Understanding Critical Citizenship and Other Forms of Public Dissatisfaction: An Alternative Framework

Politics, Culture and Socialization, 3. Vol., No. 1-2/2012, pp. 177-194

Understanding Critical Citizenship and Other Forms of Public Dissatisfaction: An Alternative Framework

Ali Abdelzadeha and Joakim Ekmanb*

aÖrebro University, b Södertörn University

Abstract: Previous research has paid much attention to citizen dissatisfaction and the trends of growing political disaffection, cynicism, and scepticism – in short, the emergence of ‘critical citizens’. Also, more recent-ly, critical citizens have sometimes been viewed as an asset for democracy. However, despite both pes-simistic and optimistic interpretations of public criticism, the issue of conceptualizing negative attitudes has received less attention. The present study was conducted to enrich understanding of this particular dimension of citizens’ attitudes. To this end, the paper suggests an alternative theoretical framework for analysing various forms of negative political orientations. The framework has been tested empirically us-ing three types of statistical procedures, which demonstrate its validity and usefulness. Keywords: Critical citizens – political dissatisfaction – political disaffection – negative political orienta-tions – political attitudes – youths

Introduction

In recent decades, we have witnessed a growing academic interest in political participa-tion in the established or ‘old’ democracies. Much of this scholarly interest seems to be justified by a concern about declining levels of civic engagement, low electoral turnout, eroding public confidence in the institutions of representative democracy, and other signs

* Correspondence information: a Ali Abdelzadeh (corresponding author) School of Humanities, Education and Social Sciences, Youth & Society (YeS), Örebro University SE – 701 82 Örebro, Sweden. Phone: +46 19 30 36 90. E-mail: [email protected].

b Joakim Ekman Professor of Political Science Centre for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES), Södertörn University SE – 141 89 Huddinge, Sweden. Phone: +46 8 608 44 97. E-mail: [email protected].

Ali Abdelzadeh and Joakim Ekman: Understanding Critical Citizenship

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of public weariness, scepticism, cynicism and lack of trust in politicians and political par-ties. In the post-industrial societies, we are told, citizens have become increasingly disen-gaged from the traditional channels of political participation. Robert Putnam’s (2000) analysis of the state of democracy in the US is perhaps the best known contribution to this debate, but similar concerned voices have resonated in a number of other democracies worldwide, in Western Europe, in Scandinavia, and in South-East Asia. At the same time, it has been argued that such fears are exaggerated; the development of ‘critical citizens’ is not the same as the erosion of democracy, and the assumption of the decline and fall of civic engagement is, at best, premature (e.g. Berger, 2009; Norris, 2011, 2002, 1999). Moreover, critical citizens have been regarded as an asset for a vital democracy and a driving force for political reform (cf. Geissel, 2008).

Here, the focus is not on the debate over declining levels of participation per se, but on the concepts used by scholars to capture citizen dissatisfaction. Public dissatisfaction has attracted increasing scholarly interest in the past decade (e.g. Gunther and Montero, 2006; Montero, Gunther and Torcal, 1997; Torcal and Montero, 2006). However, there are two important limitations to this body of research. First, regardless of differences in interpretations of public criticism, the issue of the conceptualisation of negative attitudes has attracted less attention. There are only a few explicit attempts in recent years to con-struct a general conceptual model of public dissatisfaction (see below). This dimension of people’s political orientations has typically been subsumed under a general notion of (lack of) ‘political support’. Thus, if we are primarily interested in understanding varieties of public dissatisfaction, there is little to be gained from this research. Second, most of the research in this field has focused mainly on adults, rather than on adolescents. In this arti-cle, we apply a socialization perspective. Adolescence has been described as a period of ‘storm and stress’ (Arnett, 1999). It is a period during which adolescents face many de-velopmental challenges related to biological, cognitive, psychological and social aspects of their lives. Also, the political aspects of adolescents’ lives are affected, and subject to change. During this critical period, adolescents tend to be less politically engaged, and are generally more dissatisfied (cf. Dalton, 2004; Putnam, 1995). At the same time, findings from past research show that the growth of political roots in adolescence may be impor-tant to the long-term development of political attitudes and participation (cf. Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). Hence, understanding of youths’ political attitudes, not least their dissatisfaction, during adolescence is critical. In this way, the present article al-so contributes to the debate on the role of political socialization for democracy.

