U.S. Marines in Vietnam_The war that would not end 1971-1973

COVER: Near Tan My, combat photograp herCpl Steven C. Lively records the takeoff ofHMM-164 helicopters from the 9th MarineBrigade carrying the 4th VNMC Battalioninto combat on 24 May 1972.Marine Corps Historical Collection

U.S. MARINES IN VIETNAMTHE WAR THAT WOULD NOT END

1971-1973

by

Major Charles D. MelsonU.S. Marine Corps

and

Lieutenant Colonel Curtis G. ArnoldU.S. Marine Corps

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISIONHEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

1991

Volumes in the Marine CorpsVietnam Series

Operational Histories Series

US. Marines in Vietnam,Assistance Era, 1977

U £ Marines in

US. Marines in

US. Marines in

US. Marines in

US Marines in

US. Marines in

Vietnam,

Vietnam,

Vietnam,

Vietnam,

Vietnam,

Vietnam,

2954-1964, The Advisory and Combat

1965, The Landing and the Buildup, 1978

1966, An Expanding War, 1982

1967, Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1984

1969, Hikh Mobility and Standdown, 1988

1970-1971, Vietnamization and Redeployment, 1986

1973-1975, The Bitter End 1990

In Preparation

US. Marines in Vietnam, 1968

Functional Histories Series

Chaplains with Marines in Vietnam, 1962-1971, 1985

Marines and Military Law in Vietnam: Trial by Fire, 1989

Anthology and Bibliography

The Marines in Vietnam, 1954-19 73, An Anthology and AnnotatedBibliography,1974, reprinted 1983; revised second edition, 1985

Library of Congress Card No. 77-604776

PCN 190 003112 00

Foreword

This is the eighth volume of a projected nine-volume history of Marine Corps opetationsin the Vietnam War. A separate functional series complements the operational histories.This volume details the activities of Marine Corps units after the departure from Vietnamin 1971 of Ill Marine Amphibious Force, through to the 1973 ceasefire, and includes thereturn of Marine prisoners of war from North Vietnam. Written from diverse views andsources, the common thread in this narrative is the continued resistance of the SouthVietnamese Armed Forces, in particular the Vietnamese Marine Corps, to Communistaggression. This book is written from the perspective of the American Marines who assistedthem in their efforts. Someday the former South Vietnamese Marines will be able to telltheir own story.

By July 1971, less than 500 U.S. Marines, mostly advisors, communicators, and sup-porting arms specialists remained in Vietnam. It was thought at the time that the successof "Vietnamizarion" of the war would lessen even this small number, as it was hopedthat the South Vietnamese could continue fighting successfully. This hope vanished inspring 1972, dashed by a full-scale North Vietnamese Army invasion. The renewed com-bat saw the U.S. Marines return once more to Southeast Asia in a continuation of thewar that now seemed to have no end. The fighting proceed.ed into the fall, and onlyceased with the signing of peace accords in Paris in January 1973.

The War That Wou/d Not End is the product of a collaboration of two career Marines,who brought a total of 42 years of service experience to the project while assigned to theHistory and Museums Division of Headquarters Marine Corps. Lieutenant Colonel CurtisG. Arnold began the task. A native Alabamian, Lieutenant Colonel Arnold enlisted inthe Marine Corps in 1950 and served with the 1st Marine Division in Korea. Dischargedin 1953, he remained in the Marine Reserve in inactive status while he attended AuburnUniversity. Following graduation, Lieutenant Colonel Arnold was commissioned injanu-ary 1958. He attended the Communication Officers Orientation Course at Quantico, Vir-ginia, and served as a communications officer for much of his career. He served in Vietnamwith the 3d Marine Division from 1966 to 1967, receiving the Bronze Star Medal. Hewas aide to Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps General I.ewis W. Walt from 1968to 1969. He then attended Marine Corps Command and Staff College at Quanrico andremained there at the Marine Corps Schools as an instructor. I-Ic joined the History andMuseums Division in 1973 and retired from the division and the Marine Corps in 1975.Lieutenant Colonel Arnold's efforts are reflected in the themes of Chapters 2 through9, based on interviews and then-available records. He played a critical part in the loca-tion and recovery of the Marine Advisory Unit records just prior to the fall of Saigon.Lieutenant Colonel Arnold also contributed to this project through his review of the com-ment edition and with further advice and encouragement until his untimely death in 1990.

The project was completed by Major Charles D. Melson. From California, Major Melsonentered the Marine Corps Reserve in 1967 and in 1970 both graduated from Sonoma StateUniversity and was commissioned. Following Basic School, he served overseas as an infantryofficer with assignments to Vietnam in 1972 with the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade.He was awaiting orders to Sub Unit One, 1st ANGLICO, when the war ended in 1973.Major Melson spent a large portion of his career in combat and reconnaissance units in bothFleet Marine Forces Atlantic and Pacific. He has decorations for military merit, combataction, and humanitarian service. Beginning in 1982, he was as an instructor at the U.S.

111

iv

Naval Academy and earned a master of arts degree from St. John's College, Annapolis,Maryland. Major Melson subsequently was assigned to Headquarters Marine Corps, firstto the Command Center and then, in 1986, to the History and Museums Division. MajorMelson wrore the remaining eight chapters and shaped the volume into its final form.This included revising the Arnold manuscript to make use of much additional material.Major Melson left active service in 1990, but was recalled to active duty with the division,incloding duties with the U.S. Central Command during the Persian Gulf War.

E. H. SIMMONSBrigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)Director of Marine Corps History and Museums

Preface

Ernest Hemingway wrote about war in A Farewell to Arms in 1929, contending that,'Abstract wotds such as glory, honor, courage, or hallow were obscene heside the concretenames of villages, the numbers of roads, the names of rivers, the numbers of regimentsand the dates." lbr many reasons, this observation holds true for the narrative in thisvolume. The variety and scope of U.S. Marine participation in this phase of the war makesthis an account of units and individuals as part of the activities of the other Services orof the South Vietnamese forces. This is reflected in the sources used to tell this story;both authors had to rely on diverse material for information. In fact, most events dis-cussed are drawn as exceptions from the normal process of records-keeping and availabil-ity: ad hoc units and mixed-service, or even mulrinational organizations were the norm.This suggested the use of commenters who could bring together otherwise dispersed recordsto support the volume. Interviews from recorded and transcribed and other oral formatswere also especially valuable. A draft of this book was sent to key participants, 231 in-dividuals. Of these, 114 replied. They are listed in the appendix and referenced repeat-edly in the text. Most of this newly acquired material has been archived for use by Marinesand other scholarly researchers.

Military evolutions are the product of teamwork and this book is no exception. Lieu-tenant Colonel Arnold's chaprers were reviewed by Dr. Graham A. Cosmas and Lieu-tenant Colonel Lane Rogers. The original narrative subsequently was reorganized by MajorDavid N. Buckner, himself a former advisor in Vietnam. The narrative benefitted fromthe transcription of advisor debriefs undertaken by Colonel Gerald H. Turley with fund-ing by the Marine Corps Historical Foundation. He was assisted in this by Major EdwardF Wells, representing the History and Museums Division. Major Wells and Major FrankM. Batha, Jr., conducted additional inquiry to support the manuscript. Major Melson'swork was carefully reviewed by his peers: Dr. V. Keith Fleming, Jr., Major George R. Dun-ham, Major Arthur F. Elzy, Major Leonard A. Blasiol, and Lieutenant Colonel Gary D.Solis. Their help went beyond the call of duty and reflected the Historical Branch's col-legial approach to writing.

Appreciation also is due the able Editing and Design Section of Mr. Robert E. Struder,the senior editor: to Mr. William S. Hill for artwork and layout and to Mrs. CatherineA. Kerns for edirorial and composition services. They were essential in the volume's finalform and style. Further thanks are to be given the interns from The Madeira School whoassisted with the project: Ms. Soudarak S. Luangkhot for her efforts with the commandand staff lists and Ms. Jaime Koepsell and Ms. Sylvia Bunyasi for their enterprise withthe appendices. Mt David A. Melson is gratefully recognized for his help with aircraftidentification and nomenclature.

Special thanks are offered for the managing supervision of the involved Deputy Direc-tors for Marine Corps Hisrory: ColonelJames R. Williams, Colonel MargueriteJ, Camp-bell, and Colonel Daniel M. Smith. They were ably supported in providing directionby the efforts of succeeding chief historians: Mr. Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Benis M. Frank.The project also was enhanced by the day-to-day tutelage of the senior Vietnam histori-an, Dr. Jack Shulimson. The authors were especially dependent upon all manner of materi-als from Mr. DannyJ. Crawford's Reference Section, Mrs. Meredith P. Hartley's Oral HistorySection, Ms. Evelyn A. Englander's Library Section, and Ms. Joyce M. Conyers and Ser-geant Kevin L. Parker's Archives Section. Their contributions are most gratefully ac-

V

vi

knowledged. Last but not least, both authors have long wished to formally recognize theenlisted Marines who are the often unrecognized backbone of the History and MuseumsDivision.

Both authors are indebted to their colleagues in the historical agencies of the Army,Navy, Air Force, andjoints Chiefs of Staff, all of whom provided information and opin-ion, and made documentation available fot analysis. Thanks ate extended to all thosewho reviewed the various editions and provided comments, corrections, and insights onlyavailable ftom those who took part in the events described. Finally, however, it is the authorsalone who are responsible fot the content of this history, including any errors in fact orjudgement.

CHARLES D. MELSON CURTIS G. ARNOLD

Table of Contents

Foreword . iiiPreface V

Table of Contents vii

List of Maps and Charts xi

PART I VIETNAMIZATION

Chapter 1 From the Delta to the DMZNixon's DoctrineContingency ForcesFlexibility and ResponseCommand RelationsResidual ForcesMarine Security Guard, SaigonThe Marine Air Control Squadron DetachmentSub Unit One, 1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison

Chapter 2 The AdvisorsNaval Advisory Group, Naval AdvisoryThe Rung Sar Special ZoneThe Mekong Delta Tactical Zone'Trusted Friends'Winding DownAlong the DMZ

PART II THE SPRING OFFENSIVE

10

11

11

19

19

19

21

25

27

30

35

Chapter 3 The Ring of SteelTurley with Team 155The Opening RoundTeam 155 Under FireThe Outposts FallAt the Combat Base at Ai TuVNMC Brigade 258 ReinforcesEnemy in the Wire, 31 March 1972Fire Support Base Sarge Holds OnThe Collapse of the Ring of Steel

Chapter 4 The Defense of Dong HaThe Easter Sunday CrisisThe Dong Ha BridgeAction at the BridgeReaction at SaigonCamp Carroll SurrendersMai bc ExposedThe Dong Ha Bridge DestroyedCallsign BAT-21Mai bc Evacuated 63

Company

Units

36

36

37

37

4242

4343

4547505050

57

5858

606061

vii

Chapter 5 Battered Quang Tn HoldsThe Fighting ContinuesAt Dong HaDevelopments in the WestThe Fight for PedroBright LightsThe NVA Mount a Third Attack in MR 1

Chapter 6 Exodus from Quang TnDrive from the WestConfusion at Quang TnTeam 155 and General Giai DepartVNMC Brigade 147 on its Own

PART III THE CEASEFIRE CAMPAIGN .. 89

Chapter 7 The Defense of Hue CityHolding the My Chanh LineFleet Marine Force SupportTruong Takes ChargeThe Vietnamese Marine DivisionThe Marines AttackThe North Vietnamese ReactOperation Song Than 6-72In the Balance

Chapter 8 Quang Tn City RegainedTruong's CounteroffensiveThe Battle of Quang Tn CityTaking the CitadelThe Final Assault

Chapter 9 Returning NorthConsolidationPush to the NorthReorganizationThe Eleventh HourCeasefire

PART IV THE MARINES WERE THERE 137

vi"

Chapter 10 A Tract of Time9th MAB and the Naval CampaignSupport to the FleetEvacuationsSearch and RescueNGF Airborne Spotters, Fast and SlowRaids and DemonstrationsRedeyes at SeaSupport to Military Region 1Fleet Support ContinuesAcross the Beach: The Lam Son Landings.Turnaway at Quang Tn

138

138140

142

143

145

145

147

148

149

149

151

64

64

65

66

6871

72

76

76

8081

84

90

90

9092

92

94

9798

.103

106

106

112

121

123

127

• 127

128

130

130

135

Chapter 11 Any Time, Any Place

Task Force DeltaThe Rose Garden Grows

Chapter 12 On Yankee StationSuppott to the Navy: Task Force 77.All-Weather AttackMore Support to the Navy—VMCJ. . -

Snakes at SeaFighters over the North

Chapter 13 Other Marine Activities -

Leadership, Morale, and Readiness -

Beans, Bullets, and AvGas: LogisticsThunder from the Sea, Fire from theWar in the Ether

153

153

153

159

164

168

174

174

174

177

178

181

185

185

190

Sky 195

199

PART V REPRISE AND ASSESSMENT . . . .203

Chapter 14 Ceasefire and ConsolidationThe Final ActOperation Countdown 'On the LandOperation Countdown '. . - and Sea'Operation Countdown '. . - and Air'

Chapter 15 In Enemy HandsCombatants or Hostages?Egress Recap and Other ContingenciesOperation HomecomingWelcome Home MarineCode of ConductMIAs: The Joint Casualty Resolution Center

Chapter 16 Continuity and ChangeOperation End SweepTask Force Delta, The Tigers DepartTo What End?

NOTES

and Staff List, Marine Advisory Unitand Staff List, Marine Ground Units.and Staff List, Marine Air UnitsHomecomingMarine Corps, January 1972 - January

E Glossary of Terms and AbbreviationsG. Chronology of Significant Events, 1971-197 3H. Medal of Honor and Navy Cross Citations 1971-1973.I. FMF Pacific Command Relationships, 1971J. USMACV Command Relationships, 1971

251

265267270272

1973 275

277284

288292

293

The Storm Breaks—Marine Air RespondsSupport to the Air Force, MAG-15 OperationsSupport to the Air Force, MAG-12 Operations

204

204

206210

213

217

217

223

225229233234

236236244248

APPENDICES

A. CommandB. CommandC. CommandD. OperationF. Vietnamese

ix

x

K. Vietnamese Marine Division, 1972. 294L. List of Reviewers 295M. Distribution of Personnel FMFPac, May 1972 297

INDEX 303

Maps and Charts

Map, Mainland Southeast Asia. 3

Map, Western Pacific 5

Map, Marines in South Vietnam, July 1971-Febmary 1972 8

Chart, Marine Advisory Unit, 1972 25Map, South Vietnamese Defenses in Northern MR 1, January-March 1972 29

Map, North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam, 1972 39Map, Initial Deployment of North and South Vietnamese Forces,

30 March-i April 1972 41

Map, The Defense of Dong Ha, 2-4 April 1972 51

Map, The Defense of Quang Tti City, 22-29 April 1972 77Map, The Defense of Hue City, 2-25 May 1972 91

Chart, Sub Unit One, 1st ANGLICO Deployments, Fall 1972 107

Map, The Lam Son Counteroffensive, 8 June-li July 1972 109

Map, The Quang Tn City Battles, 22 July-16 September 1972 115

Map, Final Deployment of Forces, i7 September 1972-30 January 1973 132Map, 9rh MAB Operations, March-September 1972 . 139

Map, Marine Air Operations, 19724973 154Map, Southeast Asia Air Tactical Zones, 1971-1973 156Chart, Task Force Delta Command Relationships 169Map, Yankee Station and the Laotian Panhandle 175Chart, III MAF Amphibious Assault Force Buildup in 1972. .. . . 191

Chart, III MAF Aviation Fbrce Buildup in 1972 193Chart, VNMC Division Supporting Arms Schedule for 11 July 1972 Assault 198

Map, Communist Controlled Areas of South Vietnam, 1973 205Map, Prisoner of War Camps in North Vietnam 220Chart, Homecoming Reception Sequence .224

Chatr, Operation End Sweep—Task Fbrce 78 Organization. . . * . . .237Map, End Sweep Operations, 1973 * . .241

xi

PART I

VIETNAMIZATION

CHAPTER 1

From the Delta to the DMZNixon's Doctrine— Contingency Forces—Flexibility and Response— Command Relations

Residual Forces—Marine Security Guard, Saigon —The Marine Air Control Squadron DetachmentSub Unit One, Is: Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company

Nixon Doctrine

For over a decade, decisions by three presidentstransformed America's role in South Vietnam. Reach-ing a maximum troop-level of 549,000 during 1969,the U.S. Armed Forces found themselves involved ina long and unpopular war. Wirh the Nixon DoctrineofJuly 1969, however, the U.S. began its essential dis-engagemcnt from Vietnam. The United States wouldmeet its !treaty commitments, but expected SouthVietnam to assume the greater portion of its owndefense through "Vietnamization."

ByJuly 1971, Marines in the Pacific Command (Pac-Com) had once again become a combat force-in-readiness, leaving behind in Vietnam only residualforces. General Robert E. Cushman,Jr., Commandantof the Marine Corps (CMC), observed that the Ma-rine Corps during this period witnessed "the emer-gence of new forms of force, some overt, some moredifficult to recognize or define, and fewer purely mili-tary in character than before?' He went on to concludethat properly balanced and properly deployed am-phibious fotces provided "an effective means—and attimes the only means — of exerting influence on situ-ations where our interests are involved."2

Yet for Marines stationed in the Western Pacific(WestPac), Vietnam was a war that would not end. Awar whose continued prosecution was carried onthroughout Vietnam and Southeast Asia, from the Pa-cific and even from the continental United States ofAmerica. Although officially the "Cea.seftre Cam-paign," this period is better known for the central eventof the time, the Spring or Easter Offensive in SouthVietnam .

Contingency Forces

With Marine Corps strength in Vietnam limited toa few hundred, the III Marine Amphibious Force (IIIMAF) in the Western Pacific reverted to a responsiveposture with the U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet. Marinesserved in detachments on board carriers, cruisers, andcommand ships. With the exception of these ships'derachments, Marine units made up the fleet landingforce. The usefulness of deployed landing forces hadbeen apparent since Marines first went on board ships.

2

During the Vietnam war these forces consisted typi-cally of a battalion landing team (BLT) supported bya composite helicopter squadron, forming a basic air-ground ream. Seventh Fleet's landing force, called theSpecial Landing Force or SIF, made 72 amphibiouslandings in Vietnam through 1969. The Seventh Fleetassigned the SLF mission to the 3d Marine Divisionon Okinawa in late 1969. The 4th and 9th Marinesprovided battalions and Marine Aircrafr Group (MAG)36 sent medium helicopter squadrons (HMMs) to servewith the fleet amphibious forces." Navy amphibioussquadrons were administrative organizations while theamphibious ready group (ARG) was the specific or-ganization tasked for a particular mission.** The am-phibious ready groups deployed in two independentconfigurations. ARG Alpha was organized around ahelicopter carrier. ARG Bravo centered on an amphibi-ous transport dock. Another BLT remained on Okina-wa as the air-transportable contingency battalion.5

After 21 November 1970, the SLF name waschanged to Marine amphibious unit (MAU) andHeadquarters, 31st Marine Amphibious Unit deployedcontinuously with Amphibious Ready Group Al-pha.*** As amphibious ready groups were the build-ing blocks of the Navy's amphibious forces, the MAUwas the foundation of the landing force. Command-ed by a colonel, this was a standing headquarters whichprovided command, control, and continuity for

ground and air units which deployed in rotation. Forthe 31st MAU, the war did not cease with Ill MAF'sdeparture from Vietnam in April 1971. The MAU waskept within a 120-hour travel time of Military Region(MR) I and BLT Bravo was no more than 168 hoursaway from commitment to operations in MR 1. In Mayand June 1971, the 31st MAU with BLT 1/9 and

*A composite squadron generally consisted of 4 heavy-cargo liftCH-53As, i4 personnel lift CH-46Ds, and 4 utility UH-lEs,

**An amphibious squadron typically ronsisred of an amphibi-ous assault ship (LPH), two amphibious transport docks (LPD), twolanding dock ships (tSD), two or three rank landing ships (LST),and an amphibious cargo ship (LKA).

***The terms SLE and Sperial Landing Force continued to beused informally. As of 1989, the MAU was changed to MEU for Ma-rine Expeditionary Unit, a return to a mote traditional designa-tion for deployed Marine forces.

Adapted/mm Naval Historthal Center Material

FROM THE DELTA TO THE DMZ 3

Gulfof

Ton Ian

Da Nang

Cambodia

Gulfof

hailand

SouthChina Sea

Cape Ca Mau

HMM-164 was on 72-hour standby in support of thedeparture from Da Nang of the 3d Marine Amphibi-ous Brigade, the last major Marine combat unit re-maining in Vietnam.

By July 1971, freed from direct operations in Viet-nam, III MAP was the Pacific Command's immediatereserve. Lieutenant General Donnj. Robertson, as IIIMAP commander, had operational control of the 3dMarine Division (3d MarDiv), the 1st Marine AircraftWing (1st MAW), and the 3d Force Service Regiment(3d FSR). III MM was now a regional force with theat-er concerns ranging from Vietnam to the Philippinesand Korea, concerns corresponding with the SeventhFleet area of operations. As crises occurred, the Ma-rine units afloat were among the first U.S. tactical unitsto respond. Regional responsibilities brought newproblems and concerns to General Robertson. One is-sue was the reduction of Pacific Fleet amphibious ship-ping from six to four squadrons during the year,severely constraining the ability of the Seventh Fleetto commit amphibious forces.

The 31st MAU served as the forward element of aMarine amphibious brigade (MAB), based on GeneralRobertson's conclusion that the MAB was the size offorce that available Seventh Fleet transport could move.Existing contingency plans reflected incrementaldeployment as shipping became available. GeneralRobertson's staff planned for at least one additionalbattalion landing team to be flown into an objectivearea to reinforce a deployed brigade. The III MAFplanners assumed that additional Marine units could

mount out within two weeks if supported by theEastern Pacific amphibious ready squadron. Withinanother two weeks the arrival of two additional am-phibious squadrons could double the available ship-ping for amphibious operations? When not on boardship for contingencies, exercises, and port visits, Ma-rine units trained ashore at III MAP's "MAU Camp" inthe Philippines, using the nearby Subic Bay and Zam-bales training areas.* Upon joining a new Marine bat-talion and squadron, the ARG and MAU conductedamphibious landing exercises to rehearse and validateoperation and landing plans. At the same time portcalls to Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and Japancaused deployments to take on aspects of pleasurecruises.

In August 1971, Fleet Marine Force Pacific (FMFPac)established a table of organization for a Western Pa-cific "ready" brigade. The following month, the 9thMAB formed a cadre staff from personnel of the threeOkinawa-based Marine commands to plan and preparefor a scheduled exercise, Golden Dragon II, with RearAdmiral Walter D. Gaddis's Task Force 76. Thisnucleus staff embarked on the task force's flagship, theUSS Blue Ridge (LCC 19). That fall BLT Bravo (BLT1/9) deployed to Camp Fuji,Japan, while the 31st Ma-rine Amphibious Unit with BLT 2/4 and HMM-165on the USS Trziboli (LPH 10) remained at sea or at Su-bic Bay with Amphibious Ready Group Alpha.

War between India and Pakistan broke out during

*The presence of Philippine security forces and Communist NewPeople's Army units made these training areas literally live-fire areas.

4 THE WAR THAT WOULD NOT END

Deparrmenr of Defense Photo (USN) K98639

The instrument offorward deployment was the Marine landing forces and the amphibi-ous ready groups of the Seventh Fleet, represented here by an amphibious assault ship(LPH) and two amphibious transports (LPDs) underway in the Western Pacific in the 1970s.



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A26566

The senior Marine in the Pacific through the end of1972 was LtGen William K Jones, commanding FleetMarine Force Pacific. He oversaw the Marine Corpsstanddown and withdrawal from South Vietnam.

this period. Vice Admiral William P. Mack of theSeventh Fleet assigned the 31st MAU to Task Force 74for the evacuation of Americans threatened by thefighting in Pakistan. The MAU interrupted its prepa-rations for Exercise Fortress Light II in the Philippinesand the ARG ptoceeded towards the crisis area. It wasreplaced in December 1971 by the provisional 331stMarine Amphibious Element of Major Raymond M.Kostesky, known as "Ray's MAE" at III MAP. This con-sisted of a headquarters, rifle company, and helicop-ter detachment all on board the USS Denver (LPD9). The India-Pakistan emergency requited combinedMarine and Navy staffs to develop planning data forthe air deployment of company-sized to brigade-sizedunits to assist in the evacuations of U.S. civilians andforeign nationals when requested. This planning ef-fort provided the basis for III MAF evacuation con-tingencies the following year.8

Admiraljohn S. McCain,Jr., CinCPac, declared thecrisis resolved on 7 January 1972 and the 9th MABnucleus staff resumed planning for Exercise GoldenDragon. Lieutenant General William K. Jones, as FMFPacific commander, drew three observations from the

crisis: first, the separation of individual ready groupships for more than 30 days reduced Marine readinessto carry out the mission of amphibious assault by frag-menting the 31st MAU; second, Marines had to sup-plement ships' crews because Navy manning levels didnot account for 24-hour combat operations, and fi-nally an increased use of "special caregory"* messagetraffic reduced the flow of necessary information need-ed for effective planning. These observations provedvaluable in the months to come as amphibious forcesreturned to Vietnam?

The 1972 New Year, the Year of the Rat in the Tetcalendar, began with Lieutenant Colonel William R.Von Harren's BLT 3/4 assuming duties with the 31stMAU, now under Colonel Walter C. Kelly, and Lieu-tenant Colonel Phillip B. Friedrichs' BLT 1/9 continu-ing as BLT Bravo. In another change, LieutenantGeneral Louis Metzger relieved III MAF commanderGeneral Robertson.** In March 1972 BLT 1/9 loadedARG Bravo ships at White Beach, Okinawa, for thecrisis-delayed Exercise Golden Dragon II, by way ofport visits to Hong Kong and the Philippines. At thissame time the assistant commander of the 3d MarineDivision, Brigadier General Edward 3. "E. J." Miller,joined the staff on the Blue Ridge as brigade com-mander for the exercise.

Flexibility and Response

During the last half of 1971, the main activity ofIII MAP aviation units in Southeast Asia was duty atsea with the Seventh Fleer amphibious groups. Ma-rine Medium Helicopter Squadrons 164 and 165 ro-tated in turn to the 31st MAU as "composite"squadrons; the BLT with ARG Bravo was supportedby a detachment from Marine Light Helicopter Squa-dron (HML) 367.

In Vietnam, a detachment of air controllers from1st MAW remained at Da Nang. Another "in-country"*** aviation activity was the combat evalua-tion of the North American Rockwell YOV-1OD Broncogunship, for which a detachment of two aircraft and21 Marines flew with the U.S. Navy's Light AttackSquadron (VAL) 4 at Binh Thuy.**** The modifiedOV-lOs mounted a 20mm gun and an infrared sight,the night observation gunship system (NOGS). TheMarines flew 200 combat missions denying the cover

*This message traffic was usually highly controlled and thus un-available to most who needed the information.

"Ill MAF temained a lieutenant general billet through t972.***Term referring tu the geographic confines of South Vietnam.****Deployed from I June 1971.


Department of Defense Phnto (USMC) A800352

The commander of the III Marine Amphibious Forceduring the reaction to the Spring Offensive was LtGenLouis Metzger The former 3d Marine Division com-mander was responsible for the Marine ai, groundand logistic forces used in the Western Pacific.of darkness to the Communists in MR 3 and MR 4.By 31 August 1971, with the resting completed, theMarines departed. As a result of the evaluation, Lieu-tenant General William K. Jones recommended adop-tion of the OV-1OD by the Marine Corps.'°

Strict Department of Defense limits on the entryof combat aircraft and personnel into Vietnam limit-ed the 1st MAW during 1971 largely to its CinCPacstrategic reserve mission. For the air units stationedin Japan and Okinawa this brought an emphasis onreconstructing material stocks eroded over the yearsof combat and filling training gaps which had deve-loped because of the demands of operations. In De-cember 1971, the USS Coral Sea (CVA 43) arrived fora Western Pacific cruise with Marine All-Weather At-tack Squadron (VMAFAW]) 224 attached to the car-rier air wing, and provided an added capability. Thecharacter of Marine air deployments remained stablethrough the first three months of 1972.

Command Relations

Seventh Fleet, Seventh Air Force, and the remain-

Military Advisory Command Vietnam Photo

The commander ofAmerican forces in South Vietnamthrough the middle of 1972 was Gen Creighton WAbrams, USA. Complex command relations in sup-port of the South Vietnamese resulted in a coalition.

the Military Advisory Command Vietnam (MACV)continued to support the South Vietnamese in theirwar against the North Vietnamese. The Seventh Fleetprovided strategic deterrence and sea control. In ac-cordance with Washington's policy, senior Americancommanders in the Pacific increased the logistic andcombat support to South Vietnam, but at the sametime continued to withdraw American troops from theembattled '

Command relations varied depending upon the mixof forces.* Operations at sea were under the controlof the Seventh and Pacific Fleets. For operations inSouth Vietnam, MACV, as a subordinate of CinCPac,exercised control of units through regional assistancecommands. The 1st Regional Assistance Command(FRAC) was assigned to MR 1. Seventh Air Force's com-manding general controlled air operations in SouthVietnam as MACV's deputy for air. In contrast, airoperations over North Vietnam were controlled byeither Seventh Fleet or Seventh Air Force under CinC-Pac. For the redeploying Marine units this meant

This was complicated by an 'advisory" command operating ining advisory, administrative, and logistical units with support of the Government of South Vietnam.


THAILAND

CAMBODIA

GULF OFTHAILAND

SU1 HQVNMC HQMSG

SOUTH CHINASEA

kilometers 0 25 50 75

VNMC — Vietnamese Marine Corpsand Advisors -

SU1 — Sub Unit One, 1st ANGLICOMACS-4 Det — Marine Air Control

Squadron 4 DetachmentMR — Military RegionHQ — HeadquartersMSG — Marine SecurityRSSZ — Rung Sat

Special ZoneMDTZ — Mekong Delta

Tactical Zone

Marines in South VietnamJuly 1971-February 1972


defining operational control ("opcon") and adminis-trative control ("adcon") depending upon where theywere and for whom they worked. Complex commandrelations required that the greatest attention he paidto coordination at the tactical level (see appendices).General Merzger commented that most, if not all,major deployments and actions during this periodoriginated from the Joint Chiefs of Staff passedthrough the chain of command to the "action agen-cy:' III MM, and that FMFPac "could only serve as anadvisor" to CinCPac and Pacific Fleet to "sell" a specificcourse of action.12

Residual Forces

In South Vietnam, Keystone Oriole Alpha, theseventh increment of President Nixon's phased with-drawal program, was completed on 30 June 1971,marking, for the time being, the end of the U.S. Ma-rine ground units' active combat role in the VietnamWar. However, as the sun rose over the South ChinaSea on the morning of iJuly 1971, United Stares Ma-rines were still to be found, nevertheless, throughoutthe length and breadth of the Republic of Vietnam.These Marines were charged with diverse roles and mis-sions. Some were combat-experienced advisors, others

Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker second from

possessed detailed technical knowledge, a few hadbroad training in computer communications and datatheory, but they all had one common denominator —they were U.S. Marines.

Not since March 1963, when they had numbered532, had there been so few Marines in-country. Thelargest group, wirh a total of 195 Marines, was SubUnit One, 1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Compa-ny (ANGUCO) with Lieutenant Colonel Eugene F.Shoults as officer-in-charge. The next larger group wascomprised of the Marines who guarded the AmericanEmbassy in Saigon and the Consulate in Da Nang.These were the 156 men of Company F, Marine Secu-rity Guard Battalion (MSG). The Marine AdvisoryUnit of the Naval Advisory Group was the third lar-gest in size with 68 Marines serving as advisors to theVietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC). The smallest unitwas the 20-man detachment of Marine Air ControlSquadron (MACS) 4, 1st MAW, which had remainedbehind at Da Nang to operate the Marine TacticalData Control Center known as the Southeast Asia Tac-tical Data System Interface (SEATDST). The remain-ing 107 or so Marines were assigned duties as advisorsto the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), theVietnamese Navy (VNN), the Territorial Forces, and

the left, was the senior American official inSouth Vietnam. He is pictured in Saigon at the change of command for Company E,Marine Security Guard Battalion. Maj Edward]. Land, Jr., is on his left, Other Marinespresent for the ceremony were from the MACVstaff and Sub Unit One, 1st J4NGLICO.

Photo courtesy of LtCol George E. Jones, USMC (Ret)


as members of the Military Assistance Command,Vietnam

Marine Security Guard, Sazon

In a less dramatic, but no less meaningful role thanthe fleet or advisory units, was the special mission be-ing carried out by the Marine Security Guard (MSG) atSaigon and by the detachment at Da Nang. Five of-ficers and 151 enlisted Marines guarded the U.S. Em-bassy in Saigon and the U.S. Consulate at Da Nang.Their primary mission was to "provide protection forall classified material and equipment and other ad-ministratively controlled matters at the Departmentof State's Ibreign Service Establishments." In addition,these Marines were "to provide protection for U.S. per-sonnel and Government property under the direct con-trol of the Chief of Diplomatic Mission." Because ofthe large size of the Vietnam security guard, it wasdesignated Company E of the Marine Security GuardBattalion.'

All Marines on State Department duty in Vietnamhad successfully completed the necessary training andhad met the sttingent qualifications required whileundetgoing the five-week academic and physical train-ing course at the Marine Security Guard School atHenderson Hall in Arlington, Virginia. They hadreceived training in subjects ranging from protocol tocounterespionage. Qualification with a new series ofsmall arms was mandatory since Marine Corps-issuedweapons were not used in embassies. A joint boardof both State Department and MSG Battalion person-nel had the final word as to whether a Marine was ac-cepted for embassy or consulate duty. One out of fourtrainees was eliminated. The tough school was neces-sary for the demanding subsequent assignment ofsecurity guard Marines to one of 117 embassies andconsulates located in 96 countries.

The Marines of Company E did not restrict them-selves exclusively to security tasks. As much as the po-litical and military situation would allow, they formeda viable bond of comradeship with the Vietnamesepeople, particularly the children, in and around "TheMarine House"* compound near the ambassador'sresidence. They had "adopted" the children at HoaKhan Hospital, as well as the orphans at Hoi Duc Anh.

On 3 July 1971, Dr. Henry Kissinger, special advi-sor to President Nixon, arrived at Saigon to confer withU.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, South Vietnam'sPresident Nguyen Van Thieu, and other U.S. embassyand military dignitaries. The MSG Marines performed

Generic name foe the lodging for MSG Marines in Company E.

a myriad of chores related to providing security for Dr.Kissinger. That same month, on 13 July, an electricalfire developed in offices of the United States Agencyfor International Development (USAID) in Saigon,trapping mission employees on the fifth through ninthfloors. Seventy-five Marines, both officers and enlist-ed men, responded to USAID's call for assistance. TheMarines entered the building, located the trapped em-ployees, and guided them to safety. Time and againthe embassy Marines entered to make certain all per-sons were clear of the building and that all classifiedmaterial was secured. After ascertaining these twofacts, the Marines turned their full efforts toward fight-ing the fire. Their quick response prevented the firefrom spreading beyond the fourth floor.

The political and military situation in Saigon dur-ing the last half of the year had become tense as thedate for national elections neared. Routinely sched-uled training was cancelled during this period of un-predictable activity, nor only by the enemy but alsoby the diverse factions within the city of Saigon. Inthe month of August, the city of Saigon was on fullalert as citizens went to the polls to elect their represen-tatives to the Republic of Vietnam's lower house. On26 September 1971, Sergeant Charles W. Turbervillewas killed and four other Marines wounded during aterrorist attack on U.S. Embassy personnel in PhnomPenh, Cambodia. This necessitated the transfer of fiveMarines from Company E, under Master SergeantClenton L. Jones, to Phnom Penh to reinforce the em-bassy guard there.'

On 28 October 1971, a new commanding officer,Major Edward). Land, reported to Company B, reliev-ing Captain William E. Keller. Major Land, a nativeof Nebraska with an easy-going, midwestern manner,had enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1953 at the ageof 17. Before being commissioned in 1959 he servedas a drill instructor for two years in San Diego and wasa distinguished marksman with both rifle and pistol.His first tour in South Vietnam had been spent withthe 1st Marine Division at Da Nang as officer-in-chargeof a scout-sniper platoon. Major Land faced some ofthe biggest challenges of his Marine Corps career ashe took charge. During the fall, the Company's"Scramble Reaction Team," designed to meet any kindof emergency, responded to 140 bomb threats and 29bomb detonations, as approximately 122 enemy rock-ets fell within Company E's area.'6 On Christmas Day1971, a Communist terrorist threw a M26 fragmenta-tion grenade into the Marine House compound in Sai-gon, injuring Sergeant Michael L. Linnan and Salay

FROM THE DELIA 10 THE DMZ 11

Mag, a local security guard. While the Security Guarddetachment continued its mission, other Marine unitswere more directly involved in the continued conductof the war.

The Manne Air Control Squadron Detachment

The smallest and most concentrated unit of U.S.Marines in South Vietnam was a detachment on topof "Monkey Mountain" on the Tien Sha Peninsulanortheast of Da Nang. The 20-man detachment ofChief Warrant Officet Guy M. Howard was from Ma-rine Air Control Squadron (MACS) 4, 1st MAW. Itsjob was to operate and maintain the Southeast AsiaTactical Data System Interface (SEATDSI) and hadstayed behind when the air wing departed Vietnam.These Marines were operators and technical specialistsof the Marine Tactical Data Communications Center(TDCC), a component of the Marine Air Commandand Control System which was originally known as theMarine Tactical Data System (MTDS).

Developed by an exclusively Marine Corps researchand development effort, MTDS was meant specifical-ly for amphibious warfare and to be compatible withthe systems of the other services as well as the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) system. It wasdesigned to be "an advanced, mobile, land-based,semi-automatic tactical air defense and air controlcapability?' The system made full use of computers in-tegrated with a display system to process volumes ofinformation rapidly. It was a case of space-age tech-nology being used in a "brush fire war?'

This system, which was operational in South Viet-nam inJuly 1967, enabled the squadron to establisha data-quality interface with units of the Seventh Fleet.

This was the first combat employment of such a sys-tem and allowed the integration of MTDS with theNavy's shipboard and airborne tactical data systems(NTDS and ATDS). Shortly after being establishedon Monkey Mountain, the TDCC was expanded toprovide assistance for all American as well as alliedforces.

In December 1971, CinCPac approved the deploy-menr to Udorn, Thailand, of an Air Force unit thatwould provide an air-to-ground digital link capabili-ty as well as ground terminal equipment that couldbe integrated with the Marine SEATDSI at Da Nang.This vital data link and interface also automaticallytransmitted radar surveillance provided by Air Forceand Navy elements operating over the Gulf of Tonkinand North Vietnam. The information then was trans-mitted instantly to the Task Force 77 Anti-Air Warfare

Coordinator and the Air Force Air Defense Com-mander. The SEATDSI also was used to rendezvous,refuel, and monitor air strikes over North Vietnam andto provide the vital coordination between naval gun-fire missions and air strikes that were being conduct-ed near each other.

Because of the special capability of the MarineTDCC to understand clearly data messages from boththe Air Force and Navy data systems, it was impera-tive that a detachment of Marines remain in Vietnamto continue 1:0 provide an interface between the in-compatible Air Force and Navy systems. All three sys-tems were used to monitor the location and dispositionof friendly air and to detect, identify, and direct in-tercept efforts against the hostile air threat which stillprevailed in the north. This small Marine detachmentwith its unique equipment contributed to the capa-bility of both Air Force and Navy units to operate ona regional basis.17

Sub Unit One,1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company

The single largest and most dispersed U.S. Marineunit in Vietnam was Sub Unit One, 1st Air and NavalGunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO). Much as themotto of the U.S. Armed Forces Radio and TelevisionNetwork in Vietnam, Sub Unit One (SUI) covered"From the Delta to the DMZ?' Marine naval gunfirespotters on top of outpost Alpha 2 from GioLinh justsouth of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) kept a closeeye on any movement to the north, while as far southas the Ca Mau Peninsula on the Gulf of Siam, spot-ters provided territorial forces their naval gunfire(NGF) requirements. Unlike the handpicked U.S. Ma-rine advisors, the ANGLICO Marines and naval per-sonnel had received neither language training norformal instruction on Vietnamese culture, yet werecalled upon to serve in ARVN units. They were quitecapable, however, of putting high-explosive naval ord-nance on target. According to Lieutenant ColonelD'Wayne Gray, who, on 19 july 1971, had relievedLieutenant Colonel Shoults as officer-in-charge of theunit, "the Marines came through in good style?'

Lieutenant Colonel Gray, a prematurely gray, pipe-smoking Texan, was well qualified for this assignment.He was knowledgeable of the Vietnamese, their lan-guage, and their culture. In 1964 he had attended theVietnamese Language School at the Foreign ServiceInstitute in Arlington, Virginia, and had served aprevious tour in Vietnam in 1965 as advisor to theChief of Staff of the Vietnamese Marine Corps, then


Department of Defense Photo (USN) KN20294Sub Unit One, 1st ANGLICO, was an essential element/or the continuedAmerican navalgunfire support to South Vietnamese and US. Army forces. Here the guided missile cruiserUSS Oklahoma Cityfires 6-inch, .47-caliber; tnj.ile-turret guns supporting ground units.

Lieutenant Colonel Bui The Lan. After his return tothe United States he otganized the first Marine CorpsVietnamese Language Course at Quantico, Virginia.He taught Vietnamese language for one year beforebeing assigned to Headquarters Marine Corps(HQMC) and took over the Vietnam desk in the jointPlanning Group. In addition to this extensiveknowledge of Vietnam, he was a qualified aerial ob-server (AO) with broad experience in supportingarms.* 18

As Gray assumed command of Sub Unit One at aplatoon-sized ceremony in Saigon, he was concernedwith two matters. First, he was determined to supplythe South Vietnamese all the naval gunfire and airsupport they needed to stand off the northern forces.Second, he also wished to see his Marines and sailors

*The AO, a naval aviation observer (tactical), was a Marine Corpsphenomenon in which ground officers in light aircraft and helicop.ters controlled supporting arms and reported on enemy activities.Ar times, a warrant officer or lieutenant found himself controllingthe firepower of a major general. These qualified, and occasionallycolorful, individuals served with ANGLICO, observation squadrons,artillery regiments, and the division intelligence section.

continue to work well with the Vietnamese as well asthe Koreans and the Australians. He later stared thatthe possibility of a major involvement with North Viet-namese forces never crossed his mind: "things werewinding down; this was going to be a quiet period2'°

ANGLICO was charged with the coordination ofnaval gunfire and air support in any form for U.S.Army and allied forces. In Vietnam, ANGLICO wasresponsible for obtaining and controlling the fire ofSeventh Fleet's destroyers and cruisers along the coun-try's entire coastline. In addition, the ANGLICO Ma-rines assigned a brigade tactical air control parry tothe Korean Marine Corps units. Sub Unit One's head-quarters was in Saigon adjacent to the MACV com-pound, but its spot and liaison reams were positionedat eight sites along rhe coastal areas. LieutenantColonel Gray felt that his teams knew how to shootand communicate, that rhey were above average in in-telligence, and that they possessed the initiative neces-sary to carry out their advisory responsibilities to seniorofficers concerning fire support matters. The teamswere ready, but there were some obstacles.



Sub Unit One's officer in charge, LtCo/D'W/ayne Gray,pictured here as a co/one/in 1974, /eda diverse groupof specia/ists in operations that covered the /ength ofthe Repub/ic of Vietnam. He wears US. Army andARVN parachutist and nava/ air observer insignia.

When coordinated, naval gunfire, artillery, and airsupport complemented each other. Naval gunfire wasgenerally accurate and effective under a variety ofweather conditions and helped fill the gap left bydeparting U.S. artillery. These gunfire missions,however, had to be coordinated to prevent interfer-ence with air strikes in the same area. It was standardprocedure to coordinate the activities of both air liai-son teams and tactical aircraft with naval gunfire sup-port ship missions. The Marine tactical data systeminterface capability, mentioned earlier, provided theclose coordination and control of supporting arms.*

The problem for ANGLICO teams was the neces-sarily detailed coordination of supporting fires to com-bat units. At the time, artillery and NGF were norpermitted to fire at the same time that close air sup-

tThe basic organization for employment was a tactical air con-trol party (TACP) with airborne or ground forward air controllers(FACs) and a shore fire control party (SFCP) with naval gunfire spotteams and liaison teams. These rask units combined to form an air-naval gunfire platoon.

port missions were being flown in the same area. Thisproblem was addressed daily, but no satisfactory so-lution was found to permit use of the Marines' res-trictive fire plan, which allowed for simultaneous airand gunfire missions. Gray recalled the U.S. Air Force"just refused to consider any alternative .. and theU.S. Army, all the way to the top, let them get awaywith it2 Consequently, when the aircraft made theirruns, the artillery and naval gunfire simply had to stopfiring. Although it was a coordination nightmare, thesituation was tolerable during this slack period as therewere no really worthwhile targets of opportunity orpressing needs for gunfire support2°

The range of the naval guns was also a major defi-ciency. Almost three years earlier, on 15 March 1969,the battleship USS New Jersey (BB 62), with her16-inch guns, had returned to the United States fordecommissioning. The preponderance of naval gunsthat remained were mounted on destroyers and wereof 5-inch bore diameter. The older 5"38 guns, withtheir limited range and manual loading, were reservedfor areas near the coastline. The newer automated andlonger-range 5"54 gun was used on targets which wereeither farther inland or which called for heavy, fast con-centrations. '[he 5"54 also fired a rocket-assistedprojectile (RAP),** which extended the normal rangeof the American gunfire support ships. This round,however, was not very accurate or effective at maximumrange. Despite limitations, the support ships, work-ing closely with the spotters ashore, formed an arrayof combat power which was a deterrent to enemymovements and activities along coastal areas.

Liaison and staff integration between ANGLICOand supported forces presented a real, but lesser,problem. ANGLICO detachments, headed by juniorMarine and Navy officers and enlisted men, often werechallenged by senior American Army and Air Forceofficers to provide the most appropriate supportingarm to employ in a given situation and how best touse it. Often the rank differential was extreme, suchas the time a 115. Army lieutenant general landed hishelicopter on a fire support base in MR 1, to discussnaval gunfire with the senior American present, a U.S.Marine lance corporal.

The challenge to communications for the widely dis-persed ANGLICO and fire-support units was met by

•*This projectile was fired from a gun-tube as though it was anordinary round. At a certain point aftrr leaving the gun a rocketignited and gave the ordnance extra propulsion to extend its maxi-mum range. Keep in mind that effective use of naval gunfire iswithin the first three-quarters of the range of the gun fired.


Photo courtesy of MajGen Donald R. Gardner, USMC

Control of supporting arms by Sub Unit One was byair observers flying from American and South Viet-namese aircraft. This AO is flying in the right seat ofa US. Air Force Cessna 0-2 Skymaster over theMekong Delta in support of riverine operations.

Master Sergeant Donald F. Heim and his team of Ma-rine communicators. Heim, a former Marine artilleryofficer and to Gray "a superb staff NCO' was cons-tantly at work holding together a radio networkplagued by the area's marginal high frequency wave-propagation and extended distances that taxed thecapabilities of his equipment. The network, however,was unusual in that it provided an alternate meansof voice communications among Marines throughoutSouth Vietnam. This network later was to prove sig-nificant in tying together an otherwise disparate groupof Marines.*

Fire support teams were supporting the UnitedStates, Vietnamese, and Australian armies and theKorean and Vietnamese Marines. In MR 1 a liaisonteam with XXIV Corps in Da Nang supported U.S.Army units. Shore fire control parties were with the1st, and later the 3d, ARYN divisions at Quang Tn;spotters worked with Vietnamese Marine Corps(VNMC) units and their U.S. Marine advisors along theDMZ and with the American 23d (Americal) Infan-

*Becauae ANGLICO operators were with a variety of units andin equally varied locations, MACV's Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff,

J-3 (Operatiunal), Brigadier General William I-I. I.anagan, Jr.. a Ma-rine himself and a personal friend of Lieutenant Colonel Gray, hada Marine-manned communications ayatem that extended rhe wholelength of South Vietnam.

try Division at Chu Lai. In MR 2 a liaison team wasmaintained at Nha Trang; spotters were flown in onrare occasions when needed. A liaison team was ar MR3 regional headquarters in Long Binh and spot teamswere with the U.S. Army's 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Di-vision, at Bien Hoa and with the Australian forces atNui Dat. In the Mekong Delta in MR 4, a liaison teamwas assigned to the regional headquarters at Can Tho.Two Marine AO's flying with VAL-4 at Binh Thy and ashore fire control party with the 21st ARVN Divisionat Ca Mau completed Sub Unit One's dispositions.During the next few months, Gray shifted his teamsto meet the differing needs of the supported units.

Near Hoi An in MR 1, the largest ANGLICO con-tingent in South Vietnam was assembled under MajorEdwardJ. "Jim" Dyer. Within this northernmost andmost heavily threatened of the country's militaryregions, ANGLICO Marines supported the 2d Repub-lic of Korea Marine Corps (ROKMC) Brigade and werecharged not only with control of naval gunfire sup-port but also with arranging for and controlling allallied air support. ANGLICO personnel were attachedto the companies of the brigade so that when theKoreans needed air strikes, helicopter support, or med-ical evacuation, the planes could be requested anddirected in English. This policy was necessary becausethe helicopters belonged to the U.S. Army and the tac-tical close air suppott was provided by the U.S. AirForce, U.S. Navy, and South Vietnamese Air Force(R\TNAF). English was the only common language.

Major Dyer, a former naval officer, was an especial-ly qualified Marine. While in the Navy, he had beena naval gunfire liaison officer on Okinawa with the3d Marine Division. During his first tour in Vietnam,he was an advisor to the Vietnamese Navy's junk force.At the end of 1965, he requested an inter-service trans-fer to the Marine Corps, was commissioned in Saigon,and reported to the Marines for a full tour of dutyas a 105mm howitzer battery commander in Vietnam.In June 1971, Major Dyer was in Vietnam again forhis third tour, his second as a Marine, and was rightat home with his naval gunfire platoon in support ofthe ROK Marines.

The Korean camp and outposts were examples rightout of a field manual — immaculate in every way withevery sandbag in place. Jr was apparent to Major Dyerthat the "Blue Dragon" Marines were thoroughlyprofessional: they kept their hair cut close, wore theiruniforms with pride, and appeared physically ready.

During July 1971, despite Typhoons Harriet andKim, the cruiser USS Ohlahoma City (C1.G 5) fired

repeatedly in support of the ROKMC. Staff visits tothe ship by both ROKMC staff officers and ANGLI-CO personnel ensured coordination and technical un-derstanding among the parties concerned. Briefingswere held in the areas of operations, friendly positions,common radio frequencies, intelligence targets, andtarget lists. Enemy activity was generally light, but theROKMC had scattered contact while on a cordon andsearch operation in the foothills of the Que Son Moun-tains. In the field with the ROK Marines, CorporalAnthony Sandoval provided the communications linkand control necessary for NGF and air support. Mosrof his efforts were directed toward controlling helicop-ters flying logistic support missions.

Military Region I was the area that, on a day-to-day basis, provided the most return for the expendi-ture of money, ammunition, time, and manpower.Although it was difficult to assess damage done andenemy killed, many targets along the DemilitarizedZone were fired upon daily. In addition, Marines inQuang Tn, the northernmost province, served as anearly-warning, instant-response, reaction element.Lieutenant Colonel Gray called them "disasterpreventers" Time was to prove him correct.

Elsewhere, when things were quiet, Marines were

idle, and this idleness presented a problem. The ap-parent enemy inactivity and the lack of a need torespond was countered by a vigorous training andcross-training program and enrollments in MarineCorps Institute correspondence courses in forward ob-server techniques. Communicators were sent to the 3dMarine Division Naval Gunfire School at Subic Bay,Philippines, and NGF spotters were trained in com-munications procedures and equipment while in Viet-nam. Many Marines, including Gray and First SergeantErnest Benjamin, both of whom were over 40, under-went parachute jump training at the ARYN AirborneTraining Center at Tan San Nhut Air Base, while someMarines completed similar training on Okinawa givenby the U.S. 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne). Thephysically demanding preparation for such training oc-cupied the otherwise slack rime and built an "Air-borne" esprit within Sub Unit One? It also createdan atmosphere of mutual respect between ANGLICOand the ARVN Airborne Division it supported.

Along the northeast sector of the DMZ, the NGFarea of responsibility shifted inland to the west. Naval

*Members of ANGLICO units were required to be parachutetrained in order to carry out their mission in support of joint andcombined operations, in this ease with the ARVN Airborne Division.


Photo courtesy of Mai Charles W. King. USMC (Ret)

Ground spot teams brought supporting arms to bear on the enemy from various loca-tions, such as from this outpost just below the DemilitarizedZone in Quang Tn Province.Here an air strike is conducted along the main avenue of approach from North Vietnam.


Photo courtesy of leatherneck Magazine

Sub Unit One liaison teams operated with selectedAmerican and al/led units. Here Korean andAmeri-can Marines work side-by-side at the Korean MarineBrigade's combat operations center near Hoi An.

gunfire spotters shared common locations with theU.S. Marine advisors on such hilltop outposts as Al-pha 1 and Alpha 2 (Gio Linh) just below the DMZ.A spurt of enemy activity during the latter part of Au-gust gave the spotters the opportunity to call up to10 missions a day. Most of the missions were suppres-sive fires targeted against enemy mortar and rocket po-sitions. Supporting the Marine spotters on the groundas well as the 1st ARVN Division were ANGLICO aer-ial observers flying from the airfield at Dong Ha inborh U.S. Army and RVNM aircrafr. Army LieurenanrGeneral Welborn G. Dolvin, commanding XXIVCorps, expressed his satisfaction wirh the naval gun-fire support rendered in his area of responsibility dur-ing this period.21

Despite the fact that areas became devoid of ene-my activity and obvious enemy movements, LieutenantColonel Gray was insistent that his men be gainfullyemployed. Drugs, racial unrest, inter-service rivalry,and bad weather threatened morale and challengedhis unit's leadership. In a letter to Headquarters Ma-rine Corps recommending a reduction of the unit'smanning level, Lieutenant Colonel Gray said, "No Ma-rine should remain in Vietnam who does not have afrill day's work to do every day." The proposal to reducewas made in order "to make these Marines availablefor more productive employment and to remove themfrom this environment where idle minds createproblems at a higher rate than found in a normaldevil's playground."zz These reductions were madefeasible by dissolving all ANGLICO units in MR 2 andMR 3, while still maintaining mobile spot reams pre-pared to reenter those areas on short notice.

Fbr example, during late September 1971, a flare-up in Tay Ninh Province, MR 3, and across the bord-er in Cambodia, challenged the responsiveness as wellas boosted the morale of Sub Unit One. Enemy ac-tivity in that area appeared to threaten the city of TayNinh. Intelligence reports caused the MACV DeputyJ-3 for Operations, Brigadier General William H.Lanagan, to ask for an additional tactical air controlcapability along the Cambodian border. The USAFwas tasked to provide the forward air controllers (FAC)and ANGLICO to supply the communicators and FACteams to direct and control USAF aircraft inland.

In less than an hour, Master Sergeant Heim had themen and equipment staged. At first light the nextmorning, Lieutenant Colonel Gray, Master SergeantHeim, and the Marine teams boarded helicopters, flewto Bien Hoa, picked up three USAF ground forwardair control officers, and then flew to Tay Ninh City.There they took up three positions around the city.During the next several days, the teams receivedsporadic rocket fire in and near their positions.Although they did not control any air strikes, thereams were in place and were ready and communicat-ing with the orbiting aircraft. An emergency had beenmet with dispatch.a3

By October, the winter monsoon had come to thenorthern provinces. Weather conditions were so severefrom 4 to 13 October that there were no naval gun-fire support ships available. During the rest of themonth the weather remained so miserable that neitherfriend nor foe did much moving. On 23 October 1971,typhoon weather conditions, with gusts up to 85 miles-per-hour, was uprooting trees and flooding the DalstSgt Ernest Benj'izmin was the senior enlisted Ma-tine in Sub Unit One. This was his fourth tour in Viet-nam and one during which he confronted many de-mands of combat /eadersbtj, in the Spring Offensive.

Photo courtesy of leatherneck Magazine


Photo courtesy of LtCol George F. Jones, USMC (Ret)

Atgraduationfrom the parachute school at the ARVNAirborne Training Center at Tan Son Nhut Air Basenear Saigon, Sub Unit One members are awarded'jump wings"for completing the demanding course,earning prestige while serving with airborne units.

Nang, Chu Lai, and Quang Ngai areas. The commu-nications equipment with the liaison-spot teams wasdamaged by the weather, whilethe Marines themselvessuffered no injures.

By November 1971, as the adverse weather condi-tions subsided, suitable targets for naval gunfire in-creasingly appeared. Still, the employment of navalgunfire ships decreased as ARVN artillery took upmore of these fire missions. By 29 November, the Ar-my's 23d Infantry Division had departed Vietnam. Asthe 2d ARVN Division relocated to Chu Lai to assumethat tactical area of responsibility, Shore Fire ConrrolParty "1-3" at Quang Ngai moved with it. The AN-GLICO platoon at Hoi An prepared to stand downas the Korean Marine Brigade made preparation forits departure in early December?

On the night of 22 December 1971, MACV AdvisoryTeam 17 personnel observed a sizable enemy troopmovement north of Duc Pho village in Quang Ngai.The enemy seemed to be moving in the direction of

the town, and the advisors wanted the ANGLICOoperators to "do something about it."25 The liaisonteam located with the 2d ARVN Division at Chu Laiwas called into action. Team commander Lieutenant(jg) Aaron D. Garrett, USN, responded by calling inhigh-explosive, variable-timed fragmentation, andsmoke projectiles into the middle of the enemy's dis-position. The Army advisors jubilantly radioed backthat the mission was a success. Because of the coverof darkness, the Communists had displayed uncharac-teristic boldness and were caught moving across theopen terrain. When the rounds hit, the enemy for-mation was broken, and they quit the field in a rout.An early morning sweep did not reveal any bodies, butblood trails and abandoned equipment were inevidence.

•By the end of 1971, Vietnam's navy had four deep-

draft ships with naval gunfire capability, albeit limitedwhen compared to the larger, more heavily armed U.S.ships. Nevertheless, an attempt was made toward Viet-namization of naval gunfire support.* Vietnamese firecontrol personnel readily grasped the rudiments ofNGF, but the indirect fire capability of the VNN shipswas severely limited by the existing gunfire control sys-tem and close-in support of friendly troops was there-fore marginal. ARVN officers were trained and didcontrol some fire in the Mekong Delta, but as a whole,the effort was ineffective.28

During January 1972, Sub Unit One continued toprovide support for ARVN units in MR 4. Naval gun-fire provided support during the construction of firebases in the southern portion of the Ca Mau Penin-sula. As the fire bases were completed, ARVN artillerywas moved into position. Both naval gunfire and ar-tillery then concentrated on bringing fire to bear onsuspected enemy control points, staging areas, andprobable base camps. By early March, field artillerywas programmed to provide complete coverage of theDelta Region. A gradual and consistent reduction ofnaval gunfire requirements appeared to be reasona-bly certain.

In order to extend the range of naval gunfire in-land, on 2 February 1972, the American destroyer USSMorton (DD 981) sailed into Da Nang harbor to fireinto Elephant Valley, an enemy staging area west ofthe city. Such a mission had been considered previ-ously, but this was the first time it had actually been

*Attempn to organize a South Vietnamese ANGLJCO-type unitwithin the \TNMC were turned down by the VNN, ARVN, andVNAF.


carried out. While its operations were difficult to coor-dinate within the confines of the bay, the destroyer'spresence provided moral support in and around theDa Nang area.27

By 24 March 1972, there were no U.S. ground spot-tets on an assigned basis anywhere in Vietnam exceptalong the DMZ. There, Marines remained in the ob-servation tower at Gio Linh Alpha 2 along with theirARVN counterparts. From other ANGLICO person-nel, additional spot reams had been organized torespond to an emergency or any unusual situation.Lieutenant Commander Richard M. Kreassig, USN,the ANGLICO liaison officer for XXIV Corps, hadeven drawn up a contingency plan to cover the possi-ble evacuation of exposed Alpha 2 during an emer-gency, particularly during the February Tet period. ATet offensive anticipated by MACV did not material-

alert. Now, because of Lieutenant Colonel Gray's per-sistent recommendations, Sub Unit One's authorizedpersonnel strength was reduced from 185 to 89 men,effective 1 May 1972.

It appeared that peace indeed had come to SouthVietnam; the market places in the Cam Lo village justsouth of the DMZ were scenes of active trading. BruMontagnards were once again planting their crops inthe Ba Long Rivet Valley with a reasonable hope ofharvesting them without Viet Cong interference. Onecould drive alone from Quang Tn Province to thebustling capital city of Saigon and southward to CaMau in the heart of the Delta without fear of ambushor confrontation. The canals in the U Minh Forest wereopen to civil use with relative assurance of safbty. SouthVietnam, with its natural wealth in forests, paddies,and rivers, seemingly had begun to prosper once

ize, however, and allied forces srood down from their more.2°

CHAPTER 2

The AdvisorsNaval Advisory Group, Naval Advisory Units—The Rung Sat Special Zone

The Mekong Delta Tactical Zone—Naval Advisory Group, Marine Advisory Unit —' Trusted Friends'Winding Down —Along the DMZ

Naval Advisory Group, Naval Advisory Units

By mid-1971, the main thrust of U.S. policy insideVietnam was the advisory effort. Most Marine advi-sors were concentrated within the framework of theNaval Advisory Group (NAG) under the Commander,Naval Forces Vietnam, Rear Admiral Robert S. Salzer,This included the Marines who served their tours large-ly unheralded in the Mekong River Delta Region ofMR 4. This river plain, to the east, south, and westof Saigon, accounted for almost a quarter of the totalarea of South Vietnam. A grid of rivets and canalsdominated this relatively flat region, where boats andhelicopters provided the most practical modes of trans-portation. Otherwise, a traveler faced an exhaustingstruggle on foot through a quagmire of murky water,oozing mud, and practically impenetrable tropicalvines and roots. Under French colonial mie, the deltawas criss-crossed by a well developed road and canalsystem for ease of regional movement. Because of theimportance of this network to the economies of bothVietnam and Cambodia, it was vital to keep thesehighways open.

From as early as 1954, the thick mangrove junglesof the delta provided a place of refuge for the VietCong (VC) guerrillas as they waged their war of terrorupon the region's hamlets and river commerce. Aftereach attack, the VC could return to the relative safetyand seclusion of their base camps. However, operationsconducted by South Vietnam's Regional (RF) andPopular (PF) Forces which began in 1964, over the yearshad reduced the enemy activity from a major threatto minor harassment. Since july 1964, when Major Ed-wardJ. Bronars was assigned as the first U.S. Marineadvisor in the delta, Marines had worked with thesegovernment troops, assisting in base, village, and ham-let security. Within the delta, Marines were assignedto both the Rung Sat Special Zone and the Mekong

Delta Tactical Zone.'

The Rung Sat Special Zone

The Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ), southeast of Sai-gon, was an area of apprmiimately 480 square miles,extending to the South China Sea. Rung Sat, whichmeans "Forest of Death:' was an area of great concern

to the South Vietnamese government because the LongTau River ran through its center. The Long Lu, or Roy-al Rivet, could accommodate deep-draft ships up to720 feet long. The river banks were low and lined withdense mangrove marsh and swamps. It was the mainshipping channel leading to Saigon and much of thelogistic and economic support of South Vietnam de-pended on the rivet remaining open. The RSSZ com-mand was charged with keeping this waterway openand functioning.

By October 1971, enemy activity had been broughtunder control. Combined U.S. Marine, Navy, andArmy advisors, under the supervision of the Senior Ad-visor, RSSZ, U.S. Navy Commander Douglas A.Stewart, worked with the local forces in operationsdesigned to keep the enemy off balance. At the sametime they assisted the civilians in reconstruction, publichealth, education, and other aspects of nation-building. With some sense of security, the fishermen,woodcutters, and farmers once again were followingthe roles of their forefathers as an ominous peace set-tled over Rung Sat, the Forest of Death.

Majorjames M. Tully was Commander Stewart's as-sistant senior advisor and was specifically charged withtactical ground and air operations. The zone was divid-ed into two districts, Can Gio on the east and QuangXuyen on the west. Each district had a U.S. Marineadvisory team assigned to it. The Quang Xuyen Dis-trict team was headed by Captain Ronald S. Neubauer,while Captain David W. Blizzard headed the team inthe Can Gio l)istrict. Daily, Vietnamese and Ameri-cans shared food, hardships, and work as they patrolledthe waterways of the Rung Sat. With his assignmentto the swamps of the RSSZ, Captain Neubauer, a lean,red-headed Marine from Norwalk, Connecticut, wasfar removed from the pageantry of his previous dutystation. While assigned to the Marine Barracks,Washington, D.C., he had served as parade adjutantand as a social aide at the White House.2

To cover their vast districts each captain was assist-ed by six enlisted advisors and one Navy medical corps-man. The enlisted Marines, on occasion, were calledupon to advise Vietnamese officers while the Navycorpsmen were often required to perform functions

19

or to give treatment that normally would be expectedof a physician. The enlisted Marines were often com-munications, intelligence, and engineer specialists.They assisted in all forms of military and civil opera-tions, but the counterinsurgency effort was their forte.Each man on rhe ream worked closely with his coun-terpart in an effort to develop a comprehensive pro-gram to pacif' the entire Long Thu shipping channel.

In such an undertaking, each meter of river was asvital as the next. Friendly forces had to be as mobileand as flexible as possible in order to counter the VietCong threat. Operations ranging from multi-companyhelicopter and waterborne assaults down to squad-sizeinterdiction missions were carried out repeatedly andwith such effectiveness that enemy activity had beenreduced to practically nothing. Advisors accompaniedthe Vietnamese on operations, assisting the com-manders on the ground in talking with the commandand communications helicopters, providing aerial ob-servation, close air support, naval gunfire support,troop lifts, and medical evacuation.

Marine Staff Sergeant Freddie L. Murray was as-signed to work with the Regional Three militia in late1971. Murray assisted the Vietnamese with commu-

nications between ground units, arranged for boats tomove through the waterways, and for U.S. Navy orArmy helicopter support. There was nor much excite-ment in the Rung Sat, only the hard, dirty work ofslogging through knee-deep mud and swamp undera blistering sun. Murray felt that progress had beenmade and the advisors no longer went on field opera-tions "unless they have a specific target to hit."

There were times when Marine advisors gave morethan just morale or communications support. On 9November 1971, Captain Blizzard accompanied a Viet-namese PF squad in the Can Gio District that walkedinto an enemy ambush. One '4PF" was hit by the ini-tial burst of small arms fire and fell seriously wound-ed. While directing the other Vietnamese to securea helicopter landing zone, Captain Blizzard radioedfor a medical evacuation helicopter. With the helicop-ter on the way, he ran 50 meters to the fallen soldierand, while enemy bullets struck around him, hoistedthe wounded man to his shoulders and carried him300 meters to the secured zone. After the "Medevac'Caprain Blizzard rallied the Vietnamese and led themin an assault on the enemy position. For his bravery,he was awarded the Silver Star Medal. Later, he was


Photo courtesy of LtCol Ronald S. Neubsuer, USMC (Ret)

Capt Ronald S. Neubauer reviews a plan with South Vietnamese local forces prior to theirinsertion into the Rung Sat Special Zone. He wears the black beret of the 'unk force" navy.

THE ADVISORS 21

to go north to join the fighting in MR 1 with the Viet-namese Marines.

The Mekong Delta Tactical Zone

To the northwest along the Cambodian border,things had not been quiet. Late in 1970 the NorthVietnamese and Viet Cong had made an effort to iso-late Cambodia's Phnom Penh, the capital of theKhmer Republic, by closing all lines of communica-tions including the vital Mekong River between TanChau, Vietnam, and the capital. Early in 1971, theoil tanker Mekong was sunk while transporting petrole-urn upstream. After this attack the CambodianGovernment asked the United States and South Viet-nam to provide protection for the rivet convoys be-tween Tan Chau and Phnom Penh. This was not tobe an easy task, for convoy protection required closecooperation among nine military services of the thteenations.

After a tequest from the Cambodian Government,Operation Tran Hung Dao 18 was initiated for theMekong Delta Tactical Zone (MDTZ). The primary ob-jective of this operation was to organize and coordinateground and air support for convoys which carried mili-tary cargo and petroleum products from Tan Chau to


American advisor MajDonaldR. Gardner is seen, atleft, in front of a typical sandbagged defensiveposition and Butler Building housing area at the TanChau naval operating base in South Vietnam.

Phnorn Perth. The vital tiver route passed thtoughmore than 100 kilometers of dense jungles, high riverbanks, and several narrow gorges affotding the ene-my ideal ambush positions at almost any point. Onl8januaty 1972, Major Donald R. Gardner relievedNavy Commander Atthur Sr. Clair Wright as senior

South Vietnamese local forces on a Vietnamese Navy rivercraft make preparations forgoing ashore. They are members ofRegional Force Company 999 armed with small arms.

Photo courtesy of LtCoI Ronald S. Neubauer, USMC (Ret)

advisor, Tran Hung Dao 18 (THD-18); area coordina-rot; and Commander, Task Group 11615. Major Gard-ner, wearing a Silver Star Medal from a previous tourof dury in Vietnam and after serving nine months inthe Chau Doc Province, was embarking upon an as-signment that had political and cultural implicationsunavoidable even at the advisory level. Traditionally,Vietnamese and Cambodians neither liked nor respect-ed one another. It was Major Gardner's task tominimize this historic antagonism through a continu-ous liaison and coordination effort. As he recalled,only "the good working relationship, in spite of ethnicdifferences, between the FANK (Cambodian Army),4th ARVN Ranger Group, and the THD-18 made thispossible."

In addition to the Vietnamese Navy commitmentof ships, tankers, tugs, and barges to haul fuel and

other supplies to Phnom Penh, there was a constantrequirement to support the ARVN ground forces thatprovided river bank security. Originally, the \TNMChad been tasked with these duties, but, ultimately,the ARVN 4th Ranger Group of the 44th Special Tac-tical Zone was assigned this mission. In cooperationwith the Cambodian 4th Infantry Brigade, the ARVNRangers were successful in preventing the enemy fromclosing the river supply route.*

Major Gardner's VNN counterpart, CommodoreNghiem Van Phu, a graduate of the U.S. Army's Com-mand and Staff College, had run convoys on the RedRiver in North Vietnam prior to 1954, before Gard-ner was old enough to wear a uniform. He was a naval

*MajGen Donald R. Gardner later noted that this "was the onlysource of supply for Phnom Penh. Had it failed, Cambodia wouldhave fallen in 1971?' (Gardner comments)



Photograph of the naval op crating base on the Mekong River andthe nearby town of TanChau shows the defensive barriers, the interior of the base, and the boat dock at the right.

THE ADVISORS 23

Photo courtesy of MajGen Donald R. Gardner. USMC

Patrol craft were the essence of n'verine operations.Here a Cambodian patrol boat riverine (PBR) docksat the Tan Chau base. This American-made craft usedwater-jet prop ulsion to operate in the shallow, restrict-ed waterways. It is armed with Browning .50-caliberguns in the bow and M60 machine guns in the stern.

professional in every sense and expected no less fromhis officers and men. Under the commodore's tutelage,Gardner quickly became accustomed to "brown waternavy" techniques.* Major Gardner learned the customsof the delta people, visited their families, and madeefforts to improve sanitary and living conditions. Thepeople-to-people effort took on a new meaning oneday when on a sampan he helped to deliver a child.Every day seemed to present new challenges.

In February and March 1972, allied forces uncoveredcaches of arms and supplies near outlying bases alongthe Cambodian border indicating that Communist in-filtrators had prepared for more than guerrilla-typeharassment actions. Air strikes by American, Viet-namese, and Cambodian forces provided some con-voy protection, but the Communists, however,repeatedly made their presence known. In early 1972there were more than 60 ambushes against shippingto Phnom Penh. During this time, the enemy sankone barge and damaged other vessels with rockets.Communist antiaircraft fire downed three helicoptersproviding escort air cover.5

Naval Advisory Group, Marine Advisory Unit

While individual Marines served Vietnamese forces

*"Brown water navy' is a phrase used to describe riverine andcoastal operations as opposed to the 'blue water navy' of the ocean-going forces.


Convoy escort into Cambodia brought about some un -

usual situations, as in this case where there is a meet-ing between a focal Communist military leader andthe lzn Chau district chief in the center of the picture.

within Navy and MACV advisory units, one group ofMarine advisors had caught the Corps' popular im-age as "The Marine Advisors:' These were the officersand men of the Marine Advisory Unit** who servedwith the Vietnamese Marine Corps. The VNMC wasformed at the time of the 1954 ceasefire that estab-lished North and South Vietnam. An elite unit by anystandard and closely associated with the U.S. MarineCorps, the VNMC had been fighting the Communistsfor more than 20 years. Marines selected to serve asadvisors with them were considered fortunate for be-ing among the only Marines in combat and for theexotic nature of their assignment. As advisors, theAmericans wore the same distinctive green beret and"tiger stripe" field uniform of the Vietnamese. Un-der the supervision of a Senior Marine Advisor (SMA),Marines were assigned to VNMC battalions, as wellas to brigade and division staffs.

The VNMC had its beginning in October 1954when Lieutenant Colonel Victorj. Croizat helped or-ganize the VNMC from former colonial-era comman-dos who had come south under the provisions of theGeneva Conference agreemenrs.***e A division-sized

tAbbreviaced at the rime as the MAIJ, but heceafter MarAdvUto avoid confusion with the Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) ofthe Seventh Fleet.

***lsr and 2d Banal/Ions de Marche, in arcocdance with Decree991-QP/ND of 130tt54.


service since 1968, the VNMC boasted nine infantrybattalions, three artillery battalions, and three brigadeheadquarters designated Marine Brigades 147, 258,and 369. Each of the brigades was originally formedfrom the infantry battalions which made up its nu-merical designation, e.g., Marine Brigade 258 origi-nally had the 2d, 5th, and 8th battalions under itscontrol. In practice, a brigade headquarters controlledwhatever mix of units it was assigned. The VNMC,along with the ARVN Airborne, formed the JointGeneral Staff General Reserve of the Republic of Viet-nam, and, as such, was employed in any of the fourmilitary regions. Additionally, a VNMC battalion ora task force could be attached to any of thc corps tac-tical zones or army divisions to serve as a reaction force.From April 1971, two brigades operated in Quang TnProvince, first under the operational control of the 1stARVN Division headquarters and later with the new-ly formed 3d ARVN Division. The Marine divisionheadquarters and the remaining brigade wete locat-ed in Saigon.

By now, many of the U.S. Marines reporting to theadvisory unit in Saigon for duty were returning to Viet-nam for their second and third times. Some had com-pleted the Army's Military Assistance Training Advisor(MATA) Course at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, or theMarine Advisor Course at Quantico, Virginia. A fewadvisors were fluent in Vietnamese and most couldconverse at a basic level. Upon arrival in Saigon, thenew advisors could tell that the city was prospering:

the open markets were doing a rushing business, streetvendors were hawking their wares, nightclubs abound-ed, and there was a swarm of people constantly in mo-tion on small but noisy motorscoorers. As the advisorsmade their way north to join their battalions, they weresurprised at the peaceful appearance of the country-side. During the latter part of 1971, both Americansand Vietnamese moved throughout the area with lit-tle trepidation. No one felt the necessity of wearinga helmet or flak jacket and few Marines actually car-ried a magazine loaded in their weapons. The Viet-namese seemed happy and in good physical shape;many would greet the Americans in English when theypassed.

After the initial briefing in Saigon by the SeniorMarine Advisor, those Marines assigned to the brigadesoperating in the north often made their way there byserving as mailmen and couriers to Marines alreadyin the field. While all the advisors' mail came intoSaigon, the way it got to the other end of the countrywas not predetermined. Fbr example, when CaptainRay L. Smith checked in and was assigned to the 4thVNMC Battalion at Mai mc, he carried four bags ofmail with him. It was relatively easy to catch an air-craft from Saigon to Da Nang, but from that pointon, the itinerary was erratic. After spending a day atDa Nang, Smith was able to catch a plane to Phu Bai.Because of the monsoon rains, Major Walter E. Boom-er, senior advisor to the 4th VNMC Battalion, metCaptain Smith at Phu Bai in a Jeep. Smith was wary

The honor guard before the main building of Vietnamese Marine Corps Headquartersin Saigon wean the distinctive "sea wave" camouflage uniforms, insgnth, and green berets.

Marine Corps Historical Collection

THE ADVISORS 25

Adapted from Mañne Advisory Unit Material

Marine Advisory Unit, 1972

Division Artillery AdviaAssistant Advisor (3)

0-3 AdvisorAssistant G-Training AdOperations

as the two traveled from Phu Bai through Hue, QuangTn, and Dong Ha, right up to the position where hewas to be stationed. It seemed to be a different kindof tour from his first in Vietnam.

Some Vietnamese Marine officers had been trainedin the United States and spoke English. They had beenin combat for years and often did not feel the needfor an American advisor. Because of this, the Ameri-can Marines often felt more like a fire support coordi-nator than an advisor. In fact, during this periodColonel Joshua W. Dorsey Ill, who had relievedColonel Francis W. Tief as senior advisor, was makingplans to pull the advisors from the battalion level. Hewanted to consolidate them at each brigade, thusforming a "liaison team" that could be responsive asthe needs arose?

'Trusted Friends'The Marine advisors with the battalions in the field

had a "fairly comfortable" life. They lived in bunkers,slept on cots, and shaved and bathed out of their hel-mets. There were kerosene lamps for light and gaso-line stoves which took the damp chill out of the air,particularly during the monsoon season with itspenetrating cold. Rats in the bunkers, however, didnothing for peace of mind. Their number was cons-tandy multiplying, along with hordes of mosquitoes.One Marine advisor killed 34 rats in his area in anevening.

Marine advisors routinely shared the Vietnamesefood of their counterparts' mess, which together withattempts to converse in Vietnamese, did more to fostergood personal relations than anything else. Eating

Senior Marine Advisor

Assistant Senior Marine Advisor

Administrative OffiretAdministrative ChiefAdministrative ManAdministrative Man (2)

Brigade Senior AdvisorAssistant Senior AdvisorFire. Support Coordination

AdvisorLiaison Officers (3)

0-1 Advisor

-H C-I AdvisorAcl.isotor

ie

G-2, Recon AdvisorH

Engineer AdvisorAssistant Advisor

Training Corn nand Advisor

Medical Advisor (USN)

Base Command Advisor

Motor Transport AdvisorMotor TransportMaintenance Advisor

Arnphibious SupportBattalion Advisor

Strength

USMC USNOfficer: 4 i 0

Enlisted: 1 0 1

Total: 51 1

Supply AdvisorSupply ChiefSupply ManSupply Man (2)

Communications AdvisorCommunications

Maintenance Advisor

Ordnance Advisot

Vietnamese food, however, initially could be an un-settling experience. "Nuoc Mam," a fermented fishsauce with salt added, was served with practically ev-ery meal as a source of protein. When of poor quali-ty, it had a strong, offensive smell to mosr foreigners.Luckily, battalion commanders usually had the highquality variety which was quite tasty. Special occasionscalled for exotic foods such as coagulated duck bloodpudding with peanuts on top, a delicacy unknown tomost Americans.

Vietnamese Marine methods of food procurementdiffered from the orderly, industrialized logisticalprocedures of rhe USMC. The battalion commanderwas given an allocation of funds to buy food for histroops. He would do his purchasing in the local mar-kers and from individual farmers. Although thegovernment provided bulk rice and canned goods, thepreponderance of the food prepared in the battalionmesses was obtained from the local area. When resup-ply runs arrived, any meat would be cooked immedi-ately iii order to preserve it since there was norefrigeration. This would provide meat for the next

few days without any problems unless it became fly-blown and maggot infested. Occasionally, in themountain regions, a deer or a wild boar would be shotand find its way into the battalion's cooking pots. Ifthe battalion was operating along the coast, the menumight include crab and other seafoods. Farm producewas also cheaper there than it was inland. The Ameri-can advisors often made contributions to their coun-terparts' mess by sharing packages from home. Theresults could be unpredictable. Captain Ray Smithrecalled receiving a large can of lobster meat and turn-ing it over to to his counterpart's cook who was in theprocess of preparing the evening meal. Eagerly an-ticipating the rare delicacy, he sat down to dinner tofind it on the menu all right. . . submerged in turnipsoup.

Although the Americans made every effort to knowtheir counterparts better by living with them and shar-ing their lot, they took pains not to become involvedin certain aspects of Vietnamese military procedures.One such area was the administration of discipline.A Vietnamese Marine found guilty of an offense was



The senior Vietnamese and American Marine leaders, in late 1971 are, from left, LtGenlie Nguyen Khang, Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps; ColJoshua WI Dor-sey III, Senior Marine Advisor; and RAdm Robert £ Salzer, Commander Naval ForcesVietnam and the Naval Advisoty Group. Col Dorsey wears the Vietnamese Marine uni-

form with American and Vietnamese rank insignia, as typical for Marine advisors.

THE ADVISORS 27


A major portion of the advisory effort was focused on training. These Vietnamese Marinerecruits negotiate an assault course at the VNMC Training Center near Thu Duo. Theyare equzOped with American Ml helmets, individual equimen4 and M16 rifles.

awarded punishment that might seem harsh to theobserving advisot and certainly would not be foundin the Uniform Code of Military Justice or even the"Rocks and Shoals" of the old Corps. It was, in short,immediate and corporal. Strict discipline contribut-ed to the high morale of the closely-knit VNMC bat-talions. Another positive indicator was the Marines'intense personal loyalty to their commanders, espe-cially battalion commanders. Their relationship waslongstanding and it was nor unusual for a Marine tohave served in the same battalion for as long as 15years. It was only natural for the Vietnamese empha-sis on the family to extend into professional life.

Winding Down

During June 1971, VNMC Brigade 147 defeatedNVA assaults during which the enemy had used teargas and had reached the Marines' fighting holes.* OneU.S. Marine advisor, Captain Dennis M. Dicke, was

*Vietnamese Marines, whose senior officers had come from thenorth, referred to their enemy as Communista or Viet Cong (Viet-namese Communists) and did nor uae the American term NVA(North Vietnamese Army) or the Communist's PAVN (People's Armyof Viet Narn).

mortally wounded on Operation Lam Son 810 whileserving with the 7th VNMC Battalion. The outcomeof the battle was doubtful until artillery and close airsupport turned, the tide in favor of the Marines. ByJuly 1971, the situation in South Vietnam seemedquiet enough, although Marine battalions in MR 1had beaten back enemy attacks during the precedingthree months. By mid-year, however, activity had sub-sided and newly arrived advisors were reporting to theirbattalions in the field with a feeling that this was go-ing to be a quiet period indeed.

During this rime, battalions spent about threemonths in MR IL and then rotated to Saigon for refur-bishing, training, and rest and recuperation with theirfamilies. Each of the battalions had a designated basecamp near Saigon which served as a permanent homefor the unit where administration, supply, and train-ing activities rook place. In addition, many of the Ma-rines' families lived nearby. Upon arrival in Saigon,the Vietnamese Marines were granted a 10-day leavewirh their families. Often when a battalion was dueto return north, men who had overstayed their leavereported in packed and ready to go. After fighting a


long war, the advisors learned the important thing wasto be there when the unit departed for the "front:'and they usually were!

