Human Rights, Universalism and Cosmopolitanism

Between Cultures and Civilizations

By

Vittorio Cotesta

1. Human right in Western tradition

The turning point on the issue of human rights takes place in the late eighteenth century.

Nonetheless, to believe that it all began with the American and the French Revolution is clearly

misleading. The development of the idea of the unity of humankind takes place within the span of

two millennia so that, by omitting this premise, we risk losing the universal sense of the issue. It is

beyond doubt, however, that both perspectives – that of ‘natural’ differences and of ‘natural’

equality – start to conflict in the modern age and especially in the eighteenth century.1

Tocqueville helps us to understand what is at stake here. On the one hand there is a society

historically constituted and organized around the principle of inequality; on the other, social,

economic and cultural forces are advocating the construction of a society founded on the principle

of equality. In both cases nature is a source of difference and of equality. A preliminary clarification

of such issue is needed. Furthermore, in this perspective, the continuity between Greco-Roman

Stoicism and modernity emerges.2

In the words of one of the most fervent opponents of the French revolution, Edmund Burke, we

understand the epochal character of the struggle: ‘In no time at all [the French] have destroyed their

monarchy, their church, their nobility, their laws, their possessions, their army, their fleet, their

trade, their arts and their manufacture’ (Burke 1999: 409). This should be an example and a warning

that such a plague is spreading throughout Great Britain and Europe. In their devastating fury, the

French have ‘torn the roots’ of every property and have created ‘institutions and the best of anarchy,

called human rights’ (Burke 1999: 412-413). In particular, the doctrine of popular sovereignty is a

‘non-sense’ or a violation of the fixed rule of nature. In Great Britain, where only a few

irresponsible individuals are in favour of human rights (Burke 1999: 428-429, 432, 439, 418).

A critique centred on analytical positivism is that of Jeremy Bentham towards the ‘inventors of

human rights’ (Bentham 1838-1843: 156). Of such rights there are no traces in social and historical

reality. They are truly a non-sense: ‘To speak of natural rights is mere nonsense: to speak of natural

and non-prescriptive rights is rhetorical nonsense’ (Bentham 1838-1843: 124). Bentham’s criticism

casts a huge shadow over natural and human rights: ‘no such natural rights exist, no such rights

prior to the founding of political society have ever existed; no such natural rights distinct from and

opposed to legal rights have ever existed. The expression … is purely figurative’ (Bentham 1838-

1843: 123). Rights are the creation of political society.

An analysis of the meaning of these criticisms shows that Burke is fighting the doctrine of

human rights on their own ground. If we consider nature as it is, we realize that men are born

‘unequal’, different. The only society created following a natural method of selection is the one

structured following differences of rank as in English society, in which the upper classes (nobility

and bourgeoisie) are integrated within the same hierarchical model, excluding the populace, ‘furious

and libertine’, easily led by ‘the passion for servitude’ (Burke 1999: 413, 410). This society,

following the natural selection approach, creates rights.

Bentham puts forward a linguist critique ante litteram to the human rights theory. He proves

that propositions of a general character, such as: ‘Men are born free and have equal rights. Social

distinctions can only be founded on mutual convenience’ (Declaration of the Rights of Man and

Citizen 1789), do not have, as would be said nowadays, an empirical reference. The dichotomy is

evident (it is not true that all men are born free and equal) as in fact at birth, no two people are

equal. This kind of assertion, on which the 1789 Declaration of Human Rights is based, then

appears to be meaningless.

As to the element of the critique, on which even Burke agrees, intent as he is on pursuing other

aims and not in demonstrating logically the nonsense of the theory of human rights, concerns the

claim of conceiving in juridical terms the shaping of political society. In other words, there is no

sphere of law from which principles and norms of positive laws descend.

This point is of the utmost importance. In fact, Burke and Bentham grasp the central issue both

of natural laws as well as of the theory of human rights. The 'nature' referred to in both assumptions

and criticisms has the same meaning. The critics consider nature in its historical effectiveness. They

note that at birth men are different. Their lives are lived on the basis of access to resources, their

rights, culture, and capacities. This is the only society; the others are merely in the minds of their

ideological mentors.

The theory of natural rights maintains that this society is the only one. It also posits that at birth

men are different from each other. The organizational principles of society are considered, on the

contrary unfair. Holding that an historical reconstruction, such as society founded on slavery or

class distinction is a natural fact, is pure invention.

Modern political theory has juxtaposed a natural society founded on the equality of men with a

natural society founded on difference. Differences considered natural by political traditionalists are

considered unnatural by modern political thinkers. In the society to be built the fact that all men are

born equal is to be borne in mind, as is abolishing the differences which from birth accompany

individuals throughout life. The theory of natural rights counter-poses an ideal society to the

existing society. Is this ideal world merely an image, an abstract form in line with the thinking of

critics of the theory of natural rights and human rights?

In the Declaration of Human Rights and Citizenship, men are considered by birth ‘free and

equal’ as concerns their rights. Undeniable, unwritten rights concern freedom, property, security and

the resistance to oppression. In a different cultural context, Amendments I, III, IV and V of the

Constitution of the United States of America identify the same guaranteed rights inviolable by the

state or by its functionaries. If the objection to the French declarations (that of 1789 and

subsequently) refers to their abstract nature, the amendments to the American Constitution place

individual rights at the basis of their juridical norms. What appeared impossible to Bentham and

Burke at that time was being implemented in a concrete and historical fashion. However, the

justification of such rights remains an open one.

