1

University of Vienna

Institute for Political Science

Wi/SE 2011-2012

M11/FOP Gefahrdung der Demokratie durch ungleiche Machtresourcen

Forschungsarbeit

Prof. Dr. Dieter Segert

“Transformation of Post-communist Poland:

New Political Elites and the Problems of the New Political Life”

Özlem Cihan, 0809194;

31.05.2012

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CONTENTS

Introduction.............................................................................................................................. 3

1. Circulation vs. Reproduction............................................................................................... 5

2. Historical Overview............................................................................................................. 7

2.1. Polish Way of Socialism...................................................................................... 7

2.2. Polish Nomenklatura and Recruitment.............................................................. 8

3. New Political Elites............................................................................................................. 11

3.1. Origins of Polish Elites in the Immediate Years................................................ 11

3.2. Origins of Political Parties................................................................................. 14

4. Problems of the New Political Life................................................................................... 18

Conclusion........................................................................................................................... 25

Literature.............................................................................................................................. 26

3

Introduction

More than two decades have passed since the communism in Eastern European countries has

collapsed. A general observation shows the successful establishment of new liberal political and

economical systems. Unquestionably the development story in these regions reflects a consensus

based non-violent transformation. Nonetheless, new discussions within social sciences were

raised mainly related with the functioning of post-communist structures and their efficiency.

Another important aspect and discussion among scholars happened to be the analysis of the new

elites and their role within this process. From a personal perspective, a necessity in the

combination of these two aspects occurs, since, even though mobilized mass movements form

the essence of these revolutions, the leading role and especially developments in the aftermath of

communism is shaped by these personalities and their institutions.

Following these discussions, the main aim of this work is to analyze the new political elites in

Poland and problems of this new political life. As aforementioned, new elites and their affects in

the designation of the new system would naturally build a mutual correlation with the problems

that the new system encounters. Specifically speaking, it is a question whether the new elites

were able to construct ideal systems in the immediate years or their heritage or habits from the

communist past by accident or design, effected the efficiency of the new formation. It is very

much important to understand the immediate years in transitional systems in order to investigate

the future problems, because in many cases the frustrations in political regulations or reforms

have shaped the future order or preferences and only by this way the current position in politics

can be analyzed. From this perspective the investigation was aimed to be a case study concerned

about Poland. This was a conscious preference, related with the unique developments in the

country’s communist past especially the Solidarity movement. For this reason it is also important

to note that, this study does not aim to investigate the effects of communism within the new

system alone, rather it also seeks the impacts of developments in the 1980s among the elites and

institutions both communist and opposition movements. In this sense the research question of

this study is designed as follows:

• “In which ways do the new political elites in Poland have contributed to the problems of

the new Political life in the aftermath of communism?”

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My analysis consists of four parts. The first two parts are mainly introductive parts. In the first

part as an importan aspect of elite theory the circulation vs. reproduction of elites will be

analyzed. Presented by Ivan and Szonja Szelenyi, this approach stresses the importance of

diversity among Eastern European countries in elite formation. So simply it is an approach that

stresses the analysis of the proportion in circulation and reproduction in seperate fields. This is

important in terms of understanding the different elite formations in political, economical and

cultural area. For our topic it is a significant starting point in understanding the new elite

formation and origins of these elites. The second introductive part presents a historical overview

in order to understand the significant past of communist Poland, specifically the Solidarity

movement and former communist elites. As an importan part of the main analysis the third

section focuses on the origins of the new elites and two sub-parts have been designed for a more

detailed investigation. The political elites themselves will be analysed by their background and

present features and in the second sub-part the main political parties and their origins in Poland

between 1991-2005 will be investigated. Personally such divison was very much necessary,

since the political elites alone indicate importance in political life, but also their governmental

positions and their institutions generally shapes the regulations and new policies. For this reason

these two parts cannot be seperated from eachother if we are analysing the new elites within the

new political system. Finally in the fourth section the problems of the new political life in

Poland, based on the structure and origins of political elites and parties, will be discussed.

For the methodology it can be said that, text analysis forms the main method. Nonetheless for

elite analysis existing surveys, and for final discussions certain statistics were taken from the

Polish Public Opinion Research center and their data indicates an important proportion of the

arguments. Existing survey over Polish elites were taken from scholars which can be considered

as experts on the case of Poland like Szelenyis, Wasliewski-Lipinski and Wesolowski. Their

detailed research has maintained a solid basis for this work.

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1.Circulation vs. Reproduction

Elite mobilization especially within Eastern European countries has taken the attention to elite

theories, since the transformation of the system would naturally require a transformation among

the elites. Briefly speaking, it was the case just like in great French Revolution, where the old

elites were eliminated completely. Such issue was also taken into account for the Eastern

European cases, in which the transformations were consensus based.

When the consensus based transformations of the Eastern European Countries are considered;

curiosity over the new elite formation has strengthened emphasizes over elite theories and it was

asked whether new elites of transformation were entirely new or old nomenklatura was able to

retain its former positions. With such questions, certain scholars have developed theses for

understanding elite settlement in Eastern Europe after 1989. Ivan and Szonja Szelenyi’s

circulation vs. reproduction theory is one of the most significant theses among all, since they

have presented a broader understanding for elite settlement, which was able to analyze countries

within their unique circumstances.

Ivan and Szonja Szelenyi argued that there are two forms of elite change: reproduction or

circulation of elites. According to their reproduction theory; “revolutionary changes in Eastern

Europe did not affect the social composition of elites. This is because the old nomenklatura elite

has managed to survive…and is now becoming the new propertied bourgeoisie.” According to

circulation theory; “transition to post-communism resulted in a structural change at the top of

the class hierarchy: the new people are recruited for command positions on the basis of new

principles.”1 Their findings support the fact that both of these theories are acceptable in certain

fields despite the dominant existence of reproduction theory. So simply, each analysis among

Eastern European countries would have to present different amounts of reproduction or

circulation.

