring (Figure 1). During negotiations unions may engage in integrativebargaining, joining with management at an early stage of decision-making toexplore solutions through joint problem solving (Walton and McKersie, 1965).The alternative is to await management proposals and then seek to extract con-cessions in return for change during distributive bargaining. Whether a unionbranch engages in such cooperative or conflictual strategies represents a rationalchoice between actions following a calculation of ‘how best to maximize theirinterests given the constraints of the situation’ (Crouch, 1982: 12–13).

Orientations, on the other hand, reflect deeply held assumptions or framesof reference about the employment relationship. Such ideologies of trade union-ism develop over a long period of time and will tend to endure unchanged inworkplaces despite changes in management policy and union leadership (Blytonet al., 1996; Sayles, 1958). Thus, whilst the decision to engage in integrative ordistributive bargaining is a short-term rational choice, orientations reflect his-torical relationships within workgroups about the employment relationship.Orientations are composed of beliefs and attitudes that comprise militant andmoderate ideologies central to the Marxist sociology of trade unions (Allen,1966; Hyman, 1975). For example, Kelly (1998: 61) suggests these beliefs con-cern: the extent to which the interests of managers and employees are shared orconflict; the validity of industrial action; whether unions should rely on collec-tive bargaining or joint problem solving; whether to rely on membershipresources or employers; and the goals of unions from ambitious to moderatedemands.

Our theoretical perspective emerges from the radical school of industrialrelations identified by Crouch (1982, 26) as having ‘concern for workers’ atti-tudes, frameworks of action, ideologies’ with a ‘stress [on] the subjective statesof social actors and the effects these states have on structuring their pursuit offrequently conflicting goals’. Trade unions and members make rational choiceswithin a constrained context that includes the structure of relations betweenmanagement and labour and the subjective values and perceptions that com-pose ideologies. We agree with Kelly (1998: 80) that this radical perspective





departs from an exclusively rational choice approach. Furthermore, ourbehavioural conception of action in negotiations is a weak form of rationalchoice that acknowledges negotiators will find it very difficult to determine arational course of action (Walton and McKersie, 1965: 352–3). As integrativeand distributive bargaining have different ‘rational behaviours’ it is not easy fornegotiators to adopt a clear sequence of actions with predictable outcomes.Nevertheless, we agree with Walton and McKersie (1965: 353) that in a com-plex context negotiators behave ‘purposefully, attending in some balanced wayto conflicting goals’.

Combining the two dimensions of orientation and action in Figure 1 sug-gests four possible union responses to workplace restructuring.

■ Cooperative engagement. Moderate union branches frequently cooperatewith management over change. Problem solving is the routine approachwith distributive bargaining occurring at the final stage of negotiations todivide gains. The danger for moderate unions who routinely cooperate,however, is incorporation into a management agenda to the detriment ofworker interests.

■ Militant opposition. Militant union branches may refuse to cooperate withworkplace restructuring and defend the status quo. When managementdevelop proposals for change both management and unions engage in dis-tributive bargaining. Preventing employees engaging in joint problem solv-ing and relying only on a final battle of strength frequently requires wellorganized left-wing political leadership (Darlington, 1998, 2001).

■ Moderate opposition. Moderate union branches may at times refuse tocooperate and suddenly oppose change. This requires a new approachtowards negotiations and may be triggered where managers propose workplace changes that involve too much ‘give’ from unions and ‘take’ bymanagement.

■ Militant engagement. Union branches with a militant orientation mayengage in joint problem solving with management and cooperate over


Militant Militantengagement opposition

Cooperative Moderateengagement opposition

militant

orientation

moderate

cooperate conflict

action

Figure 1 Union responses to workplace restructuring




workplace restructuring. The tactical decision to cooperate involves activeunion engagement with workplace problems, and partnership discussionsover restructuring and flexibility in Royal Mail are good examples (Beale,2003). Cooperation may also develop on a particular issue (for example,health and safety) if the interests of management and unions coincide.

Both Militant Opposition and Cooperative Engagement responses appear logi-cal because they present union representatives with few tactical dilemmasbetween integrative and distributive bargaining (Walton and McKersie, 1965).Union negotiators involved in Militant Opposition refuse to participate in jointproblem solving and conceal information about their preferences in order tobargain hard over management proposals, whereas union negotiators who pur-sue Cooperative Engagement are prepared to openly discuss issues with man-agement and are not required to bargain hard in order to extract gains frommanagement in return; they believe management will ‘play fair’ when it comesto negotiations. The logical consistency of both these responses suggests mostunions will fall into one of these two categories.

The union responses of Militant Engagement and Moderate Opposition onthe other hand, involve tactical bargaining dilemmas because they break withthe ideological tradition of the union branch. Militant branches that engage inintegrative bargaining run the danger that managers are only cooperating toencourage union compliance. It may then prove difficult for the union to revertto hard tactics in distributive bargaining to secure improvements in terms andconditions in return for workplace change. Militant unionists may also find itparticularly difficult to persuade managers that they are genuine about cooper-ating. Union representatives would also need to convince militant branch mem-bers that cooperation does not involve ‘selling out’. Similarly, moderate unionbranches that suddenly find they have to oppose management plans may findtheir opposition is not taken seriously because management feel the union willultimately not take action to prevent the imposition of an agreement even if itoffers little for their members.

Our research hypothesis is that the interaction between union orientationand action is important in understanding union responses to workplace restruc-turing and the distribution of outcomes. In this paper we explore union responsesin identical negotiating processes to the same workplace restructuring (the intro-duction of teamworking) in four departments of one company, the iron and steelproducer Corus. The union branch in each of the departments demonstrated oneof the four types of union response to workplace restructuring.

Methodology

Within the Construction and Industrial division of Corus two competing inte-grated steelworks (Scunthorpe and Teesside) have survived cyclical decline in





the industry and recurrent financial crisis in the company. During 1998 both theScunthorpe and Teesside sites reached separate Works TeamworkingAgreements committing all union branches to negotiate the introduction ofteamworking in each department. Both management and unions agreed team-working was essential to improve the financial performance of both sitesthrough reducing manpower and raising labour productivity. Teamworkingwould end traditional occupational distinctions between process and craft jobson the shop-floor, with craft workers joining production teams. Team leadersselected by management would replace traditional foremen and manage multi-skilled groups of 10–15 workers.