Justification can be found in Immanuel Kant’s works, the peak of reflection on human rights at

the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century.3 Kant initially proposes to

show the existence of a sphere of principles, norms and values from which basic juridical norms can

be derived. In the second place, Kant considers the individual and his intellectual and moral

freedom. Furthermore, Kant’s conception of law is that of a global regulating of the relationships

among individuals, society and states. For instance he maintains that

a violation of rights in one place is felt throughout the world; the idea of a law of world

citizenship is no high-flown or exaggerated notion. It is a supplement to the unwritten code

of civil and international law, fundamental for the upholding of public human rights and

hence also of perpetual peace (Kant 1977: 96).

Along this line it is possible to find a justification of ‘natural rights’ or, as it is now more

appropriate to say, ‘human rights’.

In a polemic against Hobbes’ theory of the social contract, Kant claims that freedom, equality

and independence are ‘a priori principles’ and not ‘laws emanating from an already existing state

or, rather, laws according to which it is possible in general to conceive of a State following certain

principles of purely rational law external to the individual’ (Kant 1786). The proof of the rationale

of these claims is provided by Kant through an opposing path of reasoning, (i.e. proving the

acceptance of the opposite principle irrational). Freedom is not an issue. Equality, on the contrary,

poses problems. The first element one has to consider is that for Kant, the equality of all concerns

every single person as a subject. As subjects of the same legislative power exercising sovereignty;

privileges by birth are inadmissible:

Since birth is not a deed of the one who is born, and since he can thereby incur no

inequality in his legal status and no subjugation to coercive laws other than to the sole,

supreme legislating power that is common to all, there can be no innate privilege of one

member of the commonwealth as a fellow subject before others. And no one can bequeath

the privilege of a rank which he possesses by virtue of the common weal to his

descendants and therefore cannot, as if they were qualified by birth into the ruling class,

forcibly prevent others from rising through their own merits, to the higher positions in the

social hierarchy (Kant 1786: 63-64).

One could consider Burke’s reasoning on the hereditary character of social privileges as being thus

confuted. For Kant the ‘natural’ conception, in Burke’s perspective, seems an accidental

construction of civil society which on the contrary, to be such has to take inspiration from civil

values. Kant’s idea of the merit of the individual, obvious for a Christian thinker, is also one of

justice, if one does not want to condemn from birth some people to a cruel destiny. What counts

most, nonetheless, is the fact that this condition is ‘universal’; everyone has to be in the condition of

‘non-privilege’ from birth not only for the good of the individual, but also for that of the

community.

Nonetheless, to state that the principles of liberty, equality and independence are given a priori,

is not a demonstration that this is so. Following Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Kant confutes that

reasoning is contradictory and/or absurd if one takes away the assumption of judgement. In this

case, the conflict lies in assuming that rights are a product of the shaping of political society and to

imagine at the same time, that individuals as holders of rights, shape by themselves a political

society. In other words, individuals have such rights ex ante and if they have them before, they

cannot receive them from political society afterwards.

Kant also assumes the existence of a non-written code that has to be integrated by positive

codes, by laws of the states. This non-written code is, we think, the sphere of pre-political rights

from which legislators take inspiration in their activities.

In the first definitive article of his project for Perpetual Peace, Kant claims that ‘The civil

constitution of each state must be republican’ (Kant 1977: 85). The republican constitution, he goes

on, must be based: ‘1) on the principles of freedom of the member of society (as men); 2) on the

principles of dependency of all on a common legislator (as subjects); 3) on the law of equality of all

(as citizens) (Kant 1977: 85). This constitution ‘originally lies as the basis of all the species of civil

constitutions’ and Kant asks himself, whether or not it is the ‘only one that can bring perpetual

peace’ (Kant 1977: 86).

The path, at this stage, seems clear: there are principles, such as freedom and equality, on the

basis of which civil constitutions are founded; out of civil constitutions stem subsequently, as a kind

of specialization, political societies.

Yet Kant posits also a relationship between law and global society. In the ‘Second Article for

Perpetual Peace,’ he claims that ‘International law must be based on a federation of free states’

(Kant 1977: 89). Hence each state must be based on principles of freedom, interdependence and

equality and on the global level; they create a federation of free states. Kant rejects the hypothesis of

a world government, at that time perhaps not even conceivable and even today quite improbable.

Since, even if on the basis of these principles different states are formed (albeit inspired by the same

principles) the problem of the juridical regulation of the relations comes to the fore.

In the third definitive article for perpetual peace, Kant states: ‘Cosmopolitan law must be

limited to the condition of a universal hospitality’ (Kant 1977: 94). The relationship among states

must hence be based on openness and reciprocity. This is the right of ‘a foreigner, who reaching the

land of another people, of not being treated with hostility’ (Kant 1977: 94). He even conceives that

the foreigner be sent away, ‘but while, on his part, he acts pacifically, the other cannot act with

hostility against him’. The principle of hospitality is something more for Kant. The idea of the unity

of humanity and of common resources available on earth emerges together with that of prohibition

of their appropriation only for individual ends. The right of hospitality in this sense specifies itself

as ‘a right of visiting belonging to all men, that of offering oneself to sociability in virtue of the right

to the common possession of the surface of the earth whose spherical form obliges them to suffer

others to subsist contiguous to them, because they cannot disperse themselves to an indefinite

distance, and because originally one has no greater right to a country than another’ (Kant 1977: 94).

