Truman's Greek Experiment: The Dawn of Containment

American Foreign Relations Semester Research Paper Kimmins

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Truman’s Greek Experiment: The Dawn of Containment Following World War II

CISA 6906 American Foreign Relations

William Kimmins


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Introduction The US entry into an advisory role in Greece following the end of the Second

World War was the first true test of the emerging Truman Doctrine and the method of

containment upon which it would come to rely (Condit 1996, 9). Truman and his

administration saw the struggling nation as a pivot point either to stop the expansion of

Soviet influence outside of Russia or, potentially, to begin to lose control of not only

Europe but also the resource rich Middle Eastern states (Condit 1996, 9). Truman

requested authority from Congress on 12th March 1947 to address the expansion of

Soviet influence into Greece and to offer assistance through military and economic

means to any country resisting Soviet incursion (Truman 1947, 1-2). This represented a

departure from previous US foreign policy, which historically had limited entanglements

with foreign allies as much as possible. Wilson’s presidency began the shift away from

isolationism, and the ‘Greek experiment’ was a deliberate move in response to Soviet

actions following the war (Herring 2008, 614-615).

This paper argues operations in Greece gave new form and function to America’s

efforts in counter terrorism, counter-insurgency, information operations, diplomacy, and

even involvement in global economics. The communist insurgents, who received direct

assistance from neighboring communist regimes and indirectly by Moscow, had been

working with and alongside the men of Wild Bill Donovan’s Office of Strategic Services

(OSS) for years prior to the outbreak of hostilities (Paul , et al. 2013, 15) (Mousalimas

2004, part 6). Additional training, experience in battle, and the OSS’s famous ability to

use violence to achieve objectives beyond the battlefield gave the communist

insurgency in Greece an advantage over the populist movements the United States had


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faced in places like the Philippines (Iatrides 2005, 27). Additionally, although previous

counterinsurgency campaigns had been barely noted by the general populace in the

United States, the Greek question was front-page news as the first test of new policies

involving post-war Europe (The Washington Post 1947). Greece would be the first in a

series of cold war ‘hot spots’ in which Soviet communism and American democracy

would do battle through sponsoring other forces rather than risking another worldwide

conflict through direct confrontation.

The Greek communist party, the KKE, had already established a presence within

the country’s political realm. During the occupation of Greece by Axis forces in the later

years of World War II, they had facilitated the creation of the National Liberation Front

(EAM) and its military arm1. The resistance fighters from EAM had been instrumental in

the allied operations against the Axis powers in Greece following operations

LADBROKE and FUSTAIN (Paul , et al. 2013, 14-22). The Popular Greek Liberation

Army, ELAS, refused to disarm following the withdrawal of Nazi forces from Greece

(Paul , et al. 2013, 14-22). With both a political and military arm in place following the

liberation of Greece, the Soviet Union arguably had a pre-packaged solution to

expanding their influence beyond the Iron Curtain.

The key US advantage in Greece following the conclusion of World War II was

the economic inroads already made within the country. Great Britain had previously

been the primary agent of reconstruction in Greece prior to its own economic struggles

forcing a withdrawal (Herring 2008, 614-615). The US assumed the British role in both

1 The military arm of the National Liberation Front, the Popular Greek Liberation Army, would become the fighting core of the communist insurgency and opposition to the ruling government during the Civil War from 1946-1949.


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Greece and Turkey after 1947, and through the economic power of the Marshall Plan

the US was positioned as key supporters of the ruling Greek Government (Vetsopoulos

2002, 11-15).

The key political players in Greece during the end of the Nazi occupation as well

as during the years leading to (and through) the country’s civil war were the National

Liberation Front (EAM) and the National Republican Greek League (EDES) (Paul , et al.

2013, 14-22). The National Liberation Front was an organization created and managed

by the Greek Communist Party during the war when citizens were unable to form

political organizations of their own. Moscow supported the EAM during its rise to

prominence, and the group absorbed many other socialist or left-leaning political groups

during the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War between the US and

the USSR (Condit 1996, 10-11). The military arm of the EAM, the Greek People’s

Liberation Army (ELAS), attempted to seize control in Athens prior to the recently

returned government establishing its rule fully (Paul , et al. 2013, 10-11).

The British government elements stationed in Greece were able to defend the

capital with 75,000 battle-hardened troops, but most of the ELAS- rather than disarming

in defeat- simply went underground and found safe havens in their communist

neighbors (Paul , et al. 2013, 14). The ELAS ruined any chance there might have been

for a reconciliation after the initial attempt to seize power however, by executing

thousands of hostages including right leaning socialist political leaders before refusing

to honor the terms of the treaty with the British Government (Paul , et al. 2013, 14-15).

The terms in the treaty were specific as to the disarming and disbanding of all

ELAS/EAM fighting groups and their reintegration into normal civil society (Paul , et al.


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2013, 14-16). The ELAS, however, fled to neighboring Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, or to

sanctuaries prepared in the rural and mountainous areas of Greece (Paul , et al. 2013).

The National Republican Greek League was the largest non-communist

resistance group during the Axis occupation, and became the legitimate political

opposition to both the EAM and the Greek Communist Party (KKE) (Herring 2008, 614).

Interestingly, despite the anti-communist sentiment amongst the League they were also

openly opposed to the monarchic government of the exiled Greek king (Panourgia

2009, 53-55) In fact the statement of their leader Napoleon Zervas in 1941 emphasizes

that the organization sought to create a free socialist state in Greece regardless of the

outcome of the war (Zervas 1941). The Greek Army had actually dismissed Zervas in

1935 following a failed coup attempt (Herring 2008, 614-621). The US would support

the EDES (once identified as the Greek Democratic National Army), despite their

socialist leanings, over other Soviet-supported resistance groups under the Truman

Doctrine (Harris 2013, 14) (Truman 1947, 1-2). EDES forces and leadership joined the

new Greek government, and their expressed desire to establish a republic (albeit a

socialist republic) made their ideology more palatable to US delegations (Zervas 1941).

Following the battle of Athens and the withdrawal of EAS from Greek politics, the US

also had few alternatives to the EDES. At the same time there were other insurgent

(formerly friendly resistance) fighters re-emerging from the rural areas in the mountains

with the stated goal of bringing democracy to Greece (Paul , et al. 2013, 14-15).

