American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 57: 254–266, 2015

Copyright © American Society of Clinical Hypnosis

ISSN: 0002-9157 print / 2160-0562 online

DOI: 10.1080/00029157.2014.976784

Traditional and Alert Hypnotic Phenomena: Development Through Anteriorization

David M. Wark

University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA

Modern research techniques show that hypnotic induction involves behavioral and cognitive

inhibition as components of many hypnotic phenomena. One standard laboratory technique for mea-

suring cognitive inhibition is the Go/NoGo procedure. The procedure moves the average, or centroid,

of electroencephalography signals toward the frontal, or anterior, part of the brain. This process, called

anteriorization, produces a shift in the emotional and cognitive signals from the anterior cingulate

cortex. This has implications for both the scientific understanding and clinical use of hypnosis.

Keywords: alert hypnosis, anteriorization, cognitive inhibition

Fish attacked by predators may show a specific, single, genetically determined response.

Marine sticklebacks school together and confront the predator as a mass, but freshwa-

ter sticklebacks scatter, perhaps as a confusion tactic (Greenwood, Wark, Yoshida, &

Peichel, 2013). The response is genetically determined. When mammals are attacked,

they have a slightly larger but constrained repertoire available: flight, fight, or freeze

(Cannon, 1932). Higher-level primates, such as humans, have a myriad of options if

threatened. They can, for instance, ignore, deny, regress, deflect, attack, ally with oth-

ers, or do something else. They may manage this in part through the anterior brain’s

executive function of judgment, attention focusing, and allocating resources (Miller,

Freedman, & Wallis, 2002).

This article argues that we can use the term “hypnosis” to reference the anterior

cortex’s process of stopping or inhibiting cognitive, motor, emotional, or physiological

responses. That process is illuminated by citing research using contemporary techniques:

electroencephalography (EEG), magnetoencephalography (MEG), positron emission

tomography (PET), and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). These tools

can demonstrate, objectively, what is happening in the brain of subjects, patients, and

clients involved in hypnotic changes. The goal of this article is to present a preliminary,

Address correspondence to David M. Wark, University of Minnesota, 2021 East Hennepin Avenue, Minneapolis, MN

55413, USA. E-mail: wark@umn.edu

Color versions of one or more of the figures in the article can be found online at www.tandfonline.com/ujhy.

HYPNOSIS AND ANTERIORIZATION 255

accessible integration of neuroscience and hypnosis research and offer a perspective for

scientists and clinicians.

Neuroscience of Inhibition

To start, consider these rigorously controlled observations of what happens at the neu-

rological level during a hypnotic induction. Pierre Rainville et al. (1999) observed eight

highly susceptible subjects. Using PET measures of regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF),

they were scanned twice: during rest and after traditional induction using the Stanford

Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale Form A (SHSS-A) by Weitzenhoffer and Hilgard (1959).

After subtracting on a voxel-by-voxel basis the images during rest and hypnosis, the

authors produced an image of cerebral changes produced by induction.

The authors note several areas of increase and decrease in rCBF, indicating activation

and deactivation in various parts of the brain. Reduced activity was observed in the

rear or posterior parts of the brain: the parietal lobe, Brodmann area 40 (BA 40), the

precuneus (BA 7), and the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC; BA 31). For information

about the location or function of the Brodmann areas, the reader can consult Figure 1, the

more complete Kaiser Brodmann Atlas (Kaiser & Sterman, 2013), or Kandel, Schwartz,

Jessell, Siegelbaum, and Hudspeth (2013).

The authors found increased activity in two areas of the brain, the right inferior frontal

gyrus (BA 47) and the right anterior cingulate cortex (BA 24). These areas are in the

forward or anterior part of the brain, known as the “pre-frontal cortex.” This is the

site of the brain’s executive functions: focusing attention, detecting errors, problem-

solving, and allocating resources between brain areas (Miller et al., 2002). Neural

impulses generated in the right and left frontal cortex are considered to be important

in the intentional (i.e., conscious) or unintentional (i.e., unconscious) stopping, prevent-

ing, or inhibiting of certain responses (Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004). Stopping

Medial Surface Lateral Surface

FIGURE 1 Brodmann areas of the human brain (from http://en.

wikipedia.org/wiki/Brodmann_areas). This work is licensed under the

Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License.