‘In this way, concludes Kant, distant parts of the world can enter into peaceful reciprocal

relationships and these can become in time, formally juridical and finally, draw closer together

humanity into a cosmopolitan constitution’ (Kant 1977: 85).4

This conception of human society as global society constructed on cosmopolitan law has been

criticised by many. Leaving aside the most obvious and banal critique which scoffs at this ‘utopian’

conception, reference could be made to the modern issue of freedom and equality to grasp that this

utopia is not necessarily destined to remain so. More interesting, instead, are other critiques. The

most important among these is the critique relative to the conception of global society on the basis

of a European identity. This critique comes both from within European culture, as well as from a

vast political and cultural movement that culminates in the contestation of the primacy of the Greek

world and hence of Europe and the Western world predominant in the cultural field and in human

civilization.

From a philosophical perspective, a debate on human rights has been reopened, focusing on

Kant’s proposal and addressed to completing his justification of a global order based on human

rights.

More useful is another critique based on the idea that in the Western world and, above all, in the

USA, human rights have been reduced to a means of protecting private property (Woodiwiss 2005).5

On this basis, human rights are an invention of the United States and, in particular, of F. D.

Roosevelt and his ‘Proclamation of Four Liberties’ (1941). In Roosevelt's speech, a transition of

meaning from natural to human rights6 occurs. It is true that for Roosevelt, human rights are

understood as being universal: ‘Freedom – in the four fundamental meanings of freedom of opinion

and expression, of religion, of will and of freedom from the fear of war – means the supremacy of

human rights everywhere’ (Roosevelt in Woodiwiss 2005: 88).

Yet, this universality is criticised by Woodiwiss. In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

of 1948 there is a Western and, above all, American, understanding of human rights. There are no

references either to other cultures or to Asian values. The Islamic, Confucian, Buddhist, Hindu and

even Catholic Christian and orthodox Christian values can also be considered sources of human

rights (Woodiwiss 2005: 145). The reduction of human rights to individualism and socialism void

the claim of universality contained in them.

Whether this interpretation of human right is feasible or otherwise, whether they really are

transfigured by the logic of capitalism and of proprietary individualism or otherwise, one point

remains: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 starts from Western cultural premises.

On the one hand there are references to the “Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen” of 1789,

particularly to Article 1: ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They have

reason and consciousness and must act towards others according to a spirit of fraternity’ (our italics)

which create difficulties for any regime limiting in any way, the use of reason, freedom of thought

and participation in the government of one's own country (article 21).

On the other hand, the articles that refer to the aspirations of American and European societies

after the Second World War are quite distant from those of many Asian and African societies. What

is more important, furthermore, is the rational foundation of human rights, detached from any

religious legitimacy or origin.

This outlook is confirmed by many but it receives official sanction in the documents approved

in the different regions of the world. The preamble of the ‘Universal Islamic Declaration of Human

Rights’ (1981) states that human rights are ‘eternal’ and ‘indicated’ by Allah. Beyond the specific

content, coinciding with and sometimes even more extensive than those stated in the 1948

declaration, these rights are asserted in the name of Allah the Compassionate, the merciful. In the

preamble of the Bangkok Declaration (1993) the need is stressed ‘to redefine all matters related to

human rights and to assure a fair and balanced approach’ to their defining and the contribution that

‘the Asian countries with their different and rich cultures’ can offer. The ‘Arab Charter of Human

Rights’ (1994) starts by declaring that it is ‘Based on the faith of the Arab nation in the dignity of

the human person whom the Almighty has exalted ever since the beginning of creation and in the

fact that the Arab homeland is the cradle of religions and civilizations whose lofty human values

affirm the human right to a decent life based on freedom, justice and equality’.

These missions and the declarations can be studied from several perspectives. They might be

only lip service, they might have had consequences, or they might have been the basis for national

constitutions. Our perspective highlights the cultural fact they represent. To the Euro-Western

conception of human rights is opposed or juxtaposed an Islamic, Asiatic, or Arab perspective of

human rights. In the ‘Bangkok Declaration’ and in the Arab Charter there is a noticeable critique

against colonialism and neo-colonialism. The most serious challenge, nonetheless, comes from the

‘Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights’ in which each right appears to have descended

directly from Allah.

Now the question is far more complex than ever. At the turning point of modernity, the conflict

was between two conceptions of human life within European and Western society. These two

conceptions have been brought back to the general principles animating them: difference, hierarchy

and hereditary rights of the social position versus freedom, equality, personal merit in the

acquisition of one's own position within society. In the conception of ‘natural’ rights, before, and

‘human’ rights after, men and women are the holders of inalienable and undeniable rights. For this

reason, there is some truth in the claim that this conception involves a form of individualism or,

even worse, of proprietary individualism. The interpretation however, fails to grasp the core of the

theory of human rights. It is not by chance that it neglects the lengthy historical process, the lengthy

theoretical elaboration lingering instead only on the last two centuries, in other words on the period

of colonialism and imperialism. It is an even more unjust critique because it fails to consider that

rights were also denied to a conspicuous part of the population in European and Western societies.

In fact, the creation of world society, criticised by Kant for its spirit of conquest, implied at the same

time a hegemony of the capitalist bourgeoisie in Europe and in America.

This critique of human rights sees societies as ethnic blocks and it can be traced to

methodological nationalism while efforts should be addressed to class, cultural, gender and power

differences within each society and at the level of global society.

2. The critique of human rights from the perspective of the African Renaissance

The movement of philosophers, sociologists, poets usually referred to as African Renaissance has

two main goals. The first is the criticism and rejection of the image of an “African” man constructed

by the Europeans. The second is the elaboration, on the basis of African cultural traditions, of a

specific perspective on the world, on society, on politics and on human rights. It is not possible here

to deal with every aspect of this vast and complex cultural movement. Therefore we will focus

mainly on the conception of society, power, and, especially, human rights. To tackle such issue let

us start with some texts collected in two major anthologies of African philosophy: Philosophy from

Africa (2002), and A Companion to African Philosophy (2006). The two collections provide an

overview of current African philosophy.