Supporting one side over the other became complicated because of the contact

between the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) US/Greek Operations Groups (USOG)

with fighters from both the EDES and their Greek Democratic National Army; and the


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EAM forces that would be the EDES enemy throughout the Greek Civil War

(Mousalimas 2004, Part 6). When the OSS team entered Greece via parachute drop in

1944, they linked up with elements of all the andartes elements operating in the

mountainous portions of Greece against the Nazi occupation (Mousalimas 2004, Part

6). Throughout the resistance to the occupation and eventual withdrawal of axis forces

from Greece, the OSS advisors fought alongside the EAM/ELAS fighters, and often

formed close ties with these same individuals (Mousalimas 2004, Part 6).

The expedience of alliances on the field would also become a hallmark of

American operations during the Cold War. Examples exist in the history of nations such

as Syria, Indonesia, and Peru. On the sands of Syria between 1956 and 1957 the US

would attempt two coups d’état and an assassination in the name of regime change to

contain communism. All attempts failed miserably because in each case the US officials

sponsoring the action chose the first Syrian willing to accept US money and logistical

support (Herring 2008, 677-679). Operation WAPPEN failed in 1957 because the Syrian

military officials involved in the coup turned themselves and their bribe money in to the

Syrian intelligence service (Blum 2004, 88). Indonesian rebels in 1958 received US CIA

support simply for their anti-communist rhetoric, and without any consideration for the

true global negative impact of overthrowing the central government (Herring 2008, 693).

In Peru for the sake of political expediency and because of ignorance to the true

domestic climate, US Vice President Richard Nixon publicly lauded and embraced the

brutal dictator Manuel Odria (Herring 2008, 684). The US in the years to come would

often choose the best option for support to American policies or achievement of


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American goals in a country and would ally with that element long enough to accomplish

a specific mission before shifting away from them (Herring 2008, 683-685).

This type of policy becomes disastrous in the long term and middling at best in

terms of short-term gains. As in most cases where expediency takes priority over ethics

and ideology the pressure to form the partnership only lasts as long as the conflict.

Once that pressure is no longer present, all the differences and ideological separations

that both sides likely ignored in favor of a shared goal or enemy become ‘deal breakers’

and have frequently results in the partners becoming enemies2. It borders on delusional

to believe that partners from diametrically opposed ideologies could maintain a lasting

partnership without some type of outside pressure. The pressure is key to forcing the

partners to set aside their ideological differences in favor of the shared goal.

A study of the Greek civil war based simply on the stated objectives of the

indigenous combatants could characterize the warring parties as a socialist

revolutionary group and a democratizing revolutionary group, with the US supporting the

socialists against democratic reformers (Paul , et al. 2013, 14-18) (Zervas 1941, 1)

(Vetsopoulos 2002, 80-81). Previously, the US had provided support and advice to both

sides, though in 1946 it chose the side most clearly opposing the Soviet Union. The

distinction between the US choosing to support directly one side in a civil war versus

choosing to support a proxy against a competing ideology is important to the overall

story. In the first case, the US is merely meddling in the private affairs of a smaller and

less powerful nation, while in the second case the US is advancing its ideology against

2 Another paper could easily argue that it was exactly this kind of logic and the inevitable fallout from those types of decisions that produced the cold war between the US and the USSR.


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another superpower. The only way to make sense of this seemingly reversed dichotomy

is when examining the parties supporting each of the major forces involved in the

fighting. Such an examination reveals the Greek Civil War to be the first of the proxy

wars between the democratic republican form of government (represented by the US

and its continental European allies) and the monolith of a conglomeration of Marxist-

labeled ideologies (represented by the Soviet Union) (Paul , et al. 2013, 14-22) (Iatrides

2005, 6-8).

The current methods for information operations emerged during and after World

War II for the United States and Great Britain, and their use in Greece added a

dimension. The use of propaganda had been widely known throughout the evolution of

modern warfare, but in Greece the superpowers controlling/supporting the actual

combatants had a different agenda from the combatants themselves (Iatrides 2005, 7).

Moscow sought to increase directly its influence in the western world, and their

information campaigns reflected that objective. The presence of a functioning

communist party within the Greek populace made the small nation a readymade access

point to the western world from a political standpoint, and the potential for a non-kinetic

communist takeover of the fledgling government would only require logistical support

from the Soviet Union. This attitude led the political officers of the Soviet Politbureau to

focus their efforts elsewhere as the communist information bureau formed and took

shape throughout the world (Encyclopedia Brittanica 2014) . The most telling element of

the Soviet information campaign with regard to operations in Greece is the fact of the

Greek communist party’s exclusion from the information bureau (Iatrides 2005, 29).

Perhaps this represented the level of Soviet confidence in an ideological victory in


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Greece, or perhaps it was an acknowledgement of the need for outside support to the

communist insurgents fighting there. If it was confidence in the future victory of

communist forces in Greece then the exclusion was simple patience on the Soviets’ part

because they could invite the Greek communists to join the bureau later. From the

opposing perspective however, if it was an acknowledgement of the need for outside

support then it represented the insistence from the Soviets that the KKE focus on

winning at home; while the Soviets dedicated all their resources to securing outside

support to their efforts.

While Moscow focused its efforts on gaining popular support elsewhere, the KKE

within Greece faced a completely different information problem. The war and resistance

to axis occupation forced bands of fighters with disparate ideologies together by virtue

of the common enemy they faced. After the axis withdrawal however, the divisions

between bands of fighters and different organizations began to resurface. Almost

immediately after the axis withdrawal in 1944, the EAM and the EDES ideologically split

from each other as the EDES integrated into the freshly returned government and the

EAM withdrew (Paul , et al. 2013, 16). The EAM was engaged in the war for the will of

the people. There was a brief window where (if other nations adhered to their stated

principles) self-determination could have shifted the Greek government into communism

after the withdrawal of the EAM and the battle of Athens (Paul , et al. 2013, 14). The

EAM and other KKE sub-organizations used cultural nationalistic concepts to gain

popular support to their cause (Iatrides 2005, 7). Communist elements also specifically

avoided the use of overt or well-known communist slogans or message themes. The

hammer and cycle did not appear on banners seeking support, no images of Stalin or


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other Soviet leaders were plastered on walls (Iatrides 2005, 7). Avoiding those themes

and messages was an attempt to moderate the public image of Greek communism in

the eyes of the people. Rather than taking the standpoint of fully committed support to

the Soviet system, the EAM sought to portray themselves as ideologically aligned with

Moscow but culturally and historically aligned with the people (Iatrides 2005, 7).