After leave, training was the order of the day. Someof the training was undertaken within the base campareas, while formal schools were conducted at the Viet-namese Marine Training Command at Thu Duc,northeast of Saigon. This camp included recruit train-ing facilities, ranges, and housing to accommodate2,000 students simultaneously. Indoor classrooms, aconfidence course, infiltration course, mine and boo-bytrap course, and a 300-meter bayonet course provid-ed individual training.'

American Marines were assigned to the trainingcommand to assist in the management of the instruc-tion program. With the withdrawal of American unitsfrom Vietnam, much U.S. Marine Corps equipmentwas turned over to the Vietnamese Marines. Marineadvisors concerned themselves with teaching theVNMC personnel the use and care of this surplusequipment." On one occasion to assist this training,

Another focus of the advisory eff ort was on equ4t'mentand maintenance training. In this instance a lance cor-pora/from the 3d Marine Division instructs a Marinefrom the VNMC Signal Battalion in the use of com-munications equ4'ment that had been provided bydirect transfer from American stocks on Okinawa.



RAdm Robert £ Salzer and Col Bui The Lan, the As-sistant Commandant of the Vietnamese Marines, at-tach the Navy Unit Citation streamer to theorganizational colors of the Marine Advisory Unit on12 August 1971, the second such award to the unit.

the 3d Marine Division sent a mobile training teamfrom Okinawa to Thu Duc. This team spent six weeksinstructing the Vietnamese in the use of the equip-ment left by III MAF, including 106mm recoilless ri-fles and multi-channel radios, the AN/MRC162s and163s. These two items of equipment played impor-tant roles in the events which were to follow.12

On 12 August 1971 at 0900, Admiral Salzer, asCommander Naval Rirces Vietnam, presented the ad-visory unit their second Naval Unit Commendation.*At the same time, a major effort was being made toreorganize the VNMC. Historically, the involvementof American Marines had been on the battalion lev-el, giving tactical advice to their counterparts in thefield. Colonel Dorsey wanted to shift the emphasis ofthe U.S. Marine advisors from one of rendering tacti-cal advice to one of resource management.

Colonel Dorsey hoped to accomplish two major ob-jectives during 1972. Together with Major Donald B.Conaty, the G-3 advisor to the VNMC Division,Colonel Dorsey worked to foster a greater sense of uni-ty between the Vietnamese Navy and the VNMC inorder to build a viable amphibious assault team. Theirchief aim was to have the division plan and executea brigade-size landing. They also planned to organizeand use tactical operations centers (TOC) at thebrigade as well as division level. These centers would

4Fot the period of July 1969 to 1 July 1971, extended through31 Decensher 1971 in lieu of a third award.

THE ADVISORS 29

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include a fire support coordination center (FSCC)capable of coordinating artillery, air strikes, and navalgunfire. Finally, a division command post exercise wasto be conducted to test each aspect of the reorganiza-tion. To this point, the VNMC had not operated asa division-level force and lacked necessary commandand control personnel and equipment. Even thougha VNMC division headquarters had been committedin Laos during Operation Lam Son 719, there was verylittle command experience above the brigade level.'

Along the DMZ

South Vietnamese defenses along the DemilitarizedZone consisted of a string of positions developed inpart from the previous American defenses orientedalong the main avenues of approach from the northand the west. These stretched from the coast, inlandacross National Highway 1 (QL-1), turning south acrossHighway 9, and tied in with a string of fire supportbases guarding the the highland valley approachesfrom the west. American Marines recalled this as the"Leatherneck Square" bounded by Gio Linh, ConThien, Cam I.o, and Dong Ha. Now these locationswere known by Vietnamese names or more anonymous

alpha-numeric appellations. On 6 October 1971, a U.S.Army liaison team from MACV arrived at Alpha 4(Con Thien) to inspect the position before the newlyformed 3d ARVN Division assumed responsibility forthe DMZ. The 1st ARYN Division, which had tacti-cal responsibility for the DMZ, was scheduled to dis-place south in early November. MACV Advisory Team155, under Colonel Donaldj. Metcalf, USA, the senioradvisor, was tasked with providing American supportto the commanding general of the 3d ARYN Divi-sion. Team 155, which was primarily billeted at QuangTn, consisted of more than 200 men. Of this num-ber, less than 20 U.S. Army advisors were actually inthe field with ARVN units. With its hot food, bar,and showers, Team 155 was an oasis to the U.S. Ma-rines serving with the VNMC in northern MR 1.14

Throughout this period there had been occasionalenemy contact, generally of platoon size, but no majorenemy encounters. On 23 October 1971, elements ofthe 4th VNMC Battalion made contact with an esti-mated enemy platoon east of Alpha 4. In the result-ing action three Vietnamese Marines were wounded.In spite of a raging rain storm, an Army helicopterpiloted by First Lieutenant Scott Livingston, USA, flew


Photo courtesy of Col John W. Ripley, USMC

A battery of Vietnamese Marine 105mm howitzers in Military Region 1, deployed in sup-port of a VNMC brigade in late 1971. The lack of prepared positions and defenses indi-cates that this was a temporary position and away from any Communist counterjire.

THE ADVISORS 31

in to evacuate the wounded Marines. The weather wasso bad that, on the returning leg, the helicopter wasforced down at Mai Inc Combat Base where it had toremain overnight. According to Major Boomer, thewounded Marines were evacuated the next morningin spite of the fact that ". . helicopters don't fly inweather like that?" On a lighter note, on 10 Novem-ber 1971, all the American Marines in the northgathered at Charlie 1 to join with Marines all over theworld in celebrating the 196th birthday of the Corps.Birthday cakes were flown up from Saigon and theVietnamese Marines joined in the big celebration.There was plenty of beer for everyone, but the cakemade a number of Marines sick.16

Activity along the DMZ was almost at a standstill.It was an ideal time to consolidate the advisors at thebrigade level, but as Colonel Dorsey remembered:

something was going on; particularly up north therewas a feeling of foreboding. The fire support bases wrrc atminimum strength, whereas the USMC had these same basesfully manned. The ARVN strength was insufficient, and theywere not actively patrolling, although the VNMC did alittlr—but nor enough. I couldn't help but feel that some-thing was going to happen. It seemed like a charade. Theweather was bad; it was really cold. The FSBs litre supportbases] were socked in.'7

The weather was indeed terrible along the DMZ. It

In contrast to the previous picture, along the forwardedge of the South Vietnamese defensive arc below theDemilitarized Zone were prepared defensive positions.This is the outpost at Gio Linh, defending QL-1.

Photo courtesy of LtCol George Philip Ill, USMC (Ret)

was miserably cold and everybody, including the NorthVietnamese Army was preoccupied in trying to keepwarm and dry. Major Boomer, with the 4th VNMCBattalion, said he never had been so cold in his life.He was having some second thoughts on why, whengiven a choice of assignments upon arriving at Saigon,he had chosen an infantry battalion instead of a staffjob at division headquarters. It was tough, but it wouldget tougher. Factors other than the weather were slat-ed to deteriorate.

A significant attack occurred on the night of 12 De-cember 1971, 3,000 meters to the east of Charlie 3.The NVA failed in their assault of a Regional Fbrcecompany, losing 17 men in the process. The nextmorning the dead NVA soldiers were laid out in CamLo village, Frotn that time on, the road from Cam Ixsto Charlie 2 did not seem quite so secure. On 21 De-cember, just after the 5th VNMC Battalion, withMajor Donald L. Price as senior advisor, replaced the4th VNMC Battalion, the enemy fired more incom-ing rounds on the newcomers than the 4th battalionhad received all that fall.18 Late one evening, MajorPrice and Captain Marshall R. "Skip" Wells lookednorth into the DMZ and observed the sparkle of sig-nal flares, assuming that even the NVA had "to trainbefore an offensive."

Major Robert P Sheridan, senior advisor to theVNMC Brigade 369, expressed his concern at this timeto brigade commander Colonel Pham Van Chungabout the lack of mobility resulting from maintain-ing fixed locations. Colonel Chung, who had a repu-tation as an outstanding commander who used hisstaff and appreciated his American advisors, conduct-ed battalion-size operations west of Highway 9. Twoconsecutive sweeps from the Rockpile south to the BaLong Valley revealed no sign of the enemy, but theywere indeed out there; Major Sheridan even talked toone of them on Christmas Eve.

The Marine advisors had two channels of commu-nications: at brigade, the advisor had an AN/MRC83radio Jeep which he used for his twice-weekly checkswith advisory unit headquarters in Saigon. The otherchannel was the local "Gunga Din" network whichlinked the advisors in the local area. Although it wasa secure net utilizing the tactical cryptographic device,the KY38, the Marines would usually transmit in theclear mode as they conversed over the "party" line. Itwas quicker and used less power from the radios' bat-teries. After the nightly electronic "advisor conference"on 25 December 1971, Major Sheridan wished all aMerry Christmas. To everyone's surprise an Asian voice


Photo courtesy of Maj Charles W. King, USMC (Ret)

In November 1971, the 3dARVN Dithion and Viet-namese Marine units were responsible for the defensesalong the northern border The division commander;BGen Vu Van Giai, ii shown at Fire Support BaseCharlie I with the VNMC Brigade 369 commander,Col Pham Van Chung, and two American advisors,on the occasion of the US. Marine Corps Birthday.

in perfect English came up on the air and replied,"Merry Christmas to you," and this general conversa-tion followed:

S: Who is this?NVA: Oh, I listen to you all the time. Where are you? Mai

icc? Sarge? or Fuller?S: I can't tell you where I am.NVA: You are American Marine. Why don't you go home?S: I'll go home when you guys go home.NVA: Well, maybe we Will all go home some day. Are you

married?S: Yes.

NVA: How many children do you have?S: Too many.NVA: That's good. I have five girls in Hanoi which I haven't

seen in nine months,S: Maybe the next time you go to Hanoi you can make a boy.

Both laughed and then talked about the poor weather.Finally the enemy signed off with, "I must go now.Merry Christmas! I hope the war ends soon." Yes, theenemy was out there, and furthermore he was listen-ing, so deficient communications security took on awhole new meaning.

By january 1972, the 3d ARVN Division hadresponsibility for everything north of Highway 9, in-cluding Dong Ha and Fire Support Base Fuller. Thedivision commander, Brigadier General Vu Van Giai,visited his troops in the field every day. General Giai'sU.S. Army advisors were oriented on training and logis-tics and were not present at units below the regimen-

tal level. Giai also dropped in on the VNMC units,which were under his operational control and orient-ed to the west of Quang lii. He seemed to enjoy speak-ing in English with the Marine advisors.

The 3d ARYN Division, newly formed and occupy-ing unfamiliar terrain, was beset with many problems.The ARVN soldiers, a mix of varied quality, were un-trained as a unit. Lieutenant Colonel William C. Cam-per, USA, a MACV Team 155 advisor with the 2dARVN Regiment, observed that 'we were getting col-lege students who had evaded the draft for long peri-ods, also interpreters who had worked for u.s. forces:'These were "big-city slickers" who did nor compareto the average ARVN soldier ftom a rural background.Camper concluded, "they definitely had an effect onmorale and adequacy of training"ai

On 27 January 1972, a USAF gun ship, patrollingHighway 9 to Khe Sanh, was shot down at 5,000 feet,right over the Khe Sanh air strip, by an SA-2 missile.During February, enemy activity started to pick up tothe west. Fire Support Base Fuller was hit with rocketfire almost daily. Both the outpost at Nui Ba Ho andFSB Sarg, along with Fuller, started reporting groundcontacts, South Vietnamese troops in the vicinity ofthe Rockpile, north of Highway 9, reported hearingtracked vehicles and trucks moving at night. Lieu-tenant Colonel Camper recalled that he accompaniedan air cavalry "Pink Team" in a Hughes OH-6 Cayuse("I.oach") helicopter, landing in several locations be-hind the Rockpile, finding "fresh tracks from trackedvehicles in a number of locations:' but seeing no ene-my troops and receiving no enemy fire.*

Directives and warnings from Saigon required ahigh state of readiness during Tet, the national holi-day period celebrating the lunar new year. Both MACVand ARVN staffs predicted that the North Vietnamesewould challenge Vietnaniization in 1972. General Wil-liam C. Westmoreland, as Chief of Staff of the U.S.Army, had visited South Vietnam in early 1972 on be-half of the Chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff andthe Secretary of Defense. After touring all four mili-tary regions and talking with Army General CreightonW. Abrams and Chairman of the Vietnamese jointGeneral Staff, General Cao Van Vien, he concludedthey were confident "that they can handle the situa-tion" that existed.a2

Communist troop buildups were identified along

50.S. Army Pink Teams wete composed of five helicopters. TwoOH-6 "Loath" light observation helicopters acted as stoma whiletwo Bell AH-i Cobra gunahips provided an attack capability. A UH-1provided the flight's rommand and control.

THE ADVISORS 33

the DMZ and Laotian border areas west of Quang Tnand Thua Thien Provinces. The North Vietnamesegeneral high command had organized a corps-levelheadquarters to carryout the attack on South Vietnam'sMR 1. Idenrified as the Tn Thien Hue Front with the702d Command Group Headquarters, it crossed overprevious front and military region boundaries to un-dertake the Spring Offensive. It was commanded byMajGen Le Trong Tan and his political deputy LeQuang Doa. This coincided with a multidivision threatin the tn-border region west of Pleiku.* Like most in-telligence predictions, the questions of when, where,and in what strength were left to local commandersto determine. American commanders and advisors inMR 1 were directed by General Abrams to determinelikely avenues of approach and assembly areas to pre-plan Arc Light strikes, as he wanted "no delays dueto targeting procedures when the rime comes to gowith these strikes?'23

Other reports indicated that big guns were beingmoved west of the Marines' positions and groups of20 to 30 enemy were observed moving openly duringthe daytime.24 Incidents of road mining were beingreported. Captain George Philip III, advisor to the 1stVNMC Artillery Battalion, narrowly escaped deathfrom a vehicle mine detonation. While returning tothe battalion command post and instead of crossinga bridge just south of Mai Loc, he drove his jeep intothe stream to wash it. A vehicle full of ARVN artilleryofficers drove over the bridge Captain Philip haddelayed crossing. The bridge exploded, killing themall. This incident was cause for instituting the "two-jeep" policy which made it mandatory for at least twovehicles to move in convoy at all times in case of anenemy ambush or mine incidents.25

On 5 March 1972, the South Vietnamese began anoperation to clear the area around Fire Support BaseBastogne, east of Hue City, and met heavy resistanceftom elements of the 324B NVA Division. This gener-ated a flurry of response by B-52 "Arc Light" bomb-ings and tactical air sorties, but the appearance hereof NVA troops was nor seen as part of a concerted buil-dup of forces in MR 1. Indications were that the main

*At the American Embassy was Edwin W. Besch, a medically re-tired Marine captain, who followed the activities of NVA and VNMCunits as an intelligence analyst 6r the Central Intelligence Agency.He tecalled that, "in fact, the first fitm indication of the impend-ing offensive in South Vietnam was the infilrrarinn into the westernhighlands of the 320th NVA Division" from north of the DMZ inJanuary 1972, followed by the 2dNVA Division from Laos. (Beschcomments)


The senior South Vietnamese commander for MilitazyRegion I had both political and military responsibili-ties. LtGen Hoang Xuan Lam held ihisposition from1966. His American "advisor" in 1972 was US. ArmyMajGen Frederick J. Kroesen, Jr., commandingthe 1st Regional Assistance Command at Dci Nang.

threat was directed at MR 2. This was the prevailingview held by MACV and the American Embassy inSaigon.26 The Vietnamese I Corps commander, Lieu-tenant General Hoang Xuan Lam, and his latestAmerican counterpart, Major General Frederick J.Ksoesen, Jr., USA, commanding the newly formed 1stRegional Assistance Command, viewed the situationwith concern.** Dispositions by the 3d ARVN Divi-sion and the VNMC units in MR 1 remained aroundkey terrain and avenues of approach along Highway9 from the west, from where the North Vietnamesethreat had come in the past. Although the positionsalong the DMZ had always been within range of ar-tillery, they were not considered worthy of a conven-tional attack by combined arms.27

During the last week in March, VNMC patrols inQuang Tn Province began finding caches of mortarand B-4o rocker rounds. People were spotted movingsupplies and a Vietnamese was captured in the BaI.ang Valley carrying mortar rounds. By this time ev-ery friendly location that had an artillery position was

was established on 19 March 1972.


North Vietnamese Army PhotoBy thic time in the war, the main threat to the South Vietnamese and the Americanscame from the full-time soldiers of the North Vietnamese Army. This mortar unit's hair-cuts, uniforms, and training were those of a conventional force rather than insurgents.

receiving enemy incoming artillery and rocket roundsregularly. The U.S. Air Fbrce and Navy flew supportmissions every day, weather permitting, but manytimes during the day visibility was almost zero. TheU.S. Atmy's 8th Radio Research Field Station (8thRRFS) at Phu Bai reported that a NVA artillery head-quarters was located only six kilometers southwest ofFire Support Base Sarge.

From Sarge, Major Boomer had briefed General Giaion everything the Marines had been seeing and theirconcern over the buildup of enemy forces. Boomer pro-posed offensive action west of Sarge in the belief thatthis would provide "more accurate information on theenemy's intentions and possibly disrupt his plans."

General Giai "casually dismissed" this proposal.28Major Boomer, in retrospect, said that it was obviousthat the enemy was stockpiling ammunition and sup-plies at the base of the hill on which FSB Sarge waslocated. By now, enemy contacts and artillery fire "grewheavier," and it was clear that a major enemy buildupwas taking place.

On 28 March 1972, an NVA soldier noted that hewas with a unit "in a staging area in the jungle veryclose to the enemy. In spite of his daily patrols, thelatter is unaware . . . . We rake advantage of a heavydownpour to cross the Ba Long River." His objectivewas the cloud-shrouded firebase "Dong Toan," knownto the Americans as Sarge.29

PART II

THE SPRING OFFENSIVE

CHAPTER 3

The Ring of SteelTurley with Team 155 —The Opening Round—Team 155 Under Fire—The Outposts Fill

At the Combat Base at Ai Tu — VNMC Brigade 258 Reinforces—Enemy in the Wire, 31 March 1972Fire Support Base Sarge Holds On —The Collapse of the Ring of Steel

Tm èy with Team 155

Recently assigned as Assistant Senior Marine Advi-sor (ASMA) with the Naval Advisory Group, Vietnam,Lieutenant Colonel Gerald H. "Gerry" Turley waseaget to get to Quang Tn Province to pay a visit tothe two VNMC origades, 147 and 258, under the oper-ational control of the 3d ARYN Division. After twoweeks of oriew.trion in Saigon, Turley arrived at theAi Tu Cornba. Base on 29 March 1972 by helicopter,drove out to the Mai I.oc Combat Base, and spent thenight with VNMC Brigade 147. The brigade, withMajorJim R. joy as senior advisor, was responsible forthe western segment of the 3d ARVN Division's areaof operations. Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Nang Bao,brigade commander, told Lieutenant Colonel Turleythat Mai Lec had not received any incoming artilleryfor almosr two years. Jr was a peaceful night and apleasant change of pace from garrison dury in Saigon.l

The next morning Lieutenant Colonel Turley wasunable to go by helicopter to the brigade's outpostsbecause of poor flying weather and returned to the3d ARVN Division command post at Ai Tu, accom-panied by MajorJoy. During the course of the morningTurley received briefings from MACV Advisory Team155 on the disposition of forces, the state of readinessof division units, and American supporr available—although practically all American combat units hadbeen withdrawn from Vietnam. The Army briefingrevealed that the 3d ARVN Division was a newly con-stituted and untested organizarion. It had been in ex-istence for less than six months and did not represent a

significant increase of combat power to I Corps. Thedivision, activated on 1 November 1971, had complet-ed the organization of its infantry regiments only themonth before. One of irs three infantry regimentsmanning the northern front had been operating as aunit for only the last three weeks. Short of equipmentand not fully organized or trained, the 3d ARVN Di-vision was unready for combat. Even so, Brigadier Gen-eral Vu Van Giai's aggressiveness, professionalism, anddepth of combat experience had won him the respectof the U.S. Marine advisors and had created a senseof confidence and self-assurance among his soldiers.

The division, with the 2d, 56th, and 57th ARYN

36

Regiments, had its headquarters at Ai Tu, betweenDong Ha and Quang lii City. Jn facr, at the very mo-ment of Lieutenant Colonel Turley's briefing, the 56thand the 2d ARVN Regiments were administrativelyexchanging areas of operations.2 The 56th was replac-ing the 2d at Camp Carroll, Khe Gio, and Fire Sup-port Base Fuller, while the 2d simultaneously relievedthe 56th at Alpha 4, Charlie 2, and Charlie 3. AtCamp Carroll was a composite artillery group of 26pieces ranging from 105mm howitzers to 175mm self-propelled guns. Included in this group was a batteryof VNMC 105mm howitzers. The 57th Regiment's areaof operations covered the rest of the northern frontextending from Dong Ha, northward to the DMZ. Firesupport bases included in its area were Alpha 1, Al-pha 2, and Alpha 3, with regimental headquarters atCharlie 1. The area to the east of QL-1 to the Gulfof Tonkin, was nominally under the control of theQuang Tn Province chief and his local forces.

In the VNMC Brigade 147 area were outposts at NuiBa Ho and Sarge held by the 4th VNMC Battalion,along with two companies of the 8th VNMC Battal-

Marine and Army advisors were present with SouthVietnamese forces along the Demilitarized Zone whenthe Spring Offensive began. On the left, ItCol Ger-aldH. Turley confers with another Marine advisor TheUS. Army lieutenant colonel in the background il-lustrates the different uniforms in use at the time.


THE RING OF STEEL 37

ion operating in the vicinity of Fire Support Base Hol-comb, forming the western flank of the defensive arc.All three positions were on dominant terrain featuresoverlooking the natural avenues of approach from theLaotian border. Sarge and Nui Ba Ho overlookedHighway 9, the east-west route which the French hadbuilt and the U.S. forces had improved during theirstay. Fire Support Base Holcomb overlooked the beau-tiful Ba leng Valley through which the Thach HanRiver flows. The other brigade, VNMC Brigade 258,was at Fire Support Bases Nancy and Barbara to thesouth? General Lam, commanding I Corps, which en-compassed the five northernmost provinces of SouthVietnam, had called the disposition of the 3d ARVNDivision on fixed combat bases his "ring of sreel."

Other familiarization briefings for LieutenantColonel Turley included such subjects as sensor place-ments and reporting, special radio and intelligencenetworks, and the combat support available from theU.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force. They were good brief-ings; Turley was to realize their value a few hours later.He was anxious to return to Saigon, but rhe briefingsand poor flying weather had taken up the morning.His return would have to wait until after lunch at thewell-appointed Team 155 dining facility.

The Opening RoundCombat outposts Sarge and Nui Ba Ho, occupied

by the 4th VNMC Battalion, stood astride the histor-ic invasion routes into Quang Tn Province and HueCity. Major Walt Boomer was with the battalion com-mander, Major Tran Xuan Quang, and the 'Alpha"group on Sarge and Captain Ray Smith was on NuiBa Ho with the "Bravo" group of the battalion.* Out-post Nui Ba Ho was actually two positions, Nui BaHo and Ba Ho East. The formidable hill mass roseabruptly from the valley floor and its slopes were sosteep that, as Captain Smith recalled, "no one everclimbed to the top just for the fun of it2 The top ofthe hill was so small that a UH-1E helicopter couldbarely land, while larger helicopters could not landthere at all. At apptoximately 1030 on 30 March 1972,a platoon patrol from the 1st VNMC Company on BaHo East made contact with an enemy platoon 1,000meters northwest of Nui Ba Ho. Moments later, the8th VNMC Battalion, operating in the vicinity of Hol-comb, also reported making contact with the enemy.

*It was common practice for the Vietnamese Marine Corps todivide its infantry battalions inro two command groups, each con-trolling two teinforred rifit companies. The battalion commander,with the senior advisor, headed the Alpha group, while the execu-tive officer, with the assistant advisor, was with the Bravo group.


LtCol Nguyen Nang Bao led VNMC Bnkade 147 atMaiIloc. He was promoted to colonel in June and con-tinuedas brikade commander A native of Nonh Viet-nam, he was a 19-year veteran, and had attended US.Marine basic course and command and staff college.

As these engagements progressed, NVA 120mm and130mm artillery, firing from positions to the west,struck Mai Inc and Camp Carroll. The fire was so in-tense that the South Vietnamese were unable to mantheir guns and provide counrerbattery or supportingfires. Under this protective umbrella, the NVA infan-try boldly advanced on the Marine positions.

Shortly after 1100, Captain Smith saw three com-pany-sized NVA units advancing on the base of NuiBa Ho. They were "marching in mass formation, rightacross Highway 9, at sling arms." These units wereacutely vulnerable to friendly artillery fire but nonewas then available. Heavy cloud cover and accompany-ing low visibility along the entire DMZ also preventeduse of close air support, although airborne forward aircontrollers were on station? Smith, who was one ofthe few advisors fluent in Vietnamese, was listening tothe enemy artillery fire direction net. Smith deter-mined that the NVA were shooting destruction mis-sions with adjustments to within five meters, some veryprecise shooting. Since all South Vietnamese locationswere well known to the enemy, devastating fire nowfell on all positions and particularly on the fire sup-port bases.

Team 155 Under FireDuring his noon meal, Lieutenant Colonel Turley

sat with Major James E. Smock, USA, the senior U.S.


Army advisor to the 20th ARVN Tank Battalion of the1st ARYN Armored Brigade. This was the only oper-ational ARVN battalion equipped with U.S. M48 tanksin South Vietnam. The 20th Tank Battalion had justcompleted training and had not yet fired a shot inanger.6

Coming out of the dining hail at noon on 30 March1972, Lieutenant Colonel Turley heard the all-too-familiar swishing-sound of incoming artillery roundsfollowed by their impact in the Ai Tu perimeter.Although he did not realize it at the time, it becameevident that the North Vietnamese had launched awell-coordinated, well-planned, three-pronged infan-try attack across the entire Quang Tn frontier. Morethan 12,000 rounds of enemy rocket, mortar, and ar-tillery fire prepared the way for the largest NVA offen-sive into South Vietnam. Supported by Soviet andChinese-built tanks and artillery, some 25,000 NorthVietnamese infantry attacked across the DemilitarizedZone with such rapidity and shock that the men fac-ing the onslaught were stunned. Every outpost andfire support base along the DMZ under the commandof the 3d ARVN Division was taken under accurateand devastating fire. Perhaps it was, as higher head-quarters put it, "only a feint," but the quiet periodwas over and the "feint" was to continue unabated forthe next six days. Realizing that he would be unableto return to Saigon with the airfield under fire, Lieu-tenant Colonel Turley, with Captain John D.Murray—an advisor with VNMC Brigade 147, left be-hind when Major Joy made his way back to Mai Locwith the opening rounds—ran to the tactical opera-tions center to keep abreast of the situation and toassist Team 155 as best they could.

The artillery preparation, which had begun preciselyat noon, was followed by infantry attacks involvingunits of the 304th, 3 08th, and 324B NI/A Divisions,five infantry regiments of the B-5 Front, three artilleryregiments, two tank regiments, and several sapper bat-talions.*7 The fledgling 3d ARYN Division met thisonslaught with five regiments of infantry, includingtwo VNMC brigades, nine battalions of artillery, ar-mor, and ranger forces. The enemy had a numerical

*85 &ont 27th Infantry Regiment; 3lstlnfanhy Regiment; 126thInfantry Regiment; 246th Infantry Regiment; 38th Artillery Regi-ment; 84th Artillery Regiment; 2O2dArmor Regiment; 2O3dAr-mor Regiment. 304th NVA Division, 9th Infantry Regiment; 24thInfantry Regiment; 66th Infantry Regiment. 308th NVA Division:36th Infantry Regiment; 88th Infantry Regiment; lo2dlnfantty Regi-ment. 3248 NVA Division: 29th Infantry Regiment; Bo3dlnfantryRegiment; 812th Infantry Regiment.

advantage of more than three to one and overwhelmedthe ill-trained and equipped defenders.

Although the intelligence agencies of the militarycommanders, both U.S. and ARVN, had expected amajor confrontation during 1972, the bold and sud-den thrust directly across the DMZ was neither predict-ed nor expected.** In fact, when a speculative questionof a possible NVA attack directly across the DMZ wasposed to General Lam, he replied, "They cannot!" Hisreply was not one of arrogance, but was based on pastexperience. This had been, and was, a war of guerrillaactivity and attrition, with major confrontations, suchas Tet in 1968, occurring only after months of inten-sive preparation and stockpiling. Besides, it would beillogical for the enemy to attack openly across a coastalpiedmont region, fully exposed to American air pow-er, long-range artillery, and all-weather naval guns. Inaddition, the South Vietnamese forces in that areawere firmly entrenched on critical terrain features fac-ing the classic avenues of invasion. In the minds ofboth the ARVN and U.S. commanders a massive at-tack by the NVA across the entire DMZ, and especial-ly its eastern portion, was unthinkable.°

It did seem feasible that an attack, an end run,could come from the west. The allies had long detect-ed enemy movements in western Quang Tn Provinceand patrols west of the Rockpile often heardmechanized activity. Additionally, enemy unit move-ments were covered by an appreciable buildup of sup-porting antiaircraft guns. On this basis, intelligenceevaluators had predicted a limited attack and infiltra-tion from the west and had suggested February 1972as the likely month. But the allies had no plan to de-fend against a conventional combined arms invasionand had not fortified their static positions against suchan assault. Knowledge of the enemy's past performanceand capabilities simply did not point toward such aneventuality. The fixed outposts and fire support bases,although deteriorating to some extent, had servedsatisfactorily both the U.S. Marines and U.S. Army overthe past five years and appeared well-placed to coun-ter enemy infiltration and harassing tactics from thenorth and west. All this analysis became academic. As

**The use of the 304th NI/A Division and 308th NVA Divisionacross the DMZ indicated a majot effort. Both commands had foughtat Dien Bien Phi against the French in 1954, and wete considered'hon Divisions." A recent Notch Vietnamese publication stated'Quang Tn —Thus Thien was chosen to he the main lotus of theoffensive:' (Tap So Do Cat Than Danh [Hanoi, Ministry of Defense,1986], p. 18, as ttarislated by RobettJ. Descant). (Vietnam Com-ment File)


Base AreasMain AttacksSecondary Attacks

THAILAND

GULF OFTHAILAND

SOUTH CHINASEA

SOUTH CHINASEA

Adapted from Government of Vietnam Material

North Vietnamese Invasionof South Vietnam

1972kilometers °


North Vietnamese Army PhotoDivision and front-heavy artillery units prepared the way for the Communist offensiveby disrupting the South Vietnamese defenses and commandsiructure. North VietnameseArmy gunners prepare to shoot 122mm field guns that fire as far as 23,900 meters.

The Mai Loc combat base served as Marine brigade headquarters in Military Region 1.W/hen the offensive began, it was occupied by VNMC Brigade 147. The flat, low-lyingterrain did not offer protection from the concentrated artillery fire of the Communists.



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the thunder of massed artillery smothered the now ex-posed division headquarters, it also hindered the hastypreparations of the South Vietnamese and Americanadvisors to counter the new threat to MR 1?

The Outposts Thil

While Nui Ba Ho was under attack by the 9th NVARegiment, the Alpha command group on Sarge, only2,000 meters to the south, began receiving a heavyartillery barrage. More than 500 rounds of accurate firekilled 15 Vietnamese Marines the first day. MajorBoomer continuously moved along the exposed faceof the mountaintop trying to locate the enemy gunsfiring from across Highway 9 to the northwest. In spiteof the heavy fire hitting Camp Carroll and Mai 11cc,he was able to call in some counterbattery missionswhich he credited with the destruction of several ene-my gun positions. The adverse weather kept U.S. Airfhrce fighter-bombers at Da Nang and carrier-basedaircraft in the South China Sea from responding insupport of the Marines on the battered hilltop.

A direct hit destroyed the bunker which housed spe-cial equipment for monitoring enemy radio nets. Atthe command bunker, losing contact with the two U.S.Army operators, Major Boomer moved outside to dis-cover that the radio facility had collapsed and wasburning. He approached the inferno in a vain attemptto rescue the soldiers, but quickly realized there wereno survivors.b0

A Communist perspective of the South Vietnameseoutpost Sarge on 30 March 1972. According to them,the position's location and defenses were not an ob-stacle to North Vietnamese Army "shock fighters."

North Vietnamese Army Photo

Because of the small size of the hilltop on Nui BaHo, the enemy's larger caliber guns had difficulty zero-ing in on the Marine position. By the middle of theafternoon, however, 82mm mortars had been movedinto firing positions by the NVA infanrry and were do-ing heavy damage. The only counterbarrery fire camefrom the battalion's sole 60mm mortar on the posi-tion. While engaged in serving this weapon, everymember of the Marine mortar crew was either killedor wounded.

At 1700, a platoon outpost 600 meters to the northof Nui Ba Ho came undet intense small arms androcket-propelled grenade fire. The Marine defendersrepelled three "human wave" ground attacks withsmall arms, M79 grenade launchers, and handgrenades. Simultaneously, the enemy assaulted thesquad outpost on the south side of Nui Ba Ho. A106mm recoilless rifle on Nui Ba Ho fired a flechetteround in support of the southern squad, but theweapon malfunctioned before a second round couldbe fired.* As darkness fell the enemy, having failedto dislodge the defenders, pulled back and harassedthe Marines with artillery. During the nighr the ene-my continued to maneuver into position for an attackthe following morning.

At the Combat Base at Ai Tn

Lieutenant Colonel Turley and Captain Murray, anx-ious to learn the fate of the Marine-held positions un-der arrack on 30 March 1972, had remained at the 3dARVN Division tactical operations center. The oper-arions center, jointly manned by ARVN personnel andMACV Advisory Team 155 members, was receivingreports of enemy contact throughout its entire areaof operations. Naval Gunfire Team "1-2:' with FirstLieutenanrJoel B. Eisenstein in charge, and a U.S. Airlkrce tactical air control liaison team were situated wi-thin the TOC. They provided command and controlcommunications links to the maneuver units, but theartillery fire that slashed through the TOC "antennafarm" rendered the ARVN communications system in-effective.

As Lieutenant Colonel Turley and Captain Murraybecame more involved in the TOC, coordinationproblems became evident. Looking toward a weekendwith his family in the Philippines, Colonel DonaldJ. Metcalf, the senior advisor, had left for Saigon as

Flechette rounds were anti-personnel projectiles which dischargedthousands of tiny steel darts. The flechettes looked like finishingnails with four fins stamped on their bases. They were deadly whenused against "human wave" attacks.


the initial rounds fell upon Ai Tu. Murray recalled thatno contingency plans were implemented, administra-tive radio messages cut out tactical nets, logs and jour-nals were not maintained, no coordinating efforts weremade between Team 155 and its ARYN counterparts,and the senior MACV Advisory Team 155 officerpresent, Major James Davis, was collapsing from fa-tigue.h1 Turley and Murray, neither in the ARVN orMACV chain-of-command, but both eager to get in-volved in the war, moved to help the Assistant G-3Advisor, Major Davis. The Marine officers noted thatby evening on 30 March, U.S. Army support person-nel of Team 155 were openly packing their belong-ings, preparing for departure.

VNMC Brigade 258 Reinforces

At 1400, 30 March 1972, General Giai ordered Viet-namese Marine Brigade 258, with MajorJon T. Easleyas the senior advisor, to displace it's 3d, 6th, and 7thInfantry and artillery battalions northward from FireSupport Bases Nancy and Barbara along the My ChanhRiver. The Marine battalions were moved to reinforcethe northern defensive line and to assume overall secu-rity for the Dong Ha area and the Highway 9 andHighway I road junction. This shift left the division'ssouthwest flank exposed to possible enemy action. Justat dusk, the brigade command group, the 3d VNMCInfantry Battalion, and the 3d VNMC Artillery Bat-talion headed north up QL-1, unaware of the tacticalsituation. As they drove through the night, they passedelements of the 20th ARYN Tank Battalion all alongthe road. The tankers had just completed a commandpost field exercise and were considered qualified forcombat. It was reassuring for the brigade's Marines tomove past the newly acquired American-built M48battle tanks.'2

On the morning of 31 March, Colonel Metcalf ar-rived back at the 3rd Division TOC. He asked Lieu-tenant Colonel Turley to assume the duties of seniorAmerican advisor within the operations center in placeof the exhausted Major Davis. Colonel Metcalf want-ed to stay with General Giai and Lieutenant ColonelNormand Heon, USA, the Team 155 assistant senioradvisor, was required to select and prepare a less ex-posed command post south of the Thach Han Riverin Quang Tn City. In addition, Turley had alreadybeen helping and was abreast of the tactical situation.

Turley initially balked at this request. He realizedthat he was from a different service advisory chain-of-command, and that his visit had placed him in theAi Tu TOC strictly as an interested, but detached, ob-

server. Then considering the urgency for continuity insuch a rapidly changing and confusing period, he com-plied with Colonel Metcalf's tequest. Turley's priori-ties at the moment were to stop the enemy attack andstabilize a badly deteriorated situation. Consequent-ly, he directed that the TOC query all U.S. combatsupport units with which it had communications asto possible assistance. Insistent calls went out to the1st Regional Assistance Command in Da Nang, andto U.S. naval gunfire support ships offshore. Turley alsoopened a journal to include the events occurring wi-thin the 3d .ARVN Division's operations area.*

Enemy in the Wire, 31 March 1972

Ar first light, 31 March, the enemy made a massassault on the northern section of Nui Ba Ho. A Ma-rine 106mm recoilless rifle on the northern slope, fir-ing flechette rounds into the formation, wasinstrumental in stopping the enemy at the perimeter.The NVA withdrew leaving an estimated 100 dead onthe wire. Ar 1000, having stopped three more groundprobes, the Marines on Nui Ba Ho were hit by 130mmartillery rounds. This time the fire was more accurate.rliench lines and bunkers began to collapse. At approx-imately 1500 the determined enemy unleashed a mas-sive ground attack up the northern slope from thesaddle between Nui Ba Ho and Ba Ho East. The in-tegrity and mutual support of the two positions wasdestroyed, but not without its price; the outer bandof barbed wire was completely covered by NVA bod-ies. Meanwhile, 75mm recoilless rifles, brought up bythe enemy during the previous evening, systematical-ly began to reduce South Vietnamese defensive po-sitions.

The battalion executive officer in charge of the Bravogroup was finally able to establish communicationswith the VNMC 105mm howitzer battalion. He ur-gently radioed, "We are going to die if we don't getsome support." One platoon of two guns respondedto this desperate request even though the gunners hadto pull their lanyards while lying prone under the in-tense enemy counterbattery fire. Their valiant effortwas credited with killing many enemy soldiers andknocking out two of the recoilless rifles on the north-ern slope.

At 1730, Captain Smith saw an enemy companymoving up the southern slope, hauling a "largewheeled gun." At precisely that moment the weathercleared and a flight of U.S. Air Rrce McDonnell

tA version of this was used to establish the chronology for theevents described.

Douglas F-4 Phantoms provided the sole air strike insupport of Nui Ba Ho, knocking out the gun and dis-persing the force to the south. At darkness on 31March, the NVA resumed the attack on the northernslope, tenaciously assaulting the pinnacle. I.ess thanfour squads now defended the position. At about 2130,a U.S. Air Force Lockheed AC-130 Spectre gunshipcame on station to support the defenders but couldnot acquire targets anywhere in the area. The aircraftwas unable to fire its Gatling guns but did drop flares.One of the flares, breaking through the haze and cast-ing an eerie glow, revealed the grim fact that the NVA

had completely inundated the position. At 2205, oneof the surviving command post troops, calling fromthe perimeter, reported that he had been captured buthad escaped. He said the enemy force had control ofthe hill mass and suggested it was rime to evacuatethe position.

Smith, grabbing a PRC25 radio and a M16 rifle, wasthe last ro clear the command bunker. As he emergedhe did nor see anyone he knew, but he did see fiveNVA about three meters in front of the bunker. Herecounted, "The NVA were as confused as I by then.I ran right by them without being detected." At the



Enemy nfiemen move through the protective wire at Sarge after the fall of the position.They are dressed in characteristic green uniforms and armed with AK-47 assault rifles.


back side of the hill Smith heard some familiar voicescalling names he recognized. He approached thegroup of survivors huddled against the southeast corn-er of the wire:

I realized they were afraid to go through the wire berauseof the booby traps. By this time it was obvious that the po-sition was lost. So my rounterpart and I began directing the26 survivors single file through a gap in the first band ofwire. As we were doing this, an NVA began firing over ourheads no more than five feet to my tight teat. I turned andfired, knockiog him down."13

Realizing that the shot would bring more NVA totheir position, Captain Smith moved quickly to thehead of the column, which was held up at the outerperimeter of concertina wire. Unhesitatingly, he threwhimself backwards on top of the booby-trap-infestedwire. Recalling this later, he said that he had foolish-ly thought that the radio on his back would absorbthe blast had he tripped a mine. Quickly the Marinesscrambled over Smith and the wire. With severe cutson his arms and legs, Captain Smith crawled off thewire leaving most of his clothes entangled behind him.

Having cleared the outer perimeter of the wire,practically naked and bleeding profusely, Smith as-sisted the executive officer in rallying the Marines andmoved toward Mai Lcsc. Evading the NVA along theeastern slope, he continued to call for artillery fire ontop of the hill while the harried survivors, chilled bythe cold wind and rain, moved into the darkness. NuiBa Ho, the first position lost to the enemy, fell at 2140on 31 March 1972. The Communist offensive was lessthan two days old.t4

Fire Support Base Serge Holds On

On 31 March 1972, Fire Support Base Sarge con-tinued to be hit with massive fire and infantry assaultsby the 66th NVA Regiment. Major Boomer was in ra-dio contact with Captain Smith on Nui Ba Ho.Although Smith's voice was steady throughout the day,that night, as the two were talking, Boomer knew thesituation was bad when Smith's voice broke a little ashe said, "If we make it, it'll just be luck." Major Boom-er knew that Nui Ba Ho had to be manned if Sargewas to be held, since Nui Ba Ho dominated the ap-proaches to its southern neighbor. He was dismayedwhen, at 2150, he heard Smith calling for artillery fireon top of the position which the Bravo group was sup-posed to be occupying. He was unable to communi-cate with Smith, apparently because of Smith's evasiontactics. The two Marine officers were close friends andBoomer believed that a last ditch effort to stop the

NVA at Nui Ba Ho had failed and that Smith hadbeen killed.

Enemy ground attacks on Sarge persisted throughthe night of 31 March. By 0200 on 1 April 1972, theNVA had overrun all of the squad outposts to thenorth, east, and south and penetrated the defensiveperimeter. The bad weather continued unabated, buta B-52 Arc Light struck likely enemy staging areas westof Highway 9. Despite the efforts of the VietnameseMarines, the NVA launched wave after wave of infan-try attacks against the hill.

"The enemy is thrown into confusion and hisresistance is weakening:' reported an NVA cameramanwith the attacking Long Chau Unit.s At 0345, dur-ing a deluge of rain and intense enemy fire, what re-mained of the Alpha command group evacuatedSarge. Moving off the hill between two enemy units,Major Boomer radioed MajorJoy at Mai mc, ' . . we're

moving:' Shortly thereafter Boomer lost all radio con-tact with brigade. It was as if the entire 4th VNMCBattalion had been swallowed up into the night.

Ar dawn, a "Victory" banner was brandished overSarge's command post by the NVA, with "enemySouth Vietnamese] Marines emerging from their

bunkers:' while "PLAF men pursue those fleeingsouthward." Escape from the encircling enemy broughtthe Marines no respite from chilling rains or from thefatigue brought on by two days of fighting withoutfood and sleep. All through the day of 1 April thesurvivors of Sarge followed a tortuous route throughthe jungle, evading a seemingly ubiquitous enemy.

During this period, higher headquarters orderedB-52 strikes against the enemy's resupply and stagingareas at Khe Sanh and into Laos. MACV and the RVNJoint General Staff, nevertheless, believed that theNVA would not cross the DMZ with more than a feintand any main NVA attack would be at MR 2. Thusthey concentrated the air effort in the Kontum areain order to prevent the NVA from seizing Pleiku.

The NVA's sudden shift from guerrilla harassing tac-tics to mobile conventional warfare caught both Gener-al Giai and the commander of I Corps, General Lam,by complete surprise. Never before had the North Viet-namese struck either military or civilian areas with sucha concentration of artillery fire. During the first 48hours a hail of artillery and rocket rounds struck eachof the combat bases and the surrounding civilian areasalong the entire buffer zone. In the face of this un-precedented attack, civilians began gathering their be-longings and fleeing south to Dong Ha!°

By midday of 1 April 1972, members of the 57thARVN Regiment on Alpha 2, at Gio Linh, abandonedtheir exposed positions on the perimeter and soughtprotection in bunkers in the southern portion of thefire base. ARVN artillerymen refused to leave theirbunkers to fire counterbattery missions. Naval gun-fire from the USS Buchanan (DDG 14) and the USSJoseph P Strauss (DDG 16), directed by a five-manANGLICO spot team at Alpha 2, suppressed enemysupporting arms fire and impeded the advance of theNVA infantry, allowing the ARVN forces to withdraw.

CorporalJames F. "Diamond Jim" Worth was a fieldradio operator with First Lieutenant David C. Brugge-man's ANGLICO spot team with the ARVN 57th In-fantry Regiment at Alpha 2. The 20-year-old Worth,from Chicago, Illinois, had been in Vietnam with SubUnit One since the previous year. According to Lieu-tenant Colonel D'Wayne Gray, Worth had requestedmast to get back into the "field' rather than stay inthe relative safety of Saigon. Gray described Worth as"an Irish charmer and not at all above conning hisCO."7 The outpost had been hit with heavy artillery,rocket, and mortar fire when the North Vietnameseattacked. For two days Corporal Worth and the othermembers of his team called for suppression, interdic-tion, and counterbattery fires during the critical mi-

tial stages of the attack while the 3d ARVN Divisionhad lost most of its artillery and the weather prevent-ed close air support. Communist ground forces hadprobed Alpha 2 and cut the position off from friend-ly support. The situation now reached a climax as theenemy launched its final assault supported by artillery.As the fight went against the South Vietnamese, Lieu-tenant Bruggeman requested helicopter evacuation forhis ream through Lieutenant Fisenstein at the divi-sion tactical operations center.'8

From his position on the Alpha 2 observation tow-er, Corporal Worth watched the soldiers of the ARYN57th Regiment abandon their fighting holes on theoutpost's forward slope. As he looked to the rear hesaw the ARVN 105mm howitzers also abandoned asNVA infantry closed from three sides of the fire base.An evacuation helicopter was on its way if the Marinescould make the relative safety of Alpha 2'ssoutheastern corner landing zone.

After some delay, Worth and the other Marinesspotted an Army UH-1. The U.S. Army UH-1 helicop-ter, piloted by Warrant Officers Ben Nielsen andRobert Sheridan, flew in low and landed. Sheridan,a door gunner, and Lieutenant Eisenstein, quicklyjumped out to assist the Marines. With their weaponsand gear, Worth and the other Marines prepared to


Photo courtesy of Maj Charles W. King. USMC (Ret)

The Alpha 2 outpost and the tower from which a naval gunfire spot team controlledAmerican destroyers to blunt the imfial Communist attack from the DemilitarizedZone.


board the helicopter. That instant, mortar roundsstruck the landing zone, mortally injuring LieutenantBruggeman and dispersing his men. As the Marinesscrambled on board the helicopter, Worth was not withthem. As Warrant Officer Sheridan glanced abouthim, he saw a few shell-shocked Vietnamese soldiers,but all the rest of the ARYN force had left.

The aircraft took off, flew to the Ai Tu Combat Baseto pick up ANGLICO's HM1 Thomas E. "Doc" Wil-liamson, USN, who attempted life-saving measures onBmggeman. With the corpsman on board, Sheridanthen headed for Da Nang. Lieutenant Bruggemandied of wounds halfway back to the medical facility.Corporal James Worth was never seen again after thefall of Alpha 2. He joined the ranks of the missingAmericans, who were either dead or captured at thewar's end.*b9

As Alpha 4, Alpha 2, Fuller, Khe Gio, and Hol-comb were lost, General Giai moved his division head-quarters to the rear. With the departure of the bulkof Team 155 south of the Thach Han River, VNMCBrigade 258 headquarters was ordered to leave its 3dVNMC Battalion at Dong Ha and to move to Ai Tuto assume overall control of the division forward com-mand post during the displacement. As LieutenantColonel Ngo Van Dinh and his staff arrived at Ai Tuaround 1500, together with the 6th VNMC Battalionwhich had come up from FSB Barbara, a barrage ofmore than 800 rounds of artillery greeted them.2°

The Collapse of the Ring of SteelAt 1620, 1 April, Lieutenant Colonel Normand

Heon, assistant senior advisor, Team 155, had recom-mended the withdrawal of all the remaining U.S. per-sonnel at Ai Tu. The U.S. Marine advisors, nor subjectto this order, stayed with their Vietnamese counter-parts. Two U.S. Army advisors also voluntarily re-mained with the 56th ARVN Regiment at Camp Car-roll. The forward command post at Ai Tu, manned by30 Americans, both officers and enlisted men, repre-sented the U.S. Marine Corps, Army, and Air Fbrce.Now under Lieutenant Colonel Turley, each manvolunteered to remain to operate the division-levelcombined arms coordination center, the only com-mand and control center north of Da Nang with work-ing communications.2'

By 1700, Charlie 1 and Charlie 2 were abandoned.As the fire support bases below the DMZ fell and were

•He was listed missing in action and declared dead by the Secre-tary of the Navy under Tide 37, U.S. Code, Section 555 on 17 De-cember 1976.

evacuated, soldiers and civilians thronged southwardand were infiltrated by NVA forward observers. Refu-gees moving east along Highway 9 reported that the27th NVA Regiment was at Cam Lo. Refugees andARVN stragglers came across the Dong Ha bridge inan unbroken stream. ARVN units were fragmentedand ineffective. No kind of identification of rank orunit was in evidence. Approximately one out of three"fatigue-clad persons" carried a weapon. Press reportscalled it a "3d Infantry Division debacle ... as govern-ment troops panicked."

Colonel Metcalf observed later that it took a greatdeal of expertise to withdraw correctly in combat, "inthe sense of being able to deploy yourself by echelondown a highway or out of an area." With the hastyretreat of the ARVN forces, Metcalf learned that you"can't sit down as the senior advisor with the divisioncommander or the senior advisor with the regimentalcommander and say well, this is the way the booksays."22

Now Communist T-54 main battle ranks, PT-76am-phibious ranks, and BTR-50 armored personnel car-riers drove across the DMZ creating panic among theconfused refugees.**23 As "tank panic" took hold,soldiers of the 3d ARVN Division threw their weaponsand equipment away and joined the civilian exodus.General Giai, while hastily formulating a defensiveplan, personally attempted to stem the wholesaledesertions of the DMZ defensive positions by his sold-iers, but all order had been lost. Whatever Giai's faults,he was not a coward, recalled an Army advisor at therime.2

As soldiers of the 57th ARVN Regiment streamedacross the Dong Ha Bridge, Giai grabbed them anddemanded to know why they were running and wastold "ranks, tanks!" Giai replied, "Show me a tank andI will go with you, and we will destroy it together."Personal example was to no avail. By darkness on 1April every A.RVN combat base north of the Cam Lo

**The North Vietnamese had always had armored units and somevehicles had been used in the south in the past. More recent ex-perience was available with the NVA use of armor during the 1971Lam Son 719 incursion into Laos and in their attack on the Plainofjars. The two armored units committed—the 202d and 2O3dNVAArmoredRegiments, as well as the infantry divisions, used a varie-ty of armored vehicles, differing in nomenclature and technical de-tails. After action analysis revealed the vehicles to be a mix of Sovietand Chinese manufactured equipment, for example: the Soviet T-54or the Chinese l'ype 59, the Soviet PT-76 amphibious tank or thesimilar Chinese Type 63, the Soviet BTR-5o armored personnel carrieror the Chinese Model 1967, and the Soviet M46 130mm gun orthe Chinese Type 59. Rsr simplicity in the narrative, the terms usedare those found in the contemporary records. (Besch comments)

River had fallen.25 The NVA had taken a mere 48 hoursto crush the northern "ring of steel:' At best, theretreating ARYN had served to slow the NVA becausethe enemy had deployed into battlefield formations.

At 1900 on 1 April 1972, Colonel Metcalf left AiTu Combat Base with General Giai for the new com-mand post located in the Citadel in Quang Tn City.Since the main 3d ARVN Division command post dis-placed to Quang Tn City without maintaining the nor-mal duplicate command and communications radiochannels, Turley and his small staff were the only fa-cility which had the capability of controlling all U.S.supporting arms. During the initial critical days of the

around the clock recommending B-52 Arc Lightstrikes, directing tactical air support, and adjustingVietnamese artillery and naval gunfire support. Allthe fire support coordination in Quang Tn Provincefor the next few days was carried out by 30 men inone bunker north of the Thaeh Han.

Although good communications were maintainedwith FRAC's operations center in Da Nang as well aswith the 3d ARVN Division main command post atQuang 'lii City, at no time did Turley receive any majortactical guidance from these higher headquarters.General FrederickJ. Kroesen's newly organized FRACheadquarters had replaced the Army's XXIV Corps,



An infantry attack in a "combat"photograph by the North Vietnamese. The soldier tothe left of the tower waves a red and blue National Liberation Front banner, despitethis being a NI/A unit. The soldier on the right cames a rocket-pmpelled grenade launcher.

invasion, this small band of Americans operated which only 10 days earlier had departed forJapan. The

advisory command, recalled General Kroesen, was"heavily weighted to provide administrative assistanceand logistical advice," with only a token intelligenceand operations section. It was neither manned norequipped to monitor the combat activity or to pro-vide tactical guidance.26

Turley continued to operate in his own fashion, rely-ing on his previous experience and Marine Corps train-ing.* Brigadier General Thomas W. Bowen, USA, the

Lieutenant Colonel Tutley was awarded a Legion of Merit in partfor his advisory actions that were tredited with the delay of the multi-division attack in MR 1 that allowed I Corps units to organize adefense in Quang Tn Province.

deputy FRAC commander, authorized him the use ofB-52 Arc Light bombing to halt the attack. Anunidentified Air Force "general" called directly fromSaigon and told Turley to give him the center of im-pact for desired targets and that he would providethem as requested. Turley asked for strikes on areasthat earlier sensor "readings" indicated were assem-bly areas or likely enemy avenues of approach. TheU.S. Air Force flew 64 B-52 strikes called by Turley onthese targets. Despite these strikes the enemy closedon the ARVN defenses south of the Cam La, MieuGiang, and Cua Viet Rivers. The situation wascritical


Photo courtesy of [Cdi Francis C. Brown, USN

American helicopter support in the 3d ARVN Division area of operations was under thedirect control of the senior American advisor of MACV Advisory Team 155. This BellUH-J Iroquois and its crew are on standby at the "Tiger Pad" at the Quang Tn Citadel.Support by these aircraft was in great demand during the hectic days at the offensive's start.

CHAPTER 4

The Defense of Dong HaThe Easter Sunday Crisis —The Dong Ha Bridge —Action at the Bridge — Reaction at Saigon

Camp Carroll Surrenders—Mai Loc Exposed—The Dong Ha Bridge DestroyedCallsikn Bat-21 — Mai Loc Evacuated

The Easter Sunday Cnth

Easter Sunday, 2 April 1972, proved to be a fatefulday for the defenders of northern Quang Tn Province.Sunday morning, things were grim at Mai Loc, whereVNMC Brigade 147 remained under constant enemyartillery fire. Bad weather limited the effectiveness ofthe airborne forward air controllers and air support.The 15 5mm guns at the combar base had depletedtheir ammunition in largely futile countethre. Afteralmost three days of constant bombardment and noradio contact with the battalion at Sarge or the twocompanies on Holcomb, no supporting B-52 strikes,and rapidly depleting supplies, MajorJim R. Joy, thebrigade advisor, requested help from the 3d ARVNDivision to resupply small arms ammunition, artilleryrounds, and food.1

The survivors from Sarge and Nui Ba Ho started toreappear after a night on the run. Major Tran XuanQuang, the 4th VNMC Battalion commander, andMajor Walter E. Boomer, had decided at daybreak tostop evading and strike out for friendly lines at MaiInc combat base. Just as the group of survivors leftthe jungle to enter a cleared, hilly area, an NVA unitattacked. The exhausted Marines, with little ammu-nition and some without weapons, broke and ran,leaving their wounded comrades. Major Boomer co-vered the retreat with his own fire. His delaying ac-tion allowed the dispirited troops to withdraw to theeast. Boomer, who now was no longer with the bat-talion commander, guided eight other VietnameseMarines to the comparative safety of Mai Inc.

Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Turley's position at AiTu as an involved visitor by this time had become oneof grave responsibility and direct authority. The onlyoptimistic note was a report from a naval gunfire shipwhich informed him that the 31st MAU was presenton Seventh Fleet amphibious assault ships within sightof the beach. At 0915, Colonel Metcalf telephonedLieutenant Colonel Turley from the newly established3d ARVN Division command post in the Citadel ofQuang 'Iii City, and told him, "You are directed totake over as senior American advisor to the 3d ARVNDivision, Forward, by order of the CommandingGeneral, FRAC."2

50

The battered and disorganized 57th ARVN Regi-ment, which almost 24 hours earlier had evacuatedits command post at Charlie 1, radioed Ai Tu around1015 and reported NVA armor on QL-1 in the vicinityof Alpha 2. The radio message reported the vehiclesas 20 Soviet-built PT-76 and T-54 tanks. When askedif they could stop the tanks north of the Mieu GiangRiver, the unidentified voice indicated that they couldnot. Turley passed this information to FRAC head-quarters, as it appeared that the road to Dong Ha waswide open to a rapidly moving enemy armored force.

The Dong Ha BridgeOutside of Dong Ha was the 3d VNMC Battalion,

with Captain John W. Ripley as its advisor. Thismeager blocking force had to gain enough time for the3d ARVN Division to organize a new defensive linealong the Mieu Giang River. With the report of ad-vancing N'VA armor, Lieutenant Colonel Ngo VanDinh, Marine Brigade 258 commander at Ai Tu, im-mediately ordered Major Le Ba Binh, 3d battalioncommander, to defend Dong Ha and its bridges "atall costs." Dinh also sent four of the 6th VNMC Bat-talion's jeep-mounted 106mm recoilless rifles north toprovide antitank support. At Quang Tn, Colonel NgoVan Chung, deputy commander of the 3d ARVN Di-vision, in the absence of General Giai, committed thefreshly painted and newly received M48 battle tanksof the 20th ARVN Tank Battalion, also to meet thisrhreat.

Major Binh had little intelligence on the situationhe now faced. A North Vietnamese red and gold flagwas seen flying from the girders of an old railwaybridge over the Mieu Giang River, When Major Binhheard a spurious radio report of the fall of Dong Ha,he turned to Captain Ripley and said, "If you please,I am going to send a message on my command net?'He sent over both Vietnamese and American chan-nels the message that there were "Vietnamese Marinesin Dong Ha" and "as long as one Marine draws abreath of life, Dong Ha will belong to us?'

Major Easley, Senior Advisor to Brigade 258, hadcalled Captain Ripley and told him to expect the worstand that reinforcements were not anticipated. Easleysaid that radio contact with the 57th ARVN had been

THE DEFENSE OF DONG HA 51

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lost, NVA tanks were on the move southward, refu-gees wete streaming across the main Dong Ha bridge,and the brigade headquarters had to remain at Ai TuCombat Base to maintain perimeter security for theforward command post of the division.

At approximately 1100, the Marines were joined byelements of the 20th ARYN 'link Battalion, under thecommand of Lieutenant Colonel Ton Ta Ly, with U.S.Army Major James E. Smock as his counterpart.General Giai designated Lieutenant Colonel Ly, whowas senior in rank to Major Binh, as overall area com-mander. As control was passed, the two units' com-mand posts were consolidated in an M113 armoredpersonnel carrier (APC). By 1115, forward elements ofone company of the 3d Battalion were just short ofthe principal Dong Ha bridge, waiting for the rest oftheir unit to join them.

As two rifle companies of the 3d Battalion movedinto Dong Ha from the west to establish a defensiveposition on either side of the main bridge, a thirdcompany was extended westward along Highway 9 tocover the railroad bridge. The position was in full viewof the NVA on the north bank, particularly the NVA

soldiers at the railroad bridge. As the battalion com-mand group, now mounted on tanks, moved past theoutskirts of Dong Ha, a devastating artillery barragehit it. All troop movements south of the river stopped.Ripley described it as an "absolute fire storm." Shellsblew buildings and defensive structures apart. Theenemy artillery took its toll of civilian refugees fleeingthe battle. The march to the bridge had to loop to thesouth to enter Dong Ha from a less exposed direction.

At one point, a large group clad in ARVN uniformspassed the Marines, "not a civilian refugee amongthem, just a huge glob of men—moving south, neat-ly dressed and covered, but with no rank or insignia.About every third man was armed." It was more thanMajor Binh could take. He leaped off his tank,grabbed one of the fleeing soldiers and screamed athim, "Where are you going?" The startled soldier re-plied that it was "no use, no use:' Major Binh drewhis pistol and killed the soldier on the spot, but theretreating horde continued southward unimpeded. Noone even took notice of the incident as they skirtedthe fallen soldier and continued southward.

The 36th NVA Regiment attempted ro cross the par-


David Burnett Contact Press Images

At the 3d VNMC Battalion command post at Dong Ha, the American is Capt John IVRzj,ley. Bending over the map is the battalion commander, Maf Le Ba Binh. Note thenumber of radios usedto control the unit andthe ARVN M113 armoredpersonnelcarriei



Other Americans at Dong Ha were with the 20thAR VN Tank Battalion. Maj James E. Smock, USA,shown here, was crucial to the destruction of the DongHa bridges. He is wearing the standardAmerican hel-met and protective body armor or 'flak jacket."

tially destroyed railroad bridge. When the NVA in-fantrymen gained a foothold on the south side of therailroad bridge, Captain Ripley called for a continu-ous naval gunfire mission. His request went directlyto the Fire support coordinators at the Ai Tu tacticaloperations center. First Lieutenant Eisenstein, incharge of the ANGUCO liaison team, contacted Com-mander Williams J. Thearle, USM, commandingofficer of the USS Buchanan (DDG 14). The Bucha-nan, a guided missile destroyer, was the flagship ofNaval Gunfire Support Task Unit 70.8.9. The task unitincluded the destroyers Buchanan, Strauss (DDG 16),W/addell (DDG 24), Hamner (DD 718), and Ander-son (DD 786). Ripley called for interdiction fire in thevicinity of the railroad bridge, 300 meters to the rightand left of the bridge. There was almost instantresponse. The ANGLICO team, consisting of Lieu-tenant Eisenstein and Sergeant Joe D. Swift, also

worked up a number of defensive fire plans in the vi-cinity of QL.1 and called for fire on unobserved tar-gets. Four columns of black smoke indicated that theships' automatic 5-inch guns had found their targets.

For more than an hour continuous naval gunfire in-terdicred the approaches to both bridges. Ripley re-quested that fire support boxes of approximately 1,000x 2,000 meters be shifted between the bridges.* Jr wasa very effective and responsive system: no fire com-mands, no map checks, no adjustments, just a requestfor more fire at the railroad bridge. Upon hearingtanks on the north bank about 200 meters up QL-1,Ripley called for another fire mission which bracket-ed the area.

The 3d VNMC Battalion continued to deploy underthe protective fire of U.S. Navy ships. Shortly, two com-panies of Marines and the 3d Troop of the 20th ARYNTank Battalion moved forward and occupied Dong Haand established defensive positions on the south sideof the main bridge. The 1st Troop and Headquarters'Section occupied the high ground sourhwest of thevillage, a position which provided good observationof QL-1 north of the Mieu Giang River. Upon seeingfour enemy PT76 tanks traveling along the banks ofthe river just east of Dong Ha, Ripley shifted the navalgunfire. With responsive and accurate fire, the shipsdestroyed all four tanks. Ripley was watching from avantage point. He recalled the incident:

We could see them burning neatly. My rountetpatt, theMarine Battalion commander and the tank battalion com-mander were both observing this superb display of naval gun-fire. When tht tanks were hit and burning, both weresurprised and elated in seeing the potential of NGF. I was

to receive many requests for NGF by the Vietnamese afterthis attack.5

Other enemy tanks, however, appeared on thehotizon, raising "rooster tails" of mud and dust as theybarreled down QL-1 toward the main Dong Ha bridge.When the tanks were within 1,000 merer of thebridge, the weather cleared, and Vietnamese-pilotedA-i McDonnell Douglas Skyraider aircraft, orbitingoverhead, dived through the cloud opening andbombed and strafed the fast-moving tanks. The VNAFpilots destroyed 11 tanks, but one pilot was forced toball out of his burning aircraft. The violent and savagenoise of battle strangely quieted as opposing elementsstopped firing and looked skyward as the pilot'sparachute blossomed and he drifted slowly toward mi-minent capture on the north side of the river.

*Boxes are rectangular areas in which naval gunfire projectilesimpact.


Government of Vietnam PhotoSouth Vietnamese troop movement was hampered by large numbers of refugees on theroads, including military stragglers. Communist forces used them to screen their owndeployment, causing destruction and the needless deaths of those fleeing the battle area.

The 20th ARVN Tank Battalion was equipped with American M48 main battle tanks.Armed with a 90mm gun and range flnder it held its own against enemy armor

Photo courtesy of Capt Edwin W. Besch. USMC (Ret)



After the penetration of forward South Vietnamese defenses by infantry and artillery,North Vietnamese tanks were used to make rapid advances to secure critical locations.Light amphibious tanks armed with 76mm guns are shown crossing a river early in theoffensive. The vehicles carry infantrymen on their upper decks and are camouflaged

The cleared skies permitted the Vietnamese A-is tostop the tanks momentarily, but others continued thethrust southward. Although the NVA tanks across theriver were moving in defilade, Ripley could hear themand see the dust raised by their tracks. An observa-tion aircraft orbiting overhead kept the commandcenter at Ai Tu informed of the tanks' movement. AtAi Tu, Turley and Dinh anxiously monitored the posi-tioning of the thin line of defense along the tivet line.

At 1200, an NVA tank column came into view mov-ing south along QL-1 from Charlie 1 toward Dong Ha.Although the range was in excess of 2,500 meters, thetanks of 1st Troop on the high ground immediatelytook the column under fire and knocked out six ene-my vehicles. The NVA unit commander was stunned.His monitored radio message to his higher headquart-ers reported the loss of six tanks to direct fire weapons,but he indicated that he had no idea where the firehad come from. The 2Oth's executive officer, Major

Kieu, in command of his own tank, claimed two ofthe T-54s, spotting his cannon shots through the useof machine gun rounds viewed through his rangefinderat a range of 3,000 meters. The South Vietnamesetankers had learned their lessons well.6

The 308th NVA Division's thrust from the DMZ tothe south had gained momentum as each ARVN out-post and fire support base fell. After more than threedays of continuous artillery attacks and tank-infantryassaults, it now appeared that the North Vietnamesewere making their main attack along the axis of QL-l.Ar this time Camp Carroll and Mai Loc to the westwere still in friendly hands, but all resistance to thenorth of the Cam Ix, and Cua Viet Rivers had crum-bled. By noon on Easter Sunday nothing was betweenthe enemy and the coveted Quang Tn City— excepta river, a bridge, and a battalion of Vietnamese Ma-rines and ARVN tanks.

At about 1215, as the first NVA tank nosed out


toward the north side of the bridge, Vietnamese Ma-tine Sergeant Huynh Van Luom, a veteran of manyyears fighting, took two M72 Light Antitank Weapons(LAW), simple shoulder-fired, single-shot rockets, andwalked up to the south side of the bridge. Althoughhe was an assault team section leader, he had electedto move forward alone. As he reached the plankingof the bridge he took two ammunition boxes filledwith dirt and one strand of concertina wire and placedthem in front of him. It was a ludicrous situation, the90-pound Marine crouched in the firing potition todo battle with the 40-ton behemoth bearing down onhis meager fortification. Luom coolly extended bothhis LAWs as the tank started across the bridge.

The tank stopped. Perhaps the tank commandercould not believe his eyes, but he stopped dead in histracks as he watched the lone Marine take aim. Ser-geant Luom fired. The round went high and to theright. The tank started to ease forward. Luom pickedup the second rocket, aimed and fired. The rocketricocheted off the front armor, detonated on the tur-ret ring, and caused the turret to jam.

The whole incident took only a few seconds. Theslightly damaged tank backed off onto the north sideof the bridge. Sergeant Luom grinned. The wholefront breathed easier. In his assessment of the situa-tion, Captain Ripley gave Sergeant Luom credit fbrsinglehandedly stopping the momentum of the en-tire enemy attack. Ripley called Sergeant Luom's ini-tial decisive action at the bridge the "bravest singleact of heroism I've ever heard of, witnessed, or ex-perienced." The enemy tank commander, in backingoff the bridge, had made the worst possible decisionhe could have made, for all at once the Marines alongthe river realized that an enemy tank could bestopped. While Sergeant thom's heroic stand had tem-porarily halted the NYA, Captain Ripley knew thatthey would try again, in overwhelming force, and thatthe outnumbered Marines might nor he able to hold.Both he and Army Major Smock, with 20th Tanks,radioed the Ai Tu TOC and requested permission todestroy the bridge.

Lieuteiiant Colonel Turley conferred with VNMCBrigade 258's Lieutenant Colonel Dinh. The two sold-iers knew bridges are not arbitrarily blown in combat.A local commander must consider all aspects beforedestroying a bridge that, only hours later, could bebeneficial to him. General Giai wanted armor to crossover and secure a bridgehead on the north bank fora counterattack, and Giai's deputy, Colonel Chung,would not give permission ro destroy it. Ripley, the

man on the spot, persisted, "you can't deny me per-mission, we only have one company at the bridge

you've got to permit me to blow it!" Turley shotback a "Wait, out' which is radio procedure indicatinga reply is forthcoming after a moment of consultation.

The moments dragged by as Turley deliberated whatto do. He was the senior American north of the ThachHan River, but his role was that of an advisor. ColonelDinh said that he could not make the decision, thiswould have to come from I Corps. The operationscenter became very quiet as the Americans there andtwo Americans at the bridge waited for a decision. Ifthe bridge was not blown, it would be only a matterof hours before the North Vietnamese armor wouldbe rolling into Quang Tn or even Hue. Turley fidget-ed as he waited for his counterpart to take action. Hefelt, due to Major Smock and Captain Ripley's insis-tent, on-site, appraisal of the situation, that it had be-come an operational necessity to blow the bridge.Turley called the FRAC G-3 and presented the plight,but the FRAC tactical operations center could not per-mit the bridge to be destroyed. Based on a MACVstanding operational procedure, FRAC denied permis-sion to destroy the span; permission would have tocome from Saigon. At 1245, Turley took matters intohis own hands. He radioed Smock and Ripley to blowthe Dong Ha Bridge immediately. Turley indicatedthat, if necessary, additional demolitions would be sentup and that FRAC had been informed of the deci-sion. Ripley replied, almost gleefully, that he had al-ways wanted to blow a bridge.

As Turley consolidated available support, fragmen-tary information sent out by the forward commandpost over the radio was confused by Destroyer Squa-dron 3, which sent a message to the AmphibiousReady Group and 31st MAU requesting immediatewithdrawal of U.S. personnel from Ai Tu and the pos-sible landing of the landing force.* The squadron com-mander, Captain Roger D. Johnson, went on to statethat "NVA and ARVN tanks engaged at Quang Tnairfield," while the NVA armor was still north of theCam I.o-Mieu Giang-Cua Viet River. Information co-pies of the message were sent to FRAC, NavForV,MACV, and had entered the national military com-mand system. Lieutenant Colonel D'Wayne Gray,commanding Sub Unit One, who was at FRAC head-quarters in Da Nang to coordinate ANGLICO sup-

*ComDesRon 3 meg to C1G76.4 dtd 020510Apr72. This land-ing force" message was used to recall Turley to Saigon to explainto Rear Admiral Robert S. Salter, commander of U.S. Naval ForcesVietnam, his reasons for sending the message.


port, was in radio communications with BrigadierGeneral William H. Lanagan,Jr., at MACV in Saigonand the ANGLICO team at Ai To. Lanagan thoughtTurley "had gone crazy:' when the garbled messagetrailic arrived at MACV with "Turley Sends," and warn-ed to know what a Marine was doing with an armyunit? Lieutenant Colonel Turley had more immedi-ate concerns at the time.

Action at the Bridge

Captain Ripley, a U.S. Naval Academy graduate, hadcommanded a rifle company in Vietnam in 1966, earn-ing a Silver Star Medal. He had gained extensive ex-perience with demolirions while attending the U.S.Army Ranger School and while serving with BritishRoyal Marines. As Ripley walked forward toward thebridge, Major Smock drove up on an ARVN tank,yelled to him, "Hey Marine, climb aboard and let'sgo blow a bridge."

The two Americans with two ARVN tanks movedforward to within 100 meters of the bridge, at the junc-tion of highways 9 and 1, known as "The Triangle."The tanks, being in total defilade, stopped at thispoint. Ripley and Smock dismounted and, shieldedfrom enemy view by an old, heavily constructed DyeMarker* bunker, moved behind the bunker. From thebunker to the bridge was open space and enemy ar-tillery and small-arms fire was sweeping the area. Thesun was bright, the weather had cleared, but there wereno aircraft overhead and no naval gunfire coming in.

The two men ran forward across the open space andfound a small group of ARVN engineers desperatelytrying to emplace demolition charges. The engineershad about 500 pounds of TNT block and C4 plasticexplosive positioned at the juncture of the bridge andthe approach ramp. The main Dong Ha bridge wasa two-lane, 60-ton, American-built structure of con-crete and steel girders, with a wooden roadway approx-irnarely 505 feet long. Unfortunately, ARVN engineershad placed the explosives in such a position that upondetonation, the bridge might have merely "flapped"in place and would not have torqued and dropped.

Ripley realized that all of the explosives, C4 andTNT blocks in about 25-30 wooden artillery ammu-nition boxes, would have to be transported onto thebridge and placed in a staggered alignment under-neath the girders. A high chain-link fence topped byconcertina "German-steel-tape" wire prevented easyaccess to the underpinnings of the bridge. After a

*"Dye Marker" was the code name given to the McNamara Linewhich was constructed along the trace of the DMZ in 1967-1968.

quick conference with Smock, it was agreed that onceRipley cleared the fence, Smock wbuld push the TNTover the fence and Ripley, in turn, would plate it un-derneath the spans.

Swinging his body up and over the fence, Ripleybarely cleared the concertina as he slashed his uniformon the barbed-wire. Clearing this obstacle, with asatchel charge and some blasting caps, the Marinestarred crawling hand-over-hand above the water alongthe first "I" beam girder. From underneath, the bridge"looked like a battleship" in size and appearance. Half-way out on the span he tried to swing himself up intothe steel girders by hooking his heels on either sideof the "I" beam. It was then that he realized that hestill had on his personal combat equipment and thathis CAR15 rifle was slung over his shoulders.** All atonce the weight was oppressive. As he was hangingby his hands, laden with explosives, web gear, andweapons, and with the NVA soldiers on the north bankwatching, Ripley made an effort to secure a footholdon the beam. His arms ached with pain, his fingergrasp felt insecure, and he knew he could not hangthere indefinitely. After several attempts to swing hisbody, he lodged his heels on the "I" beam. Workinghis way up into the steel of the bridge, he discoveredthat the support girders were separated by practicallythe width of the artillery ammunition crates in whichthe explosives had been packed.

Crawling back and forth between the beams, Ripleyplaced the demolitions in a staggered alignmentamong the six beams. Major Smock, remaining at thefence, muscled the 50-pound boxes near the five chan-nels created by the six beams by climbing the fenceeach time and placing them within reach. As eachchannel was armed, it was necessary for Ripley to dropdown from one beam and swing over the next, verysimilar to a high wire act in a circus.

As the Marine laboriously dragged each crate of ex-plosive charges down the chute formed by the legs ofeach of the "I" beams, Major Smock became impa-tient with Ripley's meticulous manner. He called,"Hey, you dumb jar-head, that isn't necessary .

What are you doing that for? Work faster!" Ripley re-plied, "This is the way the Army taught me. Youtankers don't know anything!"° Ripley assured Smockthat the charges had to be placed diagonally in orderto torque the span from its abutment. Smock insist-

**The CAR15 was a shortened and modified vetsion nf the Mliiservice rifle, not standard issue to the Marine Corps, but availablethrough other sources. It was also known as the XM177 ColtCommando.


skeptical of these reports, despite the evidence thatnow faced them. Earlier in the day, the senior Marineadvisor, Colonel Dorsey, had tried to get Turley outof Ai Tu. By this time, General Abrams was even moreexasperated by the spurious request for Seventh FleetMarines. Colonel Dorsey again ordered Turley to returnto Saigon as soon as possible in a message passed byANGLICO's Lieutenant Colonel Gray, at Da Nang,who had voice radio communication with the Ai Tuoperations center.'2 This would be overtaken by otherbattlefield events.

Camp Carroll Surrenders

Photo courtesy of the U.S. Naval Academy

This diorama depicts the situation Capt John WCRzjtiley faced in placing demolition charges underneaththe Dong Ha Bridge. The boxes containing explosiveswere slid down the bridge framework. To move fromcharge to charge required him to swing under the gird-ers in full view of North Vietnamese riflemen

ed that there was enough power to blow that bridgeand "three more like it." Despite the "interservice"rivalry, the bridge had to blow on the first try. Therewould be no time for a second attempt. After liftingall the demolition boxes to Ripley, Smock, exhaust-ed, sat down and lit a cigarette while Ripley relaxedamidst the steel girders.''

Reaction at Saigon

While these events were underway, LieutenantColonel Turley received a response from Saigon, butnot the one he expected. During the first few days ofthe offensive, the situation in northern MR 1 wasviewed by MACV with concern, "if not with alarm:'With Colonel Metcalf at Quang Tn City, Turley wasthe senior advisor for the ARVN units in direct con-tact with the major elements of three NVA Divisions.He was constantly on the radio with higher headquart-ers at Da Nang and Saigon in an effort to convincethem that the attack that "could not happen:' was,in fact, underway. MACV and the Vietnamese JointGeneral Staff, lulled into a kind of complacency byreports of the success of the Vietnamization effort andby the intelligence community's forecasts, were very

At 1520 Sunday afternoon, the forward division tac-tical operations center received a radio call from U.S.Army Lieutenant Colonel William C. Camper, senioradvisor to the 56th ARVN Regiment at Camp Car-roll.'3 Camper reported that white flags were goingup all over the place, the Vietnamese were surrender-ing, and that he requested to be evacuated immedi-ately. At that moment an Army Boeing CH-47Chinook, callsign "Coachman 005," appeared over Mai

Lix, dropped an external load of artillery ammunitionat the position, made an abrupt turn and headed forCamp Carroll, with two escorting gunships. Appar-ently the pilot had monitored the conversation.

The fall of Camp Carroll was a significant blow tothe overall defense of Quang Tn Province, and has yetto be fully explained. Team 155 contemporary after-action repotts indicate that the fate of the 56th Regi-ment "remains unknown:' after it had been told thedivision and corps had no more reserves to supportit and that the commander should act as he thoughtproper. Personnel of the regiment had made radio con-tact with the NVA to negotiate terms of capitulation,or as the Communists would call it, a "collective com-bat refusal."* Camper had advised the AR\TN com-mander, Lieutenant Colonel Pham Van Dinh, to breakout with available armored vehicles and those soldi-ers willing to fight. When Dinh refused, Camper re-quested evacuation of the Americans.

Men of the 24th NVA Regiment were comingthrough the camp gate as the helicopter landed at Car-roll to get Camper, MajorJoseph Brown, Jr., USA, andtheir ARYN radio operators. Camper loaded another30 ARVN soldiers who had kept their weapons and"were willing to fight on:' Battery B, 1st VNMC Ar-tillery Battalion, continued to resist until overrun at

*On 3 April 1972, the 56th ARVN Regiment commander madea broadcast on Radio Hanoi asking orhet South Vietnamese unitsto surrender.



LtColNgo Van Dinh commanded VNMCBrzade 258at Ai Tu and later as a colonel during the Quang Tncounteroffensive. He had attended the US. Marinebasic course and was an 18-year service veteran.


ColPhan Van Chung, senior brigade commander waswith VNMC Bnade 369 as part of the national reserveas the spring offensive began. He was a North Vietnamnative and graduate of the US. Marine basic course.

North Vietnamese infantry move through defensive positions at Camp Carroll. In theforeground is an M42 twin 40mm Duster an antiaircraft weapon usedfor ground defense.



dusk. In the confusion caused by this surrender, noneof the artillery pieces was destroyed. By the time theSouth Vietnamese called an air strike on the base, theNVA had moved the self-propelled guns. Eventually1,000 soldiers of the 2,200 man regiment regainedfriendly lines.'

Mai Lx Exposed

Because of their mutually supporting missions, thefall of Camp Carroll left Mai Inc open to enemyground attack without supporting artillery fire. TheMarine advisors at Mai bc had been without rest formore than 96 hours. During this period, Captains EarlA. Kruger, David S. Randall, and Clark D. Embreytime and again had moved between the brigade oper-ations center and battalion command posts across fire-swept terrain to erect fallen AN/RC292 radio anten-nas in order to maintain communications with the 3dARVN Division. Major joy realized that the tacticalsituation had become untenable and briefed his ad-visory personnel on the withdrawal plan. At the sametime he directed the destruction of all equipment thatcould not be carried. Stragglers from the 8th VNMCBattalion from Holcomb and elements of the 4thVNMC Battalion from Sarge and Nui Ba Ho, as wellas remnants of the 56th ARVN Regiment from Car-roll, began consolidating at Mai Inc with the battal-ion of regional forces located there.'

By this time, Major Boomer and his small band ar-rived at Mai Inc as the rest of the Alpha commandgroup straggled in. The 4th VNMC Battalion, whichhad been 632 strong, could muster only 285 of its Ma-rines, including the wounded who had been able towalk. In recalling the incident, Major Boomer said thatthe NYA ground attack on Sarge and Nui Ba Ho hadbeen carried out flawlessly, that enemy artillery wasaccurate and intense, and that he had the distinct im-pression that the 3d ARVN Division headquarters wasnot convinced of the urgency of the situation.'° Boom-er and Captain Ray Smith, both believing the otherto be dead, were reunited outside of Mai Loc. Theyremained outside the base perimeter with the survivorsof their battalion "watching it receive a great deal ofaccurate enemy artillery fire," but were not attackedthemselves. Joy briefed them by radio about the plansto pull out. Smith and Boomer's exodus was not over.'7

The Doug Ha Bridge Destroyed

While Ripley completed preparations at the mainhighway bridge, Major Smock and the ARVN engi-neers went to complete the demolition of the railroad

bridge upstream. Finally, with all the explosives inplace, Ripley took electric blasting caps from his pocketand crimped them to communications wire and ranthis from the charges. As a precaution he had also pre-pared 30 to 45 minutes of time fuze before attempt-ing an electrical detonation. Clearing the fence, he ranthe wire to a nearby M151 utility truck, aJeep whichhad been hit by shell fire and was still burning. Ripleytouched the communication wire to either terminal,but the bridge did not blow. Now it seemed the fateof South Vietnam's northern provinces rested on aburning fuze sputtering its way toward 500 poundsof high explosive. After what seemed an eternity, thetime fuae was nearing its end. The tell-tale smoke trailwas now out of view and Ripley "waited and hoped?'