Negotiations in each department followed a set formula established in theworks agreements starting with a Key Task Analysis (KTA) to help identify theminimum manning required and then negotiations to reach a DepartmentalTeamworking Agreement to confirm manning and pay levels. The KTA wasdesigned as an opportunity for integrative bargaining, with management andunions jointly conducting work-study to make proposals on the structure ofteamworking. Each KTA project team of management and union nomineesassessed and timed work tasks to produce a manpower utilization rate indicatingthe possible extent of manning reductions. The subsequent negotiations over theDepartmental Teamworking Agreements represented an opportunity for mainlydistributive bargaining to establish the manning levels and payment for team-working. The pay level in teams was to be established by a weighted averagingsystem combining the pay of all workers moving into a team. Employees previ-ously earning above the new average would benefit from protected earnings.

Following initial interviews with works managers and trade union officialswe selected four departments to study in detail with different trade unionresponses to the negotiations. During separate one-hour-long interviews weinvited the departmental managers, lead trade union representatives and otherkey participants to describe the negotiations in their department. All interviewswere recorded and transcribed. We explored the orientation and tactics of eachside during both the KTA and in reaching teamworking agreements. Questionssought the key issues, benefits, bargaining power, bargaining relationships, con-cessions and ability to persuade bargaining opponents.

To assess the implications of union responses we collected information onseveral outcomes for employees in each department including manning reduc-tions, average pay levels and monthly health and safety performance fromMarch 1998 to May 2002. This information provided a reliable comparisonbefore and after the introduction of teamworking to assess the impact of unionresponses.

We also surveyed employee views of job satisfaction, job pressures and theindustrial relations climate before negotiations for teamworking in 1999 andafter the introduction of teamworking in 2002. Surveys were posted to thehomes of all employees in each department and returned directly to theUniversity. Response rates for the four departments averaged 48 percent in1999 and 42 percent in 2002 (see Table 1).





This longitudinal check increases our confidence that any changes inemployee attitudes resulted from the negotiations and introduction of team-working rather than pre-existing differences between the departments. The sur-vey elicited responses on Likert scales to a 16-item job satisfaction scale (Warret al., 1979), six items on work pressure (Andries et al., 1996) and a four-itemscale of industrial relations climate (Dastmalchian et al., 1991).

In addition to outcomes for employees, we also assessed the impact ofunion responses on the main aims of management to reduce manning andimprove departmental plant performance. We collected monthly longitudinaldata on departmental output from March 1998 to May 2002. Dividing outputby manning levels creates a measure of labour productivity comparable acrossdepartments. We report both output and labour productivity measures.

Overview of the four departments

The four departments studied in detail, two from each site, represented differ-ent union responses to negotiating teamworking. At the Corus Scunthorpeworks both the union branches in the Blast Furnaces and Medium Section Millwere historically moderate. At Corus Teesside works, in contrast, militantunion branches negotiated teamworking in the Teesside Blast Furnace andTeesside Beam Mill. A further strength of our research design is that we selectedmatching departments to control for technological factors. We are able to com-pare two technologically similar mills in the Medium Section Mill and TeessideBeam Mill, and two blast furnace departments with very similar technology butdifferent industrial relations traditions. At Scunthorpe, the moderate BlastFurnaces union branch adopted conflict tactics on the issue of teamworkingdespite its tradition of moderation. The Medium Section Mill branch on theother hand, engaged in its usual practice of cooperation with management. AtTeesside, the militant branch at the Blast Furnace decided to cooperate withmanagement, whilst the militant branch for Teesside Beam Mill decided to tryand maintain the status quo and not cooperate during negotiations (Table 2).


Table 1 Details of employee surveys

1999 Survey 2002 Survey

Response ResponsePopulation Response rate Population Response rate

Teesside Blast Furnace 99 58 58% 82 30 37%Teesside Beam Mill 372 143 38% 216 124 57%Scunthorpe Blast Furnaces 152 96 63% 125 59 47%Medium Section Mill 379 129 34% 265 73 28%

Totals 1002 426 43% 688 286 42%




Combining union orientations with tactics identifies four types of unionbranch response to workplace restructuring (Figure 2). The union branch of theMedium Section Mill responded with cooperative engagement, in TeessideBeam Mill with militant opposition, in Scunthorpe Blast Furnaces with moder-ate opposition and at Teesside Blast Furnace with militant engagement.

The distinction between militants and moderates is confirmed by the indus-trial relations climates measured in the departments at two separate points. Acombined four-item industrial relations climate scale (Dastmalchian et al.,1991) (1999 alpha = 0.8722; 2002 alpha = 0.9059) allows us to rank the fourdepartments from the most positive climates to the most negative as follows:Scunthorpe Blast Furnaces (average mean = 3.2); Medium Section Mill (3.41);Teesside Beam Mill (3.6); and Teesside Blast Furnace (3.88).1


Table 2 Industrial relations during negotiating teamworking in four departments

Union strategy/ Cooperative Militant Moderate MilitantResponse engagement opposition opposition engagement

Department/ Medium Teesside Beam Scunthorpe Teesside Blastbranch Section Mill Mill Blast Furnaces Furnace

Union Moderate Militant Moderate Militantorientation

IR climate Cooperation Conflict Cooperation ConflictManagement Fostering Forcing Forcing Fostering

tacticsUnion tactics Cooperate Conflict Conflict CooperateSigning of First to sign Last to sign Third to sign Second to sign

agreement

Teeside Blast Furnace Teeside Beam Mill(Militant (Militantengagement) opposition)

Medium Section Mill Scunthorpe Blast(Cooperative Furnaceengagement) (Moderate

opposition)

militant

orientation

moderate

cooperate conflict

action

Figure 2 Union responses to workplace restructuring in the four departments




Teamworking negotiations and outcomes

In this section we describe the negotiations and outcomes of teamworking ineach of the four departments. Both union strategies and the outcomes of team-working in the four departments show marked variation.