256 WARK

smoking, stopping eating before a sugary dessert, stopping emotional outbursts, or

dialing down “road rage” while driving are all examples of self-control involving inhi-

bition. The ability to define and use these mechanisms has important clinical hypnosis

implications.

What follows is a sampling of the neuroscience evidence that support this important

connection between increased pre-frontal signals and any inhibitory effects mediated

through other parts of the brain. The effects are strong and appear for many different

populations and situations. We start with a study of cognitive inhibition.

In a general review, Aron et al. (2004) described various techniques for measuring

psychological inhibition. A historically important one is the Wisconsin Card Sorting

Test (Berg, 1948), in which the subject is presented with a series of cards showing dif-

ferent symbols and colors. The subjects sort the cards on one dimension, perhaps color.

Then, with that task well established, they are asked to shift and sort, for example on

shape. To do that, they must inhibit the first rule. The more errors they make on the sec-

ond task, the lower the subject’s ability to inhibit. Studies of inhibition in both animals

and humans, involving images and brain lesions, across a wide range of measures and

response paradigms, consistently involve the inferior, or lower, frontal cortex (Milner,

1963). While the exact mechanisms for the frontal cortex’s contribution to inhibition

is not clear at this time, Aron et al. (2004) conclude that there is strong evidence that

the right inferior frontal cortex (BAs 44, 45, and 47) is clearly implicated. Interestingly,

these are among the areas that are increased and activated during hypnotic induction

(Maquet et al., 1999; Rainville, Hofbauer, Bushnell, Duncan, & Price, 2002; Rainville

et al., 1999).

Demakis (2003) performed two meta-analyses on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test

literature, covering 1,779 patients with brain lesions. He was trying to locate the part of

the brain, anterior or posterior, and the particular hemisphere, right or left, that accounted

for poor performance learning one sorting task and inhibiting it when trying to perform a

different sorting. He concluded that patients earning low scores had frontal lobe damage

and that lesions on both hemispheres (BAs 44, 45, and 47) are probable sources for the

signals that produced the effect.

Because card sorting involves complex decisions, scientists have developed other

easier to interpret tasks to measure inhibition. Probably the most widely used is the

Continuous Performance Test (Rosvold, Mirsky, Sarason, Bransome, & Beck, 1956).

One version is the Go/NoGo arrangement in which a subject is asked to make a response

on the Go trial (“Press the button when you see the letter P”) but to inhibit on the NoGo

trial (“Do not press when you see the letter X”). The subject with more ability to inhibit

will make fewer errors on the NoGo trials (Fallgatter & Strik, 1999). Depending on the

purpose of the study, there can be other measures of inhibition, such as the time it takes

to switch from one task to another and the scores on memory retrieval. But in every case,

there is a measure of inhibition. To study the effects, the subject’s brain is scanned using

various techniques.

HYPNOSIS AND ANTERIORIZATION 257

Morein-Zamir et al. (2014) studied adults with attention deficit hyperactivity disor-

der (ADHD) who have problems with attention and self-control. The task was to look

at pictures of houses (one story or two story) or faces (male or female) with colored

borders around the pictures. The color signaled how the subject was to respond. So, for

example if the frame is red, the subjects must choose the picture of a two-story house

but inhibit response to the one-story house. The task was simple: attend to the frame and

make a decision (Go or NoGo) when following a rule. Compared to the normal controls,

data showed subjects with ADHD made more errors. They also showed lower activation

in their inferior frontal cortex, the presumptive source of signals to inhibit the motor

response. The authors’ explanation is that lower activation in the right inferior frontal

cortex is associated with lower inhibition in adults with attention deficit disorder.

Hege et al. (2014) studied a group of overweight and obese people in an MEG scanner

while they were choosing or inhibiting food-related visuals. The more impulsive subject

showed decreased response inhibition. They also had decreased activity in the prefrontal

control mechanisms required for inhibition.