At this time, the command group of the 1st ARVNArmored Brigade reached Dong Ha and the unit'scommander and his advisor, Lieutenant Colonel LewisC. Wagner, Jr., moved to The 'IFiangle to see the bridgetheir unit was supposed to cross and to assume com-mand of the Dong Ha area. Colonel Nguyen TrongLuat and Lieutenant Colonel Wagner felt that thebridge should not be destroyed until the situation wasclearer. At this rime the only enemy action was sporad-ic small arms and mortar fire met by friendly air andnaval gunfire. Suddenly, the bridge blew! The span,curling in the predicted twisting manner, was severedfrom the abutment and "settled into the river?' Thewooden roadway was to continue to burn for severaldays. Ripley reported to Turley that both Dong Habridges had been destroyed at 1630.* Is

Now all the firing had stopped and there was a calmfor a few moments. Then, on the north side, armornoise was evident once more as the NVA mediumtanks shifted from their positions to make room for theamphibious tanks to come forward to the river's edge.The enemy seemed determined to cross. Ripley sawfour of them ready to cross and immediately called anaval gunfire mission. The Buchanan sailed within thefive-fathom curve, a minimum safe depth, to getwithin effective range and let go with a salvo. All fourtanks were destroyed on the river bank. Ripley later re-marked that it probably was one of the few ships inthe Navy that rated four enemy tanks painted on herstacks. Subsequently, a B-52 strike, which had earlierbeen scheduled for that area, silenced the tank activi-ty to the east of Dong Ha, for the time being at least.19

tTeam 155s Colonel Metcalf stated "a great amount of confu-sion' existed about the blowing of the Dong Ha bridges. Eventual-ly credit was given to the 57th ARVN Regiment, 20th links, andthe 3d VNMC Battalion. (Metcalf inevw)

With their armored thrusts thwarted at the DongHa and mouth of the Cua Viet River, the determinedenemy exerted pressure in the western portion of thebattle area. The Cam In Bridge, directly south of theabandoned combat base at Charlie 3 was the next ob-jective. The 1st ARVN Armored Brigade's advisor cal-led for airstrikes to destroy the bridge and naval gun-fire support was called for by the Ai Tu forward com-mand post and fire from the guns of the Buchanan,Strauss, and radde/l squelched the enemy movement.All night long, hundreds of naval projectiles werecalled in upon the enemy. It was not uncommon tocall in "danger close" missions, that is firing upon tar-gets rhat were within 300 meters of friendly forces.

Cal/sign BAT-21

At 1800 on 2 April, a U.S. Air Force Douglas EB-66electronic warfare aircraft was hit by a Communist mis-sile over the DMZ while covering a B-52 strike. Theaircraft radio callsign was "BAT-21" and the recoveryof its sole survivor, also known as BAT-21, began totake shape.2° Air Force Captain David K. Mann,together with the Pacific Air Force Headquarters oper-ations analysis directorate, concluded that the mission"was possibly the most extensive SAR effort ever at-tempted:' In mounting the largest-scale search and res-cue operation of the war, Seventh Air Force, acting forMACV, assumed control of all American supportingarms within the operating area of the 3rd ARVN Di-vision for the next 11 days. A no-fire zone was placed

around the American airmen to protect them and U.S.aircraft from "friendly fire." The authority to requestand control air, naval gunfire, and artillery waspreempted by the I Direct Air Support Center (IDASC) at Da Nang. This sent ANGUCO'S LieutenantColonel Gray into a rage that drove him "absolutelyup the wall. I could not convince the Air Force colonelin Da Nang to change his position. Neither could Iget his U.S. Army seniors to even try to change his po-sition." That there were other Americans and SouthVietnamese at risk had no weight.21

According to Major General Frederickj. Kroesen,at FRAC, this rescue mission and the absolute fire con-trol vested in the Air Force "was a peacetime systemimposed on a wartime situation for which it was to-tally anachronistic." Remembered Lieutenant ColonelTurley, then at the Ai Tu Combat Base, the "unilater-al rear area arrangement of giving the USAF controlof all TAC air, naval gunfire and artillery fire proba-bly seemed like a rational decision to officers eightykilometers from the battle lines. However, it was a trag-ic decision for the 3d ARYN Division."22 GeneralKroesen concluded, "no commander in MR 1 couldchange it and no command authority in Saigon couldbe convinced of the need to change it."23

The 3d ARVN Division continued to fire organicartillery, despite the no-fire zones, and rescue forceaircraft did attack North Vietnamese forces, but theenemy was not met with the kind of concenttated


Photo courtesy of Col John W. Ripley, USMC

A reconnaissance aircraft photograp bed the Dong Ha Bridge shortly after its destruction.To the left is "The Triangle" road junction of Highways I and 9 and to the nght ü theDye Marker bunker and the bridge and its burning roadbed At far nkht are Communistarmored vehicles pulled off the road, exposed to air attack and unable to advance further


Photo courtesy of LtCoI George Philip UI, USMC (Ret)

Artillerymen break out projectiles from shzping containers and fuze them for use atVietnamese Marine artillery positions at Mai Thc combat base. This was a time-consumingprocess and it limitedmobility when a large amount of ammunition was in this condition.

Communist soldiers pursued South Vietnamese and American stragglers after the fallof the defensive positions. This was often a confused situation that saw the fragmenta-tion of units on both sides as one moved to escape and the other moved to destroy them.



defensive fires needed at a critical period. LieutenantColonel Turley cites this as one reason that the then-critical Cam In River Bridge was not destroyed priorto its capture by the Communist forces. To the sur-prise and frustration of the American and Vietnamesefighting for their lives to hold collapsing positionssouth of the DMZ, this MACV operation took on alife of its own, seemingly out of proportion to thedefense of Quang Tn Province.2

Mat Loc Evacuated

Low on ammunition and without resupply, Lieu-tenant Colonel Bao, the 147th Brigade commanderrecommended that Mal Inc be evacuated. GeneralGiai concurred and the evacuation plan went into gfect. All equipment that could not be carried was des-troyed.25 The Bravo command group of the 4th VNMCBattalion, which had reorganized at the village of MaiLoc, led the column eastward toward Dong Ha. Earlierthe executive officer of this battalion had watched aU.S. Army CH-47 Chinook helicopter come in on aresupply run. He noticed that the helicopter had flownlow to the ground and had not been fired upon dur-ing its approach. Taking an azimuth on its route, just

as night was falling, he then put the stragglers incolumn and charted the way to Dong Ha. Brigade 147was evacuating Mai bc, but it was leaving as an or-ganized fighting unit, with a point, flank security, arear guard, and with all of its wounded.zO

Left as the rear echelon of the withdrawing brigadewas the recently attached 7th VNMC Battalion, fromVNMC Brigade 258. Major Andrew D. DeBona andCaptain Ronald R. Rice were present at 1815 when theorder to pull out arrived. They would later recall the"monumental" effort fbr the battalion to disengage, astwo of three rifle companies were fighting the 66thNVA Regiment. As darkness fell, the battalion wasseparated into disorganized groups mingling with theBrigade 147 column or preceding on their own towardsAi Tu. The battalion command group started acrosscountry on a compass azimuth, with two companiesand an assortment of civilian refugees. The20-kilometer, cross-country march did not end until1000 the next day. Ibr the two Marine advisors itproved to be a long, dark, wet, and anxiety-riddenordeal.27

The 3d ARVN Division had failed to hold its maindefensive positions in Quang Tn Province.

CHAPTER 5

Battered Quang Tn HoldsThe Fzhting Continues—At Dong Ha—Development in the lVest

The Pzht for Pedro—Bnght Lights—The NVA Mount a Third Offensive in MR 1

The Fighting Continues

On 3 April 1972, I Corps' Lieutenant General Lam,now convinced that the action in the north was thepredicted Communist offensive, requested reinforce-ments for the Quang Tn atea. After thtee days of con-tinuous and brutal fighting, the ARVN tanks andMarines had held their ground against superior NorthVietnamese forces. The destruction of the bridge atDong Ha had slowed the impetus of the NYA attackacross the DMZ.1 Infantry, armor, and naval gunfirehad won this fight, since, during these days, heavycloud cover and NVA air defenses had precluded ef-fective close air support and had prevented assessmentof the results of the B-52 strikes flown each day againstsuspected enemy concentrations and staging areas.2The situation was still tenuous, and General Lamwanted to launch a counterattack as soon as weatherpermitted the use of close air support.

During his return south on 3 April, LieutenantColonel Turley slept for the first time since the inva-sion began. The tesponsibility for assisting with thedefense of Dong Ha was left to the U.S. Marine advi-sors and ANGLICO Marines with VNMC Brigade 258at Ai Tu. In Saigon that afternoon, an anxious Tutleymet Rear Admiral Robert S. Salzer, Commander NavalForces Vietnam, and briefed the admiral on the situ-ation along the DMZ, using maps and log entries. Sal-zer directed Turley to return to MR 1 with ColonelJoshua W. Dorsey and the VNMC Division! That sameday, Lieutenant Colonel Camper had arrived at DaNang and repotted to General Kroesen for debrief-ing. Camper reported that the enemy had launcheda massive invasion in the north and that civilians andARVN troops were fleeing southward in panic andconfusion. The 56th ARVN Regiment had surrenderedCamp Carroll to the NVA without attempting to des-troy its artillery, ammunition, or facilities. Camper'sreport confirmed Turley's assessment of the situationin MR 1 that had only begun to filter through to ICorps and MACV.

During the week after Easter, the headquarters ofthe VNMC Marine Division and VNMC Brigade 369,which had been the joint General Staff reserve in Sai-gon, moved by air transport to the Phu Bai Airfield.

64

The division headquarters and its supporting elementsestablished themselves in the Citadel at Hue, underthe command of Lieutenant General Le NguyenKhang, who was put in command of the Hue Citydefenses. The subordinate brigades of Khang's divi-sion were under the tactical control of General Giaiat Quang Tn City. Brigade 147, consisting of the 4thand 8th Battalions, was at Hue City to refit and actas the corps' reserve. Brigade 369 took charge of a largeand critical area north of the My Chanh River.

Besides the additional Marine brigade, the arrival ofthe ARVN Ranger Command, which consisted of threegroups of three battalions each, supplemented hyanother Ranger group from Quang Nam, bolstered thetroops of the 3d ARVN Division and seemingly en-sured the successful defense of the northern provinces.The presence of these reinforcements strengthenedGeneral Lam's resolve to regain lost territory.5

Brigade 369, commanded by Colonel Pham VanChung, was given an area of operations bordered onthe east by the South China Sea, on the north by theNhung River, and on the west by the jungles of HaiLang District. The brigade's 5th VNMC Battalion, theBlack Dragons, arrived by truck from Phu Bai and weredropped off on QL-I about five kilometers north ofthe My Chanh River. Colonel Chung ordered the bat-talion westward to occupy Fire Support Base Jane. En-route, the battalion advisor, Major Donald L. Price,observed a VNAF helicopter gunship circling low overthe unit's route. Suddenly he saw a smoking contrailstreak towards the helicopter. Price first thought anNVA gunner had fired an RPG (rocket-propelledgrenade) antitank rocket, "a dumb mistake for thegunner in view of the gunship's firepower." Then Pricerealized the rocket had changed course as the helicop-ter banked hard to avoid it. As rhe battalion continuedon to Jane, they captured a young NVA soldier, whowas dazed by the gunship's attack. On questioning,he admitted the Communists had a small surface-to-air missile that one man could fire, thar would "chasethe fire in the airplane." It was the heat-seeking SA-7.Major Price reported this information to his senior ad-visor at brigade, Major Robert F. Sheridan. Theyrecalled that the conduct and effectiveness of airborne

BATFERED QUANG Till HOLDS 65


Vietnamese Marines were among reinforcements sentnorth in Military Region I soon after the Spring Offen-sive began. They display personal weapons and equiji-ment carried by fully loaded Marines in combat.

control and close air support significantly changedfrom that time onward?

At Dong HaWhile reinforcements were hurriedly being shuttled

northward, the 3d VNMC Battalion and 20th ARVNTank Battalion repulsed repeated enemy attempts tocapture the now-mined town of Dong Ha. The ene-my's artillery and mortar fire continued unabaited andeach night, using small craft, he attempted to infiltrateplatoon-sized units across the river on either side ofthe blown bridges. Initially, the 20th Tank Battalion'screws illuminated these attempted probes with theirtank-mounted searchlights. The searchlights quicklybecame targets for NVA artillery and mortar fire andafter two or three nights were no longer effective. Dur-ing daylight, intermittent sniper fire came ftom thenorth side of the rivet. A steady rain cloaked the bat-tle area and allowed enemy troops to make small, un-detected forays along the south bank. In spite ofnumerous minor penetrations of the thin defensiveline, from 3 to 8 April, the small combined forceprevented the NVA from establishing a major bridge-head. The gunfire support ships which deliveredplanned fires and responded to urgent requests from

the field fully supported the defenders. Although thetank units shifted regularly to alternate positions, thebattalion advisor, Army MajorJim Smock felt that theblocking mission assigned to the tank battalion nul-lified the tanks' mobility, firepower, and shock effect.Additionally, lack of aggressive leadership and thereluctance of the ARYN tank commander to visit for-ward positions increased the problems of the tankers'morale and desertion rare. With the only informationregarding the friendly situation being the sight of thelocal forces withdrawing through their defensive po-sitions, the individual tankers assumed that they hadbeen abandoned to a last-ditch effort to hold DongHa.

Nearly 20,000 civilian refugees had already fledsouth, but there were an estimated 28,000 more tocome.7 It would be inviting disaster to allow them tomove, in unbroken pace, through the Dong Ha areadefensive positions; they would have to bypass to theeast. To reduce the problem of enemy infiltration, 3dBattalion's Major Binh blocked refugees from cominginto Dong Ha village. Brigadier General Thomas W.Bowen, Jr., deputy commander of FRAC, had noti-fied Ai Tu that "all restrictions are off on air."8 Arclight operations continued north of the Cua Vier Riverirrespective of civilian presence, "accepted and en-dorsed as a military necessity .2 by the Americanand South Vietnamese authorities?

With Dong Ha devoid of civilians, looting of thedestroyed houses and household possessions occurred

A UH-i gunshijts makes a rocket-firing run. As "air-borne artillery," the helicopter gunsh4os flown by Viet-namese andAmerican forces were used to provide firesupport while units were moving and without theirown weapons in position. In this task, helicopters werevulnerable to the SA- 7 missiles used by the NV/s.


by soldiers in search of food and other belongings. AtHue, General Khang heard about the looting and tookimmediate steps to stop any misconduct by his serv-ice. Khang issued instructions by printed proclama-tion which was distributed over the battlefield fromhelicopters. The tenet cited the achievements and thefighting spirit of the Vietnamese Marines against over-whelmingly superior enemy forces. He acknowledgedthat their accomplishments had given a new spirit tothe wilt of the Vietnamese populace and congratulat-ed his warriors for their valiant deeds. Then in no un-certain terms he stated that due to the current tacticalsituation, the conduct of operations in densely popu-lated and built-up areas was necessary, but that all

fighting men are instructed to assist the peoplein every way possible to protect lives and property. Ma-rine unit commanders are ordered to kilt on sight anyMarine who is caught ted-handed robbing!" The toot-ing ceased immediately.10

A group of 250 men, comprising the 57th ARYNRegiment, arrived at Dong Ha to give some relief tothe 3d VNMC Battalion and the 20th ARVN tanks.This battalion-sized regiment was assigned an area

from Highway 9 to the naval base boat ramp on theCua Viet River. The still-rattled ARVN unit permit-ted the enemy to gain a foothold on the south sideshortly after they arrived, although the 2Orh's tanksprovided support by fire. Major Binh, disgusted withthe 57th ARVN, requested that another Marine bat-talion be sent forward to reinfbrce his battalion.

Developments in the WestBefore the invasion, the 1st VNMC Battalion, oper-

ating from Fire Support Base Pedro, had encountereda company-size NVA patrol and had killed 32 enemysoldiers. One of the dead had a map indicating everyfire support base and trail in the vicinity. It was evi-dent that the enemy had more than a passing interestin the area, so the Brigade 258 commander, LieutenantColonel Dinh, decided to strengthen his westem flankwith mines, By now, the 1st Battalion, with MajorRobert C. Cocketl as senior Marine advisor and Cap-tain Lawrence H. Livingston as his assistant, had laidapproximately 5,000 mines along the forward edge ofthe western perimeter of Ai Tu out to Pedro exceptfor the road leading into the fire support base itself.On 4 April, the Bravo group with Captain Livingston

66 THE WAR THAT WOULD NGF END

Photo courtesy of Maj Charles W. King, USMC (Ret)

An advisor and his radio operator were essential to the South Vietnamese for obtainingAmerican supporting arms during the defense of Quang Tn Province. Maj William R.Warren and the Marine car,ying his PRC25 radio are with the 6th VNMC Battalion.

BATTERED QUANG TRI HOLDS 67

was hit by a "sapper" attack during the early morninghours. The attack was stopped short when the NVAwere caught in the crossfire between the Alpha andBravo groups." The question the advisors now askedwas, when will the enemy attack next?

On 5 April, General Giai had alerted the 6thVNMC Battalion at Ai Tu to prepare to move to thevicinity of Dong Ha at first light the next day. MajorDo Huu Tung, the battalion commandet, aftet areconnaissance to Dong Ha, began briefing his uniton the move north. Assisting in this were his advisors,Major William R. Warren and Captain William D.Wischmeyer. By 1300, however, the plans had beenchanged; the 6th VNMC Battalion was going to Pedroinstead and the 1st VNMC Battalion was moved backto Ai Tu to assume a portion of the perimeter defense.

Further south, by now, VNMC Brigade 369 was tothe west of Hai Lang and had the mission of keepingopen this highway, QL-1, the main supply route fromHue to the battle area. The brigade's battalions oc-cupied a series of old and abandoned U.S. Army firesupport bases in open, rolling terrain. They includedFSBs Barbara, Sally, Nancy, and Jane, which blocked

Under fire at Dong Ha, Capt John V R4'ley scram-bles to get his dead radioman's equ:ment andanother American advisor helps wounded to theshelter of the M48 tank that will take them to safety.Ma/Jim Smock was wounded during this incident.


the approaches into southern Quang Th Province fromthe Ba Long River Valley and the Hai Lang nationalforest •12

On the morning of 6 April, some unexpected visi-tors arrived at Dong Ha in a rented Cittoen automo-bile. They were news reporters and televisioncameramen intent on getting the story of the DongHa standoff first-hand. The news contingent reachedthe mobile command posts of the 3d VNMC Battalionand the 20th Tank Battalion as an enemy force ap-proached through a woodline a scant 50 meters to thenorth. Although Captain Ripley was concerned withthe pressing tactical situation, the ring of correspon-dents closed in on the American Marine. As micro-phones were thrust into his face, and cameras whirredaway, the clucking sound of mortar rounds beingdropped into their tubes was distinctly heard.

Ripley yelled for everyone to take cover as an incom-ing round detonation rent the air. The explosion sentbodies flying in all directions. Ripley, ringed in by thenewsmen, was unhurt, but the shell had killed Ripley'sradioman and all seven of the correspondents werewounded. As the thumping of mortar rounds in-creased, Ripley ran back across the field where thegroup had initially been taken under fire. He was at-tempting to find a radio antenna to replace one thatwas destroyed when his operator was killed. He want-ed to get the radio operating in order to call for a med-ical evacuation helicopter. The tempo of the mortarattack increased. Ripley yelled to Major Jim Smock,"They've bracketed us!" Smock, himself wounded,quickly assisted the other wounded in boarding an ar-mored personnel carrier. A nearby explosion sent thetank advisor sprawling into a ditch with a painful backwound. Unaccountably, Ripley remained unscatchedas he moved through the dense fire.

The armored vehicles pulled back from the impactarea on orders from their commander. Ripley flaggeddown a withdrawing M113 and helped some of thewounded climb aboard. The APC pulled off, however,leaving other newsmen in the ditch. With the persu-asion of his leveled CAR15 rifle, Ripley convinced thecommander of the last tank departing the battlefieldto stop. As he helped Smock and the test of thewounded Americans onto the superstructure of thetank, he thought that the enemy was concentratinghis fire on them. The tank departed abruptly, leavingRipley amid exploding mortar rounds. Later, MajorSmock was to credit Ripley for displaying "the onlyresemblance of command and control on the battle-field:' in that he had remained calm and had immedi-


ately organized a blocking force that had enabled theevacuation of all the wounded.

As Ripley stooped to lift the body of his radio oper-ator, he realized he was all alone on the battlefield.He saw a squad of NVA infantrymen moving acrossHighway 9 and into the cemetery to the northwest.Although they were less than 50 meters away, the ene-my simply watched as the American Marine captainshouldered his dead radio operator and, withoutglancing back, started walking toward friendly lines.He expected to be shot in the back at any momentas he walked down the road to relative safety. Onlywhen the NVA saw that Major Binh and his two "cow-boys" had returned to search for their advisor did theyopen fire.* The small group made its way to friendlylines through a maze of burning buildings with theNVA in hot pursuit.'3 Suddenly, a large rocket shotfrom ground level in the northwest sector and head-ed toward an airborne FAC spotter aircraft. Ripley, whohad never before seen a surface-to-air missile (SAM),said "it looked like a telephone pole lumberingskyward." The SAM missed, perhaps due to the lowaltitude of the OV-10, but the enemy's threat to al-lied air took on a new meaning.

This enemy antiaircraft capability, now at the for-ward edge of the battle area, severely hampered searchand rescue operations as well as restricted use of thoseAC-130s specially equipped for suppressive fire sup-port north of Ai Tu Combat Base. Overhead was anANGLICO spotter in an OV-10 Bronco, who had beenmonitoring Ripley's radio messages and relaying themto the Ai Tu COC. This was one of the four Air ForceRockwell International OV-10 Bronco's that had recent-ly been taken north at the urging of LieutenantColonel Gray who, with Major Edward J. Dyer, wasnow supervising the ANGLICO effort for MR 1.

The battered 3d VNMC Battalion withdrew fromDong Ha on 7 April, leaving the town defended bythe 1st ARVN Armored Brigade, the 4th and 5thRanger Groups, and the understrength 57th ARVNRegiment. The 1st and 3d Troops of the 20th TankBattalion remained in support of the Ranger Groups,while the 2d Troop moved to Ai Tu Combat Base asa local reserve. The 3d VNMC Battalion rejoined itssister battalions, the 1st and the 6th, as VNMC Brigade258 consolidated its perimeter security at Ai Tu Com-bat Base and defended the western portion of the 3dARVN Division's area. With the 20th ARVN Tank Bat-

*The combination bodyguard-personal servants who accompa-nied Vietnamese officers and their advisors.

talion, these Marines had stopped a reinforced NVAdivision at the river's edge at a place where, accordingto later intelligence reports, the NVA had foreseen lit-tle opposition. For the 3d VNMC Battalion, the costhad been high. Of 700 Marines who had been orderedto Dong Ha on 30 March, only 200 walked back toAi Tu eight days later.'4

The Ftght for Pedro

In Brigade 369's area of operations, the 5th VNMCBattalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Ho QuangLich, had his executive officer, Major Tran Ba, rake twocompanies 1,200 meters west of Fire Support Basejaneto see if contact could be made with the enemy. Uponentering the Hai Lang Forest on 8 April, the SouthVietnamese found a dug-in NVA force with mortarsand machine guns. Major Ba and his command groupwere cut down at the outset and Captain Marshall R.Wells, the American advisor, assisted the now-leaderless Marines back ro Jane. Major Price recalledthat as this group broke cover from the treeline, ar-tillery and machine gun fire had to be used to shakeoff the pursuing NVA. The death of Ba, a well-respected combat officer and personality, causedbrigade commander, Colonel Pham Van Chung, tofocus on the danger from the west to QL-1 and theNVA concentrated there. A threat that FSB Jane wasin position to meet.'5

To the northwest, on the morning of 8 April, the6th Battalion command group arrived at Fire SupportBase Pedro, but fortunately Major Tung elected notto position his command post inside the base. Instead,he moved his remaining three companies to the northand northeast of Pedro and formed them into a cres-cent perimeter which intersected a dirt road used toresupply Pedro from Ai Tu. Intelligence reports indi-cated that enemy armor would soon would attack fromthe west along the axis of Route 557.

On 9 April, the battalion commander's judgementwas vindicated. Following its established pattern ofpreceding a ground assault with intense artillery prepa-ration, the NVA opened fire on Ai Tu with 130mmguns shortly after midnight. The heavy barrages con-tinued throughout the night. At first light, enemytanks could be seen through the haze to the west, roll-ing up Route 557 and across the open piedmont coun-rryside. By 0645, it was clear that 16 tanks and twobattalions of enemy infantry were in the attack.

The lead tanks, moving at an estimated 20 milesper hour, outstripped their supporting infantry andbreached FSB Pedro's perimeter at approximately 0715.

They easily tolled over the two protecting bands of con-certina wire and collapsed the decrepit bunkers. Anentire platoon outpost was overrun and annihilatedeither by gunfIre or the churning tank tracks. The Ma-rines inside Pedro crouched in their holes while fir-ing their small arms. The tanks rolled over the entirearea, killing some of the defenders in their positionsand taking those who had fled toward Ai Tu underfire with their main guns. While two T-54s were churn-ing up Pedro's defensive positions, the other tankswithout waiting for their infantry protection startedmoving across the mine field. Nine tanks were lost inthe process.

Although there was a 1,000-foot ceiling thatprevented close air support, horizontal visibility wasgood. Upon seeing the first two T-54s, Major Warrencalled Major Easley at brigade on the advisor's radionet. He requested reinforcement by the troops of the20th Tank Battalion, which was in reserve at Ai Tu,and also called for a heavy artillery concentration tobe fired on the enemy infantry which followed in traceone-half mile behind the assaulting tanks. As he wastalking to Easley, he reported, "The NVA tanks areflying red over white, swallow-tail pennants from theirradio antennas." Almost immediately, all the pennantsdisappeared. Obviously the NVA were not only em-ploying fluent English-speaking operators on their ra-

dios but also were coordinated and tied together withradio communications since all the tanks reactedsimultaneously.'°

As reports of the enemy tank attack came intoVNMC Brigade 258's headquarters over both the Viet-namese tactical and U.S. advisor nets, LieutenantColonel Dinh began assembling a reaction force. Wi-thin 30 minutes, two infantry companies of the 1stVNMC Battalion accompanied by Captain Livingstonas advisor, and an armored force of eight M48 tanksand 12 M113 armored personnel carriers from 2dTroop, 20th ARVN Tank Battalion, were movingquickly to reinforce the 6rh VNMC Battalion. At thesame time Vietnamese Marine 105mm howitzer fire,augmented by two barrages from ships just offshore,forced the NVA infantry to withdraw from the battle-field and seek refuge in the Ba Long Valley.

Meanwhile, a hole had opened up in the overcastsky, allowing four Vietnamese A-i Skyraiders to attackthe tanks threatening the 6th VNMC Battalion's com-mand post. The bombs knocked out five tanks thatwere maneuvering toward the slight knoll on whichrhe command group was located. Although theCommunist-built tanks were within easy striking dis-tance of the battalion's command post, inexplicablythey did not fire their main guns before the air strikescame in.

BATtERED QUANG TRI HOLDS 69

Photo courtesy of Capt Edwin W. Besch, USMC (Ret)

An aerialphotograph shows destroyed armor 500 meters west of Fire Support Base Pedroduring the Communist attacks. Annotations are from analysis conducted in 1972. Anotherpossible explanation for the ARVN M48 tank was the close proximity of the fighting


The break in the weather and its attendant air sup-port had provided the time necessary for the reactionforce to arrive on the scene. A brief tank battle oc-curred as the leading ARVN M48s moved into posi-tion around the 6th VNMC Battalion's command post,with the M48 proving more than a match for theCommunist-built T-54s. The ARVN tank crewsachieved first- or second-round hits on T-54s at rangesup to 1,500 meters. The NVA tanks' fire control sys-tem seemed not to be as effective since the T-54 tankcrews appeared to try to bracket their targets. Whenthe smoke had cleated the ARVN crews had destroyedfive T-54s without losing any of their tanks. MajorNguyen Dang Hoa had otganized the counterattackwith his own 1st VNMC Battalion and the Bravo com-mand group of the battalion. The Marines, mountedon tanks and APCs, quickly retook Pedro. BravoGroup, with Captain Livingston, moved through thefire support base and swept south for about 1,000meters. The sweep accounted for about 100 enemydead and one captured tank.

Captain Livingston, later tecalling the incident, stat-ed that the enemy employed poot tactics: their ar-tillery, tanks, and infantry were used in a

uncoordinated manner. He said that the VietnameseMarines were terrified when first confronted by theenemy armor and reacted in an "uncontrolled stateof panic:' but once they realized that their LAWs couldknock out a T-54, they reacted with confidence. In fact,some of the Vietnamese Marines ctouched in theirholes and let the tanks run over them and then hitthe tank in the teat with a LAW. The 1st VNMC Bat-talion, over six months, was credited with destroyingmore than 60 enemy tanks with the LAW. A fellowadvisor said that Livingston probably had "more ex-perience with nose-on-nose tank battles than any otherU.S. Marine" during this period.

Within two hours after Major Hoa's force had be-gun its counterattack, 13 of the 16 T-54 tanks had beendestroyed by mines, tank fire, air strikes, or infantryweapons. One tank escaped, but the remaining twowere captured. One of the tanks was captured in amost unorthodox manner. An unnamed VNMC pri-vate in an outpost position held fast in his hole as oneof the T-54s came clanking up a slight incline. Theangle of the tank's bow, as it climbed the hill, obstruct-ed the driver's view; he could not see the private's po-sition. Suddenly the Matine leaped up with his M16rifle and motioned for the driver and the crew, whohad their hatches open, to dismount. The NVA, look-ing somewhat sheepish, cleared the tank, turning it

over to the Vietnamese Marines. This tank, along withthe other captured one, was driven back to the Ai TuCombat Base. There, the tanks were adorned withhuge Vietnamese Marine Corps emblems and latersent to Saigon as war trophies.

On 10 and 11 April, additional attacks were beatenback by the Pedro defenders with the NVA leaving 211dead behind. On 12 April, the Bravo command groupof the 1st VNMC Battalion, with Captain Livingston,was ambushed by an estimated two battalions of NVAwhich had infiltrated during the previous night andhad dug in astride the dirt road leading back to AiTu. The enemy had recoilless rifles and antiaircraftguns in the fighting holes with them. Major Tung, 6thVNMC Battalion commander, deployed his units and,after a reconnaissance by fire, ordered an assault ledby his executive officet, who was killed during the at-tack. Captain Livingston rallied the Marines, then ledthe armor assault force until the senior company com-mander was able to direct the action. The shock ef-fect of the armor, immediately followed by thesupporting infantry proved to be too much for the dis-ciplined enemy. Although some withdrew, mostfought and died in their holes. Captain Livingstonreceived the Silver Star Medal for his courage andleadership while under fire.17

An enemy prisoner and some captured documentsrevealed that the NVA's effort against the Marines'western front had consisted of an infantry regimentand a tank battalion. Had the enemy been successfulin his attack, he would have destroyed the combat ef-fectiveness of the 3d ARVN Division's forces north ofthe Thach Han River. The enemy, however, had notbeen successful and the Vietnamese Marine Corpsproved that individuals could indeed destroy enemyarmor with their own antitank weapons. The M72LAW had been thoroughly tested against armor in awide variety of controlled situations during its develop-ment and had been carried by U.S. Marines for yearsin Vietnam. The NVA offensive, however, provided itsfirst battlefield test against enemy armor. Its successin this role bolstered the morale of the South Viet-namese forces. While it was reassuring for the Marinesto know they could stop the mighty T-54 main battletank with their LAWs, it was the Communist 130mmgun that was the real problem. The incessant pound-ing of the "130s" indicated that, despite setbacks, theNorth Vietnamese intended to continue their attacktoward Quang Tn and toward their final objective—the ancient imperial capital of Hue.

In the week following the battles at Pedro, numer-

BATFERED QUANG TRI HOLDS 71


Special forces such as these MACV Special Operations Group maritime commandos atDa Nang were used to recover the American airmen evading capture north of the CamLv River Though wearing South Vietnamese uniforms, most of the weapons they carryare of Communist origin. The two submachine guns, however, are Swedish Karl Gustavs.

ous enemy attempts to break the stabilized 3d ARV'NDivision defense lines were turned back. I Corps head-quarters repeatedly reported that South Vietnameseinfantry, tanks, and artillery, augmented by U.S. navalgunfire, caused the attacking enemy to break andwithdraw in disorder. Continued bad weather,however, precluded the use of VNAF or U.S. tacticalair power. General Lam, commanding I Corps, con-tinued to plan for a counteroffensive as soon as theweather lifted and his air support could be employed.Another factor noted by General Kroesen was thatGeneral Lam's horoscope was favorable for such amove.18

Bright Lights

Concurrent with these events, the BAT-21 incidentstill continued just south of the DMZ. By rhis timein the war, political pressure would not permit anymore Americans to be captured, the South Vietnamesenotwithstanding.'° Marine Lieutenant Colonel AndrewE. Andersen was the officer-in-charge of the MACV-SOG Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) taskedwith the location and recovery of American evaders

and prisoners in Southeast Asia.* His "Bright Light"teams provided for the recovery of Americans after theusual search and rescue efforts had ended. He wasnearing the end of his tour in 1972 when the SpringInvasion began and he was sent to MR 1 to direct therecovery of airmen and any U.S. advisors who were stillbehind enemy lines. Prior to this, two Air Force OV-lOsand an HH-53 had been shot down and two Armyhelicopters additionally were lost, before the recoveryeffort was turned over to the JPRC.

Arriving at the 3d ARVN Division headquarters atQuang Tn City, Lieutenant Colonel Andersen and ateam of two American and six Vietnamese special

*MACV's 2,000-man Studies and Observation Group, commonlyknown as "SOG' conducted special warfare tasks throughoutSoutheast Asia. By definition, special warfare consisted of rhe threeinterrelated tasks of counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, and

psychological warfare. Unconventional warfare included guerrillaoperarions, resissanee operations, and escape and evasion operations.MACV-SOG was composed of units from the Army, Navy, and AirForce and some 8,000 local irregulars. Marine Corps units were nutassigned to the task force, but direct support was provided through-out the war and individual Marines were assigned to fill various billetswithin thr command.


forces troops from the SOG-Maritime OperationsBranch moved west our Highway 9 to an ARVN block-ing position at the Cam In bridge. From this locationit was possible for his men, dressed as civilians, to crossthe Cam In River and recover the evaders.* Andersenestablished the no-fire "boxes" around the Americanevaders and felt that the3d ARVN Division "had quitby this time!" As many a 90 air strikes a day were runin direct support of the rescue.effort. By 13 April, twoAmerican airmen were recovered alive by the JPRCteams of Lieutenant Colonel Andersen. Andersenwrote later that there "were no friendly forces forwardof our recovery position . . . Khe Sanh to our westwas lost and a major enemy thrust to cross at DongHa was expected at any moment?'2°

The month's first two weeks also witnessed the ar-rival of III Marine Amphibious lbrce units respondingto direction from Seventh Fleet, CinCPac, andJCS. Inaddition to forces afloat off the DMZ, two Marinefighter squadrons flew in from Iwakuni, Japan, withtheir mount-out supplies, and set up at Da Nang AirBase. Highly sophisticated electronic sensor aircraftwere deployed to bolsrer the overall air effort. ANGLI-CO's Sub Unit One expanded from 89 to 191 person-nel. On 13 April, air observers from the Okinawa-based 3d Marine Division reported to Sub Unit Onein Da Nang. On 14 April, more air observers, newlyarrived from Camp Pendleton, California, were briefedat Saigon before departing for MR I and MR 4 for air-borne spotting duty from USAF and VNAF aircraft.Major Glen Golden, a naval air observer and artilleryofficer, reported to the 3d ARVN Division at theQuang Th Citadel with the assignmenr as Naval Gun-fire Officer for MR 1. ANGLICO's Lieutenant ColonelD'Wayne Gray regarded Golden as an expert practi-tioner of fire support coordination and a "rock ofstability during a time when stability was hard to find?'Available naval gunfire support now included 27 des-troyers, 2 light cruisers, and a heavy cmiser.21

Since the beginning of the offensive, General Giai,responding to the continuous enemy pressure, hadpersistently requested reinforcements from the corpscommander. General Lam reluctantly committed thereinforcements which, in keeping with the principleof unity of command, were attached to the 3d ARVNDivision. Now, the unwieldy command structure ofthe division was breaking down in its efforts to con-trol two ARYN infantry regiments, two VNMC

*This exploit earned Lieutenant Thomas R. Norris, USNR, theMedal of Honor.

Marine Aircraft Group 15 Command Chronology

Commanders coordinate US. Marine Corps supportto the South Vietnamese armedforces. Shown in dis-cussion are, from the left, BGen William H. Lanagan,

Jr., MACV MajGen FrederickJ. Kroesen, Jr., FRAC;LtGen William K Jones, FMFPac; and MajGen LeslieE. Brown, 1st MAW Face-to-face contact was criticalto the effective prosecution of nationwide operations.

brigades, four Ranger groups, and one armor brigade,as well as the Regional and Popular lkirces in QuangTn Province.22

The Ranger groups and Marine brigades, under theoperational control of the 3d ARYN Division at QuangTn City, continued to report to their parent organiza-tions for support. The reason for this was two-fold.Loyalty to their units played a part, of course, but,more importantly, at no time was the 3d DivisionHeadquarters' communications system or logistic baseexpanded to provide adequately for the command orsupport of the attached units. Attached Rangers andMarines were forced to use their own command chan-nels in order to have their needs met. In retrospect,it was evident that the commanders of I Corps andthe 3d ARVN Division could not properly accommo-date the rapid buildup of forces. As an example, a re-quest by General Khang, supported by GeneralKtoesen, to assume control of his three brigades wasdismissed as unnecessary by General Lam.23

The NVA Mount a Third Attack in MR I

The invading NVA, thwarted at Pedro, continuedto push men and armor toward Quang Tn City, cross-ing the Cam In and Mieu Giang River barrier by the

BAITERED QUANG TRI HOLDS 73

Photo courtesy of ICdr Francis C. Brown, USN

Lessons learnedfrom North Vietnamese artille7y fire were put into effect by the 3dARVNDivision and MACV Advisozy Team 155. South Vietnamese engineers constructed thedivision command bunker in the Quang Tn Citadel using sand bags and steel matting.

Picturedare captured Communist tanks from the two armored regiments that supportedthe attacks in Quang Tn Province. Closest is a Chinese Type .59 and in the rear is a SovietT-54. Both have been marked with "TQJ.C" by their captors, the Vietnamese Marine Corps.


still standing Cam La Bridge. After more than twoweeks of rain and dense cloud cover, the weather brokeallowing a massive air effort to hit every suspected ene-my position and staging area. Increased numbers of8-52 Arc Light strikes as well as hundreds of tacticalair strikes were flown each day in support of ARVNground forces.24

On 14 April, FSB Basrogne, southwest of Hue City,fell to units of the 324B NVA Division, giving GeneralI.am worries other than retaking lost ground. The 324Bwas now in position to attack Hue City, consideredby the Vietnamese and MACV to be "the focal pointof history and culture" for all of Vietnam. Criticalfighting occurred between the 1st ARVN Division andthe NVA for control of the Bastogne and Birminghamfire support bases. Tn spite of the concentrated alliedair offensive, the enemy moved his units into position,ready for the attack. This put an end to General Lam'soptimistic desire for a counteroffensive.

On 16 April, FSB Jane was attacked by infantry andartillery, catching the 5th VNMC Battalion out of po-

had to fight its way to the base under the cover of airstrikes controlled by Major Price from Jane. As hadhappened a week earlier, Captain Wells was with thecutoff unit, having a radio shot off his back, and col-lapsing from exhaustion. Major Price played an im-portant role in getting the survivors back to the firesupport base, earning a Silver Star Medal for his ac-tions. After dark, Wells and the other serious casual-ties were evacuated by helicopter. Jane held, but thebatrali6n had suffered and Colonel Chung, thebrigade commander, relieved them the next day withthe 7th VNMC Battalion. The enemy began to pres-sure the Marines of Brigade 369 on their hills as NorthVietnamese gunnets "blew the tops off the bases" withartillery fire.

On 18 April at 1830, the 3 04th NV/I Division struckall along the western front moving toward Quang TnCity. At the same time another NVA force of the 308thNVA Division moved south passing through CampCarroll arid Mai Inc towards Dong Ha. The 5th RangerGroup, with the 20th ARVN Tank Battalion in sup-port, confronted an enemy regiment southwest of


North Vietnamese Army PhotoDespite reliance on armor and motorized forces, the North Vietnamese Army's infantrydisplayed a greater degree of crosscountry mobility than their opponents. An NVA in-fantry unit crosses a stream car.'ying individual and unit equzjpment with ü. The soldierin the foregroundis holding apair of "Ho ChiMinh"sandals, the common footwear used

sition. The battalion's Btavo group was surrounded and Dong Ha along the Vinh Phuoc Rivet. As the inten-

BATITERED QUANG fli HOLDS 75

sity of the battle increased, desperate ground forces,naval gunfire, along with diverted B-52 and tacticalair strikes, stopped the NVA forces. \TNMC Brigade258, with a troop of 20th Tank Battalion tanks, ex-perienced a strong enemy attack along its westernfront. The ARYN tanks, although they were continu-ously sniped at by enemy antitank teams, enjoyed ex-cellent results. Bravo group of the 1st VNMC Battaliontook heavy casualties, but by midnight all was quietagain.

As the enemy withdrew, the 6th VNMC Battalion

captured a tank and a prisoner. The tank was practi-cally new and the prisoner had a fresh haircut, newuniform, good equipment, and an extra pair of shoes.It was believed that the enemy had placed a high pri-ority on first hitting Ai Tu combat base, but had shift-ed his emphasis to the attrition of South Vietnamesetroop units. These fresh troops and supplies indicat-ed to Major Warren and Captain Wischmeyer, withthe 6th VNMC Battalion, that the enemy felt the tac-tical situation was worth the investment of additionalmen and materiel.25

CHAPTER 6

Exodus from Quang liiDrive from the rest— Confusion at Quang Th

Team 155 and General Giai Depart— VNMC Brigade 147 on Its Own

Dn've from the West

While the ARVN defenders held the Dong Ha po-sitions, the concentration of the battle, both offen-sively and defensively, had shifted to the westernapproaches of the Ai Tu and Quang Tn areas. Thwart-ed at Dong Ha, the enemy continued to advance fromthe west along Highway 9 and had crossed over theriver at Cam I.o. This maneuver rendered the defendersof Dong Ha vulnerable to enemy moves to sever QL-1between Dong Ha and Quang Tn City.

On 22 April 1972, VNMC Brigade 147, which hadbeen at Hue City for a period of rest and refurbish-ing, sent its 8th Battalion north to relieve the 3dV'NMC Battalion at Ai Tu. The next day, the re-mainder of VNMC Brigade 147 relieved VNMCBrigade 258 there. Under 147's operational controlwere the 1st, 4th, and 8th VNMC Battalions and the2d VNMC Artillery Battalion. The brigade headquart-ers,, the artillery battalion, and the reconnaissancecompany set up within the Ai Tu Combat Base withthe 4th VNMC Battalion responsible for perimeterdefense. The 1st VNMC Battalion was deployed ap-proximately 3,000 meters to the southwest betweenAi Tu and FSB Pedro. The 8th VNMC Battalion waspositioned one kilometer to the northwest of Ai Tu.'

The 1st ARVN Armored Brigade was responsible forthe area from QL-1 to five kilometers to the west,bounded by the Cam lb River to the north and the AiTu Combat Base to the south. The brigade, in addi-tion to its organic units, controlled the 57th ARYNRegiment and the 4th and 5th Ranger Groups. The 2dARVN Regiment had the area south of Ai Tu to theThach Han River. The 1st Ranger Group was locatedsouth of the Thach Han River, VNMC Brigade 369 wasstill further south near Hai Lang, and the 3d ARVNDivision's headquarters was at the Quang Tn Citadel.2

During the period 23 to 26 April, on orders fromthe 3d ARVN Division, VNMC Brigade 147 conduct-ed operations to the west searching for enemy units.Several times, the Marines spotted the enemy andcalled for artillery fire on him. The 8th VNMC Bat-talion sported two tanks, and turned them away withartillery fire? For the first time AT-3 Sagger wire-guided antitank missiles were used against M48 tank

76

crews along Highway 9 west of Dong Ha. The ARYNtankers "seemed fascinated by their flight and wouldstare at them, rather than firing at the readily iden-tifiable firing positions or moving." U.S. Army advi-sor Lieutenant Colonel Louis P. Wagner reported thatthe forward deployed M48s were particularly vulnera-ble to N'VA teams armed with the Saggers and B-40rocket-propelled grenades?

At 0630 on the morning of 27 April, the 304th NJ44Division launched an attack on the Ai Tu area fromthe southwest. The enemy, supported by 130mm ar-tillery fire, attacked \TNMC Brigade 147 and the 1stARVN Armored Brigade to the north of the Marines.In VNMC Brigade 147's area, the 1st VNMC Battalion,with Major Robert C. Cockell and Captain LawrenceH. Livingston, made the first contact. Although hitwith more than 500 rounds of 82mm mortar fire wi-thin the first two hours, as well as artillery fire, thebattalion stopped two ground attacks while sufferingonly minimal casualties.6 During the late afternoon,Communist tank and infantry forces attacked both the1st and 8th VNMC Battalions. Artillery and the ARVNM48s, in direct support of the Marines, destroyed 15enemy tanks and drove back the infantry. By night-fall, the two outlying battalions were pulled in closerto the Ai Tu perimeter. Enemy 130mm fire, however,struck the base ammunition dump and destroyed mostof the brigade's ammunition stockpile.

At the 3d ARYN Division headquarters in QuangTn, ANGLICO's HM1 Thomas E. Williamson wasmanning an improvised dispensary that had been es-tablished with Navy Lieutenant John M. Lapoint,HMC Donovan R. Lcavitt, HM2 Francis C. Brown, andHM3 James Riddle, from the Naval Advisory Unit inDa Nang. They had been able to provide treatmentto ARYN wounded who were unable to be cared forat the swamped provincial military hospital. They hadalso assisted with injured Americans, including the"BAT-fl" airman. As the situation deteriorated on 27April, Williamson heard that a seriously woundedAmerican advisor with the 2d ARVN Regiment wascut off from air and road evacuation. "Doc" William-son loaded a medical bag and with a U.S. Army ser-geant, Roger Shoemaker, obtained an ARVN armored

EXODUS FROM QUANG TRI 77

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Photo courtesy of Capt Edwin W. Besch, TJSMC (Ret)

Although South Vietnam's armor held out well againstthe North Vietnamese tanks, z proved vulnerable tothe Soviet-built AT3 Sagger wire -guidedant itank mis-sile. The missile was manpacked and hada maximumrange of 3,000 meters. At reght it a SA-7 surface-to-air missile, another weapon encountered during 1972.

personnel carrier to take them north of the Thach HanRivet through small arms and artillery fire. They wereable to evacuate the seriously injured LieutenantColonel William C. Camper, saving his life?

This pressure on Ai Tu from the west led indirectlyto the collapse of the South Vietnamese lines at DongHa by 28 April 1972. Responding to a penetrationfrom the west which threatened to cut logistical sup-port from Ai Tu Combat Base, the 1st ARVN ArmoredBrigade commander recalled the 20th ARVN TankBattalion from irs supporting positions in Dong Haand along the Cua Viet River and sent the unit south-

ward to deal with the threat. The 57th ARVN Regi-ment, seeing the tanks pulling out, broke from itsdefensive positions and retreated in disorder towatdQuang Tn City. That morning, a massive traffic jamquickly occurred at the northern gate of Ai Tu. TheMarines refused to let the panic-stricken forces throughthe gate. Finally brigade commander, Colonel Bao, a1ter talking with the officers of the retreating units, letthem through rather than have a milling mob des-troy the tactical integrity of the northern perimeter.That afternoon, Major Jim R. Joy sent all hisadvisors, except Major Emmett S. Huff and CaptainEarl A. "Skip" Kruger, to Quang Tn City to establisha new command post to support a possible with-drawal.

The 3d ARVN Division sent the 369th brigade's 7thVNMC Battalion north to reinforce Brigade 147, leav-ing FSB Jane unoccupied. Enroute to Quang Tn, thebattalion made heavy contact with the enemy, andonly two companies succeeded in breaking throughto Quang Tn City, arriving at Ai Tu shortly before dark.After dark, 10 M48 tanks which had previously beensent to the south of the rivet to reopen QL-1, returnedto Ai Tu led by the 20th ARVN Tank Battalion tom-mandet. The tanks were back in direct support of theMarines.9

At 0200, 29 April, the NVA launched a tank andinfantry assault along the 2d ARVN Regiment's front

Inside the Quang Tn Citadel at the MACV Advisory Team 1)5 compound adjacent tothe 3dAR VN Division headquarters, the congestedand crowded conditions did not leadto efficiency and provided the North Vietnamese artillery a lucrative target to hit.

Photo courtesy of 1.Cdr Francis C. Brown, USN

EXODUS FROM QUANG 'FRI 79

Photo courtesy of Leatherneck Magazine

Marine Corps medical support came from US. Navypersonnel. HMJ Thomas E. Williamson, with ANGLI-CO'S Sub Unit One, treatedAmencan and South Viet-namese wounded during a critical period whileworking from the Quang Tn Citadel. He is wearinga Marine Corps uniform with metal naval rank insig-nia; the name tags were a locally used modification.

and the Thach Han River, securing the north end ofthe bridge leading into Quang Tn City. Forward aircontrollers operating under flare-light brought instrike after strike on the enemy's position. Three ofthe five enemy tanks were destroyed northwest of thebridge, but the enemy still controlled the north end.At first light, Brigade 147 assigned the two compa-nies of the 7th VNMC Battalion the mission of open-ing the bridge to Quang Tn City. Supported by thetanks from the 20th battalion, the Marines routed theNVA from rhe bridge's defensive bunkers, killing 12enemy soldiers and taking two prisoners.

The 4th and 5th Ranger Groups, which were sup-posed to secure the re-established bridgehead, hadcrossed over to the Quang 'Fri City side of the bridgeand kept going. Finally, Colonel Bao, unable to findany ARVN troops, and no longer confident of the di-vision's ability to keep it open, assigned the 7th Bat-talion units responsibility for holding the bridge. Asthis occurred, the defensive positions north of Ai Tu,which had held against the enemy for almost a month,continued to crumble. The ARVN infantry broke fromtheir positions in an unauthorized withdrawal andflowed south in disorder across the Thach Han Bridge.

Late in the afternoon of 29 April, NVA artillery againhit the Ai Tu ammunition dump. Fires and explosionsraged among the remaining ammunition stocks untilthe morning of 30 April, reducing the Marines to lessthan 1,000 rounds of ammunition for their howitzers.It had become evident to Majorjoy, the senior brigadeadvisor, in view of the mass withdrawal from the north,that Ai Tu was no longer defensible.

Early Sunday morning, 30 April, an ARVN soldierwho had been captured at Camp Carroll by the NVAand had escaped made his way into the area of the8th VNMC Battalion. He reported that a regimental-sized enemy force supported by 20 tanks was in as-sembly areas southwest of Ai Tu. Up to this point, ar-tillery and tanks had stopped the attacks, but now,ammunition supply was critical and the 20th ARYNTanks had been ordered south of the Quang TnRiver to establish a defense around Quang Tn City.Naval gunfire could not be used against the stagingarea designated by the ARVN noncommissioned of-ficer as it was near maximum range and the friendlyforces were on the gun-target line.* The Marines calledin tactical air with sorties striking so close ro the frontlines that the enemy troops fled into the defensive wirein an effort to escape the napalm and bombs.

At first light on 30 April, Colonel Chung of VNMCBrigade 369 sent his 5th Battalion north up QL-1 toopen the road to Quang Tn. The barralion was mount-ed on M48 tanks and M113 personnel carriers. Justsouth of the 0 Khe River Bridge, the battalion was hitby heavy automatic weapons and recoilless rifle fire."The Marines continued to advance on foot, dtivingthe enemy skirmishers back:' recounted the battalionadvisor, Major Donald L. Price. As the battalion com-mander and Major Price moved forward for a betterview of the bridge, they heard the sound of an NVArank engine starting up on the north bank of the river.With the possibility of a tank ambush, Major Pricebegan what he called a "duel between forward ob-servers."

Major Price, on the south side of the 0 Khe, calledfor naval gunfire, concentrating on the vicinity of therank engine noise. Meanwhile, the NVA on the northside of the river called in 122mm and t3onim artilleryfire, appatenrly on the roadway to the south. This duel

*A "gun-target line" is drawn between the weapon and the tar-get and is used in fire control to make corrections to impactingrounds. The possibility of error is greatest along the axis of this lineat extreme range, in some cases rendering supporting fire imprac-tical due to the risk of hitting friendly forces.


went on for more than an hour until Major Price wasable to prevail wirh a series of accurate airstrikes thatresulted in secondary fires and explosions in the ene-my position. The 5th Battalion then remounted thearmored vehicles and attacked across the bridge withthe M48s in the lead, firing rapidly into suspected am-bush locations along the toad.

Another bottleneck was reached between the bridgeand Hai Lang, where the NVA had installed them-selves in former ARVN outposts alongside the high-way. Major Price called in air support, including thatof an AC-130 gunship, "to blow the target away:' Asthe 20mm Garling guns and the 105mm howitzer ofthe Spectre opened up, tactical aircraft arrived on sta-tion and followed the AC-130 attack with devastatingaccuracy on the now-smoking target. Hit by a lethalcombination of MK82 high-explosive bombs andnapalm fire bombs, surviving NVA infantry attempt-ed to escape in all directions, "most being shot downby 5th Battalion Marines." With the destruction of thisenemy force, down QL-1 "came an exodus of refugeesfleeing south." Despite this, the battalion's prospectsof linking up with units in Quang 'lii City faded. Theywere now overextended, low on ammunition, and un-able to move up the road into the flow of refugees.Colonel Chung ordered the battalion back to theo Khe Bridge and to hold it open for a breakout ofunits from the north.'°

Confusion at Quang TnEven heavy air attacks could nor save the untena-

ble salient north of the Thach Han River. At noon on30 April the 3d ARVN Division's commander,Brigadier General Giai, made the decision to with-draw the Marines from Ai Tu Combat Base and tobring VNMC Brigade 147 to Quang Tn City to pro-vide a defensive force and to concentrate on securinghis lines of communication to the south. Lacking se-cure communications to all his subordinate com-mands, GenerahGiai called all his unit commandersto a meeting at the Citadel. He explained his ration-ale for a relocation south of the Thach Han River: theexpectation of a renewed enemy offensive; shortagesof fuel and ammunition; concern for artillery piecesbeing captured; the real possibility of being cut offby enemy action; and constant enemy fire at helicop-ter flights going into Quang Tn and Ai Tu. Under thisclosely held plan, the security of Quang Tn City wouldbe maintained by VNMC Brigade 147, the only tacti-cal unit remaining in any condition to hold the north-ern approach to Quang Tn City. General Giai's seniorAmerican advisor, Colonel Metcalf, felt "It would be

our last-ditch defense" against the attacking 3 04thNVIS Division." The remaining ARVN and Rangerforces would form a defensive line on the south bankof the Thach Han. The armor and armored cavalrywould be committed to open the highway to the sourhtoward Hue.'2

Colonel Bao, along with Major Joy, arrended themeeting at the Quang 'Iii Citadel. When they receivedthe order to pull back, Bao andJoy tried to telephoneLieutenant Colonel Nguyen Xuan Phuc, the deputybrigade commander, who was at Ai Tu with MajorHuff, and inform him of the decision. Secure voicecommunications could not be established, so rhedeputy commander was ordered to report to QuangTn for a briefing. While awaiting his arrival, ColonelBao and Majorjoy conducted a reconnaissance of thecity.

Upon the arrival of Phuc, Bao briefed him on thedivision withdrawal plan. Althoughjoy had attemptedro persuade the brigade commander to return to AlTu personally to oversee the withdrawal, Bao felt hecould exercise better control from his new commandpost in the position formerly occupied by MACV Ad-visory Team 19, the U.S. Army advisory team furQuang Tn Province." While the brigade deputy wasenroute back to Ai Tu, 3d ARVN Division receivedintelligence that indicated the NVA planned adivision-sized attack on Quang 'lii City that night andordered Ai Tu to commence the evacuation immedi-ately. The plan had already been explained to thesubordinate commanders notrh of the river and be-gan smoothly as the Marine brigade headquarters andits artillery battalion departed first. The 1st VNMCBattalion comprised the main body, followed by the8th VNMC Battalion in trace, covering the westernflank. The 4th VNMC Battalion closed the columnas the rear guard.

Prior to leaving, Major Huff and Captain Earl A.Kruger destroyed the secure voice radio equipment andother classified material. The American advisors, hav-ing finished their destruction duties, joined the 4thVNMC Battalion just as it was clearing the south-eastern perimeter of the Ai Tu Combat Base. CaptainKruger, later awarded the Silver Star Medal for his ac-tions, effectively directed and controlled tactical airstrikes, and artillery and naval gunfire missions, slow-ing the pursuing NVA and permitting the brigade'sorderly and covered withdrawal.

As VNMC Brigade 147 moved south from Ai Tu,Major Huff requested fire missions from ANGLICO'sMajor Glen Golden, who, in turn, relayed the requests

to the ships. At that time rhete were 16 naval gunfireships responding to Golden's requests. These ships in-cluded the 8-inch cruiser USS Newport News(CA-148), three 6-inch cruisers, and 12 5-inch destroy-ers. Golden attempted to keep gunfire between thebrigade and the NVA, and to provide some form ofcontinuing fire support. In the existing situation, hewas concerned that he might have to walk out ofQuang Tn City on a pair of arthritic knees.'

The withdrawal was going as planned until the Ma-rine column, approaching Quang Tn City, discoveredthat ARVN engineers had destroyed both bridgesacross the Thach Han River. The Marines tried to towtheir artillery across a ford, but the swift current andsoft bottom frustrated their efforts, forcing them todestroy 18 howitzers and 22 vehicles. Fortunately, 16of the 18 remaining tanks of the 20th ARVN Tank Bat-talion were able to ford the river one kilometer northof the bridges. Two tanks were lost, one to a mine andthe other to recoilless rifle fire. Marine infantry swamand waded the river at the bridge site and moveddirectly into their defensive positions. While wading

the river, Captain Kruger narrowly escaped drowningas a Vietnamese Marine, losing his footing, panickedand grabbed Kruger's arm. Twice the advisor went un-der, but he maintained his hold on the radio floatingon an air mattress. Major Huff pushed the air mat-tress toward Kruger, who then pulled himself tosafety.'

By dark, the brigade had occupied its planneddefensive positions in Quang Tn City: The 1st VNMCBattalion had an area west of the city; the 4th VNMCBattalion guarded the eastern and southern ap-proaches; and rhe 8th VNMC Battalion defended thenorth. The headquarters and the remaining units oc-cupied a location inside the Citadel compound.16

Team 155 and General Giai Depart

The 3d ARVN Division command post, within theCitadel, was having a difficult rime coordinating themaneuver elements of the division. Command integri-ty had completely dissolved. Infantry units along theriver, seeing the tanks continuing to move south, aban-doned their positions. All types of vehicles began to


Photo courtesy of lstSgc Jimmy D. Evans, USA (Ret)

Armored units, forced to leave the highway because of enemy action, and refugees hadto brave the demands of crosscountry travel At this fording place east of National High-way 1, 20th ARVN Tank Battalion vehicles are lost as they bog down in a river bed

run out of fuel and were abandoned. Major Golden,the MR I naval gunfire officer, who had arrived at the3d ARVN Division command post a week earlier,found little cohesion between the ARVN staff and itsU.S. Army counterparts. According to Golden, twobunkers inside the Citadel served as the control centerof the division. One bunker housed the combat oper-ations center (COC) of the ARVN division; the other,50 yards away, contained the command center ofMACV Team 155. The only interchange that existedwas at the highest level between Brigadier General Giaiand Colonel Metcalf. Other counterparts did not talkto each other and the 27 maneuver battalions report-ed, if they reported at all, as individual units.

On his own initiative, Golden installed a direct tel-ephone line between the ARVN artillery officer in theARVN combat operations center bunker and himselfin the advisor bunker. As he received fire requests fromMarine advisors withdrawing with their units, or fromANGLICO aerial observers flying in U.S. Air Force

OV-lOs, he was able to fire several massed time-on-targets with ARVN artillery and American naval gun-fire. There was no formal fire planning, but air, ar-tillery, and naval gunfire managed to keep pressureon the enemy. Golden received his first and onlyguidance from Colonel Metcalf, who pointed to a amap and said, "everything outside this circle aroundthe Citadel is a free fire zone:' Although Golden re-quested thousands of naval gunfire rounds in suppottof the withdrawal, he latet stated "the only thing thatsaved the entire situation, the only thing that slowedthe NVA down, was American tactical air . . . . Wehad so much of it."17

The enemy, however, had routed the South Viet-namese in the north and wanted to maintain pressureon the city. On 1 May, General Giai decided that fur-ther defense of Quang Tn City would be fruitless, andto protect "the lives of all of you?' he decided to pullall units back to a defensive line at My Chanh.18 In-telligence reports indicated that the city would be hit



The ARVN went south to dig in and fight again. This M48 pu/Is out with its turret point-ed north towards the enemy. On board are wounded and other escaping soldiers.


by a 10,000-round artillery attack beginning at 1700.At J215, the 3d ARVN Division's chief of staff walkedinto Advisory Team 155's bunker and, using Ameri-can radio circuits, called all the subordinate com-manders and their advisors and said "General Giai hasreleased all commanders to fight their way to the MyChanh River!" This came as a complete surprise to allAmericans in the tactical operations center. Within30 minutes, the I Corps commander, LieutenantGeneral Lam, or a deputy, issued a counterorder to"stand and die:' This directive apparently was fromSaigon as Lam was reporting directly to PresidentThieu.'°

At this point, General Giai's subordinates refusedto obey and said he could withdraw with them or beleft at the Citadel, "a threat they ptoceeded to carryout."20 All across the northern salient, commandershad already begun their withdrawal and a mass exo-dus had begun. Unit commanders did nor ac-knowledge the change in orders or openly refused todeviate from the original command. Within hours theentire area was in chaos and confusion reigned.21

The end comes for the Americans with the 3dARVNDivision at Quang IN An Air Force noncommissionedofficer burns classejied documents to prevent themfrom falling into enemy hands at the Citadel. OtherequzjOment and material was left behind during therapid withdrawal that followed shortly afterwards.

Photo courtesy of I.Cdr Francis C. Brown, USN

No orderly withdrawal plan was promulgated oreven suggested. It was every battalion for itself. Anyidentifiable sense of unity crumbled. The confusionof orders, combined with a month of constant bom-bardment and harrowing combat, destroyed the lasttraces of cohesion among the ARYN troops and advi-sors. A frightened mob poured out as a "tidal waveonto Highway 1" and fled southward toward Hue.Only Marine Brigade 147 remained under control.Shortly afterwards, Colonel Metcalf called brigadeheadquarters via secure radio and said, "The ARVNare pulling out; advisors may stay with their units orjoin me" for evacuation. MajorJoy responded that theBrigade 147 advisors would remain with their units.22

Brigade 147 withdrew from Quang Tn, destroyingexcess equipment in the process. This orderly destruc-tion included large amounts of communications gearleft by advisory teams which previously occupied theposition. A little after 1300, the brigade headquart-ers and artillery battalion headquarters moved to apoint southwest of the Citadel, where they expectedto be joined by the 3d ARVN Division commanderand staff, and then to push on to the south to linkup with VNMC Brigade 369 at My Chanh.23 In a let-ter home, a U.S. Army captain who was serving as anadvisor with the ARV'N, praised VNMC Brigade 147for its coolness:

As bad as I hate to say it, thank God for the Marines.The ARVN regulars, rangers, and militia ran, and I do meanran, away from the NVA. However, one brigade of Marinesnot only stood and fought but damned if they didn't launcha counterattack while everyone else ran away. Without doubtthey saved us . .

24

General Giai had loaded his remaining staff officerson three armored personnel carriets and had roaredout of the Citadel in an attempt to break out alongwith his retreating men. The departing M113's left be-hind about 80 Americans and Vietnamese of the ad-visory compound. Colonel Metcalf called GeneralKroesen for rescue helicopters in accordance with pre-arranged plans with FRAC and said, "Now is thetime.' 'as

General Giai and his staff, unable to break throughthe encircling enemy and link up with VNMC Brigade147, came roaring back into the Citadel, adding atleast 40 mote people to be evacuated by helicopter.By 1500 the helicopters had not arrived. Major Goldenhad lost radio contact with VNMC Brigade 147 as itmoved out of range. At this time, as he was destroy-ing all radio equipment and weapons, the telephonerang: the commercial telephone circuit to Hue con-


including General Giai. The second helicopter land-ed in trace, and after taking on about 40 more peo-ple, flew away. Sixteen Americans remained in theCitadel in addition to the remaining 3d ARYN Divi-sion staff. After a seemingly interminable wait, a thirdHH-53 came in low and settled into the landing zone.Hurriedly, the remaining survivors clambered onboard. Colonel Metcalf and Major Golden were thelast Americans on the ground at the Citadel. As thelast helicopter lifted off, a lone enemy rifleman en-tered the compound and fired several rapid shots atthe aircraft. The hazardous rescue mission had beencompleted with no time to spare.2°

VNMC Brigade 147 on Its Own

North Vietnamese Army PhotoAs the forward defenses crumbled the Communistsmoved in for the final assault. "Nguyen Thanh Binh,a valiant and resourceful scout" leads his small unitinto Quang Tri City in this North Vietnamese picture.Shown is the relatively small amount ofpersonal com-bat equzOment carried by the NVA infantryman.

tinued to function.* In spite of the urgency of the mo-ment, with flames leaping around the burning warmaterial, Golden answered the call in the precise niili-tary manner that professionals use in telephone con-versation. All at once it felt good to do somethingnormal. The feeling, however, did not last long, forthe voice on the other end, the naval gunfire officerat Hue, casually asked how everything was going upthere. Infuriated by the "social" call, Golden ripped.the telephone from the wall and hurled it into the fire.

At 1635, U.S. Air lbrce search and rescue helicoptersarrived to remove the 118 persons inside the Citadel.U.S. Army gunships escorted the helicopters and U.S.Marine and Air Ibrce fighters provided air cover. Thefirst helicopter landed and quickly loaded 40 people,

One item of equipment lost at this time was the naval gunfirebeacon, a transponder that allowed the naval gunfire ships to com-pute accurate firing data, especially important considering the lackof landmarks along the coast of MR 1.

To the south, Brigade 147 had been waiting for Giaiand his staff to arrive for the move to the My ChanhRiver. Major Joy had been talking with Colonel Met-calf earlier in the afternoon to coordinate the effort.After being unable to break through and join thebrigade, Metcalf radioed Joy that the linkup could notbe made and that the advisors with the brigade shouldresort to their own devices. In what had to be takenas a gesture, Metcalf reiterated that the Marine advi-sors, who included Majors Huff, Charles). Goode, andThomas F. Gnibus, and Captains Kruger and Mar-shall R. Wells, could rejoin him for the helicopter lift-our. MajorJoy declined the invitation, saying the ad-visors would remain with their units. The departingTeam 155 senior advisor replied, "Good luck." MajorJoy saw the "Jolly Green Giant" helicopters going intothe Citadel. He then realized that there was only ene-my to the north.

Brigade 147 proceeded east for approximately 2,000meters and then turned south. After making severaldifficult stream crossings, the column arrived at theHal Lang area, 10 kilometers south of Quang Th City.The enemy had engaged the fleeing ARVN forces justwest of the Hal Lang District headquarters, haltingall movement to the south. An NVA corporal with amortar unit reported, "The people were moving onbicycles, motorbikes, and buses. . . . No one was ableto escape."27 The NVA attack on this road, by artilleryand infantry weapons, earned Highway 1 the title"Highway of Horror" for the estimated 2,000 civilianand military dead left along a three-quarters-of-a-milestretch. "A solid wall of military and civilian rollingstock of every description, bumper-to-bumper andthree vehicles abreast;' remained on the mad. Personaleffects, individual equipment, and bodies were piledin the vehicles and lay strewn alongside, and to the

EXODUS FROM QUANG TIll 85

Government of Vietnam PhotoOnce again civilian and military refugees Jledfrom the lighting. These civilians, walkingalong National Highway I south of Quang Tn City near Hal lang, blockedthe road south.

east, where individuals had attempted to flee to One by one the M48 tanks of the 20th ARVN Tanksafety.2B Battalion were lost in the defense of Quang Tn

Colonel Bao, the Brigade 147 commander, after a Province. This one was destroyed by Communist an-long and heated discussion with his battalion corn- thank missiles on Highway 1, south of Quang Tn City.manders, decided to establith a tight perimeter for the Photo courtesy of lstSgt Jimmy D. Evans, USA (Ret)night and resume the march the next day. In thecourse of the conference it became dear that all unitsin the brigade were still well organized and combateffective. Ten M48s, however, had been lost in the vi-cinity of the Nhung River. kur were destroyed by ene-my recoilless rifle fire, while six had been lost tryingto ford rivers. Only six tanks remained of the 42 thathad arrived at Dong Ha on Easter Sunday. Major Huff,assisting the brigade operations officer, prepared thenight defensive fires and requested that a forward aircontroller, one of whom had been in contact with thecolumn since it had departed Quang Tn City, remainon station throughout the night. An AC-130 gunshipalso was made immediately available by I DASCshould any contact be made during the night. MajorJoy, on VNMC Brigade 369's tactical net, contactedMajor Robert F. Sheridan, that brigade's senior advi-sor. Major Sheridan had followed his fellow advisors'radio traffic closely in the days preceding the mass ex-odus. Sheridan gave Joy a thorough briefing on thesituation and the area into which VNMC Brigade 147was moving.



The Communists attempted to cut the withdrawalroute from Quang Vi City by fire and maneuverNortø Vietnamese forward observers calledartillery firein on civilian and military highway traffic to close thislink to the failing 3d ARVN Division and its units.

Major Sheridan had advised Colonel Chung to keepBrigade 369 moving, including his 105mm howitzers.The constant shifting of positions, never spending twonights on the same piece of terrain, served to keep theNVA artillery and infantry off balance. Captain Ge-orge Philip, with the artillery battalion, felt the brigadewas the "bull's eye" for the NVA artillery. "A favoritetarget was the VNMC 105mm batteries which werewoefully ourranged and usually easily observed" by theNVA from their elevated positions ro the west. TheMarine batteries had to displace four to five times aday to survive, saved by the "extremely slow" way inwhich the NVA observers tried to get a bracket Itwas still a helpless and frustrating experience. RecalledMajor Andrew D. DeBona, "We were continually onthe move, rarely staying over one day in the same spot:'He did note that the digging of new fighting posi-tions did not suffer, as "nothing enhances your abili-ty to dig like incoming."°

Without a battalion at IFSB Jane, the brigade hadbeen unsuccessful in its attempts to keep open theroad between Quang Tn and Hue, but it had inflict-ed exceptionally heavy losses on the enemy in close

combat.31 It was estimated that at least a reinforcedNVA regiment now held QL-1 at Hai Lang, but thata horde of intermingled civilian and ARVN stragglersprevented maneuver on the highway.

Brigade 369's efforts were now directed at keepingthe bridges over the 0 Khe and My Chanh open tothe withdrawing troops and civilians. With Quang TnCity lost, Colonel Pham Van Chung decided thatVNMC Brigade 369 would be hit by the NVA the nextday at first light. In planning for the defense of theo Khe and My Chanh River lines, recalled Sheridan,"He ordered antitank mines to be emplaced immedi-ately along Highway 1, that naval gunfire and artillerybe registered:' and that battalion blocking positionsbe established along the highway.32

At dawn on 2 May, VNMC Brigade 369's "wholeworld came apart" as it was subjected throughout itsarea to massive artillery fire. Major Sheridan stated that"we all just got deeper in our holes and called NGFon the suspected routes of advance." The brigade's twoforward battalions, advised by Major Donald L. Priceand MajorJames D. Beans, were hit by tanks and in-fantry and had to fight their way to the My ChanhRiver, a mile or so to the south, "destroying NVAtroops along the way?' At the My Chanh River, thebrigade dug in astride QL-1 to hold the bridges at MyChanh. As Sheridan watched, thousands of civilianrefugees, interspersed with troops, passed over thebridges?3 Major Price recalled that there was great con-cern that NVA armor would pursue VNMC Brigade147. This concern was focused on the large highwaybridge, adjacent to the long-destroyed railway bridge,across the My Chanh River.

Communist tanks attempting to pursue the ARVNsouth of the 0 Khe River bridge, were met by the 9thVNMC Battalion. The lead tank was hit by antitankrockets and the following vehicle piled in behind

Photo courtesy of lstSgt Jimmy D. Evans, USA (Ret)

Further to the north, early on the morning of 2 May,after an uneventful night, VNMC Brigade 147 pre-pared to move out as planned. At 0500, tank noiseswere reported to the west, near the 1st VNMC Battal-ion's area. Brigade headquarters placed the entireperimeter on 100-percent alert. By 0600, no tanks hadappeared from the west, but the 8th VNMC Battal-ion reported rank rumblings due south, in the direc-tion the brigade was planning to cross the 0 Khe River.At 0715, units began receiving small arms fire fromthe northwest, followed by a heavy volume of smallarms fire from the vicinity of Hai Lang to the east.The brigade and its remaining 20th ARVN Tank Bat-talion armor, with assorted ARVN and civilian strag-glers interspersed, was surrounded.

Simultaneously, enemy armor supported by infan-try and 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifle fire came fromthe north, west, and east. The ARYN tank and APCdrivers panicked and fled in their vehicles to avoid ene-my contact, breaking without returning a single shot.None of the remaining M48 tanks reached the MyChanh River; all were believed to have become casual-ties of the terrain. With the bolting of the armoredtask force, effective command and control of VNMCBrigade 147 evaporated as anxiety gave way to hysteria.

Majorsjoy and Huff jumped off the command APC

as it broke from the column. Joy yelled for the otheradvisors, riding on the following vehicle, to jump also.An American civilian evacuee, Jerry Dunn, a commu-nications technician from the provincial CORDS ad-visory team, joined the six Marines. Two U.S. Armyadvisors remained on the APC and were swallowed upin the dust and confusion. The Marine advisors, mov-ing at the end of the column, continued to call airstrikes on the Hal Lang area where the attack had origi-nated. It was soon apparent that the advisors werehopelessly separated from their counterparts, who hadremained on the APCs. While on the move, MajorJoytold Major Huff to contact the forward air controllerflying overhead and to request an emergency helicop-ter evacuation. The air controller acknowledged therequest and then reported that there were enemy tanksmoving toward the advisors from the east and south.It appeared that in less than 10 minutes the NVA tankswould be on top of them.

Ar 0945, the advisors heard a helicopter overhead.Major Huff gave it a bearing and, as the pilot starteda downward spiral, MajorJoy popped a smoke grenadeand stood up to guide the helicopter into the land-ing zone. The helicopter landed in a deluge of artillery,mortar, small arms, and recoilless rifle fire. The ins-tant before touchdown, the aircraft commander, Cap-



Incoming artillery and antitank rounds took a toll from those within armored vehicles.These ARVN crewmen drop inside theirpersonnelcarrierto escape from enemy fire. Theinterior of the vehicle is crowded with engineer material and personal possessions.


tam Stanley A. Dougherty, USA, shifted his approach90 degrees, thus turning the port side toward thesenior advisor, but denying the remaining membersof the group easy access to the hatch.

Under fite from all sides, the advisors scrambled bypanicked ARVN stragglers who were grabbing ontothe helicopter. The helicopter unexpectedly lifted offwith Major Huff astraddle one of the skids, holdingon to Captain Kruger with one hand and onto theaircraft with the other. At about 50 feet altitude, thepilot, seeing Kruger dangling below his aircraft, setback down in a hail of fire, permitting the two Ma-rines to board.

With rotors turning furiously, the pilot attemptedto take off once more. Finally, after kicking all butfour ARYN soldiers from the skids, the aircraft gainedsome altitude, only to go into a 45-degree plummettoward the earth. Ar tree-top level, the now-smokinghelicopter pulled out of the steep dive and picked upspeed. As they skimmed south over the My ChanhRiver, the Marines discovered that they had been res-cued by FRAC's Brigadier General Thomas W. Bowen,Jr., USA. Bowen, who had been flying in the area, hadordered his pilot to make the courageous rescue at-tempt. Six Marines, one civilian, and four ARVN sold-iers had literally been plucked from imminent captureor death.

Afrer a desperate march south, most of VNMCBrigade 147 eventually straggled into the lines ofVNMC Brigade 369. Once actoss the My Chanh River,VNMC Brigade 147 reassembled at the Hue Citadelto regroup once more.35 As the day ended, the floodof refugees across the bridges became a trickle and on-coming units were directed to cross along the coastto the east.

On orders from Colonel Chung, Major Price des-rrnvrr1 rhe Mv Chanh River Bridge. A squad of Ma-

rine engineers attempted to render the bridgeimpassable. With only a limited amount of explosives,they set off a charge under the center span, but suc-ceeded only in destroying a few wooden cross mem-bers and dislodging orhers. Realizing that this easilycould be repaired by the enemy, Major Price had theengineers siphon fuel from the tanks of their vehicles.Forming a "bucket brigade" with the engineers, us-ing their helmets to hold the fuel, they soaked thewooden road bed and supports in gasoline and dieselfuel. Major Price set the bridge on fire with signalflares. The smoke from the fire lasted for days as a bea-con along QL-1 for attack aircraft. CommentedSheridan, "although not as spectacular as our friendJohn Ripley's Dong Ha Bridge, it nevertheless had thesame result:' Chung's VNMC Brigade 369 held thekey terrain and he stated "No Communist will crossthe river and live." Prisoners captured that day con-fessed to being surprised by the resistance they met;they had been told the road to Hue City was open.*38

VNMC Brigade 369 had access to the vast array ofAmerican firepower from the air and at sea. That even-ing Sheridan tried to coordinate fire missions on thevisible NVA tanks and infantry north of the My ChanhRiver, and was frustrated by an air controller whowould nor clear air strikes because the FAC could norsee the targets. Chung did nor care, so long as the airsupport continued north of the river. As Sheridancalled Lieutenant Colonel Turley at the Marine divi-sion command post for help in resolving the impasse,he recalled, "I was knocked to the ground and bouncedaround for what seemed to be an eternity." Six B-52sdropped their bomb loads just on the other side ofthe river. When the concussions ended, a disheveledColonel Chung got our of his collapsed bunker andsaid with a smile, "That was very good. Do it again."37

*Marjne Division casualties through May were 764 killed, 1,595wounded, and 285 missing.

PART III

THE CEASEFIRE CAMPAIGN

CHAPTER 7

The Defense of Hue CityHolding the My Chanh Line — Fleet Marine Force Support —Truong Takes Charge

The Vietnamese Marine Division —The Marines Attack —The North Vietnamese ReactOperation Song Than 6-72—In the Balance

Holding the My Chanb LineSouth Vietnam reeled from the setbacks of the past

month. By 2 May 1972, the entire province of QuangTn, including Quang Tn City, had fallen to the NVA.Elsewhere in MR 1, the invaders threatened Hue byoccupying Fire Support Base Bastogne. The populaceof Hue was in a "near state of panic?" In MR 3, justnorthwest of Saigon, NVA tanks rolled into An leeand were held there only by bitter fighting on the partof South Vietnamese forces. The South Vietnameseand American governments had to react to a criticalsituation and, within less than a week after Nui BaHo had fallen, the Ameticans responded with a rapidbuild-up of air power within South Vietnam and withforces offshore. ARVN unit equipment losses werestaggering, but American trucks, tanks, howiraers, air-craft, and additional advisors began arriving at DaNang.2

Fleet Marine Force SupportIn response to General Creighton W. Abram's desire

for direct American support, CinCPac and the SeventhFleet deployed elements of III Marine AmphibiousForce (III MAF) into the combat area. Marine AircraftGroup (MAG) 15, with two fixed-wing squadrons,operated from Da Nang in defense of Hue. The 9thMarine Amphibious Brigade (MAB), as the landingforces component of the Seventh Fleer, had alsoresponded rapidly to the invasion. Elements of thefleet's amphibious forces were in the Gulf of Tonkin.'The initial rasks of the fleer's amphibious forces hadbeen to provide MACV security and emergency evacu-ation for U.S. forces should the need arise, By the timeMACV and the South Vietnamese recognized the ex-tent of the enemy invasion, the U.S. had four amphibi-ous ready groups off Vietnam, totaling 16 ships underthe command of Rear Admiral Walter D. Gaddis inthe USS Blue Ridge (ICC 19).

After the loss of Quang Tn City, ANGLICO's SubUnit One regrouped its shore fire control parties inMR 1 and established new arrangements for air ob-servation teams at Phu Bai, Da Nang, and Chu Lai.By now, liaison/spot reams were deployed in three ofthe South Vietnamese military regions. On 2 May,Lieutenant Colonel D'Wayne Gray, of ANGLICO, sent

90

a message to FMFPac requesting additional naval gun-fire officers, air observers, and enlisted communica-tors. Within 48 hours, more than 200 Marines hadreported to MACV Headquarters in Saigon. These spe-cially trained Marines were from FMFPac units inCalifornia, Okinawa, Hawaii, and Japan. LieutenantColonel Gray formed the incoming personnel intonaval gunfire spot teams and deployed them with theARVN Airborne and Marine Divisions. For Gray, thisresponse to a request for help was "heartwarming."

Lieutenant Colonel Gray had serious misgivings,however, about the handling of supporting arms dur-ing the previous month in MR 1 after receiving reportsand listening to the needs of the commanders of the1st ARVN Division and the Vietnamese Marine Divi-sion.* He informed Brigadier General William H.Lanagan, with MACVJ-3, that the defense of Hue re-quired "an effective commander for i Corps:' whocould command the respect of his division com-manders. Moreover, the Americans needed to replacethe South Vietnamese artillery and tank losses. Hestrongly argued that priority of American firepowermust be given to the defense of Hue. Gray believedthat effective targeting and coordination centers forrhe total fire support effort needed to be establishedand this "will require strong American action; theVietnamese do nor know how to do it?' This couldhappen only if General Abrarrss personally intervenedat once with the senior U.S. Army advisor and the AirForce commander. General Lanagan forwarded theseconcerns to the MACV chief of staff, stating that thecmx of the problem was obvious, "the almost totaldisconnect between the air war and the ground war

. The Ameticans had to get their houses in orderbefore they could hope to help the Vietnamese.**

*Gray had maintained a continuing relationship with the Viet-namese Marines from a previous advisory tour and from Vietnameseclassmares in Marine Corps Schools ar Quantiro, Virginia.

**Jn 1975 the Center for Naval Analyses studied this period, con-rluding that the presence nf moderately sophisticated anriairrrafrweapons hampered U.S. abilities to provide close and direct air sup-port, adverse weather during April 1972 severely degraded what closeair support was available, naval gunfire played a viral role in com-pensating for air support, and trained and experienced fire sup-port personnel were essential to coordinate these supporting arms.(CNA, Hur&QuangTri, pp. 1-2.)

THE DEFENSE OF HUE CITY 91

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Taking command during the battle was LtGen NgoQuang Truong, shown here in front of the I Corps for-ward headq uarters at Hue, He wears the ARVN uni-form with both Vietnamese and American seniorparachute insignia from tours with airborne forces.