This debate was accepted considering the nomeklatura elites in new economical system, their

survival and power; so that circulation vs. reproduction was always the main indicator of

understanding new elite settlement. Since; the scholars have extended Szalai’s argument of

technocratic continuity and proposed a circulation of elites’ hypothesis. According to Szalai,

1 Ivan and Szonja Szelenyi, Circulation or Reproduction of Elites during the postcommunist Transformation of Eastern Europe, Theory and Society, Vol. 24, 1995, p. 616.

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managers of state companies were aiming a special transformation, in which they were able to

combine political and economical capital. This process was an increasing struggle between the

old elite and the new technocracy inside the top strata of communist regime and the younger,

educated, technocratic new elite would control the process of regime change2. Following this

argument Ivan and Szonja Szelenyi claimed that; the former elite will be able to maintain its

privileged position at the top of the class structure but there will be political limits of

determining their success…we suggest that those who relied exclusively on political capital for

their power and privilege are likely to be downwardly mobile,…the new political elite is likely to

come from the ranks of people who were low in political capital in the past, but high in cultural

capital. Those who combine cultural and political capital (new technocracy)…”3

These statements have been detailed by Wasilewski and Lipinski with introduction of two sub-

reproduction basis; intergenerational and intra-generational reproduction. According to the

writers there are two ways for an intergenerational reproduction: firstly intergenerational

reproduction of nomenklatura occurs when the new elites happen to be the cadre kids, children of

former communist elites and secondly it takes place when the members of the new elites are

children or grandchildren of pre-war elites. The intra-generational reproduction is actually same

with Szelenyis’ reproduction argument and so it occurs when the former elites able to attain their

old positions or when they find place in the ranks of new elite but in a different field.4

For our case this debate and its assumptions are quite noteworthy, since this work presents a

deeper analysis in circulation and/or reproduction discussions.

It is also important concerning the integration of Solidarity intellectuals’ into new elite ranks and

their circulation in distinct cadres from post-communists (circulation and reproduction) in the

early political life in Poland.

2 Andras Bozoki, Theoretical Interpretations of Elite Change in East Central Europe, European University Institute Working Papers, RSC. 2002/55, p. 13. 3 Szelenyi, p. 618. 4 Jacek Wasilewski, Edmund Wnuk-Lipinski, Poland: Winding Road from the Communist to the Post-Solidarity Elite, Theory and Society, Vol. 24, 1995, p. 686.

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2. Historical Overview

2.1. Polish Way of Socialism

Socialism in Poland reflects a genuine example, in which oppositions and public actions were

experienced through certain periods of time. This process starts in the mid 1950s, when the party

reformers and young Marxists tried to improve the system in a democratic way without changing

its core identity. This attempt was not affective; however it has been generally emphasized with

its contribution for future movements of democratic opposition. After the riots in 1956,

Wladyslaw Gomulka has regained power and this was the end of Stalinism in Poland.5 After this

development, some changes within the system were established. Even though the core aims of

social or economical order were protected, semi-pluralisation and liberalization of the internal

life was enabled. However such atmosphere was once again interrupted by the government

during the suppression of student demonstrations in 1968, and soon after this was followed by

the anti-Zionist campaign during the Arab-Israeli Six-Day war. Although government

suppression and anti-liberal actions were arisen, the consciousness of Polish people was

unavoidable. Just after these incidents in December 1970, a price increase for vital consumer

goods triggered bloody riots in the port cities of Gdansk, Gdynia and Szczecin. Similar with 68

demonstrations, 70 riots has awakened the consciousness of blue-collar workers, so that many

future Solidarity movement leaders were originated from these riots.6

The oppositions until 1980 were triggered with different motivations and clearly they were lack

of unity, both socially and institutionally. However by the end of 1970s something noteworthy

was established in Poland; a mass movement, a mobilization that had involved all social groups

and regions with the leadership of an electrician; Lech Walesa and soon after this movement had

institutionalized under a free trade union, the first of its kind, and named Solidarity.7 As

Wasilewski briefly stresses; “in the communist world it was the first secular, legal, mass and

nation-wide institution existing outside the control of the Communist Party. It had fully

developed formal structure, covering the whole country: from the remotest village to Gdansk and

from the forgotten rural workshop to the giants of socialist industrialization. Institutionalization

5 Wasilewski, Lipinski, 1995, p. 671 6 Background Note: Poland, U.S. Department of State, 22.03.2012, www.state.gov. 7 Maciej Bartkowski, Poland’s Solidarity Movement (1980-1989), 2009 International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, December 2009, p. 2.

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of the mass anticommunist descent became a fact.” Solidarity after this period became a unique

movement within communist world and it was not just supported by the intellectuals, workers or

the society itself, it has involved a significant amount of the Communist Party members and

intra-party democratic movement was formed. From this perspective, Solidarity has affected the

development and institutionalization of the Polish counter-elite impressively, so that the

opposition survived the imposition of Martial Law, reappeared as an organized political power

and they managed to arrange roundtable discussions with the regime in 1988. 8 Following this,

the first free elections since 1940s in Poland took place in June 1989 resulted with conciliation

between Communist political and Solidarity counter-elite and it was the end of communism in

Poland.9

Solidarity movement was an impressive institutionalized mobilization by its nature in the

Communist world. However there is another important issue related with this movement which

has strongly affected the post-communist formation of the governmental and political life,

following the elite recruitment process. After the Communism, Solidarity was labeled and

stressed as an anti-communist movement and soon after many Solidarity based political parties

were popped-up and mostly with oppositions to each other. This was followed by

institutionalization of new political groups which were also anti-communist but at the same time

they were originated from non-Solidarity persuasion.10

2.2. Polish Nomenklatura and Recruitment

After the Second World War and by the end of 1940s Stalinist system in Poland was completed.