The need for an analytical framework that is explicitly designed for dealing with negative political orientations derives not only from the above-mentioned limitations and the growing presence of critical citizens, but also from the fact that public dissatisfaction seems to be a multidimensional phenomenon; when forming opinions or making judg-ments about politics, people tend to distinguish between different aspects of the political system (Klingemann, 1999). Also, it is likely that public dissatisfaction and political sup-port are unrelated, in the sense that dissatisfaction is not just a lack of political support. Rather, public dissatisfaction follows a logic of its own, and may have different behav-ioural consequences (Kavanagh, 1997; Magalhães, 2005). In sum, all of this implies that various forms of public dissatisfaction should be treated as conceptually distinct from broader political attitudes, especially from political support (or lack of it).

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Accordingly, the main purpose of this study was to enhance our understanding of dif-ferent forms of what David Easton once referred to as ‘negative support’ – the opposite of political support – which is a concept that embraces people who are dissatisfied or disaf-fected with, or critical, cynical or hostile toward, or feel alienated from their political sys-tem. The article breaks down into three sections. In the first section, we discuss the notion of ‘critical citizens and ‘political disaffection’, and suggest a theoretical framework for analysing different forms of negative political orientations. Subsequently, we move on empirically to use and demonstrate the validity of the proposed framework. This will be done by examining (a) how well the framework fits empirical data on young people’s ori-entations, (b) whether we can distinguish between groups of adolescents, and (c) whether the separated groups are differentiated with regard to civic engagement. In the concluding section, we discuss our empirical findings and the potential usefulness of the suggested framework.

Critical Citizens and Other Types of Dissatisfaction

One of the probably most frequently cited attempts in recent years to construct a general conceptual model of political support, explicitly designed for analysing public opinion surveys, has been made by Pippa Norris (Klingemann, 1999; cf. Linde and Ekman, 2003; cf. Neller, 2006; Norris, 1999). Norris, in collaboration with some of the most prominent survey research scholars in the world, has developed David Easton’s three-fold distinction between different objects of support – the political community, the regime, and the au-thorities – into a five-fold model of support for the political system (Easton, 1965, 1975; Norris, 2011, 1999). She stresses that Easton’s distinctions provide a good starting-point, but that they, at the same time, are in need of refinement. Emphasising the multidimen-sional nature of the concept of support, Norris distinguishes between five levels or objects of support: the political community; regime principles; regime performance; regime insti-tutions; and political actors. These different objects are treated as existing on a contin-uum, ranging from diffuse support (for the national community) to specific support (for particular political actors).

The strength of the Norris model is that it captures both diffuse and specific support for the political system (cf. Fuchs, 1999). Her model also takes into account the difference between support for democracy as the best form of government (support for the principles of democracy) and public support for ‘democracy’ as it works in practice, with all its flaws and shortcomings (support for the performance of democracy) – a crucial distinc-tion in analyses of public support for democracy (Dalton, 2002; Linde and Ekman, 2003; Qi and Shin, 2011). At the same time, the framework suggested by Norris is inadequate if we are interested in various forms of public dissatisfaction. In the Norris model, we find no explicit attempts to conceptualise public dissatisfaction. Rather, dissatisfaction is sim-ply understood as a lack of political support.

All this is ultimately related to the notion of public criticism – at least in so far as it is directed at the lower levels of the model (the performance, institution and actor levels) – as something fundamentally beneficial to a vibrant democratic society. Basically, Norris’s argument is that critical citizens can be considered as a resource for democracy and a


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driving force for political reform. For instance, citizens have the power to ‘throw the ras-cals out’ whenever they are dissatisfied with the political authorities in their country. Be-cause of the critical citizens’ possession of this power ‘democracy has a potential for re-newal and responsiveness that is its ultimate strength’ (Pharr and Putnam, 2000, p. 13). Moreover, some scholars argue that those groups of citizens who show different ‘symp-toms of criticism’ or are critical of their regimes, in one way or another, also value de-mocracy as the only legitimate political system and support its fundamental norms and principles (Dalton, 2004; Klingemann, 1999; Norris, 2011, 1999). Hans-Dieter Klinge-mann refers to such citizens as ‘dissatisfied democrats’: ‘They clearly approve of democ-racy as a mode of governance, but they are discontented with the way their own system is currently operating’ (1999, p. 32). Pippa Norris simply calls them ‘critical citizens’ – those who are aware of the basic characteristics of liberal democracy, and ‘believe that it is important to live in a democratic state, yet they remain dissatisfied when evaluating how democracy works’ (Norris, 2011, p. 19; 1999).

Is it really the case that critical citizens are always an asset for a vivid democracy? The idea of public criticism as a resource for democracy has become widely accepted over the past two decades (Geissel, 2008, p. 36; Norris, 1999; Nye, Zelikow and King, 1997). Geissel (2008) has tested the idea of criticism as a resource for democracy, demon-strating that ‘good citizens’ – i.e. people who participate, are well-informed, identify with democracy, have high levels of internal political efficacy and support the principles of democracy – are also attentive to politics, i.e. have a disposition to deal with political top-ics. Thus, not all critical citizens are necessarily an asset to a democracy; rather, it is the attentive critical citizens who are.