Cooperative engagement and teamworking in the Medium Section Mill

The cooperative union branch of the Medium Section Mill had worked withmanagement over the previous decade to introduce new technology; it had ledthe way in changing to more flexible work practices and was selected as the‘front-runner’ to start the first set of negotiations. This branch approachedteamworking in the same cooperative spirit intent on working with manage-ment. The union branch recognized the dangers of assisting management in thekey task analysis (KTA) and had internal debates over the pros and cons ofcooperation. When asked whether the KTA was ‘…a good thing for the unionsto be involved in’, a union branch officer suggested the main disadvantage wasdemanning while the main advantage was identifying good working practices:

We all knew what the exercise was about, it was about demanning so you got twoviews about it. From a trade union point of view it wouldn’t be something that wewould put on the top of our priority list to do again, but …the KTA did throw upsome good things that we found people weren’t doing it the right way or were doingit a different way which turned out a better way than we originally thought in somecases.

Another union representative explained the branch had decided to cooperatefully because the union had agreed to the process in the Scunthorpe WorksTeamworking Agreement and the economic conditions facing the businessrequired concessions on manning levels:

…it was part of the [plant-wide] framework agreement and we decided to do it, andat the end of the day, we agreed it jointly up here in the multi-union committee thatwas the only way to do it, because you had to look at the workload to decide howmany people were going to do it. Bearing in mind that this was coming from thebackground of a hostile environment the business was in then.

The union branch was resigned to the inevitability of cooperating with man-power reductions (Table 3, column 2).

During the KTA process in the Medium Section Mill the union branchencouraged employees and managers to work together accurately to recordover 3000 work tasks and times. A union branch officer recounted ‘…we hadno agenda for the KTA, we just looked at the jobs and assessed how long ittook’. A manager in the plant explained union and employee cooperationhelped to ‘…establish the building blocks’ for teams and identified substantialmanning reductions could be made under teamworking if the company spentadditional capital (Table 3):





The output of [the KTA] identified synergies within the mill [of]…some seven oreight percent of manpower reduction… . The business had a desire for something inthe order of 15 percent manpower reductions and we reconfigured the teams in away by which that 15 percent would be achieved… . The key task analysis actuallypointed us to some areas where with the introduction of a minimum amount of cap-ital actually identified we could make the gap between the 15 percent aspiration thatwe aimed for.

The KTA revealed manpower utilization before teamworking was 76 percent(Table 3), suggesting a manning reduction between 20 and 25 percent was pos-sible.


Table 3 The KTA process in four departments

Medium Section Teesside Beam Scunthorpe Teesside BlastMill Mill Blast Furnaces Furnace

Key issues for Identified manning Establishing the Scope for radical Warned off othermanagement reductions if spent case to reduce change and areas. Could

capital. manning. manpower reduce manningreductions. by increasing

flexibilitybetween 2 areas.

Key isues for None. Unions Arguments over Union argued Measured whatunion described the measurement of over you could do

inevitability of jobs, large gap measurement of rather than whatcooperating with between jobs and you did.manpower management and excluded fromreduction. unions. process.

Main benefits for Details useful to Only ‘started the Information to Brought bothmanagement clarify thinking on learning curve’. reduce manning. parties to

structure of teams bargaining tableand ‘establish the and realizedbuilding blocks’. diverse attitudes

in sections.Main benefits for Showed some jobs Union and safety None. Employees got

union could not be 100% reps got involved involved andutilized and to influence counted all tasks.required some slack. teamworking.

Generation of Alternatives aired Confirmed Neither Managersalternatives and employees existing views managers nor identified

involved. with unions unions opportunity;gathering committed to unions regarded‘intelligence’. KTA. KTA as ‘line in

the sand’.Manpower 76% 71% 90% 82%

utilization




Following the KTA process, as Table 2 reports (column 2), the union branchwas the first to sign a teamworking agreement and it conceded widespread gainsto management and extracted few concessions in return. Whereas managementfelt they were in a strong bargaining position to reach an agreement, the unionfelt in a weak bargaining position (Table 4, column 2). Managers in the millexplained ‘…our strength was the KTA’ and ‘…it was a logical means to justifymanning reductions, it’s almost a bible’, suggesting unions had little choice butto accept the manning reductions that were jointly identified. A union branchofficer explained ‘…we couldn’t negotiate over pay because of the weighted aver-age system’. Both management and unions trusted each other, agreed the negoti-ations were friendly and felt the other side would listen and be influenced duringthe negotiations. The cooperative engagement by the union in the processenabled management to implement the KTA findings in full, reduce manning andreach a quick agreement without offering significant concessions. A managerexplained they attained ‘…a team working structure that matched the produc-tion floor’, ‘…met the company’s manning reduction target’ and reached the veryfirst Departmental Teamworking Agreement at either site because ‘both sideshaving read the key task analysis…we were going into the negotiations relativelyclose. …we didn’t have this gulf to close up’.


Table 4 Negotiations on teamworking agreements in four departments


Main benefits for Quick Managers Demanning Reachedmanagement agreement, relieved to and versatility. agreement

widespread reach withgains. agreement; appropriate

employees did structure.not acceptteam-working.

Management bargaining Strong Weak Strong Strongpower

Union bargaining power Weak Strong Weak WeakTrust/distrust Trust Distrust Distrust DistrustFriendly/unfriendly Friendly Unfriendly Unfriendly Tense

but roleplaying.

Success in persuading Both Some union Management Unionother side management success. success, union successful,

and unions unsuccessful. managementexperienced less so.success.

Ballot on agreement Approved Initially Approved Approvedrejected




Cooperative Engagement by the moderate union branch in the MediumSection Mill produced the best outcomes for management of all four depart-ments with the smallest fall in output, the largest improvement in productiv-ity and the greatest reduction in manning (Table 5, column 2). A manager inthe Medium Section Mill explained ‘…what did change was the level of coop-eration, the level of performance and generally the level of commitment fromthe guys and certainly they were doing the best they could with what theygot’.