As Wasilewski and Lipinski analyze, this process has had five types of action; the political

monopoly of the party based on Marxist-Leninist principles, mechanism of political approval for

the incumbents in politics, media, culture and intellectual life (nomenklatura system),

nationalization of economy and centralization of resources, police repression against the

opponents of the new system, and finally, mass propaganda and brainwashing in order to gain

control in people’s minds.11

8 Wasilewski, Lipinski, 1995, p. 674. 9 Background Note: Poland, 2012. 10 Wasilewski, Lipinski, 1995, p. 675. 11 Wasilewski, Lipinski, 1995, p. 670-671.

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Such hierarchical, centered and stabilized system has created nomenklatura system in which a

certain authority of the party and state was established. The Communists tried to make their

system rational and effective, seeking for potential cadres for every field of social life, so that

they may qualify as leaders in the given field, and so that they may be ready to move at anytime

at the party's direction, subjecting them to severe hierarchical discipline.12 Specifically speaking;

“what nomenklatura was at any given moment depended on the organization and the world view

of the intellectuals; what the intellectuals were however depended on the groupness and

recruitment practices of the nomenklatura.”13 When the certainty of ideological structure is

considered, one can stress the coherent formation of institutions and individuals or elites. From

this perspective, it can be said that, although the system has had a penetration in the early years

of state socialism, -since the communists also had to share power with other political forces in

the early postwar years; the systematic control and hierarchy among political and economical life

was ultimately formed. As it has been emphasized; “it had firmly established itself by the time of

Edward Gierek's accession to power in 1971, but it still provided no more than a crude grip on

the commanding heights of government and society by the Communists without an elaborate

mechanism of overall coordination and self-perpetuation. It was only under Gierek that the

nomenklaturistic control of all political and social activities was systematized and gave rise to a

closed caste of ruling elite which reproduced itself.”14 With all of these components, this system

is referred as the Nomenklatura System, however it must be noted that, here the notion of

nomenklatura is referred and used only for the people within the system; for the communist

elites.

After the establishment of state socialism the recruitment of the Polish nomenklatura was limited

to party channels, and there were two patterns within this elite recruitment system: communism-

combatant and communism-combatant-proletarian. The first pattern existed from the end of the

World War II until the immediate post-war years and according to this, the main criteria was

faithfulness to communist principles with Communist party membership. The second principle

was established in the Stalinist period and it has made the first criteria more rigid, also it has

12 Takayuki Ito, Controversy over Nomenklatura in Poland, Journal of East and West Studies, Vol.11, No.1, 1982, p.59. 13 Gil Eyal, Elenaor Townsley, The Social Composition of the Communist Nomenklatura: A Comparison of Russia, Poland and Hungary, Theory and Society, Vol.24, 1995, p. 727. 14 Ito, 1982, p. 62.

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broadened the pool of eligibles to include people of the right class origin and membership.15 This

rigid and class origin based system has evolved to an occupation based formation after the riots

in June 1956 with Wladyslaw Gomulka’s governance. This pattern was named as party-specialist

pattern and it was an attempt to reconcile political, qualificational requirements. Similar to first

two patterns party membership was expected, but also within this pattern an occupational

qualification was required with diploma-holding members. Final pattern was effective in the

Solidarity period in 1980s and it was called loyal expert pattern. According to this type, main and

foremost criteria were to be the qualificational credentials. So simply the party membership and

political involvement were no longer primary principles as long as an appointee declared his/her

loyalty to the Constitution.16

These patterns -with the exception of the fourth pattern- were designed and based upon simple

ideological principles and as Wasilewski analyzes, “…whatever the rules, a candidate, if not

proposed and nominated, was at least accepted by a political organisation (a specific secretariat

of the party). The loyal expert pattern has departed from this rule. It has retained, however, the

require-ment of approval of the constitutional principles of the system.”17 When the social

composition of these elites is investigated, some typologies can be found. According to Eyal and

Townsley’s research and survey in 1988; social characteristics of Polish nomenklatura shows us

that, 92.8% of these elites were male, 81.9% of them were party members, 87% of them had

tertiary or higher education and 73.9% of them were between 40-59 years old. When the writers

analyze these elites’ family backgrounds -also in 1988-; they find out that communist

nomenklatura in Polish society was barely reproduced from former elites and they were more

likely to be recruited within the new social structure. Different variables are also affective within

this analysis, such as industrialization level; however the communist elites in Polish society have

reflected mainly classical settlements of revolutions. According to statistics; 4.4% of elites’

fathers were also elite, 8.4% of them were lower managerial while 6.8% of them were

professionals. Higher amounts of data indicate that; father occupations were more likely to be

white collar (19%), farmer (21.2%) and skilled manual (36.4%).18

15 Wasilewski, Lipinski, 1995, p.677. 16 Jacek Wasilewski, The Patterns of Bureaucratic Elite Recruitment in Poland in the 1970s and 1980s, Soviet Studies, Vol.42, No.4, 1990, p.744-745. 17 Wasilewski, 1990, p. 745. 18 Eyal, Townsley, 1995, p. 732-736.

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To sum up, it can be said that Polish Nomenklatura was for a long period recruited by the

principle of loyalty to party and ideology as it can be expected and they mainly consisted of

middle-aged, well educated, males those come from peasantry and working class families.

To sum up, post-war process in Poland has reflected classical elite circulations of revolutions, in

which old cadres were filled with completely new members by new principles of communist

system.

3. New Political Elites

Starting with 1989 semi-free elections, the core of the new system in Poland was started to be

formed. These very first steps, including following early elections, appeared to be very crucial

and thus they have been widely analyzed among scholars because of their importance in shaping

the new system. From this perspective, the new political elites in these immediate years also

compose a substantial analysis and one of the most noteworthy questions is whether these new

elites were successfully circulated among new cadres or whether former nomenklatura has

managed to survive. Political parties of the new system, mainly the ruling parties constitute the

second dimension of this part. From a personal perspective, in order to analyze the new political

life, governmental personalities and institutions and their origins or visions have to be

understood. In this sense, while the first sub-part is designed to investigate proportions of

reproduction and / or circulation among political elites, the second part aims to analyze the main

ruling parties and their origins between 1991 and 2005 elections.