Political disaffection

The above findings demonstrate the need for a more nuanced conceptual framework – one that allows us to distinguish between different types of citizen dissatisfaction. The idea conveyed in the distinction between, say, support for regime principles and regime per-formance, basically tells us that not all support – and conversely, not all criticism – is equally important for the persistence of the political system. The same idea may be found in other conceptual frameworks as well. Most notably, in recent years, some scholars have explicitly attempted to conceptualise negative political orientations by introducing the concept of political disaffection (cf. Gunther and Montero, 2006; Gunther, Montero and Torcal, 2007; Montero et al., 1997; Torcal and Magalhães, 2009). This dimension of peo-ple’s orientations toward politics and representative institutions needs to be differentiated from illegitimacy and political discontent (Montero et al., 1997).

Following di Palma (1970), political disaffection has been defined as ‘the subjective feeling of powerlessness, cynicism and lack of confidence in the political process, politi-cians and democratic institutions, but with no questioning of the political regime’ (Torcal and Montero, 2006, p. 6). Thus, political disaffection has two, partly independent, sub-dimensions. The first dimension, which is called political disengagement, comprises a cluster of attitudes related to survey respondents’ lack of engagement with the political process and a general distrust of politics. This dimension of political disaffection could be operationalised through indicators such as lack of political interest, lack of political sali-


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ence (the belief that politics is not important), and lack of internal political efficacy (cf. Magalhães, 2005, p. 978). The second dimension, institutional disaffection, consists of beliefs about a lack of responsiveness of the political authorities and institutions, and also respondents’ lack of confidence in the institutions of political representation. This second dimension can be measured using two major groups of indicators, namely institutional confidence and assessments of the responsiveness of democratic institutions (Torcal and Brusattin, 2007; Torcal and Montero, 2006).

We appreciate the conceptual innovations suggested by Torcal, Gunther, Montero and others, and we certainly agree that it is important to distinguish lack of political support from various forms of negative orientations. Mere lack of support comes close to indiffer-ence, but not close enough to hostility (cf. Easton, 1967, pp. 163-164). At the same time, the three-fold distinction between political disaffection, political discontent and lack of belief in democratic principles is not sufficient, since there are in fact other types of citi-zen dissatisfaction relating to the political system not covered by Torcal and associates. Most obviously, the three-fold framework omits dissatisfaction relating to the political community (cf. Norris’s framework). Also, the three-fold framework fails to uphold clear distinctions between its three dimensions, since ‘political discontent’ and ‘political disaf-fection’ are both based on performance-driven dissatisfaction. Thus, a more sophisticated analytical framework is called for. In the next section, we will develop such a framework or model, and then go on empirically to demonstrate the validity of that model using vari-ous statistical techniques.

An alternative framework

Here, we want to suggest an alternative framework for analysing negative political orien-tations, drawing on both Norris (1999) and the ‘political disaffection’ framework (Gun-ther and Montero, 2006; Montero et al., 1997; Torcal and Montero, 2006). As we have noted, the Easton/Norris framework makes a distinction between principles and perform-ance when it comes to support for democracy. This entails a distinction between diffuse and specific support. In our suggested framework (Figure 1), we refer to this distinction as constituting a universal–specific dimension. Accordingly, dissatisfaction may be de-scribed either as ‘universal’, i.e. relating to a principle-driven negative orientation, or ‘specific’, relating to dissatisfaction with what a political system actually delivers. The ‘universal’ kind of dissatisfaction is likely to be found among, for example, neo-Nazis who distance themselves from the ideals of liberal democracy and support another form of government, based on a racist ideology and authoritarian rule.

The second dimension in our model is inspired by Torcal and Montero’s notion of po-litical disaffection, and also by the work of Almond and Verba (1963, 1980). What these scholars have in common is the inclusion of ‘the self’ in their analytical frameworks. Tor-cal and associates draw attention to the fact that people may be unhappy about their capa-bilities, which entails a distinct type of negative orientation not covered by the Norris framework. In a similar fashion, Almond and Verba include ‘the self’ in their original model of political culture. In Figure 1, we have included the notion of the self in the po-litical system by suggesting a political sphere–personal sphere dimension. Negative ori-entations in the political sphere refer precisely to dissatisfaction related to ‘politics’ in a


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conventional sense, whereas dissatisfaction in the private sphere refers to one’s actual or perceived capabilities and skills, on a personal level. For example, a citizen may feel like an outsider, for various reasons, or a citizen may feel powerless and unable to have any influence at all over what the government does. Figure 1: An alternative framework for analysing negative political orientations

We thus end up with a matrix with four different varieties of negative political orienta-tions (Figure 1). In the upper-left corner of the matrix, we would locate citizens who are dissatisfied with current politics in principle; they feel ideologically alienated in the sense that they do not share the general democratic principles on which the political system is founded. A non-democrat would end up in this box.