Table 5 Summary of outcomes from teamworking in four departments


Output per man Up 28% Up 5% Up 13% Up 9%Output –2% –9% –5% –9%Reduction in –30% –15% –18% –17%

manningJob satisfactiona No overall Increased Overall decline No overall

change (t = 0.13), overall (t = 4.43, changeincreased satisfaction p < 0.001), (t = 1.54).satisfaction (t = 2.81, decreasewith p < 0.01), satisfactionmanagement, increased with pay,involvement, satisfaction workload,industrial with effort,relations, health management, industrialand safety; involvement, relations,decreased industrial management,satisfaction relations, attention paidwith pay. attention paid to suggestions.

to suggestions.Work pressureb Increases No significant No significant No significant

(t = 2.080, change (t = 0.669). change change (t = 0.253).p < 0.05) (t = 1.688,

p < 0.1).Average earnings £62.48 £71.01 £67.41 £61.98

in teams/basicpay per shiftc

Health and Improves 11% Improves 6% Improves 27% Improves 10%safetyd

Notes:aJob satisfaction changes reported when significant change.bWork pressure a summary six-item scale.cAverage earnings in teams agreed in the negotiations, taken from Departmental Teamworking Agreements.dHealth and safety measured as change in all injury frequency rate in department comparing the periods March 1998–1999(before teamworking) and May 2001–2002 (after teamworking).




Union and management cooperation over teamworking also led to a sig-nificant improvement in health and safety (Table 5) as employees had been fullyinvolved in reassessing working practices and management implemented unionsuggestions to protect the health and safety of members working in teams.However, the overall returns for employees appeared limited. Almost all theincrease in productivity (28%) appears to result from substantial demanning (a30% reduction), a reduction made possible by capital expenditure revealed byemployees in the KTA. As a result the pressure of work increased significantlywith more employees reporting tighter deadlines, a great deal of pressure, nothaving enough time to get the work done and mental tiredness (Table 5).However, overall job satisfaction among employees in this department did notchange (Table 5). Although satisfaction with pay fell (t = –2.57, p < 0.05)reflecting a poorer pay settlement in return for teamworking compared to someother departments (Table 5), satisfaction increased with health and safety issues(t = 2.68, p < 0.01) and with the way the department was managed (t = 2.94,p < 0.01), involvement in decisions (t = 2.45, p < 0.05) and industrial relations(t = 2.31, p < 0.05). Consistent with the ideology of cooperative trade unionismthe union branch acquiesced in work intensification and demanning in the hopeof securing the future productivity of the mill with a departmental manager fos-tering continued employee involvement and improvements in health and safety.The significant improvement in labour productivity suggests the union branchachieved one of its main objectives to help secure the future of the plant and thelack of change in job satisfaction indicates that this was acceptable to branchmembers.

Militant opposition and teamworking in Teesside Beam Mill

In contrast to the Medium Section Mill, the union branch at Teesside Beam Milldescribed itself as ‘a very, very strong branch’ with the most militant reputationand it was a ‘staunch defender of traditional working practices’. As the most‘vehemently opposed’ to teamworking it was very likely to be the last depart-ment to sign a teamworking agreement (Table 2). This militant union branchapproached teamworking as it had all issues, determined to extract maximumpayment for the most minimal changes. A manager from the departmentexplained that this militant position did not weaken throughout negotiations onteamworking:

I don’t recall ever having cooperative meetings with the TU, never ever having a pro-posal in any shape or form even in manning, task analysis, numbers, rotas, youname it, we failed abysmally to convince them on any point, content or debate.

During the KTA the union representatives were ‘pretty suspicious’ and believed‘management had their agenda of demanning and to get less men to do a greaternumber of tasks’. In response the union ‘allowed certain people to join’ the pro-ject team to ‘ensure all work tasks were included’. This reinforced the union’sbargaining position to try and ensure any concessions in manning would come





at an additional cost to management (column 3 of Tables 3 and 4). As a resultmanagers and unions ‘argued over the measurement of jobs’, neither side wouldengage in genuine joint problem solving during the KTA and approached it asroutine bargaining intent on gaining at the expense of the other side. The unionwas ‘fairly sure we’ve never convinced management that our way is right…andwhat happened is that we backed them into a corner and they capitulated intoa decision because of the strength of our action’. The recommendations of theproject team were described by a manager as ‘quite a professional documentwith firm ideas of what the teams should be…that tied us fairly tightly in someareas to what they recommended, … the TU took that as being the basis of thenegotiations’. When managers subsequently decided to:

…radically change it in that we created a new team which they hadn’t thought of…itwas very difficult to sell that because we couldn’t review the Task Analysis, youknow, what to change. We said that ‘we thought that was a recommendation’, and‘thank you very much for that recommendation, but we see it slightly different’, andthey wouldn’t, they were quite aware as it were.

Whereas managers sought to ‘divorce themselves’ from the KTA, the union‘…used to rely on it during the negotiations because it supported a number oftasks and certain manning levels’. The main aims of the union in the subsequentnegotiations were ‘…money, with an increase for the amount of responsibilitythey were taking on and the extra tasks…and manning making sure there wasa correct number of men to do the job safely without being rushed off theirfeet’. Making sure the KTA was helpful to the union weakened managementbargaining power (Table 4, column 3) and ultimately minimized change. ‘Veryconflictual’, lengthy and unfriendly negotiations with ‘…a lot of banging on thetable’ by a 20-strong union bargaining team forced concessions from manage-ment over manning levels and pay. In the words of one manager ‘…we did haveto compromise on our view when we eventually got them to sign,…it soundsbitter and twisted but we’d given everything and nothing had come back fromthe other side at all, in terms of compromise’. The union ‘…bent the rules a lit-tle bit’ of the weighted averaging system to determine pay because ‘…we didn’twant lower paid jobs included’. Militant opposition weakened the resolve ofmanagers to force through change because industrial action over teamworkingremained a real and credible threat throughout the negotiations. The finalagreement was rejected by the branch members, signed by the national unionunder procedural rules and reluctantly operated by the branch. When we askeda manager in Teesside Beam Mill to identify the main achievements of the nego-tiations in his department he could identify few:

We felt as if we hadn’t got everything that we wanted, far from it…we had a walk-out on the second day of teamworking for example, and I had to address them allin the canteen… . Bully them…into going back to work…I certainly thought ‘this isgoing to be a long next four months maybe, and a hard twelve months in this busi-ness’. …I think part of the problem was we just hadn’t sold teamworking to them





before we started negotiations. I think they genuinely thought that they could keepTeesside Beam Mill out of the teamworking arena.