3.1. Origins of Polish Elites in the Immediate Years

In this section, new political elites and their possible communist heritage will be analyzed by

their social, family backgrounds. Unlike the communist system, standardized procedures or

patterns for elite recruitment was no longer the case, since the new system was aimed to be a

liberal democracy based on parliamentarian principles. In this sense, high and middle ranked

governmental personalities indicate the main proportion of this analysis, since they are the main

ruling elites within the new system.

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Table.1 Basic Characteristics of the New Political Elite in Hungary, Poland and Russia in 1993 (with %) 19

Hungary Poland Russia

Gender male 88.1 88.2 95.3 female 11.9 11.8 4.7 Age 45 and under 38.7 50.0 35.8 over 45 61.3 50.0 64.2 Education primary or less 1.0 2.5 0.4 secondary 1.0 4.6 1.6 tertiary 97.9 92.9 98.1 Tertiary degree humanities 46.1 22.9 46.4 technical 40.6 38.5 57.6 business 40.6 38.5 57.6 Occupation/positions in 1988 high party official 2.2 3.1 13.8 high state administration 9.7 5.9 22.4 high economic manager 6.4 5.5 10.2 cultural decision maker 4.8 0.8 5.5 low level manager 12.9 15.0 17.7 professional 24.7 29.1 11.8 non-manual or lower 3.7 11.6 5.9 Communist party membership in 1988 not member 70.2 77.8 20.4 member 29.8 22.2 79.6 Father’s education primary or less 36.3 37.9 41.8 secondary 15.0 28.0 30.9 tertiary 48.7 34.1 27.3 Father’s occupation high elite 4.8 8.0 11.9 lower economic manager 8.3 13.4 17.2 professional 12.4 8.8 12.5 routine non-manual 20.7 25.6 8.3 agriculture 5.9 16.8 4.2 manual skilled 21.3 18.9 28.6 manual unskilled 7.7 2.1 5.2

According to the comparative survey in table 1, some general statements can be given.

Obviously the new Polish political elites consist of male dominated, well educated, middle aged 19 Eva Fodor et.al, the New Political and Cultural Elite, Theory and Society, vol.24, 1995, p. 788.

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professionals or technocrats those mainly come from white and blue collar families instead of

communist intelligentsia. It is not very much surprising to see less proportion of reproduction

among these elites, when the solidarity based ideology of late communist era considered. To be

more precise, three facts for such higher amounts of circulation can be given. First of all, there

was a strong motivation to break the old ties with communist regime. Second, the political

positions were easier to replace, since managerial or professional skills were least required in this

field and finally this was due to the opposition movement (Solidarity) in the 1980s and as the

writers emphasize; “they were able to convert their negative political capital into actual

leadership positions as a reward for their perceived integrity and persistence”(p.789).20 This

was an important issue for Poland, because even though the political sphere has been constructed

with new anti-communist cadres, intergenerational reproduction and more importantly strong ties

with Solidarity vision was inherited with new political leaders. In both cases the oppositional

past has accelerated the consequences. It is clear that only a small proportion of new political

elites’ were children of party officials or bourgeoisie, yet the existing amount in table 1 shows

that cadre kids had turned out to be rebellious kids who ideologically contested their communist

fathers and found themselves in the ranks of the new political elite.21

The Solidarity past is another unique case for Poland’s immediate political settlement. Unlike

other Eastern European examples, the former opposition of communist era has not split into

different parties for normalization of opposition like Hungary, instead the case in Poland was, as

Wesolowski analyzes, a coup of sorts inside Solidarity bringing to power new elite, which filled

governmental posts and gained a decisive position in the national assembly… Well-known

intellectuals wielding great political influence dominated Solidarity's parliamentary caucus,

which in turn set the tone in the national assembly, despite the fact that Solidarity did not

constitute a majority in it. Among the most notable deputies have been the liberal Catholic

intellectuals; secular centrists and democratic leftists. This was observable in elite’s value

politics related with their former vision, since the Solidarity values were centered in the policy

making process and the politics were seen as the fulfillment of these certain values. 22 Especially

for 1989-1991 periods the general view of political life was based on the struggle between

20 Fodor et.al, 1995, p. 787-789. 21 Wasilewski, Lipinski, 1995, p. 687. 22 Wilodzimierz Wesolowski, The Significance of Political Elites in Post-Communist Poland, W. Wilson International Center for Scholars, September 1991, Washington, p.7.

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Solidarity and post-communists. This situation had naturally evolved especially after mid1990s,

however considering the post-Solidarity Diet in 1997; it was clear that the effects of governing

elites’ oppositional past had not vanished from Polish political life.23

3.2. Origins of New Political Parties

Political institutions, for our topic the political parties, compose the second crucial variable for

elite formation. It is necessary to build a correlation between institutions and the elites within

these institutions. Because, even though the political parties ideally rule based on general will

with their suitably designed programs, in many cases representative personalities do affect the

structures and political outcomes. To simply put it, it is a situation centered in policy-making

process in which the political life is constructed. As Wasilewski brightly stresses; “Elites are

shaped by the institutions in which they have climbed-up and which they serve. Yet elites are

institution-builders and they shape institutions they themselves design.”24 Following this

argument, ruling parties starting with 1991 elections will be analyzed.