A distinctly different type of negative orientation would be found among citizens who are not anti-democrats, but for various reasons are dissatisfied with the way the system actually works, at least for the time being (upper-right cell in the matrix). This kind of dissatisfaction is precisely what Norris (1999) focuses on, i.e. on citizens dissatisfied with regime performance, political institutions, and political actors. Norris’ optimistic claim is that this kind of dissatisfaction does not constitute a threat to democracy; rather, ‘critical citizens’ may be an asset to democracy (cf. above).

In the lower-left corner of Figure 1, we would place people who feel that they do not belong in a given society or country. This has ultimately to do with a sense of being an ‘out-sider’, or of ‘not belonging’ (cf. Schwartz, 1973, p. 7). This orientation would be found, for


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example, among certain immigrant groups, or among people with values very much at odds with prevailing mainstream values. In a manner of speaking, the senses of being an outsider in general (or non-political) terms and of being an outsider in society with reference to po-litical regime principles may appear at first glance to be pretty close. Still, it makes sense to distinguish the two. For example, an individual may feel perfectly at ease with the dominat-ing (democratic) regime principles in a given society, but still feels that he or she does not belong in a community, for example, for ethnic or religious reasons.

In the fourth box (lower-right), we would place people who are dissatisfied with their perceived personal ability to make a difference in society. Otherwise stated, in this box we would find individuals with a feeling of powerlessness, i.e. a feeling of being unable to affect society in various ways. In the literature on political participation, such an orien-tation would come close to a perceived lack of internal efficacy (cf. Niemi, Craig and Mattei, 1991).

In the next section, we will empirically demonstrate the validity of the framework proposed above, specifically in relation to young people. This will be done by addressing three main questions, namely: (a) How well does the suggested framework fit with actual empirical data on young people’s political orientations? (b) Can we distinguish between different groups of adolescents with different patterns of negative political orientations? (c) If so, are there any differences between the groups of youths with regard to civic en-gagement?

The suggested framework of negative political orientations has been developed in re-lation to the academic debate on public dissatisfaction and declining levels of political participation. Consequently, it makes sense to test the usefulness of the framework in re-lation to measures of civic engagement. The civic engagement construct in this study was operationalised in the following indicators: political interest, political discussion with par-ents, perception of future civic engagement, and online political participation. These indi-cators were justified by the fact that our empirical data were collected among 13 to 16 year-olds rather than adults. At the same time, some of these indicators, e.g. political in-terest and discussion, have been considered as universal indicators of civic engagement (cf. Norris, 2000, p. 240). The aims of using these indicators is to demonstrate the useful-ness of our framework, and to highlight some differences between the groups of youths with varying patterns of negative political orientations.

Method

Participants and Procedure

The data for the current study were collected in a large Swedish city, as part of an on-going longitudinal study carried out within a multidisciplinary research program for the investigation of young people’s development in a social and societal context. The main goals of this seven-year long joint program are to understand the different ways in which young people articulate political and civic engagement, and to explain the mechanisms and processes through which they develop various directions of civic engagement. The community where the data were collected is a large Swedish city with a total population


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of about 135,000. According to national statistics, this city was similar in 2010 to the Swedish average in annual mean income (225,242 Swedish Kronor/person, compared with 229,056 Swedish Kronor/person for the whole country), rate of unemployment (9.5%, compared with 8.4% for the whole country), and percentage of immigrants (5.7%, compared with 6.7% for the whole country).

Thirteen schools within the city were selected for participation in the study: 10 of the 14 junior high schools, and 3 of the 7 high schools. These schools were selected on the basis of their different features for the purpose of representing different types of schools (public schools and private schools) and also various students’ socioeconomic and ethnic backgrounds. Multi-ethnic schools in low socioeconomic areas were over-sampled to in-crease their representation in the overall sample. All seventh graders in junior high schools and first graders in high schools were targeted in the study (N=2012). The partici-pation rate was 94.1 % (N= 915; 48.7 boys, 51. 3% girls; M age=13.4, SD=.53) for the compulsory-school seventh graders, and 84.7 % (N=948; 49.1% boys, 50.9% girls; M age=16.6, SD=.71) for the high-school first graders.