In an ecological application, Nash, Schiller, Gianotti, Baumgartner, and Knoch (2013)

studied a type of social inhibition. Subjects first participated in a Go/NoGo task, using

EEG to assess ability to inhibit. Then, after the screening, they participated in a game

during which they could earn and keep real money. They were told they were in a two-

person investment competition, playing against an anonymous other person. The subjects

were asked whether they would “always” or “never” return the investment of the other

person in the game. Thus, they made a social commitment or promise. They did not

know that the “other person in the game” was in fact a computer and that the outcomes

were rigged. In short, they participated in an investment/gambling game in which they

made decisions about the amount of money they would return to the other person. If they

inhibited, or broke their promise, they would increase their actual financial return. The

results were that the students whose brains showed higher scores on inhibiting in the

pretest before the game were more likely to break their promise and walk away with more

money. Again, the difference in frontal lobe activity was related to behavioral inhibition,

this case in a social arena.

In early research on medical applications, Crawford (1994) cites evidence that when

high hypnotizables experience successful hypnotic anesthesia, there is an increase in

cerebral blood flow to their frontal lobes. That is evidence for her conclusions about

cognitive flexibility; highly hypnotizable subjects seem to have more control to shift

attention and inhibit or, as she says, “disattend,” and are thus resistant to incoming

distractions. For example, seeing reversals in the Necker cube and Schroeder stair-

case illusion requires sustained attention and concentration (Stuss & Benson, 1986).

Reversals in these illusions are correlated in high susceptibles (Crawford, Brown, &

Moon, 1993). They were less bothered by distracting noises, more able to find hidden

details in pictures, and more able to inhibit pain.

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In research by Hampshire, Chamberlain, Monti, Duncan, and Owen (2010), the goal

was to investigate more deeply the role of the right inferior frontal gyrus. How was it

involved beyond sending signals to inhibit other responses? Subjects were investigated

in a task in which they silently counted and then reported the number of up arrows on the

screen (COUNT), pressed a button to indicate the presence of an up arrow (RESPOND),

or withheld a response to the up arrow (INHIBIT). Using fMRI data, the authors found

that both the left and right inferior frontal cortex (BAs 47 and 45) responded during the

COUNT task but much more significantly to the RESPOND and INHIBIT tasks. They

also found during the INHIBIT task strong deactivating signals to the sensorimotor cor-

tex (BAs 3, 4, 6, and 43) the part of the brain involved in inhibiting button pressing. Their

conclusion was that the inferior frontal cortex is involved in detecting signals (COUNT)

and that detection is a necessary precursor to other signals either permitting or inhibiting

motor responses.

In summary, across a wide range of subjects and situations—inhibiting pain and dis-

tractions (Crawford, 1994), changing sorting rules (Demakis, 2003), interpreting visual

signals (Morein-Zamir et al., 2014; Hampshire et al., 2010), inhibiting impulses to eat

(Hege et al., 2014), and breaking promises (Nash et al., 2013)—there is a functional con-

nection between the frontal cortex and behavioral inhibition. When the inferior frontal

cortex is activated and signals are sent to other parts of the brain, a routine, familiar, or

highly likely response can be reduced or suppressed entirely.

Inhibition and Hypnotic Phenomena—Amnesia

How then is inhibition related to hypnosis? Consider this list of classic hypnotic phe-

nomena from Edgette and Edegette (1995): analgesia—inhibited sensation in chronic

pain; anesthesia—inhibited sensation and perception in acute pain; catalepsy—inhibited

movement; hallucination, positive and negative—inhibited perception; time distortion—

inhibited cognition and perception; and amnesia—inhibited memory.

In general, all these hypnotic phenomena involve some reduction or inhibition of a

response; that response may be behavioral, cognitive, emotive, perceptual, or a combi-

nation of several of these processes. But this change in response is, for some, a central

aspect of the definition of hypnosis (Green, Barabasz, Barrett, & Montgomery, 2005).

Typically the term “hypnotic phenomena” means that the responses are in some way—

positively or negatively—enhanced or inhibited by a suggestion in combination with or

following an induction.

As an example, consider the hypnotic phenomena of amnesia or inhibited memory.

Edgette and Edegette (1995) point out that hypnotic amnesia is more than simple forget-

ting. It is directed to specific content and may include things not usually forgotten, such

as a subject’s name or age. Further, hypnotic amnesia can be time specific for events

that happened at a particular moment in the past or during a hypnotic session. So the

HYPNOSIS AND ANTERIORIZATION 259

phenomenology is an inhibited recall, a puzzling loss of content. How does neuroscience

account for this effect?