The parliamentary elections in October 1991 have generated a fragmented view in the

parliament, because the Solidarity movement has split into different parties and groupings. New

regulations were made in the electoral law and under the pressure of the post-communists and

smaller post-Solidarity parties, the Sejm adopted proportional representation system.25 Also as an

opposition to former 1989 elections, in which only a limited number of the seats were freely

contested, all parliamentary seats were freely contested. In this sense, generally 1991 elections

were seen as delayed founding elections which reflect the regime change from semi-democracy

to democracy.26 Major groups were: left-centrist (also post-solidarity) Democratic Union, post-

communist Democratic Left Alliance, several Solidarity splinter parties and Catholic Electoral

Action party.27 Democratic Union was a modern secular mainly center left party, yet the party

also consisted of various elites like social democrats and right liberals. The leader was Tadeusz 23 Jacek Wasilewski, Witold Betkiewicz, Five Terms of the Polish Post-Communist Parliament, in; ” Representative Elites in Post-Communist Settings”, Heinrich Best, Michael Edinger (eds.), Gesellschaftliche Entwiclungen nach dem Systemumbruch, Heft8, August 2003, p. 38-40. 24 Jacek Wasilewski, Elite Circulation and Consolidation of Democracy in Poland, Program on East and Central Europe Working Paper Series, No.40, in; “Democracy, Markets & Civil Society in Post-1989 East and Central Europe”, Harvard University, May 17-19 1996, p. 5. 25 Wasilewski, Betkiewicz, August 2003, p.35-36. 26 Wasilewski, Betkiewicz, August 2003, p.42. 27 Poland Elections in 1991, Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1991, http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2255_91.htm.

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Mazowiecki who has ruled the cabinet after 1989 elections. The Congress of Liberal Democrats

was another post-solidarity party and it must be noted that it was visible only after the leader

Bielecki became prime minister in January 1991. Democratic Left Alliance was an alliance of

parties and social organizations previously enjoying communist patronage and they have won

almost an equal vote rate with Democratic Union.28

Table 2 below shows the fragmented structure of the parliament significantly. The parties in the

Sejm presented a pluralist view and this was highly appreciated; however the problem among

these parties were the absence of real diversity in programs and policies. It was due to post-

solidarity and post-communist heirs of these parties as aforementioned and this fact formed a

similarity based on the heritage. Besides, such similarity was visible in some cases despite their

different backgrounds. For example the Polish Peasant Party was dissolved from ex-communist

United Peasant Party and had won a fair number of seats, but as Millard analyzes:

“the peasant parties by 1991 had experienced numerous splits, mergers, alliances and further

splits. The largest of them, the Polish Peasant Party (PSL),… however, the PSL continued to face

competition from the various elements of the Solidarity peasant movement, with which it had

much in common. Both advocated greater interventionism in the countryside, though the PSL

was less pro-clerical than the PL (People’s Alliance) and somewhat more protectionist.”29

Table.2 Distribution of seats after 1991 elections30

Political Group Total

Democratic Union (UD) 62

Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) 60

Catholic Electoral Action (WAK) 49

Polish Peasant Party “Programme Alliance” (PSL) 48

Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN) 46

Center Citizens’ Alliance (POC) 44

Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD) 37

People’s Alliance (PL) 28

Solidarity Trade Union 27

Polish Party of Beer Friends (PPPP) 16

28 Frances Millard, The Polish Parliamentary Elections of October 1991, Soviet Studies, Vol.44 No. 5, 1992, p. 843. 29 Millard, 1992, p. 843. 30 Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1991, http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2255_91.htm.

16

German Minority 7

Christian Democracy 5

Christian Democrats Party 4

Labour Solidarity 4

Other Parties 23

The fragmented Sejm (Diet) could not last for long, since Lech Walesa, the President of the

Republic has dissolved the Sejm and the new elections were carried out in 1993 based on the

new electoral law adopted by the Sejm just before its dissolution. “By setting minimum

thresholds (5 percent for parties and 8 for coalitions) for Sejm participation, the new law sought

to avoid political fragmentation of the legislature, giving an advantage to strong political parties

and groupings.”31 As a result the Sejm was no longer fragmented and the most striking fact was

the victory of post-communists on the one hand, Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and Peasant

Party (%65.9 of majority); and the failure of post-Solidarity parties on the other. It is also

important to note that one third of the votes were wasted due to the new electoral law regulation,

because these votes did not have the chance to be represented in the Sejm. The parties and the

rates of the results are as follows:32

Parties Votes % Seats

Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) 2,815,169 20,4 171

Polish Peasant Party (PSL) 2,142,367 15,4 132

Democratic Union (UD) 1,460,957 10,6 74

Labour Union (UP) 1,005,004 7,3 41

Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN) 795,487 5.8 22

Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms (BBWR) 746,653 5,4 16

German Minority organizations 84,166 0,61 4

31 Poland Elections in 1993, Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1993, http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2255_93.htm. 32 Wasilewski, Betkiewicz, August 2003, p.38-39.

17

As mentioned above, the importance of these elections was the formation of post-communist

Diet. The Labour Union as a new party was a post-Solidarity party who composed of strong

social democrats. The Prime Minister was Waldemar Pawlak from Peasant Party until 1995 and

the new Minister was from SLD, Jozef Oleksy who was also dismissed on January 1996 and

after that for one period it was Wlodzimierz Cimoszewic again from SLD. These results have

brought along some discussions and concerns about future of the system, since post-communist

victory was not expected. However after the new election in 1997 and formation of the new

cabinet (until 2001) it was seen that, a post-Solidarity Sejm was established this time and Poland

until the new millennium followed a routine competition based on post-communist and post-

Solidarity groups. Similar to the former elections some parties died and some new parties were

born. The SLD and Peasant Party were again strong members of the Sejm, but the winner was

Solidarity Election Action (AWS) with 33.8% of total votes. Solidarity Election Action (AWS)

and the Freedom Union (UW) were new and important players of the process. “Both parties had

grown out of the Solidarity movement. AWS combined various mostly right wing and Christian

groups under one label, while UW was formed based on the liberal wing of Solidarity.”33 In the

following years SLD and Peasant Party remained affective, yet in 2001 and with new elections