Participants filled out questionnaires during regular school hours in their classrooms. Trained research assistants distributed the questionnaires and informed the students that participation in the study was voluntary; the students were assured of the confidentiality of their responses. No teachers were present when the students filled out their questionnaires. Moreover, before the study took place, parents were informed about the study by regular mail, and received a postage-paid card to return if they did not want their children to par-ticipate. Only 1% of parents refused to allow their children to take part. No-one was paid for participation in the study, but we made a contribution to the class funds of all of the classes involved.

Measures

Principle-driven dissatisfaction. Negative orientations relating to ‘principle-driven dissat-isfaction’ refer to feelings of not sharing the political ideals of a given political system (e.g. a liberal democracy), and instead embraced other (opposing) regime principles. This measure comprised two items: “The military should be in power if the government is no good” and “Politicians should decide which religion a country has” (Pearson’s r= .40). Responses were on a four-point scale, ranging from 1 (totally agree) to 4 (totally dis-agree). Agreement with these statements was interpreted as entailing principle-driven dis-satisfaction.

Political estrangement. The measure of youths’ feelings of lack of belonging comprised three items. Youths responded to the following statements: “I feel at home in Sweden as a country”, “I feel at home in the municipality where I live” and “I feel at home in the resi-dential area where I live”. A four-point response scale was used, ranging from 1 (applies exactly) to 4 (does not apply at all). Thus, lack of agreement with these statements was in-terpreted as a general feeling of estrangement. Cronbach’s alpha for this measure was .82.

Political powerlessness. This measure comprised eight items. Youths were asked to indi-cate what they could do if they really tried. The items were: “Actively contribute to the


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work of organisations trying to solve social problems”, “Take leadership in a group to ad-dress social issues”, “Take on responsibility in a political youth organisation”, “Be an ac-tive member of a political organisation”, “Help to organise a political protest”, “Discuss politics with persons more experienced than me”, “Participate in a demonstration in my hometown”, and “Convince others to sign a petition about political or social issues”. Re-sponses were on a four-point scale ranging from 1 (I could absolutely not manage it) to 4 (I could absolutely manage it). Cronbach’s alpha for this measure was .92.

Performance-driven dissatisfaction. This dimension of youths’ attitudes toward the politi-cal system was measured on three sub-dimensions: dissatisfaction with (a) regime per-formance, (b) political institutions, and (c) political actors. Negative orientations, based on evaluations of ‘regime performance’, concerned youths’ dissatisfaction with what ‘democracy’ is actually delivering. This sub-dimension was measured by the following question: “On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Swe-den?” The response scale ranged from 1 (very satisfied) to 4 (not at all satisfied). Youths’ dissatisfaction with political institutions was measured by three items concerning their degree of confidence in the government, the parliament, and the courts (alpha = .91). The response scale for this measure ranged from 1 (no confidence at all) to 4 (a lot of confi-dence). The third sub-dimension of youths’ performance-driven dissatisfaction was meas-ured by a single question: “How satisfied are you with how the people now in national of-fice are handling the country’s affairs?” Responses were on a four-point scale ranging from 1 (very satisfied) to 4 (not at all satisfied).

Indicators of civic engagement

Political interest. Our first indicator of civic engagement focused on youths’ interest in politics, and was measured by the following single item: “How interested are you in poli-tics?” The response scale ranged from 1 (very interested) to 5 (not at all interested).

Political discussions with parents. This measure comprised three items, asking youths about how often they discussed politics or societal issues, or environmental issues, and what they listened to on the news with their parents. The responses were coded on a five-point scale, ranging from 1(very often) to 5 (never). Cronbach’s alpha for this measure was.78.

Perception of future civic engagement. Youths’ perceptions of future civic engagement were measured using two indicators. The first indicator concerned whether they would join a political party as adults. Responses to the question were coded on a four-point scale, ranging from 1 (Definitely not) to 4 (For sure). The second indicator was about be-ing active in organisations and engaging in societal issues. The question was phrased as follows: “Some people have set goals for themselves concerning their engagement in so-cietal issues. Have you?” The response options for this question were: (1) “I want to work actively in organisations, and I’m already a member of an organisation”, (2) “I definitely want to work actively (in organisations or by other means) on issues like this, but have not yet committed myself”, (3) “I am not interested in issues like this, and as far as I can see, I will not commit myself to engage in them” and (4) “I am not interested in issues


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like this, rather the opposite, and I will certainly not commit myself to do anything about them”.