Truong Takes Charge

Abrupt changes in the MR 1 and FRAC commandstructures strengthened the organizational unity of theSouth Vietnamese forces. On 4 May, the South Viet-namese Joint General Staff replaced General Lam withLieutenant Genetal Ngo Quang Truong. Truongmoved his main command post to the Hue Citadel,a move that reflected a change in purpose and focusfor operations in MR His immediate task was tostabilize his forces and to make effective use of availa-ble American suppott through FRAC. Major GeneralFrederickJ. Kroesen, the FRAC commander, recalledthat General Truong's first actions and concerns were"consolidation of the defense of Hue:' He had to re-store the ARVN command structure and organize areliable logistics system for his front-line units.Truong's available forces included the Marine andARYN Airborne divisions responsible for the north-ern and northwestern areas of Thua Thien Province,the 1st ARVN Division south and southwest of Hue

*Previously. General Lam operated from both Hue and Da Nang.

City, and the 2d ARYN Division in MR l's southernprovinces.

On the same date, command changes also affectedthe Vietnamese Marine Corps. While visiting Marinedivision headquarters at Hue, President Nguyen VanThieu announced that the Marine Commandant,Lieutenant General La Nguyen Khang, had beenpromoted to Chairman of the Joint General Staff forOperations. The President named General Khang'sdeputy, Colonel Bui The Lan, as interim VNMC Com-mandant. Thieu's order of the day was that the MyChanh Line would hold; there would be no furtherwithdrawals7

The Vietnamese Marine Divisionftr the first time since the Spring Offensive had be-

gun, the VNMC Division had its own tactical area ofresponsibiliry.** Its battle line extended from the Gulfof Tonkin, westward across QL-1, and on into thefoothills of the Annamite Cordillera. The division for-ward command post moved from Hue City to the vil-lage of Huong Dien near the coast north of Hue.Colonel Joshua Dorsey's Marine Advisory Unit founditself fully committed to field operations with theVNMC Division, establishing a combat operationscenter, a fire support coordination center, and a com-munications center in the village school house. ColonelDorsey abolished the battalion advisory billets and in-creased the brigade advisory teams to six officers, in-cluding a fire support coordinator. Frequent taskorganizing of the brigade teams still provided advi-sors to the battalions when required.

In order to support the division, elements of theAmphibious Support Battalion were deployed to MR Ifrom Saigon to operate with the ARVN 1st Area Logis-tics Command at Hue with the rear headquarters ofthe Marine division. To control the infusion of Ameri-can supporting arms, the division needed critical sup-port in the form of communications equipment,operators, and fire-support coordination personneldrawn from ANGLICO, 1st Radio Battalion, the AirForce's 20th Tactical Air Support Squadron (TASS),and the Army's 14th Signal Company?

As the NVA offensive halted at the My Chanh River,

**The creation of a division-sized forte of Vietnamese Marineswas the advisory unit's maior goal for a number of years. Designat-ed a division in 1968, the personnel strength was not attained un-til September 1970, and specialized support and service units werestill lacking in 1971. In March 1971 during Lam Son 719 a divisioncommand post deployed to control VNMC brigades involved in theincursion into Laos with mixed results. By 1972 the desire to fieldthe VNMC Division as a unic was high on the list of advisor priorities.


Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A8OO66

The Marine leadership/or the defense of Hue included from left, BGen Edward]. Millerof the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade; Co/Joshua Dorsey, Senior Marine Advisor, andBGen Bui The Lan, commanding the Vietnamese Marine Corps. Gen Ian's use of thenametape 'Laan" was as an aid/or pronounciation for the benefit of the Americans.

The deployment and conduct o/ operations by the entire Marine Division required com-mand and controlfacilities near the front lines. The location of the division forward corn-mand post was the small coastal village ofHuong Dien within the local school building.The building housed the combat operations and fire support coordination centers.



everything to the north was declared a free-fire zone.The 1st Regional Assistance Command believed thatthe Communist forces were capable of launching a newoffensive in Thua Thien Province. The 304th, 308thand 324B NVA Divisions, the 202d and 203d NVAArmored Regiments, and supporting units were allavailable to rhe enemy. The NVA also could holdQuang Tn Province with two divisions, supported byartillery and armor.'0 From 5 to 25 May, the NVAprobed the river-edge defenses. Losses sustained inprevious weeks did not permit full-scale offensive ac-tions, but the enemy's intentions were clear. Hue wasthe target and a major assault of the My Chanh Linewas imminent.

On 5 May, VNMC Brigade 25ff displaced its head-quarters north from Hue to Phong Dien on QL-1 torelieve the headquarters of VNMC Brigade 369. It wasa shift of headquarters only, as the respective barral-ions remained in place and the 39th ARVN RangerBattalion assumed control of Camp Evans. Brigadecommander Lieutenant Colonel Ngo Van Dinh con-centrated his 2d VNMC Battalion at the junction ofQL-1 and the My Chanh River in order to prevent anyreconstruction of the bridge by the enemy. Dinh heav-ily reinforced his western flank as he anticipated theall-out attack on Hue to originate in the nearbyfoothills. The area to the west, due to thick canopyand rolling hills, was well concealed from aerial ob-servation. The Marines of Brigade 258 were thinlyspread over a large area, but Dinh was confident. Hekept his units moving, effectively employing the prin-ciple of economy of force by concentrating his forcesonly as enemy threats developed. Static defensive po-sitions did not suit him; he was anxious to push north.He told his advisors, "give me 20 tanks and a diver-sionary attack from the east, and we will be in QuangTn City in two days:"'

VNMC Brigade 369 assumed operational control ofthe eastern half of the division's area of the My ChanhLine, including the Regional and Popular Force unitsresponsible for the area near the coast. This drastical-ly reduced VNMC Brigade 369's area of responsibilityand the My Chanh Line was stronger than ever.Colonel Pham Van Chung, who commanded Brigade369 during the withdrawal of South Vietnamese forcesfrom Quang Tn City and to the My Chanh River, be-came division chief of staff (forward). LieutenantColonel Nguyen The Luong then assumed commandof the brigade.

VNMC Brigade 147 remained at Hue with the 4thand 8th VNMC Battalions, replacing personnel and

Photo courtesy of Capt Edwin 'OP. Besrh, USMC (Ret)

Superior Communist artillery equtjt'ment continuedto provide the North Vietnamese their main long-range weapon. Its concentrated fire proved devastat-ing to the ability of the South Vietnamese to fightin MR I from positions designed to withstand rocketandmortar attacks only. This 122mm gun is a ChineseType 60, used along with Soviet D74 artillery pieces.

making up supply losses directly from U.S. MarineCorps stocks. Lieutenant Colonel Turley assistedColonel Dorsey in these resupply efforts. New anti-tank weapons arrived to augment the Vietnamese Ma-rine capabilities to defeat armor on the ground.'2

North Vietnamese 130mm guns, however, con-tinued to trouble the Marine defenders along the MyChanh River. The ARVN 175mm guns, which out-ranged the enemy artillery, were back in action. Thereorganized Marine division fire support coordinationcenter (FSCC) at Hue made every effort to providelucrative enemy targets for the 175s. NVA heavy ar-tillery was well deployed, making it difficult for theair observers to get a fix on firing positions. Due tothe SA-7 antiaircrafr threat, airborne forward air con-trollers, forced to fly above 9,500 feet, could nor readilyspot enemy gun flashes. The enemy guns had no morethan two platoons (two to four guns) in any one posi-tion. These were spread all over the northwest portionof Quang Tn Province. As FACs flew over suspectedenemy gun positions, the guns obviously would ceasefiring and another platoon would open up from adifferent sector, linked by an efficient communicationsnetwork.'3

The Marines Attack

Using his Marine and airborne units in MR 1,General Truong conducted a series of limited objec-tive attacks and raids, These were a combination ofheliborne and amphibious assaults together with

ground attacks that provided the South Vietnamesetime to prepare for their counteroffensive and succeed-ed in keeping the NVA off balance. The South Viet-namese gave the code name Song Than (Tidal Wave)to these operacions.'

With two usable bridges and available air, navalgunfire, and artillery support under his control,Colonel Lan began planning for operations within hisarea. Colonel Dorsey suggested a heliborne assault intothe Hai Lang District. The commanding general ofMR 1, General Truong, fully concurred with the Ma-rine recommendation and asked General Abrams forSeventh Fleet support from the 9th MAB. Under theguidance of their commander, the Vietnamese Marinesbegan planning a helicopter raid. Within 72 hours offinal approval, the raid, named Song Than 5-72, wasunderway.

During darkness on 12 May, the first Marines to gonorth since the N\TA invasion clandestinely crossed theMy Chanh River. Captain Luc of Brigade 369's recon-naissance company, First Lieutenant Thu Xuan, the

communications officer of the 9th VNMC Battalion,and a small group of other Marines swam the river toestablish a communications site to assist command andcontrol of the operation the next morning.15

In the first instance of direct support from the 9thMAB, CH-46s and CH-53s from HMM-164 lifted 1,138Vietnamese Marines into attack positions. To move thetwo battalions, 60 Vietnamese Marines were carriedby each U.S. Marine CH-53 and 20 by each CH-46in two sequential waves. Lieutenant Colonel EdwardC. "Ed" Hertberg of HMM-164 planned to provide themaximum possible lift capability in each wave and toreduce possible losses. Operations officer MajorDonald C. Brodie explained that the "helicopter as-sault routes were flown at 'nap-of-the-earth' height:'contrary to then-current practice. The CH-46s were tobe 30 to 40 feet off the deck (above ground) and theCH-53s only slightly higher.16 A single wave of helicop-ters was used for each of two landing zones, reducingthe exposure time to NVA antiaircraft fire.

Major Frank S. Bells' maintenance crews on the USS



US. Marine direct support arrivedfrom the 9th MAB for the defense of Hue. Here Vie:-namese Marines boarda Boeing CH-46 Sea Knzght from HMM-164 for the first of a numberof helicopter assaults behind enemy lines flown by the Americans in the spring of 1972.


Okinawa (LPH 3) made the aircraft ready for launchand began their long wait for recovery. The firsthelicopter launch from the offshore amphibious readygroup went at 0800, 13 May, and within 40 minutesall helicopters were in the air and enroure to Fire Sup-port Base Sally to load rhe 3d and 8th VNMC Battal-ions, the assault force from Lieutenant Colonel thong's369th Brigade.

Six AH-lGs, two OH-6As, and a UH-1 of the Ar-my's Troop F, 4th Cavalry (Air Cavalry) flying fromHue/Phu Bai provided armed escort. Brodie com-mented that the transport helicopters were free to em-ploy whatever evasive maneuvers they felt the terrainand enemy threat presented: "Troop F would adjusttheir flight paths as necessary to avoid us and attackthe targets or areas of potential threat. With our 'jinx-ing' flight and their escort service, I always thoughtit looked like snakes crawling through a kettle ofspaghetti."

The two landing zones received devastating firefrom the air and sea. As a result, touchdown in Land-ing Zone Tango ocurred at 0930 without oppositionin a cloud of dust and smoke. The Marine helicoptersreturned to the ships for fuel then flew back to FireSupport Base Sally for the second wave at 1055. Asthe lead aircraft touched down in Landing Zone Del-ta at 1136, Major David J. Moore, the squadron ex-ecutive officer, radioed the "12 is hot from here onin" as moderate small-arms fire was received. Immedi-ately, the Army commander of the escorting gunshipsshifted the landing to the southern portion of the

zone. "Troop wave continue was the order passedto the flight.18 The enemy hit three CH-46s and Ma-rine airmen left one CH-53 in the zone with adamaged tail rotor. The crew of the downed Sea Stal-lion returned to the ship with the other helicopters,having had to destroy the aircraft to prevent its cap-ture. Colonel Sumner A. Vale, the 9th MAB chief ofstaff, recalled "We received the report that one wasdown due to mechanical problems and it was knownwhat the problem was . . . . The squadron wantedto go in to repair it or lift it out?' General Miller de-nied the request because of the tactical situation.'°

During the day's fighting, U.S. Marine helicoptersflew 18 wounded Vietnamese Marines to Hue and alsodelivered supplies from FSB Evans. The 9th MAB'snaval gunfire spot element of Detachment Bravo,HML-367, flew support for the landing from the USSDenver. By 1250, the assault was complete and the9th MAB Marines were back on ship. One brigadehelicopter was lost, another crashed at sea, and a sin-gle squadron Marine was wounded by enemy fire.20

Once on the ground, the two VNMC battalionsswept south and attacked toward the My Chanh River.Shortly thereafter, the 9th VNMC Battalion crossedthe My Chanh and attacked north toward its two sis-ter battalions. The 66th NVA Regiment was caughtcompletely by surprise. Captain Richard W. Hodory,assistant battalion advisor to the 3d VNMC Battalion,landed with one of the assault companies. As the Ma-rines debarked from their helicopter the enemyreleased heavy automatic weapons fire. Captain

Armed helicopter escort was provided by US. Army air cavalry units operating from DaNàng and Hue-Phu BaL This is a Bell AH-1 Cobra gunshib flying over the flat, sandy,coastal plain in support of operations with the American and Vietnamese Marines.

Marine Corps Historics Collection

Hodory moved with the Matines as they assaultedacross 400 meters of open rice paddies toward an en-trenched enemy. This aggressive action drove the NVAfrom their positions, but as the Marines consolidat-ed, heavy enemy mortar, automatic weapons, andsmall arms fire began raking the area. Captain Hodoryimmediately called for and controlled supporting ar-tillery fire. In the face of this fire the enemy brokeas the Marines counterattacked. Hodory then calledfor air strikes and naval gunfire, inflicting severe casual-ties on the withdrawing forces, and earning himselfa Bronze Star Medal.21 As the battalion then marchedsouth to link up with the 9th VNMC Battalion, it un-covered large quantities of combat equipment andfreed mote than 150 civilians who had been detainedby the enemy.

Although the operation lasted only one day, SongThan 5-72 worked. The Marines owed much of thissuccess to the element of surprise and to the heavyfire support. Elements of the division FSCC had dis-placed to the brigade command post at Phong Diento support the attack. The U.S. Air Fbrce representa-tive directed tactical air support from the main divi-

sion FSCC. Major Golden, MR 1 naval gunfire officer,flying over the battle area, and three ANGLICO spotteams moving with the ground elements, controllednaval gunfire and ARVN artillery. The joint effortsresulted in reports of 240 NVA soldiers killed, threeenemy tanks destroyed, and two 130mm guns put ourof action.

The North Vietnamese ReactStunned by this attack at the rear, the NVA quick-

ly rallied and, on 21 May, mounted a full-scale armorand infantry attack on the My Chanh Line. Contraryto what Colonel tan and his staff had expected, theNVA attacked due south down the coastal highway,Route 555, moved across the My Chanh River, andpenetrated Brigade 369's defensive area. The Region-al Force troops fell back, exposing the flanks of the3d and 9th VNMC Battalions. Vulnerable to the over-whelming armor threat, both battalions withdrew. Af-ter an all-day fight, however, the two battalions,assisted by close air strikes and ARVN armored caval-ry, began pushing the enemy back towards the MyChanh River. The Marines had suffered heavy casual-ries, but by nightfall, had restored the line. The ene-


Department of Defensc Photo (USMC) A800663

Other American support arrived in the form of new weapons to counter the armor threat.Here a Vietnamese Marine commander and American advisor supervise the installationof the TOW wire-guided antitank missile launcher Though effective to 3,000 meters,the system was considered too heavy to be manpacked by the individual Vietnamese.

98 THE WAR THAT WOUTJ) NOT END

my remained determined to gain a foothold on thesouth bank of the river.

At 0100, 22 May, the NVA launched a tank-infantryattack against the 3d VNMC Battalion. They had theinitiative and could "smell blood:' one American ad-visor reported.22 The numerically superior force, sup-ported by 25 tanks, overran the forward battalion, butnot before the Marines had destroyed eight tanks withM72 LAWs and direct fire from 105mm howitzers.Continuing their attack through the early morningdarkness, the enemy penetrated deeply into friendlyterritory, hitting VNMC Brigade 369's command postat first light. Inside the command bunker was MajorRobert D. Shoptaw, an advisor with the division staff,who recalled Major Regan R. Wright, the brigade ar-tillery advisor, "getting a crash course on how to firethe LAW from a young Vietnamese Marine:' Thebrigade advisor, Major Robert F. Sheridan, directedMajor Donald L. Price to see if the newly arrived an-titank weapons could be used. A U.S. Army sergeantfired the TOW (tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided) missile system from atop the command andcontrol center bunker. Vietnamese Marines cheered asa Pt76 burst into flames and then as a second mis-sile demolished a heavy machine gun nest. This ac-tion marked the first time the ground TOW systemhad been fired in combat.*SS Five enemy armored ve-hicles came within 400 meters of the command postbefore being destroyed. By 0930, a total of 10 ranksand armored personnel carriers had been destroyed.As the 8th VNMC Battalion counterattacked, the ene-my fled the battlefield, leaving their dead and wound-ed. The NVA had paid a heavy price and gainednothing; the My Chanh line was intact.24

Operation Song Than 6-72The VNMC's next offensive action, a spoiling at-

tack, took place using the 4th, 6th, and 7th Battal-ions of VNMC Brigade 147. This time, the Marinesused both surface and vertical assaults. From planningto execution, the amphibious assault took less then36 hours. On 23 May, the 7th VNMC Battalion andits advisors moved by truck to the Tan My naval basewhere it boarded landing craft for the short trip tothe ships of the U.S. amphibious force—the Schenec-tady (1ST 1185), Manitowoc (1ST 1180), and Cayuga(1ST 1186), and the Duluth (LPD 6).

*G.4 advisor Major Robert D. Shopraw, noted, "Since the lOWwas large and the Vietnamese were small, they didne favor ir. Thiswas the same attitude they harbored about carrying 81mm mor-tars. Despite the field advisors pleas efforts were made toobtain vehicle-mounted systems.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A 800643

South Vietnamese load an American landing craftmechanized (1CM) at Tan My naval base northeast ofHue. These "Mike" boats took them to the amp hibi-ous ships of the Seventh Pie et for surface assaults onthe Communist flank. The boats were manned bysailors and Marines of the amphibious forces.

The VNMC 0-3 operations officer, LieutenantColonel Do Ky, and a small division staff went onboard the Blue Ridge with Colonel Lan to coordinatethe assault. The amphibious assault, known as Oper-ation Song Than 6-72, was conducted with VNMCBrigade 147 Headquarters serving as landing forceheadquarters. Detailed planning and close coordina-tion were required with Brigadier General Edwardj.Miller and his 9th MAE, the U.S. Navy amphibiousships of ARGs Bravo and Charlie, the American B-52Arc Light strikes, and the largest assembly of navalgunfire support ships in the Vietnam War. Early onthe next morning, the VNMC Division's combinedsurface-helicopter assault took place at WunderBeach—the former "Street Without Joy" area, a fewmiles southeast of Quang Tn City.

On the Cayuga and the Duluth the Vietnamese Ma-rines were assigned to boat teams and lined up on deckin order. The Vietnamese Marines stayed in place un-til called away to load the amphibian tractors. Finalcoordination and briefings were completed by theVietnamese and American assault units. Major Walter


E. Boomer, with the 7th, recalled that the most of theVietnamese Marines had never made an amphibiouslanding before, and spent the night on the open flightdecks of the landing ships.

As the Vietnamese stretched out along the deck andate their evening meal, curious U.S. Marines came overand struck up conversations in halting phrases. Someadvisors, Vietnamese Marines, and American Marinesof the landing force had served together previously.As old acquaintances were renewed, the Vietnameseinvited the Americans to come along with them forthe assault: "Together they would kill many Com-munists! Sat Cong!" Ritual landing preparations con-tinued throughout the amphibious task force,undertaken with the routine of an exercise, creatinga feeling of life imitating art for those not actively in-

volved in the landing. Yet previous enemy artillery hitson naval gunfire ships and resistance to the firsthelicopter landing showed the Communists could andwould inflict damage offshore.

The landing began the next morning, 24 May, withartillery, air, and naval gunfire strikes on Red Beachand Landing Zone Columbus. Lifting off the Okina-wa at 0750, the helicopters of HMM-164 headedtowards Tan My to pick up the VNMC assault troops.Elements of the 4th and 6th VNMC Battalions metLieutenant Colonel Herrberg's aircraft on a highwaywhich served as the pick-up zone. Loading some 550Vietnamese Marines, the helicopters took off for theirobjective.

The LSTs launched 20 amphibian tractors, with Ma-rine crews and VNMC assault troops, from a release

A landing craft approaches the open stern ofan amphibious transport dock (LPD) whereSouth Vietnamese forces will embark for the IT/under Beach landing. The well deck canaccommodate a number and vanety of landing craft and allows the transfer of groundcombat forces without the more time-consuming and dangerous use of nets andladders,


100 THE WAR THAT WOULD NCff END

point 3,600 yards off Wunder Beach. Watching fromthe Cayuga was company First Sergeant Robert S. Yna-cay, who commented "It was a beautiful day for a land-ing, nice and clear The LVTs formed into twowaves, the first consisting of First Lieutenant John T.Paparone's LVT Platoon, BLT 1/4, and the second byFirst lieutenant Robert L. Williams' IVT Platoon, BLT1/9. As the "Amrracs" closed within 2,000 yards of RedBeach a final B-52 Arc Light placed a string of bombsdown the length of the beach, raising a curtain of fireand sand. The tractors hit the beach at 0832 and weremet by scattered NVA infantry and artillery fire. Lieu-tenant Williams commented:

We approached the beach as the first mortar rounds wentoff. As soon as they hit, a Vietnamese Marine tried to crawlup my leg and out the hatrh. We beached, dropped thetamp, and literally threw Marines out the hatrh.

As the Vietnamese Marines consolidated and movedoff the beach behind continuing air support and navalgunfire, the U.S. Marines turned their amphibian trac-tors into the water and returned to the ships. It wasthe first combat experience for nine of every 10 Ameri-cans involved.* While launching the surface assault,the Duluth and the Cayuga were fired upon by a NVAartillery battery. The destroyer USS Hanson (DD 832)immediately joined the other gunfire support shipsin returning fire and silenced the NVA batrery.26 Onthe Duluth, BLT 3/4's Lieutenant Colonel William R.Von Harten remembered that the ship "made blacksmoke and we got the hell our of shore fire range22°

Initial reports from the landing force indicated thatthe 7th VNMC Battalion had secured its immediateobjectives, killing at least 50 Communist troops in theprocess. As they quickly moved over the sand dunesto the south, the Marines encountered only tokenresistance from the surprised enemy. Later field mes-sages reported large amounts of enemy weapons, am-munition, and food caches captured.

At 0940, 18 CH-46 and CH-53 helicopters fromHMM-i64 lifted elements of the 4th and 6th VNMCBattalions into Landing Zone Columbus near QuangTn City at the road junction of Routes 555 and 602.Artillery smoke was laid west of LZ Columbus to screenthe helicopter movement from enemy artillery fire andthe Army air-cavalry division gunships marked thezone with suppressive fires, No enemy fire was encoun-tered by the Marine helicopters as the Vietnamese Ma-

*A combat rargo officer had initially refused to issue contingen-cy ammunition (L Form) to the ' mttackers" until overruled by theBLT t/9 commander of troops on the ship, Captain Dennis It. Ken-dig, whn cited the authority of "common sense.' (Kendig Comments)


While the amphibious assault was underway, otherVietnamese forces were carried into the attack byHMM-164. LtColJames A. Poland, a division staff ad-visor, uses hand signals to guide CH-46s to the high-way landing zone establishedto pick up the Marines.

tines unloaded. Soon after landing, however, bothbattalions made heavy contact with elements of the78th NYu Regiment, 325th NWi Division.** Two ene-my soldiers captured by the Marines stated that theirregiment had just arrived in the area in preparationfor an attack on the My Chanh Line.

All the battalions of Brigade 147 returned to theMy Chanh position, terminating the second offensiveaction by the VNMC. For the second time in 11 days,Vietnamese Marines supported by the 9th MAB andTask Force 76 effectively countered the Communistthreat to Hue. In addition to the two prisoners of war,369 enemy were believed killed, three tanks were des-troyed, and more than 1,000 civilians were freed fromCommunist control.a0

While VNMC Brigade 147 was engaged on thecoast, the NVA executed an attack of its own.3' Oneday after the landing, at 0530, 25 May, a numericallysuperior NVA tank-infantry force hit Brigade 258 inthe western portion of the VNMC division's large areaof responsibility. The regimental-size enemy forcemade a stubborn attempt to break the My Chanh Line.

**325tb NV4 Division,' ist.h Infantry Regiment; 95th InfantryRegiment; and JOist infantry Regiment.

Although enemy armor was employed in unprecedent-ed numbers, the NVA committed its infantry prema-rurely, exposing it to heavy supporting arms fire. Waterfrom the many small tributaries of the My Chanh Riverbecame undrinkable due to the hundreds of enemydead polluting these streams. The countryside was lit-tered with burned-out hulks of enemy vehicles.

One of the biggest advantages the Vietnamese Ma-rines enjoyed during their defense of the My ChanhRiver was the combat information provided by air ob-servers and forward air controllers. "They were face-less, but every advisor knew them intimately by theircallsigns' later wrote Major Sheridan, who had beenwith VNMC Brigade 369, "They were our link withthe outside world?' Captain George Philip, also with369, recalled "The observers were on station 24 hoursa day and Spectres [AC-130s] were up every night."32

One Marine advisor, Captain Allen D. Nettlein-gham with VNMC Brigade 258, said the USAF FACsdid an outstanding job in spite of the restrictionsplaced upon them:

- no way we can praise them enough. In fact we wereextremely fortunate in that most of the FACs who came upto fly for us just happened to have 'faulty' altimeters andthat helped us considerably. The FACs, flying much lowerthan the prescribed ceiling, would trace tank tracks rightinto the hoorches with the tanks sitting inside. They wouldthen call in an airstrike and blow the tanks asny. Other FACsflying at night picked up a couple of convoys just north ofthe bridge and called in an 'artillery raid'—a massive TtY—and destroyed the rrurks.*35

As air observers and FACs uncovered road and trailnetworks or spotted troop movements and vehicles,

*'1VJT time-on-target, is a procedure by which artillery fire fromseveral different locations is directed at a single target and sched-uled to arrive at the same time.



With the troops loaded, the helicopters launched to fly north. In the foreground is agroup of civilians from nearby villages. The presence of noncombatants in the battle areawas a continuing concern for commanders for humanitarian and military reasons.


Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A800746An LVTP-5 launchesfrom the well deck of an under-way LPD with a platoon of South Vietnamese Marineson board The vehicle's only armament is a .30-caliberBrowning machine gun mounted in the turret overthe bow ramp. This photo shows the normal depthat which the amphibian tractor rode in the water

they would report them to the Marine defenders alongthe My Chanh. As trails, supply points, and troopsightings were plotted and connected, a pattern soondeveloped showing lines of communication mainlyfrom the Ba Long Valley toward Camp Evans. Withthe arrival of the 325th NVA Division in Quang InProvince, the Communists had three divisions withwhich to attack the My Chanh Line.

Early on the morning of 26 May, a reinforced NVAbattalion launched a savage attack against Brigade258's western flank. Captain Robert K. Redlin, an ar-tillery officer who had been assigned on an emergen-cy basis as an infantry advisor, was present as oneelement of the enemy force made the 9th VNMC Bat-talion pull back more than 1,000 meters to consoli-date. Redlin directed heavy air strikes and navalgunfire on the enemy, who finally broke contact, leav-ing their dead where they had fallen. The 1st VNMCBattalion, with Captain Lawrence H. Livingston, alsowas heavily hit by the enemy's fierce attack. Two NVAbattalions from the Seth NVA Regiment, supportedby tanks, mortars, recoilless rifles, and artillery fire,threatened to overrun the 1st VNMC Battalion's posi-tion. Livingston quickly called air strikes on the ene-

The surface assault for Song Than 6-72 moves towards II7under Beach. The amphibiantractors (LVT.F) are in two parallel platoon columns as they cross behind the USS Duluth.

Department of Defense Photo (USN) 111901

my, inflicting many casualties. Again the SouthVietnamese had stopped the enemy drive to Hue. Asthe NVA withdrew from the VNMC Brigade 258 area,they left mote than 200 corpses on the battlefield.

May had been a bad month for the NVA along theMy Chanh River. It had suffered mote than 2,900 sold-iers killed, 1,080 weapons captured, and 64 armoredvehicles destroyed or captured. The Communists hadfailed to capture Hue; The My Chanh Line had heldand it was a good month for the Vietnamese Marines.On 28 May, on the Emperor's Walkway in front of theImperial Palace at Hue, President Thieu personallypromoted Colonel Lan to brigadier general. Duringthe month more than 15,000 Vietnamese Marines hadjoined the defenders of MR 1 and practically everyable-bodied Marine was now in the northern provinces.

In the Balance

The first part of June 1972 was characterized bylimited South Vietnamese offensive thrusts northacross the My Chanh Rivet, but by the end of themonth a major effort had been launched to recaptureQuang Tn City. Major General Howard H. Cooksey,USA, replaced General Kroesen as the senior Ameri-can in MR 1, and as such, he continued the Americansupport to General Truong in the defense of Hue andthe counteroffensive to regain Quang Th Province, This

month also witnessed the departure of GeneralCreighton W. Abtams and his replacement by GeneralFrederick C. Weyand, USA, as MACV commander.

With its maneuver battalions up to combat strengthand fire support agencies consolidated in the VNMCDivision's FSCC, the Vietnamese Marines took the in-itiative on 8 June and launched a spoiling attacknamed Song Than 8-72. All three VNMC brigadeswere committed in a four-battalion attack across theriver. The Marines moved forward under the cover ofa closely coordinated and well-executed fire supportplan which included B-52 strikes, tactical air, artillery,and naval gunfire. The American-established FSCCat division headquarters permitted supporting armsto be fired in concert, a technique heretofore fraughtwith problems of execution. According to LieutenantColonel Duncan M. Jones, the division artillery advi-sor who had helped set up the fire support coordina-tion center, "there were still many problems, but nonethat could not be overcome."

As the battalions crossed the My Chanh River, theheaviest resistance was encountered along the coastalareas, particularly along Route 555, known to theAmericans as the "Triple Nickel:' The enemy was wellentrenched, hut ftiendly.casualties were comparativelylight with nine men killed in action. The NVA took


Department of Defense Photo (USN) IJ.51899

The heavy cruiser USS Newport News shelled the beach in the landing was completedand the LVT platoons returned to the amphibious group. In the background is the flatcoastal plain which made reference points for naval gunfire hard to locate from the sea.


a heavy beating, with the successful Marine operationaccounting for 230 enemy killed, seven tanks des-troyed, and 102 weapons, including several SA-7surface-to-air missiles, captured or destroyed. At theconclusion of the operation the Matines wete northof the My Chanh River, once again in Quang TnProvince, and anxious to continue north.5°

In order to consolidate the Marines' captured terri-tory, ARVN engineers built pontoon bridges across theMy Chanh River to give tanks, artillery, and trucks ac-cess to Quang Tn Province. Plans were already beingmade to send the Marine brigades back into the offen-sive. Such plans culminated in Song Than 8A-72. Thisoperation was another spoiling attack which began onis June. Once again all three VNMC brigades wereinvolved. Marine Brigade 147 struck north along Route555, into the notorious "Street Without Joy" coastalarea. VNMC Brigade 369 held the center position asit attacked across open rice paddies, flanked to the westby VNMC Brigade 258, moving along QL-1. The NVAforces were defending in depth along QL-1 and Route

555, reinforced by armor, artillery, and antiaircraftunits. Stream and canal networks between the tworoads were interlaced with trenches and fortified po-sitions. Further to the west lay rolling hills and theenemy's 130mm guns.

As the 6th VNMC Battalion with VNMC Brigade147 moved north along Route 555, it was met by anenemy counterattack. During darkness on 20 June, areinforced enemy infantry battalion supported byranks and artillery hit the 6th Battalion's defensive po-sitions. The NVA tanks were not coordinated with theinfantry maneuver and VNMC artillery quicklyresponded to each tank sighting with massed fire.Despite the heavy artillery fire, at least 40 NVA soldi-ers were able to break through the 6th Battalion'sperimeter and attack the battalion command post,fragmenting the command group.

MajorJames M. Tully and the attached ANGLICOnaval gunfire spot team became separated from theVietnamese Marines. I.ocaring the battalion com-mander, Tully, with the aid of the spot team, assisted

Touchdown in landing Zone Columbus was in the sandy coastal stri 7,, the "Street WithoutJoy" of the French Indochina l*r This photograph is taken from a departing helicopteras the South Vietnamese Marines begin to move out from their dangerously concentrat-ed landing formation which makes them vulnerable to enemy artillery or mortar fire.

Marine Corps Hisroriral Collecrion


in calling for supporting fires. For the next eighthours the battle raged. Both tactical aircraft and navalgunfire supported the battalion as Lieutenant ColonelDo Huu Tung rallied his battered Marines for a tankand infantry counterattack. Backed by B-52 strikes andother supporting arms, the 6th VNMC Battalionpushed the enemy from the penetrated posicion.'' Theenemy responded with heavy artillery and mortar firethroughout the entire zone of action. While the 6th\TNMC Battalion was fighting for its life, the 1st and5th VNMC Battalions also repulsed large armoredcounterattacks.

By 27 June, the VNMC had successfully establisheda new defensive line four kilometers north of the MyChanh River. The operation had netted 761 enemykilled, eight tanks destroyed, and freed hundreds ofcaptive villagers.° The liberated Vietnamese from a

Major Tully was instrumental in helping organize the effort torepulse the enemy and later was awarded the Silver Star Medal.

hamlet in Hai Lang District described their life un-der the Communists as being full of terror and forcedlabor. More than two-thirds of the population had fledsouth in the face of the Communist invasion; thosewho had stayed behind in hope of harvesting someof their rice crop found life misetable. According toone of the escapees, a young farmer named Le Thi,the NVA told the villagers that those who had fledto Hue with the ARYN forces would starve and thatif any of those who had remained tried to escape theywould be shot. Another said that the invaders forcedthe people to carry supplies, harvest rice, dig weaponscaches, and build field fortifications. The attacks bythe South Vietnamese Matines had made escape fromNVA occupation possible for more than 2,000 peo-ple. The villagers were sent south to the My ChanhRiver where boats picked them up at the river's edgeand took them to Hue. Trucks eventually transportedthem from Hue to Da Nang refugee camps.4°

CHAPTER 8

Quang Tn City RegainedTruong's Counteroffensive —The Battle for Quang Tn City —Taking the Citadel—The Final Assault

Truong it CounteroffensiveWith a firm hold on the southern portion of Quang

Tn Province and daily attacking the enemy supplylines, the South Vietnamese planned in earnest for therecapture of lost territory to the north. I Corps' Lieu-tenant General Ngo Quang Truong wanted to defendHue against threats from the west while conductingoffensive operations from positions along the MyChanh River to regain the Quang Tri-Dong Ha area.Troung wrote, the "limited offensive operations hadbrought us enough time to prepare for the long-awaited big push northward." FRAC's Major GeneralHoward H. Cooksey reported that the objective wasto recapture Quang Tn Province, but that the destruc-tion of enemy forces and material was an importantsecondary task and the South Vietnamese decided, atfirst, to bypass Quang Tn City.2

Teams from ANGLICO were in all four militaryregions to meet the increased demands for fire sup-port coordination. In response to Lieutenant ColonelD'Wayne Gray's urgings, the American command or-ganized its fire support assets, including ANGLICO,to support offensive as well as defensive operations inMR 1. FRAC integrated air, artillery, and naval gun-fire for maximum effect in support of the groundfighting. Major Glen Golden was with the liaison teamwith FRAC in Hue; liaison/spot teams were with theVNMC Division, the Airborne Division, 1st ARVN Di-vision, and 2d ARVN Division; and naval gunfire airspot teams were flying out of Phu Bai and Da Nang.3

Phase one of Lam Son or Total Victory 72, the multi-division I Corps counteroffensive, began after six daysof extensive preparatory fires by all available support-ing arms and an amphibious feint at the mouth of theCua Viet River.* The operational concept was for theVietnamese Airborne Division and the Marine Divi-sion to attack abreast to the northwest, employing bothsurface and helicopter assaults to seize a line along theThach Han River. The Marines' axis of advance wasalong Route 555, taking in the area from the coastto QL-1. The Airborne Division's area included QL-1on the right to the foothills on the left, with QuangTn City in their zone of action.

'Known as Song Than 9-72 to the VNMC.

106

A 9th MAB amphibious demonstration onpreceded the counteroffensive. A special amphibioustask group was activated by Task lkrce 76 to simulatethe preparation and conduct of an amphibious assault.VNMC units went on board ship from Tan My to addctedence to the northern feint. On 27 June 1972, theAmerican amphibious forces moved to the objectivearea and by 0800 landing craft and amphibian tractorscarrying South Vietnamese Marines were near theirturnaway point. Helicopters from HMM-165, com-manded by Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. F. "Doc"Egger, launched from the USS Tnzoli (LPH 10) andheaded for the beach. At 0806, the surface force—simultaneously with the helicopter force—reverseddirection 5,000 yards from the shore.

Intelligence estimates by the 1st Regional AssistanceCommand later indicated confusion and relocation ofsome NVA units in response to the demonstration,contributing to the initial success of Lam Son 72. Itwas also noted that the North Vietnamese reactedquickly, firing artillery at the amphibious ships fromthe mainland and offshore islands. Colonel SumnerA. Vale, the 9th MAB chief of staff, witnessed the NVAshore fire "landing in the wake of the Blue Ridge anda ship to the starboard of her." Second LieutenantStephen C. Ibgleman, a rifle platoon commander withBLT 1/9, recalled:

We were on the Schenectady and were heading ourfrom the beach. Tiger Island was passing on our port side.It was flat and green and &irly low in the water. We sawwhite flashes from the foliage, then saw the shellburars walk-ing towards us, boeh in the air and on the surface. The Ma-rines passing ammunition on the aft gun-mount didn't flinchand continued to pass ammuniciun cn the 3"50s whichhanged away. The cmisee IUSS Newport Newsl came in andopentd up, afterwhith the gunson Tiger Island remainedsilent. It was more fire than we had received during SongThan 6-72.

On 28 June, the Marine Division's portion of theoverall I Corps effort began. The 3d, 5th, 7th, and8th VNMC Battalions pushed north and immediatelyencountered stiff resistance. The enemy was well dug-in and showed no inclination to withdraw. General I.anlaunched a helicopter-borne assault behind the enemylines to relieve the pressure on the attacking Marine

QUANG 111 CITY REGAINED 107

Sub Unit One, 1st ANGLICO Deployments, Fall 1972

Military Region 1

Naval Gunfire Liaison Team(FRAC Main/Hue)

Naval Gunfire Liaison/Spot Team(1St VNMC Div/Hue)

_J Naval Gunfire Liaison/Spot Team(1st ARVN Airborne Div/Hue)

Naval Gunfire Air Spot Team(FRAC/Phu Bai)

-J Nay-al Gunfire Liaison/Spot Team(1st ARVN Div/Camp Eagle)

Naval Gunfire Liaison Team(FRAC/Da Nang)

Naval Gunfire Liaison Team(FRAC Rear/Da Nang)

Naval Gunfire Liaison/Spot Team(2d ARVN Diy/Chu Lai)

Command SectionOfficer in Charge

Military Region 2

Naval Gunfire Liaison/Spot Team(22d ARVN Div/Ba Gi)

Naval Gunfire Liaison/Spot Team(22d ARVN Div/LZ Uplift)

_J Naval Gunfire Liaison/Spot Team(22d ARVN Div/LZ Olie)

-J Naval Gunfire Liaison/Spot Team(22d ARVN Div/LZ Crystal)

-J Naval Gunfire Air Spot Team(Birth Di,th Province/Phu Cat)

H Naval Gunfire Liaison/Spot Team(Binh Dinh Province/Qui Nhon)

Military Region 4

Naval Gunfire Liaison Team(DRAC/Can Tho)

____

Naval Gunfire Air Spot Team(DRAC/Binh Thuy)

_____

Naval Gunfire Liaison/Spot Team(9th A]WN Div/Rach Gia)

Naval Gunfire Liaison/Spot Team(An Xuycn Province/Ca Man)

Adapted Jrorn Sub Unit One Material



On a command tour of the Pacific, theCommandant of the US. Marine Corps visits unitsinvolved in the Spring Offensive fighting. From left in the Hue Citadel are Gen RobertF. Cushman, CMC; ColJoshua Dorsey, Senior Marine Advisor, BGen Bui The [an, VNMC,LtCol D'lVayne Gray, SU1, 1s ANGLICO; and BGen Edwa.rdj Miller 9th MAB.

US. Marine helicopters turn away from the Vietnamese coast during the amphibiousdemonstration by the 9th MAB for the Lam Son counteroffensive. Both the air and sur-face assaults were aimed at the North Vietnamese rear positions along the Cua Viet River

Department f Defense Photo (USMC) A800753

QUANG TRI CITY REGAINED 109

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battalions. On 29 june, the 1st and 4th VNMC Bat-talions, supported by the 9th MAB, conducted a heli-copter assault and secured key objectives along Route555 and the coastline in the vicinity of Wunder Beach.For a third time, U.S. Marine CH-46 and CH-53helicopters had lifted Vietnamese Marines into enemy-held positions.

A helicopter pilot with HMM-165 described his firstcombat flight:

The first wave lifted off and the second wave of 46s were

pulled out of the stack and spotted. Within seconds theywere tuening and launched. We were spotted on 2 and 3.

We unfolded one blades and the crew chief went topsideto check the locking pins. As soon as we wece turning, tow-er cleared us en launch.

Helicopters from the USS Trzjpoli and Okinawa load-ed the two VNMC battalions at Tan My, flew themnorth, and put them down in Landing Zones Flamingoand Hawk. After intessive shore, sea, and airbombardment—including B-52 Arc Lights—hadblasted the enemy, the helicopters landed and weremet by small arms fire. Only scattered enemy forcesopposed the 1,450 Vietnamese Marines landing withprecision. The helicopters from HMM-164 and

HMM-165 returned to the ships with minor damageand no casualties. ANGUCO's First LieutenantStephen G. Biddulph, with the 1st Battalion, recalledthat after the assault "the enemy on several occasionstried to msh tanks and armored personnel carriersdown the surf to envelop us:' The NVA effort did notsucceed because of the direct fire from ships positioned4,000 meters offshore.

The start of Lam Son 72 was a complete success asthe vertical envelopment relieved the pressure to thesouth and facilitated a rapid advance and recaptureof lost territory.8 As June ended, the NVA had givenup more ground as they were pushed further back intoQuang Tn Province. The South Vietnamese daily cap-tured artillery, tanks, and armored personnel carriers.During the month, the allies killed 1,515 enemy sold-iers and destroyed 18 armored vehicles. The Marinestook 15 enemy prisoners.

Flying in support of these operations were airborneair controllers and naval gunfire spotters wirh 20thTASS out of Da Nang. As part of this continuouscoverage, on 29 June, Captain Steven L. Bennett,USAF, and an ANGLICO air observer, Captain



Amphibian tractors underway after turning back from the shoreline. Though the Lim Sonlanding was contrived the Communist reaction was genuine and the amphibious groupwithdrew from the area under accurate artilleiy fire from enemy coastal defensive positions.

QUANG TRI CITY REGAINED lii


South Vietnamese Marines head north once more as the Lam Son counteroffensive returnsthem to Quang Tn Province. Helicopters from HMM -1 64 andHMM-165 pick up waitinghelo-teams from the 1st and 4th VNMC Battalions, using a road as a pickup zone.

'Like a school of sharks," was one descnition of the low-level flight pattern used by theMarines to evade enemy antiaircraft fire enroute to Landing Zones Flamingo and Hawk.Army escort gunships and supporting arms were also used to reduce the enemy threat,


Michael B. Brown, USMC, flew one such sortie in anOV-10. After operating for three hours over the battlearea, Captains Bennett and Brown received an urgentrequest from a South Vietnamese unit under attackby a larger NVA force. With no air support in the im-mediate area and the combatants too close for gun-fire, Bennett rolled in to strafe the enemy. After theaircraft pulled out of its fifth run, an SA-7 missilestruck its left engine, setting it on fire, dropping thelanding gear, and piercing the canopy with fragments.Bennett turned south and he and Brown prepared toeject. At this point Brown reported "my ejection sys-tem was severely damaged" and would not work. Cap-tain Bennett then chose to ditch the aircraft in theGulf of Tonkin, an unheard-of procedure for the OV-1oand one from which no crew in an emergency previ-ously had survived. The aircraft cartwheeled repeat-edly on impact with the water. As Brown swam clear,Bennett sank with the wreckage, giving his life for hiscrewmember.*

On 30 June 1972, President Thieu went out to theUSS Blue Ridge to express his personal appreciationfix the American assistance during these operations.That same day, fighting continued on the ARVN Air-borne Division's portion of the Quang Tn battlefield.CorporalJohn E. Parton was attached to the 3d ARVNAirborne Battalion as an ANGLICO naval gunfirespotter. The battalion was engaged by a well-entrenched Communist unit and unable to move for-

his action, Captain Bennett was awarded a posthumous Me-dal of Honor.

ward. Corporal Parton took a LAW antitank rocket andmoved forward in an attempt to locate the machinegun position to his unit's front. Exposing himself tofire, he located the machine gun and launched therocket at it, destroying the gun while receiving mor-tal wounds in the process.** The airborne soldiers thenassaulted the enemy position and continued forward.American support was not limited to advice andmaterial alone.

Other ANGLICO Marines with the Airborne Divi-sion were among the first to reach the outskirts ofQuang Tn City. First Lieutenant Anthony P. Shepard'sspot team was assigned to the 2d ARVN AirborneBrigade. At 2300 on 4 July, the spot team accompa-nied the brigade reconnaissance company throughfriendly lines to a position southeast of the city. The90-man company led by Captain Tran Ut, with U.S.Army First Lieutenant Terry Griswold as an advisor,split into three groups and moved to within 300 metersof the Quang Tn Citadel walls. From this locationShepard and Lance Corporal Michael Jurak directednumerous air and artillery strikes on the Citadel andsurrounding NVA positions?

The Battle for Quang Tn (By 7 July, the Airborne Division, in its offensive to

the west, was trying to keep abreast of the Marines toits right and had reached positions just south of QuangTn City and the Vinh DinE Rivet The airborne troopshad run head-on into a strongly entrenched enemy

**r his actions Corporal Parton was awarded a posthumous SilverStar Medal.


Department of Defense Photo (USN) 1151902ANGLICO spot teams controlled naval gunfire that struck Communist targets along thecoast in support of Lam Son 72. The USS George K. MacKenzie stands off the coast as.its 5-inch, .38-caliber ordnance explodes on shore in support of ongoing operations.



Supporting arms fire was effectively controlled by air-borne Air Force and ANGLICO controllers from a var-iety of aircraft. A North American Rockwell 011.10Bronco turns over the Gulf of Tonkin, flying juct offshore to avoid the Communist antiaircraft fire.

force determined to hold the city. By 10 July, the for-ward units of the VNMC 1st, 3d, 5th, 7th, and 8thBattalions were on a line that ran generally from thebend in Route 555 as it turned west toward QuangTn City, eastward to the coast. With the ARVN Air-borne Division stalled on the outskirts of the city,General tan was reluctant to expose an unprotectedflank as his division continued northward.'° To breakthe impasse, Lan decided to move one battalion byhelicopter across the Vinh Dinh River to a posirionjust northeast of the city while two battalions wouldassault enemy positions from east to west. The mis-sion of the Marines was to block Route 560 and to pre-vent the enemy from resupplying his forces in the cityitself.

Suppotting fires for the helicopter move began at0600, 11 July, and the final Arc Light hit 15 minutesprior to the landing at approximately 1200, "L-Hour?'

South Vietnamese forces reached the outskirts of Quang Tn City by early July 1972. Bythen the preceding fighting had reduced the city to rubble, as in this view of the moatand walls of the Citadel This worked in favor of the Communist defenders by providingthem defensive positions from which to hold off the attacking Vietnamese Marine units.




The Vietnamese Marine Division initially moved to cut off Quang Tn City from rein-forcements with continued American support. At the division command post at 1-JuongDien, operations were briefed to the amphibious forces by the FRAC G-3, with LtColGerald H. Turley holding the map. At the right rear is an air photograph of the Citadel.

Thirty-four American helicopters from HMM-164 offrhe Okinawa and HMM-165 off the TniOoli carried 840Marines of the 1st VNMC Battalion with 12,000pounds of ammunition and rations into the attack.Six U.S. Army air cavalry gunships led the troop-ladenhelicopters into Landing Zones Blue Jay and Crow,2,000 meters north of Quang Tn City. The six hoursof heavy preparatory fires had nor blunted the ene-my's ability to fight.

Throughour the eight-mile flight to rhe objective,SA-7 surface-to-air missile firings caused the helicop-ters to fly the contour of the earth at the highest pos-sible speed. Within 10 minutes of landing thehelicopters had disembarked the Vietnamese and hadlifted off. One pilot had been surprised when he land-ed practically on top of a NVA T-54 tank. Quick reac-tion by a Bell AH-1 Cobra gunship knocked out thetank with a TOW antitank missile before it couldrespond. Another helicopter had landed on top of aNVA command post. Twenty-eight of the helicoptersentering the landing zones were hit by small arms fire.In spite of evasive flying, one Cfl-53 carrying 55 Viet-namese Marines was hit by a SA-7, burst into flames,

and went down with heavy loss of life. Five U.S. Ma-rine crewmen of a downed CH-46 were extracted fromthe zone by U.S. Army crews of Troop F, 4th Air Caval-ry, who braved antiaircraft fire to effect the rescue. Fiveof the Army's six helicopters were shot up during theassault.'' Losses by the 9th MAB were a CH-53 andtwo CH-46s (both recovered), two Marines killed, andseven wounded. The four survivors from the CH-53Sea Stallion were recovered later.

The U.S. Cl-I-53 carried 50 Vietnamese Marines, anAmerican crew of five, and a combat photographerfrom BLT 1/9. It was struck on irs approach to the land-ing zone while 100 feet above the ground. The deto-nation of the SA-7's 5.5 pound warhead in thehelicopter's right power plant sent engine-turbine frag-ments down and forward into the passenger compart-ment. The pilot autorotated the flaming aircraft tothe ground in a hopeful, controlled "crash and burn"procedure. Two crewmembers were killed outright anda third seriously injured. Of the Vietnamese Matineson board, most were killed, with only seven return-ing to friendly lines. The helicopter was completelydestroyed by fire and the detonation of ammunition

carried by the Vietnamese. The surviving Americanstook shelter in a nearby bomb crater and "hunkered-down" as the wreckage cooled and NVA soldiers pokedthrough the remains. At dusk a VNMC patrol locat-ed them and brought them to friendly lines andAmerican Army helicopters returned them to theirship.'2

Despite the helicopter losses and damage, theAmerican-supported Vietnamese attack had been ex-ecuted with precision and superb coordination. Lieu-tenant Colonel Gerald Turley commented, "Theexecution was beautiful; lift off, staging, coordination,control, communications, prep fires— everything wenton schedule — never looked more beautiful." Since thebeginning of July, with the arrival of LieutenantColonel Walter D. Fillmore as the new assistant Ma-rine advisor, Lieutenant Colonel Turley concentratedon the recapture of Quang Tn City as the G-3 advisorto the Vietnamese Marine Division.! 3

The 1st VNMC Battalion, commanded by MajorNguyen Dang Hoa, encountered heavy fire white dis-embarking in the landing zone and the Marines im-

mediately began taking casualties as they engagedelements of the 320B N144 Division.* After landingand consolidating, Major Hoa personally led his menagainst the dug-in enemy. Two trench lines had to beoverrun before the landing zone perimeter was secure.Despite severe losses, the Marines fought off the ene-my and expanded their positions. By consolidating anddefending the landing zones, the South Vietnamesekilled 126 Communists, captured six, secured largequantities of material, and flanked the NVA position.'

The naval gunfire spot team officer, First LieutenantStephen G. Biddulph, was hit in the legs shortly af-ter leaving his helicopter. Captain Lawrence H. Living-ston, the 1st VNMC Battalion advisor, moved throughintense small arms fire to carry the wounded lieutenantto safety. He "came sliding in beside me like a manstealing second base:' recalled Biddulph,'5 At the sametime, CorporaiJose E Hernandez of ANGUCO bravedenemy fire and helped wounded Vietnamese Marines

*320B NVA Division: 48th Infantry Regiment (only clement en-countered); .52d infantry Regiment; and 64th Infantry Regiment.

QUANG TIll CITY REGA!NED 115


Helicopters from the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade were used to place VietnameseMarines in position around Quang Tn City on 11 July 1972, Here HMM-165 aircraft fromthe USS Thpoli arrive to pick up Marines of the 1st VNMC Battalion behindfniendly lines.

find protection in a nearby depression. He then calledin naval gunfire in an attempt to halt onrushing NVAreinforcements. The wounded Vietnamese and Ameri-can Marines, although requiring urgent medical at-tention, could not be evacuated as the enemy kept thelanding zones saturated with artillery, mortar, and an-tiaircraft fire.

Despite the expansion of the perimeter, the Marineswere still in a tenuous position as heavy fire continuedto come from one of the initial objectives, an enemytrench network in a tree line approximately 50 metersaway. Captain Livingston formed the Vietnamese Ma-rines into an assault force. Although knocked off hisfeet by an exploding round in the early stage of theassault, Livingston led the casualty-riddled force to theedge of the trench fortifications. The enemy soldiersrushed out and engaged the Marines hand-to-hand,

but were defeated in the savage fight. After seizingthe objective, Livingston moved back under fire to en-sure that the wounded Lieutenant Biddulph, whomhe had earlier pulled from danger, was still safe.*Fighting continued for nearly three days in the 1stVNMC Battalion's area. Not only did the Marines seizeand hold their initial objectives, but in doing so theyalso forced the NVA to withdraw to the west, towardQuang Tn City. During this same three-day period,the 7th VNMC Battalion, as it moved against the ene-my, overran an armored regiment's command post.The action resulted in numerous enemy tracked vehi-cles and trucks being destroyed or captured.

Realizing the need to resupply— particularly

*lr his actions, Captain Livingston was awarded the Navy Cross;First Lieutenant Biddulph and Corporal Hetnandez received SilverStat Medals,


Matine Advisors, Unit Phoro

Air photographs were used in the planning ofoperations by the allied forces. This showsone of the landing zones in which very heavy resistance was met on 11 July 1972. Theannotations were keyed to suspected enemy dispositions and weapons emplacements.

ammunition — the Marines in their extended position,General Cooksey requested that Seventh Fleet Com-mander Vice Admiral James L. Holloway III providea five-section causeway pier at Wunder Beach, now un-der South Vietnamese control. The pier provided amuch-needed alternative line of communication to thebattered QL-1 and other constricted coastal routes.Seventh Fleet furnished the USS Alamo (LSD 33), anunderwater demolition team, and a tugboat for sup-port. On the morning of 13 July, naval constructionpersonnel, "Seabees," began installation. By 1300 theyhad completed the job. Once the causeway was riggedand operating, U.S. Marine shore party and navalbeachmaster personnel went ashore to instruct and su-pervise the Vietnamese units responsible for beach

6

By i4 July, the Vietnamese had cut the enemy'smain supply route, Route 560, into Quang Tn Cityresulting in diminished fighting. Only then could thefirst "medevac" helicopters clear the wounded fromthe combat area.'7 Among those flown to Hue City

by the Army aircraft was ANGLICO's Lieutenant Bid-dulph, who "lay on the floor near the left hatch withmy M16 rifle stuck out the door to the ready." Heremembered, "A litter patient lay squarely across mywounded legs and I held another patient around thebody to prevent him from falling out . . . . we stillhad to make it over the heads of the enemy to get

8

On 17 July, the Marine Advisory Unit received need-ed replacemerLts when nine officers from the 1st Ma-rine Division at Camp Pendleton, California, arrivedin Saigon. By the middle of July, the VNMC was atits peak combat strength and its prestige was such thatvolunteers had to be turned away. By 20 July, theVNMC Division had consolidated its positions north-east of Quang Tn City as the Airborne Division con-tinued its efforts to take the city. Heavy fighting wascontinuous, but little progress could be made beyondthe city's outskirts. The NVA commented "the liber-ation forces again hashed up its best" forces.b9

For General Truong, the determination of the NVA

QUANG TIll CITY REGAINED 117


North Vietnamese Army defenses were in strength around Quang Tn City. This 12.7mmDShK 38/46 heavy machine gun is operated in the antiaircraft mode. The assistant gun-ner in the middle is operating the mechanical tracking device used to leadflying aircraft.


to hold Quang 'lii City at all costs caused problems.He recalled that although the city had not been aprimary objective, "it had become a symbol and amajor challenge."20 In response to questions fromSouth Vietnam's President Thieu, General Cookseyobserved that General fruong "played a crucial role,both in planning and execution in the battle of theCitadel."21

Realizing that the NYA were concentrating ondefending the Citadel of Quang Tn, the Marinesseized the opportunity to exploit enemy weaknessalong the coast by enveloping his left flank and sever-ing his lines of communication south of the Cua VietRiver. General Lan assigned this task to VNMCBrigade 147, with three battalions. The plan calledfor two battalions supported by tanks to attack northfrom their positions and link up with a third battal-ion that would be landed by helicopter approximate-ly four kilometers to the north. After joining, all threebattalions would attack to the southeast, seizing a crir-

ical road junction. This would either drive the enemyacross the Thach Han River or force him north towardthe Cua Viet River.

On 22Ju1y, the amphibious task force's USS Okina-wa, St. Louis (LKA 116), Manitowoc (LST 1180), andPoint Defiance (LSD 31) moved into position to launchLieutenant Colonel Hertberg's helicopters. The USSDenver also was assigned to provide deck space. Air,artillery, and naval gunfire softened the enemy posi-tion for three and a half hours. Arc Lights struck thelanding zones just prior to HMM-164's arrival. The 5thVNMC Battalion assaulted with two waves totaling 688men. Gunship escorts of Troop F shot-up both zones,reporting enemy fire from Landing Zone Lima, butnone from Victor. Landing occurred at 0938 in Limaand at 1004 in Victor with initial objectives secured;the supporting arms plan had worked well. Withmoderate contact in the landing zones, the 5th VNMCBattalion moved our rapidly and linked up with thetwo surface assault battalions. The 2d VNMC Battal-

By July 1972, the Marine Division was asszgned the mission to take the city back fromthe Communists. These Vietnamese Marines and their advisors were trying to avoid draw-ing artillery fire using an M113 armored personnel carrier as a mobile command post.


ion, however, ran into stiff resistance as it maneuveredto cut the enemy's supply route along Route 560. U.s.close air strikes hit the NVA bunkers, enabling the Ma-rine battalion to move through the fortified area andcomplete the link-up. Once consolidated, the brigadesecured its initial objective against relatively light op-position. Throughout the remainder of the two-dayoperation, enemy contact was light to moderate. Theoperation ended on 24 july. It netted 133 Communistsoldiers killed, three enemy tanks destroyed and twoarmored command vehicles captured, a 100-bed hospi-tal overun, and numerous weapons captured or des-troyed. No losses were sustained by the suppottingAmerican Marines.

By the end ofjuly it was apparent that the AirborneDivision, its combat effectiveness weakened by previ-ous battles in the Central Highlands, could not over-come the hardcore NVA defenders of the Quang TnCitadel. The paratroopers, although only 200 metersfrom the Citadel's wall, stood down as the Marine Di-vision was given this mission. Lieutenant ColonelTurley briefed the advisors that changes would be re-quired in the type of operations needed to attack and

During darkness on 27 july, VNMC Brigade 258relieved the ARYN airborne troops in place. The nextfour days saw heavy ground contact and massive ar-tillery duels between the Marines and the NVA. Theenemy fired more than 1,000 mortar and artilleryrounds daily against the Marines, who responded inkind. Captain David D. Harris, an advisor with VNMCBrigade 147, had to be evacuated to the United Stateswith severe leg and back wounds. Killed alongside himwas ANGLICO's First Lieutenant Edward G. Hayen II.

The Communists were defending the city with the325th NVA Division, reinforced by elements of the308th, and 320B NVA Divisions and supporting forcesin southeastern Quang 'Iii and Thua Thien Provinces.*During the month ofjuly, these units had paid a heavykrice for their persistence in holding on to Quang TnCity: more than 1,880 enemy dead and the captureor destruction of 51 armored vehicles, 7 antiaircraftguns, 4 artillery pieces, a 20-ton ammunition dump,and 1,200 individual weapons.23 In other areas of MR

*Enemy order of battle waa based on a number of sources in MR1. Most timely were the VNMC units in contact, as verified by FRAC

QUANG TRI CITY REGAINED 1t9

Vietnamese Marine Corps Photo

Heavy fighting took place at the wails of the Citadel as massive artilleiy duels occurredDespite serious losses, the Communists held onto the position through August 1972.

destroy the enemy entrenched in the city itself.22 and the military intelligence chain.


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1 there were continued concerns about NVA threatsfrom the west, as Que Son and FSB Ross in Augustwere hit by 130mm guns and ground attacks by the711th NVA Division.* This threat to Da Nang wouldcontinue through the following month.24

As August 1972 began, most of Quang Tn City re-mained in Communist hands. The territory north andwest of the Thach Han River, particularly around theAi Tu combat base, was dotted with NVA artilleryunits.25 The enemy maintained a seemingly ceaselessartillery and mortar barrage on the South Vietnamese,who now burrowed into the ground "like gophers."26This was a busy time for Sub Unit One, 1st ANGLE-CO. Lieutenant Colonel George E. "Ed" Jones, com-manding Sub Unit One since the previous month,recalled that in addition to controlling naval gunfireand air strikes, ANGUCO radios and operators provid-ed an extensive and "very solid backup system fur theoperational South Vietnamese units as well as the U.S.Marine and U.S. Army Advisors."27 Air observers fromANGUCO continued "dawn to dusk" coverage fromAmerican and Vietnamese Air Fbrce aircraft, provid-ing the primary "eyes" over areas considered no-man'sland.

The brigades of the Marine Division wete wellplaced to deny the enemy resupply and to make a fi-nal lunge into the heart of the city, the Citadel, butwere held off by the well-concealed defenders. Ene-my fire and the congestion of friendly units in the areaseverely hampered maneuver by the Marines. MarineBrigade 147, operating northeast of Quang Tn City,began receiving heavy pressure from the enemy, buthad thwarted several attempts by the numerically su-perior enemy to reopen Route 560 northeast of thecity. The Marines' supply blockade began to take itstoll on the N'VA's ammunition stockpiles. All enemysupplies making their way into the city had to be fer-ried across the Thach Han River.28

To the south, VNMC Brigade 258, with four maneu-ver battalions under its operational control, was inheavy house-to-house fighting around the Citadel.The 3d VNMC Battalion attacked from the northeast,with the 6th and 9th VNMC Battalions closing in fromthe southwest. Each day, VNMC Brigade 258 movedslowly forward, tightening its grasp on the enemyforces still in the Citadel. This slow progress madeGeneral Lan realize that he would have to reinforcehis maneuver forces if they were to overpower the three

* 711th NIA Division: 31st Infantry Regiment; 38th Infantry Regi-ment; and 2 70th Infantry Regiment.

NVA regiments holding the Citadel.** Lan continuedto keep VNMC Brigade 369 in division reserve.20

Taking the CitadelOn 22 August, an unusual and significant contact

was made by the 8th VNMC Battalion as it confront-ed a sizable enemy force attempting to break out fromthe Citadel. Preceding the attack, the enemy artilleryprovided a curtain of fire. The NVA infantry advancedbehind the cover of tanks, The Marines, surprised atsuch an action, quickly rallied and drove the NVA backinto the Citadel. During the remainder of the month,the desperate enemy increased the number of his nightattacks in an effort to rupture the tight circle the Ma-rines had drawn. By this time in the invasion and theLam Son counteroffensive, the VNMC had suffered1,358 men killed and 5,522 wounded. The Corps es-timated that it had killed 10,285 Communists dur-ing this same five-month period.°

As September began, Marine units had been inconstant street fighting inside the city for 35 days un-der some of rite heaviest enemy artillery shelling sincethe invasion in March. The forward maneuver battal-ions had been under daily counterattacks by enemyunits of the .308th NI/A Division. In the city, theVNMC 1st, 3d, 5th, 6th, and 8th Battalions attackedthrough the rubble to reach the Citadel and the QL-1highway bridge over the Thach Han River.

On 5 September, Major Richard B. Rothwell, withthe 5th VNMC Battalion, personally helped to blunta local counterattack by the enemy from inside theCitadel. As the enemy attacked the 5th VNMC Bat-talion's command post just at dusk, Rothwell rushedto a balcony on the second floor of a building to gaina better view of the enemy disposition. Althoughwounded in both the head and face from an explod-ing mortar round, he called for supporting fire.Despite his painful wounds, he kept calling and ad-justing artillery fire and directing air strikes. At 2130the enemy withdrew in confusion having lefr behindmore than 50 individual and crew-served weapons.***

A battalion from VNMC Brigade 147 had taken uppositions at the An Tiem Bridge where Route 560crossed the Vinh Dinh River. All enemy supply andinfiltration routes and lines of communication to thenorth were effectively blocked. The Communists werefeeling the bite of supply and ammunition shortages.

**It was determined later that the N'VA rotated units in and outof Quang Th City to maintain fresh defenders.

***For his actions Major Rothwell was awarded the Bronze Star

Medal.



On 7 September 1972, BGen Edward]. Miller of the 9th MJIB and Col Nhon of theARVN Rangers inspect a unit at the Tan My naval base prior to loading them on assaultships for an amphibious demonstration. These troops were part of the successful maneuver

HMM-165 helicopters from the USS Tripoli turn bach 5,000 yards from the coast in asimulated assault. Surface forces turned back at the same time. Both South Vietnamese andAmerican Marines were transportedso as to give every indication of an authentic landing.



on 8 September, the three battalions of the 1st RangerGroup relieved VNMC Brigade 147 of its blocking mis-sion north of the city. General Lan now had twobrigades he could commit in the pincer movementwhich would begin the all-out assault on the city. Ma-rine Btigade 258 continued its attack along thesouthern front with four battalions while VNMCBrigade 147 attacked from the northeast with the 3dand 7th VNMC Battalions.3'

Generals Truong and Lan also requested an am-phibious diversion by the U.S. Seventh Fleet to drawthe enemy away from the Vietnamese Marines attack-ing the Citadel. The U.S. amphibious forces agreedto carry out the feint, except for an actual landing.Virtually all aspects of an assault were conducted, in-cluding an operation order, increased radio traffic, andcovert missions which discreetly left evidence in thevicinity of the selected landing beaches. The USSJuneau (LPD 10) loaded 400 ARVN Rangers from TanMy for the supposed surface assault.

The Final AssaultOn 9 September, the final assault on Quang Th City

began with intensive artillery fire and air strikes onthe Citadel. On the same day, Task Fbrce 76 and the9th MAB carried out the amphibious diversion northof the Cua Viet River. As the Vietnamese Marineslaunched their attack to recapture Quang Tn City, a8-52 strike, naval gunfire, and tactical air opened upin the diversionary objective area.32 The 9th MAB sawthe heaviest volume of supporting arms fire yet, whichreached a peak at H-Hour minus 3 through H-Hour.Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Kirby, observing fromthe primary control ship, remembered that the "fire-power brought to bear on that beach was enormous."33As these fires ceased, B-52s bombed the landingbeaches while the task force concentrated for the land-ing. Surface and helicopter forces approached theirturnarounds as naval gunfire stopped. Surface forcesturned back at 10,000 yards and the helicopters ofHMM-165 at 5,000 yards. Upon retiring from the

Early 11 September 1972, Vietnamese Marines succeeded in gaining the top of the Citadel'swall and continued to push in more men. The rubble of the 18th-century walls proveda major obstacle to anything except infantry movement and continued small unit action.



Marine Advisory Unit Command Chronology

The Quang Tn battlefield as recorded on the Marine advisors' situation map of 26 Sep-tember 1972. The top of this special map is north and the numbered grids are 1,000meters across. Annotations include unit boundary lines (ND for Airborne, TQLC for Ma-rines, BDQforRangers). Unit headquarters are shown by the stylized jiags, and company-sized units by the numbered circles. The numbers indicate signzfcant events.


Photo courtesy of Cot Donald L. Price, USMC

Members of the 6th VNMC Battalion raised their nation's flag over the west gate of theCitadel For the South Vietnamese and their Marines this was aproud moment of victoiy.


beach the amphibious forces returned to holding areasand the Rangers returned to Tan My..

The NVA reacted by hastily shifting major forcesand artillery north of the Cua Vier River to counterthis apparent amphibious assault, thus markedlyreducing the level of artillery and antiaircraft fires atQuang Tn City. The diversionary action enabled theMarine Division to advance rapidly. An additional bo-nus to the deception became evident immediately fol-lowing the B-52 strikes. As the bombers departed, theNVA emerged from the tree line to defend against theanticipated assault from the sea, Naval gunfire inflict-ed casualties on these troops in the open.34

At Quang Tn City an imaginary line drawn acrossthe middle of the Citadel became the boundary be-tween the two Marine brigades. VNMC Brigade 258continued its attack in the southern portion whileVNMC Brigade 147 attacked in the northern half, The3d VNMC Battalion, now attached to VNMC Brigade147 and closest to the northern wall of the Citadel,stood fast while the 7th VNMC Battalion deployedto its north. Near the southeast corner of the Citadel,Lieutenant Colonel Do Huu Tung, commandingofficer of the 6th VNMC Battalion with VNMCBrigade 258, set up a forward command post andmoved within striking distance of the 18th-centurywalls of the Citadel, which were 30 inches thick and15 feet high. A lot of this wall had already beenreduced to rubble, but unsurprisingly much of it stillstood. Progress toward the wall was slow because theenemy had tunnelled an intricate and interlockingdefensive system throughout the entire fortress. Onthe night of 9 September, a squad of Marines fromthe 6th VNMC Battalion managed to slip in and outof the Citadel.

At 2100 on 10 September, Lieutenant Colonel Tunglaunched a night attack against the enemy on thesoutheast cornet and was successful in gaining a lodge-ment on top of the wall. Early on 11 September, a pla-toon moved over this section of the wall, and in spiteof stubborn enemy resistance, expanded to occupy acompany-sized position within a few hours.

While the fighting for the Citadel was going on,the 1st VNMC Battalion had secured the bridgeheadwhere QL-1 crossed the Thach Han Rivet and held it

despite several fierce NVA counterattacks. From 11 to15 September, the 2d VNMC Battalion reached theThach Han River, closing the gap between the 1st and6th VNMC Battalions. The VNMC 3d and 7th Bat-talions fought their way through the northern part ofthe city and reached the fortress wall on the morningof 15 September. Ar 1015 that same day, the 3d VNMCBattalion entered the north side of the Citadel. Thatafternoon the enemy stiffened his resistance and calledin a massive artillery barrage to stop the 3d and 6thVNMC Battalions as they advanced toward the westwall. By 1700 on 15 September, the Marines hadgained complete control of the Citadel.

The NVA withdrew, stating that with "modern tech-nology and weapons and a maximum of firepower, theU.S. had schemed to level this area and turn QuangTn town into a land of death with no place for therevolutionary forces."" At 1245 the next day, the redand yellow flag of the Republic of South Vietnam wasraised over the city's west gate by members of the 6thVNMC Battalion. The ceremony marked the end of138 days of NVA occupation of Quang Tn City.

President Nguyen Van Thieu visited the frontlinepositions of the Vietnamese Marine Division on 20September to congratulate General Lan and theofficers and men of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. ThePresident then flew by helicopter to the command postof VNMC Brigade 147, after which he drove to the6th VNMC Battalion's command post. There he per-sonally congratulated Lieutenant Colonel Tung andhis Marines on their success inside the Citadel. Therecapture of Quang Tn was probably the most signifi-cant South Vietnamese victory of the spring inva-sion.*aO During the seven-week battle to recaptureQuang Tn City, the VNMC had suffered 3,658 casual-ties of the more than 5,000 casualties sustained sinceJune 1972—about 25 percent of the entire Corps.**a7The Vietnamese Marine Division, with its victory atQuang Tn City, had come of age as a fighting unit?8

*This prompted General Cooksey, the FRAC commander, torecommend the Viecnamese Maxine Division for a United StatesPresidential Unit Citarion.

**Edwin W. Besch, in Saigon, observed later that an "Inchon-style" landing in North Vietnam by Vietnamese or American forcesmight have heen iess costly.

CHAPThR 9

Returning NorthConsolidation — Push to the North — Reorganization —The Eleventh Hour— Ceasefire

Consolidation

On 25 September 1972, VNMC Brigade 369 openeda new command post at Hai Lang Village and assumedoperational control of the battalions at Quang Tn City,and VNMC Brigade 147 assumed defensive positionsalong the coast and on the division's right flank.VNMC Brigade 258 reverted to division reserve. MajorGordon W. Keiser took over as senior advisor forBrigade 258 from Major Robert D. Kelly.1 For theAmericans of ANGLICO and the advisors there wasa sense of accomplishment. Ibr the South Vietnamese,however, the battle was far from over.

The Vietnamese Marine Division had used tacticalair almost daily since the NVA invasion in March 1972.Between June and September, there had been 3,381American and 775 Vietnamese air tactical sorties, and525 B-52 strikes flown in support of the VNMC. From26 to 28 September, 18 VNMC officers, two from eachof the infantry battalions, underwent instruction inclose air support and naval gunfire spotter techniques,followed by an immediate practical application with

U.S. Marine advisors. Most of the Vietnamese officersbecame competent in coordinating U.S. air strikesthrough an airborne FAC and controlling naval gun-fire. This added capability further reduced the neces-sity for ANGLICO and advisor involvement in thecontrol of U.S. supporting arms.2

With the capture of the Quang Tn Citadel and theestablishment of Marine blocking positions at the ap-proaches to the city, the VNMC Marine Division, withits forward headquarters at Huong Dien, was in a po-sition to push north. General Lan was anxious to re-occupy all of the territory lost during the NVA invasionprior to any kind of ceasefire negotiations. Since thebeginning of the Laster Invasion, when President Nix-on outlined the conditions for such a ceasefine, Presi-dent Thieu had been concerned that all lost SouthVietnamese ground be regained prior to an in-placesettlement. Enemy activity had dropped sharply afterthe taking of Quang Tn City, but it was evident thatthe NVA was still present in strength just outside thecity. Identification of a unit from the 312/h NVA Di-

South Vietnamese Marines move into the ruins of the Citadel after the Communists weredriven out. Both the Marines and the living conditions show the effect ofprevious fighting.


127

vision raised the enemy presence to six divisions inQuang Tn Province, as reported by the 1st RegionalAssistance Command.* The enemy artillery fire fromthe northwest which daily showered Vietnamese Ma-rifle posirions occasionally was followed by nighttimeprobing attacks.3

Heavy monsoon rains began to fall in October andwould continue until the end of December. The areato the east of the city was low-lying coastal marshlands,threaded with rivers, and was difficult enough to crossin good weather. The torrential rains would make pas-sage impossible in some areas. Experience had shownthat during the monsoon a 200-meter-wide river couldbecome a two-kilometer-wide bay overnight, a vitalconsideration when moving armor, artillery, and foottroops. With growing concern about the peace negoti-ations in Paris, General Lan recommended that an at-tempt to take the offensive should be made immedi-ately, taking advantage of the lull in enemy operationsand the continued presence of 9th MAB support.Route 560, north of Quang 'lii, was the only improvedline of communications east of QL-1 leading to the

*312th NVA Diñsion: 141st Infantry Regiment; 165th InfantryRegiment (only element encountered); and 209th InfantryRegiment.

Cua Viet River, This was the obvious axis of attack andLan hopvd to move north by some other route andto do so before the monsoon restricted his options.He ordered Colonel Nguyen Nang Bao's VNMCBrigade 147 to attack north along Route 560 to pushthe enemy beyond mortar range of Quang Tn City andto capture Trien Phong District Headquarters. Accom-plishment of this mission would also serve to cut amajor NVA supply line.4

On 7 October, prior to H-Hour, the division's firesupport coordination center arranged for heavy ar-tillery, naval gunfire, and close air support. GeneralCooksey's headquarters in Hue coordinated theAmerican fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. U.S.Army helicopters provided armed reconnaissance for-ward of the axis of attack and eastward to the beach.Flights were composed of two U.S. Army light obser-vation helicopters with ANGLICO air observers onboard, providing excellent naval gunfire coverage ontargets up to 5,000 meters inland. This capability wasparticularly valuable during inclement weather whenaircraft could nor operate because of limited visibility.

Push to the North

Ar H-Hour, the 8th VNMC Battalion moved out in


Government of Vietnam Photo

Firepower from both sides reduced Quang Tn' City to a uniform level of destruction. Thisis the view along Quang Trung Street after the South Vietnamese retook the city.

RETURNING NORTH 129


Marines of the 9th Battalion consolidate their gains. Here a TOJV antitank missile teaminstalls a launcher At ngh4 LtCol Nguyen Kim De, the battalion commander and Ma]Paul L Car/son, an advisor supervise the emplacement of this weapons system.

the attack under difficult circumstances along Route560. The highway ran through a marshland betweenthe Thach Han River and the Vinh Dinh River, wherethick groves of bamboo and hedgerows permitted ene-my snipers to fire point-blank at the advancing Ma-rines. The attack continued for three days againstheavy enemy resistance. On 10 October, with the frontlines extended the desired distance, Colonel Bao, com-mander of Brigade 147, moved his other three battal-ions on line and awaited further orders. The operationhad resulted in 111 enemy killed and 55 weaponscaptured.

On 20 October, General tan ordered Bao to con-duct a second operation along the eastern flank of thebrigade front. The attack, conducted by the 9thVNMC Battalion supported by armor, was designedto extend the friendly lines north toward the Cua VietRiver. The river was critical to the defense of QuangTn City; whoever controlled the Cua Viet controlledthe economic lifeline of Quang Tn Province. The riveralso was sufficiently deep and wide to accommodatelanding craft inland all the way to Dong Ha and into

Quang Tn City itself. It was essential that this arterybe in South Vietnamese hands prior to any settlement.

The 9th VNMC Battalion encountered stiffresistance as ii: moved north. The eastern portion ofthe two-pronged attack reached its objectives, but thewestern portion was held up by a heavy 122mm rock-et attack. U.S. Army armed helicopter "Pink Teams"were called in to suppress the rocket positions. Cap-tain George Philip III, a U.S. Marine advisor flyingin the command and control helicopter, served as theliaison between the VNMC units on the ground andthese American helicopters. With the fire suppressed,the western prong moved on line with the eastern forceon an axis about six kilometers from the Cua VietRiver, still short of its south bank.5

VNMC Brigade 369, commanded by LieutenantColonel Nguyen The Luong, held the western portionof the division front against an enemy attack the firstweek in October, but the remainder of the month wasrelatively quiet with the exception of daily enemybombardments. The brigade conducted limitedpatrolling to its front and meanwhile improved defen-


sive positions in Quang Tn City. During the monthseveral reconnaissance patrols crossed the Thach HanRiver to try to determine the enemy's intentions.VNMC Brigade 258, with Colonel Ngo Van Dinh incommand, remained the division reserve. By October'send, the Marine front lines had stabilized along a linethat could permit subsequent efforts to establish afoothold on the Cua Viet outlet to the sea. Moraleand discipline remained high for all VNMC units asthey improved positions and replacements filled thedepleted ranks.

Reorganization

Due to the preponderant number of recent recruitswho had reported to MR 1 to fill the ranks of his bat-talions, Genera! Lan directed that, commensurate withmilitary operations, all elements of the division under-go troop inspections. Battalions rotated out of the lineand positioned themselves on the hard sandy beachesnear Wunder Beach. The U.S. Marine advisors wereamazed at the detailed inspections conducted. Inspect-

Advisors required material and maintenance supportfor the period of Vietnamization. Maf William R.Hart, an artillery advisor; and Maf Joseph J. O'Brien,an infantry advisor; confer amid the battle's aftermath.


ing officers meticulously went over each item of equip-ment laid out in parade-ground fashion on the beach.Individual weapons were inspected by these officerswith the thoroughness of drill instructors. Basic skillsand knowledge were demonstrated in an area whichwas only four miles behind the front lines.

On 1 November, orders came from Saigon for theMarines to cross the Thach Han River west of QuangTn in an effort to expand the division's area of con-trol. Under the cover of early morning darkness,VNMC Brigade 369 sent 600 Marines led by the 6thVNMC Battalion across the Thach Han River directlyopposite the Citadel. The crossing, using sampans,small boats, and barges, was not without difficulties.Some of the Marines drowned as sampans overturnedand guide ropes broke. By dawn on 2 November,however, nearly 200 Marines were established on thewestern side, followed shortly by 200 more. As the Ma-rines moved inland they were vigorously opposed bythe enemy. The forward elements bogged down 500meters from the river line in the face of heavy enemyautomatic weapons and mortar fire. The NVA coun-terattacked the Marine foothold with a regiment sup-ported by mortars and artillery. The massivecounterattack reflected the enemy's firm intention tomaintain positions west of Quang Tn City and to denythe southern forces access to the Ai Tu area, Later inthe day, as the Marines moved north along QL-1, be-tween a small canal and the Thach Han River, theycame under intense small arms fire from concealmentin the dense foliage. All of the company commanderswere killed and more than 40 Marines were reportedmissing. Despite the employment of every availablesupporting arm, the Marines could not make head-way. During the hours of darkness of 2-3 November,the 6th VNMC Battalion withdrew east of the ThachHan River, leaving only a reconnaissance team on thewest bank. The 6th VNMC Battalion operation wasthe Marines' last effort to cross the Thach Han Riverprior to the ceasefire in January 1973.6

The Eleventh Hour

On 11 November, the day after the U.S. Marineshad celebrated their 197th birthday, the VNMC be-gan an operation to extend its control to the north-west. As Lieutenant Colonel Ttan Xuan Quang's 4thVNMC Battalion attacked, it was stopped by intenseartillery and mortar fire and localized ground coun-terattacks. The NVA appeared determined that theMarines would not teach the Cua Viet River. In spiteof severe resupply problems, the NVA expended five

RETURNING NORTH 131

times more ordnance during November than it hadin October!

The monsoon rains curtailed both enemy andfriendly movement. 'Il-ansporting supplies was difficultfor both sides, and living conditions were equally op-pressive. The two sides could see each other occasion-ally, but neither seemed inclined to fire; they shareda miserable lot. Routes previously used to resupplywere flooded. Route 555 itself was nearly obliteratedby rising water and rendered unusable.8

The Communists expended every effort to keep for-ward units close to the Marine positions and thushopefully to make tactical air and naval gunfire sup-port impossible. On one occasion, however, the tacticdid not work. A B-52 strike was conducted in supportof the 4th VNMC Battalion which was operating justsouth of the Cua Viet River near the beach. Six promi-nent bill masses were the only logical positions for theenemy to occupy, above the flooded lowlands. Previ-ously, B-52s had dropped their bombs with suchdevastating effect that it was unnecessary to rebombthe same position. On this occasion, however, threeof the six hill masses were programmed for addition-al strikes six minutes after the first. As the second flight


Reorganization and consolidation was translated to im-proving living conditions and personal appearance atthe unit level In contrast to previous conditions, thesetwo 369th Brigade Marines are in front of an impro-vised living space constructedfrom ammunition boxes.