AWS and UW have been disintegrated. Such situation has give birth to new groupings and

parties such as; Law and Justice (PiS), Civic Platform (PO) and Self Defense. While PO

combines liberals in a liberal-conservative vision, PiS stands as a right-wing party. Self Defense

was regarded as a radical populist party of farmers’. 34

SLD had won 41.4% of the votes and hence the party reached its highest support since 1989 and

it had totally 216 seats in the Sejm. PO was second with 65 seats, followed by Self Defense with

53 and PiS with 44 seats. Soon after, a coalition between SLD and Peasant Party was

established.35 It is clear to say that 2001 elections were a total failure for post-Solidarity parties,

especially when the former post-Solidarity Sejm is considered. PO and PiS have become the

leader parties in the next elections on 2005; basically it was a competition between two centre-

right parties and their popular leaders: Kacynzski twins (Law and Justice) and Donald Tusk

33 Norman Schofield, et.al, Modeling Elections in Poland, Center in Political Economy, Washington University, 25 August 2011, p.4. 34 Schofield et.al, August 2011, p.4. 35Poland Elections in 2001, Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2001, http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2255_01.htm.

18

(Civic Platform). The results of these elections reflected the victory of the right wing and

populist right wing parties.

Table. 3 Results of 2005 Elections in Poland 36

Distribution of seats Political Group Total Law and Justice (PiS) 155 Civic Platform (PO) 133 Self-Defense 56 Left Democratic Alliance (SLD) 55 League of Polish Families (LPR) 34 Polish Peasant Party (PSL) 25 German Minority 2

Based on these results it can be said that, the rise of the right-wing in Poland was visible. 2007

elections belonged to Civic Platform and Donald Tusk instead of Kacynzskis, yet he and PiS

remained as the second, also the main opposition party. Liberal conservative and centrist PO has

won 41.5% of the votes and they are still the ruling party in Polish politics.37

For a brief clarification, this part can be summed up by analyzing the main party families. The

dominance, especially in the immediate years and till mid 2000s belongs to the fragmented post-

communist and Solidarity parties. They were close to center left wing and social democrats of

Western Europe and initially the division between these two major groups has started to be

diminished. In the second half, after 2001, liberal conservative and centrist flow has started to

shape the Polish politics and in certain cases populism and radicalized right wing was raised as a

new problem within the political life.

4. Problems of the New Political Life

System transformation in Poland was achieved in a peaceful and dedicated manner. Even with a

current perspective it is necessary to accept the importance of this successful revolution. Since,

36 Poland Elections in 2005, Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2005, http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2255_05.htm. 37 Elections 2011, National Electoral Commission, 9 October 2011, http://wybory2011.pkw.gov.pl/wsw/en/000000.html.

19

after the system transformation, and even during the immediate years of this process, Poland has

never faced with a threat against democracy and its principles. Moreover, it is quite fair to accept

problems within newly evolved systems and in this sense, before starting to the problem analysis

it is necessary to emphasize the appreciation of Poland’s way to democratic system settlement.

To start with, a problem definition needs to be given. By referring problems of the new political

life generally, the absence of ideal system functions will be investigated. This investigation will

not contain technical matters, since Poland has a functioning parliamentarian system. Basically

main concern here will be the efficiency of policies and new regulations based on the new ruling

elites and parties; conceptual paradoxes, current discussions within political life etc. will be

analyzed. From a personal perspective, the state of political elites and the institutions which they

serve and shape mutually stands as the most important factor for the development of political

systems. Following this aspect, the democratic political life in Poland has not threatened by the

old elites who have managed to attain former positions; however these elites themselves have

generated consequences by their decisions and regulations also by their former intellectual

experiences and beliefs. The aim here is not creation of a scapegoat, and neither a direct causality

can be given. However due to the sensitivity of systems during transformations, the political

subjects and their actions gain much more importance for ideal politics and also for the future

developments.

Political life in Poland after 1991 has not faced with an inevitable crisis, however an obvious

dissatisfaction from ruling parties and elites can be observed. In the early years, the dominance

was designated by the competition between post-communist and post-Solidarity parties and this

was probably the first and foremost problem in politics, since the government formation has

followed this routine for almost a decade. After 2000s it was clear that post-communists were no

longer any different from post-Solidarity in policies and as Raciborski analyzes; “all government

coalitions since the first free elections in 1991 have been homogeneous in character, formed

either by post-communist or by post-Solidarity parties… We should also stress that this

historical divide has not manifested itself in party blocs as in-for example-France. Parties on

one side of this historical divide often have very different programs, they compete vigorously

with each other during elections, and their day-to-day relations are characterized by conflict.

The straightforward consequence of the post-communist divide for the formation of the

government elite is that its members will come from only one of the two groupings: from among

20

post- Solidarity activists or from the post-communist cadres.”38 For some, such circumstances

are combined to the monopolized cultural structure of the communist past. Because the

communist system has after all established a common, cultural framework under monolithic

institutional, social, ideological forms and it has isolated the system and elites from a wider

global culture. Although at the end of 1970s such legacy has played an important role in leading

the collapse of this bloc, it also has persisted afterwards and affected the construction of ideal

democratic institutions.39 Such evaluations may be harsh; however immediate year problems

related with lack of stability in the Sejm and Lech Walesa’s actions which were publicized as

“war at the top” reflect a contradiction within the new political elite. Since Walesa’s

interventions into the governments during his presidency due to the slow and uneasy

developments in the new system have been criticized as actions for seeking to create his own

elite for the struggle of power. In fact these interventions have not hastened economical and

political reforms, since the new elites of the cabinet mainly followed former regulations of

governments.40

Another handicap is probably the political leaders’ strong effects within party politics. In fact

the political elites of this new system had the perception of understanding a better state and

system when party leaders are (should be) involved in politics and this was actually a good thing.

Table 4, below is taken from a survey with early year’s Polish party elites and the results directly

confirms aforementioned perception of these elites.41

So basically 1990s have confronted governmental elites’ strong affects and similar perceptions in

political life and the main diversity in this structure was based on the late communist past and

opposition. In fact both the post-Solidarity and post-communist cabinets (1993-1997 and 1997-

2001) have followed quite similar policies especially in economical reforms with small

differences in the rapidity of the transformation. Basically they aimed privatization,

liberalization, improvement of social conditions and welfare. However their differentiated

perceptions in ideologies and the lack of compromise have made certain coalitions impossible.