Online civic engagement. Youths’ involvement in political and civic activities on the Internet during the past two months was measured by responses to the following state-ments: “Have discussed societal issues or politics with friends on the Internet”, “Have vis-ited the site of a political or civic organisation”, “Have sought information about politics or societal issues on the web”, “Have read about politics in a blog”, “Have viewed videos or film clips about political or societal questions”, and “Have discussed societal issues with people I don’t know personally”. The response options were: (1) no (2) yes, occa-sionally (3) yes, several times. Cronbach’s alpha for this measure was .85.

Statistical Analysis

In order empirically to test the usefulness of the theoretical framework suggested above (Figure 1), three types of statistical procedures were adopted. First, a confirmatory factor analysis was performed in order to test the plausibility of the hypothesised dimensions of negative political orientations, using Mplus statistical package (Muthén and Muthén, 1998-2010). Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is a theory-driven multivariate statistical procedure, which means that the researcher must pre-specify all aspects of the model, such as the number of latent factors, the indicators of each latent factor, and whether the latent variables are related to each other (Brown, 2006). CFA was considered to be the most appropriate way of analysing the data at hand, since our purpose was to establish whether our hypothesised model fitted the empirical data. In other words, we chose to use confirmatory factor analysis, rather than regular exploratory factor analysis, in this study because our interest was in testing (confirming) hypotheses concerning the structure un-derlying a set of variables concerned with negative political orientations, not in exploring the interrelations between these variables per se.

To evaluate the fit of the CFA model, we used a combination of estimates, classified as absolute and relative fit indices, as suggested in the literature (Brown, 2006; Kline, 2010). These fit indices are estimates of how good the theoretical model matches the ob-served data. Thus, good model fit implies that the data are consistent with the assumptions of the hypothesised model. Brown (2006) suggests reporting at least one estimate for each type of fit index. Consequently, in this article, we examined values on the Chi-square test of model fit (an absolute fit index), and on the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) and the Standardised Root Mean Squared Residual (SRMR) index (relative fit indices).

Second, a K-means cluster analysis was performed to identify groups of youths with similar political orientations. K-means clustering attempts to minimise the distances be-tween the variable scores and the cluster centres. Put more simply, this classification technique identifies homogeneous groups of youths, i.e. those who share similar charac-teristics with regard to their negative political orientations. Consequently, youths in the same group are most similar to each other in their profile of negative political orienta-tions, and most dissimilar to members of other groups on these same orientations. The choice of this second type of analysis was based on our interest in understanding youths


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in terms of their characteristic patterns of negative political orientations, rather than in examining interrelations between the variables. Thus, for at least two reasons, a person-oriented approach was appropriate. First, it allowed us more accurately to identify specific types of young people with certain patterns of negative political orientations. Second, be-cause we were studying groups of youths who share similar characteristics, and not the variables, there was the potential to contribute to our understanding of the different ways in which youths engage in civic activities.

Finally, a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with post hoc tests, was used in order to see whether the groups obtained by the K-means clustering differed in terms of their ‘means’ on a set of indicators of civic engagement. MANOVA is an extension of the analysis of variance (ANOVA), and is used to compare several groups on more than one different, but related, dependent variables (Pallant, 2010). Thus, this type of analysis is appropriate for examining differences and similarities in civic engagement among groups of youths with different patterns of political orientations.

Results

How well does the suggested framework fit the empirical data on young people’s political orientations?

We used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to examine the plausibility of the four-dimensional framework. We hypothesised a CFA model that encompasses four correlated factors with one higher-order factor for the negative political orientations, principle-driven dissatisfaction, political estrangement, performance-driven dissatisfaction and poli-tical powerlessness (see Figure 1). The higher-order factor, i.e. performance-driven dissa-tisfaction, comprised all the sub-dimensions (Figure 2). This CFA model yielded a signi-ficant chi-square value (χ2 (128) = 739.45, p < .001), and the following values on the rela-tive fit indices, CFI = .96; RMSEA = .05, 95% CI .05 – .06; SRMR = .06. On the basis of Hu and Bentler’s (1999) recommendations – CFI equal to or higher than 0.95, RMSEA equal to or lower than .05, and SRMR equal to or lower than 0.08 – our hypothesised mo-del was shown to have acceptable fit values. The standardised parameter estimates of the model are given in Figure 2. All the factor loadings were statistically significant and ap-peared to be reliable indicators of the latent variables included in the CFA model (cf. Tabachnick and Fidell, 2006). Overall, the results of the confirmatory factor analysis clearly indicate a satisfactory model, and thereby provide evidence for the plausibility of the theoretical framework for analysis of different forms of negative political orientations (as suggested in the theoretical section above, see Figure 1).


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Figure 2: Results of a confirmatory factor analysis.