2.1. The question of rationality and humanity

The first step Africans need to take is that of ‘speaking for themselves and about themselves thus

creating authentic and truthful discourse on Africa’ (Ramose 2002: 1), returning, so to speak, to the

foundations of African discourse. The focal point of this reflection is the critique of the conception –

so central for western cultural tradition – that the definition of rational human being should not be

applied to Africans (or to Native Americans and Australasians). If Africans are not capable of

philosophising ‘by their nature, their true being, what they are [...], the question assumes an

ontological character for it relates to the humanity of the Africans’ (Ramose 2002: 4). By denying

their ability to philosophise, the full humanity of Africans is questioned once again. ‘The history of

Western philosophy – says Ramos – is a deformation of the identity of Africa’ (Ramose 2002: 5).

The arguments presented by K. Wiredu are similar: ‘Colonialism included a systematic program

of de-Africanization’. ‘African philosophy [therefore] has been a quest for self-definition’ (Wiredu

2006: 1). It must be a ‘philosophy by and in the interest of black people’ (Wiredu 2006: 23).

To achieve such aims, African philosophy has to conceive a vast program of conceptual

decolonization. The issue is not the re-thinking a given theory or the opposing of new to old

paradigms; rather it relates to the fundamental categories through which paradigms and concepts of

man and society are built. The rejection of Western philosophy is the rejection of its basic categories

(Wiredu 2006: 15).

Through his philosophical categories, argues E. Biacolo (2002), the West has represented itself and

Africa by using a binary way of thinking in which the first element, a negative one, relates to Africa

and the Africans while the second element, a positive one, refers to the Europeans and the Western

world. The dichotomies, according to Biacolo, are as follows: wild vs. civilised, pre-logical vs.

logic, perceptive vs. conceptual, oral vs. written, and religious vs. scientific. These clearly are

theories and authors central to Western twentieth century culture which have helped to construct

images of Africa and the West.

The pathway of the African Renaissance branches off in two directions which are particularly

relevant to our argument. The first is linked to the vindication of a truly African identity; the second

aims at the creation of humanistic discourse conjugating universalism and particularistic

perspectives.

The discourse over the vindication of a truly African identity derives, from an epistemological

point of view, from nineteenth- and twentieth-century European culture. In the nineteenth century,

W.B. Du Bois and W. Blyden are emblematic. Both authors, claiming that ‘Africa can give its

contribution to humanity’, unfold their argument from within the ‘paradigm of race’. Du Bois

(1897) supports the necessity of a division of races and the need for the black race to offer its

contribution to the development of humanity. For many years, he believed that colonialism was an

opportunity for the development of Africa.

On this point, W. Blyden disagrees. Blyden claims that ‘African culture must be protected from

foreign influences, including the Christian influence’ (van Hensbroek 2006: 81). Blyden ‘conceives

his own philosophy as part of a great process of people, races and nations vindicating their

legitimate place in this world’ (van Hensbroek 2006: 82). Tension and contrasts with Europe

animate his ideas and the personal identity of Africans he constructs is in marked contrast to that

constructed by Europeans.

According to van Hensbroek, in the claims made by Blyden it is possible to detect a contrast

between cultural paternalism and nationalism. His claim is that Africa already either has everything

1 On the issue of natural rights from a historical-philosophical point of view see Strauss (1953) and Bloch (1961) and, from the standpoint of historical sociology, Mannheim (1986).2 For a critique of human rights based on natural equality especially see Strauss (1953); for a defense, see L. Ferry and A. Renaut (2007: 429-589), and Z. Sternell (2010).3 Kant’s thesis, in truth presents another fundamental element for our reasoning, that of ‘nationalism’ and ‘racism’. It is as though he were still divided between equality and difference. He is in favor of equality in general – there is only one humanity; but, at the same time, he sees a hierarchy (a difference) between races, civilizations and peoples both in Europe and between Europeans and non-Europeans.4 It might seem a purely utopian discourse, indeed hypocritical, that of justifying the conquering and predatory attitude of some European states towards other peoples. Kant, fully aware of the issue, states that ‘one is horrified witnessing the injustice perpetrated by them (trading countries) when exploring foreign lands and peoples (exploring being a synonym for them of conquering)’ (Kant 1795: 95) and he lists a series of injustices, practically, the globalization process since the discovery of America. Does this mean that Kant was against the globalization of the world? On the contrary, as shown by the Project for Perpetual Peace. What he did mean was that the global society was to be built on legal rights and not on conquest. 5 A. Woodiwiss maintains that human rights have been distorted to protect private property (art. 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948) which represents the essence of Western society (Woodiwiss 2005: 89). 6 From Burke and Bentham, it emerges that by the end of the eighteenth-century the expression ‘human rights’ was widespread.

or nothing (van Hensbroek 2006: 83). Africa has everything because it has its own culture and its

traditions; Africa has nothing because these are not recognized and are not part of the discourses on

civilization. Rejecting the idea of a hierarchy among races, Blyden posited a theory in which order

can be based on difference. On this premise it becomes possible to vindicate a role for Africa among

civilizations.