38 Jacek Raciborski, Forming Government Elites in a new Democracy: The Case of Poland, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol.40, No.1, 2007, p.24. 39 Wasilewski, May 1996, p.4. 40 Wesolowski, 1991, p.7-10. 41 Bogdan Mach, Wilodzimierz Wesolowski, Politicians in Times of Transformation: Transformational Correctness or Genuine Differences in Perception, Papers // WZB, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, No. P 98-001, http:// hdl.handle.net/10419/50233, 1998, p.10.

21

The natural consequence of this view was lack of differentiated representation and well-

established opposition. Krzysztof Jasiewicz presents an important detection which is probably

the core issue related with this matter:

Most CEE parties tend to take a stronger position on one dimension and be more ambiguous

about the other. During at least the 1990s, moreover, cultural considerations tended to loom

larger than socioeconomic issues in driving political conflict. This was so nowhere more than in

Poland, where voters chose between ex-communists and the legatees of Solidarity mostly with an

eye on cultural questions such as abortion or the Catholic Church’s role in public life.42

This is in the simplest definition can be named as politics of culture rather than focusing on

socio-economic problems or differences in method of approaches based on the ideal left-right

ideologies.

In fact table 5 shows a survey that aimed to investigate the perceptions of governmental elites’

and their parties’ left-right political orientations. The questions were open ended and respondents

were asked to give their own personal orientations. The results support that the party groups-

either Solidarity or communist cadre based- reflect quite similar understanding in politics toward

leftist and rightist orientations. However it is also quite surprising to see leftist Freedom Union

party’s response to social justice and responsiveness with only 5.0% rate. Conceptual

42 Krzysztof Jasiewicz, The Political-Party Landscape, Journal of Democracy, Vol.18, No.4, 2007, p.28.

Table 4. The profiles of politicians: who is involved in politics

Political parties

Experts leaders respected all people leaders able to difficult N=

(and political groupings) of civic interested gain social to 100 %

parties leaders in politics support and answer

followers

UP - Labour Union 0,0 45,5 3,0 39,4 12,1 0,0 33

SLD - Dem. Left Alliance 0,0 40,0 14,0 26,0 20,0 0,0 50

PSL - Polish Peasant Party 2,0 56,0 0,0 28,0 14,0 0,0 50

UW - Freedom Union 0,0 42,0 2,0 48,0 4,0 4,0 50

BBWR + KPN - (Right Groups) 6,3 43,8 0,0 37,5, 9,4 3,1 32

PC - Centre Alliance 0,0 63,3 0,0 26,7 10,0 0,0 30

ZChN - Christian National U. 0,0 66,7 3,3 26,7 3,3 0,0 30

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complexities indicate a political confusion in Poland. It is important to emphasize individualist

and differentiated visions of political elites. Such complexities are also caused by the

harmonization of different groups within political institutions. Since, the Solidarity heritage only

in the mid 1990s gave birth to new parties or groupings and for example Poland had not

developed a Christian democrat party, rather in the late years this absence was filled with

extreme right wings.43

Table5:44

Table.5.1. the Most Often Mentioned Features of the Right Political Orientation (%)

Positive Positive Positive Toward Toward Toward Critical of

Private Religion Nation Critical of Social Property &Church &Tradition Left Welfare

Party Affiliation Labour Union 58.8 64.7 47.1 0.0 29.4 Democratic Left Alliance 34.6 42.3 34.6 15.4 15.4 Peasant Party 75.0 41.7 16.7 ___ 8.3 Freedom Union 68.2 40.9 36.4 4.5 4.5 Center Alliance 73.3 46.7 66.7 ___ ___ Christian National Union 79.3 65.5 69.0 ___ ___

Table.5.2. the Most Often Mentioned Features of the Left Political Orientation (%)

Positive Positive Positive Strongly Responsive Toward Toward Toward in favor to Public

State Social Egalitarianism of Secular Opinion Intervention Welfare and Social State

Justice Party Affiliation Labour Union 39.4 58.8 47.1 52.9 23.5 Democratic Left Alliance 3.7 40.7 11.1 33.3 48.1 Peasant Party 20.0 72.0 8.0 44.0 20.0 Freedom Union 60.0 65.0 5.0 30.0 5.0 Center Alliance 56.7 43.3 3.3 40.0 ___ Christian National Union 51.7 34.5 10.3 34.5 6.9

43 Wasilewski, Betkiewicz, August 2003, p.45. 44 Mach, Wesolowski, 1998, p.23.

23

It is also important to give some statistics in order to understand Polish elites’ perception of

politics. The question for this survey is: How do Polish politicians understand politics? The

results are very much interesting. 68.0% of SLD, 66.7% of Labour Union, 70.0% of Peasant

Party and 60.0% of Freedom Union members have seen the politics as “an activity for the sake of

own party”. Second most popular answer to this question was given as “a struggle for social

influence” and thirdly politics was understood as “a struggle for power”. 45 When such aims are

combined with new electoral law on 1993, it was inevitable for small and middle parties to

disappear from the political life. Especially after 2005 elections and the victory of right wings,

the Sejm presented a two-party system. When the data above is evaluated together, lack of real

policies and boom of populist, catch-all parties after mid 2000 can be understood.