Truman and his administration had to focus on the domestic climate in order to

gain support to any recover effort in Europe. Public opinion during this time was firmly

against further or continuing foreign involvement, and a desire to focus on the homeland

permeated the American populace (The Washington Post 1947). Truman and his

cabinet became acutely aware that the American people would accept very little

commitment from either a military or a financial perspective to any country other than

the United States. Following other wars, the focus following the conclusion of hostilities

immediately became fixing any damage done to the homeland by the conflict, and

America expected no less after WWII (Herring 2008, 598). The only way to sell

congress on the requirements of worldwide recovery efforts was to find a threat to the

furthering of the American way of life. Communism made a good selling point for this

concept, since its system was diametrically opposed to American capitalism and

democracy. Because of the hostility towards further foreign entanglements, the US

information campaign focused inward and held few appeals for outside assistance

beyond financial contributions to the European Recovery Program (aka the Marshall

Plan) (The Washington Post 1947).

Greece both as a geographic location and taken in the context of global events

has shaped almost every dimension of US foreign policy for over 60 years. The heavy


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use of financial support as an incentive to democratic governance grew from the seed of

the Marshall Plan’s European Recovery Program. Today whenever fiscally conservative

activists and politicians demand a justification for spending on foreign aid (which often

seems to benefit the US indirectly if at all); they need look no further than Athens

through the second half of the twentieth century. Security experts concerned about the

US method and propensity for covert and unconventional warfare operations can

examine the OSS advisors who became the core of both the CIA and later USSOCOM.

Diplomatically Greece was a testing ground for the US model of specializing experts

within a larger diplomatic framework to support friendly emerging governments and

economies. The US method for supporting a friendly regime, or conversely for removing

a unfriendly (or not friendly enough) regime all came from the US involvement in the

Greek Civil War and Greek Reconstruction following World War II.

The Significance of the Greek Problem Greece taken out of the global political context would not, this paper argues,

have been significant to the US or its allies. Historically, the Greek monarchy had not

been an influential economic power, which partly accounted for its inability to make any

recognizable progress toward reconstruction after the war (Truman 1947, 1-2). The

primary purpose of the axis power occupation during the Second World War really had

more to do with expanding territory in strategically important areas and securing a

victory for the Italian army, than with any resources or money gained from the conquest

(Panourgia 2009, 39-48). The true significance of the Greek conflict is the issue of

clashing civilizations, political ideologies, and future superpowers happening through

each side’s proxies engaged in direct combat. Greece’s civil war, which supposedly was


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a contest for political dominance during reconstruction of the country, was key to

drawing the battle lines between two of Roosevelt’s ‘four policemen’ in the post WW II

era (Lippman 1943). It would eventually also force the other ‘policemen’ to choose a

side between the US and the USSR, and the echoes of that division are still influencing

geopolitics today (White 2014).

The US was unable to find a true ‘good fit’ for its own goals in supporting a Greek

faction after the axis withdrawal and surrender. Of the three potential choices, the

United States would most likely have preferred to support the previous monarchy-based

regime. The problem with that approach was the legitimacy (or lack thereof) of a

powerful, unelected monarchy. The people of Greece had long sought to remove the

monarchy and initiate democratic reforms prior to the flight of the ruling government

when the Italian army invaded (Zervas 1941, 1-3). Supporting George II would have

meant the US giving open support to a non-democratic system of rule in the name of

curtailing communist influence. Such support would likely have been unacceptable to

the American public, and would have created domestic problems for the Truman

administration (Prochaska 2007). The ELAS and KKE received direct support and

advice from the USSR, so choosing their side would not be a viable option from the

American perspective (Truman 1947, 1-2). The only alternative left was an organization

that used no political double-speak to explain their goal of bringing socialism to the

former monarchy, regardless of the victor in World War II (Zervas 1941, 1). Normally

this political agenda would have excluded General Zervas and his organization from US

support, but in Greece there was no viable alternative (Condit 1996, 9-13) (Harris 2013,

18-19).


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The choice to support the entity that offends American goals and objectives the

least would become a hallmark of US proxy wars. Examples include the faction the US

supported in Vietnam following the failure of the French endeavors in Indochina, the

elements to which the US gave aid and training to in Iran, or even the support to the

Mujahedeen in Afghanistan during the 1980s. The US “defaulted” morally to supporting

a Greek government that deliberately (with US support) ignored legitimate election

results, overthrew a popularly elected government in Iran (because, amongst other

things, it failed to align itself with the US objectives), and supported a religiously

fundamentalist xenophobic organization (the Mujahedeen). Of note is that this same

organization would one day launch a campaign of terror which ushered in the ‘Era of

Persistent Conflict’ for the US military (Herring 2008) (Casey 2008, 19-20).

The entire US model of supporting ‘covert regime change’ derives from the US

role in the reconstruction of the Greek government and military as well as its role in

Greece’s civil war. During the Greek civil war, support from the US government was

overt and acknowledged by Truman. The US selected one side of a conflict and threw

its resources into ensuring that side’s success in the war. However, there was also a

covert side to the US role in the conflict devoted to opposing communism as an

ideology rather than directly opposing the representatives of communism in a kinetic

campaign. The information operations conducted by the CIA in Europe during the

Eisenhower years can trace back directly to the propaganda campaigns Allen Dulles

(Director of Central Intelligence under Eisenhower) participated in during his OSS

service in Greece (Office of Strategic Services 1944, Part 9). In Greece, the OSS used

covert operations for political as well as military gains. This combined with Allen Dulles’


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experience in information operations had a fateful effect on US policy. It made the

progression from overt to covert natural. In effect, it normalized the US choosing which

government would rule in another country (Wisner 2014).

America’s European allies saw Greece as the point of entry for “socialist” (that is

Soviet) influence and ideology on the continent. While Churchill had fairly clearly

defined where he saw geographic vulnerability in the ‘Iron Curtain’ speech, Greece was

well within the zone the former allied powers defined as ‘free’ (Churchill 1946). Potential

expansion beyond the lines delineated after World War II regardless of the legitimacy of

that expansion represented an unacceptable threat to the sovereignty of the western

powers. Greece, though not important to what would become the Western European

Union by itself, gained importance because of the clash of ideologies between the

socialist east and the democratic west.