Retraining was high on the list ofpriorities. Here a class is given on the SImm mortar abattalion support weapon that also proved to be a heavy load when carried by SouthVietnamese infantry and often was left behind when equzL'ment was moved by foot.


132 THE WAR THAT WOUU) NOT END

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RETURNING NORTH 133


Victory in Quang lh is celebrated on the US. MarineCorps' birthday in 1972. From left are LtGen NgoQuang Truong, commanding I Corps; Co/Joshua Dot-sey, USMC, Senior Marine Advisor; andBGen Bui TheIan, commanding the Vietnamese Marine Division.The event took place in front of the situation mapat the division command post at Huong Dien.

struck, NVA soldiers who had survived the first attackhad moved back into their battered positions. Viet-namese and U.S. Marines 3,000 meters away bore wit-

ness to the devastating effectiveness of strategicbombers in a tactical role.°

December 1972 was marked by the ever-present pos-sibility that the continued negotiations betweenAmerican National Security Advisor Henry Kissingerand North Vietnam's Le Duc Tho would result in aceasefire agreement and that truce accords would gointo effect. Generally the frontlines remained staticwith the VNMC no closer than three and a half milesfrom the Cua Via River. During the first part of themonth the NVA initiated nothing larger thancompany-sized attacks. However, at dawn on 17 De-cember, the enemy launched a battalion-sized attackon the 7th VNMC Battalion, located west of the VinhDinh Canal. The NVA, in two separate attacks, lost37 dead on 18 December, and 132 killed the next day,

and gained no ground. Documents found on enemydead and on prisoners revealed that ar least three regi-ments opposed the VNMC efforts to move north. The27th NP2I Regiment,* the 48th NVA Regiment, andthe 101st NVA Regiment were making every effort tofix the Marines in place.

Lieutenant Colonel George E. Jones' Sub Unit Onecontinued to support South Vietnamese forces inMR 1 and throughout the rest of the country. Duringthe last quarter of 1972, American ships, their fire

coordinated and controlled by ANGLICO personnel,

Of the B.> Front.

fired 211,700 rounds in direct support of the ArmedFbrces of South Vietnam. U.S. naval gunfire enabledSouth Vietnamese artillery to move inland and pro-vide support fbr areas further to the west. Due to heavyrain curtailing airborne air controllers and tactical airsupport, almost twice as many naval rounds were firedduring November and December in MR 1 as were firedby South Vietnamese 155mm howitzers. An NVA sold-ier captured by the ARVN Airborne Division, whichwas positioned west of the VNMC Division, reportedthat naval gunfire was extremely effective along theThach Han River and that he, and others, had sur-rendered due to the heavy pounding.

By the year's end, naval gunfire spotter instrucrionhad been given to Vietnamese artillery forward ob-servers who then applied their new skills upon return-ing to the field.b0 On Christmas Day 1972, Sub Unit

Victory in Quang Tn is celebrated in Saigon. For theVietnamese Marines, this campatgn brought increased

popular support andprestige that was reflectedin hikhlevels of recruitment despite battlefield losses.

Photo courtesy of Capt Edwin v/. Beach, USIYIC (Ret)

One suffered its last death in action when a Marineair observer in a South Vietnamese Air Fbrce Cessna0-1 Bird Dog aircraft flew along the Cua Viet Riverto inspect the NVA positions to the notth. First Lieu-tenant Dwight G. Rickman left Phu Bai that day toconfirm that the Communist forces were complyingwith the truce. He never returned."

There was very light contact between the two forcesas 1973 began. Both sides made prnbes and counter-probes. On 14 January, the frontline battalions ofVNMC Brigades 147 and 258 had heavy contact withthe enemy all along the front. With a ceasefire likely,the 9th MAB became involved in coordinating plansto take all U.S. personnel our of MR 1. General Milletrequested that MACV make it clear to CinCPac thatthe amphibious forces were the only available resourcescapable of the task and that they not be used for clear-ing mines in North Vietnamese waters.'2 On lSJanu-ary, under orders from Saigon, General Lan beganplanning for a final effort to gain the Cua Viet River

prior to the now-certain ceasefire. The attack was tobe made by an infantry and tank force with enoughpower to reach and cross the Cua Viet River. Task IbrceTango was organized with the mission to seize theformer U.S. naval base and LST ramp at the mouthof the river.

Ar 0655 on 26 January, as the main VNMC attackbegan, every available supporting arm was brought tobear on the NVA. The ground attack, led by ColonelNguyen Thanh Tn, the deputy commandant of theVNMC, advanced in two mechanized columns. MajorJames R. Sweeney, as the senior U.S. Marine advisorwith Task Fbrce Tango, moved forward with ColonelTn. One column moved north along the coastal sanddunes while the other took advantage of a woodlinewhich ran roughly three kilometers inland from thebeach to move north by a parallel axis. Within threehours, the Marines had seized the intermediate ob-jectives despite determined resistance from the NVA.

As the 4th VNMC Battalion under Lieutenant


Photo courtesy of LtCol George E. Jones, USMC (Ret)A large group of the normally disbursed Snb Unit One, 1st ANGLICO — the headquart-ers staff and others —pose in front of the unit headquarters in Saion. At rzht is LtColGeorge E. Jones, the commanding officer during the counteroffensive in mid-1972.

RETURNING NORTH 135

Colonel Nguyen Dang Tong, with Major William M.Keys as advisor, proceeded rowards the final objective,the South Vietnamese armor came under fire by wire-guided AT-3 missiles. During the next 18 hours, 26M48 tanks and M113 armored personnel carriers werelost to Communist missile teams employed in groupsof two and three. During this time, SA-7 surface-to-air missiles destroyed two allied aircraft flying closeair support. The NVA resisted fiercely as the left-handcolumn closed on its fortified positions.'3

Ar 0145, 28 January, the column along the beach,with only three tanks in support of a mixed force of3d, 4th, and 5th VNMC Battalion Marines, made afinal assault. At 0700, 300 Vietnamese Marines brokethrough the Communist lines and hoisted a red andyellow South Vietnamese flag at the Cua Vier River.A radio message to the task force command postreported the lead company had secured the LST rampon the south bank of the Cua Viet River and they werestanding knee-deep in the river. Colonel Tn radioedback ". . . go deeper!"

Ceasefire

At 0745 the USS TurnerJoy (DD 951) fired the lastU.S. naval gunfire support in the Vietnam War andpulled off the gun line. Lieutenant Colonel GeraldH. Turley noted this action in the advisors' operational

log. This was a fitting climax as the Turner Joy hadbeen involved in the Gulf of Tonkin since 1964. Atthe same time, the U.S. withdrew all support to TaskForce Tango, anticipating the ceasefsre that would gointo effect at 0800. Beginning around 0600, all ar-tillery north and south of the front began firing,gradually increasing in rate. Both sides had been stock-piling artillery ammunition for the final moments ofthe war. Neither side wanted the other to be able tomake any last-minute gains of ground.'

The final enemy shelling produced some surprises,at least for Major Nguyen Dang Hoa's 1st VNMC Bat-talion east of Quang Tn City. During the previous fewweeks the battalion command group, which was lo-cated in an abandoned village a short distance to therear of irs forward companies, had experienced onlydesultory harassing fire. As the area was quite flat andthe enemy possessed no vantage spot from which toadjust artillery fire, it was assumed that the commandgroup's location was nor known to the NVA. This as-sumption proved untrue.

After a few ranging shots of high-explosive, point-detonating rounds, the enemy switched to shellsarmed with hitherto rarely used delay fuzes. Whilethe well-built South Vietnamese bunkers provided amore-than-adequate defense against the former

The opposing forces remained facing each other where the battle lines were drawn. Atthe Thach Han River at Quang Tn, the south bank is marked by South Vietnamese flags.

Government of Vietnam Photo


rounds, they were no match for the delay-fuzed vari-ety. Although the area was saturated with delayrounds, none hit any of the crowded bunkers. Withlow-hanging clouds precluding any friendly air sup-port and the U.S. Navy pulling off the gun line, therewas little else to do but wait for the ceasefire. At 0800all firing stopped. While the Americans and the SouthVietnamese observed the truce accords, the NVA pre-pared for a new offensive.16 Recalled LieutenantColonel Turley, who had served through to the end,"all US. Marine advisors were formally relieved of theirduties with Vietnamese battalions:' They returned tothe VNMC division command post at Huong Dienwhere General Lan assembled the Marine AdvisoryUnit for a final formation. The next morning, all butfive advisors returned to Saigon for rotation back tothe United States.17

For Task Force Tango along the Cua Viet River thefighting continued. That evening the NVA launcheda counterattack against VNMC forces at the naval base.Other NVA units cut across the tear of both columnsin an effort to separate them from support, and suc-ceeding in this by 30 January. Ar this point, a

company-sized force from the 4th battalion was en-circled at the Cua Viet River outposts. Efforts to resup-ply the Marines from across the beach resulted in theloss of a mechanized landing craft (LCM). The VNMCunits attempted to break our south along the beachon 31 January, rather than be isolated by the NVA."All contact with beleaguered Marines was lost andthe outpost overrun," was the terse wording of the di-vision operations summary as of 0935 that morning.The South Vietnamese suffered 40 casualties and lost20 armored vehicles in the posr-ceasefire incident.'°

PART IV

THE MARINES WERE THERE

CHAPTER 10

A Tract of Time9th MAB and the Naval Campaign — Support to the Fleet— Evacuations — Search and Rescue

NGF Airborne Spotters, Fast and Slow—Raids and Demonstrations—Redeyes at SeaSupport to Military Region 1—Fleet Support Continues

Across the Beach: The lam Son Landings —Turnaway at Quang Tn

9th blAB and the Naval Campazn

Separate from the advisory effort with the Viet-namese Marine Corps in MR I, 111 Marine AmphibiousForce aviation and ground units participted with theSeventh Fleet and the Seventh Air Force in reacting tothe enemy's Spring Offensive. The North Vietnameseattack of 30 March 1972 had found III MAP forcesdeployed for rapid response to the unfolding and con-fusing situation. Brigadier General EdwardJ. Miller's9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) Headquarterswas on the USS Blue Ridge at White Beach, Okina-wa; Colonel Walter C. Kelly's 31st Marine AmphibiousUnit (MAU) had just departed the U.S. Naval BaseSubic Bay, Philippines, for the South China Sea onAmphibious Ready Group (ARG) Alpha ships; Lieu-tenant Colonel Phillip B. Friedrichs' Battalion LandingTeam 1/9 (BLT Bravo) with ARG Bravo had left HongKong for the East China Sea.*l On the morning of2 April, the 31st MAU and BLT Bravo were alreadyoff the Vietnamese coast awaiting developments in MR1. Vice Admiral William P. Mack, the Seventh Fleetcommander, had diverted ARGs Alpha and Bravo topositions 15 nautical miles east of the DemilitarizedZone (DMZ) for possible evacuation of Americansfrom Dong Ha. On the TnjOoli, Colonel Kelly andLieutenant Colonel William K. Von Harten, com-manding BLT 3/4, monitored radio traffic sent byLieutenant Colonel Turley from the Ai Tu CombatBase, as he "attempted to bring order from chaos2**a

AdmiralJohn S. McCain,Jr., CinCPac, cancelled Ex-ercise Golden Dragon on 3 April, and III MAF's com-mander, Lieutenant General Louis Metzger, orderedGeneral Miller and the 9th MAB staff to remain onthe USS Blue Ridge for combat or evacuation opera-tions. The Blue Ridge, with the Task Force 76 com-

*ARG A: 31st MAU, BLT 3/4, HMM-165, and Logistic SupportUnit Alpha on the Tripoli. Anchorage, Duluth, and Schenectady.ARG B: BLT 1/9 on the Denver, Tuscaloosa, and Mobile.

**hter it was learned that General Cao Van Vien of the SouthVietnasnesejoinr General Staff and General Abrams were still as-sessing the situation in MR I and had not sent or approved theinitial calls for assistance to the Seventh Fleet, requests which hadbeen generated from the confused situation in MR 1. See Chapter4 foe details.

138

mandet, Rear Admiral Walter D. Gaddis, and GenetalMiller, sailed for Vietnam on 5 April. Admiral Mackreturned ARG Bravo to White Beach, Okinawa, toreplace defective amphibian tractors and to load ad-ditional supplies and personnel. These orders werepassed through the operational chain of command tothe "action agency"— III MAF in General Metager'scase. He recalled that Seventh Fleet was saturated withmessage traffic at this point. Aviation deploymentswith "tight" time schedules required Metager to movehis forces and to notify Seventh Fleet that unless other-wise directed he would do so "in accordance with ord-ers from higher authotity."a

With the forward deployment of amphibious forcesto holding areas off the DMZ, Admiral Mack directedunits to conduct "ready operations:' a term that in-cluded both contingency and support activities. The9th MAB had various contingency plans which werebased on its task-organized character. After the ini-tial attacks, the amphibious brigade turned its atten-tion from potentially conducting emergency evacua-tions to building up its forces. During the next 10months there were at least nine changes in task or-ganization as amphibious ready groups and Marineunits rotated. Changes occurred because of ship avail-ability, contingency requirements, and the long inter-vals at sea.***4

Marine units at sea for operations on 9 April werethe 9th MAB headquarters, 31st MAU, and BLT Bravo.Upon arriving in the Tonkin Gulf, the brigade or-ganized itself into a regimental landing team and acomposite helicopter squadron.****5 Admiral Mackkept Amphibious Squadron (Phibron) 5 in theWestern Pacific as ARGs Alpha and Btavo, despite its

***Thete were three general arrangements: first, the peeinvasionready force of an embarked Marine amphibious unit and an addi-tional battalion landing team; neat, the expansion of contingencyfoeces to two MAUs and two BEll; finally, the retention of two MAUsas the probability of intervention lessened in late summee 1972.

S***Initial task oeganization on 9 April 1972: 9th MAD (IC 79.1),H&S Co, 9th MAB (Iii 79.1.0), Det, 1st RadBn (TO 79.1.0.1); RLT4 (TU 79,1.2), l-lq, 31st MAU (TIE 79.1.2.0), BLT 3/4 (TO 79.1.2.1),81.1 119 (Tb 79.1.2.2), Det B, HML-367 (TO 79.1.2.2.1), Det A,HML-367 (TU 79.1.3); BLSG (TU 79.1.4), LFSP (TU 79.1.5);HMM-165 (TU 79.1.6).

A TRACT OF TIME 139

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planned return to the United States. On 11 Aptil, thenewly arrived Amphibious Squadron 7 formed Am-phibious Ready Groups Charlie and Delta.* GeneralMetzger fotmed an additional MAU and BLT to pro-vide landing fotces for Charlie and Delta. The 33dMAU was activated under Colonel Robert J. Perrich,then commanding 4th Marines. This amphibious unitconsisted of Lieutenant Colonel Edward C. Hertberg'sHMM-164 and Lieutenant Colonel Clyde D. Dean'sBLT 1/4. Embarkation on amphibious ships was fol-lowed by landing exercises in the Philippines, and thendeployment to amphibious holding areas off the coastof Vietnam.

When the USS Blue Ridge arrived off the DMZ withTask Force 76 and rhe 9th MAB, Admiral Gaddis andGeneral Miller were ordered by Seventh Fleet to con-duct "amphibious operations as directed." Five possi-ble courses of action arose: evacuations, landings,demonstrations, support to the Seventh Fleet, and sup-port to the South Vietnamese. Prompted by Admirals

*Phibron 5: USS Trttoli(LPH 10), Duluth (LPD 6), Denver (LPD9), Mt. Vernon (LSD 39), Anchorage (15D 36), Mobile (LKA 115),Tuscaloosa (1ST 1187), and Schenectady (1ST 1185). Phibcon 7: USSOkinawa (LPH 3),Juneau (LPD 10), Point Defiance (LSD 31), Alamo(LSD 33), St. Louis (LKA 116), Manitowoc (1ST 1180), Surnter(LST1181), Cayuga (1ST 1186). Berbour County (1ST 1195), and BristolCounty (1ST 1198).

Mack and McCain's need for a variety of alternativesduring April, Admiral Gaddis and General Miller con-ducted a wide-ranging and at times frenzied planningeffort simultaneously with ongoing operations.**6 TheMarines of the 9th MAB soon wete involved in tasksother than their basic amphibious assault mission. Thisdictated separation from task force and parent unitsto meet commitments that were not anticipated in ex-isting contingency plans. Most assignments wereparallel at various times to ready operations and sup-port to the Republic of Vietnam? "They were interest-ing times;' concluded General Miller.8

Support to the FleetThe Seventh Fleet amphibious ships soon found

that the demands of 24-hour combat watches in theGulf of Tonkin could not be met entirely with theship's crew, most of whom were conducting both regu-lar and general-quarter duties at such points as gunpositions, watch stations, and damage control stations.Battalion and squadron staffs manned shipboard coor-dination centers for operations, logistics, and fire sup-port during periods of general quarters (particularlywhen Vietnamese Marines were embarked and Task

**The 9th MAE operations officer, Lieutenant ColonelJames L.Shanahan, recalled this description as 'possibly not extreme enough:'(Shanahan Comments)


Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A800634American Marine staffs spent the early part of the Spring Offensivepreparingfora varietyof contingencies before the situation stabilized enough to take definite action. BGen Ed-wardj Miller; in his stateroom on board the USS Blue Ridge, at rzht rear; and his staffare briefed by the MAB G-3, LtCol James L. Shanahan, on a proposed course of action.

A TRACT OF TIME 141


In a number of instances, command and controlfacilities were maintained on amp hibi-ous ships. In this LPH combat operations center tasks could have ranged from fire sup-port to logistics coordination. Radio operators and staff officers man positions for thecommunication nets used to manage amphibious and air operations during landings.

In a traditional role, Marines manned shipboard gun positions alongside naval person-nel. Here a mixed crew serves a 3-inch, 50-caliber gun mount. Originally designed asantiaircraft weapons, guns of this type provided antiboat and shore fire support.

Photo courtesy of Maj Charles D, Melson, USv1C


Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A800?62

Some US. Marines worked .50-caliber heavy machine guns during landing operationsby the South Vietnamese armed forces. Shown here are South Vietnamese Rangers load-ing landing craft at Tan My for movement to amphibious assault shijtss located offshore.

Force 76 provided command and control facilities).*To counter the threat of Communist small-boat at-racks, ships' crews manned deck-mounted machineguns. When sailors assigned to fire .50-caliber machineguns proved unskilled in their use, Marine armoredvehicle crews and truck drivers who were trained touse the M2 Browning and M60 machine guns werepressed into service to conduct training for the sailors.As landing operations began, the ships' captains as-signed Marines to landing craft to operate machineguns. Embarked Marines continued these shipboardduties throughout the crisis in the gulf

Seventh Fleet used Admiral Gaddis' ships, withGeneral Miller's Marines on board, to augment otherfleet units such as the carrier and naval gunfire groups,for naval gunfire spotting, antiaircraft defense, andelectronic support measures. These tasks were concur-rent with ready operations, but required independentsteaming and sent Marines the length and breadth ofthe Tonkin Gulfs area of operations. In one instance,the departure of fleet hospital ships from Seventh Fleethad left Admiral Gaddis without major medical fa-

*Marines on board ship were commanded by the tenior Marinepresent, the "rommanding officer of troops," who answered to thevessel's captain for their discipline and welfare. Under normal cir-cumstances, requirements fot mess, maintenance, and police func-tions to support the ahip came from a 'ship's platoon" from whichthe Marines' share of housekeeping duties waa met.

cilities closer than the naval hospital at Subic Bay,Philippines. At the start of the Spring Offensive, sur-gical teams were established on the USS Trzoli andOkinawa, and these ships were positioned to providemedical coverage for carrier and gunfire strikes. Thesesame facilities treated Vietnamese Marines woundedduring assault landings.° Other amphibious ships werediverted at various times to provide search and rescueplatforms, helicopter gunship support, disaster reliefoperations, and mine clearing—taking their embarkedtroops with them. These final events were conductedafter the combat crisis in MR 1 had passed inmid-1972. The flexibility of the amphibious task forcewas one of its greatest assets, but had to be employeddiscreetly. The use of Marines for numerous unexpect-ed duties caused enough concern at Headquarters Ma-rine Corps for staff to observe in a study:

Some of the functions performed by the 9th MarineAmphibious Brigade during the period reported on normallyare not assigned to the landing force; for example: minesweeping missions supported by Marine assets; augmentingship AA defenses with landing force surface to air missiles:dedicating amphibious lift assets to SAR functions. The Ma-rine Corps position is that landing force assets will not beassigned to perform these functions eacept in an emergen-cy when other assets cannot be made available,'°

EvacuationsThe uncertainty of the military situation in MR 1

made the evacuation of Americans from the region

the most probable mission. General Creighton W.Abrams asked Admiral Mack to support possible with-drawals from Hue, Phu Bai, and Da Nang. MajorGeneral FrederickJ. Kroesen, Jr., USA, commanding1st Regional Assistance Command (FRAC), plannedfor the evacuation of 2,240 American military andcivilians and 65,000 pounds of cargo. If movement byUSAF aircraft were not possible, this would be accom-plished by Task Force 76 and the 9th MAB. AdmiralMack allocated a single Marine amphibious unit—areinforced infantry battalion and a composite helicop-ter squadron—to carry out these plans, on the assump-tion that withdrawals would be sequential. The DaNang plan required an additional helicopter squa-dron. Simultaneous withdrawals from Da Nang andPhu Bai would need an additional Marine amphibi-ous unit and naval amphibious ready group.

Existing operation plans dealt with administration,logistics, reporting, and standardized amphibiouslandings rather than with specific contingencies. Asa result, units had to draw up evacuation plans fromscratch." Responsibility for contingencies rotated with9th MAB units on "Yankee Station"* and were the

*'Yankee" and Dixie" were naval terms for specific locations ofcarrier task force operations in the Gulf of Tonkin and the SouthChina Sea. In 1972, Yankee Station was used in a more generic sensefor any ship location in the Gulf of Tonkin.

subject of continuing coordination with the FRACthrough July 1972, even as the North Vietnamesethreat to MR I diminished.' Of major concern wasthe 8th Radio Research Field Station (RRFS) atHue/Phu Bai and its 1,000 special-intelligence per-sonnel and the.ir equipment. Plans called for 9th MABto secure landing sites, provide security, and to with-draw the evacuees by helicopter or amphibian trac-tor. Marines went ashore to coordinate and conductrequired reconnaissance of Hue/Phu Bai for this pos-sible mission. After his reconnaissance, LieutenantColonel Von Harten told the 31st MAU commander,Colonel Kelly, that defenses ashore were virtuallynonexistent arid that a successful evacuation underenemy attack was doubtful. On another visit, a BLT1/9 helicopter was not allowed to land at the 8th RRFSlanding pad because it did not have the proper clear-ance to enter a "sensitive" area.'3

Search and Rescue

Amphibious ships from Task Force 76, at one timeincluding both helicopter carriers, were used as searchand rescue (SAR) stations in support of Task Force 77carrier air-attacks. These vessels deployed to positionsoff North Viernam rather than remain in the amphibi-ous holding area near the DMZ. The "Big Mothers"of TF 77's Helicopter Combat Support Squadron (HC)

A TRACT OF TIME 143


During the course of air operations in 1972, amphibious assault shijis sewed as searchand rescue platforms for Navy and Marine Corps helicopters. Between air strikes, thisSikorsky SH-3 Sea King on the USS Denver is on SAR standby off North Vietnam.


7, flying Sikorsky SH-3 Sea King helicopters from TF76 amphibious ships positioned in the Tonkin Gulfwere the primary SAR aircraft to recover Air Fbrce andnaval crews who went "feet wet." With a motto of "Youfall, we haul:' Navy SAR crews picked up downed flyersfrom under the guns of shore-based North Vietnameseforces. Marine helicopters and crews stood by to as-sist. To support recovery attempts, Admiral Mack hadordered General Miller to have a 300-man helicopterreaction force available on 48-hour standby to rescuedowned crews or escaping prisoners from shore.'

On 14 April, the brigade received a reminder thatbeing offshore was still within the combat zone. TheNavy's helicopter direction center (HDC) on the TrjOo-Ii dispatched an unarmed HMM-165 helicopter to as-sist in the search for a missing Marine Intruder EA-6Apilot off the coast of North Vietnam. The CH-46,flown by Marine First Lieutenants Lawrencej. "Hal"Paglioni and Michael L. Powell, flew a lazy search pat-tern in the humid air of the Tonkin Gulf in responseto vectors from the ship's MDC. As the aircraft reachedTiger Island (Hon Co), North Vietnamese antiaircraftgunners opened up on the helicopter flying at 500feet. A single 14.5mm round passed through the frontof the aircraft, between Powell's legs, ripping diagonal-

ly through the front and out the side of the armoredseat, exploding and wounding him in the face. As theymade their way back to the Thpoli, the two pilots ber-ated the HDC for the error and pointedly observedthat there was "still a war going on?"

One Marine pilot who flew search and rescue offNorth Vietnam, First Lieutenant Laurence W. Rush,recalled these operations at general quarters:

Everyone was sleeping fully clothed and with life vestson, The air strike was due to start at three. The air was tensewith expectation . . . . We expected to be busy in a veryshort time . . Dawn came and a new dimension was ad-ded. We could actually see our planes diving in and thesmoke trails nf the missiles coming up to meet them. Wecould see the shore line and the ship was ordered to pro-ceed to a new holding area just beyond sight of shore.'°

The Marine and Navy helicopters rescued severalAmerican aircrews shot down during the intensifiedair war over North Vietnam. One Thailand-based AirForce F-4 crew was recovered during an April 1972strike at Thanh Hoa. The men were floating off thecoast when a SH-3 SAR "bird" located them; thedowned airmen first thought it was a North Viet-namese helicopter! Despite this misperception, theSH-3 picked them up and ferried them to the LPD

Glad to be back, Navy Lt Randall H. Cunningham and Lt ) William P Driscollarrive on the USS Constellation after being rescued in the Gulf of Tonkin. They gotthree MiGs before going down. The CH-46 that brought them is from HMM-i64.


A TRACT OF TIME 145

Photo courtesy of Maj Charles D. Melson, USMC

A Marine UH-1 lands on the USS Denver after flyinga naval gunfire spot mission in support of Linebackerand Freedom Train operations. It was flown by theHML-367 detachment with BLT Bravo, whose aircraftprovided interim support to the naval gunfire shits.

1555 Denver In another instance, Lieutenant RandallH. Cunningham and Lieutenant (jg) William P. Dris-coil were picked up by Navy SAR helicopters aftershooting down their fifth MiG and becoming the Na-vy's current leading air aces. A Marine CH-46 fromthe USS Okinawa carried Cunningham and Driscollto their own ship, the Constellation.

NGF Airborne Spotters, Fast and SlowAdmiral Mack requested General Metzger to pro-

vide aircraft and Marines to support Task Group 77.1engaged in naval gunfire strikes north of the DMZ.General Meager, himself an air observer, proposed us-ing McDonnell-Douglas Th-4F Skyhawk dual-seat jetsflying out of Da Nang as "Fast FACs" because thethreat of enemy antiaircraft fire over the DMZ andNorth Vietnam prevented the effective use of anythingbut jet aircraft. He also proposed UH-1E helicoptersoff amphibious ships as spotting platforms. Trainedpersonnel to support this were in two naval gunfirespot teams already with General Miller, in an addi-tional team at Subic Bay, and among 16 more air ob-servers rushed out from Okinawa and Hawaii. Addi-tional air observers were with the infantry and artilleryunits of the brigade.

On 18 April, the USS Denver departed the am-phibious holding area off the DMZ to join Task Group77.1 for naval gunfire operations. General Miller es-tablished a naval gunfire support element on boardthe Denver using two UH-IE helicopters of Detach-ment Bravo, HML-367, and two UH-lEs fromHMM-165 from the USS Tr4'oli. The element was in-

itially under Major Harrison A. Makeever, but Cap-tain Stephen D. Hill was the officer in charge duringmost of its existence, The detachment included fivenaval gunfire spotters and support personnel. On 19April, a conference was held on the USS Chicago (CG11) to organize the participants. Airborne spotters wereused off Vinh on 20 April and then off Hon Mat,Thanh Hoa, and Dong fbi on succeeding days. Mis-sion effectiveness was marginal and conferences onboard the USS Denver on 23 April and the USS LongBeach (CGN 9) on 27 April were unable to resolvethe difficulties encountered in providing effective spot-ting. Admiral Mack suspended spot missions at theend of the month and directed the Denver to rejoinTask Force 76.

In retrospect, the enemy situation did not allow thisconcept to succeed. As naval gunfire strikes were con-ducted in daylight, the UH-1E spotting aircraft couldnot fly over land and still avoid the SAM and AAAthreat. The spotters encountered problems in lack ofcoordination from communications procedures to tac-tics. The naval gunfire ships, outgunned by shore bat-teries, made their runs at the coastline in column,turning in line to fire while parallel with the coast,then back to column for withdrawal. They could notwait for subsequent corrections from the spotters. Asthe threat of North Vietnamese countermeasures in-creased, the ships conducted their fires at night whichmade air spotting difficult, if not impossible. Thesemissions also hampered Lieurenant Colonel Friedrich,who found his efforts to prepare BLT 1/9 for contin-gencies wasted because of the 180-mile separation ofhis staff and units from the rest of the brigade for atwo-week period in support of such operations.'7

Raids and Demonstrations

American planners had long considered the possi-bility of an amphibious landing at Vinh to cut theVietnamese panhandle north of the DMZ. The Ma-rine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia, had present-ed such a landing as a planning exercise to studentsin the past. Lieutenant General William K. Jones,commanding general of Fleet Marine Force Pacific,remembered suggesting this option to General Wil-liam C. Westmoreland in 1965 while Jones was abrigadier general in charge of the MACV operationscenter. In practice, Seventh Fleet conducted feintsnorth of the DMZ in 1968 and 1971.18 The availabili-ty of the U.S. forces and the vulnerabilities of theNorth Vietnamese to this course of action were nevergreater than in the spring of 1972 as authorities in

Washington and CinCPac considered the feasibility ofraids and demonstrations by amphibious forces. ACentral Intelligence Agency analyst on AmbassadorEllsworth Bunker's staff in Saigon, Edwin W. Besch,observed that an amphibious landing in North Viet-nam to the rear of NVA forces would have had a greatetoperational effect than the tactical landings conduct-ed in South Vietnam.'

Early on, Seventh Fleet's Admiral Mack proposed anamphibious assault directly at the North Vietnamesemainland, or at least a feint or demonstration.* Soonafter arriving in the Tonkin Gulf, Admiral Gaddis is-sued an order for a Task Force 76 demonstration againstthe Dong Hoi-Quang Khe areas. Admiral McCain,CinCPac, then directed a demonstration just south ofthe DMZ. The 1st Regional Assistance Command'sGeneral Kroesen objected and did not want the am-phibious task force to operate away from its northernholding area. He was concerned that the 325th NVADivision would move into MR 1; he believed that theamphibious task force off the DMZ prevented this byposing a threat to the rear and supply lines of the NVAB-5 Front Both operations were canceled prior to aproposed D-Day of 24 April 1972.20

By late April, planning focused on more specificcontingencies. Prompted by the need to relieve pres-sure on South Vietnamese forces in MR 1 and by thepossibilities of having to rescue stranded aircrews,General Miller and Admiral Gaddis developed plans

*Amphibious demonstrations were operations conducted as a de-ception to cause North Vietnamese forces to redeploy or remaininaccive in order to deal with a perceived threat. The full range ofpreparation was conducted to include croop movement, com-munications, and preparatory and supporting fires. The assault wasexecuted as an actual attack wsth surface and airborne forces turn-ing away just at the last moment prior to landing.

to land Marines by surface and air assault on severalpoints in North Vietnam. Lieutenant Colonel JamesL. Shanahan, the 9th MAB operations officer, com-mented that there "was scarcely a single square-inchof the North Vietnamese coastal littoral of any valuewhatsoever which was nor the subject of at least oneplan."25 Lieutenant Colonel George B. Crist as brigadeplans officer considered Vinh, Dong Hoi, Quang Khe,and Hon Matt island as logical targets. Courses of ac-tion included a rwo-BLT demonstration at Dong Hoi,a rwo-BLT raid at Quang Khe, a one-BLT raid on HonMar, a rwo-BLT demonstration at Vinh, and a raid ora feint at Quang Khe with up to two BLTs. Brigadeproposals called for the transportation and support ofVietnamese forces to conduct these same missions us-ing TF 76. General Miller emphasized throughout theplanning process the requirement for absolute localsuperiority in supporting arms.22

Colonel Robert J. Perrich's 33d MATS joined 9thMAB in the Tonkin Gulf on 28 April. On Okinawa,Major General Joseph C. Fegan, Jr., the 3d Marine Di-vision commander, assigned Lieutenant ColoneljohnC. Gonzalez' 2/9 as BLT Delta, the division's air con-tingency unit. On 1 May, ready forces went on two-hour standby for evacuation operations in support ofFRAC. Marines and sailors of the 31st MAU, BLT Bra-vo, and the 33d MAU manned battle stations untilMACV Advisory Team 155 withdrew from Quang TnCity in USAF HH-53 "Jolly Green Giant" helicopters.The majority of U.S. Marine advisors remained withtheir Vietnamese units as they retreated south fromQuang Tn towards Hue. With the dissolution of the3d ARVN Division** and the South Vietnamese with-drawals to the My Chanh River, the situation in MR

*5The Ben l-lai Flyers" to the Marines afloat, although this wasunjust considering the relative strengths of the fnrres involved.



Daylzght naval gunfire operations by destroyers were within range of North Vietnamesecounteraction. As a result, nrkht firing was adopted to minimize this risk factor Herethe USS Richard B. Anderson increases speed to avoid sheilfire from Hon Co Island

A TRACT OF TIME 147

Marine Corps Hiacoriral Collection

In response to demands for special operations, 9thMAB ground units prepared for battle within theconfines of shijb board living. Here a man practices withan M2AI portable flame thrower discharging waterrather than jellied gasoline, from the ship's side.

1 was critical.23 American combat forces in MR 1 werereduced to the 11th Aviation Group, the 196th Infan-try Brigade, and USAF base defense forces at Da Nangas incremental redeployments conrinued.t

By 7 May, ARVN units, backed by American fire-power, formed a defensive line along the My ChanhRiver. Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong tookcommand of I Corps from Lieutenant General HoangXuan Lam and moved into frsrward headquarters in theCitadel in Hue.tt General Truong's immediate taskwas to defend Hue and stabilize his forces. Support-ed by MACV's 1st Regional Assistance Command,General Truong moved swiftly to establish his chain ofcommand, designate reserves, and enhance his controlof supporting arms. This set the stage for 9th MAB'sdirect support of FRAC and the VNMC Division inthe defense of Hue and the I Corps counteroffensivethat followed.25

Redeyes at Sea

Admiral Mack had been concerned since mid-Aprilthat the North Vietnamese would try to attack one ofhis carriers as operations intensified in the TonkinGulf. Whether the Communists could tell the differ-

*By 30 April 1972, actual American troop-strength in South Viet-nam was at 68,100—compared to the authorized goal of 49,000.

**General Metzger held 'Ihiong in high esteem from the period ofclose work between the 1st ARVN Division and the 3d Marine Di-vision in 1967, considering hini"an exceedingly competent and ablecombat commander:' (Meager Comments)

ence between an aircraft or helicopter carrier was notknown and academic to Marines who found themselvesgoing to general quarters on both. At this time, aNorth Vietnamese MiG-17, Mikoyan-Gurevich Fresco,bombed the USS Hik bee (DD 806) while engaged in asurface attack on Dong I-Ioi, highlighting the vulner-ability of Seventh Fleet ships to North Vietnamese airattack.ttt Because of the lack of effective point airdefense weaponstttt on some ships, Admiral Mackasked the Marine Corps to provide "Redeye" missilesand forward air defense teams for protection. GeneralJones, FMFPac, authorized the deployment of missileteams on 7 May after an evaluation by First Fleetshowed the feasibility of the concept of employingshoulder-fired missiles on board ship. On 8 May, FirstLieutenantjames B. Dowling's 3d Redeye Platoon, 3dMarine Aircraft Wing, departed MCAS El Toro, Cali-fornia. The platoon of 42 men took with them 44 mis-sile systems, six night viewing devices, and associatedsupport equipment. Arriving in the Western Pacificthey were assigned to General Miller for support ofthe Seventh Fleet. This allowed naval gunfire ships tocontinue to fire against targets in North Vietnamwithour diverting carrier aircraft to combat air patrols.

While an American "Thunder Curtain" of support-ing naval gunfire, tactical air, and B-52 Arc Lights pro-tected the South Vietnamese in MR 1, Admiral Mackagain moved north, issuing an initiating directive forOperation Heroic Action, a raid to seize the Dong Hoiferry crossings south of Vinh. General Miller said thepurpose was "to go into North Vietnam and a wholebunch of other things."26 Wrote a young battalion-level staff officer:

One morning in May 1972 aboard the 1155 Dens'er(LPD9), 1 was sorting incoming message traffic when I tame toan operations order. I turned to the battalion operationsofficec and said, "This looks like the real thing." He lookedat the message and headed for the commanding officer'sstateroom muttering abour "going to war."27

A week of intense planning followed; orders, maps,and aerial photos were issued to the rifle companiesand attached units. The Marines on ship in newly is-sued camouflage "utility" uniforms focused on clean-ing weapons, packing combat equipment, and a seriesof detailed inspections. Seventh Fleet assigned fourdestroyers for naval gunfire, two destroyers for escort,and two aircraft carriers for support. Rehearsal and

tttThis was on 19 April 1972. This MiG was shot down by the1155 Sterett (CG 31) with a Terrier missile.

****Available 350 and 554 guns wrre nor designed for useagainst high-performance aircraft.


communication exercises began on 11 May off DongHoi. On 13 May, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chair-man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, postponed the oper-ation indefinitely, because he wanted amphibiousforces to remain in position to back-up MR 1.28 Ad-miral McCain, CinCPac, then ordered a demonstra-non for the next day, but cancelled it when heconcluded that the absence of both helicopter carri-ers, supporting other operations, would defeat the pur-pose of the maneuver. The landing was called off "atthe last minute:'

A 9th MAB message to General Metager describedHeroic Action as a turnaway landing. General Jones,then FMFPac, remembered the raid "as a fact:' butagreed with Admiral McCain's final decision. Recordsfrom Seventh Fleet and Fleet Marine Force Pacific in-dicated it was to be a raid, while records from the Pa-cific Command and JCS stated for political reasons itwas never more than a deception plan. The possibili-ty of landing was valid considering the availability offorces and a situation that lent itself to success, andthis was what the North Vietnamese were to believe.Seventh Fleet amphibious fbrces were now totally com-mitted to the support of American and Vietnameseunits in South Vietnam.

Support to Military Region 1

To this point, 9th MAB and IT 76 operations hadbeen unilateral Seventh Fleet actions. This conditionchanged to meet General Creighton W. Abram's needfor direct support to FRAC and the South Vietnamese

in MR I. General Miller observed that, ". . . politicalconstraints precluded the reintroduction of U.S. Ma-rine Corps troops into South Vietnam in a land warfarerole. Still, there were other alternatives to simply land-ing U.S. Marines."29 The flexibility and availability toGeneral Miller and Task Force 76 provided the SeventhFleet with a wide variety of options to support MR 1.The close relationship between the Vietnamese andAmerican Marines, built up over the years, providedfor excellent coordination. Direct support to the Viet-namese Marine Corps Division included commandand control, staff planning, fire support, assault sup-port, and logistics. Lieutenant Colonel Gerald H.Turley, the G-3 Advisor to the VNMC Division,referred to the amphibious sailors and Marines as "outbrothers off shore" for the subsequent contributionsby the amphibious forces to the defense and counter-attack in MR I from May through September l972.°

General Truong and FRAC's General Kroesen metwith the 9th MAB staff for the ongoing defense of HueCity. This broadened to planning with MACV for am-phibious support of General Truong's efforts to regainQuang Tn City. General Abrams forwarded GeneralTruong's request for Seventh Fleet support to AdmiralMcCain, and subsequent planning conferences in Hueironed out the planning details and allowed for coor-dination of supporting arms and communications. In-itial plans called for offensive operations in the HaiLang Forest area.

Early on 13 May, Marines of 33d MAU's HMM-164

As support for Military Region 1 became a priority, Marines afloat put specific plans towork. In the ready room of the USS New Orleans, LtCol Charles H. F Egger briefs theother pilots and crews of HMM-165 prior to a joint operation with the South Vietnamese.

Depaftment of Defense Photo (USMC) A800697

A TRACT OF TIME 149

and BLT 1/4 "stood to" in anticipation of the day'sactivities. The TJSS Okinawa, Mobile, Cayuga,Manitowoc, Point Defiance, and St. Louis moved intoa holding area 30 miles from the coastline. To allowfor a simultaneous launch, helicopters were positionedon all available deck space.* Marines augmented theships' crews manning battle stations: guns, medical,deck, damage control, and search-and-rescue. The suc-cess of this first combined operation began the seriesof landings used to contain and later to defeat theCommunist forces in MR 1.

Fleet Support ContinuesThe first Redeye missile teams deployed the day af-

ter arriving at Subic Bay, Philippines. By 19 May, 10teams of four men each were on naval gunfire shipsin the Tonkin Gulf. The initial assignments foundLieutenant Dowling and a team on the USS Provi-dence (CLG 6), with others on the USS Mullin nix (DD944), Everett F Larson (DD 830), Benjamin Stoddert(DDG 22), Eversole (DD 789), Berkeley (DDG 15),Hanson (DD 832), Huil(DD 945), Buchanan (DDG14), and Dennis J. Buckley (DD 808). LieutenantDowling's missile teams rotated on board additionalships depending upon their proximity to the NorthVietnamese shore defenses. Eighteen two-man teamswere organized by the middle of the year to provideadditional coverage. Training of navy gunners beganat Subic Bay and Twentynine Palms, California, allow-ing the Navy to take over missile defense from the Ma-rines.** The effectiveness of this expedient antiaircraftdefense was never put to the test. The U.S. soon con-ducted naval gunfire attacks at night and Americanaircraft bombed the airfields that posed a threat tothe Seventh Fleer.3'

BLT Delta (BLT 2/9) boarded ARG ships and ar-rived off MR I on 22 May. This brought the 9th MABto irs maximum strength during 1972. The brigadeconsisted of the 31st MAU (Provisional Marine Air-craft Group 10) and 33rd MAU (Regimental LandingTeam 4), with 6,042 men and 46 aircraft, a brigadein strength as well as name. This was the largest con-centration of amphibious forces during the VietnamWar, and the largest wartime amphibious force sincethe Inchon and Wonsan landings of the Korean War.The size of this force alone gave the North Vietnamesesome concern about U.S. intentions.32

With the success of Song Than 5-72, the VNMCDivision launched Song Than 6-72. The operation was

*Twentytwo aircraft from six ships.**By 31 July 1972, training and turnover was completed and the

3d Redeye Platoon returned to the United States.

in the same general location as the first, but closer tothe coast where the NVA was using small boats to sup-ply its forward units. Again the object was to disruptNorth Vietnamese forces and to relieve pressure on theMy Chanh Line. The landing plan used a mix ofbrigade units under the 33d MAU's Colonel Perrichand HMM-164, ARG Bravo, and ARG Charlie support-ing the Vietnamese assault force. On 23 May, the 7thVNMC Battalion loaded on the Cayuga and Duluthin preparation for landing. Helicopters from HMM-i64filled available deck space for a single-wave launch.***As they had in the previous assault, the VietnameseMarines carried out this operation successfully.Helicopters brought Vietnamese casualties to theships, demonstrating the reality of war to the Ameri-cans offshore.

On 17 June, General Robert E. Cushman,Jr., Com-mandant of the Marine Corps, visited with Ill MAFcommanders as part of his Western Pacific inspectiontrip, which included Vietriam.3 Major David). Moore,executive officer for HMM-164, flew General Millerinto Da Nang, where they met General Cushman andtook him to Hue and later to the Okinawa. RecalledMoore, "Because of the SA-7 threat, our trip to Huewas a bit more exciting than General Cushman ex-pected]' By then, the South Vietnamese in MR 1 hadregained the initiative over the Communists. Lam Son72 was General Truong's plan to recapture portionsof MR 1 lost at the beginning of the Easter Offensiveand he directed the Vietnamese Airborne and MarineDivisions to attack north from the My Chanh Riverto seize a line along Route 602 from Hai Lang to Wun-der Beach.

Across the Beach: The Lam Son Landings

In support of Lam Son 72, Admiral Gaddis andGeneral Miller assembled ARG Charlie with the 31stMAU and ARG Alpha with the 33d MAU in a stag-ing area for preparations for a demonstration just northof the Cua Viet River.**** While in the staging area,the amphibious forces conducted a command post ex-ercise and, at the same time, attacked selected targetsin the objective area with naval gunfire and tacticalair strikes. The main enemy threat to this operationwas from coastal artillery located on Hon (Tiger) Is-land. On 26June, the amphibious task group was ac-rivared by Task Force 76 and a second rehearsal was

***Twenty aircraft and 20 LVT5s from nine ships. USS Duluth,Cayuga, Okinawa, Schenectady, Sumter, Juneau, St. Louis, Mobile,and Manitowoc.

****315e MAT): BLT i/4, HMM-164. 33d MAT): BLT 1/9,HMM-165.


conducted, surface and air attacks continued in theobjective area, and South Vietnamese Navy landingcraft loaded Vietnamese Marines at Tan My to join thetask force.

Following the amphibious demonstration of 27June, the 9th MAB prepared to continue OperationLam Son 72 with a VNMC two-battalion helicopterassault into landing zones behind Communist lineson 29 june. At the same time, the remainder of theVietnamese Marine Division launched a frontal attackfrom the My Chanh. American amphibious supportto this phase of Lam Son 72 allowed the rapid advanceof South Vietnamese forces to the outskirts of QuangTn City. On 30 june, the President of South Vietnam,Nguyen Van Thieu, visited the USS Blue Ridge to con-vey his personal thanks to the sailors and Marines ofthe amphibious forces for "the preservation of Peaceand Freedom" in South Vietnam?8

Another opportunity for a helicopter assault on theexposed Communist seaward flank occurred whenstrong NVA fotces entrenched in the outskirts ofQuang Tn City and to the south and east along theVinh Dinh River stalled the South Vietnamese attack.General Troung and a new FRAC commander, MajorGeneral Howard H. Cooksey, decided on a two-battalion ground attack from the east supported bya heliborne assault from the west across the Vinh Dinh

River to turn the NVA defenses. General Miller, andthe new task force commander, Rear Admiral WycliffeD. Toole, Jr., used combined brigade helicopter assetsand Task Force 76 ships for a maximum buildup ofcombat power. The 31st MAU of Colonel Donald E.Newton and the 33d MAU of Colonel Robertj. Per-rich carried out the new assignment with the ex-perienced HMM-164 on the Okinawa and HMM-165from the TrzjOoli. At the planning conference for thisoperation at the VNMC division command post,Colonel Perrich pointed out that the use of a singlehelicopter squadron would require two separate liftsto complete and that a delay was in order until bothsquadrons were available on 11 july 1972. In the wakeof this hard-won assault, General Cooksey requestedSeventh Fleet's Vice Admiral James L. Holloway III toprovide an alternate means to resupply VNMC unitsalong the coast. The solution was the installation ofa five-section causeway at Wunder Beach by the USSAlamo (LSD 33), by its Navy beachmasters and Ma-rine shore party.

On 14 July, rhe VNMC continued its attacks onQuang Tn City in support of the ARVN Airborne Di-vision. On 22 july, Brigadier General Lan conducteda two-battalion ground movement, supported by tanksand artillery, attacking up the coast and linking witha third battalion making a heliborne assault 4,000

Not all hazardsDepartment of Defense Photo (USMC) A142278

to flight were from the enemy. Mechanical failure claimed this UH-lfrom the USS Okinawa. The crew was recovered, but the aircraft was lost at sea.

A TRACT OF TIME 151


RAdm U7ycliffe D. Toole, Jr., Commander làsk Force76, makes remarks to embarked staffs, while BGen Ed-wardj Miller; Commander Task Group 79.1, look on.

meters to the north. General Miller and Admiral Tooleused the 31st MAU and ARG Charlie ships to sup-port this, and Admiral Mack even ordered the USSDenver from operations with Task Force 77 to provideadditional deck space fbr helicopter staging.* After thisoperation, General Lan said that the 9th MAB andTask Force 76 support enabled the offensive to belaunched with success, citing the devastatingly accuratepreparation fires by naval gunfire. Accotding to Lan,the 9th MAB supported the multibattalion heliborneassaults with professional skill, courageous perfor-mance, and a timeliness "which allowed the \TNMCforces to aggressively attack."a7

A typhoon in the Philippines in July caused Ad-miral McCain to direct Admiral Holloway to providerelief to America's longtime Asian ally. The USS BlueRidge, Tripoli, Juneau, Alamo, and Cayuga werediverted from combat operations in Vietnam to hu-manitarian service in the Philippines from 22 Julythrough 13 August 1972. The 33d MAU remained on120-hour recall to MR I while conducting relief ac-tivities.** The MAU commander commented that theMarines of Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. F Egger'sHMM-165 flew "their helicopters in near-zero visibil-ity to deliver emergency food supplies to peoplestranded in villages that were cut off . . . . BLT 2/4Matines worked under equally miserable conditionsto provide assistance."a8 After a short period of train-ing and an amphibious exercise, the 33d MAU, nowcommanded by Colonel Charles T. Williamson, and

See Chapter 13.**The 33d MAU and subordinate units were awarded the Philip-

pine Presidential Unit Citation for their efforts.

the ARG- Alpha ships proceeded to the Gulf of Tonkinto relieve the 31st MAU and ARG Charlie on 24August.59

General Miller and the 9th MAB staff remained offthe coast on the USS PaulRevere (LPA 248) while theSouth Vietnamese engaged in heavy fighting to retakeQuang Tn City. Contingency and support planningcontinued through the month. Lieutenant ColonelRobert W. "Rip" Kirby, commanding BLT 2/4, madea liaison visit to the VNMC Division command post,in part a reunion with an Amphibious Warfare Schoolclassmate—General Lan. Kirby asked Lan about thetactical situation during the tough fighting at QuangTn City, and the Vietnamese Marine general repliedwithout pause, "I'm still using the yellows," referringto the doctrinal "school solutions" used by MarineCorps Schools at Quantico, Virginia.40

Turnaway at Quang Tn

More specific planning began in August 1972 at therequest of General Abrams and FRAC's General Cook-sey. The objeci: was to draw NVA units away fromQuang Tn City and to the northeast. General Truong

Some hazards came from maritime weather; as withtyphoon conditions that required rotor blades to beremoved to prevent wind damage on the USS Tripoli.


believed an amphibious demonstration on, or about,1 September would accomplish this. When this wasnot approved in time by CinCPac, another amphibi-ous demonstration was requested to take place be-tween the Cua Viet River and the DMZ for thefollowing week. As with deceptions, the fact the land-ing was to be a demonstration was kept from bothAmerican and South Vietnamese participating forces.

On 6 September, Admiral Toole and General Millerusing ARG transports with the 33d MAU* occupiedthe amphibious holding area off the DMZ. They con-ducted communication tests, fired naval gunfire, andbegan tactical air attacks in the objective area, includ-ing Tiger Island and Cap Lay. On 7 September, Viet-namese ships and the USSJuneau (LPD 10) embarked400 ARVN Rangers from Tan My for the surface as-sault. Naval gunfire and tactical air continued hittingthe objective area. On 8 September the amphibioustask group was activated and rehearsals began. AirFbrce B-52s and naval gunfire struck enemy targets;South Vietnamese field artillery reinforced the Ameri-can fires. The turnaway was completed on 9 Septem-

*BLT 214 and HMM-165.

ber without incident and the amphibious forcesreturned to the off-shore holding areas.

Marine and naval officers continued liaison with ICorps, FRAC, and MACV, but the task force provid-ed no further direct combat support after October1972. Both the North and South Vietnamese unitsjuggled for tactical ground and political bargainingpositions during the continuing Paris Peace Talks,while 9th MAB and Task Force 76 remained off thecoast. The 9th MAB's backing of the VNMC andFRAC helped to recapture Quang Tn City and deniedNorth Vietnamese military and political objectives inMR I. Throughout, the Marines and sailors of the 9thMarine Amphibious Brigade, seabased with Task Ibrce76, contributed their full share to the total naval op-tions available to the Seventh Fleet in response to theNorth Vietnamese offensive. The Seventh Fleet com-mander stated the response of all ships and units tothe surge in Seventh Fleet operations caused by theinvasion of the Republic of Vietnam had beennoteworthy in every sense of the word,' Added werethe comments of General Cushman, CMC, that "I amhappy to see that in each instance Marines met thechallenges head-on in an outstanding manner."42



The Spring Offensive ended for the Seventh Fleet's amphibious forces as it began, withthe amphibious ready groups underway in the Gulf of Tonkin. A Marine helicopter fliespast the USS Juneau and USS Paul Revere underway in a holding area off the DMZ.

CHAPTER 11

Any Time, Any PlaceThe Storm Breaks—Marine Air Responds—Support to the Air Force, MAG-15 Operations

Support to the Air Force, MAG-12 Operations —Task Force Delta —The Rose Garden Grows

The Storm Breaks—Marine Air Responds

While the 30 March 1972 offensive affected all Ma-tines in Southeast Asia, especially those with theSeventh Fleet, it directly triggered the movement ofmajor Marine aircraft units back into Southeast Asiato reinforce the Seventh Ait Force. Major GeneralRobert G. Owens, Jr.'s 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1stMAW) provided critical attack, fighter, electronicwarfare, and support aircraft needed to augment U.S.alt strength in South Vietnam and Thailand. Marinehelicopter and fixed-wing units of the Seventh Fleetwere already off the coast of Vietnam as other unitsfrom the 1st MAW entered the region. The wing firstorganized a large and potent force at its bases in main-land Japan and on Okinawa.' The 3 April dispatchfromJapan of a detachment from Marine CompositeReconnaissance Squadron (VMCJ) 1 to the Naval AirStation, Cubi Point, Philippines, marked the begin-ning of the reentry of Marine high-performance air-craft to combat in Vietnam.

At FMFPac, Lieutenant General William K. Joneshad correctly reasoned that while it was unlikely thatAmerican gtound troops would be recommitted to thefighting, an immediate buildup of tactical air wouldoccur. GeneralJones, with the CinCPac staff, believedthe best response to MACV and South Vietnam's needfor more air support would be made by the dual-mission, extended-range, McDonnell Douglas F-4Phantom jets of the 1st MAW. The Phantom was usedby both the Navy and the Air Force, which madelogistical support of these planes easier than for otherMarine aircraft types, but as Marine Fighter AttackSquadron (VMFA) 212's Lieutenant Colonel RichardD. Revie observed, they had "very few compatibleparts" and even flew different-model aircraft in hissquadron's case.2 On 5 April, General Owens receivednotification from Ill MAF's Lieutenant General LouisMetzger to deploy, on order from JCS and CinCPac,two Phantom squadrons to Vietnam to support theSeventh Air Force. General Owens directed VMFA-115and VMFA-232 to deploy for "training" to Cubi Point;from there they were in position to respond rapidlyto the developing situation in South Vietnam.3

Overseeing the regional air buildup was CinCPac,

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., and his staff. Previousair operations against North Vietnam were part ofCinCPac's Operation Rolling Thunder, which had be-gun in 1965 and continued until the bombing haltof 1968. After this date, U.S. aircraft operations overNorth Vietnam were limited to armed reconnaissance,combat air patrol, and protective-reaction sorties. Airattacks continued on Laos, Cambodia, and South Vier-nam with increased intensity through the 1972 fight-ing. Marine air was fitted into Navy and Air Forcecommand and control structures evolved over the longcourse of the war. The Southeast Asia Tactical DataSystem allowetl the Air Force's Airborne Tactical DataSystem and the Navy's Tactical Data System to ex-change information over the whole of Southeast Asiaand the Tonkin Gulf This enabled tactical com-manders to control airspace to rendezvous and refuel,and to coordinate with surface and air units.

Together with an interface of aircraft, the Air Forceand Navy orga:nized common control measures, withthe region divided into tactical control areas or route"packages:' General John W. Vogt, Jfs Seventh AirForce was responsible to General Abrams' MACV foroperations in South Vietnam and into Route Package(RP) 1.* General Vogt reported to Pacific Air Force'sGeneral Lucius D. Clay for Route Packages 5 and 6a.On the Navy side, Vice Admiral Damon W. Cooperof Task Force 77 answered to Vice Admiral WilliamP. Mack for Seventh Fleet's Route Packages 2, 3, 4, and6b. A further division existed between the daytimebombing of point targets by the Navy and Air Forceand nighttime area bombing by Strategic Air Com-mand B-52s from Guam and Thailand.

Support to the Air Force, MAG-15 Operations

Reinforcement of Seventh Air Force by 1st MAW be-gan with the movement of air units to Cubi Point andended with an eventual commitment of an unofficialtotal of 4,895 Marines and 120 aircraft, The stagingof 12 F-4Bs and 15 F-4Js allowed the 1st MAW com-mander to deploy his units at short notice. The lead

*General Vogr was "double-batted" in April 1972 as Deputy Com-mander for Air Operations. MACV. In June 1972 he also becameDeputy Commander, MACV, as well as Commanding General,Seventh Air Force.

153

Gulfof

Tonkin

Task Force

Gulfof

Thailand

Cape Ca Mau

SouthChina Sea

Adapted from Naval Historical Center Material


Cambodia

rine, Air Force, and Navy squadrons.

aircraft touched down at Da Nang on 6 April withinhours of the orders from 1st MAW. This rapid arrival inVietnam drew the praise of The White House, the sur-prise of the Air Force, and the vexation of the Japanesegovernment for supposedly departing for Vietnamfrom Japanese bases without prior notification.t

The first Phantoms of Lieutenant Colonel Kent A.McFerren's VMFA115 "Silver Eagles" and LieutenantColonel Joe L. Gregorcyck's VMFA-232 "Red Devils"landed on Da Nang's 10,000-foot runway four hoursand 55 minutes after being ordered from the Philip-pines. The airlift of necessary support personnel andequipment took another four days for a total of 26aircraft, 984 Marines, and 2,099,702 pounds of cargo.While reinforcing Air Force wings in South Vietnam,the Marine squadrons remained under the control ofColonel Keith O'Keefe's Marine Aircraft Group(MAG) 15 (Forward). Subordinate units were Head-quarters and Maintenance Squadron (H&MS) 15, Ma-rine Air Base Squadron (MABS) 15, and the two flyingsquadrons. Marines in MAG-15 met Vietnamizationtroop levels by being in temporary additional duty sta-

4General Metzger takes exception to FMFPac records ofjapanesevexation, commenting that all deployments from Japanese baseswere to areas other than Vietnam. Once underway, or after arrivalat intermediate bases, unit movement was then approved to Viet-nam. American commanders in Japan "were well aware of this con-cern and were careful ro comply with this policy" of Japan not beinginvolved in U.S. operations in Vietnam. (Metager Comments)

The tail letters "VP" indicate its squadron.

tus while in Vietnam, thus avoiding manpower res-tttctions.

Colonel O'Keefè found the situation changed in theshort 10 months since MAG-15 had departed Vietnamunder agreed-upon troop reductions. Weather and ter-rain remained the same, but the flying required tostem the flow of North Vietnamese fotces was quitedifferent. After an initial period of maneuver, battlelines became fixed and identifiable from the air as ene-my and friendly areas. In northern MR 1 were themixed elements of the enemy B-5 Front, including the3 04th, 3 08th, and 324B NVA Divisions, and a num-ber of separate infantry and sapper units These heav-ily concentrated men and machines were "troops inthe open" targets, but also presented a greater risk toflyers from the massed antiaircraft weapons accom-panying them. The North Vietnamese employed an-tiaircraft weapons in quantity to compensate for a lackof air support. Not only were heavy antiaircraft gunsmoved south of the Demilitarized Zone, but also anew threat emerged in the form of the shoulder-firedSA-7, the Soviet-produced "Grail," which knockeddown 27 allied aircraft in 1972, one of which was ajet plane.tt Aircraft near the DMZ were also targets

The missile was also known by the Soviet designation "Strel-la' or arrow. Basically, this thteat required helicopters to fly lowerand fixed-wing aircraft to fly highet than before. Some 27 alliedaircraft were downed, compared to a reported 351 SA-7 missilelaunthings during this period.

ANY TIME, ANY PLACE 155


McDonnellDouglas F-4B Phantom fighter-bombers of VMFA -115 were among the initialaircraft from MAG-15 to arrive in Da Nang after III MAP air power was committed inresponse to the Communist Spring Offensive. A workhorse aircraft, it was used by Ma-

156

Adapted from Task Force Delta Material

THE WAR THAT WOULD NCTr END


for SA-2 "Guideline" missiles launched from just in-side North Vietnam.7 Flying from Da Nang, MAG-15lost two F-4s and a TA-4 to these defenses in the strug-gle to regain lost territory in South Vietnam.8

Despite the despetate situation in MR 1, combatoperations for MAG-15 did not start until pilots hadreceived in-country indoctrination from the SeventhAir Force in compliance with General Abrams' direc-tives.* Preparations completed, combat flights beganon 9 April with close air support missions in MR 1to defend Hue. In the transition between the north-east and southwest monsoon seasons, the weatherhampered the Marine missions. Even so, Marine air-craft flew both close and general support in MR 1 nearDong Ha, Quang Tn, and Hue, and in MR 2 near Plei-ku, Kontum, and Phu Cat.° This support includedbomb, napalm, rocket, and strafe attacks within 200yards of ground forces.**

Additional fighter-bombers arrived on 14 April with12 F-4Js of Lieutenant Colonel Revie's VMFA-212"Lancers" from Hawaii. On 16 April, five H&MS-15McDonnell Douglas TA-4Fs came from Japan. TheseSkyhawks were used for air and naval gunfire spottingmissions north of the DMZ. Known as "Fast FACs,"the TA-4 detachment flew ANGLICO air observers asnaval gunfire spotters and forward air controllers overMR 1 and North Vietnam in areas denied to sloweraircraft by antiaircraft fire. Fast-FAC missions soon in-creased to four each day and continued at that rateuntil the North Vietnamese shore-based defensescaused the naval gunfire strikes to be conducted atnight.*** 10

The NVA invasion found the allied air effort in aperiod of transition from U.S. Air Force to VietnameseAir Force control. The Tactical Air Control System andAir Ground Operations System operated at reducedlevels from the peak of the American involvement,reflecting differences between American and Viet-namese resources. While the direct air support centersand corps-level tactical operations centers were ade-quate, the tactical air control specialists at division and

*Indoctrinarion included learning rules of engagement, commu-nications procedures, and escape and evasion plans, and receivingfriendly and enemy situation briefs.

**"More like .50 meters,' observed Lieutenant General Leslie E.Brown (Brown Comments).

***FMFPac records 87 sorties flown; CNA lists 90. By 3 May 1972,Seventh Fleet and TF 77 felt there was a lack of effective employ-ment to justify the continued use of the TA-4s. Problems encoun-tered were similar to those of helicopter NGF spotting attemptsdescribed in Chapter 10.

lower unit levels were "generally unsatisfactory by Ma-rine Corps standards." Available ANGUCO person-nel and advisors were spread thin on the ground andalso had to fulfill the roles of forward air controllers.Mission fragging authority resided with General JohnW. Vogt, Jr., Commanding General of Seventh AirForce, who also was MACV Deputy Commander forAir Operations. The 366th Tactical Fighter Wing atDa Nang provided tactical control, with terminalguidance and support requests by the USAF 20th Tac-tical Air Support Squadron and the Vietnamese 1stAir Division, collocated in the I Corps Direct Air Sup-port Center (I DASC) and Control and ReportingCenter at Da Nang. Typically, MAG-15 would informthe Air Force of the number of sorties it expected tofly the following day. Lieutenant Colonel Revie ofVMFA-212 recalled that the Air Force then scheduledtargets and take-off times, as they had for years "withlittle flexibility?' Following normal briefings and air-craft preflight procedures, the aircraft proceeded tothe target area where the pilot would "link up" withthe FAC who controlled the strike on specific targets.Greater use was made of Air Force and ANGLICO air-borne controllers to compensate for the deficiency inground control. For unplanned requirements, aircraftwere diverted from scheduled missions. Under this sys-tem the sortie rate remained constant regardless of theground situation.

A study of this air employment by the Marine CorpsOperations Analysis Group of the Center for NavalAnalyses in 1973 concluded "that Marine Corps tacticalair was not used as effectively as it might have been hadthe Marines been fully supported with their own com-mand and control system;' especially in the close airsupport role.'2 The Marines felt there was a better wayto do business. Colonel O'Keefe believed that close airsupport target assignments of 1,500 meters fromfriendly units were being used out of ignorance of Ma-rine capability to hit safely closer to friendly forces.Another difference, under the Air Force system, wasthat final control remained with the pilot in the air-craft while the Marines placed it with the commanderon the ground. All of this was compounded by lan-guage difficulties when Vietnamese forces were sup-ported.

At Da Nang, base defense was the responsibility ofthe South Vietnamese and U.S. Air Force SecurityPolice "ground defrnse forces?' Already, 11 Communistattacks by fire had been launched against four SouthVietnamese air bases, inflicting 97 casualties anddamaging 17 aircraft. Seven of these attacks were



Concerns about enemy action against the Marine avi-ation units were from stan doff and infiltration attacks.These abandoned Soviet-built rockets were found ata launch site five miles southwest of Da Nang.

against the Da Nang Air Base.'3 MAG-15 was vulner-able to the "standoff" attacks and sapper raids by NVAor VC units. Internal security was MAG-15's responsi-bility, but the air and ground crews were wotkingaround-the-clock with flight operations. ColonelO'Keefe requested additional support. Concerned withMAG-15 and also the eventual security of MAG-12,General Metzger ordered Major General Joseph C. Fe-gan's 3d Marine Division to provide security forcesfrom the division's alert units or from the 9th MAB.The task of providing combat forces to the air groupsin Vietnam was assigned to 3d Battalion, 9th Marines,which was III MAF's Air Contingency Battalion, thenon 24-hour standby on Okinawa. Forces were provid-ed on a "temporary" basis to accommodate person-nel ceilings and because "it would be goodtraining."*14 Lieutenant Colonel Ronald A. Clark'sbattalion had been "chaffing at the bit" about beingin the rear during the 9th MAB buildup. This newassignment was referred to cryptically as "the mission."The 3d Battalion was going to Vietnam.

Meanwhile, Major General Leslie E. Brown, the new1st MAW commander, believed that the Seventh AirForce did not make efficient use of MAG-15 becauseof adherence to fixed flight schedules that kept the

*This also served to avoid the appearance of "The Marines havelanded" for political reasons in an election year, and also demon-strated respert for Thai sensibilities.

Marine Aitcraft Group 15 Command Chronology

At the receiving end of a rocket attack, GySgt Floydj Beem, of MAG-15, is standing in a 122mm rocketcrater near the Marine billeting area at Da Nang. Therocket was one of approximately 12 launched by theCommunists which hit the airbase on 24 April 1972.

Marine sortie rate down.** As a result, on 28 April,General Brown proposed to General Metzger thatMAG-15 augment the Navy's TF 77 combat air patrolrequirements with four sorties a day.' While sortie ratehad operational applications, it was also viewed byanalysts, especially at the JCS level, as an importantindication of readiness and effectiveness. The rate wasgreatly influenced by other factors such as combat de-mands, weather, policies for scheduling, and location.General Brown also cautioned against mistaking sortierate, bomb damage assessments, and bombing ton-nage for effectiveness against the enemy, as the airstrikes were in high threat areas where post-strike ob-servation was impractical — obscured by smoke and notverified by ground units. And finally, there was a de-pendence upon airborne forward air controllets whooperated under different limitations than did ground-based tactical air control parties.16

While MAG-15 flew daily combat missions in MR 1and MR 2, 1st MAW prepared plans in May to movethe group to another location. A compelling consider-ation was the possible loss of MR 1 with the fall ofQuang Tn City and the subsequent Communist drive

**Sortie rate is the average number of combat missions flownper aircraft per day.

on Hue.'7 As additional Air Force units arrived fromthe United States, Marine squadrons were logical can-didates for withdrawal from Vietnam.* The situationin Vietnam and Southeast Asia, however, did not per-mit the Marine air units to return to their home sta-tions; most units were redeployed within the regionto continue the support of the South Vietnamese. Thequestion faced by General Metzger and the 1st MAWcommander, General Brown, was "where?"** Whenthis was decided, the "how" took care of itself.

While this was underway, the situation in QuangTn and Bien Hoa Provinces required General Metzgerto move security forces to South Vietnam. On 25 May,the advance party of the 9th Marines arrived at DaNang to protect MAG-is. By 4 June, 365 Marines ofCompanies M and L, 9th Marines were deployed asground security forces. The Marine infantrymen did

*From the June 1972 ceiling of 60,000 Americans in Vietnam,MACV allocated the Marines 1,383 billets, a numbee to be reached

by 1 July.**FMFPac's Geneeal Jones had been General Brown's battalion

commander in World War II, when Geneeal Brown had been aninfantry officer.

not have long to settle in, as MAG-15 (Fbrward) wasscheduled to vacate Da Nang by 15 June forThailand.***58


The North Vietnamese attack towards Saigon inApril resulted in the fall of Loc Ninh and a "siege"of the provincial capital, An Loc. There was a singlesquadron of Air Thrce Cessna A-37 Dragonflies to sup-port operations in MR 3, other air support comingfrom TE 77 aircraft carriers and from Thailand. Thesituation at An Inc required dedicated close air sup-port aircraft and this requirement was met by the de-pendable A-4E Skyhawks of Marine Aircraft Group12 (Rrward). Soon after 1st MAW deployed fightersto Da Nang, General Meager issued a warning orderto General Brown to send squadrons to Bien Hoa AirBase north of Saigon.' Lieutenant Colonel Willis B.Wilson's "Avengers" of Marine Attack Squadron(VMA) 211 and Lieutenant Colonel Kevin M. John-

***Replacement personnel for Companies L and M were madefrom 3rd Marine Division to MAC-I). Company I remained withMAG-12 at Bien Hoa until its departure from Vietnam in 1973.


Marine Aircraft Group 1) Command Chronology

During a command visit, MajGen Leslie F. Brown, 1st MAW Commanding General, speakwith Col Keith O'Keefe of MAG-15 about conditions in South Vietnam at Da Nang.

ston's "Tomcats" of VMA-311 were sent "on a trainingmission" to forward bases in the Philippines in antic-ipation of going to Vietnam.20 This began the secondmajor deployment of 1st MAW aircraft on indepen-dent operations, providing support to embattled MR 3and An line.

Genetal Brown issued movement orders on 16 Mayfor 10 A-4s at Naval Air Station Cubi Point and 22aircraft at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS), Iwaku-ni. Commitment orders were sent on 17 Ma3 Thatsame day Marine Skyhawks came up on TACAN*Channel 73 of"BNH" and began the approach to BienHoa's 10,000-foot runway, the first of 32 A-4s to ar-rive "in country."** Supporting elements of MAG-12followed with Military Airlift Command (MAC) C-141and C-130 flights delivering 870 Marines and materi-al of H&MS-12 and MABS-12 Detachments. GeneralBrown temembered the MAC airplanes arriving atIwakuni literally "from all over the world. It was anabsolutely superiot performance."21

With a crisis at hand, the Marines of MAG-12 foundthemselves fully committed to the defense of Saigon.22

*Tactical air navigation (TACAN), ultra-high frequency, puise-type, omni•direceionai range and distance measuring equipmentused in air control.

**As with the MAG-15 move, MAG-12's sooner-than-expectedappearance "in counny" wss noticed byJCS and others in the chainof command.

Fortunately Bien Hoa Air Base was a fully developedVietnamese and U.S. Air Force base with support fa-cilities, revered parking aprons, and rocket resistant"Wonder-Arch" hangars.* ** Flight indoctrination bythe USAF 8th Special Operations Squadron at BienHoa started that day with orientation flights over MR3 in Air Force A-37s. Lieutenant Colonel Wilson not-ed the first death of a group pilot "on one of theseorientation/strike missions."aa

A gradual buildup of the group's sortie rate beganon 19 May and reached 36 flights a day by the endof the monrh.24 As did their fellow Marines inMAG-15, the airctews of MAG-12 found themselvesconfronted by a variety of singular missions and situ-ations. Three NVA divisions were advancing upon theprovincial capital of An [cc. Enemy forces includedthe 5th, 7th, and 9th NVA Divisions, 33d NVA In-fantry Regiment, 2 74th VC Regiment, and the 74BN½ Regiment.25 The Communist use of conventionalmilitary forces resulted in a plethora of targets, includ-ing fixed positions, vulnerable road and bridge net-works, and exposed logistical areas. There were tanksand armored personnel carriers, as well as the ubiqui.rous SA-7 and other antiaircraft weapons in locationsand densities nor experienced heretofore in Vietnam.

***The 'Wonder Arch" hangars were constructed from pre-fahrirared meral frames covered with sprayed-on roncrete to pro-vide overhead protertion to aircraft and maintenance facilities.


Photo courtesy of LtCol Michael S. Kelly, USMC (Ret)

Other Marine aircraft support arrived with these McDonnell Doug/as A-4 .Skyhawks fromVMA-311 with MAG-12. MAG-12 moved onto an existing Air Force base with developedfacilities. These included reveted flight line and hangars and prepared defenses.



The main threats, after enemy antiaircraft defenses, were from standoff and infiltrationattacks. Enemy rockets hit a But/er building used by MAG-12 's supply section. The Com-munist "rocket belt" was located in areas supposedly under South Vietnamese control

The 3d Regional Assistance Command under MajorGeneral James F. Hollingsworth, USA, at Long Binhand the ARVN III Corps and 3d Air Division at BienHoa controlled operations. The MAG supported the5th ARYN Division, 21st ARVN Division, 3d ARVNRanger Group, and the 3d ARVN Armored Brigade.Air control was by the DASC at Bien Hoa, the TACC atTan Son Nhut, and by the 21st Air Support Squadronand VNAF flying airborne FACs out of Tan Son Nhut.MAG-12's mission was part of a massive employmentof tactical air power that included B-52, AC-130, A-37,A-1E, F-4, and helicopter gunships of the Americanand Vietnamese forces. This required "superhuman"efforts on the part of airborne air controllers to managefrom their light observation aircraft, which, accord-ing to General Brown, they did "like real Fros7*2e

American aircraft provided close and direct air sup-port using bombs, rockets, and cannon. The highlymaneuverable A-4, with speed and stability, was theideal aircraft for accurate and responsive close air sup-port. The ARYN defenders of An Loc and their Ameri-can advisors praised the Marine air support which

*Fjt example, 1,077 fighter-bomber sorties had been allocatedby MACV to An Joe and MR 3 alone from 11 through 14 May 1972.

continued until other ARVN units reopened highwayQL-13, labeled the "Road of Death" by the Com-munisrs.a? Most operations were from 5 to 50 milesfrom Bien Hoa. MAG-12's Colonel Dean C. Machorecalled at times " ... it was common to see, hear,and feel air strikes flown by MAG-12 A-4s as close asthree to five miles from the field:' This served as anincentive to the Marines who kept the aircraft flying.28Later, air operations expanded to cover MR 4 and Cam-bodia. Operations were even flown to MR 2 with theaddition of a second external fuel tank and a reducedbomb load, or aerial refueling.

Because of the proximity of the fighting and thecontinued withdrawal of neighboring American units,Colonel Macho considered ground defense of the baseto be his number-one problem. The lack of groundforces and the constant threat of rocket attacks couldnot be adequately countered by his Marines.29 At therequest of 1st MAW, General Metzger ordered a riflecompany from 3d Battalion, 9th Marines sent TAD(temporary additional duty) to Bien I-ba for 90 days.On 21 May, five officers and 161 Marines of CompanyK, 9th Marines found themselves part of MAG-12.Captain Nathaniel R. Hoskot, Jr., and his companybegan their stay by moving the company into prepared

defensive positions, setting up crew-served weapons,and securing the group area. If needed, the SouthVietnamese were to provide supporting-arms fire. Byway of a welcome, on 23 May, the enemy struckMAG-12 with its first rocket attack.

MAG-12's sortie rate increased to 52 sorties a dayin July.° Generals Abrams and Vogt requested thatVMA-211 and VMA-311 be retained in Vietnamdespite continuing withdrawals of American forces.'The sortie and availability rate was the direct resultof the support and maintenance efforts of MAG-12ground ctews. These Marines kept the planes in theair with a 12-hours-a-day, seven-days-a-week effort.Sergeant Warren F. Winn, an ordnance man withVMA-2 11, explained the accomplishment:

when we first arrived here and weren't io the grooveof working together we had a hell of a rime keeping up. Assoon as we would load a plane they'd take it away and we'dstart all over from serareh. Now working as a team, we areable to stay just one step ahead no marter what,ai

lieutenant General William K. Jones commented that"Performance of this excellence does not just happen,it results from superior leadership, a high degree ofprofessional competence, team work and a lot of hardworlc"

MAG-12's effort was not lost on the Communists,who subjected the Bien Hoa Air Base to continuingattacks beginning in August in an effort to disrupt

flight operations. The heaviest attack consisted of 101rockets on 1 August 1972 that killed one Marine,wounded six others, and damaged the MAG-12 sup-ply, headquarters, and operations areas.55 The Viet-namese and Americans repaired the runway, andflights, although delayed, continued. Since the rock-ets had come from the north, the pilots took off andworked over an area five miles north of the base thatday. The attack had reminded the group of the valueof dispersion and individual security measures andresulted in a major effort to sandbag working and liv-ing spaces.*

The group logistics officer, Major Angelo M. Inglisa,wrote that it was surprising the attack was not moredamaging: "The NVA/VC apparently tried to use therockets as artillery and aimed for point targets:' ratherthan employing the rockets "as area weapons asdesigned." He reflected a belief held within MAG-12that civilian contract construction workers had surveyedthe base for the Communists to locate targets priorto the attack.

On 10 August, the initial elements of Company I,9th Marines arrived to assume the group security mis-sion from Company K, which was returned to Okina-

*Of the more than 800 rockets that hit Bien Hoa over the nine-month period, 417 rockets hit in the MAG-12 area, killing two andwounding eight Marines; six A-4s were damaged.



Air operations require maintenance and support to be effective. Here a Headquartersand Maintenance Squadron 12 ordnance man loads a MKS2 .500-pound bomb on an A-4.


wa. Captain Michael S. Kelly, the company corn-mandet, understood that this rotation of units wouldoccur every few months, but events proved otherwiseand his company stayed with MAG-12 until the end.Base defense was a "tripartite" affair with the Viet-namese Air Force Base Defense Force, the U.S. AirForce Security Police Squadron, and the Marine Secu-rity Element of MAG-12. Kelly wrote that "I workedclosely with Colonel Dean Macho and our Air ForceSecurity Police counterparts to enhance base securi-ty?'37 "India 3/9" brought with them a section of mor-tars, trucks, and a detachment from the 3d MarineDivision's Sensor Control and Management Platoon.According to Captain Kelly, they "used various types ofsurveillance devices to enhance base security, specifi-cally outside the ammunition dump." The mission wastedious, but necessary, and these ground Marines"learned the tough tasks that the 'air-wing' Marineshad."3°

The adjacent YNAF ordnance dump blew up on10 September, wounding four Marines and damagingthe MAG-12 supply building with the blast and

debris. Unable to determine the cause of this dis-aster, Colonel Macho nevertheless organized additionalreaction forces of two 30-man "platoons" made up ofmaintenance and support personnel. These ad hocunits deployed at night in billeting and flight-lineareas. Thur A-4s were kept armed and fueled on15-minute strip alert for support. With these precau-tions, the air war continued.

For Captain.James P. "Waldd' Walsh of VMA-211,26 September began as other days at Bien Hoa. The26-year-old A-4 pilot from Hartford, Connecticut, hadbeen flying combat missions with his squadron sincearriving in Vietnam in June. His mission was to hitthe heart of enemy-held territory near An Loc, theQuan Loi Airfield, an area known by MAG-12 pilotsfor the density of antiaircraft fire ranging from smallarms to 37mm AAA. After preflight and take-off,Captain Walsh and his wingman met the airborne FACnear the operating area and were given a target.

As Walsh pulled out of his bomb run, his A-4E washit by multiple rounds of gunfire. The Skyhawk shookuncontrollably and the controls went slack. When his

Marine infantry and supporting units were attached to the aircraft groups to provide adegree of security and close-in defense. At Then Hoa, these men from 3d Battalion, 9thMarines prepared defenses including seismic intrusion devices for early warning.

Photo courtesy of LtCol Michael S. Kelly, IJSMC (Ret)

i64 THE WAR THAT WOULD NOT END

instrument panel warning lights went red, Walsh in-stinctively pulled his ejection handle. According to aMarine report, the "stricken A-4 was emitting sheetsof flame from the tailpipe and had pitched violentlynose down as the pilot ejected:' With a good parachutecanopy overhead, he looked around at the rapidly ap-proaching rubber plantation for signs of the NVA andfor a "lay-up" position to rake until help could arrive.The FAC lost sight of Captain Walsh's parachute asit disappeared through the tree tops. With no visualcontact and only an intermittent "beeper" radio sig-nal, the SAR helicopter recovery team had little to goon when it arrived. The lead helicopter was struck byground fire and turned back from the area and withapproaching darkness the SAR effort was postponed.Local thunderstorms even drove the airhotne FAC awayfrom Quon Loi that riight.°

Captain Walsh hit the ground in the middle of aCommunist campsite. Shrugging out of his parachuteharness, he dodged through the rubber trees for about100 meters before being surrounded and trapped. Inthis standoff he had a single choice, surrender or die.Later he made a brief attempt to escape by diving un-derwater during a stream crossing. A Communist sold-ier waited for him to surface and took him prisoner.Captain Walsh was listed as missing in action by hissquadron. Walsh, however, was neither missing nordead, he was the last Marine to be captured by theNorth Vietnamese Communists.*41

Anticipated ground attacks at Bien Hoa failed tomaterialize, but on 22 October, the Communists fired61 rockets onto the base. Colonel Macho consideredthe group's effort at civic action to be a factor in limit-ing attacks on the base. Based upon MAG-12's previ-ous experience at Chu Lai, the group provided supportto a local orphanage and children's hospital at Ke-Sat2

Fall weather hindered the bombing effort and re-quired using Air Force LORAN, TACAN, and otherexpedients, to put ordnance on target. Maintenancecrews activated a then-dormant avionics componentof the A-4E, first in VMA-211 and then VMA-311. Acombination of training and maintenance with thissystem allowed continued support during periods ofreduced visibility by enabling the aircraft to pull outof high-angle dives at 6,000 feet.

Marine Aircraft Group 12 flew its 10,000th combatsortie on 9 December 1972, after having averaged 49combat sorties a day over a seven-month period. By

*Capta,in Walsh was released by the Communists in 1973. SeeChapter 15.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A7o3153

The value of good relations with the localpeople wasa lesson brought back to Vietnam by the returningMarines. SSgt Frank H. Peace of MAG-12 fills the fueltank of a generator that supplied electricity to the Ke-Sat Orphanage near Bien Hoa. The generator had beenreconditioned by the Marines as a good-will project.

year's end, MAG-12 had completed combat operations,flying 12,574 combat sorties totalling 15,214 hours anddropping 18,903 tons of ordnance. Combat losses in-cluded three A-4s, and three Marines killed, one miss-ing, and 11 wounded." Secretary of the Navy JohnW. Warner cited MAG-12's efforts during the battlesto defend Hue, Kontum, and An Loc, when the group"provided close air support within fifty meters offriendly positions, contributing materially to the suc-cess of the allied effort in these campaigns."