For one of the union representatives conflict was a routine way of life as he sim-ply explained ‘I wouldn’t say there were a lot of concessions that we made …wefought pretty well tooth and nail to get what we got’.

The strategy of Militant Opposition in Teesside Beam Mill to defend man-ning restricted productivity gains. Output declined by nine percent and the pro-ductivity gain was lower than the manning reduction after the introduction ofteamworking. The KTA revealed a low manpower utilization level (71%) andin reality the department was generously manned compared to others.Demanning was lower than in other departments and overall job satisfactionincreased under teamworking (t = 2.81, p < 0.01) with higher levels of pay thanother departments (Table 4, column 3). Employees reported greater satisfactionwith the way the department was managed (t = 2.45, p < 0.05), involvement indecisions (t = 2.936, p < 0.01), industrial relations (t = 2.16, p < 0.05) andattention paid to suggestions (t = 2.53, p < 0.05) (Table 5).

As unions effectively captured the gains from teamworking they restrictedthe extent to which teamworking changed the intensity or the intrinsic featuresof work. The strategy of counting every task to drive up the manpower utiliza-tion rate protected employees from many of the negative features associatedwith teamworking, such as increased pressure and stress. Little change wasreported in pressure at work (Table 5). In sum, militant opposition had deliv-ered many gains for workers but relatively few for management.

Moderate opposition and teamworking in Scunthorpe Blast Furnaces

At Scunthorpe Blast Furnaces a union branch officer explained he ‘…had beennegotiating teamworking since 1984’. Managers wanted to make ‘radicalchanges’ and believed the union officials, notwithstanding a tradition of mod-eration and cooperation in the department, would use the KTA process todefend manning levels and introduce site-wide issues into the local negotiations.Management ‘deliberately excluded’ the union from the make-up of the KTApanel and a union branch officer explained ‘…we weren’t involved…it was col-lated by management’s nominees…to reduce manpower’. A traditionally mod-erate union branch was forced into conflict to try and defend manning levels.The union refused to accept the findings of the KTA as legitimate, criticizing themethodology for deriving manning levels:

That was the biggest con worked upon the workforce… . What they’ve found out isthat [points] ‘he only utilizes 89.38 percent of his time’. So you look at all of thoseutilization times and you can say ‘well any guy at the time has a lowest utilizationtime of 85 percent … by the way, there’s no way that he could work 85 percent ofeight hours because he is entitled to take 30 minutes as snack time. So I say againthe information contained in there is fabricated because the guy can only workabout 80 percent of these utilization tasks. …So all of these [KTA] documents when





I first saw it and analysed it and when I saw through it, I thought to myself wellthat’s been a waste of time. …we weren’t involved in it, the people who wereinvolved in it were two management appointees.

A union representative pointed to the KTA document and asked ‘You knowwhat happened once we’d completed that? …That was binned and manage-ment said “well that’s it, take no notice of any of that, bin that.’’’ Another unionofficial explained the KTA ‘…was a hindrance and wasn’t particularly wellreflected in the end agreements’.

Without a credible threat of militancy, the union branch in ScunthorpeBlast Furnaces pursued conflict unsuccessfully against a management deter-mined to force through change. Employees ‘contributed information quite will-ingly’ to the KTA team and a manager explained ‘it provided the informationwe needed to push through demanning’. However, the KTA showed little slackmanning with a manpower utilization figure of 90 percent (Table 3, column 3)and a manager confessed employees ‘were shocked by the number of people weproposed to cut’.

In the negotiations, management were in a strong bargaining position(Table 4, column 3) and pushed through an 18 percent manning reduction,hypothetically involving remaining employees working 108 percent of theirtime at work. Although unions sought to negotiate down this manning reduc-tion figure, management believed union representatives were ‘role playing andbanging on the table to show hostility’ and would accept the agreement (Table4). As management predicted, the moderate union branch accepted the team-working agreement having extracted few concessions from management. Theunion described itself as ‘Totally and absolutely over a barrel…managementweren’t empowered to negotiate, they were told to achieve manpower reductionof approximately 20 percent and no deviation in the weighted averageapproach to pay…therefore they were not there to negotiate’. A managerexplained his view was ‘…they are astute union guys, they wouldn’t stand in theway of change and it benefited some of their members to go out with a pot ofgold [pension]’. Union opposition failed because it was undermined by moder-ate orientations in the branch in the face of a management determined to forcethrough change. A large number applied for early retirement.

Conflict did not produce the same results for the union branch inScunthorpe Blast Furnaces pursuing Moderate Opposition, where the depart-mental manager was as equally determined as in Teesside Beam Mill to forcechange. The result was a slightly larger productivity increase with a similarreduction in manning (Table 5, column 3). The economic performance ofScunthorpe Blast Furnaces improved as a result of teamworking with a 13 per-cent increase in labour productivity (Table 5).

The contrast with employee views at Teesside Blast Furnace (discussedbelow) is striking given that the production process is identical. Employeesreported an increase in work pressure (although only significant at the 10%level) and a decline in many features of job satisfaction (Table 5). As a result of





teamworking more employees in Scunthorpe Blast Furnaces reported ‘workingto tight deadlines’ and ‘working under a great deal of pressure’ in 2002 com-pared to before teamworking in 1999. Overall job satisfaction had declined sig-nificantly over this period (t = –4.43, p < 0.001) (Table 5). Employees were lesssatisfied with many intrinsic features of work such as their workload (t = –3.68,p < 0.001), effort required to do the job (t = –3.06, p < 0.01), the way thedepartment is managed (t = –2.02, p < 0.05), attention paid to suggestions(t = –2.01, p < 0.05), industrial relations (t = –2.45, p < 0.05) and rate of pay(t = –4.27, p < 0.001). Declining satisfaction with both effort and pay suggestsgreater dissatisfaction with the wage effort bargain. Managers appeared to bearthe blame, with one commenting: ‘They accepted the need for change as longas they weren’t affected by it’. Moderate opposition appeared to be a weakstrategy to defend the interests of union members. However, the union branchconceded because as moderate trade unionists they accepted the need toimprove productivity to secure the future of the department.