The Greek civil war and the conscious choice by the people there to turn from

monarchy and into an inclusive, participative system typifies the modern incarnation of

the Westphalian system (Powell 1994, 314). As the US and its allies used the Greek

instability as a means to confront the Soviet Union, the Greek citizens themselves were

seeking a fundamental change to their own government. Concern over communist

attempts at expansion into Western Europe would cause the previously independent

Westphalian states to begin joining in mutual defense (US Department of State Office of

the Historian 2014). Although there were occasional bilateral alliances between the

major powers on the continent, there had not been a consistent and sweeping

community. NATO and its precursors became the direct response from the democratic

western nations to the Communist push for expansion. The Westphalian peace treaties


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stripped a previous empire of its power through the concept of the sovereign nation

state, but also left each nation state to seek its own defense and prosperity (D'Orleans

2014). Now European states would need to find a way to band together for the mutual

good without ceding their sovereignty to another empire.

Initially the solution was an attempt to separate the elements of national power

(Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic) in order to avoid consolidation under a

de facto emperor. The Brussels Treaty laid the foundation for the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization, which is still the premier multilateral defense organization for the

European continent. The Greek civil war, if viewing the ELAS and EAM forces as a

proxy for the Soviets, caused a complete alteration of the world and daily life for the

average western European citizen of any nation. Currently in Europe, the premier

political and diplomatic organization is the European Union, representing the voluntary

association of 28 member nations, many of which have previously been global (or at

least known-world-wide) powers on their own. Law enforcement has reached an

international level in Interpol, which has agreements with and offices in over 190

countries. Interpol has become increasingly important as economic globalization allows

criminal organizations to shake loose from the confines of national borders (Reinares

and Resa 1997, 1-3).These organizations, and others like them within other dimensions

of national power, share the concept of voluntary association among the countries

involved. A lack of centralized leadership intentionally characterizes the international

system. The roots of this logic, the lack of a centralized world government, are the

Westphalian state system after the fall of the Holy Roman Empire. The only pseudo-


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governing organizations within the international system are those to which the member

states voluntary adhere (Powell 1994, 314).

Domestically, President Truman faced stiff opposition within the political realm.

Congress was hesitant at best to get the United States military involved in another open

conflict so soon after the close of hostilities in Europe. Greece had transitioned directly

from axis powers occupation to the garrisoning of British troops within their major cities

as the Wehrmacht withdrew from Greece. The American people had grown weary after

four years of continuous conflict, and public opinion dictated that the troops come home

and remain there. Additionally there was significant sentiment that the financial

commitment of the US to the reconstruction of Europe following World War II could lead

the US away from its traditional foreign policy approach (The Washington Post 1947). It

would not be publically acceptable to use dollar diplomacy or foreign aid to solve the

‘Greek Problem’.

Truman now faced an international problem, which was vital to his allies’

sovereignty and opposition to the competing communist ideology. This problem

extended beyond the political realm, and mishandling it could- Truman and many of

those advising him believed- have resulted in the loss of continental Europe to

communism. In Truman’s estimation, undue Soviet influence would spread globally from

Europe. Truman would have to find a way to bolster Greece’s economy, its political

system (the returning government that had been operating in exile for the last several

years), and the Greek security apparatus. The only fighting forces standing for Greece

were the irregular bands of fighters that had resisted the German occupation, and many

of those fighters supported the KKE and other communist organizations (Harris 2013,


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44-45). The Greek economy had begun to recover prior to World War II from the great

worldwide depression, but it was by no means up to pre-depression levels (Gerolymatos

2004, 142). This would require diversion of funds from the Marshall Plan’s European

recovery fund to ensure that Greece did not start the post war era under crushing

national debt (Coutsoukis 2004, 13).

Truman could not have sold Congress or the public on simply sending financial

aid to Greece and hoping for the best results that favored American influence in the

region (The Washington Post 1947). Moreover, opinion pieces in various US news

outlets bore out that the only thing the American people were willing to tolerate less than

sending large amounts of US money abroad was sending large numbers of US

servicemen abroad (Craig and Logevall 2009, 78-80). Trying to balance the competing

demands of Truman’s new doctrine and what the public and other branches of the

government would accept shaped the entire remainder of Truman’s administration, and

most administrations to follow. It would inform the doctrine of limited war undertaken by

Presidents Eisenhower and Johnson, and the increasing reliance on covert operations

that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles would introduce into American foreign policy.

It would be the reason that communist paranoia became the ‘wrapping paper’ for every

intervention and significant foreign action of every president until the end of the cold

war. When President Johnson requested support for the Vietnam War through the Gulf

of Tonkin resolutions, he used fear of communist aggression (and a dubious report of

an attack on the US Navy) to open the congressional checkbook (Herring 2008, 738-

739). When the administration sought to provide clandestine support to the Mujahedeen

in Afghanistan it framed the request as assisting indigenous people to turn away from


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the communist system and turn back communist aggression (Herring 2008, 855).

Afghanistan also became an example of the US rallying to the ‘best fit’ for a regional ally

in any given place, as the US strengthened its relationship with the Chinese government

through intelligence sharing and sales of electronic equipment3 (Herring 2008, 856-

857).

America’s foreign policy had never publicly encouraged the country to get

involved in the internal affairs of another nation although the country’s early conduct in

Central America shows the true nature of US foreign policy and its execution. From the

Monroe doctrine in the early 19th century, to the dollar diplomacy and banana republics

during the early 20th century, to the good neighbor policy of FDR; America has and

continues to make a habit of involving itself heavily in others’ internal affairs (US

Department of State Office of the Historian 2014) (US Department of State Office of the

Historian 2014) (Herring 2008, 374). Truman also faced a legislature which wanted no

part of sending American fighting men to another far-away land to fight what seemed to

the public to be someone else’s problem (Colley 1997, 35). The dilemma Truman faced

was how to avoid the pitfalls of entering a full-scale campaign so soon after the war’s

conclusion while also containing communist expansion outward from Moscow.

Balancing these concerns would, similarly, be a major consideration for every president

to come after Truman.

3 The China problem would also become an example later of the US’s tendency to ally with anyone who seems friendly to its objectives coming back to bite the administration. Soon after the withdrawal of the red army from Afghanistan, the USSR began to collapse. This left the US with a suddenly uncomfortably close relationship to the last remaining major communist power.