Consider a recognized standard technique for producing amnesia. Here are the

instructions from the SHSS Form C (SHSS-C) by Weitzenhoffer and Hilgard (1962)

as compiled (Kihlstrom, 1996):

You will have been so relaxed, however, that you will have trouble remembering the things I have

said to you and the things you did or experienced while you were hypnotized. It will prove to cost so

much effort to remember that you will prefer not to try. It will be much easier just to forget everything

until I tell you that you can remember. You will forget all that has happened until I say to you: Now

you can remember everything! You will not remember anything until then. After you open your eyes

you may feel refreshed. (p. 50, emphasis added)

Notice that the italicized words are direct suggestions to inhibit or suppress something

in memory.

According to published norms, 44% of subjects pass this item on the SHSS-C

(Morgan & Hilgard, 1978). Some subjects, but probably not all of them, may be sim-

ply complying. But for those who are genuinely experiencing the phenomenon, what

happens following a suggestion to suppress?

Two related studies (Anderson & Green, 2001; Anderson et al., 2004) working

with non-hypnotized subjects examined the effects of suggestion to suppress recalled

memory. First, in the lab, subjects learned pairs of words (onion–roach). Some of

the word pairs were not practiced, some practiced a few times, and some practiced

16 times. Then, while awake and responding in an fMRI scanner, the subjects were given

Think/NotThink instructions. If the first word of the pair (onion), is printed in green, it

was a signal to think about the response (roach). But if the word was printed in red, they

should prevent, or suppress, the associated word from entering consciousness, “not think

about it at all.” After practicing with the Think/NotThink instructions, the subjects took

a memory post-test. The authors compared the sections of the subjects’ brain that were

more active during suppressing then remembering.

The authors found that the amnesia suggestions were successful: subjects recalled

98% of the words when asked to recall, but only 87% of those they were told to ignore.

The studies showed that the more suppression trials (0 versus 16), the more amnesia.

There were two experimental controls. First, the subjects earned money for each correct

response; second, in an expectation control, the subjects were told, falsely, that other

research showed that the more times they practiced, the more likely they would be to

remember a response. However, the subjects showed less recall of the words that were

suppressed more often. The data seem to suggest that the amnesia was due to active

suppression of the response words rather than general forgetting or forgetting of the

link between the two words. Of course, the subjects could have remembered but failed

to say the word. However, to do so they would not have earned money, which they did.

Therefore, a reasonable interpretation is that the memorized response words were indeed

suppressed.

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The authors found that suppression was generally associated with activity in the infe-

rior frontal cortex (BAs 45 and 46), which is involved in various types of inhibition.

But what is inhibited? The authors found reduced activity in the hippocampus, a part of

the brain that deals with storage and retrieval of memory. There was also an increase

in the dorsal section of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; BA 32). This is the area

where the ACC connects to structures responsible for the executive function of the fore-

brain (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000) and would thus be involved in the inhibitory network

(further discussed below). Suppression also produced increases in other areas associated

with physical or motor responses: pre-supplementary motor areas (BA 6) and the dorsal

premotor cortex (BA 9).

Inhibition and Anteriorization

It is possible to look deeper into the anterior frontal cortex during cognitive inhibition

by using a standard laboratory technique. A team of researchers (Fallgatter & Strik,

1997, 1999; Strik, Fallgatter, Brandeis, & Pascual-Marqui, 1998) used a procedure called

Go/NoGo to more clearly demonstrate what happens in the brain during inhibition.

A subject, seated in front of a computer screen, is instructed to press a button as quickly

as possible when an O is followed by an X (Go condition) but to refrain or inhibit the

press when the O is followed by any other letter (NoGo condition).

The subject wears an EEG cap that records electric activity at the surface of the scalp.

These signals are generated by currents flowing in the neurons of the brain. A change

in the signal when the subject sees a symbol on the screen and makes a decision how to

respond, Go or NoGo, is called an event-related potential (ERP). A distinct rise in the

ERP shows up as a positive increase in voltage with a latency (delay between stimulus

and response) of roughly 250–450 ms after a stimulus; this increase is labeled P300.

In this study, the authors computed the average P300 for successful Go and NoGo

responses. They report a meaningful and reliable difference; NoGo responses take

longer. Several other studies (Pfefferbaum, Ford, Weller, & Kopell, 1985; Jodo & Inoue,

1990; Roberts, Rau, Lutzenberger, & Birbaumer, 1994; Schupp, Lutzenberger, Rau, &

Birbaumer, 1994) show that for the inhibited NoGo response, the latency is significantly

longer; apparently inhibiting takes more time than familiar responding.