Militant engagement and teamworking in Teesside Blast Furnace

Compared to the Scunthorpe departments the union branch of Teesside BlastFurnace was militant and described by a manager as ‘…traditional iron-makingmen with one way of working for 25 years in this place and it was very difficultto move them forward’. Teesside depended upon a single blast furnace and theimplications of an interruption of iron supply for the works had deterred man-agers from forcing changes to ‘entrenched practices’. The managers of the depart-ment explained proposals for efficiency drives presented to the union had‘…received a very abrupt “no, we won’t do it”, no matter how we have couchedit and turned it around we have found it very difficult to make them do anything’.

The main aims of the union branch in the teamworking negotiations wereto ‘Keep as many men in the job and get as much money as we could out of it’.However, the occupational culture in the physically dangerous blast furnace tra-ditionally fosters a paternalistic management style and would lead to mutualaccommodation with the union branch. The departmental manager fosteredunion cooperation in the negotiations by making it clear he would not useteamworking to force through major changes in working practices. Otherdepartments at Teesside (for example, Teesside Beam Mill described above) wit-nessed very aggressive negotiations where managers had tried to force throughradical change in negotiations with militant branches. The union branch inTeesside Blast Furnace cooperated with the change recognizing ‘…there was aninevitability about it and we had to make sure the works remained open andthe company would re-line the furnace’. A union branch official saw an oppor-tunity to cooperate in the KTA because ‘…unlike time and motion studies, itwas fairer and branch members could influence the findings’:

…we involved ourselves more than somebody standing and watching you andchecking every movement. With Key Task Analysis you can put your own things in,





what you do and what you don’t do really. …all the branch were involved becauseeverybody had the input of what jobs they did do, and were supposed’ve done, andwhat they can do during the eight hours of work.

Militant Engagement at Teesside Blast Furnace involved branch membersdirectly involved in the KTA making sure ‘…every little job that peopledone…they were all added up in the end’ (union respondent). The union wasquite determined to ensure the KTA measured current tasks rather than the tasksthat workers could perform if under more pressure in teams (Table 3, column 4).To ensure this ‘…nearly every person got a piece of paper to mark down whatjobs they did and what they could do during the shift’. Managers reported ‘agreat deal of resistance’ to a number of suggestions. Whereas managers wantedoperators to move between the east and west sides of the furnace as workdemanded, operators ‘…still wanted to sit down and not do anything until itcomes to restarting work’. As a result managers reported ‘…a situation of 50 per-cent utilization time if not less, and they were reluctant to give up what they had’.A union representative felt the KTA team ‘…worked as a team of managementand union working together to get all the data we could find’, with managers con-firming ‘…we didn’t have to drag them kicking and screaming into the roominsisting “you must do this’’.’ In addition, although management raised the issueof placing craft workers into process teams the union branch explained ‘…fromday one we didn’t want them in from the start, if they were craft jobs then craftcome in to do them rather than as part of the team’. Although managers felt‘…the KTA dragged on too long’ they also recognized ‘…it was such a sensitiveissue we had to give it the proper respect and convince the branch’.

The KTA produced a manpower utilization figure of 82 percent and estab-lished a ‘…line in the sand’ for the unions, based upon work practices beforeteams (Table 3). With the company instructing managers to deliver significantdemanning, this militant branch negotiated one of the lower reductions (17%) inmanning levels (Table 5, column 4). Management confessed they became con-vinced not even to attempt to radically change working practices in most of theblast furnace. When managers presented manning proposals for negotiationthere was little discrepancy with union figures, with a union representative com-menting ‘I think it was fairly even really in what numbers they came out with andwhat numbers we came out with, it was fairly similar’. Managers explaineddemanning exactly matched the number of volunteers for early retirement whohad already come forward. The unions felt they had to concede manning from aweak bargaining position compared to management (Table 4, column 4).Management did not force the issue, unable to convince unions to accept lowermanning levels. As a result the negotiations were described as ‘…tense with a fairbit of character assassination’, with neither side trusting the other ‘…no morethan they trusted us’, and the union ensured they ‘…spent days and days…talk-ing about the structure of every sentence in the four- or five-page agreement toclarify the jobs you can and can’t do’. The branch voted to accept the agreementwith few changes in the labour process after further discussion over covering





absent workers (Table 4). Although some employees received a pay increase after‘…the pay of ten senior guys went into the pot [the weighted average calculation],even though we knew they were subsequently taking early retirement’, the uniondid not expect a large reward for relatively slight changes in job duties.

The capacity for militant activity and evident willingness to conflict if nec-essary, enabled effective militant engagement. Union cooperation with work-place restructuring produced positive outcomes for employees because it wasbacked by the threat of militant action, thereby encouraging moderation frommanagement. A union representative explained that as a result, teamworking:

…wasn’t really a major change, we did really work as a team to a good extent,people used to swap jobs about and do different tasks each day, …and they justbrought some more work for the team to try and do it really. But each person can-not obviously do every task on the plant. It did start off well but it fizzled out, nowthat the numbers have gone, people have gone back to [working] a similar way theyused to beforehand.

In cooperating from a position of strength with a plant manager who would notforce through radical change, the union branch prevented teamworking leadingto excessive pressure on employees.

Militant Engagement in the Teesside Blast Furnace produced very differentresults compared with cooperation in the Medium Section Mill. The 9 percentproductivity increase was far lower and did not match the 17 percent reductionin manning (Table 5). Employees reported no change in work intensity (Table5) despite the reduced manning and there was no significant change in aspectsof job satisfaction (Table 5). A union representative commented ‘The job hashardly changed for most people. They get told to do different jobs but they basi-cally do more or less what they were doing before’. Cooperating over limitedchange produced few positive outcomes for management and little change foremployees.