Task Force DeltaWhile MAG-15 and MAG-12 conducted operations

from Da Nang and Bien Hoa, the 1st MAW complet-ed efforts to relocate a portion of these units outsideof South Vietnam. Initial relocation sites includedUdorn, Ubon, and Utapao in Thailand. These baseswere operating at maximum capacity with Air Ibrceunits, and the search also considered other locations.Fifteen miles northeast of the town of Khon Kaen,Thailand, was a 10,000-foot concrete runway built bythe U.S. Air Fbrce in 1967. Used as an emergency land-ing field and little else, it was situated centrally 340miles west of Da Nang and 300 miles southwest ofHanoi. General Brown recalled:

when we atareed gluing this thing together, there werejust three or four guys who were in on it from the begin-ning. Brigadier General [Andrew W.l Andy O'Donnell, whowas my assistant wing commander at the time, and s cou-ple of other guys asking each other where the hell is NamPhong? So we spread out the maps on the floor of my office


Task Force Delta Command Chronology

This US. Air Force reconnaissance photograph takenin 1969 was usedby 1st MAW top/an MAG-Ji 's moveto Thailand in May 1972. it showed the airstreji andparking ramp, which provided the "bare base "fromwhich the Marines operated within the month.

and got down on our hands and knees and finally locatedthe place*46

Maps and old intelligence reports indicated toGeneral Brown that "there just wasn't anything there:'There was no power, little water, fuel would have tocome from the ports at Utapao and Sattahip by truck,and it was barely within flying range of MR 1 forMAG-15's fighters. From General Brown's perspective

All the place had really was a runway and noth-ing else except a tot of rain, a lot of hear, and a lotof logistical problems to be resolved." The locationdid have a greater degree of physical security than DaNang, was large enough to accommodate the entireMAG, and was usable for operations if aircraft wererefueled in the air or on the ground in MR 1.

On 11 May, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer and theJCS approved the plan to move MAG-15 to Thailand,specifying that the opening of Nam Phong would beon an "austere" basis—which was "a gross understate-ment," according to General Brown. On 14 May, aplanning conference was held on Okinawa by Gener-al Metzger with 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 3d MarineDivision, and 3d Force Service Support Regiment toconsider the task. The immediate result was to senda survey team headed by Brigadier General AndrewW. O'Donnell, the assistant wing commander, toThailand to determine existing facilities and to coor-dinate with the U.S. Embassy, the Military AdvisoryCommand, Thailand (MACThai), Seventh Air Force,and other supporting agencies.

General O'Donnell and a Marine and Navy staffarrived in Thailand on 18 May, went to Bangkok, andthen on to Nam Phong. There they found a runway,

*Borh Generals Brown and O'Donnell later commanded FMFPac.

raxiway, parking apron, six Butler buildings, and an8,000-square foot hangar. As General Brown had ex-pected, the main challenges to operations were logisti-cal. Nam Phong was a U.S. Special Forces camp forthe training of Laotian irregulars, who occupied theexisting buildings and had constructed six other struc-tures and training facilities. The 50 or so U.S. Army"Green Berets" and other advisors present found theirpastoral surroundings altered by the arrival of the Ma-rines. General O'Donnell concluded from his inspec-tion that Nam Phong had potential for MAG-15operations, but would require extensive developmentfor the 60-to-90 day deployment envisioned by Ad-mirals McCain and Moorer. While in Thailand,O'Donnell negotiated terms of occupancy, designat-ing Nam Phong a "Royal Thai Air Base" and arrangedsupport agreements with the U.S. Army Support Ac-tivity, Thailand, for a logistical base through the portof Sattahip. General O'Donnell then rerutned to Japanand briefed General Brown on what was needed tosupport MAG-15.

A special organization, designated Task Force Del-ta (TF Delta), was formed at Iwakuni, Japan, on 24May 1972, and it remained in existence until well af-ter the end of the American involvement in Vietnam.General O'Donnell commanded the task force witha mission of opening the base at Nam Phong and as-suming control of MAG-is. His initial task was to makethe airfield ready to support tactical flight operations.This was undertaken by U.S. Navy Mobile Construc-tion Battalion 5, MABS-15, and H&MS-15. GeneralO'Donnell also maintained liaison with Seventh AirForce, the Royal Thai Air Force, and the Military Ad-visory Command Thailand.

A KC-130 tanker from Marine Aerial Refuelet ']}ans-port Squadron (VMGR) 152 arrived at Nam Phongon 24 May with 39 Marines, beginning the buildupof forces to more than 3,200 men. The establishmentof a U.S. Air Force aerial port detachment triggeredthe airlift of the advance party of 377 Marines, 94 U.S.Navy "Seabees," 3 civilians, and 1,399 tons of materi-al by MAC C-141s and C-S transpotts.**48

Construction began at once on 310 strong-back huts,128 administrative and maintenance structures, abomb dump, a 200,000-gallon Tactical Aviation FuelDispensing system, and storage for 360,000 gallons of

**The combined movement of MAC-IS, MCB-5, Logistics Support Group Delta, and supporting detachments to Nam Phong re.quired 278 aircraft loads to transfer 6,259 cons of material and 2,064passengers to make the field operarinnal.


bulk fuel.*49 Generals Brown and O'Donnell deve-loped a deep respect for the "Seabees' the majorityof whom artived by ship and trucked inland to NamPhong. Brown recalled "they worked hard and fast andnever quit" on the base construcrioii.°

The movement of MAG-15 aircraft began on l6Junewhen 11 F4Bs of VMFA-115 launched from Da Nang,completed air strikes enroute, and landed at NamPhong. They began flying sorties from Nam Phongon 17 June.5' By 2OJune, VMFA-232 and Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron (VMA[AW]) 533 also ar-rived at Nam Phong. The A-6A "Hawks" ofVMA(AW)-533 provided MAG-15 with an all-weatherand night capability of 12 aircraft. Additional airctaftcame from VMGR-152 Detachment Delta's fourKC-130s for aerial refueling and a H&MS-36 Detach-ment of fout CH-46s for search and rescue. By 3OJuneTask Force Delta consisted of 17 F-4s, 12 A-6s, 4KC-130s, and 4 CH46s.** In view of rheJCS-directed"ausrure" nature of this deployment, General Jonesat FMFPac and General Brown at 1st MAW were per-sonally involved with the "somewhat overwhelming"logistics support requited, particularly fot the A6s.52

As it turned our, the A-6A proved its worth duringthis deployment with "full-systems" readiness. Lieu-tenant Colonel James C. Brown, the A-6 squadroncommander, believed the deployment of MAG-15 tein-forced the expeditionary capability of the U.S. Marinesin an age of sophisticated aircraft and "especiallysophisticated" ground support equipment with all itsspecific power and environment requirements: "TheA-cl aircraft required a higher degree of ground-support facilities than either the F-4 or A-4. These re-quirements were met at Nam Phong after a difficultstart-up period." Lieutenant Colonel Brown creditedthis accomplishment to the innovation, perseverance,and hard work of individual Marines.***53

The deployment and activation of TF Delta accom-plished, the Commandant, General Robett E. Cush-man, Jr. noted:

such an achievement was made possible only throughthe team work of dedicated professionals and numerous per-

*The type and priority of construction are detailed in CNAMarActySbA, pp. 95-96.

**The TA-4 'Fast Far" Detachment with MAG-15 teturned toIwakuni, Japan, and VMFA-212 returned to Hawaii instead of go-ing to Thailand.

***Lieucenant Colonel Brown, VMA(AW)-533's commander,highlighted the joining of an attack squadron to a fighter groupas a classic example of Marine task organization. But, "there weresome subt lessons to be learned from integrating our attack orien-tation with a fighter oriented aircraft group" (Brown Comments)


Commanding Task Force Delta in its initial phase inThailand was BGen Andrew IV O'Donnell, the assis-tant commanding general of the 1st MAW His majorconcerns were as much logistical as operational.

sonal sacrifices. This matter is of considerable pride to meand should be a source of great individual self-satis&rtion'

While the activation of Nam Phong stands as anaccomplishment in its own right, ultimately irs sig-nificance rests on the purpose for which it was estab-lished, the destruction of Communist forces. GeneralVogr tasked General O'Donnell with conducting airoperations over North and South Vietnam. For Gener-al O'Donnell this meant finding out what the AirForce wanted, as well as ensuring that General Vogtunderstood the capabilities of MAG-l5's pilots andplanes. What resulted from this interaction with theSeventh Air Force was a variety of new tasks and mis-sions for Marine aircrews. General O'Donnell personal-ly flew F-4 combat missions which earned him credi-bility both with the pilots of the task force and whendiscussing operational matters with the Air Force.****

The distance from MR I required airborne refuel-ing and landing at Da Nang. The average flight timeincreased from one to two hours and the ordnance load

****An unspoken considetation was the clear risk of his becom-

ing a prisoner if downed.



Clearing away thick vegetation for the cantonment area was an initial task of Marine andNavy engineers Ethting base facilities were insufficient in quality and quantity for theincreased number ofpersonnel required to support the expanded Marine Air Group 15.

Within a short time, this tent city was erected to become the billeting area for Head-quarters and Maintenance Squadron 15 and Marine Air Base Squadron 15. Looking south,in the foregroundare supplies andmaterial being stored in the open for lack of adequatewarehousing. The jungle terrain surrounding the base appears to stretch to the horizon.


was reduced by 500 pounds to compensate for extrafuel. Support of operations from Nam Phong requiredthree H&MS-15 detachments to "turn around" aircraft:Detachment Alpha at Da Nang to rearm and refuel,Detachment Bravo at Cubi Point for maintenancework, and Detachment Charlie ar Iwakuni fur adminis-trative and logistical liaison with 1st MAW. Detach-ment Alpha starred ar Da Nang on 3 July, increasingmission and sortie rate. On 8 July, TF Delta aircraftintercepted two Communist MiG-19 Farmers overNorth Vietnam, the task force's first air-to-air encoun-ter with the enemy in ir's new area of operations.56

Ground security considerations for the task forcewere different from those at Da Nang and Bien Hoa.Although Companies L and M, 9th Marines movedinto Thailand with MAG-15, Nam Phong's locationremoved the immediate threat of ground attack thathad existed in South Vietnam. The infantry Marineswere formed into the TF Delta security element anddesignated "Sub Unit (SU1)" of MABS-15. The com-manding officer was Major John M. Campanelli, anexperienced infantry officer, assisted by Captain PhilipE Reynolds as executive officer and Captain ThomasD. Martin as operations officer." The sub unit con-sisted of 11 officers and 363 Marines organized alongthe lines of a small infantry battalion— rifle compa-nies with headquarters and service company support,including communications, 81mm mortars, motortransport, and medical sections. Irs mission was to pro-vide base security and military police support to the

task force. The Marines were armed with the full rangeof small arms, but were restricted to using only illu-mination rounds from their M79 grenade launchersand mortars. With no known external threat, MajorCampanelli concentrated his efforts on interior guardand security of vital areas: the fuel and ordnancedumps, the flight line, and maintenance facilities.Guard towers, bunkers, barbed wire, and chain-linksecurity fences were built to control the perimeter andvital areas. The size of the base required more menfor guards than SU1 could provide and it was aug-mented by MABS-15 and the flying squadrons. Alterthe initial 90-day TAD period passed for the "Grunts,"Headquarters Marine Corps assigned ithntry replace-ments directly to 1st MAW. Major Campanelli hired100 Thai auxiliary security guards from the SpecialForces Camp to augment the Marines and, on 3OJuly,12 guard dogs arrived.

The Rose Garden GrowsTask Force Delta air operations were of three dis-

tinct types: day fighter-cover, day ground-attack, andnight ground-attack. These missions in turn were as-sociated with specific geographic areas and targets.Most numerous were daytime flights supportingMACV and the South Vietnamese in MR I, MR 2, andRoute Package 1 during the combat to regain QuangTn Province. These tasks were conducted with F-4s andA-6s using bombs, rockets, and cannon fire. Sortiesnormally consisted of two or three aircraft each. Dailythe aircraft lined up on Nam Phong's single runway



The Jigbier-attack group was Joined by VMA(AU'7)-533 and its all-weather attack GrummanA-6A Intruders. The Intruders' bomb-carrying capacity and flight time were impressive.

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Task krre Delta Command Chronology

An essential element of the air effort was the continued upkeep of aircraft systems. TheWonder Arch shelters allowed the 24-hour-a-day support needed to keep the planes flying.

with engines screaming at 100 percent power as thepilots checked engine instruments. Each aircraft thentook off in turn and quickly rendezvoused on its climbout to the target area. Many of the Marine flights hit atarget, flew to Da Nang to refuel and rearm, and thenflew another mission on the return to Nam Phong.

Fighter cover was in support of the ongoing strikesby Seventh Air Fbrce against the North Vietnamesepolitical and economic infrastructure. The strikes,which had begun on 8 May, were patt of an extensivenaval and air campaign to pressure the North Viet-namese into a negotiated settlement. The campaignincluded the mining of harbors, attacks against eco-nomic targets, the use of precision-guided munitions("smart bombs"), and a massive increase in the sizeand durations of strikes with the aim of reducing theflow of supplies into North Vietnam and support tooperations in South Vietnam. In contrast to the previ-ous, graduated campaigns, commanders took allnecessary steps to ensure target destruction.*59

*The final analysis of air power in the Linebacker Campaign of1972 is outside the scope of this study. The U.S. Air Ibcce reviewof this section questioned whether the difference between RollingThunder and Linebacker was one of target destruction or a shiftfrom attacking the economy to distrupting the stotage and distri-bution of supplies (Bernard C, Nalty, Comment on deaft ms, 3Jan90[Vietnam Comment File]).

Marine F-4s conducted combat air patrols to pro-tect support aircraft from North Vietnamese reaction.This requited them to fly a specified orbit point fromwhich to covet tanker, command and control, electron-ic warfare, and rescue aircraft over Route Packages 4,5, and 6. From orbit points they could track and en-gage North Vietnamese interceptors and air defensepositions. Marine KC-130s refueled the fighters going

LtGen Louis Metzger of 111 MAIi rzht, visits Task ForceDelta in late 1972. At left are BGen Robert IV Tay-lor; commanding Task Force Delta, and Col Aubrey[V Ta/ben of MAG-15. As the war concluded, therewas a continued need to keep combat units in placeto help ensure ceasefire compliance by the enemy.



in and coming out. These missions witnessed Marineair integrated with the Air Force in air-to-air and deep-penetration flight profi1es.°

The interdiction of roads and trails in the Barrel Rolland Steel Tiger areas of Laos were the missions assignedthe VMA(AW)-533 crews with their night armedreconnaissance abilities. Lieutenant Colonel Brownwrote that his squadron" . began interdicting con-voys on Route Package 1 on 12 August and, like ourentire effbrt, it was relentless. To the enemy, this in-cessant bludgeoning was crippling. .

. "°' First Lieu-tenant Gary W. Dolgin described the aircraft and menengaged in these night flights in 1972:

Aircraft 155707 . . . has a long shadow cast behind herindicating a time late in the afternoon. She sits quierly,fueled, armed, and with power unit attached. In a few hoursa crew of one pilot and one hombardier-navigator will walkout to her. The sun will have since set. The crew will doa pre-flighr inspection, strap in, fire up, check nut the en-tire aircraft system, and take off. An hour or so later theywill be inside North Vietnam terrain following at 420 knotsover mountains and down in valleys headed for a targetregardless of weather.°5

General O'Donnell passed command of Task FotceDelta to Brigadier General Robert W. 'Thylor on 23 Au-gust. Three days later, VMFA-232 lost an aircraft to aMiG-21 Fishbed over Laos. Both crewmembersejected — the intercept officer was recovered and thepilot was missing in action. Colonel Aubrey W. "Tal"'Tàlbert, Jr., commanding MAG-15, reported that tosupport the continued effort, the"... maintenanceand supply effort to provide the full system aircraftneeded in the hostile skies of North Vietnam has heensubstantiaL"64 For maintenance crews, the beginningand end of all efforts was to get their pilots and planesin the air on time, "the primary objective to achievea Marine aerial victory over enemy aircraft," Life inNam Phong or the "Rose Garden,"* as it was nowpopularly known by its Marine occupants, revolvedaround rhe cycle of fragging, scheduling, briefing,arming, fueling, launch, and recovery activities thatalways appeared at odds with the normal routine ofliving. The routines of day, night, sleep, meals, andthe calendar had relatively little meaning in the oper-ational and maintenance cycles of air units at war.

The need for adequate ground security was high-

*A nickname Nam Phong acquired from a contemporary Ma-rine recruiting slogan, "We Don't Promise You A Rose Garden,"and a popular song by Lynn Anderson with similar lyrics. GeneralMetzger observed a single scraggly rose bush planted in the mid-

lighted by terrorist attacks on Ubon and Udorn AirBases in October. Concern for base security was at itspeak at Nam Phong, recalled First Lieutenant GeorgeR. "Ross" Dunham of VMGR-152 Detachment Delta,when the sound of an explosion from the flight linebrought cries of "Incoming, hit the bunkers!" fromthe billering area. When the smoke had cleared, in-vestigation determined that the accidental dischargeof an air-to-ground rocket had occurred in the arm-ing area.°° The ground threats to the safety of TF Deltaremained thus self-induced or from the burgeoninglocal "black market" and other economic enterprisesoutside the base. Major Kent C. Bateman, theVMA(AW)-533 executive officer, believed that this sit-uation precluded a real sense of involvement by theenlisted Marines. As only the aircrews experiencedcombat, "there was little sense of urgency by theground and support personnel."

When Major Kenneth N. Zike took command ofMABS-15's Sub Unit 1 on 26 November, it had ex-panded to include 200 Thai auxiliaries. Patrolling out-side of the perimeter, out to 16 kilometers from thebase, was now i:he responsibility of Thai military forces,because of the reluctance of the Thai Supreme Com-mand to allow the U.S. a ground combat role inThailand. General Thylor and Royal Thai Air ForceSpecial Colonel Supot, the base commander, signeda joint base defense plan at the year's end, alleviatingthe remaining security concerns. This plan tasked SU1with manning 27 bunkers and towers of the internaldefensive position. The Thais manned the remaining53 positions. Lighting and fencing continued to beinstalled and improved by the Marines. Two mobilereaction platoons were formed: one established nearthe combat operations center and the other at thebomb storage area. MABS-15 provided an additionalcivil disturbance platoon for riot dury.

With the arrival of the fall monsoon weather, con-ditions for visual delivery of ordnance declined. Forthe F-4s this meant level bombing using release pointsobtained from TACAN cuts, LORAN-equipped air-craft, and USAF Combat Skyspot control stations.69The A-6s continued to operate day and night over theroads and trails of Route Package 1.69 By now, at thepolitical level, offensive operations and successfulSouth Vietnamese resistance brought the North Viet-namese to the negotiating table. Operations continuedthrough the 23 October halt of bombing of NorthVietnam above the 20th Parallel. The Seventh AirForce noted in November that VMFA-115 and

die of the camp, "with typical Marine humpr." (Metzger Comments) VMFA-232 had the highest sortie rate of any land-

172 THE WAR THAT WOUlD NOT END

Photo courtesy of Cdt Peter B. Mersky, USNR

Fighter aircraft from MAG-15 being used in an attack role dropping general-purposebombs. Notice the open hatch on the VMFA-115 aircraft above the letter E on the/use/age,indicating the deployment a/decoy flares in response to a surface-to-air missile threat.

Combat artist MajJohn T 'jack" Dyer Jr., sketched Phantoms in Wonder Arch hangarsat Nam Phong, as the war continued into another year The on-again-off again natureof the deployment caused pro b/ems as the intensity of combat declined/or the Marines.

Iarine Corps Art Collection


based F-4 units in Southeast Asia?0 The offensive oper-ations resumed with all-out air attacks against theNorth beginning on 18 December, and continued un-til combat flights in Vietnam ceased at year's end?'

Statistics can only indicate the magnitude of the ef-fort by TF Delta and MAG-15. Figures only imply thehuman costs and achievements of the aircrews andmen who kept them operating; the personnel of TaskForce Delta contributed toward the South Vietnamesedefense and the U.S. air offensive of 197272 The NorthVietnamese Army's transition to mobile warfare madeit dependent on the delivery of fuel, ammunition, andother supplies coming by routes that were vulnerableto destruction from the air. In the resulting battle of

attrition, airpower had a crushing effect on the ene-my. Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale, USN, as aprisoner of war and an eyewitness to American airpow-er from the North Vietnamese capital in 1972, statedthat, "If I learned nothing else during the eight yearsin wartime Hanoi, it was that Clausewira is as righttoday as he was during the Napoleonic Wars; the nameof the game in. war is to break rhe enemy's wilI." Thiswas the stated. purpose of airpower. The North Viet-namese relied, however, on Ho Chi Minh's rejoinderto the air effort: "Hanoi, Haiphong, and other citiesand certain enterprises may be destroyed, but the Viet-namese people will not be intimidated! Nothing ismore precious than independence arid freedom!"

CHAPTER 12

On Yankee StationSupport to the Navy: Task Force 77—All Weather Attack —More Support to the Navy — VMCJ

Snakes at Sea — Fighters over the North

Support to the Navy: Task Force 77

While Marine aircraft groups were supporting theU.S. Air Force, other air units were with the SeventhFleet's Attack Carrier Strike Fbrce (Task Force 77) ofVice Admiral Damon W. Cooper in the Tonkin Gulf.At the time of the 1972 Communist offensive, fourcarrier battle groups were in the Tonkin Gulf ratherthan the normal two. This increased to six by June andthen to seven carrief groups by the end of the year.*

Vice Admiral William P. Mack, commandingSeventh Fleet, and Admiral Cooper, commanding TaskForce 77, positioned carrier groups for air strikes fromthe Tonkin Gulf in response to NVA attacks. Otherships moved to support the increased tempo of carrieroperarions. Nine to 13 destroyers provided a screen tointercept North Vietnamese aircraft and torpedoboats. Destroyers and amphibious ships operated twonorthern search and rescue (SAR) stations, two posi-tive identification and radar advisory zones (PIRAZ),a middle SAR station, and a southern SAR stationwhith was later renamed Picket Station Alpha to coun-ter the threat of North Vietnamese missile boats.'

Admiral Cooper concentrated air attacks in RoutePackages 1 and 2 with the resumption of naval gun-fire and bombing in North Vietnam on 7 April 1972.These struck at troop and logistic targets in the Pan-handle, Finger Lake, and Mu Gia Pass regions through'ow clouds and the heavy fire of antiaircraft defenses.One or more carrier groups remained dedicated todirect air support in South Vietnam, primarily inMR 1, during the critical days of April and May. TheMarine squadrons flew the same missions as the Navyfighter and attack squadrons to maintain air superi-ority, interdict lines of communication, and attack eco-

*Carrier air wings (CVW) were task-organized mixes of aircraftand facilities on a self-contained floating airfield. Composition ofCVW's during this period, as for example CVW-15 on the CoralSea in 1972, included two squadrons of A-i Corsairs, two squadronsof F-4 Phantoms, a Marine squadron of A-6s, and detachments ofRRsG Crusadcn (photo), EKA-3Bs (rankers), £-lBs (early warning),and SH-3G Sea Kings (rescue). Marine squadrons operated fromthree carriers in 1972: the USS Coral Sea (CVA 43), the Saraioga(CVA 60), and the America (CVA 66). Units that supported TF 77included VMA(AW)-224, VMFA-333, HMA-369, and detachmentsfrom VMCJ-1, VMCJ-2, and H&MS-15.

174

nomic targets in support of political goals. Majorattacks were flown against Vinh, Thanh Hoa,Haiphong, and Hanoi in 1972 by multiple aircraft em-ployed in self-contained forces which were aimed atsingle target areas— the carrier-launched "AlphaStrikes."**

All-Weather Attack

The previous winter, the USS Coral Sea arrived onYankee Station with VMA(AW)-224 on board as partof Carrier Air Wing (CV'V)-15. The "Bengals" werefrom the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, Marine Corps AirStation (MCAS), Cherry Point, North Carolina. Theirarrival in the Western Pacific Ocean was part of ascheduled six-month cruise. Lieutenant Colonel BillyR. Standley's unit consisted of 44 officers and 290 en-listed men, with eight Grumman A-6A Intruder all-weather bombers, three A-6Bs, and four KA-6Dtankers. Initial operations were strikes against BenKarai and Mu Gal Passes to interdict enemy convoysalong the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. Dur-ing the day the A-6s acted as pathfinders for other car-rier flights, dropping impact and delayed-fuze bombsthrough cloud cover. At night the A-6s operated withthe Air Force's "Commando Bolt" system using sen-sors and on-board moving target indicators to knockout trucks on the numerous feeder roads to the trail.2For the NVA soldiers, this continuous attack broughtmixed emotions. One recalled:

I could tell when we started to get close to the Vietnamborder. . . . We could hear the rumble of bombings in thedistance. Everyone stopped to listen to it—a dull continu-ous roar. A surge of fear went through everyone in the groupI was traveling wirh. I was sick and hslf.srarved and scaredto death, But I was near home. It had taken six months toget here . .

The Coral Sea and VMA(AW)-224 were at SubicBay, Philippines, on 30 March when Admiral Mackhurriedly recalled them to the Gulf of Tonkin to helpstem the NVA invasion force. Lieutenant ColonelStandley and his squadron found themselves engagedin air strikes ranging the entire length of North Viet-

**An attack was launched in sequence beginning with reconnais-sance, missile and antiaircraft artillery suppression, otdnance runs,and post-strike damage assessment aircraft.

ON YANKEE STATION 175

nam for the next 50 days. The squadron flew Com-mando Bolt missions at night and attack missions neatthe DMZ duting the day. In one instance, providingclose air support to a fire support base on 9 April innorthern MR 1, Lieutenant Colonel Ralph E. Brubakerobserved his "aircraft delivered their ordnance withdeadly accuracy * When the smoke from theA-6s' bomb load cleared, the firebase commander radi-oed the flight that they had "saved his position."

In addition to these tasks, the Navy air group com-mander (CAG) assigned the squadron's A-6s to des-

*Lieutenant Colonel Brubaker later commanded the squadronin 1972.

troy SAM and radar sites with "Standard Arm"AGM-78 missiles guiding in on radar transmissionsfrom the targets. These flights continued until a newphase of air opetations began on 8 May. Unlike previ-ous air operations; tatgeting was at the theater levelrather than the "Commander-in-Chief level."** AirIksrce B-52s and naval tactical aircraft were used simul-taneously against the same targets.

The new operations called upon VMA(AW)-224 to

**Under the previous, Rolling Thunder campaign, targets wereselected for apparent political value within the considerations of"graduated response." At times, selection and approval of sperifitmissions were from The White House (Air War-Vietnam, pp.251-252).

Adapted from Naval Historical Center Material


Department of Defense Photo (USN) 002709Marine Corps squadrons are capable of operating from .thit' as well as shore, and thisis reflected in both training and equzment. An A-6 makes its final app roach to a carrierdeck under the control of the landing signals officer The aircraft's tail hook is lowered

Along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in March 1972, a Chinese-built Type 63 amphibious tankwas destroyed by carrier air interdiction missions in the Panhandle region of Laos.



play a role in mining North Vietnamese waterways andharbors. On the direct orders of Presidenr Nixon,Operation Pocket Money sealed Haiphong Harbor.Admiral Mack stared rhat he was required by the Presi-dent to drop the first mine "within seconds of nineo'clock because tbe President was going to announcethe mining to the American public at that precise mo-ment back in the United States?'6 That bright, sun-lit morning, three Marine A-6As and six Navy A-7Esthundered up the defended approach to Haiphongat low level. The aircraft overflew local junks on thesparkling waterway and skirted it's shore line. Air andgunfire strikes silenced Communist missile and antiair-craft positions for air crews who, according to AdmiralMack:

had to know exactly where they were going and thendrop mines in a very narrow channel regardless of fog, rain,or darkness. The drop had to be planned so that several air-craft could pick a point in the harbor area and drop theirmines at 200 feet, microseconds apart, while going 300 to400 knots,

Captain William D. Cart, Jr., the bombardier-navigator in the lead Marine A-6A, established thecritical azimuth for the Haiphong Harbor attack on9 May. His aircraft dropped the first of 36 MK52-2mines seconds after 0900 and completed the missionwithin the hour. For the main channel, 12 miles longand up to 250 feet wide, the U.S. forces used 75 minesover three minefields to block the waterway. Another700 MK36 destructors were dropped in shallow waterto deny passage to local shipping.*

After a three-day grace period before the mines werearmed, 26 merchant ships remained trapped inHaiphong harbor. Air-dropped mines also closed theports of Hon Gai and Cam Pha, north of Haiphong,and the ports of Thanh Hoa, Vinh, Quang Khe, andDong Hoi to the south. After using more than 8,000mines in the coastal areas and another 3,000 in in-land waterways, the Navy believed it had stopped theflow of material into North Vietnam from the sea.With 80 percent of needed supplies entering the coun-try this way, and the rest by rail, air interdiction wasintended to bring both North Vietnam's economy andits military to a standstill.

Relief on Yankee Station came in July with the ar-rival of the USS America (CV 66). By then,VMFA(AW)-224 had flown 2,800 combat sorties with4,500 hours of flight time and the loss of four aircraft

*Special fuziog on a general-purpose MKS2 500-pound aircraftbomh produced the destructnr.

and crews. With Operation Pocket Money, the MarineA-6s and crews played a crucial role in delivering

one of the most significant blows to the enemy sincethe beginning of the Vietnamese conflict."8

More Support to the Navy—VMCJ

In the spring of 1972, with the increase in opera-tions from the Tonkin Gulf, Lieutenant General thuisMetzger, the III MAF commanding general, tasked the1st MAW commanding general, Major General RobertG. Owens, Jr., to provide electronic warfare supportto Seventh Fleet and TIE 77. This responded to aSeventh Fleet shortage of the specialized aircraft forthis task and exercised the capabilities of 1st MAW'sGrumman EA-6A Intruders. The Intruders of theVMCJ-1 "Golden Hawks" were well-enough equippedto allow American pilots to penetrate what was consi-dered the third-heaviest air defense system in theworld.**9 Electronic warfare permitted the intercep-tion, recording, and jamming of communications andradar systems used in North Vietnamese air defense.As a "combat-multiplier:' the "soft kills" of intercep-tion or jamming aided other attack and fighter air-craft to enter defended areas for "hard kills" withordnance. On 3 April, General Owens ordered the im-mediate deployment of a six-plane detachment fromVMCJ-1 to NAS Cubi Point.*** Major John D.Carlron's detachment began missions in support of TF77 on 7 April. Later in the month, on 20 April, four"Playboy" EA-6As of Detachment X, VMCJ-2, off theUSS Saratoga (CVA 60), arrived as reinforcements.50The resulting composite detachment of 221 Marinesincluded crews and KC-130s from VMGR-152 and per-sonnel and support equipment from H&MS-15."

Aircraft flew from Cubi Point to Da Nang Air Basefor combat missions. Marines at Da Nang serviced theaircraft using fuel, revetments parking, and "readyroom" space provided by the Navy's Fleet Air Recon-naissance Squadron (VQ) 1. Routinely, an early morn-ing flight of four EA-6s and a KC-130 with additionalflight crews departed the Philippines for Da Nang.Once there, pilots were briefed for morning sorties andthe EA-6s were fueled and serviced. After briefingsand inspections, the planes launched to support Navyand Air Force strikes over North Vietnam. Morningmissions completed, they returned to Da Nang for fueland replacement crews to fly in the afternoon. Aftercompleting these final missions, the aircraft landed

**After the Soviet Union and Israel.***The detachment could still operate from carrier flight derks

if required.

at Da Nang for refueling and returned to Cubi Pointwith an accompanying KC-130.

Admiral Cooper commented in April 1972 on theeffective electronic warfare support TF 77 received fromthe Marines and their EA-6A aircraft, declaring that on"the five strikes they have supported, SAM guidancehas been erratic and no aircraft have been hit."12 Thiswas critical support in conducting carrier-air operationsinto Route Packages 2 and 3. Major General Leslie E.Brown, while 1st MAW commander, concluded:

ECM missions provided CTF 77 the primary EW sup-port necessary to suppoet intensive Alpha Strikes againstNorth Vietnam without sustaining prohibitive airreafrInsses}

Operations continued at this pace through the Oc-tober 1972 bombing halt, when the detachment's mis-sion shifted to passive surveillance of North Vietnamto obtain an electronic order of battle. The 18 Decem-ber 1972 resumption of bombings found the detach-ment engaged again in active support of Navy and AirThrce attacks on Hanoi and Haiphong. The NVA com-mander for air defense of Hanoi, Tran Nhan, recalledthat when the bombs fell in December "radar screens

for the nine missile batteries around Hanoi remainedblank."14

At the ceasefire, the VMCJ-2 detachment returnedto 2d MAW in North Carolina, while the VMCJ-idetachment remained at Cubi Point supporting theSeventh Fleet. The composite detachment flew 2,496combat sorties and 5,356 hours, losing one aircraft.*15Vice Admiral James L. Holloway III, commandingSeventh Fleet when the detachment returned to IIIMAF control on 18 February 1973, told the departingMarine pilots that their "unique role in electronicwarfare provided invaluable support to the U.S. airstriking forces which were penetrating a most formid-able and sophisticated anti-air warfare environment."16

Snakes at SeaAnother aircraft singular to the inventory of 1st

MAW supported the Seventh Fleet, the newly arrivedBell AH-1J Sea Cobras of Marine Helicopter AttackSquadron (HMA) 369. Cobra gunships flew ftom am-phibious ships to locate and destroy North Vietnamesesampans ferrying cargo from merchant ships to landing

*Excluding KC-130 sorties of i,44o hours and 568 combat flights.



A Grumman EA-6A of VMAQ-2 prepares to launch from a carrier deck. The squadronis identified by the "Playboy"logo and aircraft ca/I-letters "CY" on the vertical stabilizer


sites along the coast of North Vietnam and attempt-ing to avoid the mines of Operation Pocket Money.

The squadron was still forming and had just receivedit's AH-lJs when the Spting Offensive occurred. Adetachment was sent to the 9th MAE, and on 11 June1972, Admiral McCain called upon General Metzgerto provide gunship suppott to TF 77. The origin ofthe Marine Hunter Killer ("MarHuk") operation atosefrom the desire of Admiral Holloway and AdmiralCooper to ensure that the blockade of North Vietnam'sseaward approaches was complete and that not a "grainof rice" made it ashote through the use of small, ex-pendable boats which avoided the normal sea lanes.The use of carrier fixed -wing aitcraft for this role divert-ed them from more critical intetdiction missions. Thesolution rested in a more flexible, low-performance air-craft, the helicopter gunship.'7 With rhe demise ofNavy light attack helicopter squadrons, III MAF hadthe only immediate source of armed helicopters.General Metzger believed, however, that the value ofstopping a sampan and it's cargo was not worth thepossible loss of a gunship. He also objected to depriv-ing General Miller and the 9th MAE of both amphibi-ous transports and gunships during a critical period.One consequence was the use of U.S. Army Cobrasfor helicopter escort during the amphibious landings.18

Despite official reservations over the mission, Gener-al Brown warned the acting squadron commander,Captain Ronald G. Osborne, to be ready to go. AsMajor Dawson P. "Rusty" Hansen assumed commandof the squadron on 15 June, it was loading on boardship to assume its role as the Marine Corps sea-basedattack helicopter squadron.' Ar the rime, 18 officers,99 enlisted men, and seven helicopters were squeezedinto limited deck and hangar space on board the USSDenver A troop transport, the ship lacked aircraft sup-port and maintenance facilities. In fact, Admiral Hol-loway initially wanted a helicopter carrier (LPH) forthis mission, but none was available because of 9thMAE combat and ready operations. Major Hansen andhis maintenance officer, Captain David L. Caldon,overcame problems related to supply, missile counter-measure modifications, avionics support, ordnancehandling, and the acquisition of Zuni 5-inch rocketsnot normally used by helicopters.2° Without doctrineor experience to go by, "innovation and imaginationwere the keys" for the self-styled "Marhuckers."21

Major Hansen and Captain David C. Corbert, theoperations officer, developed a concept of employmentand techniques to accomplish the mission assigned bySeventh Fleet. This had two parts: the surveillance ofmerchant ships at the Hon La anchorage and the de-

An AH-1J Sea Cobra from HMA -369 in this case flies the call-letters of HMM-165 whilepart of a composite squadron. It is armed with 20mm cannon and Zuni rocket pods.


struction of sampans running cargo ashore from theseships.* As the merchant ships were from the People'sRepublic of China, they were not to be attacked orthreatened by the Marines. Rules of engagement keptthe Marines at least 500 yards from the merchants andover the water at all times. Thsk Force 77 controlleddaily sorties and coordinated air, gunfire, and rescuesupport. Over time, tactics evolved from a single morn-ing and afternoon flight to random launches duringthe day. Finally, continuous night flights were conduct-ed under illumination shells fired by accompanyingdestroyers. Because the AH-1J lacked radio cryptolog-ic equipment, the use of radio silence was often man-datory to prevent and deceive North Vietnamesemonitoring.22 Flying without radio communicationsat night over the open sea was one measure of thesquadron's skills.

The North Vietnamese positioned 23mm, 37mm,and 57mm antiaircraft guns for air defense around thethree-sided Hon La anchorage. These weapons and avariety of small arms hit nine helicopters in 140 fir-

*tzur merchant ships were anchored at Hon La. Another an-chorage site was at Non Nieu.

ing incidents.2a Enemy fire from the anchorage andthe beach increased threefold over the six-month peri-od of operations, but "very early the enemy realizedthat if they fired on the AH-lJs they could expectCobras, NGF, and/or fixed wing to engage them. Thishas made the enemy fire short unsustained bursts andthus reduced their volume and accuracy?'24 Major Han-sen and his relief, Major David L. Ross, believed theSea Cobra's small profile, maneuverability, and firepower prevented losses.

The AH-lJs fought back with 20mm guns and rock-ets and also were able to "call for" naval gunfire andtactical air. Two air observers were assigned to the squa-dron as airborne controllers, Chief Warrant OfficersJames E Doner,Jr, and James R. Owens. The two fly-ing "gunners" soon had the squadron pilots trainedin airborne spotting and the squadron consequentlycould hit targets with more than just their on-boardweapons, giving the North Vietnamese cause not toarouse the airborne Cobras. During one flight ChiefWarrant Officer Doner's Sea Cobra was fired upon bya 12.7mm machine gun. The pilot turned his nosetowards the gun position and let loose a 5-inch Zuni

180 THE WAR THAT WOULD NUT END

Marine Attack Helitopttr Squadron 369 Photo

Squadron maintenance personnel viewed on the deck of a LPD with one of their "birds."They operatedfrom inadequate spaces under demanding conditions to keep aircraft aloft.


rocket. This was Doner's first experience with the Zuni,and "the pilot didn't tell me he was about to fite it?'The rocket enveloped the Cobra with smoke and sparksfrom it's motor, tattling the aircraft, and had Doneryelling "We've been hit...!"25

In August, the squadron moved to the USSCleveland (LPD 7) and continued full-time combatoperations. On 17 August, a concerted effort was madeto ensure continued "permissive envitonment" for thegunships using carrier-based A-6s and Vought A-7Corsairs and the fire support of seven naval gunfireships, including the Newport News. After this, hostileground fire slackened. Operating periods alternatedwith port visits through December, with a final moveto the kISS Dubuque (LPD 8).

When operations ended on 26 January 1973,HMA-369 had flown 981 combat sorties, destroying otdamaging 123 sampans carrying an estimated 5,444100-pound bags of rice. The merchant ships resortedto dumping cargo into the sea in waterproof containersin an effort to float cargo ashore?8 A 1973 Center for

An enemy view ofthe Sea Cobra showing the narrowperspective from head-on. This was a factor cited byaircrews as a reason that antiaircraft fire was ineffec-tive. Another factor was the amount of suppressivefirepower the AH-1J could put out in rapid ordet


Naval Analyses study concluded that the employmentof HMA-369 released two destroyers and carrier air-craft otherwise required for this mission? The Secre-tary of the Navy recognized that the squadronmaintained a sustained pace of heavy combat opera-tions during all types of weather, "responding gallantlyto the almost overwhelming tasks of providing a three-fold role of attack, supply movement interdiction, andconstant surveillance of the enemy?'2° Major Ross alsoptovided a fitting summary of the period when he star-ed that the squadron did more than just shoot-up sam-pans, " . . . most of all, the last six months of opera-tions have given the AH-1J the opportunity to prove itdeserves the designation of an attack helicopter 29

Fighters over the North

The USS America (CVA 66) arrived in the TonkinGulf in July 1972 with a Marine squadron on board,Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 333. The 40officers and 280 enlisted Marines of LieutenantColonel John K. Cochrane's squadron consideredthemselves "gunfighters," the special breed of aviatorswho flew fighters, even if their 12 McDonnell Doug-las F-4J Phantoms had seen more Vietnam service ina close air support role. The "Shamrocks," a 2d Ma-rine Aircraft Wing unit, was expecting to operate inthe Mediterranean when it was ordered by the Chiefof Naval Operations to report to CinCPac and, subse-quently, the Tonkin Gulf.° Operations in the skiesover North Vietnam began on 14 July; half the mis-sions were fighter patrols and the rest were ground at-tacks in Route Packages 3 and 4. In August, the airgroup commander ordered the squadron on nightarmed-reconnaissance missions, but no NVA aircraftwere encountered. These tasks continued through thefall, with port visits to the Philippines and HongKong.2'

In September, flight operations in Route Package6b began. During this period two F-4s, call signs "RedOne" and "Red Two," launched on a scheduled com-bat air patrol. Major Lee T. "Bear" Lasseter, the squa-dron operations officer, and his radar intercept officer,CaptainJohn D. "Li'l John" Cummings, flew aircraft"Red One?' Captains Andrew S. "Scotty" Dudley, Jr.,and James W. "Diamond Jim" Brady manned "RedTwo:' Lasseter and Cummings were an old team withnearly 5,000 hours of Phantom time between themas air combat instructors and from previous tours.Dudley and Brady were on their first flight into the

to then, 62 strike and 109 combat air parrol missions hadbeen conducted.

heavily defended airspace of the far North. This wastheir second flight of the day to cover air attacks oftargets on the coast north of Haiphong. Both F-4Jswere armed with four Sparrow AIM-7E-2 and fourSidewinder AIM-9D missiles, a combination man-dated by the different capabilities of the two missiles2The tactical air commander and ground control in-tercept operatot controlled the flight from the USSEngland(CG 22).

The previous day, 10 September, 1.asseter and Cum-mings had been directed to intercept a North Viet-namese MiG aitctaft. Contact was made, but lost dueto equipment failure. The 11th was different.Launched at 1700, after a delay in link-up because ofradio silence, the flight proceeded to meet an airborneKA-6 tanker to top-off with fuel for the mission. "RedOne" was filled and "Red Two" was refueling whenthe strike force they were assigned to protect beganits attack. There was not enough time to completerefueling, but Lasseter felt that his wingman hadenough fuel fot the mission and ordered Dudley tofollow him to theit assigned combat air patrol station.Prior to teaching the orbit point, Chief RadarmanDutch Schultz on the England gave Lasseter a flight

vector to two MiGs 20,000 feet over Phuc Yen AiiIield10 miles northwest of Hanoi. With intermittent ra-dar contact, the F-4s closed to seven miles of a pairof MiG-21 Fishbeds at 1,000 feet altitude. The aircraftsighted each other at about the same time, Lasseternow commenting that "we didn't surprise them?' Dud-ley made the first call, "Tally-Ho! Tally-Ho! TwelveO'Clock. Keep going straight?' The MiGs were flyingone behind the other when Lasseter and Cummingslocked-on to the lead aircraft. "OK, John, goboresight. Boresight now! Are we cleared to shoot?"*Lasseter launched two Sparrows which the silver-colored MiG dodged with an inside turn to gain alti-tude on "Red One." The second MiG reversed courseand flew out of the engagement to the north.

During the next four and a half minutes Lasseterand the MIG engaged in subsonic maneuvers below1,000 feet over the Phuc Yen runway. Cummings stat-ed that "ground fire and SAM warnings were continu-ous?' Lasseter executed a "high yo-.yo" to gain altitudeand a firing position on his opponent as Dudley

*Becausc of the number of American aircraft over North Viet-nam, visual dentificacion and permission from a control agencywas required before missiles could be used.


Photo courtesy of Cdr Peter B. Mersky, USNRA "Trtjt'-Tre" F-4J lands on the USS America in the Gulf of Tonkin. The specific aircraftis number 3886, with the 'AJ" call-letters of Carrier Air Wing 8. It is not carrying anyordnance, indicating a training flight or a return from combat in an "empty" state,

pressed the MiG. Lasseter launched two Sparrows andtwo Sidewinders during the melee but the MiG stayedlow and evaded the missiles with continued left turns.four minutes into the fight, Dudley was dangerouslylow on fuel and ready to disengage. Suddenly the MiGreversed his turn and gave Lasseter a clean shot at it:"Ha! We got him)ohn! OK, splash one MiG-21!" Las-seter said later, "MiG-21 exploded and disintegrated."Cummings commented that the Sidewinder "reallydid a job on that MiG. Everything aft of the cockpitwas gone and what was left was in an almost-90-degreedive for the ground at about 500 feet."

"Red One" and "Red Two" joined, and started backto the America when, according to Lasseter, a thirdMiG "made a mn on my wingman?' Lasseter andCummings fired their remaining Sidewinder, whichgot the MiG's "attention and sent him scooting towardshome. . . ." By now Dudley was low on fuel as bothaircraft slowed and climbed to 14,000 feet to reach thesafety of the sea. They also shortened their exit route,flying straight over Haiphong. Electronic counter-measure gear continued to emit SAM and AAA warn-ings as the North Vietnamese attempted to hit themwith a "tremendous amount of groundfire?'

The all-Marine MiG shootdown crew, happy to bealive, is Maj Lee I Lasseter, right, and Capt John D.Cummings. Cumming 'sflikht recordings were used toreconstruct their air-to-air fight over North Vietnam.

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 333 Photo



Combat ffights over North Vietnam, and Route Package 6 in particular were subject tothe full range of enemy weapons. Antiaircraft artillery included these S-60 57mm an-tiaircraft guns, used in conjunction with the "Flap Jf7heel" radar, in batteries of six guns.


In the confusion that followed, "Red One" wasdamaged by a surface-launched missile. Unable to linkup with a tanker and out of fuel, "Red Two" stayedwith his leader. Crossing the beach, Lasseter's aircraftwas burning and its engine flamed out, forcing himand Cummings to eject "feet wet" into the TonkinGulf. Dudley and Brady, now out of fuel, and withpossible battle damage to their Phantom, also eject-ed over the sea. The England launched a HelicopterCombat Support Squadron (HC) 7. "Big Mother" SAlhelicopter to pick up Lasseter and Cummings; Dud-ley and Brady wet e recovered by the USS Biddle (DLG21).

This was the only MiG kill of the war by a MarineCorps unit and an engagement with mixed results.*A second section of F-4s was diverted to the MiG fray,some 60 miles from assigned air covet positions on thecoast, resulting in no fighter cover for the strike.Another consideration raised later by Captain Cum-mings was that ". . . the North Vietnamese used our

*Two other Marines had shot down enemy aircraft during thewar, flying as exchange officers with the U.S. Air Ibrce: Captain DnyleD. Baker on 17 December 1967 with the 13th Fighter Squadronand Captain I.awrenee C. Richard on 11 August 1972 with the 585thTactical Fighter Squadron.

aggressiveness and desire to bag a MiG to lure us intoa trap cons.isting of AAA, SAMs, and MiGs?'3

The air war for VMFA-333 continued to the end ofthe year, with the squadron flying armed reconnais-sance missions during the bombing halt above the20th Parallel in October 1972. By this time, the winterweather restricted the squadron to instrument-controlled bombing through cloud cover. The Ameri-ca's air commander ordered VMFA-333 to conduct at-tack missions with the resumption of bombing on 18December 1972. In this month Major Lasseter tookcommand of the squadron after Lieutenant ColonelCochrane was shot down and injured, and Major Las-seter brought the squadron home at the end of its tourin March 1973.

As the Marine Corps is the landward extension ofthe U.S. Navy, Marine air is the landward continuationof naval airpower, demonstrated by the Marine unitswith the Seventh Fleet during the Spring Offensive.In 1972, these Marine electronic warfare, attack, andfighter aircraft flew their share of Thsk Force 77's 65,285sorties flown over North Vietnam and 35,730 sortiesover South Vietnam that helped to push the Com-munists further toward signing a ceasefire agreement.34

CHAPTER 13

Other Marine ActivitiesLeadershzjt', Morale, and Readiness—Beans, Bullets, and AvGas: Logistics

Thunder from the Sea, Fire from the Sky — War in the Ether

Leadership, Morale, and ReadinessAt this time, commanders in FMFPac and III MAF

had to address the intangible, as well as the physical,needs of their organizations: concerns related to theleadership, training, and morale of the Marines whomade up the tactical units. The conduct of Marineswho formed these units, in effect reflected the situa-tion in contemporary American society. Injune 1971,this condition was described by military historian andcommentator Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr, USMC(Ret), as ". .

. the lowest state of military morale inthe history of the country."

From his experience as a division- and a corps-levelcommander, Lieutenant General Louis Metzger re-called, "personnel problems were a major challengeduring this period"2 One squadron executive officerand commander, Major Kent C. Bareman, concludedthat "anti-war feelings of the period and the drug cul-ture mindset presented a leadership dilemma that wasimponderable."a Some officers and noncommissionedofficers, faced with this situation, appeared to avoidthe career risks of leading these Marines for lessdemanding assignments. A company-grade officer re-plied this was not quite accurate, "We were doing thebest we could with the people and equipment onhand."

Actually, many of these personnel ptoblems stem-med from the fact that the Marine Corps, unable tocall up Reserves, was forced by declining recruitment totake in substandard entrants. Once enlisted, certainof these disadvantaged young men found it difficultto meet military standards and were either unwillingor unable to accept military discipline. Marine histori-an Allan R. Millet observed that this was accepted bythe Marine Corps at the time "as a calculated risk tokeep up end strength"

A later study by Headquarters Marine Corps provid-ed the following statistics on Marine manpower at thestart of the decade: In 1971. 21 percent of all recruitswere discharged prior to completion of the 78-dayperiod of recruit training; 70 percent of enlisted Ma-rines in this period, privates through sergeants, were21 years of age or less, and 49 percent of this groupacknowledged some illegal drug usage. Only five per-

cent of the "first termers" eligible to reenlist did so,indicative of service conditions at the time. This lackof quality manpower was also reflected in disciplinaryproblems which. resulted in 587 general courts-martialand 6,655 special courts-martial. In 1971, desertionsnumbered 11,852 and unauthorized absences, 35,174,or at the rates of 56.1 and 166.6 per 1,000 respectively.tIn 1973 alone, 10,045 Marines were discharged priorto completion of obligated service. Recruiting stan-dards were lowered to the point that, by this same year,only 46 percent of incoming recruits held high schooldiplomas. Within the ranks of the lowest four enlist-ed grades of private through corporal, high schoolgraduates composed 50 percent of ground combatunits, 51 percent of support units, and 65 percent ofaviation units. One division commander reported histroops' average general classification test (GCT) scoresas 85, with 100 and above being requited for trainingmost technical skills.**8

Serving overseas when their country appeared tornby antiwar dissension, Marines went to a bob-taileddivision on Okinawa or an air wing spread over thePacific from Hawaii to Japan. Officers and men served12-month tours "unaccompanied" by families, onOkinawa alongside more generous U.S. Army and AirForce family policies. Efforts to reconstitute the 3d Ma-rine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing did notappear to be the highest priority to those on "theRock," as Okinawa was known. Facilities and equip-ment there showed the effects of the previous six yeatsof war and the vagaries of the defense budget thatsometimes appeared unable to afford basic necessitieson a cyclic basis. For some Marines the local culturealso seemed strange and unintelligible.

As Marine Corps units departed Vietnam in 1971,those men with less than nine months ovetseas wetereassigned within III MAF to finish their overseas touts.They arrived with an outlook and disdain for gatrisonliving that negated the experience they brought as

Rare per 1,000 equals number of incidents divided by averageenlisted strength x 1,000. Length of unauthorized absences histor-ically averaged 10 days.

**GCT scores are roughly similar to Intelligence Quotients (IQ):a GCT of too is believed to indicate average learning and reason-

ing ability.

185



Technology and material spent on the Spring Offensive was meaningless without the Ma-tines who made it work, such as crews andpilots of Marine Attack Squadron (All-Weather)224. Squadron members line up on the USS Coral Sea as it pulls into San Francisco in 1972.

"combat Veterans?' The resultant high turnover of per-sonnel and the demands of additional duty and fleetaugmentation programs adversely influenced combateffectiveness and unit cohesion. Racial conflict, alco-hol and drug abuse, and criminal activity that placeddemands on the small-unit leaders beyond their ca-pacity were other manifestations of institutional stress?

As commander of FMF Pacific, Lieutenant GeneralWilliam K. Jones conducted a survey that examinedperceptions by Marines of duty assignments, the le-gal system, taciat conflict, dtug use, and leadership.It reached a number of conclusions, among them theobservation that:

throughout all these areas of major contern are nega-tive attitudes ot indications which appear repeatedly. Prin-cipal among these was rhe distrust of the young Marines forthe "establishment"— tepresentsng authority, one's superiors,the chain of command, the legal structure.°

Leadership was believed to be weakest at the lowest

level, the point at which conflicts appeared and where• . the apparent intolerance and insulation of the

white SNCOs [represented) the focal point of thegeneration gap" and the communications breakdownPThis was not so much in routine official duties, butrather in the inability to establish personal trust andconfidence during informal contacts with the youngMarines, A factor in this was the loss of experiencedstaff noncommissioned officers who had been madetemporary officers in the middle-196Os.°

The poll went on to conclude that drug use in thelower tanks was abetted by a "no-squeal" syndrome,race relations often broke down in black perceptionsof inequities, Article 15 nonjudicial punishment wasbelieved to be imposed arbitrarily, and, in leadershiprelations, respect did not equate to trust among ranks,GeneralJones instituted a number of command pro-grams to get at the essence of these social problemsand took steps to get the Marine Corps to do the same,

with limited results.* While General Leonard F Chap-man, Jr., then Commandant, approved the FMFPacprograms, he "was reluctant to take action since hewas soon to leave office and preferred to leave it tohis successor," General Robert E. Cushman, Jr.

The conflict of legitimate civil rights reforms anddisruptive demands for "black power" was lessened asearlier steps taken by the Marine Corps to address thisnational social issue began to take effect. At Head-quarters Marine Corps, the Equal Opportunity Branchand the CMC Advisory Committee for Minority Af-fairs continued efforts to remove inequities from thesystem. By late 1971, 1.2 percent of Marine officers and12.1 percent of Marine enlisted personnel were blackAmericans. Personnel distribution policies placed

Lest this situation appear unique to the 1971-1973 period, irshould be nored thar one of General Jones' contributions was anFMFPar newsierrer, The Marine Leader, which included previousleadership challenges and solutions featured in his "Base PlateMeGurlc" series, first published in rht Marine Corps Gazette in theIaie 1940s.

17.97 percent of these Marines in combat arms and16.18 percent in support and service occupationalspecialties. It was in the FMF combat and support unitsthat unrest was greatest. Racial incidents continued,but were now being recognized as not isolated butrather symptomatic of something more than poor dis-cipline, In September 1971, the 3d Marine Divisiontargeted dismptive behavior by blacks in the base messhalls by prohibiting "power salutes." This resulted in34 Marines being charged with violations of the divi-sion otder. Further efforts were made to suppressprovocative posters, banners, and clothing deemed tocontain a racial content. The year ended with 116 ra-cial incidents reported to Headquarters Marine Corps,which commented that the apparent increase in as-saults and incidents of racial tension was a result ofa "more responsive and sensitive" reporting system.By April 1972, racial incident reporting and "salt andpepper" personnel reports (a unit's strength brokendown by "race" grouping) were further revised andstandardized by Marine Corps order. The human re-

OTHER MARINE ACTIVITIES 187


An "illegal assembly," as defined by military law and leadershzp, is represented by thisgathering of Marines at Camp Schwab, Okinawa, in January .1972 on Dr Martin LutherKing, Jr.'s birthday. The group included outsiders from other facilities and set-rices.


lations program had begun within III MAE units. In-spection trips by the Commandant's Advisory Com-mittee for Minority Affairs and the Department ofDefense reported that the effort in the Western Pacificwas overcoming both discrimination and the resultantblack backlash.

To counter divisive elements, small-unit leaders atall levels had to establish conditions which promotedwhat FMFPac called "job satisfaction:' Nothing wastoo insignificant if it impacted adversely on this, par-ticularly in batracks, the mess halls, and enlisted clubs.The commands emphasized unit identity, recognitionof abilities and initiative, and an equitable promo-tion system. Leadership, as always, was a full-time,demanding affair. It was a tough time, particularly ingarrison, for small-unit leadets: one second lieutenantrecalled that the human relations program, while nota substitute for effective leadership, "was an attemptto allow Marines to better understand one another."Another platoon leader, Second Lieutenant Mark B.Pizzo, remarked that officers and staff noncommis-sioned officers "were open to constant threats andreprisals" As III MAF soldiered on, one result of thetermination of the Vietnam Wat was the start of a self-conscious internal review of mission, force structure,manpower, and quality.*15

Rear Admiral Wycliffe D. Toole, Jr., and Task Force76 had to resolve "disturbing racial and disciplinaryproblems both ashore and afloat." Admiral Toole wenton to state that he appreciated the "untiring efforts" ofMarines Major General Joseph C. Fegan,Jr., BrigadierGeneral EdwardJ. Miller, and Brigadier General PaulG. Graham, to resolve these matters: "Without theirconstant personal attention . . . the situation couldhave easily escalated into disruptive physicalviolence."

Despite units' inretnal turmoils these same Marinesand sailors responded automatically to the contingen-cies of 1972 with the speed and intensity of previousgenerations of U.S. Marines, particularly during thecritical period of April and May. This desire to partic-ipate was reflected in shipboard activities and the in-tense competition to be assigned to any dutiescontributing to combat efforts. As Marine Lance Cor-

*This was completed when Genera! Louis H. Wilson, Jr., as Com-mandant of the Marine Corps in 1975, wrote Senator Sam Nunnsaying, "We have taken a hard look at ourselves. Self-discipline re-quires that we take such account as a routine mstter at all times;but, periodically, we must look deeper intn institutional assump-tions as well as operational realities. The Marine Corps has benefittedfrom this extensive review." (HQMC manpower study, p. 3)

potal Donald L. Samuels of BLT 1/9 expressed it, unitpride gave "us a little something extra and makes uswork harder2 Samuels' First sergeant, RobertS. Yna-cay, agreed that morale was highest afloat "when theMarines got to participate in U.S. Navy duties withthe members of the crew'58

On troop transports, jungle-utility-clad Marines ap-peared on deck with shorn heads, cleaning individu-al weapons "without being told to." Aviation crewspulled together as teams to meet the back-breakingdemands of wartime sortie rates. Lieutenant ColonelEddie R. Maag, the MAG-12 logistics officer, main-tained that when a private-first-class aircraft mechan-ic "will spend his own buck on a flashlight, and holdit in his mouth to ready a $15 million Phantom forthe next mission, you have to be impressed"° Theknowledge that there was a war on and Marines hada part to play in it was a major factor in restoring self-image to America's "first to fsght."ao It helped sustainthem while "boxing holes in the ocean" as membersof the so-called "Tonkin Gulf Yacht Club" and whileexperiencing the day-to-day sameness of forward-arealiving. As Thomas Hobbes stated in 1651, "War con-sisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting; butin a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by bat-tle is sufficiently known

Individual and unit quality as combat units, ratherthan as social beings or groupings, was measured inareas such as readiness, as well as in discipline andmorale. Throughout this period, III MAF units con-ducted individual and unit training to ensure readi-ness for combat and contingency operations. Suchtraining was more than the simple repetition of skills.It included physical and mental conditioning, instill-ing unit cohesion, sharing doctrine, ensuring materialreadiness, and providing leadership. Transition frompeacetime to combat was not difficult for most navaland aviation units, as their normal duties ate demand-ing in themselves. But even they had something tolearn from the experience of rapid deployment to com-bat with ensuing around-the-clock operations. Ob-served Lieutenant Colonel James C. Brown, command-ing VMA(AW)-533, there were shortfalls "regardingreadiness inspection procedures in garrison" that onlybecame apparent in the field.a2 For the amphibiousunits oriented towards ground combat, landing exer-cises and additional preparations were conducted atthe Zambales Training Area, Philippines. Once at sea,readiness preparation was conducted at the small-unitlevel with what was called on-the-job training (OJT)for anything that could be accomplished within an in-

dividual ship's plan of the day. Most units took ad-vantage of the opportunities made available duringoperations to accomplish needed improvements inreadiness. This included rehearsals for landings, com-munications exercises, and general quarters drills.23

Maintaining combat readiness for 70 separate units,on 20 different ships, with more than 6,000 men for

months at a time was especially difficult. Training ofground units on board ship is difficult under the bestof conditions; the demands of combat readiness didnot make it easier. The aviation units were alreadygeared to a high tempo of operations that did not al-low, for them at least, this benefit. The long periodsafloat and ashore were tempered by the proximity offighting in Vietnam. These operations reversed thenormal relation of staff to line, with headquarters per-sonnel being more actively involved in the conduct ofthe war and the riflemen and platoon leaders standingby. First Lieutenant Laurence W. Rush, a HMM-165pilot, noted that they had to content themselves withmonitoring the radios and listening to Air Force andNavy pilots flying "in country." "We listened to strafingand bombing runs, Army chopper strikes, rescue opsand Arc Lights—that was B-52 high-altitude bomb-ing strikes. We listened and thought that soon we weregoing to get our chance?'24

Training had functional and institutional aspects inreadiness and disciibline. Inspections on shiji servedas a measure of both physical and psychological pre-pare dness, sharpened by the proximity of the fighting.




BGen EdwardJ. Miller Commanding General of the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade,takes an opportunity to brief enlisted members on their changing Southeast Asia mis-sions andto elicit their comments, on board the USS Blue Ridge (ICC 19) in May 1972.



The end of the supply pzi&eline was at the pointmaterial was neededfor use in the conduct of a unit'smission. At nght, SSgt Francis N. Traufler the 9thMAB's supply chief issues camouflage clothing to aMarine replacement on hoard the USS Blue Ridge.

Beans, Bullets, and AvGas: Logistics

Under the existing military assistance programs,direct replacement of "service unique" equipment wasauthorized to the South Vietnamese. To the U.S. Ma-rine Corps, this meant the reconstitution of equip-ment and supplies lost in combat, as well as programsto upgrade the VNMC's potential. In addition to ad-visory personnel, additional material support wasprovided to the Vietnamese through the Marine Ad-visory Unit. To Colonel Dorsey, most significant wasthe emergency air shipment that brought 105mmhowitzers, trucks, individual and crew-served weapons,gas masks, and other "combat essential items to DaNang Air Base less than six days after the initial com-bat loss report had been received in Washington,D.C."25 The logistics advisor, Major Stanley G. Pratt,had direct telephone contact to Headquarters MarineCorps by way of the headquarters command center.Supported by the Assistant Commandant of the Ma-rine Corps, General Earl E. Anderson, the Installa-tions and Logistics Division sent timely replacementof unit equipment lost in the spring battles. The closerapport between the Vietnamese Marines and the U.S.

Marines paid dividends, as direct flights of replace-ment stocks were made into Da Nang before the startof the Lam Son counteroffensive.

General Metzger, as III MAF commander, was in-volved in a number of support activities cutting acrossthe spectrum of the missions of deployed units onland, sea, and air. Units of the 3d Marine Divisionand 1st Marine Aircraft Wing units also required anextensive logistics support effort. During 1972, this IIIMAF logistic "tail" stretched from ships in the TonkinGulf and depots in the jungles of Thailand back tothe Philippines, Taiwan,Japan, and even to the UnitedStates. The wing commander, Major General Leslie E.Brown, felt his major achievement during the periodwas the coordination of the deployment of tactical andsupport units to combat in Southeast Asia to severalfar-flung sires.20 The cost to the 1st MAW alone interms of maintenance, ordnance, and fuel was signifi-cant. The 9th MAB commander, General Miller laterwrote that the 3d Marine Division commander, MajorGeneral Joseph C. Fegan had "turned his division'inside-out' in terms of personnel and equipment" tosupport III MAF.

There was a need to maintain all manner of equip-ment at workshop (3d echelon) and depot (4th eche-lon) level at locations where facilities and supportagreements did not exist. The continued readiness ofthe 9th MAB, MAG-12, and MAG-15 depended upontheir organic maintenance programs for machines andMarines, not an easy task on a constantly moving am-phibious transport or at a remote airfield. Materialreadiness depended on maintenance of equipmentand on the availability of parts for repair, and replace-ment of items that could not be serviced on ship. Re-stricted space, diminished facilities, diverse organiza-tions, and constraints due to contingencies also werefactors to overcome. General Miller's units with TaskThrce 76 lacked the extensive facilities in Vietnam thatexisted prior to 1972. Units at sea were dependentupon Vice Admiral William P. Mack's UnderwayReplenishment Group for the supply of fuel, oil, lubri-cants, and food from supply ships. Moreover, combat-essential parts or equipment took up to 14 days to ar-rive from Okinawa and the Philippines.

When battalions and squadrons artivcd in the Viet-nam theater in April, they were able to take advantageof the U.S. Army's departure from Vietnam to replaceor obtain supplies and equipment informally fromstocks being left that would otherwise have gone tothe South Vietnamese. While common equipmentcould be "scrounged" from Navy, Army, and Air Force


Ill MAF Amphibious Assault Force Buildup in 1972STRENGTH

Adaptedfrom EMEPac MarOpsSEA and CNA MarAcIySEA Matenal

units, General Miller needed a more reliable meansto maintain forces afloat. On 16 April, General Merz-ger directed that high-priority items be senr ro FleetAir Support Unit, Da Nang, for transfer by helicoprerto units at sea. This effort was supported by dailyVMGR-152 flights from Iwakuni, Japan, via Okinawaand the Philippines. The initial efforts to establishneeded coordination in Da Nang ran afoul of rheJCS-imposed personnel ceilings on General Creighton W.Abrams that prohibited Marine helicopters and per-sonnel remaining ashore overnight. As a result, FleetAir Support Unit (FASU), Da Nang, was unable toestablish a Marine liaison team to handle the increaseof cargo. The Navy met this demand by bringing insailors from the FASU at Cubi Point in the Philippines,

and the Marines in turn sent their men to replace thesailors at Cubi Point.

This system reduced the delivery time for criticalitems to three and four days and mail, a high-prioritymorale item, averaged a four-day delivery time fromthe United States.28 Personnel movement to and fromthe brigade paralleled these supply lines. OutgoingMarines on emergency leave, transfer, liaison, or ad-vance parties traveled from ship via Marine helicoptersto Hue or Da Nang and connected with flights toOkinawa or the Philippines from Da Nang. Incomingpersonnel arrived at Da Nang by air or ship and werepicked up at FASU by helicopter for transport to theirunits. Replacements who had left the United States Ibrservice in Okinawa were often in a state of shock when

6000

5000

6042

MAB

BLT

BLT

MAU

MAU

4000

4614

MABBLT

MAU

MAU

5005

MABBLT

MAU

MAU

3000

4902

MAB

HMA

BLT

MAIJ

MAU

4331

MAB

BLT

MAU

2000

3045

MAB

BLT

MAU

3639

MAB

HMA

MALJ

MAU

10001424

MAU

1924

MAB -

HMA

MAU

Date 2 Apr 9 Apr 27 Apr 23 May 25 May 13 Jun 21 Jun 26 Jun 17 Jul


Marine Corps Histoeical Collection

An essential part of moving needed supplies andper-sonnel to afloat units was the logistics flights with or-ganic helicopters. This completed the link withdeployedforces and supporting airfields at Da Nang,South Vietnam, and Cubi Point, Philippines. Here aCH-46 from HMM-165 is loaded, with rotor-bladesturning, on the flight deck of the USS Tripoli.

they were sent on to Vietnam at a time when therewete reportedly no Marines left "in country." 'Prado'sBunker" and "The Red Dog Inn," the most convenienttransient quarters and bar, became familiar landmasksro FASU "customers" as they flowed along the supplyand replacement routes serving the sea-based 9th MABfot almost 12 months.

Air transport was vital to the employment ofMAG-12 and MAG-15 during the Spring Offensive.Advance parties flew to the operating area in MarineKC-130s as soon as warning orders were received tocoordinate for the reception and support of the in-coming squadrons to Vietnam. Concurrently, flyingsquadrons deployed directly to Vietnam or throughNAS Cubi Point, Philippines. Squadron support per-sonnel and material flew to forward locations in airtransport obtained from a variety of sources, includingthe Military Airlift Command (MAC) and Pacific AirTraffic Management Agency (PATMA), while remain-ing supplies followed on military and civilian sealift.

VMGR-152 tankers and crews assigned to thedetachment at NAS Cubi Point met initial air refuel-ing requirements. The Hercules tanker version couldcarry 32,140 pounds of fuel and could refuel two air-craft at the same time. The cargo version could carryup to 92 passengers or 26,913 pounds of cargo. BothVMGR aircraft provided direct support to fighter andattack squadrons moving into Da Nang, Bien Hoa,and Nam Phong. VMFA-212 employed the services ofsix tankers and a cargo aircraft in its move from Kaneo-he Bay, Hawaii, to Da Nang during its Pacific transitfrom Hawaii. Eventually another four tankers were sta-tioned in Thailand with TF Delta. A factor in theheavy demands placed upon the tankers was the in-compatibility of Navy and Air krce reftieling systems,although the Air krce tankers could reconfigure withadvance notice, The magnitude of tanker support is

Long-range air transport was provided by LockheedKC-130 Hercules, as this aircraft fromVMGR-152, indicated by the "QD" call-letters on the vertical stabilizer These aircraftmoved both supplies and fuel as an essential element of the forward deployment.



STRENGTH

Ill MAF Aviation Force Buildup in 1972(Excluding units with Seventh Fleet)

6000

5000

4000

30003578 3578

3113

MAG

MAC

TED

3477

MAC

MAG

TFD

3633 -MAG

MAG

TFD

MAG

MAC

TED

MAG

MAGTFD

20002141

MAG

MAG

TFD1000

. 1639

MAC

MAG

- 700

MAC

1008

MAG

Date 6 Apr 10 Apr 16 May 31 May 13 Jun 18 Jun 21 Jun 24 Jun 1 Jul

Adaptedfmm FMFPac MarOp.cSEA and CNA MorActySEA Mateyjal

indicated by statistics from the four-plane VMGR-152Detachment Delta at Nam Phong. In the year it wasdeployed, it flew 4,721 hours, refueled 3,239 aircraft,and transferred 4,434,280 gallons of JP-4 fuel

The KC-130 served to fly Marine logistic (Marlog)runs as well as for refueling. These same VMGR planesconstituted an intratheater airlift between MAC andcommercial air support to the forward locations. Start-ing in April, a daily MarI.og flight ran from Iwakuni,to Okinawa, Cubi Point, and Da Nang, where helicop-ters ferried material to the 9th MAB. These flights wereexpanded to include Bien Hoa and Nam Phong aslanding sites.3° The demand upon the available planes

and crews from Futema required additional reinforce-ment. VMGR-352 aircraft deployed in April, bring-ing the total of KC-130s to 15 in the Western Pacific,of which eight were configured for tanker operations.

General Met.zger also was concerned about his abil-ity to support sustained operations at the new loca-tions, combined with increasing demands for logisticsupport made upon General Abrams and GeneralVogt.3' The support structures in Vietnam developedby the Marines in the 1960s were no longer in place,including accurate information about existing facili-ties and services. Deployments to Da Nang and BienHoa resulted in support from Seventh Air Force of

common items such as ordnance and fuel. Uncommonsupport, including rework facilities, came from theFASTJ at Cubi Point and through the use of the ubiq-uitous MarLog for high-priority items, On 27 April1972, General Brown established Detachment Bravo,H&MS-15 at Cubi Point to conduct scheduled inspec-tions, engine buildups, and provide intermediatemaintenance activity (AIMD) support for deployedsquadrons. Remote from Vietnam, it was a secure lo-cation to work on aircraft shuttled in and out of thecombat zone.32

The deployments of MAG-12 and MAG-15 present-ed substantially different problems: MAG-12 movedinto existing facilities with direct support from SeventhAir Force and MACY; the MAG-IS movement to NamPhong was to an empty airstrip. For MAG-15, base de-velopment was the initial priority. Support at Nam

Phong was predicated on the Air Force's definition of"bate base" operations that requited ". . . no physicalfacilities other than a usable runway, taxiway, parkingarea, and source of water?'33 General Jones at FMFPactook several steps to free material for the constructionof facilities after receiving a report dared 10 May fromBrigadier General Andrew W. O'Donnell and theOfficer in Charge of Construction, Thailand. TheFMFPac commander directed General Metzger to shipto Nam Phong AM-2 marring from MCAS Futema,"Butler" buildings from Camp Butler, Quonset hutsfrom the 3d Marine Division, and contingency con-struction material held by 3d Force Service Regiment.

To build the base required the efforts of MobileConstruction Battalion 5, the Marine Wing SupportGroup, and contract civilian construction companiesto install fuel storage, navigational aids, parking


Task lksrce Delta Command Chronology

Modern military aircraft were particularly demanding of supply and maintenance sup-port to meet the needs for full-systems readiness. This was complicated by the additionaldemands of combat flying not normally met in peacetime service. A Marine maintenanceman works on an A-6 of VMA (AllY) -533 using ground support equrj,ment for power


ramps, ordnance storage, cargo handling facilities, andthe road network. The MAG was able to fly a limitednumber of sorties after fuel became available and aircontrollers were in the field's tower. Renovation of ex-isting buildings, development of a water system, andconstruction of warehouses and security positions werefollowed by laying concrete for a helicopter pad, andconstructing housing, mess halls, and seven concrete"Wonder Arch" aircraft shelters. Support of TF Deltawas dependent upon airlift to bring in 7,400 tons ofcargo and 3,000 men with MAC C-141s. Seven weekslater the USS Tuscaloosa (LST 1187), USS Mobile andthe MSC American Ranger delivered another 628 tonsof cargo, mostly vehicles, through Sattahip. DespiteGeneral Jones' personal interest in building up NamPhong, it still took from 24 May until 17 June beforethe first combat flights could be flown from the base.

General O'Donnell also was faced with the short-age of repair parts from the logistics support group,the lack of storage facilities, and the less-than-effectiveresponse from the Naval Supply Center at Subic Bayand the 3d FSR at Okinawa to supply requests. Repairparts for electronic and ordnance items were notstocked at levels adequate to meet increased failurerates from combat usage. All of this was further com-plicated by the different locations of MAG-15 and theextended distances involved with the supply "pipeline:'In June 1972, when MK46 and MK47 decoy flares wereexpended at a rate greater than the receipt of replace-

ment stocks from the United States, General Jones ex-pedited their resupply?4 Also by l7June, the PATMAairlift was only half completed, with a supply back-log at NAS Cubi Point. A solution had to be foundbefore shortages affected the tempo of operations. On4 July, Lieutenant Colonel Raneley A. Brown's KC-130sbegan an emergency shuttle of critical cargo from CubiPoint to Nam Phong, to build up stocks of fuel andordnance. Without a 15- to 30-day amount of sup-plies on hand, General O'Donnell believed TF Deltawould be dependent upon a constant flow of dailyshipments from the Air Force at Udorn, 77 road kilo-meters to the north?5

Other difficulties arose when supplies of matting,generators, and lighting became short. Shared groupand wing ground support equipment (GSE) was inshort supply because the number and dispersion ofdetachments exceeded authorized allowances of equip-ment. A solution to this was the consolidation of main-tenance Marines and equipment at common locationsto support a number of detachments. Furtherproblems cited for sustained operations at Nam Phongwere with TACAN and liquid oxygen equipmentfailures. This situation was compounded by clouds ofinsects that jammed filters and heavy rains that vir-tually turned the area into a swamp.36

Thunder from the Sea, Fire from the SkyDuring 1972, Marine advisors believed their value

to the South Vietnamese was directly related to their

The location of Marine units at Nam Phong was a remote shijiping point for both per-sonnel and material. As an expeditionary base, everything needed to power it had tobe produced on the spot. logistics Support Group Delta ("Miracles Done Immediately')fulfilled these needs. This powerplant dispensed electricity to run the base service facilities.




Aviation demands for liquid oxygen and nitrogen were met by local "expeditionary" equl-ment that required art, as we/I as science, to be made to work in field conditions,

Air traffic control communication and electronic support was by Marine Air Traffic Con-trol Unit 62. This backing included the control tower, precision radar surveillance radarand the associated navigational aids required for around-the-clock air operations.


ability to request and control supporting arms—air-craft, artillery, and naval gunfire. They were only a"troop without a rifle" if they could not. In fire sup-port coordination, the efforts of Marine Advisory Unitand ANG,LICO personnel merged, with advisors be-coming supporting arms coordinators and ANGLICOmembers becoming involved with tactical advice.Colonel Donald L. Price remembered that every moveor stop he made with his VNMC battalion caused himto go down his supporting arms checklist from mor-tars, artillery, naval gunfire, and air to medevac agen-cies and procedures; all as taught in Marine Corpsservice schools and observed closely by the VietnameseMarines who saw it work when needed.

The South Vietnamese relied on supporting armsbecause the number of enemy forces and defensesmade tactical surprise difficult to achieve, particular-ly after the battlefield had become immovable alongfixed lines. The success of the assault landings con-ducted by the 9th MAB and the Vietnamese Marinesdepended, in part, on the availability, control, andcoordination of firepower from Vietnamese andAmerican forces.* This effort was hindered earlier in

For the period from June through December 1972, the Viet-namese Marine Division was supported by the expenditure of1,457,142 105mm artillery rounds; 161,058 155mm artillery rounds;289,963 naval gunfire rounds; 4,959 tacncal air sorties; and 698 ArcLight sorties. (Marine Advisory Unit Historical Summary, 1972)

the year by a lack of controlling agencies and later onby the volume and complexity of fire coordination ef-forts required to use this support effectively.58 There-fore the majority of the American Marines sent toVietnam to augment the VNMC during 1972 had fire-support and communications backgrounds.

Previous VNMC work in fire-support coordinationwas based upon battalion- and brigade-level ex-perience where the commander had direct-support ar-tillery. The VNMC unit commanders, some of whomhad been trained in U.S. Marine schools, observed theiradvisor's effort at the unit level in plotting fire sup-port down to the battalion-level mortars and wereaware of the vii:al need to integrate the various weaponssystems. Their orientation was not conducive to con-trol and coordination by the division, which lackedthe requisite personnel and communicationsequipment.59

During the 1972 period, American supporting unitsoften required complete and detailed planning earli-er than reasonably could be expected from the SouthVietnamese in I Corps.** The Vietnamese Marine Di-vision, with its attached American advisors and AN-GLICO personnel, met these requirements in mostcases. In this process General Lan and his staff select-

**The combat operations in northern MR i were land operationssupported from the sea rather than purely amphibious operations.


Marine Corps Historical CollectionThe advisors were required to put more emphasis on turning the control of supportingarms over to the South Vietnamese, anticzfrating the time when the Americans wouldleave. A mixed Vietnamese-American control party coordinates air and naval gunfire.


\TNMC Division Supporting Arms Schedulefor 11 July 1972 Assault

Naval Gunfire*2400 — 0600 2,400 rounds harassment and interdiction fires0600 — 0800 1,500 rounds preparation fires0800 — L-Hour On-call direct-support fires

(Two direct-support ships for VNMC Brigade 147 on D-1, three direct-support ships as of 0800 D-Day)

Artillery2400 — 0600 Harassment and interdiction fires0600 — 0800 Preparation fires0800 — L-Hour On-call direct-support fires

Tactical Air0800 — 1140 Ten flights of tactical air

(Six sorties of U.S. aircraft with M84 bombs, two sorties of VNAF aircraftwith CBU55s — between third and fourth B-52 Arc Lights)One airborne U.S. forward air controller on station until 1900**

On-Call Tactical Air1200 — 1230 One sortie with bombs and napalm1230 — 1300 One sortie with bombs and napalm1300 — 1900 Two sorties per hour

Air CavalryCommand and control helicopterTwo light observation helicoptersEight helicopter gunshipsTwo search and rescue helicopters

*An alternate naval gunfire plan was developed for 0800 — 1140 should weather precludethe use of tactical air during this period.

**A naval gunfire spotter was airborne with the FAC aircraft. The FAC was available to con-trol airstrikes if naval gunfire targets were not available; however, priority was given to navalgunfire missions in the objective area.

Adapted from the Song Than 9-72 Folder, Marine Advisory Unit File


ed specific objectives, while General Miller and hisstaff determined landing zones and beaches. Fire-support plans were then developed for two to threehours of preparatory fire from air, naval gunfire, andthe VNMC Division and ARVN corps artillery; B-52bombing of the landing zone or beaches; and tacticalair strikes just prior to landing the assault forces (seechart with this chapter).°

General Lan's staff used overlays and target lists toplan helicopter approach and retirement lanes, land-ing zones, friendly positions, and required fires. AN-GUCO, in conjunction with USAF and VNMCplanners, produced joint schedules of fire that werebased upon Arc Light support availability. Delivery offires was made according to time schedules with fluc-tuations in tactical air availability being covered by ar-tillery and naval fires. Plans remained flexible untilthe B-52 support was confirmed, usually by 1600 theday prior to the operation. The Seventh Air lkrce alsoneeded air requests the day prior to execution, whichconflicted with the Eighth Air Force confirmationschedule. This situation was alleviated when theEighth Air Rrce confirmation time was changed toi4oo to coincide with the Seventh Air Fbrce. The MR 1Direct Air Support Center received its copies of plansfrom the USAF liaison officer of the VNMC Division,and also briefed the supporting tactical air supportsquadron for assignments, planned targets, on-stationaircraft, post-landing support, and air controller re-quirements. Artillery requirements were assigned tosupporting units by the VNMC Division Artilleryrepresentative with VNMC brigade input in the formof requests via the artillery chain of command.

The VNMC Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer, or hisI Corps counterpart, delivered completed plans to theNaval Gunfire Support Unit (Task Unit 70.8.9). TheNaval Gunfire Support Group staff assigned targets,missions, and fire-support stations. Overall naval gun-fire support in early 1972 was hampered by the declinein "gun" ships from 292 vessels in Fiscal Year 1965 to128 in Fiscal Year 1973. When the spring offensive be-gan, there was a shortage of ships to meet the demandfor fire suppott.* Arrival of the USS Newport News

*Lieutenant Colonel DWayne Gray of Sub Unit One and advi-sors with forward VNMC battalions credit two destroyers, the USSBuchanan (DDG 14) and the USS Anderson (DD 786) with bluntingthe NVA ground attack across the DMZ during the first days ofthe offensive, a time when poor weather restricted tactical air sup-port. Captain John W. Ripley stated that, at Dong Ha, naval gun-fire was responsive to fire requests in every case ". . . and was theonly supporting arm which could respond with a volume of fireapproaching that of the enemy's?' (Ripley intvw)

(CA 148) with 8" guns provided an increase in capa-bilities, if not in numbers, from the available destroy-ers and their 5"54 and 5"38 guns:" Demands forsupport multiplied as targets south of the DMZ in-creased and were further expanded as restrictionsagainst targets in North Vietnam were removed.