The influence of Blyden’s ‘Afrocentrism’ manifests itself in several ways during the twentieth

century, as with Senghor’s Negritude claiming the specificity of African civilization, or the idea of

the superiority of African over Greek and Western European culture. Cheik Anta Diop, although

still working within the paradigm of race, overturns the relationship between Africa and the West. If

Greece and its civilization are ‘mothers’ of the West and if the Egyptian civilization is the ‘mother’

of African civilization, then the relationship between Greeks and Egyptians is one of dependence. In

fact, Greek civilization derives from ancient Egypt; for the transitive property, it might then be said

that the African civilization, daughter of the Egyptian civilization, is superior to European since the

latter is the ‘daughter’ of Greek civilization. ‘It is impossible to insist on everything the world –

especially the Hellenic world – owes the Egyptian world. The Greeks did nothing but take up and

sometimes, to a degree, develop Egyptian inventions’ (quoted in Wallerstein 2005: 130).

The theory of the Egyptian origins of Greek civilization was revived in the 1980s by M.

Bernal’s Black Athena. Bernal (1987), argues that Greek civilization, as recognised by the ancient

Greeks themselves, derives from Egypt. If we accept this argument – which has been strongly

criticised – the relationship between the West and Africa is reversed. If a priority has to be

recognised, then this belongs to the African civilization and confirmation of this can be found,

above all, in philosophy (Obenga 2006; Masolo 2006a).

The humanist thesis does not go to the core of such issues. Rather, moving within

hermeneutics, de-constructivism and analytical philosophy, it breaks down the images of Africa that

was constructed by western culture (Mudimbe 1988) in order to assert the value of African

civilization in the context of humanity (Wiredu 2006; Appiah 2006). In this sense, K. Gyekye re-

evaluates Immanuel Kant and his categorical imperative according to which we must never treat the

other as a means but always as an end (Gyekye 2006: 307).

Alongside this critique of the images of Africa constructed by Europe and through the re-

discovery of African values, a comparison between European and African societies can be

established.

2.2. Societies, democracy, human rights

The focus here is on society as a whole, in other words, the values, the social organization, the

systems of government. As concerns values, society seeks a shift of Europe and the West from

individualism and of Africa from community precepts. Western society, argue many African

philosophers, is highly individualistic and atomistic. The edifice of western society is based on

individuals and on individual rights. The African perspective, on the contrary, places the system of

family ties at the heart of society. The contrast between a society of individuals and a society of

groups becomes manifest in relation to all sorts of vital problems. Concerning the different systems

of government, the contrast is between government by majority and government by consensus. Rule

by consensus is exercised through the unanimous consent of the leaders of the groups that make up

society.

In this perspective, several African intellectuals even go so far as to assert the necessity of

‘many democracies’ (Teffo 2006: 445, develops the standpoint by Ramose 1992) and argues for an

African model of democracy (Teffo 2006: 444-445). African society ‘is based on the principle of

solidarity. This is characterised by humane people-centeredness’ and on the denial of the ‘western

multiparty system, which is alien to African political culture’. More importantly, in such a model,

‘family ties, as a specific manifestation of democracy within African society, imply the full and

equal participation in the community’ of each individual (Teffo 2006: 445). Furthermore:

This system involving the kingship institution might be called a communocracy, insofar

as it is a type of governance based on general community involvement and participation.

Communocracy, then, might be said to be a form of democracy characteristic of many

traditional African societies (Teffo 2006: 446).

There is a risk, implied in this traditional view, represented by the autocratic character of the

leaders; but ‘the great respect that people have for chiefs or kings attaches to the institution and not

the individual chief per se’ (Teffo 2006: 447).

This is because ‘The institution of kingship is one of the main traits that define African culture. It

would therefore be a mistake for Africans to try to discard kingship in the name of modernity,

especially modernity as perceived and conceived by foreigners’ (Teffo 2006: 448). In conclusion,

according to Teffo, ‘the traditional political system still has a contemporary vitality’ (Teffo 2006:

448) and can be the basis for a system of government appropriate to African societies (Gyekye

1988; Ramose 1992; Wiredu 1997).

Contrary to what might initially be imagined, African philosophers do not think of such models

as a mere African specificity. Instead, these models are projected at entering the global political

scenario in two ways. The first is the conjugation of their system of political decision based on

consensus with the model of deliberative democracy; the second singles out in African political

culture, a series of human rights which challenge the western model or in any event, vindicate their

place within the ongoing debate on human rights.

The first perspective is sustained by G. Carew. Deliberative democracy, according to Carew, is

defined as a way of ‘promoting common understanding and a shared sense of purpose’ a way of

‘clarifying issues’ and ‘safeguarding our cherished values of freedom and equality’ (Carew 2006:

462). This perspective requires the awareness of operating in a ‘global civic community’, freed from

the domination of a capitalist market-oriented culture and, at the same time, the belief that post-

colonial states are not culturally homogeneous as the metropolitan states but are, internally,

fragmented along ethnic and cultural lines and, externally, are subordinated to the West in the global

capitalist hierarchy. There are, therefore, two converging aims: to protect the independence of states

against the totalitarian external corrosion and to promote the democratization of the decision-

making process at all levels, including the global one (Carew 2006: 468).

The critique of liberal individualism contained in African community policy ‘is not the rejection of

individual status; on the contrary, it implies an alternative way of seeking it within humanity’.

(Masolo 2006b: 495). Such a conclusion, widespread in African philosophy, does not therefore

place individualism and communitarian policy; it conceives, on the contrary, the self-realization of

the individual within his own community. From such a standpoint, it cannot be said that personal

and individual values are specifically ‘Western’.