Conclusion

The introduction of teamworking produced varied outcomes in the four depart-ments we studied. The gains associated with a militant union ideology may beinterpreted as support for the Marxist perspective (Kelly, 1998). The more mil-itant workforces at Teesside had greater success in preventing worsening wagesand conditions because union organization on the shopfloor made more credi-ble their opposition to management. The militant branch that engaged withmanagement (Teesside Blast Furnace) did so for tactical rather than principledreasons. It quite clearly did not accept joint problem solving and rejected theunderlying message during the KTA that a unity of interests existed betweencapital and labour. However, our findings also suggest that militant branchesmay engage in cooperative processes with management for tactical reasons, andin so doing they may benefit from integrative bargaining processes. For





example, the departmental manager at Teesside Blast Furnace was not stronglycommitted to teamworking and was deterred from forcing radical changes inworking practices through union engagement in the KTA. In return for unioncooperation in reducing manning and a slight increase in flexible working, man-agement conceded a pay increase for some employees by deriving the averagewage by including higher and excluding lower salaries. In this case, tacticalcooperation proved a viable strategy for the union branch. Thus workers maybenefit from tactical cooperation over particular initiatives in certain circum-stances when they cooperate from a position of strong workplace union orga-nization. However, this cannot be taken as an argument for cooperation andjoint problem solving per se. Cooperation only worked for the union branchwhere it was backed by a credible threat if management exploited cooperationduring joint problem-solving by withholding or distorting information to seeka bargaining advantage. It does nevertheless suggest that even militant unionbranches should not reject joint problem solving out of hand.

The findings illustrate that trade union responses and strategy should beunderstood as a combination of action in negotiations and ideological orienta-tion. The ideological orientation of trade union branches and members heavilyconditioned the success of behaviour during the bargaining process. The tradi-tion of moderation and cooperative industrial relations climates in the MediumSection Mill and Scunthorpe Blast Furnaces made these two union branchesmore willing to make concessions during the bargaining process and acceptmanagement-led changes (Table 4). Trade union representatives made rationalchoices but these were conditioned by their ideological orientations and theresources and capabilities provided by their union members. Scunthorpeemployees had moderate ideologies of trade unionism and freely providedinformation for the KTA to design effective teams and secure the future of theworks, notwithstanding the opposition of the union representatives to this pro-cess in the blast furnaces. In contrast, militant workers at Teesside regardedjoint problem solving in the KTA as a fixed sum game about manning reduc-tions and job protection. As a result militant union branches ensured all jobswere included with maximum timings to calculate the manpower utilization fig-ure, and that significant demanning would subsequently require managementconcessions over pay despite the weighted averaging system.

The ideology of trade union branch members affects the success of differ-ent behaviours of their representatives during the bargaining process throughthe willingness of union members to act in accordance with the decision tocooperate or pursue conflict. Furthermore, the ideology of branch members willaffect the strategies that managers adopt during bargaining. Branches with amilitant ideology deterred managers from forcing too many changes because ofa greater risk of failing to reach an agreement (for example in Teesside BlastFurnace). In contrast, it appears equally rational for managers to force moder-ate union branches into making concessions regardless of whether union repre-sentatives pursue integrative or distributive bargaining tactics (as in the case ofScunthorpe Blast Furnaces). The theoretical implication of this finding is that a





rational or strategic choice focus only on what unions do during bargaining(Frost, 2001), when they respond to management initiatives for workplacerestructuring, is likely to prove insufficient to explain the outcomes.

In addition a focus only on the outcomes for employees (manning, pay, jobsatisfaction and work pressure) would lead us to conclude that a militant ori-entation was always preferable and the moderate union branches in our studybehaved irrationally. However, moderate union branches acted rationallyaccording to their belief that making concessions in the prevailing economic climate helped to secure the continued survival of their departments. Kelly(1998: 8) is correct to note ‘workers’ behaviour is complex because they“resist” exploitation as well as cooperate with the employer to ensure the via-bility of their particular firm’. The union branch of the Medium Section Millwas quite aware that cooperative engagement over teamworking would deliverimproved plant performance at the cost of work intensification and greaterdemanning. In Scunthorpe Blast Furnace, the union branch sought to restrictdemanning and work intensification although this would lead to a smallerincrease in productivity. Militant opposition in Teesside Beam Mill preventedwork intensification and improved overall job satisfaction. Militant engage-ment by the union in Teesside Blast Furnace prevented significant changes inwork with little impact on job satisfaction and productivity increases lowerthan the extent of demanning. The choices in negotiations are complex; how-ever, these negotiators thought they behaved rationally in the pursuit of goals,although goals and actions did relate to beliefs and ideologies.

The Marxist focus only upon ideology and worker gains labels union mod-eration as acquiescence and overlooks the extent to which union strategyreflects the different utility preferences of negotiators. Moderate trade unionistsplaced a greater value on long-term plant survival and sacrificed the protectionof manning and workload levels. Militant trade unionists did not believe man-agement claims that accepting change with little in return would secure plantsurvival. In such instances a greater emphasis was placed on protecting currentjobs and preventing work intensification. In the case of these four departments,the tradition of union moderation at Scunthorpe in part reflects the lack ofalternative job opportunities in ‘a one horse town’ where the steelworks pro-vides a large percentage of well-paid jobs for male manual workers. Teessidesteelworks on the other hand is part of the labour traditions of the North-Eastof England and regarded itself as ‘bomb-proof’, sited on a coastal location witha deep harbour port, suggesting Scunthorpe would close first. Only futuredevelopments will decide whether the moderate unions at Scunthorpe madeappropriate concessions successfully to extend the life of the steelworks, orwhether the Teesside works will survive and greater worker concessions provedunnecessary. Since we concluded our research the new chief executive of Corusannounced that Scunthorpe would be the preferred source to meet the internaldemand for products in the company and each department at Teesside wouldhave to compete in the external market. Militant trade unionism at Teesside





protected the current terms and conditions of workers but may prove insuffi-cient to guarantee long-term job security.