Generals M.erzger and Miller believed that any am-phibious landing by American Marines required six toeight destroyers and a cruiser for support. Such oper-ations also needed local air superiority provided by anestimated two aircraft carriers and two Da Nang-basedfighter squadrons. On 19 April 1972, General Millernoted that the Navy, engaged in Operation Lineback-er, could not provide the necessary forces to supportamphibious landings in North Vietnam. FRAC's MajorGeneral FrederickJ. Kroesen, Jr., voiced his oppositionto amphibious operations north of the DMZ, becausethat would result in reduced naval gunfire support toMR 1 at a crucial time. The demands for support forboth Seventh Fleet operations and MACV operationswere in constant conflict, influencing 9th MAB rela-tions with VNMC and FRAC. A related constraint onnaval gunfire was the nonavailability of aerial spotting.Adequate numbers of USAF aircraft to meet ANGLI-CO needs, as well as aircraft capable of surviving aloftin northern MR 1 and North Vietnam, were not avail-able. As a result, naval gunfire was limited to eitherdirect or unobserved fires of decreased effectiveness.

ANGLICO's Lieutenant Colonel George F. Jonesbelieved that the problem of quality and quantity ofnaval gunfire support resolved itself by mid-year whentargets of opportunity declined along the coast andsupport to the ARVN Airborne Division increased inthe drive towards Quang Tn City. The need for quali-fied fire-support personnel and communicationsequipment for the South Vietnamese was recognized,but never organized prior to the ceasefire and with-drawal of American assets

A subjective comment on the battlefield effect ofconcentrated firepower was provided by a North Viet-namese Army veteran of the 1972 Quang Tn Cityfighting who recalled a B-52 Arc Light. As the batt-lefield became very quiet and he knew something wasgoing to happen:

I just looked up into the sky and saw hnw beautiful theday was, the sun was shining. And then we saw the bombs,round big black discs . . . the noise of the bombs and youcouldn't see anything at all because of the smoke and thedust and we couldn't hear anything at all . ,

,

War in the EtherNo less a part of effective firepower was the targeting



Supporting arms fire, such as that from the 8-inch, J5-caliber guns of the USS NewportNews was not available to the Vietnamese, except through continued American partici-pation in the war This applied to the full range of air power as well naval gunfire.

Air powei such as from B-52 Arc Likht strikes stopped North Vietnamese armor at QuangTri andAn Loc, where this Communist T54 tank was unable to climb out of a bomb crater



efforts by Cajnain Clarence W. Phillips with 12 menof Detachment "N:' 1st Radio Battalion. This suppottreached the VNMC Division through Captain FrankM. Izenour,Jr., the Marine advisor with the main di-vision command post at Hue. Detachment "N" hadoriginally deployed with the 9th MAB for the exer-cise in Korea. Integrated with the Task Force 76 JointIntelligence Center and operating from the sup-plemental radio spaces of the USS Blue Ridge usinginput from the service cryptologic agencies inSoutheast Asia, the detachment provided signal-intelligence information. On 18 April, signal-intelligence tasking authority was passed to GeneralMiller, commanding 9th MAB, and the next day thedetachment was augmented by another officer and 11enlisted operators from the 1st Radio Battalion inHawaii.

Detachment "N" had originally deployed with the9th MAB for the exercise in Korea. Integrated withthe Task Force 76 Joint Intelligence Center and oper-ating from the supplemental radio spaces of the BlueRidge using input from the service cryptologic agenciesin Southeast Asia, the detachment provided signal-intelligence information. On 18 April, signal-intel-ligence tasking authority was passed to General Miller,

commanding 9th MAB, and the next day the detach-ment was augmented by another officer and 11 en-listed operators ftom the 1st Radio Battalion in Hawaii.

Operating from the Blue Ridge posed "reception"problems because of the distance from shore. From24 April 1972, two or three direct support elementswere in operation ftom naval gunfire ships at any onetime, with control remaining at the headquarrers ele-ment on the Blue Ridge. An additional 10 operatorsexpanded the detachment, with further tesourcesavailable as needed from the Marine Support Bat-talion.*

InJuly, Captain Phillips and his men moved to theUSS Paul Revere (ISA 248) with the 9th MAB staffwhen the USS Blue Ridge returned to the UnitedStates. The detachment analysts relocated to the NavalCommunications Station, San Miguel, Philippines,until 21 January 1973, when Detachment "N" wasdeactivated. l.t provided timely and continuous sup-.port throughout the III MAF response to the NorthVietnamese i.nvasion.

*The Marine Support Battalion was a component of the NavalSecurity Group and consisted of companies that were assigned withNaval Security Group Activities worldwide.

PART V

REPRISE AND ASSESSMENT

CHAPTER 14

Ceasefire and ConsolidationThe Final Act— Operation Countdown, 'On the Land

Operation Countdown, . and Sea!_ Operation Countdown, . and Air'

The Final Act

General Frederick C. Weyand, USA, the last MACVcommander, insisted to Lieutenant General InuisMetzger that he had to have Marines off the coast ofSouth Vietnam to ensure the security of the remainingAmericans in the country, support that could be pro-vided only by Metzger's III MAE At a minimum, thiswas with two Marine amphibious units (MAUs) at seaand the planes of Marine Aircraft Groups 12 and 15.General Metzger later asserted that this period of theVietnam war "repeatedly demonstrated the manyfuncrions that only amphibious forces can perform?'l

Determined resistance by the South Vietnamese anddirect support by the Americans, including the aircampaign against North Vietnam, halted and thenreversed the Communist "Nguyen-Hue" Spring Offen-sive. President Nixon had used diplomatic and mili-tary pressure to bring about a settlement of the war asthe South Vietnamese regained lost territory and theaerial bombing and mining of North Vietnam tookeffect. By 11 October 1972, the mining and bombingefforts had closed ports through which North Vietnamhad obtained 85 percent of its foreign trade: "seaborneimports into North Vietnam have been cut from over250,000 tons a month to almost none?'2 By then, U.S.authorities believed the North Vietnamese wanted toreach an agreement. As a result, on 23 October 1972,U.S. Armed Forces stopped air and naval gunfire bom-bardrnent north of the 20th Parallel. But numerousfalse starts and recriminations by both parties and theirallies occurred as the proposed ceasefire approached.

President Nixon authorized Operation LinebackerII on 18 December 1972 when the North Vietnamesefailed to act in good faith on the previous ceasefireproposals, opening the way to the Christmas bomb-ing of Hanoi and the virtual destruction of critical tar-gets in North Vietnam. Referring to rhe "lateDecember 1972 US Blitz on North Vietnam:' theCommunists stated that the Nixon Administrationhad mobilized almost all its strategic bombers inSoutheast Asia and the Pacific, and tactical aircraft inSouth Vietnam, Thailand, and with the Seventh Fleet,"to conduct a strategic bombing operation againstNorth Viet Nam the savageness of which is un-

204

precedented in the whole history of the US war of ag-gression in this country." The intensity of operationswas unmatched by any of the previous eight years ofstrikes against North Vietnam. Linebacker II's blowsagainst military and economic targets brought theNorth Vietnamese back to the negotiating table.

The "Agreement on Ending the War and RestoringPeace in Vietnam" was signed as the result of negoti-ations by Dr. Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho at theParis Conference on Vietnam. The ceasefire was a partof an accord that met both American and North Viet-namese demands that had evolved during the course ofthe conflict. Ir was a unilateral accord with the less-than-wholehearted concurrence of the Republic ofVietnam and the Communist "Provisional Revolution-ary Government?' It called for cessation of all militaryoperations in North and South Vietnam to go intoeffect at 2400 Greenwich Mean Time, 27 january 1973.All forces would remain in place, with disengagementsupervised by a Two Party joint Military Commission;only replacement of existing equipment and supplieswas authorized Within 60 days all Americans wouldwithdraw, all prisoners of war would be returned, andall U.S. mines would be cleated from North Viet-namese waterways. Seventh Fleet and III MAF opera-tions in both North and South Vietnam ceased on 28january 1973 with the signing of these accords. Forthe Americans, including the U.S. Marines, this agree-ment brought an end of combat and support opera-tions.* The ceasefire campaign was over.5

For the Vietnamese of both sides, the struggle con-tinued, fought hard from the morning of the cease-fire and for a month or two thereafter. The Com-munists throughout South Vietnam had put out thered and blue flags of the National Liberation Frontin a land-grab effort just prior to the ceasefite, expect-ing the South Vietnamese to be hampered by theterms and timing of the agreement. The South Viet-namese countered with military attacks during and after the ceasefire, which were successful in defendingterritory that they already held.

While the major American equipment and resup-

*Opcrations continued in taos until 21 February 1973 and inCambodia until 15 August 1973.

CEASEFIRE AND CONSOLIDATION 205

THAILAND

GULF OFTHAILAND

CAMBODIATuy

SOUTH CHINASEA

Adapted from Government of Vietnam Material

Communist Controlled Areasof South Vietnam

kilometers? 2

ply effort ended with the ceasefire, NVA infiltrationcontinued. This included numbers of armored vehi-cles and artillery moved into base areas in Sourh Viet-nam. Although the AWN and NVA had equalnumbers of armored vehicles inside South Vietnam,the North Vietnamese had twice as many with trainedcrews. Similar buildups wete detected in artillery andantiaircraft weapons that countered any South Viet-namese air superiority.

Operation Countdown, 'On the land .

Operation Countdown, the final withdrawal of FreeWorld forces from Vietnam, began immediately afterthe agreement was signed and the withdrawal of Ma-rine Corps units followed on schedule.* First to leavewas Sub Unit One, ist ANGLICO. From 1 Aprilthrough 10 September 1972, this specialized unit borethe brunt of the increased demands for air and navalgunfire support throughout the whole of Vietnam.**7Lieutenanr General louis H. Wilson, Jr., the FMF Pa-cific commander, observed that Sub Unit One's depar-ture made it the last Fleet Marine Force unit to leaveVietnam and that the aggressive spirit displayed by

*As of 3ijanuary 1973, there were 21,821 American servicemenin South Vietnam. (MACV ComdHist 1973, p. 476)

•*Sub Unit One lost three killed and three missing and suffeted

ANGLICO airborne and ground spotters, combinedwith the firepower of Seventh Fleet naval gunfireships, "was given considerable credit for stemming thetide of the NVA invasion in MR I during March/April19722

Lieutenant Colonel George E. Jones, Sub Unit One'slast commander in Vietnam, recorded that on themorning of 28 January 1973 his Marines and sailorsthroughout Vietnam's four military regions ceased ac-tive operations in support of the South Vietnamese.Like other redeploying units, there was an incremen-tal transfer of personnel and equipment phased by "X-Days."***Jones stated simply on 17 February 1973 thatSub Unit One, 1st ANGLICO, "ceased to have anoperational mission and all efforts were directedtowards the deactivation of the unit."9 With a majorityof personnel and equipment gone, the remainingmembers boarded flights for duty stations elsewherein the Marine Corps. This marked the end of eightcontinuous years of combat support to the South Viet-namese Armed Forces and their allies.'° Sub Unit One,1st ANGLICO transferred to FMFPac and deactivat-ed as a unit on 14 March 1973.

The Marine Advisory Unit was also deactivated bythe ceasefire. It had been in the process of withdrawing


Photo rourtesy of LtCol George E. Jones, USMC (Ret)

Prior to departure from South Vietnam, Sub Unit One's officer-in-charge, LtCol GeorgeE. Jones, is presented a gift by the commanding officer of the ARVN Airborne TrainingCenter; Col Vinh, honoring ANGLICO's close relationshzjti with the Airborne Division.

i4 wounded in action. ***xDay being the ceasefire date of 28 january 1973.



The American departure from Vietnam occurredat the same time as the continued delivezyofequst'ment to the South Vietnamese. Here a 60-ton crane loads a LVTP-5 for transpor-tation to Phung Thay for the Vietnamese Marines as part of Project Enhance Plus.

battalion advisors and shifting the emphasis of supportto logistics, training, and staff functions as part of theoverall reduction of American forces at the beginningof 1972. The NVA invasion reversed this as the unitwas totally committed to the fight. The advisor struc-ture had been reinforced by additional ANGLICO,U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Navy personnelas it deployed to MR 1 in April 1972. According tothe Senior Marine Advisor, they all "encountered ex-ceptionally intense and continuous enemy artilleryattacks-by-fire, ground attacks, and the introductionof large numbers of enemy armored units." To com-pensate for casualties, disease, and exhaustion amongthe Marines, nine additional temporary-duty advisorswere assigned.* The first of their number arrived inJuly and a second group in October 1972. At the peakof the Spring Offensive, the advisory unit reached astrength of 66, including U.S. Navy medical persormel.

Anticipating the withdrawal of American forces atthe end of 1972 and possible restrictions on support,the Departments of Defense and State sought to ac-celerate the delivery of equipment approved for Viet-namization programs. Project Enhance Plus, began on

*Fourteen advisors were wounded in action during 1972.

14 October 1972 and was completed with the deliveryof 39 armored personnel carriers from the Army, 7 AirForce aircraft, and 31 amphibian tractors from the Ma-rines. These high-priority items, except for the am-phibian tractors, were delivered by air, interruptedonly by the tentative ceasefire with North Viernam.12

The U.S. Marines provided the Vietnamese Marines1 LVTR-5, 2 LVTC-5s, and 28 LVTP-5s, all amphibiantractors in recovery, command, or personnel carrierconfIgurations. These tractors were taken ftom III MAEinventories to hasten delivery and loaded on U.S. Navyamphibious ships at Okinawa beginning 8 November1972. Delivery was completed by 27 November 1972,when all the vehicles were unloaded at the VNMCcompound near Saigon. American Marines from the1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion and the 3d ForceService Regiment accompanied these tracked vehiclesto provide needed instruction in their use and main-tenance. Follow-on training was arranged by MajorOliver M. Whipple, Jr., advisor to Captain Dow ThienNiem's fledgling Amphibian Tractor Company, in-cluding rehearsals at sea with the 9th Marine Am-phibious Brigade (MAB) and Seventh Fleetamphibious groups.'3

General Wilson at FMFPac and the senior advisor,


Colonel Dorsey, believed the arrival of these amphib-ian tractors provided the VNMC Division an assaultcapability previously lacking, that allowed operationsto be conducted north of the DMZ. In reality, theVNMC was saddled with additional maintenance andsupply problems and amphibious capability was neverestablished because the Vietnamese Navy did not as-sign ships for amphibious operations or training.*14Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird allowed the Ma-rine Corps to fund $714 million in Fiscal Year 1974to provide replacement LVT-7 series amphibian trac-tors. As the new-model JIVTP-7s became available, theywere to be exchanged on a one-for-one basis for theLVTF-5s. This decision was approved by the JointChiefs of Staff in November 1972, but was then can-celed by Secretary Laird in January 1973, putting aneffective end to the program.

Colonel Dorsey and his staff had approached theceasefire "in accordance with MACV directives" andplanned as if for any other military evolution. Theyconceived three phases, keyed on "X-Day:" standdown(prior to X-Day); withdrawal (X to X+45); and roll-up (X+45 to X+60). Specific tasks had to be accom-plished during each phase, along the lines of standardmilitary staff responsibilities: personnel; intelligence;operations; and logistics. The unit-level advisory ef-fort continued through 16 February 1973, when thelast two Marine advisors departed from the brigadeand battalion levels. The American authorities inSouth Vietnam at the time reported that the "activeUSMC field advisory effort is terminated."

Living side-by-side with their counterparts, U.S. Ma-rine advisors had provided tactical advice and soughtto enhance Vietnamese Marine Corps combat effec-tiveness. The advisory unit "contributed immeasura-bly towards the development of the VietnameseMarine Corps into a thoroughly professional fightingorganization."5 The last Senior Marine Advisor wrotein his final historical report about the division's finesthour, when two brigades of Vietnamese Marines wereordered to hold the invading Communist army at theMy Chanh River, "and hold they did. The My ChanhLine was subjected to tremendous pressure andalthough it bent at times, it never broke. This was dueto responsive supporting arms fire plans, excellent

*ln June 1974, VNMC Logistic Support Branch head, LcColGeorge F. "Jody" Strickland, justified the continued existence ofthe LVT program to the Defense Attache Office because of cross-cnunrry mobility and acmored-infanuy attack value rather than theamphibious assault value. (LrCol George E. Strickland, Commentson draft ms, dcd 4Jan90)

small-unit leadership, and the courage and tenacityof individual Vietnamese Marines."

In addition to standdown affairs, Colonel Dorseyhad to request spare parts for the LVT5s which had notbeen included in the previous support agreements be-cause of the planned acquisition of the LVT-7s. InMarch 1973, General Wilson and Admiral Bernard A.Clarey replied that spare parts were not availablethrough the Marine Corps, but suggested the Republicof China as a source on a "government to government"basis. By that time, the advisory group believed theVietnamese Marine Division was "almost totally self-sufficient in tactical operations and had made giantstrides in self-sufficiency in all other areas."° TheAmericans described General Lan as a tough, profes-sional Marine who demanded high standards of disci-pline and obedience. The Vietnamese Marines wereseen as a "sharp, effective fighting unit" with abilityand experience in independent, combined, and jointoperations.

Colonel Dorsey reported on 27 March 1973. Withthe exception of minor alterations to withdrawal plans,"the phase down of the Marine Advisory Unit was ac-complished in a professional manner without apprecia-ble problems. Until the end, the Marine Advisory Unitmaintained a readiness to return to combat operationsin support of the Vietnamese Marine Corps."7

The Marine Advisory Unit closed down on 29 March1973 after serving with the Vietnamese Marine Corpsfor 18 years. That same day, Commander, Naval ForcesVietnam and the Naval Advisory Group ended an eraof commitment to the Vietnamese Navy and MarineCorps. All remaining tasks were turned over to theVNMC I.ogistics Support Branch, Navy Division, ofthe Defense Attache Office (DAO).18 The improve-ment of amphibious capability and equipment main-tenance were felt to be the two areas where "majorDAO assistance is required?"° These problems werepassed to Lieutenant Colonel Walter D. Fillmore toresolve as head of the recently created Vietnamese Ma-rine Corps logistic Support Branch of the Defense At-tache's Office in Saigon.°

Headed by a Marine lieutenant colonel, the VNMCLogisric Support Branch consisted of five U.S. Depart-ment of Defense civilians and 27 Vietnamese civilians.Functions of the Naval Advisory Group, Vietnam, werecontinued for maintenance and supply under existingsupport agreements through the Office of the Chief,Navy Division. This organization was a component ofArmy Major GeneralJohn E. Murray's Defense Attache



Americans were stillpresent in Military Region 1, but with a less active role than duringthe previous year's fighting. These 9th MAB Marines are examining captured Communistweapons in front of the Vietnamese Marine Division command post at Huong Dien.

As active combat ended the ready forces of the Seventh Fleet remained for a variety ofcontingencies. Vith the departure of the USS Blue Ridge, the amphibious and landingforce headquarters was on the USS Paul Revere, here for joint training near Tan My.



Office, which superseded MACV in March 1973. Gen-eral Murray had previously served as the CinCPac j-4and had been Admiral McCain's representative toMACV during the Spring Offensive. Instead of tradi-tional attache duties, Murray's terms of reference inthis assignment were for "cleaning up the battlefields"with the assistance of the Defense logistics Agency.21

Lieutenant Colonel Fillmore monitored, managed,and coordinated supply and maintenance require-ments for U.S. Marine-peculiar and U.S. Army-com-mon equipment transferred to the Vietnamese Ma-rines. In his initial report, Fillmore indicated thedifference between his logistics branch and the formerMarine Advisory Unit. Because of the physical sepa-ration of the VNMC Logistics Support Branch in Sai-gon from the Vietnamese Marine Division in QuangTn Province, and with the limited number of person-nel within the branch, "it is extremely difficult for theBranch to accurately report nn VNMC operationalmatters."22

Operation Countdown, . and Sea'

Brigadier General Paul G. Graham's tour as 9th Ma-rine Amphibious Brigade commander began on 16

November 1972. It was characterized by the prepara-tion of contingency plans and liaison with MACV tosupport final troop withdrawals and the recovery ofAmerican prisoners. The 31st MAU and 33d MAU ro-tated in providing an amphibious force off the coastof MX 1. During this period, HMM-164 recovered thecrew of a downed Air Force B-52 bomber from theTonkin Gulf The Marines provided troop training tothe VNMC in December 1972 andJanuary 1973. Col-onel Charles 11 Williamson, the 33d MAU com-mander, recalled that he worked closely with the ad-visory unit in latejanuary 1973, and that this involvedlaunching and maneuvering the LVT-5 tractors in thewater: "I had been watching the tractors being drivenby the Vietnamese until around noon and was justleaving the bridge of the flagship, USS Cleveland(LPD 7), when the Commodore called me back andhanded me a 'flash' message," a ceasefire had beensigned and the Amphibious Ready Group wouldreturn to Okinawa to prepare for Operation EndSweep. After going ashore to the 1st Regional As-sistance Command (FRAC) headquarters in Da Nangto coordinate the abrupt discontinuation of the jointtraining, Colonel Williamson returned to the

Navy and Marine attack aircraft continued to be used for the conduct of direct air sup-port during weather conditions that prevented them seeing their ground targets. TheseA-i/s from MAG-12 used their own instrumentation to release bombs in low cloud cover

Photo courtesy of Cdt Peter B. Mersky, LTSNR



As the ceasejire took effect, Marine units awaited the outcome of redeployment plans.Outside the group commandpost are the commander of MAG-12, Co/Dean Macho, andthe commanding officer of the 3/9 security force, Capt Michael £ Kelly. The sedan onthe left had been passed down from the last commanding general of III MAIl to 3dMAB,then to ANGLICO, andjmnally to Col Macho, as the senior Marine commander in Vietnam.

Cleveland at dusk. 'As we lifted off, I looked downat Da Nang, which I had first seen in the Spring of1965 . . I never had such an empty feeling23

After the ceasefire, the 9th MAB Headquartersreturned to Okinawa and operational control of afloatMarine amphibious units was turned over to III MAF.General Graham later reported that existing opera-tional schedules as well as the task organization andmissions of the 9th MAB and its subordinate unitsquickly changed: "No longer did the contingency evac-uation or security responsibilities have priority. Insteademphasis was placed on using MAB and amphibiousassets to support Operarion Homecoming Afloat andOperation End Sweep."24 On 31 January 1973, SeventhFleet directed the commanders of the 9th MAB andTF 76 to work out the details for organizing a surfaceready group to support contingency operations fotFRAC and the American Embassy in Saigon.25

The military situation in MR 1, according to the 9thMAB liaison officer with FRAC, Major Howard L.Richey, indicated that NVA and ARVN activity wouldnot pose an immediate threat to Americans in theregion. On 2 February 1973, Major Richey observed astate of "cautious optimism" prevailing towards theceasefire in MR 1 and that Da Nang "is in full obset-

vance of Tet."26 Of a more prophetic note was the 5February situation report that observed that SouthVietnamese commanders "at all levels in MR 1 expres-sed deep concern over withdrawal of U.S. advisors atthis time. Equally concerned over failure of ICCS [In-ternational Commission of Control and SupervisionJto appear on scene to ensure compliance with ceasefire, and failure of NVA to respect terms of Parisagreement."27

The 9th MAB stood down from operations anddeactivated on 9 February 1973, becoming the 9thMAB nucleus staff and III MAF forward commandpost on the flagship of Task Force 76, the USS PaulRevere (LPA 248).28 The 31st MAU remained on shipsas the available ready force. Colonel Ray A. Stephenswrote that his unit was directed through a series ofevolutions to assist in prisoner recovery and mine clear-ing at the same time. Then III MAF "cancelled thisassignment and alerted the MAU to reconfigure forevacuation operations in South Vietnam."29 This wasaltered drastically when Seventh Fleet assigned ARGAlpha and Bravo amphibious ships to support theMine Counter Measures Force, Task Force 78. Controlof HMM-165 and HMH-164 also went to TF 78 as itgathered forces. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific crypticallyrecorded that "until mine sweeping operations were



Security concerns continuedfor lash Force Delta. But Nam Phong 's distant location provid-ed the best defense. A sapper demonstration team is used to show task force personnelhow terrorist attacks could be conducted through the base's defensive perimeter.

Air bases in South Vietnam remained the target of Communist attacks. Smoke rises as agroup of rockets hits at Da Nang in this period These were not followed by ground assaults.



Task lkrce Delta Command Chronology

Year's end at Nam Phong in 1972 was marked by arrival of the Bob Hope Christmas Show.MAG-15 commander Co/A ubrey V Ta/bert, Jr., introduces Hope on an imp rovised stage.

completed, III MAF forces would be forced to oper-ate without its full complement of helicopters."30Seventh Fleet and III MAF reconstituted the amphibi-ous ready fbrce by organizing a surface-assault-configured ready group of five ships from Amphibi-ous Squadron One: an LKA, LSD, and three LST5?1*Headquarters, 31st MAU remained on the USSCleveland and Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 3/4 wasBLT Alpha. Through March 1973, the amphibiousready group and BLT Alpha remained afloat off DaNang on a 12-hour recall to MR 1. By April 1973, the33d MAU on Okinawa was deactivated and theWestern Pacific afloat forces returned to the postureof the previous year, the 31st MAU with AmphibiousReady Group Alpha and BLT Bravo with ARG Bravo?2

Operation Countdown, . and Air'

The year 1972 had witnessed Marines flying 15,412sorties over South Vietnam** and 539 sorties overNorth Vietnam, mostly in Route Package i? The NewYear had begun on a discordant note with an acciden-tal air strike on Da Nang Air Base on 8 January 1973,

*These were the USS Ta/are (LKA 112). Monticello (1.SD 35), SanBernardino (LET 1189), Racine (LET 1191), and Fresno (LET 1182).

**19 percent of the tactical air effort.

causing damage and casualties to units on the ground.A flight of Marine and Navy aircraft, under U.S. AirForce control, bombed the western corner of the air-base because of a F-4 "I.oran Bird" cockpit error.34Despite this, operations continued throughout theregion.

Marine Aircraft Group 12 flight operations con-tinued in Sout:h Vietnam and in Cambodia duringJanuary 1973. Colonel Dean Macho claimed credit for864 enemy casualties and 293 buildings and 956bunkers destroyed or damaged during this final peri-od. MAG-12's 2,123 tons of ordnance destroyed 8ranks, 12 artillery positions, 28 trucks, and 20 sam-pans, with numerous fires and secondary explosionsbeing reported by the aircrews. During the group'seighth month in combat, longer and heavier workloads were experienced to meet combat and withdraw-al requirements. Air strikes in Cambodia were threetimes more frequent than previous months with the"Cambodian Reds" moving south through KiampongThom and Angkor Wat towards Phnom Perth. InJanu-ary, according to Colonel Macho, air strikes within 200yards of friendly positions "were not uncommon:' Thethreat from antiaircraft gunfire and missiles remainedhigh over the target areas. Weather was cleat, even if


inaccurate weather reports from Tan Son Nhut andBien Hoa caused the MAG-12 duty officer to "backdoor" estimates of the ceiling and visibility used forcrew briefs.36 On 15 January 1973, Vietnamese AirForce forward air controllers (FACs) took over controlof all air strikes. Initial difficulties with language andprocedures wete overcome. By the end of the monthMarine aviators were speaking pidgin Vietnamese aswell as the FACs spoke pidgin English: "problems werefew, courtesy was high, and the Vietnamese fliers werea pleasure to work with."a7

A single volley of 122mm rockets hit the group areaat 0227 on 26 January 1973. The Marine killed dur-ing the rocket attack, Private First Class MarkJ. Miller,was the last Marine killed in action prior to the cease-fire. This was the same day as the final combat flights,with MAG-12 becoming the last American fixed-wingaviation unit to depart Vietnam?8 With the cessation

of combat operations throughout Vietnam on 27Janu-ary 1973, the group made preparations to return toIwakuni, Japan. Colonel Macho felt the move was"smooth and orderly with no major problems:' Thiswas through the efforts of First Lieutenant EdwardJ.Jobin, the MAG-12 embarkation officer, and theMAG-12 (Rear) Logistic Coordination Center underChief Warrant Officer Larry G. Cravens at Iwakuni.3°MAG-12 (Fbrward) aircraft departed Bien Hoa on 29January 1973. The retrograde began within 24 hoursof the ceasefire, requiring the support of 70 transport"lifts" flying around the clock to move 600 Marinesand 2,791,000 pounds of cargo over the next five day&°The MAO's 28 A-4s arrived at Twakuni, Japan, on 1February 1973 at 1430 and the remaining men andequipment followed on 3 February.

For lisk Force Delta, 1972 ended with the Bob HopeChristmas Show making an appearance at Nam

4c- /4-/3'

Nam Phong continued to operate as an expeditionary field into 1973. The control towercrew, with its ever-present "crash truck,"could depart on short notice when ordered to leave.

Watercolor by John T. Dyer, Jr., Marine Corps Art Collection

C-

NMI PHOQ(rCOUT.Os.7owR CR4çp ciç


Task lk,rce Delta Command Chronology

Despite its temporary nature, Nam Phong had reached its peak of expansion and de-velopment. Looking down the long axis of the runway, on the left is the flight line andmaintenance areas, in the center is the headquarters, and farther left are the living spaces.

A contemporary comment on the ceasefire z made by this squadron photograph of abomb- and rocket-loaded P.4 Phantom. Forces remaining in Southeast Asia were unableto return to their home bases until allied prisoners of war were released by the enemy.



Phong. Mr. Hope's arrival marked the seventh monthof what had been perceived by some as a "90-clay"deployment. Colonel Aubrey W. Talbert, Jr., ofMAG-15 recalled that the start of 1973 was character-ized by continued planning for the several possiblecontingencies which might result from a cessarion ofhostilities in South Vietnam and "two major changesin the geographical areas into which combat sortieswere f1own!'' Air operations in South Vietnam con-centrated on direct support to Republic of Vietnamunits in MR I until 26January 1973, after which theywere directed to missions in Laos and Cambodia. Thatsame day a rocket attack at Da Nang damaged twoMAG-15 Phantoms on the ground being rearmed.

By the end of January 1973, 380 tons of excessmaterial were shipped roJapan. Preparations to leaveNam Phong began with the ceasefire agreement, butthe uncertainty of the cea.sefire and continued flightsover Laos necessitated continued efforts to remain aneffective force. Operations were flown against NorthVietnamese targets in Laos until 21 February 1973when a ceasefire agreement was reached for this area.One Air Force "Raven" air controller working the BlackLion Operation near Pakse, Laos, wrote VMFA-115 totell them "when you guys say that close air supportis your business, you don't kid around . . . . I knowit, the ground pounders know it, and the NVA know

it?'42 While prepared to "retrograde:' TF Delta waskept at Nam Phong by theJoint Chiefs of Staff to sup-port any contingencies, particularly the enforcementof the ceasefire agreement, the recovery of Americanprisoners, and the mine-clearing operations in NorthVietnam. The emphasis on combat again changed totraining and waiting.

To cite the chronology of significant events at theMarine Corps Command Center for 29 March 1973,"Operation Countdown completed:' marking the endof the Marines' involvement in America's long war inSoutheast Asia. This was the day after the last-knownMarine prisoner of war was released and as Marine par-ticipation in "post-war" operations continued. In ac-cordance with the ceasefire accords, the U.S. had lefta residual force of less than 200 American servicemenin South Vietnam. There remained three U.S. Marines"in country" with the Defense Attache Office and the143-man State Department security guard.* The Viet-namese Communists state of the period that for "thefirst time in 115 years, not a single foreign soldier wasgarrisoned on Vietnamese land."

*The three DAO Marines wete Ccii William B. Fleming with thePlans and Liaison Branch, LiCol Walrer D. Fillmore with the VNMClogistics Branch, and Maj Richard F. Johnson with the Operationsand Training Branch.

CHAPTER 15

In Enemy HandsCombatants or Hostages?— Egress Recap and Other Contingencies — Operation Homecoming

Welcome Home Marine — Code of Conduct—MIAs: The Joint Casualty Resolution Center

Combatants or Hostages?

By 1972, the return of missing and captured Amen-cans in Southeast Asia had become a national objectivefor the United States. For the U.S. Marine Corps, thismeant finding 136 missing Marines thought possiblyto be in Communist captivity.' During 1972 alone, 24Marines were lost in action from III MAF and only fourof these returned as prisoners the next year.* OtherAmericans, including Marines, had been saved fromcapture or loss by search and rescue missions; 232 in-dividual recoveries wete made during 1972, includingthe American advisors from the Quang Tn Citadel inMay.tt

The Communists claimed they treated "enemy sold-iers who have surreodered" with humanity. But a cap-tured Marine's probability of living or dying dependedupon a number of circumstances, including his cap-tor's perception of the chances for evasion or escapeand the immediate tactical situation. When captured,prisoners heard something like "You are now captured.We do not kill you. Just follow our command! We willhave your arms tied up and take you to a safe place.Stand up and follow us right now!" From then, theordeal was essentially an individual experience.ttt

Headquarters Marine Corps monitored the statusof Marines in captivity and tracked them as individu-als in both its Intelligence and Manpower Divisions.As near as could be determined, 48 of all the Ameri-cans known to have been captured in Southeast Asiawere U.S. Marines. Of these, 9 died in captivity, 10escaped, 2 were released prior to 1973, 26 returned

* Missing Marines included nine in North Vietnam, eight in SouthVietnam, and three in Laos. Most were aiccrews.

**The chance of successful rescue depended upon where an in-dividual was "lost." Only seven Americans were recovered from NorthVietnam out of 149 American fixed-wing aircraft lost there in 1972.A total of 239 American and South Vietnamese fixed wing aircraftwere lost in combat in Southeast Asia during 1972.

***This chapter is intended to document the return of some ofthese men in 1973. Any complete narrative about their ordeals willhave to be based on the debtiefa conducted upon their return andtake into account the diverse circumstances of capcivity, release, andrank. These debriefs, along with the majority of material onprisoners, remain classified by executive oeder for privacy and secu-rity. (OASD [ISAl Itt, 3Jan87)

during Operation Homecoming, and 1—Private FirstClass Robert R. Garwood—returned in 1979.'I"

Individual conduct could not be evaluated whilethese men were prisoners, as the only informationabout them was dependent upon press reports andstatements by visiting delegations to North Vietnam.Published stories or broadcasts by prisoners did notindicate the circumstances under which these state-ments were made. Prisoners were allowed to write amonthly letter, but most were never sent, exceptthrough "anti-war" groups favorable to the North Viet-namese.ttttt

Over time, it became evident to the United StatesGovernment that the North Vietnamese were notabiding by the Geneva Convention and that not allAmerican prisoners were living up to the U.S. ArmedForces Code of Conduct.****** The Communists re-

****The first Marine prisoner was taken on 31 December 1964and the last was taptured on 26 Sepeembee 1972.

*****Pcisonets did not receive mail until the late 1960s, and bythe war's end only 13 telatives of Marine prisoners had received out-going letters, nine from North Vietnam and four from SouthVietnam.

******The Code of Conduct was written and published afcetthe Korean Wae to provide principles to follow while in captivity.It is neither law nor regulation. It reads:

I am an American fighting man. I aerve in the forces which guatdmy country and onr way of life. I am prepared to give my life intheir defense.

I will never surrender of my own freewill. If in command, I willnever surrender my men while they still have the means to resist.

If I am captured, I will continue co resist by all means available.I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I willaccept neither parole ooe special favors from the enemy.

If I am a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my frilow prisoners.I will give no information or take part in any action which mightbe harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command.If not, I will obey the lawful orders of chose appointed over meand will back them up in every way.

When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am boundto give only name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I willevade answering further questions to the utmnsc of my ability. I

will make no oral ot written statements disloyal to my country andits allies or harmful to their cause.

I will never fotget chat I am an American Fighting Man, respon-sible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which mademy country free. I will trust in my God and in the United Stattsof America.

217

fused to furnish complete listings of names or num-bers of detained prisoners, refused inspection of prisoncamps by the International Red Cross, neither an-nounced the locations nor otherwise marked prisoncamps, publically paraded American prisoners forpropaganda purposes, allowed few prisoners to cor-respond with their next of kin, and tortured or other-wise coerced prisoners to make public confessions ofcriminal activity and anti-American statements. TheDepartment of Defense concluded that "their captorscould obtain a statement from any POW from whomthey wanted one [and) all POWs made statements inone form or another?'

Before 1971, there had been three separate groupsof Marine prisoners in Southeast Asia.* In North Viet-

*Locations where Marines were held and the nirknames giventhem by prisoners, were as follows (those with an asterisk were usedduring 1972.1973): Cambodia and border area; Tam Ky Complex(Camps I, 11,1 II), SVN; Has Lo (Hanoi Hilton-Camp Unity), NVN*;Cu toe (Zoo), NVN; Xom Ap Lo (Briar Patch), NVN; ThermalPower Plant (Dirty Bird), NVN; Son Thy (Camp Nope), NVN;Citadel (Plantation), NVN*; Dan Hoi (Camp Faith), N.VN; BangLier (Skid Row), NVN; Luong Lang (Dog Patch), NVN*; No' Coc(Rock Pile). NVN*; Duong IKe (Farnsworth). NVN; Ba Cao (BanCao), NYN.

nam were 11 Marines, all aviators and officers, theiraverage age 30 years at rime of capture. Some spentup to eight years in captivity, with 5.2 the mean. Twogroups were captured in South Vietnam. These Ma-rines were younger, mostly enlisted men, and subjectto a higher death rate in captivity.° They were con-fined in temporary camps in South Vietnam, Cam-bodia, and Laos for up to two and a half years. Mostwere moved to camps in North Vietnam by 1971.

The "Southern Group" in MR 1 suffered the highestdeath toll of all as the result of harsh living condi-tions, rather than maltreatment during indoctrinationand interrogation. The Communists originally keptabout two dozen allied prisoners in a variety of jun-gle locations in the "Tam Ky Complex" of South Viet-nam. The prisoners were confined in bamboo"tiger-cage" enclosures or were shackled to their "beds?'Of 10 Marines in this group, one was killed trying toescape, one was released, one remained with the Com-munists, and five died of various causes related to mal-nutrition.** Corporal Jose J. Anzaldua, Jr., of H&SCompany 2/5, observed that the minute any one ofhis group quit, "he was as good as dead. There was

**The Marine who stayed behind was PPC Robert R. Garwood.



Conditions in confinement varied with location. In North Vietnam, prisons were ad-ministered by the Interior Ministry, with the prisoners exploited by the Army. This war-time picture shows two unidentified Americans working under guard in the north.

IN ENEMY HANDS 219


Interior of a prison cell in North Vietnam, late in the war Bedding andpossessions werestowed in a prescribed manner in otherwise barren surroundings. Unannounced harass-ment searches and confiscations were conducted with frequency by the Communist guards.

This is a Defense Department mock-up in South Vietnam of a "tiger cage," used duringthe war to illustrate conditions of temporary confinement including leg-iron shackles.

Photo courtesy of lCdr Francis C. Brown. USN


no retrieving a man once he despaired."*7 Only 12 ofthese allied prisoners reached North Vietnam in 1971,where they were known as "The Dirty Dozen" by theother Americans already held in the North.

According to First Lieutenant Bruce R. Archer ofHMM-165, the prisoners were forced to maintain a six-day week consisting of identical morning and even-

*Ranks used in text are as of time of capture.

ing schedules. A bell woke them up at the break ofdawn, when "we were then required to fold up ourgear neatly. The prisoners were taken Out of their cellsone at a time to dump their toilet buckets, brush theirteeth, and were then locked up again." Meals were abig event of the day, if lacking in quality and quantity.

At times, food consisted of two daily meals, onelargely of rice and squash soup, the other of pork fat.

/ \-.

China (- .*-

/ \j • ( Loung Lang.

ChinaNorth Vietnam

Vinh Ninh *. (Thermal Power Plant'\,..) Son lay I Ministry of National Defense

( Xom Ap Lo ' . .< The CitadelN Dong Hoi- / Hao Lo

Hanoi 0 LCu Loc

Duong Ke*. Bang Liet'cr. P;

• Noi Coc *1?

S."S

LaosI_\ f•

Gulfof

Tonkin• Camp Locations* Held prisoners from South Vietnam I

and Laos —.._

Thailand \

____________

/ Laos

Prisoner of War Campsin North Vietnam

0 150kilometers

DMZ

IN ENEMY HANDS 221

Archer continued, "In the South we were eating chick-en, some kind of vegetable soup and rice. In NorthVietnam, after we settled into our camp site, they start-ed feeding us bread. We were getting a bowl of soupand a hard roll twice a day, with plenty of watet"° Cap-tain PauIJ. Montague, also from HMM-165 and cap-tured with Archer, commented that the situation wasactually worse. In the early years, "meat of any sortwas only given to us in minute pieces, if any atAnother prisoner wrote that in South Vietnam he wasfed "manioc, bamboo, and salt water and so was thecamp commander."tO The diet was so lacking in basicvitamins and protein that survival was a wonder. Cor-poral Anzaldua remembered that the 'nly protein wehad consisted of an occasional rat, lizard, or snake wecould catch with our hands:" Common to all

prisoners at release was a weight loss of 45 to 60pounds.

An overall death rate of 15 percent occurred, withthose surviving being healthier than expected whenexamined upon release.12 Medical care by the NorthVietnamese was limited. Marines suffered from mal-

nutrition, malaria, dysentery, ben-ben, open sores,rashes, typhoid, dental problems, ejection injuries,and psychological stress.'3 All suffered from nutritionaldeficiencies, torture, filthy living conditions, and soli-tary confinement.

The American raid on the empty prison camp atSon Tay marked the start of major changes in how theNorth Vietnamese treated their prisoners. The raiddemonstrated that the Americans could enter NorthVietnam at will and were determined to get theircountrymen back. As a result of this and other con-siderations, the Communists improved conditions,diet, and treatment. Most of the dispersed and iso-lated prisoners were eventually confined at the HoaIn Prison (Hanoi Hilton) complex. Men were broughttogether who had not seen another American in years;they now lived 30 to 50 men confined to a room.

When Captains Orson G. Swindle III of MarineWing Headquarters Group and Lawrence V. Friese ofMarine Aircraft Group (MAG) 12 arrived following asuffocating ride in a refrigerator truck, they foundscrawled on a cell door "Marine Corps Barracks Hanoi."

Meals in the north were lacking in basic vitamins and protein, but most were at leastroutinely issued In the south, this depended entirely upon what the local Communistshad available for food themselves. If they did not eat; the prisoners also starved



With their concentration thus focused at one place,the prisoners were able to organize and resist to agreater degree. The prisoners needed psychologicallyto exhibit group solidarity and to interact with eachother to overcome the guilt feelings caused by theirinevitable breakdowns under torture. Based on themain points of the Code of Conduct, the system thatevolved stressed: (1) Do not condemn, deny, or say any-thing detrimental about the United States or its al-lies ot their cause; (2) Do not give aid or comfort tothe enemy; and (3) Do not accept special favors, in-cluding parole.'

The object was to continue the war against the Viet-namese Communists by denying them the ability touse the prisoners as hostages or for propaganda pur-poses. Within the limitations of confinement, theprisoners had evolved over the yeats from helplesshostages at the mercy of their captors to organizedcombatants in a war of wills. Lieutenant ColonelHarlan P. Chapman, of MAG-13, noted that this wasof a "joint service nature" and there was a senior tank-ing officer "for each room, each building, and for thecamp. Date of tank was important but it did not mat-ter what branch of setvice." For example, MajorJohnH. Dunn, of MAG-il, established these policies whilesenior officer at Son Tay under the acronym of Blades:"Bitch constantly about necessities, luxuries bitchabout occasionally, absurdities debunk, discouragepropaganda, everyone participates, select what is tobe bitched about individually." 6 Techniques used toresist included the discouragement of visits by familymembers, the refusal to view live entertainment, theresistance to Vietnamese-sponsored holidays, thecelebration of American holidays, the stopping ofrecreation that was viewed by Vietnamese-sponsoreddelegations, and the refusal to comment during in-terrogation on any subject except personal needs.*17

As Linebacker air attacks on the North increased inMay 1972, the NVA moved more than 200 prisoners toLuong Lang neat the Chinese botdet. At the sametime, the North Vietnamese used groups of prisonetsto denounce the resumption of air bombardment withstatements and broadcasts, this included the "Peace

*Prisoner resistance was all that could be accomplished underthe circumstances, but was isolated and individual in natuce untillate in the war. LtCol Swindle recalled that the standards of ton-duct for Marines in the North were set by Chapman, Dunn, andFrederirk. (Swindle comments) VAdmJames B. Storkdale, the seniotnaval service officer held in captivity, takes exception to the con-cept ofa "4th Allied POW Wing." which he regarded as a publici-ty device after the fact. (Stockdale comments)


American prisoners were put on display for visitingdelegations, for example when American actress JaneFonda arrived in Hanoi on 8 July 1972. Along withmeeting the prisoners, touring bombed areas, andmaking radio broadcasts, Fonda visited with NVA an-tiaircraft crews where this photograph was taken.

Committee" or "Outer Seven" group of prisoners."tThey were called this by other prisoners for theirseparate treatment by, and cooperation with, the Com-munists. Associated with them were two officers,VMFA-323's Lieutenant Colonel Edison W. Millet andNavy Captain Walter E. Wilbet.' B Miller latet wtote,"I most certainly did, during the last three years of myconfinement, express my views on the Vietnam War.It has not changed. The prosecution of the VietnamWar has to be one of the major mistakes of our coun-try '

Renewed air action also tesulted in new prisonersatriving. On 11 June 1972, Captain William K. An-gus 0fVMA(AW)-224 was captured when his A-6 washit by gtound fire during a bombing run. North Viet-namese subjected him to brutal interrogation, withthe same tesults as with earlier prisoners: despair andguilt fot going beyond the "big four"ttt under tot-

**These wece Sp4 Michael P. Branch, USA; SSgt Robert P.Chenoweth, USA; SSgt James A. Daly, Jr., USA; Pvt Frederick L.Elbert, Jr.. USMC; Sgc Able L. Kavanaugh. USMC; SSgt King D.Rayford, Jr., USA; SSgt Alfonso R. Riate, USMC; and SSgt JohnA. Young, USA.

***Name rank, serial number, and date of birth being the onlyfour questions a prisoner was required to answer for his captors.

IN ENEMY HANDS 223

ture.2° But to the men who had remained in the northfor so long, it seemed these newcomers brought atti-tudes that threatened those held by earlier prisoners.*Major Leo Thorsness, USAF, felt that these men hadbeen on college campuses in the 1960s, when he hadbeen taken prisoner, and they "were not hard-coreresisters." They asked him, "Why in the world shouldwe be tortured to say things that everybody in thestates is already saying?"25

This last year of captivity for the prisoners also sawtragic hardships. During July 1972, the Luong Langcamp suffered a typhoid epidemic due to the crowd-ed and unsanitary conditions. One of those who diedwas Chief Warrant Officer John W. Frederick, Jr., ofMAG-ii, who had survived seven years of confinement.

That same month, a group of prisoners met withactress Jane Fbnda and later in August with formerU.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark, meetings thatwere staged for newsmen.** One prisoner who metwith them at that time explained, "I had no idea whoshe was, but every young officer in the camp (The Zoo)I was in at the time, viewed her as a sex symbol andwanted to see her."22 This, and other incidents,brought accusations of American prisoners cooperat-ing with the Communists, accusations a court of lawnever resolved.

One Marine prisoner concluded after his release thatnot everyone resisted to the best of his abilities. Cor-poral Jose J. Anzaldua felt that some prisoners puttogether peace statements for the enemy in exchangefor better treatment or a few paltry privileges, a littlemore food or a few cigarettes. "I tried to think of themsimply as 'weak sisters' but ultimately I hated them —and I hate them still. Beyond a certain point no man'sfear or suffering was greater than another's. We all hadthe same choices."24

8VAdm Stockdale commented that the years of "heavy" torturewere prior to 31 March 1968. After that, he felt that it was con-tinued by the North Vietnamese against those against whom theystill had grudges. A greater threat was from the early-release offers.By 1 December 1971, "all torture was a thing of the past." (Stock-dale comments)

**On llJuly 1972, a group of 16 American prisoners made stat-ments denouncing the war. Jane lksnda also made broadcasts onRadio Hanoi that were heard by American forces at the time, in-eluding Marine units. This led an unknown Marine with VMFA-333to quip: "Guess the end-of-the-cruise date and win a date withJane."On 9 August 1972, Clark broadcast over Radio Hanoi that there"is no excuse foe bombing North Vietnam but appealed for therelease of prisoners of war. Ac the time, he was a member of theStockholm-based Incemational Cornmiasion of Inquiry on war crimesin Indochina. (Vietnam Comment File)

Egress Recap and Other Contingencies

Active prisoner-recovery operations, including con-tingencies for prisoners in North Vietnam continuedthrough the end of the war and beyond. The DeputyDirector for Operations of the Joint Chiefs of Sraff be-gan a special operations project that envisioned therecovery of American prisoners from Hanoi. LieutenantGeneral Hugh J. Elwood, the Deputy Chief of Stafffor Plans and Programs at HQMC, assigned ColonelWilliam J. Davis as the Marine Corps action officerand representative. Project planners proposed opera-tions using U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps forcesto rescue prisoners from the enemy capital. These con-cepts remained in the planning stage because of thesuccess of military operations in South Vietnam andnegotiations in Faris?

In 1972, Major William B. Clark was the Head-quarters Marine Corps action officer concerned withmonitoring status of captured Marines when a specialDepartment of Defense prisoner task force formed. InAugust 1972, he attended the DOD/CinCPac plan-ning conference on recovery contingencies. He report-ed back to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, that agreat deal of meaningful and productive action hadtaken place since the previous World Wide Confer-ence on Prisoners of War. In his opinion, there were"processing sites ready and waiting with every conceiv-able problem examined," medical, personnel, arid per-sonal files were on station and up to date, next of kintelephone procedures were established, securityprecautions taken, public affairs press guidancepromulgated, and casualty transportation to the Unit-ed States laid on.28

The task force on the prisoners-of-war and missing-in-action was headed by Dt RogerE. Shields from theoffice of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-national Security Affairs. During OperationHomecoming he dealt directly with CinCPac and theServices. These efforts were coordinated under a Pa-cific Command plan known as Egress Recap, later re-named Operation Homecoming? This called for athree-phase operation and delegated responsibilityamong the Services. Phase one and phase two werecontrolled by the Homecoming Operations Center atPacific Command's headquarters in Hawaii. Phase onewas the recovery of the prisoners by Thirteenth AirForce from the Communists. Phase two was theirprocessing at an intermediate facility, the JointHomecoming Reception Centet (JHRC) at Clark AirForce Base, Philippines. Phase three was the return ofthese Americans to the United States, as the respon-

224 THE WAR THAT WOUI.D NOT END

Homecoming Reception Sequence

ArriveCentral Processing Center

Jr

To Hospital

L

Initial Medical Evaluation

Jr

Call Home

'I,

Returnecs RequiringInterim Treatment

.1

Returnees RequiringMinor or No Treatment

Administration Processing

• Escort Assignment

• Briefings

• Uniform Measurement• Uniform Pay

• Legal Counseling

• Chaplain Services

• Current Events Update

'I,

To Medevac Aircraft

Aeromedical Evacuation

Adapted from Department of Defense Material

Cleared forAdministration

Processing

Returnees RequiringIntensive Careor Quarantine

Further Processingor Evacuation as

Presented bySenior Medical Officer

Continuous TreatmentBeyond Seven Days

Further Processingor Evacuation as

Prescribed bySenior Medical Officer

IN ENEMY HANDS 225

sibility of the individual services.28 In addition, theU.S. delegation to the Four Party joint Military Com-mission established by the ceasefire agreement had atwo-man POW liaison division provided by MACV.2°

More than 2,880 American govetnmenr and mili-tary personnel were involved with the first two phasesof Homecoming, which ditectly involved 62 Marines.The III MAF Marines wotked within the organizationalframework of the joint Homecoming Reception Centerat Clark Air Force Base, Philippines, to include thecommand post, base hospital, joint Debriefing andCasualty Reporting Center, Joint Reception and Sup-port Center, Joint Information Bureau, and the QuickReaction Team/Reception Support Team, Military Air-lift Command and the Pacific Air Force provided air-craft support. Air Force Lieutenant General WilliamG. Moore described the command post as "the hubof all activity" for the command element, the Servicedeputy site commanders and State Department teamchief, and representatives of key support agencies.30

Marine Corps participation in OperationHomecoming ranged from the prisoners themselvesto Marine action officers in Washington, D.C. MajorGeneral Michael P. Ryan, then Commanding Gener-al, III MAF, assigned Colonel John W. Clayborne ashis representative with theJoint Homecoming Recep-tion Center at Clark. There he was a service deputyJHRC commander, under General Moore. ColonelClayborne headed the Marine contingent of 32 officersand 28 enlisted men who comprised the MarineProcessing Team at Clark and the escort team on boardthe Military Airlift Command aircraft. The III MAEteam began operations on 13 December 1972 whenMajorJohnJ. Burton reported to Clark as the III MAEliaison officer, assisted by Staff Sergeant Thomas W.Bohnenkamp, an administrative chief, and Master Ser-geant Fred A. Norvell, the Camp Butler uniform cus-todian. Planning and briefings continued with the AirForce, as well as with Brigadier General Paul G. Gra-ham's 9th MAB and 31st MAU for HomecomingAfloat if it was necessary to transport the returneesby sea rather than by air.31

On 26 December 1972, the prisoners at The Citadelmoved to Mba In Prison. Indication of a prisoner ex-change came to the Americans in North Vietnamwhen lists of prisoners by the date of capture were ar-ranged to establish the order in which prisoners werereleased. InJanuary 1973, the "Dirty Dozen" prisonersof the MR 1 group were also moved to Hoa In andjoined the other Hanoi prisoners fhr release. For Cor-

poral Anzaldua the word of the pending relief camein formation with the other prisoners in the main yardof the prison. The camp commander, speakingthrough an interpreter, told them "You will be releasedin 30 days." There was no visible response from theassembled prisoners: "No one believed him, for all weknew it was a trick," stated Anzaldua, "We dared nothope. We were beyond hope."32

When the ceasefire agreement was imminent, thejCS Chairman, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, notifiedthe Pacific Command that during "the next 60 daysthe most important single event will be the rerurn ofour prisoners of war?' The recovery and accountabilityof Americans held by the Communists in SoutheastAsia had become a national objective and a specificgoal of negotiation with the North Vietnamese. Ar thispoint the prisoners were the only leverage the Com-munists could exert, and President Nixon personallyfollowed the daily progress of the prisoner release andfinal troop withdrawals.

The prisoner release was dependent upon theremoval of U.S. naval mines from North Vietnamesewaterways, the withdrawal of remaining U.S. forcesfrom South Vietnam, and the exchange of some 5,000South Vietnamese and 26,508 Communist prisoners.Under the terms of the Vietnam Agreement, the in-ternationally supervised ceasefire went into effectthroughout South and North Vietnam at 0800 Sai-gon time, 28 january 1973. Within 60 days all Ameri-can prisoners and remaining military forces wouldleave Vietnam, and 23,335 Americans, 35,396Koreans, and 113 other allies were to withdraw,36 Italso began the long-awaited recovery of Americanprisoners from Hanoi. Homecoming was no longer aplan, it was operational.

Operation Homecoming

In order to support around-the-clock processing ofmen in transil:ion from Communist to American con-trol, a facility was established and manned by the Serv-ices tq provide medical, financial, psychological, andhumanitarian support. On 28 january 1973, thesereception stations were manned at the announcementof the names of the Americans to be released. Includedwere the names of 26 Marine returnees, and eightothers who had died in captivity. When thejHRC wasactivated, it was believed that the prisoners would bereleased in roughly equal groups at 15-day intervals.

Families were notified, records were audited, andcurrent promotions, awards, and uniforms were onhand to be issued upon the prisoners' arrival at Clark



Upon release, prisoners were issued civilian clothingand toilet attic/es and driven to Hanoi's Cia lam Air-port for transfer to awaiting American reception teams.In a study in contrasts, an American prisoner pans thecamera over the shoulder of a North Vietnamese.

Air Force Base. Representatives from the various Serv-ices were assigned to each pickup aircraft; however,they were not escorts for specific returnees. Marine es-cons were assigned to each Marine returnee to accom-pany him to theJHRC and then to the Unired Srates.The processing at the JHRC was designed to allow asmooth transition of the returnees back into the Ma-rine Corps. Information was provided to bring the Ma-tines up to date on the events of the last few years,and to allow them to make contact with their families.

As February 1973 began, prisoners in Hanoi beganthe transfer to their final holding facility, known as"Showplace" because the Vietnamese made efforts toimprove the condition and appearance of prisoners pri-or to release. Operation Homecoming had started forthem at last. One of the prisoner leadership's last in-structions was the "Go Home Guidance:' Theseprovided specifics on "dress, press, debrief, violators."The prisoners used military formations to display prideand dignity. Any emotionalism or arrogance was keptin check. Priority for release were the sick or wound-ed, enlisted men, civilians, and officers in order of cap-ture. But, this was ultimately controlled by theCommunists. An experience that began for a diversegroup of individuals ended as a unifying event.38

On 12 February 1973, the first phase began with

the release of 116 prisoners at Gia Lam Airfield inNorth Vietnam and 19 prisoners in South Vietnamwho left from Saigon. These first groups includedthree Marines from the north and Captain James P.Walsh from the south. Other prisoners were releasedfrom the same locations and from the British CrownColony of Hong Kong. In accordance with the provi-sions of the Agreement and Protocol, transactions wereobserved by teams from the Four Party Joint MilitaryCommission and the International Commission ofControl and Supervision.

As the first prisoners were transferred from theirVietnamese bus, their way to the aircraft was blockedby newsmen. However Air Force plane crews pushedthe newsmen aside and escorted the men to the wait-ing C-141. Colonel James R. Dennet, USA1 who head-ed the 18-man reception support team, reported, "Oneof the POWs told me that this was the high point ofthe whole operarion." Denner was impressed withthe discipline displayed as the former prisoners got offthe bus at Hanoi: "The senior man rook charge andmarched them to the turnover point. Some were limp-ing, but there was full control:' The releases that fol-lowed were based upon agreements reached in Parisand on the spot in North Vietnam. Delays in negoti-ations at exchange sites made subsequent releases ir-regular. In all, 20 MAC flights by C-141s and C-9s wereused to bring the men to the Philippines. When thelast flights arrived, 591 Americans and nine foreignnationals had been reparriared.*

After arriving in the Philippines, the former prison-ers began the next phase of Homecoming. Processinkbegan with an initial medical examination. Thereturned Marines were then debriefed. The purposeof this was to determine the status of the remainingprisoners and to elicit information on missing personswho may have been encountered in capriviry.° Cap-tain William C. Howey led the five-man debrief teamand recalled that the actual debriefs began on 13February 1973 with Lieutenant ColonelJohn H. Dunnand Lieutenant Colonel Harlan P. Chapman.** Lieu-tenant Colonel Edison W. Miller "was not debriefedby direction of FMFPac."4' Returnees then met theirescorts, received personal information briefings ontheir home situations, met with a chaplain (if desired),

*Marines were released on 12 February 1973 and on 5, i4, i6,27. and 28 March.

**UCol Howey commented that it took an estimated 45 man-hours to process the Dunn and Chapman debriefs tn collate, cross-check, and verify names mentioned. Other prisoners were specifi-tally designated to serve as "name memory banks" for the prisoners.

IN ENEMY HANDS 227


Prisoners lined up for release on 27 March 1973 at the airport. Marines pictured among the27 returnees freedthat day were SgtJoseJ. Anzaldua, fourth from the left, and Sgt DennisA. Tellier secondfrom the nght. The bus was camouflaged as a defense against air attack.

The returnees maintained their composure until it was clear that they were again safeunder American control. No one was silent as this Air Force C-141 Starlifter left the run-way at Hanoi. The photographer TSgt Robert N. Denham, USAF observed that "Youcould hear the shouts and cheers all over the aircraft" on this 28 March 1973 flight.

Depattment of Defense Photo (USMC) A9000163

and called thei.r families. Changes to initial hospitalassignments were made at this time. Aftet that, a postexchange call was made for necessities and measure-ment for uniforms in which to return home2

The men were in a euphoric state that lastedthroughout their stay at Clark. The returning Ameri-cans "were greeted by large crowds of well-wishers atthe flight line and along the ambulance bus routesto the hospital" These crowds of dependents andService personnel from Clark were the returningprisoners' first indication that their experience was ap-preciated by their fellow citizens. The returning Ma-rines adjusted promptly to eating a normal Americandiet. To Colonel Clayborne, surprisingly, "though sub-jected to the most primitive living conditions andcruelties, together with long years of imprisonment,[they) did nor 2.ppear psychologically or mentally af-fected in most cases?' They were especially interest-ed in the details of their capture and informationabout their units following rheir capture. ColonelClayborne credited a strong prisoner unity with main-taining a sense of military discipline and providingthe men a sense of purpose. Standing out in hisrecollections was the rapport between the Marinereturnees and their escorts.45

Colonel Dennet had initial concerns for demonstra-tions against the North Vietnamese by the returning

prisoners. On 16 March 1973, Dennet was preparedfor possible demonstrations against the United Statesfrom a group of 32 prisoners in Hanoi, including sevenMarines, three of whom were charged with miscon-duct after their return.46 His concern for this particu-lar release was due primarily to the personalitiesamong the returnees themselves, some "individualsin this group had been identified as having anti-warand most particularly anti-U.S. military sentiments:'Captain Howey had received derogatory informationabout some of these returnees during his debriefingsessions and passed this information on to ColonelClayborne, who informed Fleet Marine Force Pacificand Headquarters Marine Corps.

The returnees were cleared for "medical evacuation"to the United States as soon as they were ready to go,an average of 68 hours of processing time. Thirty-sixMAC C-141 flights were made to take all the men toHawaii. The first Marine to arrive was LieutenantColonel Chapman, to be welcomed by the Command-ing General of FMF Pacific, General Louis H. Wilson,Jr. Chapman was the Marine held the longest by theenemy, from his capture on 5 November 1965. GeneralWilson shook his hand and said, "Welcome back tothe Marine Corps?' Chapman replied, "Thank you,General, but I never left."° Others followed and this"process" continued until the arrival of Captain Wil-liam K. Angus on 28 March 1973, the last Marine



Arnval at Clark Air Force Base, Phil4'pines, was at all hours of the day or nzght. Despitethis, there were military and civilian well-wishers on hand to greet the returnees, in thiscase on a Military Airlift Command C-141 medical evacuation aircraft arriving from Hanoi.

IN ENEMY HANDS 229

prisoner out of North Vietnam. As Captain Angusboarded the aircraft that returned him to the UnitedStates he took the "salute of a formation of Marineswho were enroute to Nam Phong."°

The third phase of Operation Homecoming beganafter notification of a Marine's return was sent to hisfamily. The returnee was then assigned to one of sevennaval hospitals? The returning Marines were givenmore intensive medical care and counseling. They werethen debriefed further and given time to spend withfamilies and friends to catch up on lost years. This wascontrolled by Headquarters Marine Corps, with a pro-gram called Operation Homecoming Marine. Head-quarters formed a group under Brigadier GeneralEdward A. Parnell for the Manpower Division. As inthe preoperation planning, these action officers atHeadquarters supervised the process with the as-sistance of the respective hospitals and with local Ma-rine representarives.**50 They also had to assist thesurvivors of those Marines who were not coming home.

Welcome Home Marine

Chief Warrant Officer William E. Thomas, Jr., ar-rived at Naval Air Station, Miramar, California, at 1815on 30 March 1973. The 36-year-old native of Pennsyl-vania had been serving as an air observer with Sub UnitOne, 1st ANGLICO, when he was shot down near theDemilitarized Zone in 1972. At the time, he had been"controlling naval gunfire on enemy positions alongRoute 555" from an Air Force OV-io. He was escortedto the United States by Major John H. Messick, toCamp Pendleton, California. Previously WarrantOfficer Thomas had met his wife and two children inHawaii during a brief stopover at Hickam Air ForceBase. Thomas recalled, "I arrived with Sgt Anzaldua.We (Joe and I) arrived late due to aircraft problems?'A Marine Corps sedan and -reception party drove themto the Camp Pendleton naval hospital where they weregreeted by the base commander, Major General Her-man Poggemeyer, Jr.; Major General John N.McLaughlin, Commanding General, 4th Marine Di-vision, himself a former POW from the Korean War;and the hospital commander. Assigned to Operation

*Thesc were U.S. Naval Hospitals in Oakland, California; CampPendleton, California; Great LAkes, Illinois; Sr. Albans, New York;Bethesda, Maryland; Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; and Philadel.phia, Pennsylvania. USNHs in San Diego, California, andJackson.yule, Flnrida, also parriripated.

•sJnis involved were Marine Corps Base (MCB), Camp Pendle-ton, California; Marine Barracks, Great Lakes, Illinois; Marine Bar-racks, Brooklyn. Ness York; Marine Barracks, Jacksonville, Florida;Marine Barracks, Treasure Island, California; and MCB CampLejeune, North Carolina.


The first Marine to return to American soil was LtCoIHarlan P Chapman, foreground, after more thanseven years in captivity. He was greeted on his arrivalat Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii; by LtGen Louis H.Wilson, Jr., commanding FMF Pacific. The flight ar-rived with 20 returnees from all three Armed Services.

Homecoming Ward 22A, Warrant Officer Thomas wasonce again reunited with his family.

In the days that followed, Chief Warrant OfficerJoseph A. Canonico and Sergeant William C. Wester-lund of the 1st Counterintelligence Team conducteddetailed debriefings, in conjunction with medical anddental treatment. Decorations and awards were initiat-ed or completed during this period, as well as adminis-trative matters relating to pay and legal assistance.Family visits and liberty were authorized consistentwith medical, administrative, and debriefing sched-ules. On 16 April 1973, Chief Warrant Officer Tho-mas conducted a press conference and began a 90-dayconvalescent leave.51

With variations in detail this same sequence was fol-lowed by the 25 othet Marines who had returned dur-ing Homecoming. An important element of thisprogram was the public relations exploitation of thereturned Marines which allowed them to have pressconferences, make public speaking engagements, andhold interviews designed to capitalize on the massivepublic response to their return. The Marines were wel-comed home at the national level by the Comman-darn General Robert E. Cushman,Jr., and by PresidentNixon with a White House reception.52


Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A900028High among priorities for returnees was complete medical examinations, in this case, forCapt James P Va/sh, the last Marine captured during the war He is undergoing aphysi-calat the St. A/bans Naval Harp ital, New York, conducted by Capt Robert Bishop, USN.

"JVelcome home, Marine!" heard from the Commandant of the Marine Corps. At CampPendleton, California, Gen Robert E. Cushman, Jr., promotes CU'O3 U'ilhiam E. Tho-mas, Jr., in front of other returnees. In most cases, promotions waited several years tobepresented making some Marines several ranks senior to what they were when captured


Shortly after the prisoners were returned, GenetalCushman received a letter from Douglas K. Ramseythat would focus his personal attention on a MarineCorps officer, a prisoner who had been dead for sixyears in Vietnam. Ramsey, a civilian language officer,had been held a prisoner by the Communists from1966 until his release during Operation Homecom-ing in 1973. His letter told the story of Captain DonaldG. Cook, USMC. Captain Cook went to Vietnam asan observer from Communications Company, Head-quarters Battalion, 3d Marine Division. He was as-signed to the 4th Battalion of the Vietnamese Marines.On 31 December 1964 he was wounded and capturedduring fighting near Binh Gia, Phuoc Thy Province,in III Corps.5 Cook was held prisoner by the Viet Conguntil his death. The 33-year-old native of New Yorkand father of four set an example of courage and con-duct in the face of the enemy.

Held in various camps in South Vietnam near theCambodian border, Cook reportedly assumed a rigidadherence to the Code of Conducr that won him therespect of his fellow prisoners and his Communist cap-tors. Observed a fellow prisoner, after a 14-day forcedmarch to a new camp, Captain Cook's determination

and fortitude "was commended by the VC camp com-mander . . . like a physicist being praised by En-stein." Although seriously ill, Cook refused to allowother prisoners to carry him or his pack. He set theexample for others by assuming leadership, nursingthe sick, sharing his rations, organizing the prisoners,attempting to escape, and resisting the Vietnameseat every turn. The strain of this effort eventually costhim his life. Fellow prisoners believed "that Cook couldhave negotiated his own early release, had he beenwilling to pay the price of a signed statement or tape"against the United States' policy in Vietnam. CaptainCook's 1967 death from malaria was announced toother prisoners as his having "gone to a camp ratherfar from here:' The North Vietnamese finally notifiedthe American government of Captain Cook's death in1973 during Operation Homecoming.*

The return of Marine prisoners also brought discipli-nary action for some. Rear Admiral James B. Stock-dale, the senior naval officer in captivity, was met theday after his arrival at Clark Air Force Base by CinC-

He was declared legally dead by the Department of Defense on26 frbruary 1980. On 16 May 1980 Colonel Donald G. Cook's widowreceived his Medal of Honor from Secretary of the Navy EdwardHidalgo.

IN ENEMY HANDS 231

White House Photograph E084822A

The Jinaiphase of Operation Homecoming came at the White House with a receptionby the Commander-in-Chief President RicbardM. Nixon. He is shown here addressingthe returnees, backed by the Marine Band and its drum major on 24 May 1973.


Pac's Rear Admiral Earl P. Yates. A telephone call madein Stockdale's name to the Chief of Naval Personnelin Washington, D.C., concerning Navy Captain WalterE. Wilber and Marine Lieutenant Colonel Edison W.Miller, demanded that they be moved for their ownsafety as there "are released ex-prisoners who don'twant to be in the same hospital with them?'56

The telephone call appeared to have been motivatedby the fact of Miller and Wilber being on the firstflight out of Hanoi, which Stockdale felt "may nothave been either Miller's idea, or the North Viet-namese's." Colonel Clayborne's opinion was that Wil-bet and Miller were on the initial plane because ofNorth Vietnamese control and manipulation of theprocess. Reasons proposed for this were for the Com-munists to "get some favorable media exposure" or as"a gesture of contempt" to continue to exploit divisionamong the returnees.57 In regards to his release date,though he was one of the more seriously injuredreturnees, Miller said he had declined early repatria-tion, but was told with the others by the North Viet-namese that "we would all leave the country when toldto."" At this point, CinCPac and Washington's con-cern was to move Miller and Wilbet out as soon as pos-

The first Marine captured during the war; Co/DonaldC. Cook, never returned His experience remained un-told until Operation Homecoming brought back fel-low prisoners whose recounting gained him the Medalof Honor He ispicturedas a captain, the rank he heldat the time of his capture in 1964 in South Vietnam.


sible. Stockdale observed that there "ate a lot of looseends here

In June 1973, Admiral Stockdale brought chargesagainst these same two officers, in accordance with theSecretary of Defense's policy that charges againstreturnees would have to be brought by other formerprisoners. Thy were charged with conspiracy to solicitmutiny, solicitation of mutiny, mutiny, violation oforders, communications with the enemy, and urgingothers to cooperate with the enemy°° Stockdalerecalled these charges had been drafted by the judgeAdvocate General of the Navy, based in part on some50 depositions collected by the Naval InvestigativeService from returnees.61 Miller stated that "my crit-ics have preferred as much anonymity and distance aspossible" and that Admiral Stockdale "has neverspoken with me or met me?'82

Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Guybrought charges of misconduct against eight enlistedmen under him as the senior ranking officer at TheCitadel. Three Marines and five soldiers were accused.The Marines were Staff Sergeant Alfonso R. Plate, Ser-geant Able L. Kavanaugh, and Private FrederickL. El-bert, Jr. All were accused of making propagandastatements, cooperating with the enemy, disobedienceof orders, attempting to persuade others to disobeyorders, and wrongfully communicating with the ene-my about other ptisoners.*63 Sergeant Kavanaughcommitted suicide soon after the charges were pub-lished.

A divergence of opinion existed among theprisoners, the Pentagon, the Services, and the WhiteHouse on how this situation should have been han-dled.* Secretary of the Navy John Warner otdered theNavy Judge Advocate General to conduct an investi-gation and Warner himself interviewed some 19 formerprisoners and reached two separate determinations. On3 July 1973, Secretary Warner dismissed the chargesagainst the enlisted Marines; on 27 September 1973,he dismissed those against the officers. All of themreceived secretarial letters of censure.** In October1973, Secretary Warner dropped additional chargesagainst the enlisted Marines following further inves-tigation and consideration of the legal and policy is-

*The legal and command background on these charges is coveredextensively in lsCol Gary I). Solis, Marines and Militasy Law in Viet-nam: Trial by Fire (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Divi-son, U.S. Marine Corps, 1989), pp. 218-221.

**LtCol Miller's censure stated in part, he "placed personal com-fort and welfare above that of. fellow prisoners of war." (BGenWalter]. Donovan memo to CMC dtd 29May85 [Vietnam Com-ment File])

IN ENEMY HANDS 233

sues involved. Secretary Warner directed that nofurther action be taken relating to accusations of mis-conduct while a prisoner. When the Secretary of theNavy announced his decision he concluded that theconvening of a pretrial investigation under Article 32of the Uniform Code of Military justice was warrant-ed by the evidence, but felt that "further proceedings,with their attendant publicity, would subject manyformer prisoners of war and their families . . . to ad-ditional serious disruption and hatdship dispropor-tionate to any national interest which couldconceivably be served." In a similar decision, theSecretary of the Army also dismissed the chargesagainst the soldiers involved.

A short time later, the Department of Defense con-vened a committee to review the Code of Conduct andit considered the handling of the investigations intomisconduct. It concluded that "the investigations wereminimal, and the rationale supporting dismissal wasvery weak."°5 While recognizing the "emotional cli-mate" that was disinclined to prosecute any returneesand the Defense Department policy that there wouldbe no prosecution based solely on propaganda state-ments, the committee was struck by the depth of bit-terness expressed by the returnees interviewed. Theconsensus of returnees was that those who had violat-ed the Uniform Code of Military justice had nor beenrequired to account for their actions: "they were putto no rest of justice; and their apparent immunitywould serve to undermine command authority in anyfuture [prisoner-of-wan organizations."6H

The Pacific Command's Homecoming organizationcontinued through 2 October 1973, when the AssistantSecretary of Defense for Inrernational Security Affairsbelieved rhar there would be no other releases. By 1December 1973, the last vestiges of Homecoming hadfaded.° Admiral Noel A. M. Gayler's CinCPac com-mand hisrory quoted a Time magazine observationthat the "exercise was worthy of a major offensive .The U.S. milirary's planning for the operation hadbeen meticulous and even loving, in an official way."°°

Code of Conduct

The wartime experience of the Marine prisoners wasexamined from debriefs conducted as part of Opera-tion Homecoming Marine. Areas examined includedgeneral treatment, interrogation, indoctrination,prisoner organization, prisoner communications, andeffectiveness of training received prior to capture. Anacronym, "Sere' stood for Survival, evasion, resistance,and escape. These four words summarized the ordealof the Marines at the hands of the Communists in

Southeast Asia Regardless of background and qualiryof rraining, all Marines had been indoctrinated in theCode of Conduct. This code was drafted afrer theKorean War, when there was a perceived need todelineate acceptable behavior in captivity. The degreeof success or failure of this endeavor varied with eachindividual and his relarive circumstances. Conduct inthe enemy camp was influenced by two sets of stan-dards, those of international law and those of theAmerican military. While survival was a goal in itself,the quality of that survival was measured against thecriteria of resistance to the North Vietnamese. Thisgoal had been set by the Code of Conduct and theservice senior ranking officers in the Vietnamesecamps?°

The Marine Corps had used the Code of Conductfor training and insrnucrion intended to promore inMarines the positive attitude that they could opposeand defeat any enemy of their country, even if theywere captured. In recruir training, individual combattraining, and during predeployment training, Marinesreceived instruction in rhe Geneva Convention, theCode of Conduct, and survival, evasion, resistance, andescape rechniques. The emphasis on the Code of Con-ducr and the Geneva Convention before and duringthe war in Vietnam had been oriented towards "bigfour only" statements—name, rank, serial number,and dare of birth. This lefr nothing to fall back uponwhen a Marine was nor treated as a prisoner of warby the Communists, but as a "war criminal." The Codeof Conduct did provide a sound philosophy, but previ-ous training in it did not allow flexibility. Returningprisoners considered this prepararion inadequate forwhar rhey experienced. "What does one do when un-able to stick to the big four?" was the most discussedquestion during Homecoming debriefings.' As oneMarine stated, "I was mentally unprepared for intern-ment. I had guilt feelings of a rraitorous nature be-cause of my conduct?'72

As could be expected, the application of the codevaried with individuals and military service. The stan-dards of the Code of Conduct were those that Marinesrypically carri.ed with them inro captivity in Vietnam.The experience they brought our generally reaffirmedthe importance of the Code, with minor variation inwording7 Captain Montague wrote rhar it was a"beautiful code;' but that the way ir was taughr aid-ed the enem When there is time, as in Vietnam, "allcan [be) and were broken by our enemy?' It is the sub-sequenr guilt that is exploited, until "we realized wehad done our best, and had gone to the extreme" and



Much later another Marine came back to a differentreception. PPC Robert R. Garwoodreturnedfrom cap-tivity in North Vietnam and is shown in March 1979leaving the hospital at Camp Butler; Okinawa, escort-ed by Ma) Ralph S. Bates, in coat and tie at right.

were then able to pick up the pieces and continue thefight7

MIAs: The Joint Casualty Resolution Center

The Paris Accords in 1973 called for signatories toreport the location of missing persons as well asprisoners. The North Vietnamese for their part claimedan estimated one million missing to be reconciled.More than a statistic, each missing U.S. Marine was aloss to loved ones, a loss to his unit, and an unresolvedindividual tragedy that did not diminish with the pass-ing of time and the fading of memory. The missingbecame an issue for the same reasons that the prisonersbecame hostages during the war. The domestic pres-sure of families on elected representatives caused thegovernment to mobilize its efforts to resolve the sta-tus of these men, which included 290 Marines in twocategories at the end of the war: those considered miss-ing and possibly captured (believed to be 136 Marinesin 1973) and those considered killed with their bod-ies not being recovered. After Operation Homecom-

ing did not provide further insight into the status ofthe remaining missing, Secretary of the Navy Warnerdirected that "no action be taken to change the sta-tus of Vietnam MIA's" without his personal know-ledge. This policy continued until procedures wereagreed upon that allowed a judicious determinationof a "final" status in each case. Since the 1973 cease-fire, the Department of Defense has maintained thatthe status review process and the accounting for miss-ing are two separate and distinct issues.°

When the MACV Special Operations Group-JointPersonnel Recovery Center (JPRC) was deactivated, itsprisoner recovery functions were turned over to theJoint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC).* U.S. ArmyBrigadier General Robert C. Kingston's Thailand-based organization's mission was to resolve the status of2,441 Americans missing in action in Southeast Asia7The task force interviewed refugees, conductedsearches of identified crash sites, and participated inthe "technical" talks with the North Vietnamese. Inconjunction with the JCRC, the U.S. Army CentralIdentification Laboratory provided support with therecovery and identification of remains. The JointCasualty Resolution Center continued to resolve thestatus of missing Marines after the completion ofHomecoming.

One Marine who did not return during Homecom-ing was Private First Class Robert R. Garwood. Gar-wood's initial loss had been treated as a capture bythe Communists, even after reports that he had chos-en to remain with them after being offered release in1967. The Marine Corps believed him to be collaborat-ing with the enemy at the time of OperationHomecoming in 1973. Reports by prisoners who hadbeen held with him confirmed these suspicions. In-telligence gathered by DIA (Defense IntelligenceAgency) as late as 1975 indicated he operated withCommunist forces in Eastern Quang Nam and QuangNgai provinces. It was reported that Gatwood "spokeVietnamese fluently, had become a Communist Partymember and had recently been promoted to the rankof major."78 After his return to the United States in1979, it was alleged during his subsequent trial thathe acted as an interpreter, interrogator, informer, andindocrrinator of his fellow prisoners. At one point hewas said to have served as armed guard and to havestruck several prisoners for the death of the camp com-mander's cat. Other prisoners testified that he alsoprovided help to his fellow Americans and that his be-

First located in Saigon, theJCRC moved to Thailand in Febru-ary 1973. In May 1976, JCRC moved to NAS Barbers Point, Hawaii.

IN ENEMY HANDS 235

havior was the result of manipulation by the Com-munists.*79

Since the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, and upto 1990 the Defense Intelligence Agency has processed4,564 reports pertaining to Americans in SoutheastAsia: information on grave sites, crash sites, dog tags,live sightings, hearsay, and even prison camp locations.

*Garwoods trial is covered in detail io LtCol Gary U. Solis Ma-tines and Militaty Law th Vietnam; TSlby Fire (Washingron, D.C.,History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1989).

Of 672 Americans identified in these accounts: 78 per-cent had already returned alive, remains were locatedfor 15 percen.t, and 7 percent were unaccounted for.As a matter of national policy, should "any report provetrue, we will take appropriate action to ensure thereturn of those involved?' Of the "live" sightings ofAmericans in Southeast Asia by 1986, 97 were "un-der continuing investigation in an attempt to confirmthe information?' Over half of these sightings were con-sidered not related to prisoner-of-war situations.30

CHAPTER 16

Continuity and ChangeOperation End Sweep —Task Force Delta, The Titers Depart —To What End?

Operation End Sweep

The withdrawal ofIII MM units from Vietnam as aresult of the Paris Accords was contingent upon therelease of allied prisoners held by the Communists andthe clearing of American mines from the harbors ofNorth Vietnam. When these waterways were mined inMay 1972, the possibility of the U.S. having to clearthem had been recognized. These mines were a signifi-cant factor in negotiations, as the North Vietnamesepossessed only rudimentary mine-clearing capabilitiesand apparently their Soviet and Chinese allies werenot prepared to test theirs.

This was the mission of Seventh Fleet's Mine Coun-termeasure Force (Task Fbrce 78) under Rear AdmiralBrian McCauley, a Naval Academy graduate with adegree in physics from Harvard and a surface warfarecareer in destroyers. Earlier reductions in size had leftthe Seventh Fleet with few minesweeping assets. Sur-face units resided mainly in the reserve, rather thanin the active, force structure. As a result, the majorityof any minesweeping had to be accomplished byhelicopter units and the Navy possessed a single13-aircraft squadron. Planning for the clearing ofmines, codenamed Formation Sentry, began inNovember 1972 when JCS ordered the Charleston,South Carolina-based Mine Countermeasure Com-mand (MCMC) and Helicopter Mine Countermeas-ure Squadron (HC) 12 to Cubi Point, Philippines.*I

Task Force 78 was formed at Subic Bay on 24November around the Mine Countermeasure Com-mand staff, including the Navy medium helicoptersquadron HM-12 and the Guam-based Mine Flotilla1, and augmented by other West Coast units. MarineCorps representatives on the force staff were LieutenantColonel James C. Robinson, Lieutenant ColonelCharles B. Redrnan, and, later, Lieutenant ColonelVictor M. Lee. Admiral McCauley's initial concept en-visioned a single airborne mine-countermeasure

*Formation Sentry 1, the original mineclearing plan, waa draft-ed by Cdr Paul L. Gruend!, USN. and other members of the minecountermeasure staff on temporary duty with CinCPac in 1972. Itcalled for fewer assets to rover the same area in sequence over a longerperiod of time. The later lbrmarion Sentry II planned for simul-taneous sweep with more assets involved. (Gruendl Comments)

236

(AMCM) unit of eight aircraft supported by an LPHand LPD to clear five ports. As planning progressed,the complexity of the task and the desire to completethe clearing as soon as possible made it evident thatthe command did not possess the necessary forces toaccomplish the mission. Admiral McCauley wrote,"Operation End Sweep had the highest priority in thePacific Fleet. It commenced with the ceasefire and, asa result, people, ships, and aircraft, which in a war-time scenario would have been otherwise occupied,were made available." Major General Leslie F. Brown,the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) commander,recalled that the decision was made at the "highestlevels to employ USMC helicopters:' The .JCS andCinCPac staff directed Lieutenant General J.nuis H.Wilson, Jr., the FMFPac commanding general, to sup-port the Navy with Marine CH-53s, which were basi-cally the same as the HM-12 aircraft. Commander PaulL. Gruendl, Chief of Staff of the Mine Countermeas-ure Force, recalled the CH-53 had been adopted bythe Secretary of the Navy with this mission in mindand that the hard-point fittings for towing equipmentwere already in place and "the aircraft was nor modi-fied." All of this caused concem to Lieutenant GeneralI.ouis Merager at III MAF regarding roles, missions,and, more importantly, the loss of 9th MAB amphibi-ous lift and aircraft General Metzger realized the im-plications of losing both helicopter squadrons and fiveamphibious ships because of the mine-clearing com-mitment, units upon which many demands had beenmade in the previous six months. Brigadier GeneralPaul G. Graham of 9th MAB removed his Marine unitsfrom the appointed ships and changed their organi-zation to provide ship-based support for MACV,without helicopter assets. If required, the amphibi-ous assault ships (LPHs) from Task Force 78 would bemade available to 9th MAB for amphibious oper-ations.