In addition, there is another reliable finding. The EEG signals can be combined into

one estimate of the frequency, amplitude, and location of all the neural signals in the

brain (Pascual-Marqui, Esslen, Kochi, & Lehmann, 2002). The computation is called

the “centroid,” since it estimates a center of brain activity. The Go centroid, computed

from active, uninhibited responding, is in the posterior part of the brain, approximately

BA 7. However, the centroid for the slower NoGo signals, representing a measure of

inhibition, is located farther forward in the brain in the frontal or anterior cortex, BA 6

(Fallgatter & Strik, 1999). This shift is interpreted to mean that more energy is being

261 WARK

used by the inhibiting, cognitive, frontal lobes of the brain and less by the posterior

parts carrying out more physiological functions. The consistent centroid shift follow-

ing NoGo, or inhibition, is called “anteriorization” and has important implications for

hypnosis.

Along with the increased activity in the frontal cortex during anteriorization, there is

a shift in activity in parts of the ACC. The cingulate cortex is part of the limbic system

that includes the amygdala (involved with emotion and reward), the hypothalamus (that

mediates metabolism and the autonomic nervous system), and the hippocampus (mod-

erating memory input and consolidation). For a review of the anatomy, see Vogt, Finch,

and Olson (1992) or Vogt, Nimchinsky, Vogt, and Hof (1995). The total cingulate cortex

is divided into distinct regions with specific neural activities and connections. The more

forward or anterior ACC is involved in a broad range of cognitive functions. The PCC,

located toward the back part of the brain, is part of the brain that coordinates physio-

logical balance, default mode mechanism, and locations in the space. For review, see

Duncan and Owen (2000).

From the perspective of hypnosis, there are two important sub-regions in the ACC.

Some fibers from the upper or dorsal ACC connect with the cognitive and associative

areas of the total brain and facilitate “executive” functions. These include the modulation

of attention, monitoring competition, error detection, and problem solving. The lower or

ventral part of the ACC connects to the amygdala and hippocampus and carries out

“evaluative” activities, such as assessing the importance of emotional and motivational

information and the regulation of emotional responses (Bush et al., 2000).

Interestingly, the dorsal and ventral areas seem to work reciprocally. For example,

rCBF increases in the emotion-connected ventral or lower part of the ACC when sub-

jects are asked to imagine or recall experiences of anxiety or sadness or anticipate an

electrical shock (Drevets & Raichle, 1998). On the other hand, activation is increased in

the cognitively connected dorsal or upper part of the ACC when, for example, subjects

are asked to name colors of printed words or repeat words heard auditorially (Petersen,

Fox, Posner, Mintun, & Raichle, 1989). Moreover, it seems that when the activation is

strong in one area, there is a deactivation in the other. As Drevets and Raichle (1998)

point out, intense emotional responses to a threat may reduce memory and recall of the

necessary material for good decision making.

Integration of Neuroscience and Hypnosis

From the neuroscience perspective, the process of induction includes a slowing down

or inhibition of motor and cognitive responses. In addition, in certain situations, such as

Go/NoGo, there is a process of anteriorization, or forward shift, of the electrical signals

in the whole brain. This appears to happen because inhibiting a response takes more

time and more cerebral energy than simply responding. The net effect is to move the

HYPNOSIS AND ANTERIORIZATION 261

center of electrical activity forward. This shift or anteriorization also affects signals in

the ACC and changes the balance between cognitive problem solving and emotionally

based evaluative activity.

Consider now hypnotic induction, which involves requests to focus and maintain

attention on a particular spot, sensation, kinesthetic movement, image, or feeling. This

appears to be the case whether the writer’s perspective is traditional (Weitzenhoffer &

Hilgard, 1959), socio-cognitive (Gibbons & Lynn, 2010), or Ericksonian, (Zeig, 2014).

The explicit, often directive, instruction is to maintain that attentive fixation. The implicit

message is to stop or inhibit attention to any alternative spot, sensation, movement, or

feeling. Thus, hypnotic interventions very often start with an implicit NoGo instruction.

In that case, hypnotic induction than can be said to initiate anteriorization and may have

an impact on the ACC.