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When the United States became involved in the civil war on the Korean

Peninsula Eisenhower confronted a Congress that was still unwilling to entangle itself

further in others’ affairs. The only way to secure approval for the campaign was to make

it part of a UN mission against communist aggression with international backing. When

Johnson sought to escalate the involvement of the United States in Vietnam, it took the

incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin to secure congressional support and thus legal approval4.

The sinking of the Lusitania during the years leading up to World War I cost the lives of

over 120 American civilians (Simpson 2000), and the USS Panay incident in 1937 cost

not only the lives of uniformed American servicemen but also military equipment

(Herring 2008, 512) (US Naval Military Investigation 1937)5. The investigation also

determined that the Panay had been acting in accordance with official orders from the

US government, and upon which the Chinese government had agreed. (US Naval

Military Investigation 1937). However, neither of these specific incidents drew an armed

response from the US. Coincidentally, in both cases, it would be another three years

before the US became involved in the conflicts that were already in progress at the time

of the incidents. Presidents succeeding the Truman administration would need to justify

their desires to send American troops to faraway lands to combat acts of outside

aggression. Truman set the tone for this by justifying his own actions as defending

against communist aggression, despite the fact that the communists had not committed

an act of actual aggression against anyone in the democratic world. Truman was able to

create the impression that by trying to expand communist influence, the Soviet Union

4 Tonkin is of particular interest since there were numerous incidents in previous eras that were much more severe than an act of aggression against a US military vessel. 5 The Panay incident should have received an additional level of response, since the official investigation found no wrongdoing on the part of the crew (US Naval Military Investigation 1937).


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was aggressing against the democratic world. Under this logic the United States, United

Nations, and NATO were justified in pushing their own presence into hundreds of

countries all over the world as a response to Soviet aggression6.

The Issue of Force and Influence Because of the domestic climates in both the United States Congress and the

Russian Politbureau, the leaders of both superpowers chose in 1946 not to commence

another global conflict so soon after the massive losses of the Second World War. This

war would be fought not with rifles and tanks, but rather with any non-kinetic means

available. This is not to say that the war was cold or safe by any stretch of the

imagination. Quite to the contrary, Americans and Soviet citizens alike perished during

the civil war, but not for the sake of their own flags or conquered territory (Colley 1997,

1). The Greek Civil War became a war for the will of the people, with the potential

consolation prize of supporting an unpopular government as it desperately tried to stay

in power (Iatrides 2005, 29). Influence and encouraging specific types of combat, as

well as targets, on the part of the actual combatants would be the primary means of

competition between the US and the USSR. Means for accomplishing those goals

would range from direct monetary contributions to the government to logistical support

from Moscow to the offer of a safe haven in neighboring Yugoslavia (Paul , et al. 2013,

14-22). There is a shortage of primary source data regarding the inner workings of the

Soviet Politbureau during this period. Their overtures to other nations and their

6 This is the core of the Truman doctrine. Since the Soviet Union had aggressively pushed outward from its own borders the US and its allies would be justified in taking whatever steps they deemed necessary to contain communist expansion.


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increased hold on the eastern European countries indicates that the Politbureau was

fully involved in the plan to expand Soviet Influence worldwide.

One of the key elements of influence from the communist supported ELAS side

of the conflict was their avoidance of publicly aligning themselves with other communist

regimes (Iatrides 2005, 7). The KKE, ELAS, and DSE publicly avoided the typical

socialist/communist slogans, and instead relied on the Greek cultural concept of

Laokratia. This is a somewhat vague and nebulous concept. Instead of espousing the

dictatorship of the proletariat like most Soviet-aligned regimes, the KKE instead publicly

espoused the concepts of empowerment of the masses and lack of monarchic rule

(Vetsopoulos 2002, 7-8). This allowed them to co-opt the anti-monarchy sentiment of

the masses and mobilize that portion of the population in favor of their cause. It also

prevented the alienation of the members of the movement from the World War II era

who joined less for the ideology and more for defense of their homes (Iatrides 2005, 8-

10). Because this influence operation maintained the DSE and ELAS’s level of influence

amongst the population, they were also able to maintain their level of Soviet support

despite their desire for open armed conflict (Iatrides 2005, 7-10). Because the Greek

communist coalition (KKE, ELAS, EAM, and DSE) retained their outside support, they

presented a viable threat to the ruling government of King George II (Truman 1947, 1-

2). If a Soviet-backed insurgency managed an overthrow of a ruling government on the

west’s doorstep, then it would represent both a failure of the Truman doctrine of

containment at its inception, and a major expansion of Soviet influence into the territory

of the US and its allies.


22

On both sides of the divide, Greece represented a new form of campaign for the

United States: the struggle to control the information flow about a given topic and to

ensure public perception of the same. Information operations, previously called

propaganda campaigns, had been very popular with the OSS throughout World War II

(Friedman 2003). OSS founder and commander Wild Bill Donovan had been part of the

coordinator of information and later worked closely with the office of war information

(Friedman 2003), and his operatives understood the value of propaganda in any

campaign. However, the Greek Civil War would add its own bit of flavor to information

operations. Now the powers behind the struggle would be attempting to sway the

populace to one side or the other, using words. This was not a call to armed resistance

for the common citizen (not already involved), but rather an attempt to sway the

ideology of the populace away from the other side. In many ways, this proved infinitely

more difficult, since the objective of much of the information war had to do with

convincing the Greek population that communism or democracy was inherently a better

way of life without any domestic evidence (Iatrides 2005, 27).

Meanwhile the Greek government was trying to draw more support from the US

and former allied powers (Truman 1947, 1-2). There was already a known infrastructure

in place to funnel aid to the war-torn European from the democratic side of the proxy

war (Vetsopoulos 2002, 10). The key for the newly returned Greek government became

how to draw even more assistance out of the major powers who (as stated earlier) were

unable simply to open the treasury in support of another nation while rebuilding its own

(The Washington Post 1947). The Greek government accomplished this through

constantly capitalizing on the west’s fear of communist expansion constantly. Fear of


23

communism had already brought financial experts, military advisors, and a huge amount

of money to Greece (Vetsopoulos 2002, 342). Greece is perhaps one of the first

examples of the potentially communist tail wagging the vehemently democratic dog.

This theme would repeat itself ad nauseam in US foreign relations for decades to come.

Iran, Egypt, Pakistan, India, South Korea, and South Vietnam are all examples of

countries that tried to use fear of communist expansion to draw out additional aid or

resources from the United States after the Greek Civil War (Herring 2008, 672-673).