In strategic terms, this is a decisive shift. On the one hand, the Western claim that human rights

are a prerogative of Western societies alone is strongly rejected. This is coupled with the assumption

that, in the African world and elsewhere, human rights are a smokescreen of hypocrisy behind

which Westerners can conceal their dominion over the world (Woodiwiss 2005). On the other hand,

by seeking basic human rights within their own culture, they relativize Western claims and place

their cultures and their societies on a par with Western societies (Deng 2006: 499).

We should examine now the concept that human rights are ‘Western’. Western countries have

had an important role in the promulgation of human rights; yet the fact that they proposed them as

universal and that international organizations adopted them as such, implies they have universal

validity. In fact, ‘the deepest roots of the assertion of the universality of human rights lie in the fact

that human rights mirror the universal search for human dignity’ (Deng 2006: 499). Therefore, there

is nothing in human rights, as proclaimed in the West, that is ‘specifically Western’ (Deng 2006:

500). Nonetheless, there still remains the problem of bringing together the universality of human

rights with the ‘particular’ of local cultures. From this point of view two issues are examined:

democracy and development.

The construction of post-colonial states has been a disaster because Western standards have

been applied to African societies. Above all, the voting method adopted has created the risk of ‘a

dictatorship of numbers, with the majority imposing its will on the minority’ (Deng 2006: 502).

Since the African people have a tendency to vote along ethnic or tribal lines, democracy has to be

something more than voting in elections and in any case it has to envisage a ‘special protection for

minorities’. So, if democracy is a fundamental human right, it cannot be understood in such a way

that its application entails the risk of humiliating and destroying minority groups.

To meet this need, a model of democracy based on the consensus of stakeholders is set forth.

The model is exemplified by ‘the deliberations of the Council [in which] any adult could participate

and decisions were reached unanimously.’ (Deng 2006: 503). Wiredu is even more precise: ‘The

chief has absolutely no right to impose his own wishes on the elders of the council [...] The elders

would keep on discussing an issue till consensus was reached’ (Wiredu 1990: 250). Therefore, the

principle of majority decision, the ‘winner-takes-all’ principle or the zero-sum game – typical of

Western democracies – ‘are not acceptable alternatives to the system of decision-making by

consensus’ (Dia 1996: 41).

The conclusion on this point is then, two-fold. Human rights are universal and democracy is

paramount; however, the concept of democracy needs to be expanded. On a global scale as well as

within single states, the method of decision-making needs to be based on unanimous consensus, not

on the principle of majority.

The issue of development is conceived and analyzed in much the same way. One cannot be

expected to apply to societies other than Western ones, the models built by these during the course

of their own history. To ensure development, understood as the foundation for the realization of

inalienable human rights, indigenous institutions, values, practices must become the driver of a

participatory development taking place from within. In other words, the ‘elements of the human

rights agenda imply that the challenge of realizing human rights is primarily internal’ to African

culture (Deng 2006: 506).

3. World government and the neo-Confucian perspective on Human Rights

The attitude of Europeans towards China has always been deferential, despite much criticism of

‘oriental despotism’. At the time when the importance of Chinese civilization was praised (Leibniz

and Kant) its system of government was heavily criticised. Montesquieu in the eighteenth century

(1748), Hegel in the nineteenth (1822) and Wittfogel in the twentieth century (1957) all defined

Oriental despotism as a category of European political thought. Despotism and Asian government

have become synonymous and the adjective ‘Oriental’ used to indicate a different form of arbitrary

rule seemingly unknown in Western history.

To put things in their right place, a renewed conception of political Confucianism, conceived in

terms of ‘Asian values’ for inserting in the general code of humanity, is suggested.

China, though with so many adaptations, has tried to realize one of the utopias of the West:

socialism. Even today, the Chinese social and political system labels itself as Communist. The

academic and political debate is extremely lively and liberal and conservative positions confront one

another (Bell 2006 and 2008). In such discussions, contemporary intellectuals are often quoted

alongside the classics of western cultural tradition. Two alternatives are discussed: either take a

more coherent path towards a liberal government, or renew the traditional Chinese culture,

Confucianism, not only for the government of China but also to offer on the global plane a ‘Chinese

model’. Although both potential solutions are intriguing, our attention pivots on the revival of

Confucianism since – at least today – this seems more influential than the liberal tendencies.

We are not faced with an open critique of the relations between Europe and China, but with a

general conception of the world from which descends a specific role for each cultural tradition, and

therefore even a place for Europe itself. Criticism concerns instead specific points in relation to

which Confucianism represents an alternative.

Our scrutiny will be led by a philosopher, Zhao Tingyang, whose interpretation of Confucianism

is of considerable political interest. Zhao Tingyang’s point of departure is the belief that Western

world hegemony has led to the creation of a physical but not of a human global world. The world is

a geographical unity but there are no global institutions capable of governing it, because Western

political thought and practices have conceived of problems in national and international terms

without seeing that to create a universal human world it is necessary to adopt a global perspective –

to think the world qua mundus.

In order to build a human world it is necessary to follow the Chinese model, duly revisited, of

the Tian-xia, (‘all under the sky’). The reworking of such a theory concerns its physical and

geographical aspects. In the Confucian tradition, Tian-xia referred to the Chinese territory alone;

now it applies to the entire planet. By the same token, ancient institutions were conceived for the

Chinese territory, but now they have to be global. The principle of their construction remains,

however, the same. The premise of Tian-xia is to ‘rebuild the world based on the model of family

ties and to make it by such a token, a welcoming place for all peoples’ (Tingyang 2008: 14; also see

Bell 2006: 243-251). According to Chou tradition, the institutional model of Tian-xia presents the

following characteristics:

It is a monarchical system, including certain aristocratic elements […];

It is an open network, consisting of a general world government and sub-states. The

number of sub-states depends on the diversity of cultures, nations or geographical

conditions. The sub-states pertain to a general political system, in the same way that sub-

sets pertain to a greater set. Designed for the whole world, the all-under the sky system is

open to all nations […];

The world government is in charge of universal institutions, laws and world order; it is

responsible for the common wellbeing of the world, upholding world justice and peace; it

arbitrates international conflicts among sub-states […]

The sub-states are independent in their domestic economy, culture, social norms and values

[…];

An institutionally-established balance plays a key role in maintaining long-term

cooperation […];

People have the freedom to migrate to, and work in, any state they like. This implies a

world and not nationalistic philosophy (Tingyang 2008: 13-14).