Note. Ovals represent latent variables, rectangles manifest variables. The error variances are omitted to make the figure easier to read.


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Can we distinguish between different groups of youths with different patterns of negative political orientations?

To address this question, we used K-means clustering, and, after all the variables had been standardised and outliers removed from the analysis, a five-cluster solution was ob-tained. The five-cluster solution contained two variables representing performance-driven dissatisfaction (dissatisfaction with actors and regime performance), and three represent-ing the other forms of negative political orientations, i.e. principle-driven dissatisfaction, political estrangement, and political powerlessness.

Figure 3 shows the five groups obtained from the K-means clustering. As may be gauged from the figure, the first group of youths, whom we named hostile citizens (N=253), contains individuals who show high levels of principle-driven dissatisfaction. These youths seem not to share democratic political ideals, but instead embrace other (opposing) regime principles. In other words, this group is characterised by strong anti-democratic and hostile attitudes.

Youths in the second group, here referred to as outsider citizens (N=314), held com-paratively high levels of feelings of political estrangement. This means that they do not feel that they were a part of the country, the municipality, or the residential area in which they live. In other words, youths in this group feel like outsiders.

The third group, which we named critical citizens (N=188), represents youths who show high levels of performance-driven dissatisfaction, but more-or-less average values on the other three scales. Thus, youths in this group were dissatisfied with the perform-ance of political actors and the way democracy works in Sweden, at least for the time be-ing. They were, however, not anti-democrats who strongly prefer non-democratic regime principles. As can be seen from Figure 3, youths in this group are below average on prin-ciple-driven dissatisfaction.

The fourth group, self-doubting citizens (N=284), contains youths who score high on the political powerlessness scale. The youths who fell into this group had negative senti-ments in relation to their perceived capability to make a difference in society by, for ex-ample, taking on the role of leader in a group to address social issues, or actively contrib-uting to the work of organisations trying to solve social problems.

Aside from these four groups with negative political orientations, there was also a group with positive orientations, which we labelled satisfied democrats (N=412). This group contains individuals who held positive attitudes across all the scales. They were sat-isfied with the political authorities and the way democracy works, believed in their capa-bility to make a difference in society, and did not have non-democratic attitudes or feel-ings of being outsiders in society. This group was used as a reference point in this study, since it contains youths with a totally different pattern of political orientations than the other four groups.


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Figure 3: Cluster pattern: Z-scores on the four dimensions of negative political orientations

In order to validate and provide evidence for the robustness of our findings, we randomly divided the sample into two subsamples, and applied the same clustering procedure as be-fore to both. Further, we calculated kappa degree-of-agreement values in cluster member-ship by comparing memberships of both subsamples separately with those of the total sample (Cohen, 1988; Kraemer, 1982). The obtained kappa concordance values were: k = 0.82 (P <.001) for the first subsample, and k =0.77 (P <.001) for the second subsample. Following the classification suggested by Landis and Koch (1977), these kappa values can be interpreted as almost perfect and substantial. In other words, our original grouping proved to be robust.

Are there any differences between the groups of youths with regard to civic engagement?

To determine whether there were differences between the identified groups, we con-ducted a one-way between-groups multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). All five indicators of civic engagement, as described in the theory section above, were used as dependent variables. The independent variable was group membership. The multi-variate tests of significance revealed that there was an overall group difference across the five indicators of civic engagement, F (20, 5436) = 11.45, p<.001, η2=.04. When the results for the dependent variables were considered separately, the univariate tests for each dependent variable indicated that all the variables differed significantly across groups (see Table 1).


191

In order to identify where the significant differences lay, follow-up analyses were conducted. Multiple comparisons were performed using Tukey’s honestly significant dif-ference (HSD) test. The multiple comparisons revealed that the ‘satisfied democrats’ dif-fered significantly from the other four groups on almost all the civic engagement vari-ables included. An examination of the estimated marginal means for the remaining vari-ables revealed that satisfied democrats had significantly higher mean scores. This indi-cates that they discussed politics and environmental issues, etc. more frequently with their parents than other youths. They were also more interested in politics, and more likely to join a political party and be active in an organisation. Table 1: Differences in civic engagement between groups of youths.

Note. *** p < .001. a, b, c, d The superscripts indicate significant mean differences between the groups on the Tukey HSD post hoc test. All variables were recoded so that a higher mean indicates more of whatever the variable measures. η2 = partial Eta Squared. Multivariate F-test, F(20, 5436) = 11.45, p < .001, η2 = .04. We also found significant differences between the other four groups. Inspection of the mean scores for political interest in Table 1 indicates that the youths who were in the ‘self-doubting’ group were significantly less interested in politics and less engaged in online civic engagement than the ‘hostile’, ‘outsider’, and ‘critical’ youths. They were al-so less engaged in political discussions with their parents than youths in the hostile and outsider groups. Moreover, outsider youths were significantly more engaged in online civic activities, and more interested in politics than the hostile and critical youths. Overall, the groups of youths with different patterns of negative political orientations displayed unique patterns of differences in their civic engagement.