Acknowledgement

The financial support of the ESRC for this research is gratefully acknowledged. Wewould also like to thank colleagues for helpful comments when we presented an ear-lier version of this paper at the European Sociological Association Conference,Murcia, Spain, 23–6 September 2003. Thanks are also due to the editor and threeanonymous referees for their helpful suggestions.

Notes

1 Industrial relations climate is the average of scores to four items on theemployee surveys undertaken in 1999 and 2002: ‘unions and managementwork together to make this a better place to work’, ‘unions and managementhave respect for each other’s goals’, ‘in this department, negotiations take placein an atmosphere of good faith’ and ‘a sense of fairness is associated with unionmanagement dealings in this department’. Each was measured on a five-pointscale from ‘strongly agree’ (= 1) to strongly disagree (= 5).

References

Allen, V. (1966) Militant Trade Unionism. London: Merlin.Andries, F., Kompier, M. and Smulders, P. (1996) ‘Do You Think that Your Health

or Safety are at Risk Because of Your Work? A Large European Study onPsychological and Physical Work Demands’, Work and Stress 10(2): 104–18.

Bacon, N. and Blyton, P. (2002) ‘Militant and Moderate Trade Union Orientations:What are the Effects on Workplace Trade Unionism, Union-managementRelations and Employee Gains?’ International Journal of Human ResourceManagement 13(2): 302–19.

Bacon, N. and Storey, J. (1996) ‘Individualism and Collectivism and the ChangingRole of Trade Unions’, in P. Ackers, C. Smith and P. Smith (eds) The NewWorkplace and Trade Unionism, pp. 41–76. London: Routledge.

Bacon, N. and Storey, J. (2000) ‘New Employee Relations Strategies in Britain:Towards Individualism or Partnership?’, British Journal of Industrial Relations38(3): 407–28.

Beale, D. (2003) ‘Engaged in Battle: Exploring the Sources of Workplace UnionMilitancy at Royal Mail’, Industrial Relations Journal 34(1): 82–95.

Blyton, P., Bacon, N. and Morris, J. (1996) ‘Working in Steel: Steelworkers’Attitudes to Change 40 Years On’, Industrial Relations Journal 27(2): 45–56.

Bronfenbrenner, K. (1997) ‘The Role of Union Strategies in NLRB CertificationElections’, Industrial and Labor Relations Review 50(2): 195–212.

Charlwood, A. (2002) ‘Book Review’, British Journal of Industrial Relations 40(2):343–5.





Crouch, C. (1982) Trade Unions: The Logic of Collective Action. London: Fontana.Darlington, R. (1998) ‘Workplace Union Resilience in the Merseyside Fire Brigade’,

Industrial Relations Journal 29(1): 58–73.Darlington, R. (2001) ‘Union Militancy and Left-wing Leadership on London

Underground’, Industrial Relations Journal 32(1): 2–21.Dastmalchian, A., Blyton, P. and Adamson, R. (1991) The Climate of Workplace

Relations. London: Routledge.Fairbrother, P. (2000) Trade Unions at the Crossroads. London: Mansell.Frost, A. (2001) ‘Reconceptualizing Local Union Responses to Workplace

Restructuring in North America’, British Journal of Industrial Relations 39(4):539–64.

Gall, G. (1998) ‘The Prospects for Workplace Trade Unionism’, Capital and Class66: 149–58.

Geary, J.F. and Roche, W.K. (2003) ‘Workplace Partnership and the DisplacedActivist Thesis’, Industrial Relations Journal 34(1): 32–51.

Hyman, R. (1975) Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction. London:Macmillan.

Kelly, J. (1996) ‘Union Militancy and Social Partnership’, in P. Ackers, C. Smith andP. Smith (eds) The New Workplace and Trade Unionism, pp. 41–76. London:Routledge.

Kelly, J. (1998) Rethinking Industrial Relations. London: Routledge.Kelly, J. (2001) ‘Book Review’, International Journal of Human Resource

Management 12(1): 146–9.Kelly, J. (2004) ‘Social Partnership Agreements in Britain: Labor Cooperation and

Compliance’, Industrial Relations 43(1): 267–92.Marks, A.P., Findlay, J.H., McKinlay, A. and Thompson, P. (1998) ‘The Politics of

Partnership? Innovation in Employment Relations in the Scottish SpiritsIndustry’, British Journal of Industrial Relations 36(2): 209–27.

Sayles, L.R. (1958) Behavior of Industrial Work Groups. New York: John Wileyand Sons.

Vernon, G. (2001) ‘Book Review’, Industrial Relations Journal 32(2): 176–7.Walton, R.E. and McKersie, R.B. (1965) A Behavioral Theory of Labor

Negotiations. New York: McGraw Hill.Warr, P., Cook, J. and Wall, T. (1979) ‘Scales for the Measurement of Some Work

Attitudes and Aspects of Psychological Well-being’, Journal of OccupationalPsychology, 52: 129–48.

Nicolas Bacon

Nicolas Bacon is Professor of Human Resource Management at Nottingham

University Business School, UK. His research interests include trade union negotiation

strategies, teamworking, SMEs, management buyouts and the impact of shareholder

value management on HRM. He is Editor of the Industrial Relations Journal.

Address: Nottingham University Business School, Jubilee Campus, Wollaton Road,

Nottingham NG8 1BB, UK.

E-mail: [email protected]





Paul Blyton

Paul Blyton is Professor of Industrial Relations and Industrial Sociology at Cardiff

Business School, UK. He is author of The Dynamics of Employee Relations (with Peter

Turnbull) (2004, 3rd Edition, Palgrave Macmillan), and The Realities of Work (with Mike

Noon) (2002, 2nd Edition, Palgrave Macmillan). His interests include working time and

work life balance, and restructuring in the international iron and steel and airline indus-

tries.

Address: Cardiff Business School, Aberconway Building, Colum Drive, Cardiff, CF1 3EU,

UK.

E-mail: [email protected]

Date submitted November 2003Date accepted 6 May 2004





Documents

Trade union responses to workplace restructuring: exploring union orientations and actions