Within the US homeland, the anticommunist rhetoric played directly into the hands of

these lesser powers. The American people became so paranoid regarding communist

presence at home that their officials abroad would believe almost anything regarding

communist incursion into the west (Wall 2014). Countries like Greece understood this

and used it to their advantage, regardless of the actual level of communist threat. In

these cases, foreigners understood the will and thought processes of the American

people better than the US government.

While the ruling government was using its influence outside of its borders to gain

additional support from the other western nations, the KKE was outright pleading with

any communist regime who would listen to get any support in their struggle

(Gerolymatos 2004, 213-214). Yugoslavia would provide the propaganda support and a

safe haven for communist fighters as the war progressed, and would become a key ally

in the information war against the American-backed government (Marantzidis 2013, 34).

The KKE had not been part of the formation of the communist information bureau, but

had reached an agreement with Stalin by 1947 for direct Soviet support to the

communist insurgency in Greece (Marantzidis 2013, 33-36). The Soviet propaganda


24

machine during the first portions of the war focused on ensuring that the communist

forces did not suffer a total defeat, going so far as to claim the prime minister was

seeking to end the fighting in 1945 after the battle of Athens (Stavrakis 1989, 60-61). As

the war progressed Soviet propaganda aligned itself more with the demands of the

Greek communists, seeking actual regime change rather than just a presence within

Greece. The change in tone of the Soviet messaging is another example of the

disadvantaged tail wagging the massive superpower of a dog (Stavrakis 1989, 62).

In Washington, President Truman and his cabinet sought both popular and

financial support for European reconstruction, starting in Greece (The Washington Post

1947). Popular opinion was set firmly against further entanglements overseas, but

Truman recognized that based on the economic success of the United States coming

out of World War II, that simply was not a position he could take (Herring 2008, 596-

600).

Isolationism would leave the rest of the world in ruin without any concerned

power to see to the reconstruction of what the war had destroyed. Truman could not

allow this to happen for multiple reasons. First, to leave a broken global system without

aid or resolution was to degrade the ability of US industry to continue its success in the

future. The US had become increasingly dependent on a globalized economic system.

Trading partners in foreign countries were and are essential to the US economy, and

without the global system there would be no growth of the US economy from foreign

capital. The second area of concern for Truman stemmed from the proverb ‘nature

abhors a vacuum’. If the global economy required a global system of trade and that

global system of trade was broken - and the US refused to step in and direct


25

reconstruction of that system - then someone else inevitably would step in. Truman’s

fear was that that country would be the Soviet Union (Craig and Logevall 2009, 78-80).

Thus, he could not simply close his focus back to the US homeland and leave the rest

of the world to its fate (Merrill and Patterson 2010, 216-217).

Truman could not risk a shooting war with his country’s former allies any more

than Stalin could afford to lose any more of his people following the devastating losses

of World War II (Colley 1997, 2-3). They chose instead to compete for the will of the

Greek people, and found themselves in many ways competing with domestic tensions

as much as anything else. Self-determination was the order of the era following the

devastation the war wreaked on the European continent. Stalin recognized it as

potentially time to expand by degrees the influence of his own conglomerate of nations

beyond Eastern Europe. Greece could easily have been the entry point of communism

into Europe, but only if the Greeks had chosen it of their own free will. Any attempt to

take Greece by force, which involved the red army, would have garnered an armed

response from the former allied powers; this was not a viable course of action for the

Soviets. Truman could see the potential for Marshall’s grand strategy in Europe to slip

away under a red wave moving west from the mountains of the small nation. He did not

have enough support at home to enter into another shooting war against another

developed nation; therefore he had to commit himself and his administration to

rebuilding Greece as a thriving capitalist nation. Ideally, it would have rebuilt itself as a

capitalist democracy in which commerce drove politics and all people prospered; in a

less ideal world, however, Truman recognized the danger of allowing Greece to slip into

the communist abyss.


26

The Regional Effects of Greece’s Resolution If Greece had fallen to communist pressure and influence following World War II

the effects would have redrawn the map of Europe within years rather than decades the

way modern history recorded. Without the buffer created by Greece and Turkey, and

with a global display of the west’s inability to hold Churchill’s ‘iron curtain’ lines, the

Soviets would not only have continued their expansion into the European continent but

would have increased the rate of that expansion with each passing month. In short

order, all but the staunchest capitalists would have come under communist control and

influence, and the United States would have found itself quickly trying to prop up its

wartime allies against the ‘red menace’. All of this would have taken place while Truman

was attempting to convince the US populace to support his policies in Europe and of

increased globalization.

There is really no way to know what the US populace would have done if Europe

had started its descent into communism. On the one hand, it is possible that the public

could have been swayed in the administration’s favor. To achieve this, the president

would have had to package the need for increased spending and troop presence in

Europe, as so many presidents would do after Truman left office. This could easily have

led to much of the US military moving back onto the European continent as more and

more of the US budget went abroad to buy Europe back into capitalistic success. On the

other hand, it is equally possible that the US populace would have adopted the

isolationist stance of the previous generations after a major war. If the American stance

had moved into true isolationism, then the continental nations would have been left to

their fate, and Stalin would have been able to expand his empire west with severely


27

reduced opposition to his movement. The Marshall plan would have crumbled since the

US populace would have placed increasing pressure on Truman to remove any funds

from Europe and let the chips fall as they would. The US military presence in Europe

would have diminished to almost nothing quickly as the US population demanded the

return of their fighting men from foreign shores. The logic to keep units like the 1st

Armored Division and 1st Infantry Division of the US Army would have vanished since

the US would no longer have taken responsibility for the reconstruction of Europe. The

only source data from which to work from the Soviet side is the established plan through

the Communist Information Bureau to spread Marxist ideology throughout the globe.

The red army had plans for an armed invasion of Europe, but the soft power campaign

would likely have come from the foreign ministry and the committee for state security

(Комитет государственной безопасности, or KGB). Agency documents for both of

those organizations have been slowly declassified and much of their more sensitive

operations are still shrouded in state secrecy.