Because of the reciprocal impact, there may be predictable changes in the user’s brain.

The patient in emotional turmoil who enters hypnosis has a chance to shift toward ratio-

nal control. Conversely, a cool and rational client entering hypnosis has the potential

for a more emotionally based response. Both these changes can be initiated and facili-

tated by appropriate suggestion after the inhibitory induction. This article contains one

example, suggested amnesia, followed through its pathway. Other hypnotic phenomena,

catalepsy, hallucination, and pain control, could be analyzed in the same way.

Discussion

On the basis of the neuroscience research presented here, there is reason to think of

hypnosis as the results of brain anteriorization, a shift of activity in the anterior frontal

cortex. The net effect is to inhibit ongoing physical and cognitive activity. Depending

on the user’s internal condition before the induction, there could be a “state” shift from

emotional to rational, or conversely from rational to emotional. In either case, the result

of induction and anteriorization is to allow the user to move forward in a new direction.

Thus, the term anteriorization is both the name of the phenomenon and a metaphor for

its application.

There are implications for this view. One is that anteriorization may provide an expla-

nation of reported phenomena in eyes-open or alert hypnosis (Capafons, 2004; Wark,

1998). This type of hypnosis is induced by using suggestions for activity and alertness:

“You are becoming increasingly alert and attentive—there is a pleasant feeling of activity

throughout your body—you wish to be alert and attentive” (Banyai & Hilgard, 1976).

Clinically, alert inductions have been used to reduce or inhibit depression and

binge–purge eating (Bányai, Zseni, & Tury, 1993), ADHD (Barabasz & Barabasz,

1996), smoking cessation (Capafons & Amigó, 1995), compulsive gambling (Lloret,

Montesinos, & Capafons, 2014), anxiety about athletic performance (Robazza & Bortoli,

1994), academic test taking (Wark, 1996), public speaking (Iglesias & Iglesias, 2005),

HYPNOSIS AND ANTERIORIZATION 263

and treatment for combat post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Eads & Wark, in press).

In terms of clinical application, it seems anteriorization can be achieved either with

eyes open using alert induction (Wark, 2006) or eyes closed using traditional induction

(Hammond, 1990).

The second implication is that anteriorization illuminates the similarities between

prayer, meditation, mindfulness, and hypnosis; they are all ways to inhibit a particu-

lar or unwanted response to achieve some desirable alternative. For example, in prayer,

the desired outcomes are thoughts and feelings of reciprocal rapport with a transcen-

dent deity. For meditation, the usual goal is quiet, serious thought (Merriam-Webster,

2014). Mindfulness is an attempt to focus on “an awareness that emerges through pay-

ing attention on purpose, in the present moment, nonjudgmentally, to the unfolding of

experience” (Kabat-Zinn, 2003, p. 145). For hypnosis, the inhibition facilitates “sugges-

tions” about analgesia, memory, hallucination, emotional regulation, or other hypnotic

phenomena for psychotherapy (Edgette & Edegette, 1995). Thus, all these techniques

can be said to use the hypothesized anteriorization mechanism for the achievement of

emotional and cognitive outcomes.

Clearly, inhibition is important in the study of hypnosis. There is a large body of

research on techniques for the inhibition of pain; see, for example, Jensen (2011). For

the neuroscientist, inhibition has long been used to explain many phenomena, such as

the parasympathetic and sympathetic nervous systems working in reciprocal fashion

(Sherrington, 1906/1940). Moreover, anteriorization is a reliable phenomenon in the

neuroscience literature (Fallgatter & Strik, 1999).

But there are still questions. Is there evidence of EEG anteriorization when a subject

is induced into alert and or traditional hypnosis? If so, does training in anteriorization

increase hypnotic susceptibility? Does the anteriorization shift or disappear entirely

when the subject begins to carry out hypnotic suggestions?

This article began with the question of how human beings can stop and rethink

their response to threat. “Hypnosis” was offered as one name for that process, and the

article attempted to trace out the steps by which it may work. The proposed mecha-

nism, anteriorization of brain processes in a Go/NoGo situation, was the central focus.

With the past inhibited, it may be easier to generate new options and new behaviors to

solve problems. For some, this formulization demystifies hypnosis, making it a normal

process. Perhaps it will clear the way for wider, more welcoming applications.

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