Aforementioned problems and political elites’ attitudes towards politics and the outcomes have

generated an obvious disappointment among Polish people. According to 2006 survey of Polish

Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS), Polish people have listed the factors below as the

problems of democracy:

• “Bad government - power in the hands of the wrong people, conflicts between political

parties (11%)

• Abuse of freedom (10%)

• Unemployment (10%)

• Social stratification (8%)

• Pathological aspects of power such as corruption, political cliques, pathological links of

interests between people in power (8%) and poverty (6%).46

Moreover more than 40.0% of Polish people stated that they were dissatisfied with the

functioning of democracy in Poland and almost 40.0% of them consider the system to be closer

to a non-democratic system. %57.7 of them finds democracy desirable for all systems, while

40.0% don’t believe that democracy should be developed in all systems due to the differences in

political tradition and culture.47 The data here shows that, democracy and its institutions have

confronted with distrust due to mainly socio-economic problems. The political instability and

weak policies of the transformation years have affected the public confidence in the new system. 45 Mach, Wesolowski, 1998, p.15. 46 CBOS, Polish Public Opinion April 2006, http://www.cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/public_opinion/2006/04_2006.pdf. 47 CBOS, April 2006.

24

From a personal perspective, the past disappointments of Polish people mainly due to

economical frustration in former politics gave rise to the victory of Law and Justice (PiS) Party.

As Segert stresses, when the losers of the transformation have realized that they can no longer be

sustained by the left, their choices have shifted mainly towards PiS. This was also related with

increasing distrust in former politicians (mainly SLD) especially because of the scandals in

economical matters.48 Kaczynski and his leadership have stood in the forefront and especially his

actions “in the behalf of common good”. The potential danger of such policies and attitudes of

elites like Kaczynski are emphasized brightly by Jasiewicz:

“If there is a threat to democratic procedures, it comes not from any attempts to set them aside

in favor of some authoritarian option. The threat, in my opinion, may come from the instrumental

treatment of democratic procedures, from a perception that if the objective is noble, then any

means to achieve it may be justified. Such a treatment of formal procedures was of course at the

core of the communist system, which held up a utopian vision that was to be realized by any

means necessary. So when a prime minister insists that his country’s judiciary render judgments

based on raison d’état rather than the letter and spirit of the law, as Polish prime minister

Kaczyñski recently did, we have every reason to be concerned…”49

During this process, cultural cleavages became much more dominant in politics, and Kaczynski

twins’ populist rhetoric of anti-corruption (especially they were targeting the former cabinet) and

banal nationalism has gained support. Even though PiS has affected Poland’s internal and

international vision in a negative way with harsh and sometimes authoritarian attitudes, they

remained as the second and the main opposition party after their defeat in 2007 elections.

Homophobic, euro-skeptic, radical conservative sentiments of their populist program has

generated discomfort among a high level of Polish people on the one hand, while they were able

to gain support from a fair amount of society on the other. 50

To sum up in this section some major problems of the new political life in Poland has been

given. As it can be seen aforementioned problems of; weak political programs and institutional

48 Dieter Segert, Populismus in Ostmitteleuropa: Stimme der Transformationsverlierer oder Gehaerdung der Demokatie, Berliner Debatte Initial 22, 2011, p.55. 49 Jasiewicz, 2007, p.30. 50 Matthew Day, European Elections: Poland’s Controversial Law and Justice Party, The Telegraph, 01 June 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/5418173/European-elections-Polands-controversial-Law-and-Justice-Party.html.

25

structures of parties, dominance of cultural cleavages in policies, instability within parliament

due to post-Solidarity and communism heritages, political elites’ confusing perceptions of

ideologies, political institutions and politics; are quite linked with the new political elites in the

country. Moreover in some cases these issues are combined with the structural features of these

elites and these problems have created a cycle in which the Polish voters continued to seek new

political sources for the satisfaction of their expectations and needs and eventually this cycle

have brought the populist right wing into politics.

Conclusion

This work aimed to investigate the the problems of Polish political life in the aftermath of

communism with systems’ new political elites. In order to analyze the new elites, Ivan and

Szonja Szelenyi’s circulation vs. reproduction debate has been selected. Based on their

arguments and findings the elite proportions have been analyzed before and after the communist

system. This analysis mainly included the educational, family and communism backgrounds

based on existing surveys and statistics. The historical developments in Poland and especially the

Solidarity movement have been presented as an introductive section and the last two parts are

main parts in which the new political elites, parties and their politics in the political life have

been discussed and analyzed.

The findings shows that, Poland’s enlightened past of communism has affected the resolution of

communism on the one hand and the political developments after communism on the other. The

new political elites were mainly consisted of Solidarity based roots, and their oppositional past

has been rewarded by attaining new ranks among the political elites. From this perspective the

circulation of political elites is a much more suitable situation rather than reproduction, since

only a small proportion of communist elites were able to attain their former positions. It must be

noted that a value consensus in democratic principles was always established in Poland, so that

the communist heritage has never created a serious threat of going back to old communist days.

Among the new elites, just like the former revolution elites, mainly well-educated, technically

skilled, male and children of blue-white collar members have the highest proportion. Main steps

of these elites consisted of certain values: privatization, liberalization and increased social and

economic welfare.

26

After the final analyses, it has been seen that ideal dreams of the transformation were not ideally

implemented. New elites were in many ways absent of real and well established politics and

regulations. Their political perceptions were mainly shaped by either past experiences or by the

affects of strong leadership. This has reflected a two-party system in Poland which in fact was

not a real two-party system. Similar policies, dominance of cultural cleavages in politics, lack of

differentiated representation, opposition, weak institutions of parties and seasonal parties were

main problems. The Solidarity and communist heritages has been reflected to parties by major

two groups for almost a decade. The consequences of these problems were major disappointment

in democracy and its institutions by the public and rise of authoritarian, populist and radical right

wing.

The responsibility of political elites within this process is very much obvious. From a personal

perspective immediate years within transformations are very much crucial for future

developments and during the Polish transition years, elites were not able to provide well-

established political and economical regulations and their policy-making were shaped either by

cultural cleavages based on their past, or by their wrong and insufficient perceptions of politics

and policy-making. To conclude, it can be said that even though these statements are not

ultimate, they do stress important shortcomings of the mutual correlation between

transformations, new elites, their institutions and political problems.

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