The US need to ensure that western capitalism maintained a foothold on the

European continent could have derailed the Marshall Plan in its entirety. The side effect

of capitalism maintaining control was that the Soviet system required government

seizure of the means of production. In effect through capitalism remaining, democracy

would always have the opportunity to flourish. In the event of a communist victory,

rather than European Recovery Program funds going to Germany and various other

places within the continent and contributions coming in from other allied powers, the

funds would have all gone to form a financial levee against the flood of communism

sweeping the land. Without the economic bolstering of the Marshall Plan, the global


28

economy would have experienced a depression as severe as that of the 1930s.

Economically depressed countries would have turned toward the communist method,

which promised a relief to economic inequality by removing the means of production

from private hands. Once the democratic countries had shifted to a communist system,

the Soviets would immediately embed military and political controls to prevent a shift in

the opposite direction. Much of Soviet foreign policy throughout the 1940s and 1950s

focused on maintaining control of those nations behind the iron curtain who might seek

to gain independence or shift to a more democratic way of life. In Poland, this meant

tough negotiating and long-term agreements between the local leadership (Herring

2008). In Hungary, this meant a violent encounter between Hungarian civilians and red

army tanks in Bucharest (History Leaning Site 2014). Based on Soviet conduct in those

locations, it is reasonable to conclude they would have done whatever was necessary to

hold any ground they gained during their attempts at outward expansion.

Beyond the regional economic catastrophe that would have befallen Europe had

Greece become a communist nation there would have been severe global implications.

Much of the US economy had come to rely on trading partners abroad to sustain itself,

there simply was not a large enough consumer base in the US to sustain the levels of

production from US industry. This was particularly true after all the industrial and

manufacturing technological advances of the World War II years. The Soviet system of

government specifically prohibited consumerism, so if Europe had started to turn

towards the Soviet system the US trading partners abroad would have begun to

disappear. Loss of the major economic powers from the European continent would have

caused the US to compensate by increasing exports to economically developing


29

countries like Pakistan (military equipment) or the poor central and South American

nations who had previously been recipients of US dollar diplomacy. The strain placed

on developing economies by the US need to sustain its own economic growth would

have further depressed the global economy, and left an opportunity for communism to

spread even further. Global economic depression and communism spreading like a red

ink stain on a pristine canvas all from the loss of a single nation of little importance if not

taken in context with the rivalry of communism and capitalism.

The fall of Greece would additionally have destabilized the already fragile Middle

East in the wake of communist expansion (Colley 1997, 2). Stalin and the Politbureau

would not have accepted the non-aligned stances of leaders like Nasser of Egypt, and

would have pushed in those countries for common holding of the means of economic

production. This would all have aligned with the ideologies of Marx and Lenin, with a

dictatorship of the proletariat seizing control of the resources of these nations (Marx and

Engels 1849, 10). This would have had a catastrophic effect on the global economy,

since every form of industrialized production relied on oil and its derivatives to operate.

The recently recovered US economy and the still depressed postwar European

economies would all have suffered without a constant and consistent flow of oil from the

Arabian Peninsula. This supports the concept that to allow the global economic system

to continue to flounder would have economically harmed the US as much as any other

nation.

Also, the level of power that control of the Middle East would have granted the

Soviets in the wake of World War II would have been staggering. Consider for a

moment the very idea of a socialist nation that already believed in the abolishment of


30

private industry in favor of publicly held enterprises gaining control of the global oil

supply (Gray 1946). This would have given the Soviets the ability to grind industry

worldwide to a halt if capitalist nations did not capitulate to their economic policy

demands. The Soviet Union would have then gained control over the global economic

system that they simply never achieved in reality.

The Policy Implications of Greece

The victory of the new US proxy war mechanism in Greece has shaped most

aspects of US foreign policy through to today. Its echoes ring true in the amount of

foreign aid funding sent abroad by the US government currently. The apparent victory of

capitalism and the democracy that it cultivates made Washington policy makers believe

that infusions of capital could defeat Marxist-type ideologies worldwide. The origin of

today’s US Army Special Operations trace back to the OSS operatives working with the

Greek resistance during World War II, which later became the Greek national army. The

use of covert operations by Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon drew inspiration

from the victories in Athens and the surrounding mountains between 1944 and 1949.

The concept of focusing experts in a portion of national power or economic progress

within their area of expertise and then having a professional diplomat oversee the entire

operation from a whole of government perspective has been repeatedly tried since

1949, though rarely with the same level of strategic effect. The inspiration for this

method of US diplomacy is the success achieved by the advisory teams sent abroad

under the Marshall Plan.


31

The economic policies used in Greece are a departure from previous ‘dollar

diplomacy’ tactics in that the exchange of US aid for democratic reforms went without

acknowledgement throughout Greece’s reconstruction. The level of dependence on US

aid from the reconstituted Greek government may have caused the Truman

administration to assume that their diplomatic overtures would bear fruit. Looming threat

of Soviet communism and leftist insurgents may have convinced the Joint Chiefs of

Staff that the Greek military would listen to the teams of advisors they sent regarding

how best to combat the communist threat. Exposure to the effectiveness of OSS

operations in Greece may have encouraged Allen Dulles to begin increasing the scope

of CIA covert operations in the 1950s, while his brother served as the US Secretary of

State. All of these events have left ripples throughout the pond of US policy and

American involvement in other parts of the world.

The CIA still maintains primacy among all US government agencies for

clandestine and covert action, and has done so since the closeout of operations in

Greece. Allen Dulles’ experience in quiet regime change during the operations to

maintain a free Greece inspired him to shift CIA operations into the regime change

business (Herring 2008, 672-673). The creation of US Army Special Forces as the

premier experts on unconventional warfare came about from the OSS teams operating

in Europe during and after the war (Special Forces Association 2014). Unconventional

warfare is the doctrinal term applied to creating regime change in a foreign country

through military advice and assistance to a resistance movement already present within

the target country (US Army 2008, 1-2). The ease with which the US government could

have effected a regime change in Greece following World War II inspired the belief that


32

not only was the US capable of changing foreign governments but that they were good

at it.

Within the US diplomatic service, the ‘Grecian Formula’ is still operating in much

the same way as during the 1940s. The use of specifically qualified or distinguished

advisors to reconstruct or develop specific areas of a friendly regime is plainly visible

today in the concept of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) deployed into Iraq

during operations IRAQI FREEDOM and NEW DAWN; as well as in Afghanistan during

operation ENDURING FREEDOM-AFGHANISTAN (Miles 2013, 493). The very concept

of the American country team stems from the Marshall Plan specifically as it functioned

in Greece. Within any given American embassy or consulate there is a chief of mission,

the officer in charge of all US efforts within the country, and a number of departments

and directorates under the chief. Each department is responsible for a specific portion of

the US effort in the country whether it is economic, political, or security focused

(Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training 2014). The Chief of Mission’s

responsibility is to manage this whole effort rather than to conduct any specific task

regarding the host nation’s government. The inclusion of the various other departments

of the US government (Treasury, Justice, Agriculture, etc.) has become such a core

concept to American diplomacy that generally the American people regard it as naturally

occurring (Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training 2014).