Discussion

The major goal of this research was to develop a framework for analysing varieties of negative political orientations. Here, we have argued that citizens’ negative political ori-entations cannot easily be subsumed under a general notion of ‘political support’, or the lack of it. Instead, we have argued that such negative political orientations may, like the

Hostile Citizens

Outsider Citizens

CriticalCitizens

Self-doubting Citizens

Satisfied Democrats

F(5, 1359) η2 Observed power

Political interest 2.34a

2.68b 2.25a 1.86c 2.93d 47.88*** .12 1.00 Political discussion with par-ents 2.26ab

2.31b

2.10a c

2.01c

2.50d

28.91*** .08 1.00

Perception of future civic engagement

Join a political party

1.88a b

1.88b c

1.65a d

1.51d

2.01c

23.02*** .06 1.00 Become active in organizations 2.15a b

2.15b c

1.95a d

1.85d

2.27c

17.06*** .05 1.00

Online civic engagement .73a

.82b .71a .62c .83b 22.86*** .06 1.00


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notion of political support, be expressed in different ways. More specifically, we have claimed that negative political orientations constitute a multidimensional phenomenon, encompassing several different kinds of attitudes towards the political system. Further, we have argued that a deeper understanding of this multidimensional phenomenon requires a sophisticated analytical framework. Drawing on previous frameworks, this paper pro-poses an alternative theoretical framework for analysing various forms of negative politi-cal orientations. Our theoretical framework was examined empirically using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), cluster analysis, and MANOVA.

The analyses generated three important findings. First, the hypothesised CFA model of four distinct dimensions to negative political orientations, as shown in Figure 1, indi-cated good fit with the observed data. Second, it is reasonable to talk not only of different forms of negative orientations, but also of groups of young citizens with different patterns of negative orientations. Third, there were differences not only between the satisfied group and the dissatisfied groups, but also among the groups of people with negative po-litical orientations. Two important conclusions can be drawn from these findings. First, it seems to be both empirically and theoretically necessary to construct a separate concept-tual framework for analysing negative political orientations, a framework that is distinct from the ones used for studying general political orientations, i.e. political support. Sec-ond, it is meaningful to address negative political orientations as a multidimensional con-cept, encompassing a variety of attitudes.

There are some limitations and strengths of the current study that should be addressed. A potential limitation concerns the age distribution of our sample. In the current study, we were mainly interested in youths’ political orientations, which can be seen as a limitation in the sense that the findings may not apply to older populations. However, as highlighted in the introduction, youths are at a unique phase in life, both socially and politically, and this age group is an interesting one to study. Nevertheless, there is a need for studies to replicate our findings using a broader range of age groups. Since this study is part of a large-scale and on-going project concerned with political socialisation, which will generate a seven-year body of longitudinal data, we are in a perfect position to analyse changes over time, as the adolescents turn into adults. Also, making cross-national comparisons may be an important complement to obtaining more information about contextual effects.

At the same time, the study has several strengths. One is that it approaches the notion of public dissatisfaction broadly. The analytical framework suggested here, by contrast with earlier frameworks within this field, captures a broad range of politically dissatisfied and critical citizens. By using a variety of empirical indicators, we have been able to dis-tinguish between different forms of negative political orientations – covering not all, but at least the most relevant dimensions of this topical political phenomenon. A second strength is that the suggested framework is not only useful for the analysis of different forms of negative political orientations per se, but also for the examination of other re-lated political phenomena, such as civic engagement and various forms of political par-ticipation. Thus, despite its limitations, the study adds to current knowledge by suggesting an alternative typology of negative political orientations, and also by highlighting the im-portance of distinguishing between them. Political dissatisfaction is not just the opposite of political support; rather, it comes in different varieties, which have different behave-ioural consequences.


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Acknowledgment

This study was made possible by access to data from the Political Socialization Program, a longitudinal research program at YeS (Youth & Society) at Örebro University, Sweden. Responsible for the planning, implementation, and financing of the collection of data in this project were Professors Erik Amnå, Mats Ekström, Margaret Kerr, and Håkan Stattin. The data collection was supported by grants from the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation.

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Understanding Critical Citizenship and Other Forms of Public Dissatisfaction: An Alternative Framework