The system envisioned by the Tian-xia is made up of different political bodies ordered in a precise

hierarchy: ‘All-under-the sky’, states, families. As such it is opposed to the Western European

model of nation-states, communities, individuals (Tingyang 2008: 15). ‘The world, states and

families thus need to be consistent in their way of governance, so as to be nothing else but different

manifestations of one universal institution.’ (Tingyang 2008: 17). This coherent way consists in

governing ‘from the highest to the lowest levels, since smaller political societies are always

conditioned by greater ones’ (Tingyang 2008: 17).

A short sociological observation, at this point, seems necessary. The organization of the world is

based on sociological and political principles. The sociological principle places at the basis of the

system the family, obviously to check the irrationality of individuals; the political principle

vindicates the government from above, since ‘the small is always dependent on the big’. Therefore,

the result can only be a monarchical-aristocratic and, hopefully, an enlightened society.

In point of fact, from the neo-Confucian perspective emerges a criticism of democracy and its

principles. Democracy, since it is based on individualism, is characterised by aggressive external

projections, and, for such reasons, ‘domestic democracy can enhance imperialist hegemony over the

world’ (Tingyang 2008: 16). There is then the issue of double standards: democracy inwards, and

use of force outwards – such is the case of the United States of America that, by doing so, are losing

the esteem of other nations. The reason is that democracy, while it is an ‘admirable’ institution, will

‘fail if, from national, it won’t become global’ (Tingyang 2008: 16-17). The weakness of democracy

lies in the fact that as a principle of world government it doesn’t seem to be generalized – and at

least not so far. But there are other reasons for criticism, according to Zhao Tingyang, which relate

to questions of principles and facts. ‘Democracy – says Zhao Tingyang – could be distorted

[because of its inner contradictions] by power, money and marketing, misled by strategic votes, and

even absurdly, be used to bring about such terrible disasters as those visited upon the world by

Hitler. Much to our disappointment, democracy does not necessarily entail, neither theoretically nor

practically, justice, goodness and peace’ (Tingyang 2008: 23).

The alternative is to build global institutions according to the Confucian model. In fact, the

Western conception of society is centred on the principle of cooperation, yet this principle is

necessary but not sufficient for the government of the world. In fact, it is based on a live-and-let-live

attitude. To the principle of cooperation must be added that of improvement, which works along the

line of improve-oneself-and-let-oneself-be-improved, leading to a mutual improvement of the

Confucian model. In fact, the principle of rational dialogue among individuals, as envisioned by

Habermas’ theory of communicative action, can lead to understanding but not to an acceptance. In

truth, ‘there is no necessary transition from the mutual understanding of minds to the mutual

acceptance of hearts. We also need to be aware that the problem of the other is actually a problem

of other hearts rather than other minds, since hearts are not open to concession’ (Tingyang 2008:

23). Rational communication, dialogue, can therefore only work in the broader context of mutual

acceptance. Rational communication alone cannot create harmony.

‘The world is disoriented. This is a problem of our times … The physical world was created, but

a humanized world still needs to be shaped. The rebirth of the world in terms of “all-under-the sky”

requires world-orientated political reform’ (Tingyang 2008: 24). From this, a turning point can

come ‘whereby all problems in the world will be re-interpreted as problems of the world’ (Tingyang

2008: 24-25). In this context, the philosophical discussion relative to ‘all-under-the sky’ may allow

us to re-think today’s political problems and the Tian-xia ‘might become a source of inspiration for

the project of a global institution’ (Tingyang 2008: 25).

The neo-Confucian model, because of its inclusiveness, does not posit itself as the only source

of values; it presents itself as the only possible model to follow on a methodological plane, but not

at the level of values. ‘A suitable world – concludes Zhao Tingyang – could be based on two key

concepts, agora and all-under-the-sky, where Greek and Chinese traditions meet in harmony’

(Tingyang 2008: 25).

The merging of these two cultural traditions, may lead to institutions capable of giving peace

and harmony to the world.

4. For a Theory of Human Rights based on Dialog between societies, cultures and civilizations

Though these criticisms regarding human rights might be partial, the problem they address,

however, remains. The conception of human rights, elaborated by Greco-Roman culture, by

European culture and, lastly, by American culture in the twentieth century feels the effect of the

specificity of the context within which it was created. In this culture the principle of individual

autonomy has become the central point. Recently, the principle of equality has been interpreted in a

more complex way that it was a century or two ago. In the Western world, cultural currents have

emerged which in a normative context grounded in equality, vindicate differences (ethnic and,

above all, of gender). It is therefore necessary to incorporate in the theory of human rights the

recognition of difference.