Examples of this structure in US diplomacy, outside of the major combat theaters

of the Global War on Terror, exist in Africa and Southeast Asia (Africa Research Bulletin

2014). American envoys have committed to a focus on the civilian infrastructure and

economic progress within the African continent, similar to the approach taken by the


33

various advisory teams in Greece. In Southeast Asia, the approach is more subtle than

direct aid for the host nation and indigenous population. Southeast Asia is key to US

interests because of its geographic location and population concentration. Enough of

the global populace calls the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia to seriously hinder

global trade if they so choose, given the importance of the sea and air transit routes

through the area (Singh 2007). From the local perspective, the incentive to work with

foreign governments and firms is primarily economic. The US, as well as its trading

partners in Europe, purchases the majority of exports from the developing nations of

Asia. These goods range from technology and electronic components to textiles and

mineral ore for refinement (BDG 2013). Infusions of capital are the current method for

the US diplomatic machine to ensure that its overtures to the countries in control of the

most significant global trade routes are well received.

The use of US capital to maintain influence and ensure the room for democracy

to grow first took place in Greece following World War II. The difference in policy from

then to now is mostly in appearances. During the 1940s, the US had the advantage of

rolling the aid to Greece into the European Recovery Program under the Marshall Plan,

and since the money was going to flow overseas regardless of where exactly on the

continent it ended up, the US could simply move funds to the problem locations. This

did not create a public relations problem for the Truman administration because

Congress had already approved the ERP, and the public had already had their say

regarding Marshall’s great strategy. This was just execution of the plan with prioritization

of those receiving the funds first. There was no concern over the media blowback from

stating publicly that Greece needed the funds more than others did because the


34

American people had already determined that all of Europe was a ruin that needed

reconstruction.

In the current geopolitical climate, however other considerations would affect the

ability of any administration to funnel aid money as directly as Truman would. Instead, in

the case of Southeast Asia the aid flows through the course of normal commerce, with

most of the foreign income of several influential countries coming from US firms (BDG

2013). Through this method, the country of concern still relies very heavily on the US

stream of capital, and therefore is more susceptible to and supportive of US goals and

objectives. The US government does not need to label directly any of the countries as

‘in need of foreign aid’ (or at least reduce the level of foreign aid they send directly)

while still maintaining an acceptable level of influence over the government. The

Southeast Asian nations are still able to claim effective sovereignty and self-sufficiency

while receiving the infusions of foreign capital necessary to keep themselves afloat

(Menon and Chongvilaivan 2011, 109).

In the case of Africa public perception is that the entire country is falling apart

anyway, and therefore it is a much easier case to make that direct US government aid is

necessary. Data shows that the majority of African nations are still autocracies or

military dictatorships, and in the first 10 years of the 21st century, there were over 10

coups d’état on the continent (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005, 17). Africa

appears as war torn and prone to chaos now as Europe appeared to the average

American following World War II.

The US Department of Defense has shifted its policies and procedures greatly

since World War II. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor and subsequent worldwide


35

conflict the entire focus of the US military was on high intensity conflicts between

regular military forces representing conventional nation states. During WWII however,

the War Department (prior to its reclassification as the US Department of Defense) had

to acknowledge the role of irregular forces and warfare within the overall scope of

conflict. Additionally the US military, through its experiences in Greece, discovered the

effect that advising and assisting another nation’s forces rather than committing large-

scale American forces to a conflict could generate7. Defense policies over the next five

decades evolved to place small elements of military officials in almost every country

where the US maintains a diplomatic presence. Defense officials now integrate directly

into US country teams abroad, serve as advisors to host nation militaries, and

administer humanitarian programs throughout the world. The success of the OSS

elements within Greece in advising and assisting the irregular forces first in resisting

axis occupation and then in bringing down the communist insurgency showed the

Defense Department that proxy wars could be fought effectively through small groups of

culturally-savvy, mature advisors. That success led directly to the advising and assisting

operations in which US Special Operations Forces would engage for decades to come.

The creation of Army Special Forces in 1961 established the green berets as experts in

unconventional warfare, or the doctrinal application of the ‘advice and assistance’ model

(US Army 2008, 1-3). Military policy from Vietnam on became to attempt to fight by

proxy first using special operations troops to advise indigenous personnel before

7 It is unfortunate that the US government immediately appears to have forgotten this lesson as they committed thousands of US troops to the Korean conflict rather than advising the South Korean forces and keeping the US footprint small. Simultaneously though the first advisors began arriving in Vietnam to aid the democratic south against the Viet Minh.


36

committing a large-scale troop deployment of regular forces (Special Forces Association

2014).

Domestically Greece ultimately allowed for a return to the climate of past

administrations. The use of small-scale forces in proxy wars rather than large numbers

of American citizens moving across the globe to fight allowed the American public to let

most conflicts in which the US engaged slip from their minds. The glaring exceptions to

this occurred anytime large numbers of troops or units of conventional troops deployed

abroad to resolve a conflict. Large-scale deployments took place for Korea and Vietnam

beginning in 1965. In both of those cases, the American news media picked the story up

and kept it in the forefront of the populace’s consciousness until the troops returned

home. During Vietnam, the counter-culture movement and domestic opposition to the

war also made for good media, giving it even more presence in the headlines and news

broadcasts (Herring 2008, 762). As much attention as those conflicts garnered however,

places like Syria, Egypt, Laos, Thailand, and others received very little if any media

attention. The US populace largely was free to go on about their daily lives while

disregarding the rest of the world as irrelevant to them. This fit the pattern of

isolationism exhibited by the US in previous eras and following previous wars. It also

encouraged the reliance on covert or small-scale overt operations so that the actions

the ruling administration undertook in various foreign locales went unnoticed (and so

unopposed). The legacy of Greece within the domestic political realm has less to do

with any visible changes in the public’s consciousness, and more to do with the pattern

of behavior it first spawned and then encouraged in the government.


37

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