The elaboration on one’s conquered cultural basis or the diffusion and the acceptance of human

rights by individual or collective actors belonging to other cultural or religious areas (Confucianism,

Buddhism, Islam) creates the problem of conjugating human universal values with other cultural

contexts. In fact, the autonomy of the individual in these contexts, is conceived in different ways

compared to Western and European culture. In a global context, the issue emerging at the end of the

eighteenth century in America and Europe is now being faced once again. It is necessary to

construct a theory of human rights capable of including all world cultures as opposed to imposing

on them the Euro-western culture.

Different strategies can be followed when trying to construct a theory of human rights. Here we

tread a different pathway which, if partly indebted to Habermas’ theory as concerns some concepts,

distances itself from it for others, deriving these from other social theories.

The principles considered as a priori by Kant must be examined from a more complex

perspective. In human societies, some cultural universals have been defined which are usually

referred to in the interactions among individuals, institutions, states and more broadly, in exchanges

and communications. In these universals, Kant includes the autonomy and the independence of

individuals. In the amendments of the American Constitution, freedom of religion, of speech or the

press, the right to meet, the guarantee of one's person, one's goods and so forth are considered as a

priori data. In other declarations the list becomes longer or shorter. From a general perspective

however, references are made to a series of principles on the basis of which societies are

constructed. These principles or rights, understood in political philosophy as a priori, are actually

historical constructions. This can be shown through a consideration of the longue durée of history,

always attentive to structures and not only to events. To widen as much as possible the horizon of

observation to previous centuries and millennia, facilitates seeing the moment when different

visions and imagines of men and society clash. This also enables us to understand why those

historical constructions can be understood as natural facts or as cultural a priori. In effect they are

cognitive and moral assumptions in which a wide part of humanity recognises itself. Yet they are

the product of a slow historical construction and at a given point, they are understood as natural,

taken for granted, given as indisputable for they have been deeply internalised within the way of life

of men.

Now, not in all societies and not in all civilizations the same moral and cognitive premises are

elaborated. Throughout history some common values have been developed while others are

common only to the members of single civilizations or of even smaller human units. The growth of

global society as a group of connections and interdependence, places in close comparison the

different conceptions and images of the world, both within single civilizations and societies, as well

as on the general wider level of exchanges and communications. To this more intense structural

connection corresponds a more acute sensibility to the risks facing particular identities. In a

situation of generalized cultural pluralism, everybody feels threatened; from this arises the

possibility of conflicts among civilizations.

Comparison, dialogue and conflict, make clear cognitive premises and common values as a

means to declare particular values, a common human identity and to state the identity of groups and

particular societies. Human rights are a presupposition immanent to discourse (Habermas 1971) and,

at the same time, they are laid down as a claim or an expectation by the participants for human

dialogue. The common idea around which dialogue revolves, the critique and/or the conflict of

interpretations, is the concept of human dignity. This idea is at the centre of declarations of human

rights. It could then be said that human dignity is the common general value in which the whole of

humanity recognises itself. It is the point of convergence of the various and different visions of the

world. It is the general moral principle on which societies and civilizations are constructed. At the

same time, nonetheless, the interpretations of what is ‘worthy of man’ vary by society and

civilization. A theory of human rights must be justifiable nowadays, this tension between common

and particular values, between unity and difference.

An analogy clarifies this shift. Human dignity in the domain of rights is the group of rules to

which implicit reference is always made just as one refers to implicit grammatical, syntactical and

pragmatic rules of communication in the production of linguistic acts. When a social actor speaks,

he presupposes the existence of shared rules with which he constructs his sentences. From the

common presupposition of the existence of linguistic norms comes the possibility of communication

and comprehension. The rule of the code of human rights is the inviolability of human dignity.

The analogy between the code of human rights and linguistic code can go even further. Among

the rules of discourse we find logics, which is the set of rules upon which a meaningful linguistic act

is constructed. Through the linguistic code we arrive at agreement as well as dissention and

divergence in our judgements of the world. In other words, we agree both when we agree (both

think that x equals y) as well as when we do not (for A, x equals y; for B, x is different from y).

Agreement is on a general level and includes in its own internal possibilities on specific issues, both

the hypotheses of agreement, as well as that of disagreement.

Constructing a theory of human rights follows a dual pathway. On the one hand, it implies an

agreement on the method of dialogue (same cognitive premises, same logic of discourse, etc.); on

the other, it contemplates the possibility that from a situation S1 of limited agreement on content (life

forms and styles, institutions, etc.) a situation S2 is reached of wider agreement or of awareness of

divergences of judgement which in that specific moment cannot be solved.

The debate on human rights reveals a shift of this kind. In fact, all the actors in dialogue or

conflict refer to human dignity to justify the legitimacy of their own forms of life or of their own

social and political institutions. A common identity is claimed to vindicate the identity criticised or

denied by others. The more the common the basis, the more the unity of humanity advances. This

basis makes possible the concrete universality of human rights. Global society, with its connections

and interdependencies, creates wider possibilities for the assertion of cosmopolitan law.

One cannot but acknowledge that in the field of human rights dialogue and conflict are on a par.

The resources for life are distributed in an excessively unequal way and in this scenario a peace

making process without problems is inconceivable. Correction of global inequalities is necessary for

the assertion of cosmopolitan law as a network of norms, exchanges and human communication.

In today’s scenario of cultural pluralism, both on the global plane and on the level of single

societies, cosmopolitan laws cannot be those proposed by Kant. Linen in a single tint is not

sufficient. A double weave is necessary: on one surface one colour where the dots, the intersections

and knots are equal, symmetrical and regular; on the other, dots, knots and intersections and colours

necessarily different. The outcome is that the discourse on human rights remains a difficult one. It

has to include those elements by virtue of which all men are equal and those by virtue of which they

are different. This, of course, is the challenge.

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