Operation End Sweep sent workhorse Marinehelicopter squadrons where they least expected to fly,North Vietnam. End Sweep was also a new mission:airborne mine-clearing. To support the task force,FMFPac assigned Major John Van Norrwick Ill'sHawaii-based Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 237

Adapted from Task Force 78 Material

(HMH) 463 to 1st MAW. General Brown, the wingcommander, assigned Lieutenant Colonel Charles H.Egger's composite Marine Medium Helicopter Squa-dron (HMM) 165 to this mission as well, reinforcedwith the CH-53 Sea Stallions of HMH-462 and addi-tional CH-46 Sea Knights from HMM-164. Commandelements were organized around the existing head-quarters of HMH-463 and HMM-165, with aircraft andcrews coming from all the assigned Marine squadrons.The four supporting squadrons were at various loca-tions throughout the Western Pacific prior to TaskForce 78 activation: HMM-165 with three CH-53s, twoUN-is, and five CH-46s on the USS New Orleans (LPH11) and I-IMH-463 with nine CH-53s, six CH-46s, andtwo UH-ls on the USS Inchon (LPH 12) and threeCH-53s on the USS Cleveland. Nine HMH-462CH-53s at Cubi Point, Philippines, and at Futema,Okinawa, and all 12 of HMM-164's aircraft at Futemacould provide additional support if necessary.5

By 7 December 1972, the assigned forces had beenidentified: 10 ocean minesweepers, 9 amphibiousships, 6 fleet tugs, 3 salvage ships, 6 destroyers, 45helicopters, and more than 5,000 men serving with TF

78. Carrier- and land-based ait support was availableto protect the task force and additional support wasprovided by logistic and picket ships? Four surfacemine-countermeasure (SMCM) units were configuredaround the ocean-going minesweepers (MSOs). Thefour airborne mine-countermeasure (AMCM) units ar-ranged to clear extensive areas of seven ports and 15inland waterways. According to the final concept, Ma-rine CH-53s were to be used in mine-sweeping oper-ations, CH-46s for logistics and search and rescuesupport, and UH-ls for command and control. Somemissions were not covered by existing tactical proce-dures, as in how to conduct search-and-rescue opera-tions in a minefield? Aircraft and aircrewfamiliarization began at Naval Air Station, Cubi Point,Philippines, early in December 1972. The month wit-nessed intensified unit training at Subic Bay to qualifythe Matine units in the technique of sweeping minesfrom the air.

Following the final ceasefire agreement, on 24Janu-ary 1973, theJoint Chiefs of Staff named the opera-tion End Sweep and directed it to start on 27 January1973. General Metager passed control of designated

Operation End Sweep —Task Force 78 Organization

CommanderPacific Fleet

CommanderSeventh Fleet

CommanderTask Force 78

CTG 78.8CommanderAmphibiousSquadron 1

CTG 78.1CommanderMobile Mine

Countermeasures

CTG 78.2CommanderMine Flotilla

CTG 78.3Base Support

CTG 78.4Mine Counter-measures and

Inland Waterways

CTG 78.5Diving and

Salvage


Marine units to Admiral McCauley on 1 February.Control of Task Force 76's Amphibious Squadron 1(ARGs Alpha and Bravo) went to Task Force 78 at thesame time. According to HMM-165's LieutenantColonel Egger, the Vietnamese ceasefire became a real-ity when his unit's stay in Singapore was cut short andthe unit was rushed back to Subic Bay for "a new andimportant assignment."9 At Subic Bay, further inten-sive training brought the Marine aircrews up to theskill levels of their Navy counterparts. Major Van Nort-wick reported that in the short period, 50 pilots and50 crewmen were given at least three training flightstowing countermeasure devices. When the forcedeparted Subic for North Vietnam, HMM-165 was onthe USS New Orleans and HMH-463 was on boardthe USS Inchon. The Marine helicopters and crewswere now integrated into five Navy-led AMCMunits.*b0

The task force's mission required rhe clearing ofports and coastal locations of more than 11,000MK52-2 mines and MK36 destructors that had beenused during the course of the mining campaign. Thesedevices were equipped with magnetic and acousticfuzes that detonated when a target was close enough toactivate the mine. Most were located in restricted wateras shallow as three feet and the devices had been setto detonate or deactivate after a given period of time.

At an initial meeting on 5 February 1973, at theDuyen Hal Hotel in Haiphong, Admiral McCauleynegotiated with North Vietnamese Colonel Hoan NuuThai to establish procedures and the sequence of areasto be cleared. This set the pattern for subsequentnegotiations which were often more political thantechnical. North Vietnamese demands were accompa-nied by thinly veiled threats that United States andDemocratic Republic of Vietnam relations would notimprove unless the Americans met all requirements,including the completion of mineclearing by 28March. If not, the North Vietnamese intimated thatthe release of American prisoners would not gosmoothly."

On 23 February 1973, AMCM Units Alpha and Bra-vo arrived at an anchorage off of Haiphong. The nextday, Marines flew the command negoriaring team tothe Cat Bi Airfield for consultations with the NorthViemamese. Logistic runs to this airfield continued

*Flagalsip/Command Unit (New Orleans with 10 USMC CH-46s,2 USMC UK-is, 7 USN CH-53s, I USN CH-46); AMCM Unit Al-pha (Cleveland with 3 USN CH-53s); AMCM Unit Bravo (Ogdenwith 3 USN CH-53s); AMCM Unit Charlie (Incbon with 9 USMCCH-53s, 10 USMC CH-46s, 2 USMC UH-is, I USN CH-46); AMCMUnit Delta (Dubuque with 3 USMC CH-53s).

throughout the period, while additional flights trans-ported men and equipment to install three Raydist**sites around Haiphong Harbor. Admiral Noel A. M.Gayler, CinCPac, suspended operations soon afterthey began and ordered Task Force 78 from the an-chorage on 28 February, when the release of Ameri-can prisoners was delayed, demonstrating thatcontinued cleating was dependent upon prisonerrelease. The task force moved to a holding area at seawhere the units practiced flight and sweep proceduresuntil 4 March. On 7 March 1973, Marine CH-53s be-gan sweeping the Haiphong Channel with MK1O5towed sleds.*** Five days later, HMH-463 made itsfirst sweeps of the Lach Huyen River. ,a On 17 March,Airborne Mine Countermeasure Units Charlie and In-chon began sweeping the Hon Gai approaches.

In their daily routines, the helicopter crews swepta specific area. They used navigational aids locatedboth on shore and on board minesweepers to ensureaccurate location. The sweep flights themselves weretime-consuming, repetitive passes over an assignedstretch of waterway at less than 100 feet above the sur-face. One pilot from HMH-463 described a typicalminesweep sortie which began with the towing of themagnetic pipe from the LPD to the minefield underradar control, approximately a 30-minute process:

At this time radar coverage from the LPD was Inst andthe actual two-hour sweep was conducted by pilot judge-ment utilizing previously prepared charts. A 30-minutereturn to the LPD followed. If operational planning was cor-rect and nn mechanical difficulties were encountered, an in-coming relief heliropter passed the outgoing one at theminefield boundary.'

This was an exhaustive effort rhat required concen-tration and was flown in the knowledge of a possiblepass too near the blast of a detonated mine. Otherdifficulties were North Vietnamese constraints onnavigational airspace and sea lanes and poor flyingweather. Majorjoseph L. James, the HMM-165 execu-tive officer, stated that "for sixty-three days, ship andsquadron personnel, while performing their new mis-sion, encountered low ceilings, fog, and instrumentflight conditions."" The helicopters delivered suppliesand equipment to North Vietnamese engineers at var-

**A precise navigation system installed on the AMCM helirop-ters which used shore-based signal antennas. lbr political reasonsit was only used in the Haiphong channel.

***The MKI05 sled was one of the five mine-countermeasuredevices used. It was an influence minesweeping system using a floatand foils rn tow electrode trails. The other common device towedby Marines was the Magnetic Orange Pipe (MOP) using acousticand magnetic systems.



The mineclearing in North Vietnam requiredthe Ma-rines to bring together assets from outside the WesternPacific area. On the USS Inchon, MajGen Leslie B.Brown, the 1st MAW commander greets the officersand staff of HMH-463 on their arrival from Hawaii

ious inland waterway clearing sites. Flight routes intoNorth Vietnam required strict compliance to statedarrival and departure times.'5

Sweeps continued despite operational casualties,breakdowns in communications with the North Viet-namese, and other delays, until each area was readyfor a surface test run by the MSS-2, a decommissioned1ST (the former USS IVashtenaw County). When thedeactivation date of the mines was reached, flights be-came less demanding as check- or demonstration-onlysweeps were made, rather than protracted clearancesweeps. The CH-53s suspended flight operations fora time in late March and early April 1973 after twoof the helicopters crashed during towing operations.By 13 April 1973, clearing operations in the mainHaiphong shipping channel were finished.

Four days later, Vice Admiral James L. Holloway III,Seventh Fleet commander, ordered Admiral McCauleyto withdraw the task force, without notice to the NorthVietnamese, because of continued delays in the releaseof prisoners. The units of the task force made port visits

A HMH-463 Sea Stallion displayed with examples of mine-countermeasure equsfiment.The CH-53 has two electrically controlled rear-view mirrors on its nose. In the foregroundare a rattle bar and float and on the trailer at center are magnetic orange ptjies (MOPs).




The Americans meet the Communists on board the USS New Orleans in Hazhong Har-bor at the beginning of End Sweep. The leader of the North Vietnamese negotiatingteam is third from the left, Col Hoang Huu Thai. He used army rank with naval inszgnia.

Operations underway in North Vietnamese coastal waters. In this instance, a Marine CH-53is conducting a sweep flight in the Hon Gai channel. The cradle for the airborne mine-countermeasure equzvment Li attached to the lower rear of the fuselage below the ramp.


175kilometers I

Sweep Areas


Fai Tsi LongArchipela9o

Hon Me

Tonkin

Cape Ron

Cape Dao

• Hon Co

Cape Lai

End SweepOperations, 1973


Marine Corps Historical CollectionUnderway airborne minesweeping, showing the eqwpment and aircraft and the low-/eve/flight path needed to conduct operations. Repetitive sweep passes were required

On-board cameras recorded the results and locations of mine detonations. Looking fromthe rear of the helicopter an exploding mine sends a large water-spout into the air.

Marine Corps Historical Colleccion

to Hong Kong and Subic Bay and conducted neededmaiorenance and training. Marine Captain Raul A.Sifuentes, commanding AMCM Unit Delta, "cross-decked" his unit to the USS Vancouver (LPD 2) whileat Subic Bay and on 20 April 1973, HMM-165 movedfrom the Inc/son to the USS TkOoIi. Finally, inresponse to a joint American and North Vietnamesecommunique signed in Paris, Task Force 78 sailed forNorth Vietnam to resume clearing operations, whichbegan again on 18 June. It had been agreed in Paristhat sweeping would resume within five days and thatit would be completed within 35 days. On 20 June1973, after MSS-2 made four transirs of the Haiphongchannel to prove the safety of the area, AdmiralMcCauley notified the North Vietnamese that the"United States has concluded mine clearance opera-tions in the Nan Trieu [Haiphong] Main Channel."°

The clearance of Haiphong allowed the mine-sweeping units to concentrate now on the other har-bors and coastal areas. The Marines of AMCM UnitCharlie were assigned the channel to Hon Gai andAMCM Unit Delta to the Cam Pha channel. TheNorth Vietnamese continued inland sweeping usingAmerican equipment and training. By 26 June 1973,these tasks were completed and the mines had eitherbeen detonated or were inert. Operations shifted fur-ther south to the Vinh area where, on 28 June,AMCMs Charlie and Delta started to sweep and check

the seaward entrance to the Giang Song River. On 2July, AMCM Unit Delta proceeded to the Cua Sotcoastal area to check-sweep, supported by the USS Og-den (LPD 5), Impervious (MSO 779), and Moctobi(ATE 105). There, one of HMH-463's helicopters madea forced water landing. The ships recovered both thecrew and the wreckage.

Admiral McCauley declared the Vinh, Hon La, CuaSot, and Quang Hung areas clear on 4 July 1973. Ship-based HMM-165 and HMH-463 departed North Viet-nam for Subic Bay, evading Typhoon Anita enroute.Logistic support of the inland waterways operations bythe Democratic Republic of Vietnam personnel con-tinued through mid-July when End Sweep ended. Ad-miral McCauley informed the North Vietnamese theEnd Sweep forces would depart their waters on 18 July.A final U.S. and North Vietnamese disagreementprevented the sweeping of the ports of Thanh Hoa andDong Hoi, as well as several small minefields in coastalwaters.'7

Admiral McCauley shifted his flag on shore at Su-bic Bay and Task Force 78 was disestablished. Detachedon 24 July 1973, the Marines returned to Ill MAE af-ter seven demanding months with Task Force 78 thathad placed a toll on men and machines, even withthe credible maintenace effort. HMH-463 flew a to-tal of 2,147 hours, including 745 hours of the taskforce's 2,000 hours under row wIth AMCM operations,


Marine Corps Art Collection

Combat artist Maj John T Dyer; Jr., USMCR, painted a Tar/s Force Delta A-6 Intruderfrom VMA(AW9-533 in flight for combat operations from Nam P/song in 1973. Targetareas had shiftedfrom North andSouth Vietnam to Cambodia andlaos as the year began.


while HMM-165 flew 3,444 sorties, for 1,690 hours.'°In flying these hours, the squadrons of the AMCMgroup swept 27,000 miles of water.1°

Squadrons had learned new procedures in conduct-ing mine countermeasures, search and rescue, watersurvival, aircraft modifications, and evaluations. AsHMH-463's Major Van Norrwick said, they "once againproved that Marine Corps aviation can operate in anyenvironment, at any time, with skill and profession-alism'20 The Marines anticipated a return to the homestations, Hawaii for HMH-463 and Okinawa forHMM-165, to conduct needed maintenance and refit-ting not possible on ship. The continuing war inSoutheast Asia found HMM-165 retained on the TnjOo-Ii to support the 31st MAU tasked with Operation Ea-gle Pull, the evacuation of American personnel fromCambodia. As one crisis was over, another was be-ginning?'

Admiral McCauley cautioned in his after-actionreport that it "would be a mistake to attempt to de-vise general, long-standing mine warfare conclusionsfrom the specific operational and political arena inwhich End Sweep was conducted:' End Sweep was aunique solution to a unique problem and did not

present a challenge of nearly the magnitude that couldbe expected in the futute?2 General Metzger, III MAF,and General Wilson, FMFPac, realized that the Na-vy's shortage of mine-countermeasure ships andhelicopters meant that Marine Corps assets had to bediverted from an amphibious to a fleet role to per-form End Sweep, even if they did not relish it.

Task Force Delta, The Trgers DepartAs Operations Homecoming and End Sweep were

completed, some Marines were still at war. Task ForceDelta's combat sorties continued in Cambodia, justwhen ". . . it appeared that MAG-i5 would not beinvolved in combat air operations.'23 The March 1973dry season saw the Khmer Rouge flying to take PhnomPenh, and closing all major highways into the Cam-bodian capital. The situation for the lion Nol govern-ment was critical with the interdiction of the MekongRiver, the major supply artery from the sea throughSouth Vietnam. The defense of the capital and thereopening of the river required direct American airsupport to the Cambodian Army. Marine AircraftGroup (MAG) 15 continued operations in April, fly-ing missions assigned by Seventh Air Force for day-time bombing and strafing directed by airborne

Commandsupervision from Fleet Marine Force Pacific ensured that the Marines in Thailandwere not forgotten. Here LtGen Louis H. Wilson, Jr., on the nkht, arrives at Nam Phongto be met by, from the left, the Thai base commander; Ccl Nimol; BGen Robert IVTaylor; task force commander; and Cal Aubrey W Ta/bert, Jr., MAG-15 commander



Marine Corps Art Collection

MajJohn T Dyer; Jr., USMCR, recordedsome mundane tasks at the Rose Garden as wellasjlight operations. Contract Thai civilians wash down an F-4 Phantom from VMPA-ii5.

controllers. This involved the F-4s of Marine FighterAttack Squadrons (VMFA) 115 and 232, flying 12 to20 sorties a day. "Moderate to heavy" antiaircraft fireby the Communists was received from 23mm, 37mm,and SA7 weapons in positions set up along major com-munications routes. Previously, the Khmer Rouge hadused small arms and 12.7mm machine guns.24 Begin-ning 11 May 1973, Marine All Weather Attack Squa-dton (VMA[AWJ) 533 conducted strikes using itsairborne moving target indicator and ground radarbeacons to carry out armed road reconnaissance ar arate of five sorties a night. The distances flown to thetargets required inflight refueling by Marine AerialRefueler Squadron 152 Detachment Delta before andafter the target areas were hit.25 By June, the begin-ning of the annual monsoon season, the ground cri-sis had been passed with the help of MAG-15. By notauthorizing continued funding, Congress brought

an end to this support that summer. By then, Tasklbrce Delta had flown 10,215 combat sotties involvinga total of 30,998 flight hours and 24,584 tons of ord-nance. Three A-6s and two F-4s were lost in combat.26

The "on again, off again" nature of Task Fbrce Del-ta's deployment, its isolation, and the proximity ofThai civilians and available "recreational" drugs, in-creased the importance of law enforcement as the du-ration of the stay in Thailand extended beyond theceasefire. As the unifying effect of combat was re-moved, social tensions of the era manifested themselvesin unrest, drink- and drug-related incidents, and vio-lations of military law.27 A serious incident of racialunrest occurred inJuly 1973 with a series of confron-tations among black and white Marines that escalat-ed into a mess-hall riot and resultant bitterness.29 Inthe subsequent investigations and court cases, it de-veloped that the mixture of air and ground Marines


Task Force Delta command chronology

The field mess was an essential element to morale andwell-being. At Nam Thong it was the center of dailyactivity outside of a Marine's duty station or billet.

was a factor in this turmoil, compounded by the short-term rotational nature of personnel assignments.*Major John T. "Jack" Dyer, Jr., a combat artist fromHeadquarters Marine Corps, assigned to Nam Phongthat summer, recorded the scene in words and picturesin 1973:

The Rose Garden experience will soon be history,remembered most vividly by those who were thete. Withthe passage of rime the unpleasant heat, dust, mud, longhours of hard work, nightmarish combat flights, tepid show-ers when available, four-holers and Montezuma's revenge,will slowly fade from memory. Until the next time. "TheMarines don't promise you a Rose Garden, just one gooddeal after another."ao

This was the situation faced by Colonel Darrel F.Bjorklund who assumed command of MAG-15 fromColonel Talbert on 26 July 1973. Increased concernsfor internal security brought increased emphasis onSU1 defense forces, which now included a "K-9" dog

*While the leadership problems were similar in division and wing,the leadership styles used to solve them were different. Innovativeprograms weee tried by 1st MAW in,Japan: human relations instruc-tion, rounseling centers for addicts and alcoholics, a hotline tele-phone service, a "coffee house:' and cultural tentee. These programswere not in place at Nam Phong.

section, a criminal investigation detachment, customsinspectors, and a military police platoon. Their func-tions included manning roadblocks, running patrols,and maintaining a temporary detention facility. Ma-rine commanders also employed more positive solu-tions in providing adequate recreation, education, andpersonal-services support to meet the wing com-mander's goals of "racial harmony and the elimina-tion of drug/alcohol abuse!'5° Some of the moreinnovative "human relations" methods conflicted withthe more traditional ones. These were grounded inobedience to orders as opposed to sensitive treatmentof social minorities. As in other Marine Corps units,the answer to leadership problems was found in prideand purpose. Whether innovative programs or tradi-tional leadership values resolved the social issues whichparalled those in American society remains a matterof conjecture.3'

All the while, planning continued and was com-pleted to withdraw the Marines and to return NamPhong to the Thai government. Task Force Delta'sOperation Plan (OpPlan) 1-73 (Operation Sunset) wasused as the basis for the 10 August 1973 program direc-tive from the Military Assistance Command, Thailand(MACThai), that standardized the anticipated baseclosure. Brigadier General Manning T Jannell replacedGeneral Taylor as commanding general on 14 August1973. Jannell arrived from Headquarters Marine Corpsin Washington, DC., where he had been the Assis-tant Quartermaster General, The withdrawal of theMarines seemed imminent, bur no date was set. Af-ter 15 August, efforts were made to ready Task ForceDelta for departure while maintaining a high level ofoperational readiness. Marine Corps units by theirexpeditionary nature are prepared to deploy withstanding embarkation plans and special containers andpacking material for all items of equipment. Inspec-tions by the MAG-15 embarkation officer, MajorFrederick J, Schober, uncovered a major problem inthe disintegration of "embarkation boxes" from ex-posure to the elements in the tropical conditions ofthe Rose Garden.

General Jannell was directed to carry out OpPlan1-73 on 27 August 1973 when theJoint Chiefs of Staffhad directed the shut-down of Nam Phong with a tar-get date of 30 August. Task Force Delta's commandchronology recorded, "received execute order for retro-grade. Today is designated as 'R' day." After U-S.notification of the Thai and Japanese Governmentsof the move, General jannell proceeded to relocate alltactical aircraft, 45 million pounds of cargo, and 2,147



Living in the field had evolvedfrom general -p rpose tents to more permanent SoutheastAsia huts of plywood, screen, and corrugated aluminum. These are the squadron"hootches" of VMA(AU7-533, paintedAir Force blue with unit markings on the doors.

W/ben Task Force Delta withdrew from Nam Phong, supplies and equipment were pre-pared/or movement by loading prefabricated or commercial embarkation boxes. Asary component of expeditionary operations, this material had suffered from exposure.

Photo courtesy of Cdr Peter B. Mersky, USNR

248 THE WAR THAT WOULD Neff END


The IVam P/song base of Task Force Delta was nick-named the 'Rose Garden "from this recruiting posterand slogan used by Marines during the early 1970s.

men. This had to be carried out so as to ensure theleast disruption of combat readiness of the units in-volved.* The movement itself consisted of the fly-awayof tactical aircraft, air transport for people, and sealiftfor equipment. The airlift required 106 MAC C-141sand C-5s; in addition, VMGR-152 and the Pacific AirTraffic Management Agency used their C-130sthroughout the 11-day movement. At 0600, 30 Au-gust 1973, the A-6s ofVMA(AW)-533 launched downthe runway at Nam Phong for the last time. They werefollowed on the next day hy VMFA-115 and on 1 Sep-tember by VMFA-232. Because of the previous plan-fling and anticipation of the move, the finalwithdrawal ftom Thailand took on its own momen-tum. Some delay occurred to ohtain more commer-cial trucks to move the sea echelon 400 miles toSattahip. Once at the port of embarkation, the officer-in-charge of the movement unit found that expectedU.S. Navy amphibious ships were not available andthat the Military Sealift Command's 55 Green Forest

Brigadier General Victor A. Armstrong, the deputy chief of staffof FMFPac, observed that the total wear and rear on aircraft andequipment was significant, and that the "Marine Corps lived withsome of these problems for several years:' (Armstrong Comments)

and Puerto Rico would provide the lift for some sevenmillion pounds of cargo, which was mainly the vehi-cles of the task force.

Genetal Jannell completed the turnover of facili-ties and remaining equipment to a representative ofthe Thai Supreme Command. After calls on the U.S.Embassy and MACThai, General Jarinell supervisedthe final color detail at Royal Thai Air R'rce Base NamPhong at 0800, 21 September 1973, as the "Americanflag was lowered . . . signifying the departure of thefinal increment of the 2,100 U.S. Marines stationedat the facility in support of Cambodia air opera-rions1**as Present were the Thai Minister of Defenseand the Commanding General of the 1st Marine Air-craft Wing. "Approximately 50 members of the pressflew in ftom Bangkok to observe the final departure,"recalled jannell, who met them, along with MAG-15'sColonel Bjorklund. The story of the "Rose Garden"was closed with this last official act?7 By now most Ma-rine were gone; on 23 September both commericalships were on their way to Japan and on 2 November1973, the task force was dissolved.

To What End?

The Vietnam scholar, Douglas Pike, observed thatthe North Vietnamese, under Soviet tutelage and withChinese logistics support, mounted a conventionalcombined-arms invasion of South Vietnam after a de-cade of revolutionary war. Their efforts had progressedfrom dependence on manpower to a battle of tech-nology fought on sea, air, and land. fur the Com-munists this was a continuation of the process ofmilitary, political, and diplomatic efforts to achievetheir goal of domination of the Indochina region. Thisaggression was met by the South Viernamese withAmerican support, primarily logistics and firepower.°

The Marines who came to symbolize the Marinecommitment to Vietnam during the 1972 SpringOffensive were the advisors, the Covans, who with theMarines and sailors of ANGLICO's Sub Unit One,served with the Viernamese through the initial defeatand subsequent victories. Coming from diverse back-grounds and experience, their common characteristicwas earlier successful combat tours. According to par-ticipant Lieutenant Colonel Andrew D. DeBona, they"were well trained and wanted to be there."39

The 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, Marine Air-

**On 24 September 1973, the Marine Corps Historical Divisionnoted that "we should accept this time and date as heing the offi-cial end of the U.S. Marine Corps participation in the SoutheastAsian War?' (Director of Marine Corns History memo drd 245ept73)


craft Group 12, and Marine Aircraft Group 15 weredestined to serve in anonymity, rheir efforts nor con-sidered newsworthy ar rhe time.° As a matrer for rhehistorical record, when the Vietnamese Marine Divi-sion moved from Saigon to defend Hue in April 1972,aggressive support by III MAP forces contributed tothe success in defeating Communists there and atQuang Tn City. The contributions made by MarineAircraft Group 12 to the defense of An Loc in Mili-tary Region 3 were also noteworthy.'

The Marine Corps response reflected the changingsecurity requirements of the decade, as much as it didthe continuation of the previous era of fighting inVietnam. When considered in the context of maritimestrategy, the variety of demands placed upon III MAPMarines in 1972 and 1973 can be viewed as post-wardeployments that set a pattern for the next decade ofcontingencies in the Far East and elsewhere. These un-derscored the need for flexibility, versatility, andpresence. As each crisis occurred, the first United Statestactical units to respond were the forces deployedafloat, specifically the amphibious ready groups withembarked Marines. The other major employment,the independent and expeditionary operation of Ma-rine air forces, was demonstrated by MAG-12 andMAG-15 as landwatd extensions of naval aviation.

Previous contingency operations in Lebanon, theDominican Republic, and by the Special Landing lbrcein Vietnam had shown the way. But, in 1972, therewas no doctrine for the conduct of a "noncombatantevacuation" other than the "seiae, occupy, defend, andwithdraw" missions enunciated in FMFM 8-1, SpecialOpera:ions.* What emerged from the 9th MAB ex-

*The edition of 13 May 1968 was then current. This was the refer-ence used to prepare operations orders and plans for raids, demon-strations, and withdrawals. Concepts for evacuations have beenpublished since, as noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO).

perience was a mote refined concept of the noncom-batant evacuation and the use of "seabasing," ratherthan costly deployment ashore. Continued revisionstook place in the Mediterranean contingencies of 1973,and were put to the test during the final evacuationsof Phnom Phenh and Saigon in 1975.

The Marine Corps response to the North Viet-namese invasion brought together a number of diverseefforts and enterprises. Thr III MAF, the story of thisperiod was of a campaign that saw the assembly andemployment of amphibious and air forces to achievepolitical goals. General Metzget, the Marine com-mander who carried out this response, stated that

we were ready. We met every challenge:'challenges that saw operations ranging in scope fromcombat to contingency over a vast geographic area.43At what cost were the U.S. Marine Corps' efforts tobe measured for this period? From mid-1971 until 29

January 1973, 21 Marines were killed, 82 wounded,20 reported missing, and 4 captured. Twenty-four Ma-rine aircraft were lost in combat during this same in-terval. These casualties are added to the total of13,005 Marines killed and 88,635 wounded over thecourse of the war from 1961 through 1973.** Thisfighting had the smallest Marine casualty rate of thewar and in these limited terms "Vietnamization" wassuccessful. But while the Marines endured, the Com-munists persisted. U.S. Army Colonel Harry G. Sum-mers, Jr., commented to an NYA colonel in Hanoi inApril 1975 that "you never defeated us on the bat-tlefield:' After a moment the North Vietnamesecolonel replied, "That may be so, but it is also irrele-vant." The record of this period then, must reflectboth direct and indirect costs to the Corps of the warthat would not end.

**The Vietnam Memorial liars 14,809 total dead, including thosemissing and presumed dead.

Notes

PART IVietnamization

CHAPTER 1FROM THE DELTA TO THE DMZ

Unless otherwise noted, all unpublished Marine Corps documentsconsulted in preparation of this study are in the custody of the Ar-chives Section, Marine Corps Historical Centre (MCHC), Washing-ton, D.C. Unless otherwise noted, the narrarive is derived fromCinCPac, Command History 1971 rhrough 1973, hereafter CioC-Pac ComdHist [year]; USMACV, Command History 1971 through1973, hereafter MACV ComdHisr [year]; ComNavlbrV, CommandHistory 1971 through 1972, hereafter NavlbrV ComdHist [year];ComSevenrhFlr, Command History 1971 through 1973, hereafterSeventhFlt ComdHist Iyear]; HQFMFPac, Operations of U.S. Ma-rine Forcea Southeast Asia, July 1971-March 1973, hereafter FMFParMarOpsSEA; and respective Marine Corps unit command chronol-ogies and after-action reports.

Nixon's Doctrine

1. CMC Reference Notebooks 1973, Tab 1-F-I, "U.S. Objectives/Mili-tary Objectives in SEAsia; The President's Report to Congress onForeign Policy:' 9Feb72. Also, Marshall Green, "The Nixon Doc-trine: A Progress Report:' Department of State Bulletin, 8Feb71.2. Gen Robert B. Cushman, Jr., "To the Limit of Our Vision aridBack," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, May74, p. 121.3. HQMC(C/S), "Major Accomplishments, 1972-19732 Tab A, Plansand Operations, memo 24Jan74.

Contingency Forces

4. FMFPac MarOpsSEA, pp. 1-1 to 1-6.5. Marine Corps Command Center, Landing Forces Seventh Fleet.Lbs 43-I tu 43-3, 18Nov70.6. Marine Corps Museum script, "Time Tunnel" Case 19 (MCHC,Washington, D.C.).7. Seventhflc ComdHist72, passim. For the period covered this in-cluded Amphibious Squadrons 3, 5, and 7.8. Col Raymond M. Kostesky, Comments on draft ms, 22Jan90 (Viet-nam Comment File).9. FMFPar MarOpsSEA, pp. 1-7 to 1-9.

Flexibility and Response

10. FMFPac, "Operations of U.S. Marine Forces in Vietnam," May-June 1971, p. 19.

Command Retations

11. VAdm Stansfield Turner, "Missions of the U.S. Navy:' Naval War

College Review, Mar-Apr74, pp. 2-17; BGen Edwin H. Simmons,"The Marines: Now and in the Future:' Naval Review 1975, May75,pp. 102417; "Marine Cops Operations in Vietnam, 1969.1972:'NavalReview 1973, May73, pp. 196-223; arid Cdrkobert C, Schread-Icy, "The Naval War in Vietnam, 1950-1970:' Naval Review 1971,May71, pp. 180-209.12. LcGrn l.ouis Metzger, Comments on draft ms, 8Dec89 (Viet-nam Comment File).

Residual Forces

13. MACV ComdHisr7l, Vol. II, p. F-9. Also, Bob Heim, "Tell ThemWe're Here:' Leatherneck, Aug72, pp. 24-29.

Marine Security Guard, Saigon

i4. MSGBn ComdC 1971, passim. Also, SSgt M. M. Patterson,"Leathecnecks With a Special Mission:' The Observer [MACV],15Dec72.15. MGySgt Harry G. Lock, Comments on draft ms, 3Jul90 (Viet-nam Comment File).i6. Ibid.

The Marine Air Control Squadron Detachment

17. FMFPac MarOpsSEA, p. 21.

Sub Unit One, Iss Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company

18. LrGen D'Wayne Gray, Comments on draft ms, 9Nov89 (Viet-nam Comment File).19. Col D'Wayoe Gray incvw, 18Mar75, Tape 6021 (Oral HistColl,MCHC), hereafter Gray inrvw. Also, MajGen D'Wayne Gray histo BGen Edwin H. Simmons, 25Aug71, 14Sept71, 3Nov71, 13Feb72,24May72, and 28Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File).20. Gray comments.21. Sub Unit One ComdC, Aug71.22. Sub Unit One msg to CMC, 30Aug71 (Vietnam Comment File).23. Sub Unit One ComdC, Sep71.24. Sub Unit One ComdC, Oct71. Nov71.25. Ibid.26. MarAdvU File, MarAdvU Turnover folder, SMA hr to CGFRAC,7Sept72; SMA memo, 9Oct72; and SMA memo, 26Dec72.27. MACV ComdHist7l, p. V-42.28. Gray incvsv.

CHAPTER 2THE ADVISORS

Unless otherwise noted, material in Chapters 2 through 9 is der-ived from: Vietnamese Marine Corps/Marine Advisory Unit Histor-ical Summary 1954-1973, hereafter VNMC HisrSum; Marine

251


Advisory Unit Historical Summary, 1972, hereafter MarAdvUHistSum72; Marine Advisory Unit Monthly Historical Summary,hereafter MarAdvU ComdC [dare]; The Conan newsletter, hereafterConan [datej; and Marine Advisory Unit files rereived ftom theVNMC Ingiseirs Branch, Navy Division, U.S. Defense Attache Office,

hereafter MarAdvU File; Operations Evaluation Group, "Defenseof Hue and Quang Tn City?' ONR report CNS 1035 drd May 72(CNA, Washington, D.C.), hereafter CNA Hue&Quang 'lii.) Also,"Standing Operating Procedures for Marine Advisory Unit:' MAUOP5000.1A. nd.; Maxine Advisory Unit, NAG, 'The Role of the Ad-visor:' ma, n.d.; and Ma) Nguyen Thanh Tn, "Vietnamese Advi-sor:' Marine Corps Gazette, Dec68, pp. 29-32 (MarAdvU File).

Naval Advisory Group, Naval Advisory Units

1. Capt Robert H. Whitlow, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1954-2964:The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era (Washington, D.C.:Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1977), p. 142, hereafter Whitlow, Marinesin Vietnam 2954-1964.

The Rung Sat Special Zone

2. Ma) Ronald S. Neubauer intvw, 26jun75, Tape 6025 (Oral Hist-CoIl, MCHC).3. JOI Bob Williams, "Rung Sat? Leatherneck, Oct71, pp. 83-84.

The Mekong Delta Tactical Zone

4. MACV, ComdHisr 1971, Vol. II, p. p-E-12; CincPac ComdHisr7l,vol. 1, p. 313.5. Ma) Donald R. Gardner ler to LrCol Arnold, 30Oct75; MajGenDonald R. Gardner, Comments on draft ms, 23jan90 (VietnamComment File).

Naval Advisory Group, Marine Advisory Unit

6. Col VittorJ. Croizar, Comments to Maj Melson, 28Sep87; Whir-low, Marines in Vietnam 1954-1964, p. 16; Command Histories andHistorical Sketches of RVNAF Divisions, 6Feb73.7. Coljoshua W. Doesey Ill inrvw, 21May75, Tape 6023 (Oral Hist-CoIl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.); Senior Marine Advisor, SeniorOfficer Debriefing Report, 23Jan73, hereafter SMA debrief; andAward Recommendation, Joshua Worthiogton Dorsey Ill, 26Feb73(MarAdvU File).

'Trussed Friends'

8, Capt Ray L. Smith intvw, 9Mar75, Tape 6020 (Oral HistColl,MCHC, Washington, D.C.); Ma) Theodore L. Gaechel and MajDonald L. Price, Advisor Presentation to the Company of MilitaryHistorians, 4May74, hereafter CMH Presentation (Vietnam Com-ment File).

Winding Down

9. MarAdvU CnmdC, Jul71, Aug71.10. SMA Briefing Folder, Tab 1, Marine Base Concept, 11Dec71; En-gineer Advisor Folder, Tab C, Base Camp Brief (MarAdvU File).II. Training Advisor RaIder, Tab V, Turnover, 15Nov71 (MarAdvUFile).

12. ihining Folder, Tab 7, p. 1, MRC62/MRC63 Radio Relay Equip-ment (MarAdvU File); MarAdvU ComdC, Sep71.

13. Dorsey intvw; SMA Briefing Folder, Senior Marine Advisor Goals,p. 4, MAU Goals and Objectives FY72, 4Oct71 (MarAdvU File).

Along the DMZ

i4. MACV Advisory Team 155 records (Boxes 111 to 114, AccNo.334-74-146, Washington National Records Center); Col DonaldJ.Metcalf, USA, intvw by MACV, 15Sep72; Team 155 AAR,3OMar-lMay72; and "Why the Defense of Quang 'Fri Province, SVN,Collapsed?' AWC study, 23Oct72 (Vietnam Comment File). Also,Howard C. W. Feng, "The Road to the 'Ben Hai' Division: An Anal-ysis of the Events Leading to the Formation of the 3d ARVN Infan-try Division in October 197U' MA thesis (University of Hawaii),Aug87.15. Maj Walter B. Boomer iotvw, 9Mar75, Tape 6020 (Oral Hist-CoIl, MCHC).i6. MarAdvU ComdC, Nov71.17. Dorsey iotvw.18. MarAdvU ComdC, Dec71.19. Col Donald L. Price, Comments on draft ms, 7Feb90 (VietnamComment File).20. LeCol Robert I-I. Sheridan intvw, 21Mar75, Tape 6022 (Oral Hisc-CoIl, MCHC); LtCol Robert H. Sheridan, Comments on draft ms,20Mar90 (Vietnam Comment File).21. LtCol William C. Camper, USA, Comments on draft ma, 19Jan90(Vietnam Comment File).22. Gen Westmoreland msg rojCS, 1Feb72 (Vietnam CommentFile).

23. ComUSMACV msg to 7AF. USArV, NavForV, XXIVCorps,SRAC, TRAC, DRAC, 1Feb72 (Vietnam Comment File).24. MarAdvU ComdC, jan72.25. Sheridan inrvw; MarAdvU ComdC, Feb72.26. CNA Hue&QuangTri, p. A-7.27. XXIV Corps, Periodic Intelligence Report 5-72, 5Mar72, pp.11-13; LtGrn Welborn G. Dolvin, USA, Srnior Officer DebriefingReport, 20Mar72, p. 3; MajGen FrederickJ. Kroesen, USA, "Quanglii?' MHRC, Carlisle Barracks, 1974, pp. 3-4, hereafter Kroesen ms;MACV. "The Nguyen Hue Offensive?' study, Jan73, hereafter MACVNguyen Hue study; Capt Edwin W. Besch, Comments on draftms,13Mar90; Col Peter F C. Armstrong, "Capabilities and Intentions?'Marine Corps Gazette, Sep86, pp. 38-47 (Vietnam Comment File).28. MajGen Walter F. Boomer, Comments nn draft ms, 28Dec89(Vietnam Comment File).29. Manh Nhieu, "With a Shock Unit?' Vietnam No. 168, 1972,pp. 1446.

PART IIThe Spring Offensive

CHAPTER 3THE RING OF STEEL

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from:MarAdvU ComdC, Mar72, Apr72; LtGen Ngo Quang Truong, TheEaster Invasion (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of MilitaryHistory, 1979), hereafter Tkuong, fns'asion; LtGen Le Nguyen Kanginrvw, 30Sep75; HqPacAF, "The 1972 Invasion of Military Region1: Fall of Quang 'Fri and Defense of Hue," Project CHECO report,15Mar73, hereafter CHECO Invasion72. Also, LrCol Gerald H. Turley

NOTES 253

& Capt Marshall R. Wells, 'Easter lnvasion.1972' Marine CorpsGazette, Mar73, pp. 18-29; andJeffreyJ. Clarke, Advice and Sup-port: The Final Year(Washington. D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Mili-tary History, 1988).

Turley with Team 155

I. MajJim R. Joy, memo, 10Apr72 (MarAdvU File); LrCol GeraldH. Turley intvw, 17Jan74, Tape 6029; intvw 31Jul75, Tape 6027 (OralHistColl, MCHC).2. Camper comments.3. Gen Frederick). Krocsen, USA, Comments on draft ma, 3Jan90(Vietnam Comment File).4. MarAdvU ComdC, Mar72; Kroesen ms, p. 7.

5. Smith intvw.

The Opening Round

Team 155 Under Fire

19. Sub Unit One ComdC, Apr72, p. 6; HQMC Report of CasualtyNo. 364-72 and No. 364A-72.20. FRAC/VNMCOpos, App B, Brig 258, pp. t-2; Easley, USNApresentarion; Capt William D. Wisrhmeyer inrvw, 16Apr72, Tape5094 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); Maj William R. Warren intvw,16Apr72, Tape 5095 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

The Collapse of the Ring of Steel

21, CNA Hue&Quang Tn, p. 118.22. Metcalf intvw, p. 2.

23. Order of battle worksheets (Besrh comments).24. Col Raymond R. Battreall, USA, intvw by MACV. 14Jan73,p. 12 (Vietnam Comment File).25. Turley incvw; Metcalf inrvw; Battreall intvw,26. Kroesen comments,27. Col Gerald H. Turley, Comments on draft ma, 15Dec89; MajDavid A. Beookbank, USAF, Special Report Air Liaison Officer,31Jul72, hereafter Brookbank report (Vietnam Comment File).

6. Maj James 6. Smock, USA, "Organization and Training of theARVN 20th Tank Squadron," ma, 1976 (Viernam Comment File).7. MACV. FerlntRep, May72: MACV Nguyen Hue study; and XXIVCorps, PerintRep 5-72, 5Mar72.8. Kroesen ms, p. 4.9, FRAC, "Narrative Description of Vietnamese Marine DivisionOperarions' hereafter FRAC/VNMCOpns, 1Oct72, App A, Brig147, 1-12, (MarAdvU File).

10. Boomer Comments.

The Outposts Fall

CHAPTER 4THE BRIDGE AT DONG HA

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from:SMA ComdC, Mar72, Apr72; Brig 258 Tab, SMA Evaluation; CaptJohn W. Ripley memo to SMA dtd 14Jan73 (MarAdvU File). Also,Gerald H. Tudey. The Easter Offensive (Novaco, Calif.: Presidio Press,1985); John G. Miller, The Bridge At Dong Ha (Annapolis: NavalInstitute Press, 1989): and Vicki Vanden Bout, "Ripley at the Bridge:'Leatherneck, Feblló, pp. 16-19.

At the Combat Base as Ai Tu

Ii. CaptJohn D. Murray, et al., USNA Advisor Preseotion, 28Feb73,Tape 3060 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter USNA presentation:SMA, Advisor's Personal Evaluation of the NVA Easter 72 Offen-sive Thlder, hereafter SMA Evaluation; Intel/Recon Advisor Recom-mendations, 25Apr72, p. 2 (MarAdvU File).

VNMC Brigade 258 Reinforces

12. Maj Jon T Easle> cc al,, USNA presentation; Maj Regan R.Wright inrvw, 23Apr72, Tape 5089 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); SMAEvaluation, Intelligence Tab, p. 2, (MarAdvU File).

Enemy in the Wire, 31 Match 1972

13. Smith inrvw.14. Capt Ray L. Smith, er al., USNA presentation.

Fire Support Base Sarge Holds On

15. Maoh Nhieu, "With a Shock Unir' Vietnam No. i68, 1972,pp. 14-16.16. Kroesen ms, p. 7.

17. Gray comments.18. tscLr)oel B. Eisenstein inrvw by LeCol Gerald H. Turley; SubUnit One, OIC Naval Gunfire Liaison Spot Team 1-2 AAR, 30Apr72(Vietnam Comment File).

The Easter Sunday Crisis

1. Capt David S. Randall.Jr., inrvw, Mar72, Tape 5093 (Oral Hisr-CoIl, MCHC); Randall, ec ai., USNA presentation.2. Turley inrvw.

The Dong Ha Bridge

3. FRAC/VNMCOps App B, Brig 258, pp. 1-3; Easley, et al., USNApresentation.4. Maj John W. Ripley inevw, 23Apr72, Tape 5089 and 21Aug75,Tape 6032 (Oral l-lisrColl, MCHC).5. Col John W. Ripley, Comments on draft ms, 29May90 (VietnamComment File); Ripley intvw.6. Maj James E. Smock, USA, ltrs to LtCol Arnold, 19Mar76 and23Mar76, hereafter Smock lrrs (Vietnam Comment File).7. Ripley comments.8. Ripley comments and intvw.9. LtCol Gerald H. Tueley liz to ComNavForV, 6Apr72, SMA Evalu-ation (MarAdvU File); Gray comments.

Action at the Bridge

10. Ripley commeots and iotvw.11. Ripley comments.

12. Gray comments.

Reaction at Saigon


Camp Carroll Surrenders

13. Camper comments.i4. LtCol William C. Camper, liSA, intvw by Col Gerald H. Turley,18Jun83; LrCol George Philip Ill, Comments on draft ms, 21Dec89

(Vietnam Comment File); Randall incsrw; Kroeaen ms, p. 8; LtColPham Van Dinh, ARVN, broadrasr transcript, 3Apr72; "Contactswith Saigon Mutineer Officer," Vietnam No. 169, 1972, pp. 6-7.

15. Boomer inrvw.ui Boomer incvw.

17. Boomer comments.

Mai Loc Exposed

The Doug Ha Bridge Destroyed

18. Ripley comments; Tucley intvw; MACV Team 155 AAR, AnnexF, Execution; LtCol Louis C. Wagner, Jr., USA, Senior Advisor Af-ccc Action Report, 1st Armor Brigade, lApr-2May72, p. 5, here-after Wagner report (Vietnam Comment File).

Cailsign BAT-2l

19. Ripley comments; CaptJohn W. Ripley Navy Cross award cita-tion (RefSec, MCHC, Washington, D.C.). Also, Peter Braestrup,"Destruction of Bridge Halted Communist Push at Dong Ha," TheWashington Post, 26Apr72, p. 19 (Vietnam Comment File).20. LtCol Andrew E. Andersen,Jr., Comments on draft ms, 1Dec89(Vietnam Comment File); LrCol Andrew F. Andersen,Jr. intvw byFMFPac, 4May72, Tape 5040 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).21. Gray comments.22. Tucle The Easter Offensive, p. 201.23. Kroesen comments.24. Tucley inrvw; Brookbank report. See also William R. Ander-son, Bat-2J (Englewoocl Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980).

Mai be Evacuated

25. Truong, Invasion, p. 30.26. FRAC/VNMCOps App B, Brig 258, pp. 9-11; Capt David S.Randall, Jr., memo, 18Apr72; SMA Evaluation, Brig 258 Tab(MarAdvli File),27. LcCol Andrew D. DeBona, Comments on draft ma, 12Dec89;Maj Andrew D. DeBona intvw by Col Gerald H. Turley, pp. 8-14(Vietnam Comment File).

CHAPTER 5BATFERED QUANG- TRI HOLDS

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived fcomMarAdvU ComdC, Apr72, May72; and FRAC/VNMCOps App A,Brig 147 and B, Brig 258 (MarAdvli File).

The Fighting Continues

1. MACV Nguyen Hue study, p. 6.2. CGFRAC msg to ComUSMACV, 8Apr72 (Vietnam CommentFile).

4. Turley intvw.5. K.roesen ms, p. 12.6. Col Dnnald L. Price, Comments on draft ms 10Oct90 (VietnamComment File).

Ar Doug Ha

7. R\TN Ministry of Land Development and Hamlet Building, Emer-gency Reconstruction, Wftr Victim Resettlement and Rehabilitation(Saigon, 1973), pp. 82-86.8. MarAdvli Turnover Iblder, LtCol Gerald H. Turley memo to Com-NavForV, 6Apr72 (MarAdvli Filr).9. CGFRAC msg to ComUSMACV, 8Apr72 (Vietnam CommentFile).

10. Ripley intvw; Maj Jim R. Joy memo to SMA. 3May72 (MarAdvUFile).

Developments in the West

11. Maj Robert C. Cockell intvw, Apr72, Tape 5092; Capt LawrenceH. Livingston, er al., USNA presentation; Capt Allen D. Nettle-ingham intvw, Tape 5085 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).12. Price comments.13. Smock lrrs; Ripley intvw; HolgerJensrn, Associated Press, Ittto BGen Thomas W. Bowen, USA, 19Apr72 (Vietnam CommentFile).

14. Ripley inrvw.

The Fight for Pedro

15. Price comments.16. Maj William R. Warren intvw, 11Apr72, Tape 5095; Warren,et al., USNA presentation; and Capt William D. Wischmeyer incvw,11Apr72, Tape 5094 (Oral HistColl, MCI-IC).17. Maj Lawrence H. Livingston Silver Star award citation (RefSec,MCHC, Washington, D.C.).18. CGFRAC msg to ComUSMACV, 13Apr72 (Vietnam CommentFile).

Bright Lights

19. Andersen comments; CHECO 72, Invasion, p. 22.20. Andersen comments.21. Maj Glen Golden intvw, 3Jul75, Tape 6026 (Oral HistColl,MCHC); Sub Unit One mrmo to CMC, 12Nov72; LrCol GeorgeE. Jones, Comments on draft ma, 10Jan90 (Vietnam Comment File).22. MarAdvli ComdC, May72.23. Kroesen ms p. 10; Kroesen comments.

The NVA Mount a Third Attack in MR 1

24. Kroesen ms, p. 14.

25. MarAdvU ComdC, May72.

CHAPTER 6EXODUS FROM QUANG- TM

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from:MarAdvU ComdC, May72, and MarAdvU HistSum72.

Drive from the West3. MarAdvli Turnover Folder; Col Dorsey memo to BGen Lanagan,12Apr72 (MarAdvU File). 1. SMA Evaluation, Brig 147 Tab, p. i6, Maj Jim R. Joy memo,

NOTES 255

3May72 (MarAdvU File); Col Charles]. Goode and LtCol MarshallR. Wells intvw, 19Jan84 (Vietnam Comment File).2. MarAdvU HistSum, May72.3. Ma) Thomas E. Gnibus inrvw, Jul72, Tape 5087 (Oral HistColl,MCHC).4. Wagner report (Vietnam Comment File).5. Ma) Michael J. Hatcher, USA, Comments of Advisor,8Apr-2May72 (Vietnam Comment File).6. Ibid.7. ICdr Francis C. Brown, USN, Comments on draft ms, 24May90;"Vietnam Heroism Earns Corpsman a Silver Star' Hawaii Marine,23Mar73, p. 1.

8. Wagner report, pp. 12-14; Truong, Invassbn, pp. 41-44; Kroesenms, pp. is•i6; and Metcalf intvw, pp. 21-23.9. Turley incvw.10. Price comments.

Confusion at Quang Tn

11. Metcalf inrvw, p. 8.12. Kroesen comments; Kroesen ms, p. 17; Metcalf incvw; Brook-bank report, p. 20.13. MarAdvTi ComdC, May72.14. Gray comments.15. Turley inrvw.16. SMA Evaluation, Brig 147 Tab, p. 14.

Team 155 and General Giai Depart

17. Maj Glen Golden intvw, 3Jul75, Tape 6026 (Oral HisrColl,MCHC); LrCol Glen Golden, Comments on draft ms, 12Dec89(Vietnam Comment File).18. CG3dA.RVNDiv msg to 3d ARVN Div. 30May72 (Wagnerreport).19. Kroesen comments.20. MajGen Kroesen msg to Gen Abrams, 2May72 (Vietnam Corn-menr File).21.

22.

23.24.

File).

25. Brookbank report, pp. 20-21.26. Metcalf inrvw, p. i4; Goldern comments.

VNMC Brigade 147 on its Own

27. RVN Ministry of Foreign Af&irs, The Communist Policy of Terror(Saigon, 1972), pp. 41-42; See also RVN Ministry of Information,La Route De L'Horrear (Saigon, 1972).28. Maj Anthony P. Shepard, Comments on drafrms, 11Jan90 (Viet-nam Comment File).29. Philip romments.30. DeBona comments.31. SMA Evaluation, Brig 369 Tab, Ma) William T Sweeney memo,8May72 (MacAdvU File).32. Sheridan comments.33. Sheridan comments; Prire comments.34. Joy, op. cit.. pp 19-23; SMA Evaluation, Brig 147 Tab,pp. 20-21.35. Maj Robert F. Sheridan, et al., USNA presentation;\TNMC/FRACOpns, App C, Brig 369, p. 1.

36. Price comments; Sheridan comments.37. Sheridan comments.

PART HIThe Ceasefire Campaign

CHAPTER 7THE DEFENSE OF HUE CITY

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from:MarAdvU 1-listSum72; MarAdvU ComdC, May72, Jun72; MarAdvUG3 IOC Duty Log, lMay72-2OJun7l (MarAdvU File); 'fruong, In-ssasion; and FMFPac MarOpsSEA.

Holding the My Chanh Line

1. LtCol Gray memo to BGcn Lanagan, 4May72 (Vietnam Com-ment File).2. SMA Evaluation, Logistics Tab, SMA Itt to FRAC, 8May72,"VNMC Confirmed Losses, 3May72" (MarAdvU File); MajGenKroesen msg to Gen Abrams dtd 2May72 (Vietnam Comment File).

Fleet Marine Force Support

3. BGen William I-I. Lanagan, Jr., inrvw, 1May72, Tape 5036 (Oral-HistColl, MCHC).4. Sub Unit One 1stANGLICO ComdC, May72; Sub Unit Onememo, 26]ul72 (Vietnam Comment File).5. BGen Lanagan memo to MACV C/S, 5May72 (Vietnam Com-ment File).

Truong Takes Charge

6. Truong, Invaszisn, p. 48; Kroeseo comments.7. Truong, Invasion, pp. 48-57; LtGen I.e Nguyen Khang inrvw,30Sept75 (Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.);FRAC/VNMCOps, App C, VNMC Div, pp. 1-2.

The Vietnamese Marine Division

8. MarAdvU ComdC, May72, FocI 12.9. SMA debrief, pp. 16-17; Operational Communications Folder,Tab 2, Capt Thomas Zalewski memo, 8Jan73 (MarAdvU File);MarAdvU Turnover Folder, Status of Amphibious Support Battal-ion During Current Operations, 22Oct72 (MarAdvU File).10. FRAC lntSum 125-72, 3May72 (Vietnam Comment File).11. Capt Allen D. Nertleingham intvw, 11Jun72. Tape 5085 (OralHistColl, MCHC).12. MarAdvU Turnover Folder, Col]oshua W. Dorsey III Summaryof Action, 26Feb73 (MarAdvU File).13. MarAdvU ComdC, May72; Philip comments.

The Marines Attack

i4. MajGen Howard H. Cooksey. USA, Senior Officer DebriefingReport. 25Jan73, p. 5, hereafter Cooksey debrief (Vietnam Com-ment File); Truong, Invasion, pp. 56-60.15. Dorsey, op. cit.16. Ma) Donald C. Bnodie, Comments on draft ma, 5Feb90 (Viet-nam Comment File).

Ibid.Metcalf intvw, p. 9; Kroesen ms, p.19; Joy, op. cit., p. 17.Joy, op. tit., pp. 11-12.Ltr to ColJamea T. Breckinridge, 26May72 (Vietnam Comment


17. Btodie comments.18. LtCol DavidJ. Moore, Comments on draft ma, 12Dec89 (Viet-nam Commeot File).19. Col Sumner A. Vale, Comments on draft ms, 11Jan90 (Viet-nam Comment File).20. FMFPat MatOpsSEA, pp. 2-14 to 2-16; CNA MarActySEA, pp.5 2-56.

21. Capt Richard W. Hodory Bronze Star award citation (RefSec,MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

The North Vietnamese React

22. Maj Emmett S. Huff memo to SMA, 17May72 (MarAdvU File).23. LrCol Robert D. Shoptaw, Comments on draft ms, 27Dec90(Vietnam Comment File).24. Tutley intvw; Ordnance/Maintenance Turnover Folder, CWOJames 8. Hill lrr to USAIC, Fort Benning, Georgia, 23Aug72(MarAdvU File).

Operation Song Than 6-72

25. Boomer comments.26. SgtMaj Robert S. Ynatay, Comments on dtaft ma, 20Dec89 (Viet-oam Comment File).27. lstLt Robert L. Williams intvw, llspe 5076; lstLtjohn T. Papa-rone intvw, Tape 5077 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).28. Golden intvw.29. LtCol William R. Von Ha.rten, Comments on draft ma, 11Jan90(Vietnam Comment File).30. CG9thMAB debrief to CMC, 15Feb73, Thpe 5035 (Oral Hist-Coil, MCHC. Washington, D.C.); 9thMAB PAO news release,24May72 (Vietnam Comment File).31. SMA Evaluation, Brig 147 Tab; FMFPar MarOpsSEA, pp. 2-16to 247; CNA MarActySEA, pp. 53-54.32. Sheridan comment; Philip tomment.33. Nectleingham intvw.34. FRAC lntSum 152-72, 30May72 (Vietnam Comment File).

In the Balance

35. LtCol Duncan H. Jones intvw by LtCol Arnold, 21Aug75 (Viet-nam Comment File).36. Song Than 8-72 Folder; FRAC/VNMCOpns, App D, VNMCDiv, pp. 1-2 (MarAdvU File).37. LrCol Peter S. Morosoff, 'Coordinating Defensive Fire Support'Marine Corps Gazette, Jun87, pp. 19-20.38. Sub Unit One memo, 'Augmentation Personnel:' 26Jul72; Gold-en inrvw (Vietnam Comment File).39. Song Than 8A-72 Ibldet; FRAC/VNMCOpns, App D, Brig 147,pp. 3-5 (MarAdvU File).40. Covan. Jul72 (MarAdvU Files).

CHAPTER 8QUANG Till CITY REGAINED

Unless otherwise noted, material in this thapter is derived from:MarAdvU HistSum72; MarAdvU CnmdC, Jul72, Aug72; MacAd-vU Daily OpSum Folder, Jul. Aug- Sep72; PMFPac MarOpsSEA;and LrCol Gerald H. Turley and Capt Marshall R. Wells, "EasterInvasion, 1972:' Marine Corps Gazette, Mar73, pp. 18-29, hereafterTurley & Wells.

Truong's Counteroffensive

1. Truong, Invasion, p. 64,2. Truong, Invasion, pp. 64-66; Cooksey debrief, pp. 5-6.3. Sub Unit One memo to CMC, 12Nov72 (Vietnam Comment File).4. Vale eommtnts; FMFPac MarOpsSEA, pp. 3-1 to 3-3; CNAMarAttySEA. pp. 51-52.5. Capt Stephen C. Fogltman intvw, 9Mar87 (Vietnam CommentFile).

6. laurence W. Ruth, Nick/es, Dimes, Rubberbands and Glue (NewYork: Carlton Press, 1979), p. 82.7. Maj Stephen G. Biddulph, Comments on draft ma, 2Nov89 (Viet-nam Comment File).8. FRAC/VNMCOpns, App D, VNMC Div, pp. 1-2 (MarAdvU File).9. Shepard comments.

The Battle for Quang Tn City

10. FRACIVNMCOpns, App E, VNMC Div, pp. 1-2; Tueley & Wells,

p. 28.11. Tutiey intvw; 9thMAB debrief.12. Cpl Steven C. Lively debrief, Kue Army Hospital, OkinawaJul72;LtCol Mithael L. Powell, Comments on draft ma, 14Jun90 (Viet-nam Comment File).13. Turley intvw.14. FMFPar MarOpsSEA, pp. 3-1 to 3-6; Song Than 9-72 RaIder,G-3 memo, 12Jul72 (MarAdvU File).15. Biddulph comments.16. 9thMAB debrief.17. Song Than 9-72 RaIder (MarAdvU Filt).18. Biddulph comments.19. "Quang Tn: An Immortal Epic:' Vietnam, No. 172, 1972, pp.2-4.

20. Truong, Invasion, p. 67.21. LrGen Howard H. Cnoksey, Cornrnenr.s on draft ma, 9Jan90 (Viet-nam Comment File).22. Song Than 9-72 Folder, G-3 Advisor's Planning Guidance inPreparation for the Recapture of Quang Tn City, SVN, 2 5Jul72;FRACIVNMCOpns, App E, VNMC Div, Brig 147 Tab, p. 4

(MarAdvU File).23. FRACIVNMCOpns, App E, YNMC Div, Brig 258 Tab, p. 4(MarAdvU File).24. MACV Nguyen Hue study, pp. 15-16.25. FRAC IntSum 228-72, 14Aug72 (Vietnam Comment File).26. LtCol Rirhard B. Rothwell, "Leadership and Tattical Reflcttionaon the Battle for Quang TrL" Marine Corps Gazette, Sept79, p. 39.27. LtCol George E. Jones, Comments on draft ma, 4Jan90 (Viet-nam Comment File),28. FRAC/VNMCOpns, App F, VNMC Div, Brig 258 Tab, pp. 1-2(MarAdvU File).29. FRACIVNMCOpns, App F, VNMC Div, Brig 258 Tab, p. 2(MarAdvU File).

Taking the Citadel

30. FRAC/VNMCOps, App F, VNMC Div. Charts A and B; alsoMarAdvU HistSum72, App B, C, D.31. Turley & Wells, p. 28.

32. 9thMAB debeieL

The Final Assault

NOTES 257

33. Col Robert W. Kirby, Comments on draft ma, 20Dec89 (Viet-nam Comment File).34. Col Charles T Williamson, Comments on draft ms, 13Mar90;FMFPac MarOpsSEA, pp. 4-4 to 4-9; CNA MarAcrySEA, pp. :11-52.35. "Quang Tn; An Immortal Epic: Vietnam, No. 172, 1972, pp.2-4.36. CGFRAC Itt to ComUSMACV dtd 1Oct72 (MarAcivU File).37. FRAC/VNMCOpns, App G, VNMC Div, p. 2; SMA debrief.38. SMA debrief; Cooksey debrief, pp. 9-10.

CHAPTER 9RETURNING NORTh

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from:MarAdvU HistSum72; MarAdvU ComdC, Oct- Nov- Dec72: MarAd-vU Daily OpSum RaIder, Ott- Nov. Dec72, Jan73; Sub Unit OneCnmdC, Oct- Nov- Dec72; and FMFPac MarOpsSEA.

Consolidation

1. FRAC/VNMCOpns App G, VNMC Div; Cnvan, lOrt72(MarAdvU Files).2. Sub Unit One memo to CMC, 12Nov72 (Vietnam Comment File).3. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, RichardMNixon, 1972 (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Serv-ire, 1974), pp. 583-587; FRAC lntSum 266-72. 21Sept72; Tueleyintvw.4. MarAdvU ComdC, Oct72.

5. Philip inrvw.

Push to the North

Reorganization

6. Daily OpSum Folder, Nov72 (MarAdvU File).

The Eleventh Hour

7, Ibid.8. Turley intvw.9. Ibid.10. MarAdvU Turnover Folder; SMA memo, 26Dec72; Daily 0p-Sum Folder, Dec72 (MarAdvU File).11. Sub Unit One ComdC, Dec72; Jones comments.12. 9thMAB debrief13. LtCol Gerald H. Turley, 'Time of Change in Modern Warfare,"Marine Corps Gazette, Dec74, pp. 18-19.14. Turley intvw.

Ceasefire

is. SMA msg to FRAC, 30Jan73 (MarAdvU File).i6. Daily DpSom Folder, Jan73 (MarAdvU File).17. Turley comments.t8. SMA msg to FRAC, 1Feb73 (MarAdvU File).

PART IVThe Marines Were There

CHAPTER 10A TRACT OF TIME

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from:FMFPac MarOpaSEA; SeventhFlt ComdHist72; Marine Corps Oper-

arions and Analysis Group, "Dotumentation and Analysis of U.S.Marine Corps Acctvsty in Southeast Asia:' ONR study CNA 1016,dtd July 1973 (CNA, Washington, D.C.), hereafter CNA MsrAc-tySEA; and 9thMAB ComdC, Apr-Dec72. See also MajGen Ed-ward]. Miller and RAdm Wycliffe D. Toole,Jr., 'Amphibious Forces:The Turning Point:' Naval Institute Pmreedings, Nov74, pp. 26-32,hereafter Miller & Toole.

9th MAB and the Naval Campaign

1. FMFPar MarOpsSea, pp. 1-16 to 1-17.2. LtCol William R. Von Harten, Comments on draft ma, 11Jan90(Vietnam Comment File).3. LtGen thuis Meczger, Commrnts on draft ma, 8Dec89 (VietnamComment File).4. For sperific composition see FMFPac MarOpaSEA, pp. 2-7 to 2-11,310 to 3-12, 4-3, 5-2; CNA MarActySEA, pp. 29.37.5. "A Brief History of the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade:' 28Sep78;"Lineage of the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade:' 22May85 (Ref-Sec. MCI-IC, Washington, D.C.).6. ColJames L. Shanahan, Comments on draft ma, 8Jan90 (Viet-nam Comment File).7. CNA MarActySEA, pp. 58-59.8. LrGen Edward]. Miller intvw, 6Feb86 (Oral I-IistColl, MCHC).

Support to the fleer

9. Metzger comments.10. CMC itt, Documentation and Analysis of U.S. Marine CorpsActivity in Southeast Asia, lApr.31Ju172, 28Feb74 (CNAMarActySEA).

Evacuations

Il. In 1972, the JCS defined special operations as supporting orserondary operations frar which no single service was assigned primaryresponsibility.12. FMFPar MarOpsSEA, pp. 2-11 to 2-13; CNA MarActySEA, p. 52.13. Von Harten comments.

Search and Rescue

i4. CNA MarAcrySEA, pp. 5, 13, 20, 50.15. Powell comments.16. Rush, op. cit.. pp. 116-117.

NGF Airborne Spotters, Fast and Slow

17. CNA MarAcrySEA, pp. 17-18; Maj Melaon notes as Asar. S-3,BLT 1/9 (Vietnam Comment File).

Raids and Demonstrations

18. LtGen William K. Jones, Comments on draft em, 22Nov89 (Viet-nam Comment File); Dr. Graham A. Coamas and LrCol TerrenceP. Murray, US. Marines in Vietnam, 29 70-1971 (Washington, D.C.:Hist&MuaDiv, HQMC, 1986), pp. 386-387.19. Edwin W. Beach, 'Amphibious Operation at Vinh' Marine CorpsGazette. Dec82, pp. 54-60; Miller & Toole, pp. 27-32.20. CNA MarActySEA, p. 64.21. Shanahan comments.


22. CNA MarActySEA, p. 51.23. Feng, op. cit.24. MACV ComdHisr72-73, pp. F-56 to F-do.

Redeyes at Sea

25. Truong, Invasion, p. 48.26. Miller intvw.27. Maj Melson itt to the Marine Corps Gazette, Dec82, pp. 10-11.

28. Jones comments; FMFPac MarOpsSEA, pp. 51, 61; CNAMarAcrySEA, p. 2-13.

Support to Military Region 1

29. Miller & Toole, p. 28,30. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, The Easter Offen-sive Symposium, 4Der86 (Oral HiatColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.),hereafter CSC symposium.

Fleet Support Continues

31. FMFPac MarOpsSEA, pp. 2-28 to 2-29, 3-24, 4-2; CNAMarActySEA, pp. 109-111.32. MCCC, Status of Forces, 23May72.33. CNA MarActySEA, p. 55.34. Gen Robert F. Cushman, Jr. intvw, lNov-9Dec 1982 (Oral Hist-Coil, MCHC).35. Moore comments.

Across the Beach, the Lam Son Landings

36. FMFPar MarOpsSEA, pp.. 3-1 to 3-4; RVNAF Official OrderNumber 042/flMICL/NQ, 14Apr73 (JGS Archives Center).37. FMFPat MarOpsSEA, pp. 3-8 to 3-9.38. Williamson comments.39. FMFPac MarOpsSEA, pp. 3.9 to 3-10, 4-1 to 4-2. CNAMarActySEA, pp. 119•t20.40. Kirby comments.

Turnaway at Quang In

41. ComSeventhFlt msg to SeventhFlt, 13Apr72 (Vietnam Com-ment File).42. CMC msg to ALMAR/54, 2Jun72 (Vietnam Comment File).

CHAPTER iiANY TIME, ANY PLACE

Unless otherwise noted material in this chapter is derived from:FMFPac MarOpsSEA; CNA MarAcrySEA; Seventh Air Force Com-mand Histories 1972 and 1973, hereafter SeventhAF ComdHisr;tsr MAW AAR on TF Delta, 6Jan75, hereafter TFD AAR; Thsk ForceDelta Command Brief, 17Jun73, hereafter TFD Brief; MAG-12 and15 ComdC, Apr-Dec72; and Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comp-troller), U.S. Aircraft Losses in SEA, Hostile Action, dtd 17Oct73,hereafter OSAD(C) Airl.csss. See also LrCol John J. Lane, Jr., Com-mand and Control and Communications Structures in SoutheastAsia, (Maxwell AFB, Air University, 1981); Gm Williams W. Momyer,The Vietnamese Air Force, 1951-1975, Monograph 4 (Washington,D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1975); BGenjames R. McCarthy

and LtCol George B. Allison, Linebacker II: The View Fmm theRock, Monograph 8 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force Histo-ry, 1979); Carl Berger, ed., The United States Air Force in SoutheastAsia, (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1977); andUSAF, Air War-Vietnam, (New York: Arno Press, 1978).

The Storm Breaks—Marine Air Responds

1. MCCC, Status of Forces, 30Mar72. See also SeventhAF, "The US/IFResponse to the Spring 1972 Offensive: Situation & Redeployment,"Project CHECO report, 10Oct72, hereafter CHECO Redeployment.2. Col Rirhard D. Revie, Comments on draft ms, 20Dec89 (Viet-nam Comment File).3. Merager comments; MajGen Leslie E. Brown, "1st Marine Air-craft Wing Achievements and Milestones," 8Apr76, pp. 1-2, 7, here-after Brown (Vietnam Comment File). LrCol Curtis G. Arnold, "1stMarine Ait Wing Supports Operations in Vietnam:' hereafter Ar-nold (ms MCHC, Washington, D.C., 1976), p. 2; Col Albert R.Pytko, "An Epoch of Need:' Marine Corps Gazette, May73, pp.194-200.


4. ComSmvenrhFle msg to CG1stMAW, 6Apr72 (Vietnam CommentFile).5. FMFPar MarOpsSEA, p. 2-19 to 2-20; Brown, pp. 1-2.6. FRAC Inesum 125-72, 3May72 (Vietnam Comment Files).7. CNA MarActySEA, pp. 109-It!; AFSpComCen msg to CinCPac,5Sep72 (Vietnam Comment File).8. MAG-l5 ComdC, Jul72, p. 6.9. MCCC, Climatology Study, 18Nov70.10. FMFPac MarOpsSEA, pp. 2-25, 3-20; CNA MarActySEA, pp.17-18.11. LrGen Leslie E. Brown, Comments on draft ms, 11Feb90 (Viet-nam Comment File).12. CNA MarActySEA, p. 94.13, LtCol Roger P. Fox, Air Base Defense in the Republic of Viet-nam, 1961-1973, (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History,1979), p. 201, hereafter Base Defense. See also MACV/EACSJ2,"VC/NVA Rocket Artillery," 1967 (PersPapets, MCHC, Washington,D.C.).

i4. Arnold, p. 5.15. CNA MarActySEA, pp. 85-91; this covers the sortie rate build-up in detail.16, 1srMAW SitRpr, 20May72 (Vietnam Comment File).17. TFD AAR, pp. 1-1 to 1-3.18. 3/9 ComdC, Jun72, p. 5; Dec72, pp. 3-4; and Jun73, p. 3.


19. III MAP msg to 1stMAW, 12May72 (Vietnam Comment File).20. Brown comments.21. Ibid.22. Seventh/IF, "The Battle for An Loc, 5 April-2GJune 1972:' ProjectCHECO report, 31Jan73, hereafter CHECO AnLoc.23. LtCol Willis E. Wilson, Jr., Comments on draft ms, 29Nov89(Vietnam Comment File).24. Col Dean C. Macho intvw, Apt73 (Oral HisrColl, MCHC,Washington, D.C.); Brown, p. 5.

25. MAG-12 ComdC, Dec72, p. 4.26. Brown comments; CHECO Anloc, pp. 53-54.

NOTES 259

27. "Road 13—Road of Death' Vietnam No. 172, 1972, pp. 6-7.28. MAG-12 ComiC, Nov72, p. 5.29. Macho intvw.30. Brown, p. 5.

31. FMFPac MarOpsSEA, p. 3-18.32. MAG-12 ComdC, Dec72, Tab A-12.33. FMFPac MarOpsSEA, p. 3-19.34. MAG-12 ComdC, Jan73, p. 7.

35. MAG-12 ComdC, Dec72, p. 6; Jan73, p. 7.36. Maj Angelo M. Inglisa, Comments on the draft ms, 29Nov89(Vietnam Comment File).37. LrCol Michael S. Kelly, Comments on draft ms, 2Apr90 (Viet-nam Comment File).38. Kelly comments.39. MAG-12 ComdC,40. MAG-12 ComdC,4i. HQMC Report of42. Arnold, p. 10.43. MAG-12 ComdC,44. MAG-12 ComdC,

Sep72, p. 4.Jan73, p. 8; OSAD(C) AirLciss, p. 4.

Task Force Delta

4s. Marine Aircraft Group 12 Navy Unit Commendation citation(RefSec, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).46. Arnold, p. 15.

47. Brown, p. 3; TFD AAR, p. 1-3.

48. CNA MarActySEA, p. 80.49. TFD Brief, Tab A, Tab B (Vietnam Comment File).50. Brown comments.51. TFD AAR, p. 1-7.52. Brown comments.53, E.rColjames C. Brown, Comments on the draft ms, 3Jan90 (Viet.nam Comment File).54. FMFPac MarOpsSEA, p. 3-18.55. CNA MarActySEA, p. .93.56. FMFPac MarOpaSea, p. 3-18; TFD Brief, Tab H, Operations.57. MAllS-iS ComdC, Jan73.

The Rose Garden Grows

58. LtCol John M. Campanelli, Comments on draft ma, 5Jan90(Vietnam Comment File).59. Air War-Vietnam, op. cit., pp. 203-204; Mao see KarlJ. Eschman,linebacker (New York: Ivy Books, 1989); Mark Clodfelter, The limitsof Airpower (New York: The Free Press, 1989).60. Brown romments.61. lath Ronald S. Mollisen, lsth Gary W. Dolgin, and lstLt,JerryD. Owen, edt., Marine All- Weather Attack Squadron 533 (Macre-line, Mo.: Walsworch Publishing Company, 1972), p. 9.62. Ibid., p. 55.63. FMFPac MarOpsSEA, p. 4-16.64. MAG-15 ComdC, Aug72, p. 2.65. Ibid.66. Maj George R. Dunham intvw, 16Jun87 (Vietnam CommentFile).67. Col Kent C. Baceman, Comments on draft ms, 12Dec89 (Viet-nam Comment File).68. MAG-is ComdC, Nov72, p. 3.69. TFD Brief, Tab H, Operations.70. FMFPac MatOpsSEA, p. 5-8.

71. 'ff0 AAR, pp. 1-12 to 1-15.72. Task 1±rce Delta Navy Unit Commendation citation (RefSec,MCHC, Washington, D.C.).73. VAdm James B. Scockdale, A Vietnam Experience (Stanford:Hoover Press, 1984), p. i45.74. Demorratir Republic of Vietnam, "The Late December 1972Blitz on North Vietnam;' special communique, 3Dec72 (Hanoi,1973), p. 56 (Vietnam Comment File).

CHAPTER 12ON YANKEE STATION

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived fromFMFPac MarOpsSEA, SeventhFlt ComdHisc72, and CNA MacAr-tySEA. See also Clarke Van Fleet, "Year of Accion-1972' Nas.'a.lAvi-ation News, Feb73, pp. 6-25, hereafter Van Fleet; VAdm MalcnlmW. Cagle, "Task Three 77 in Artion Dif Vietnam;' Naval Review1972, May72, pp. 66-109; EdwaedJ. Marolda and George W. PryceIll, A Short History of the United States Navy and the SoutheastAsian Conflict (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1984).

Support to the Navy: Task Force 77

I. SevenrhFlt ComdHist72, p. 4. Also Van Fleet, passim.

All-Weather Attack

2. VMA(AW)-224 ComdC, Jul72, p. 4.3. Xoan Vu, quoted by David Chanoff and Doan Van Toi, ed., Por-trait of the Enemy (New York: Random House, 1986), p. 184.4. CWO2 Edward Schemer, ed., The Coral Scene (Picshel Yearbooks,Int., 1972), p. 73.5. VMA(AW)-224 ComdC, Jul72, p. 4.6. Nixon, op. cit.. pp. 583-587.7. SevenchFlt Comdl-iisc72, p. 10; Van Fleet, p. 17.

8. FMFPac MarOpaSEA, p. 3-22; Cdr Ulrik Lurkow, "Vicrnry OverIgnorance and Fear: The U.S. Minelaying Attack on North Viet-nam," Naval War College Review,Jan.Feb82, pp. 17-27; USS CoralSea and Carrier Wing 15 Navy Unit Commendation ritation (Ref.See, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

More Support to the Navy —VMCJ

9. CNA MarAccySEA, pp. 74-75.10. FMFPar MarDpsSEA, p. 2-21; ComNavAirLant msg to CVW-3,11Apr72.

ii. MCCC, Chrnnnlogy, 18May72, p. 5; Brown, pp. 9-10.12. FMFPar MarOpsSEA, p. 2-21.13. Brown, p. 9.i4. Indochina Chronology, Ort-Dec87, p.19.15. Beown, p. 10.16. FMFPac, MarOpaSEA, p. 6-9.

Snakes at Sea

17. HMA-369 ComdC, Dec72, p. 15; LeGen I.ouis Metzgee inrvwby FMFPac, Jan73, Tape 5060 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).18. Metzger intvw.19. CNA MaeActy•SEA, p. 17; Brown, pp. 6-7. Also Mike Verier,"Marhuk' Az-'iation News, 18-31Mar88, pp. 1011-1017, and Kenneth

Der72, p. 9.Sept72, pp. 4-5.Casualty No. 991-72,

260 TI-fE WAR THAT WOULD NOT END

F, Werrell, "MARHUK: Marine Helicopters Over North Vietnam"(ms, Radford College, 29May87).20. FMFPac MarOpaSEA, pp. 3-26 to 3-27; HMA-369 ComdC,Jun72, pp. 4-6.21. CTG79,8/HMA-369 AAR, 29Dec72, p. 2.22. Brown, pp. 6-7; FMFPat, MarOpaSEA, pp. 3-22 to 3-24.23. Maj David L. Ross, Comments on draft ms, 9Jan90 (VietnamComment File); C'1fl79.8/HMA-369 AAR, p. 3.24. C'IG79.8/HMA.369 AAR, p. 5; Ross comments.25.JO2JuliusL. Evans, "Gunnee, One ofaFew Good Men," NavalAviation News, Jul-Aug82, p.24.26. FMFPac, MarOpaSEA, p. 4-19.27. CNA MarAcrySEA, p. 116.

28. HMA-369 Navy Unit Commendation citation (RefSec, MCHC,Washington, DC.).29. HMA-369 ComdC. Dec72, p. 7.

Fighters Over the North

30. VMFA-333 ComdC, Jun72, p. 4.31. VMFA-333 ComdC, Dec72, pp. 3-5.32. ColJohn D. Cummings, Comments on draft ms, 11Jan90 (Viet-nam Comment File).33. VMFA-333 ComdC, Dec72, pp. 3-4; Cummings comments. Also"Marine Mig Kill:' transcript of ICS tonversation (Vietnam Com-ment File); LtColjohn Cummings Its to Mr. Michael O'Connor dtd25Jun84 (RefSec, MCHC, Washington, D.C.); Captjoseph Boyle,ed., U'7estPac 72-73 (Norfolk; Tiffany Publishing Co., 1973), p. 77.34. SrvenehFlt ComdHist72, pp. 3-5, 8-10.

CHAPTER 13OTHER MARINE ACTIVITIES

Unless otherwise noted, material in this section is derived fromMajGen Leslie E. Brown, '1st Marine Aircraft Wing Achievementsand Milestones:' dtd 8Apr76; MajGenJoseph C. Fegan,Je., inrvwdtd 8Jan73, Tape 5062 (Oral HiatColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.);FMFPac, "Analysis of Human Affairs Poll2Jul72, hereafter FMFPacHuman Affairs; and HQMC, "Report on Marine Corps ManpowerQuality and Forte Structure:' 31Dec75, hereafter HQMC Manpowerstudy. See also Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Ralph W. Donnelly, Blacksin the Marine Corps (Washington, D.C.: Hisr&MusDiv, HQMC,1975). hereafter Shaw and Donnelly; The 8DM Corporation, AStudy of the Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, 8 vols (McLean.Va.: 1980), Vol. 6, "The Soldier'

Leadership, Morale, and Readiness

1. Col Robert D. Html, Jr., "The Collapse of the Armed Forces,"Armed Forces Journal, 7Jun71, p. 31.2. Metager comments.3. Baceman comments.4. Dr. V. Keith Fleming, Jr., Comments on draft ma, lSDer89 (Viet-nam Comment File).5. Dr. Allan R. Millet, Comments on draft ms, 21Dec89 (VsetnamComment File).6. HQMC Manpower study, pp.4, 13-t4; CMC Reference Notebook1973, Lb lI-H-iS, "Desertets and Absentees"; CMC Refetenre Note-book 1974, Tab lT-H-3, "Courts-Martial During Second Half ofCalendar Year 1973."

7. Fegan incvw; See also Heinl, op. cit., pp. 30-37 and Dr. ThomasC. Bond, "Fragging: A Study," Army, Apr77, pp. 45-47.8. FMFPac Human Affairs, p. iv.

9. Ibid.10. Bernard C. Nalty and LtCol Ralph F. Moody, A Brief Historyof US. Marine Corps Officer Procnrement 1775 -1969 (Washington,D.C.: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1970), pp. 20-25.11. Jones comments.12. HQMC(API2), "USMC Statistical Report on Military Person-nel Sttength and Turnover by Race:' 30Sept71, Tables I, II, and III(RefSer, MCHC, Washington, D.C.); HQMC(AO1K), "Summary ofSignificant Racial Incidents at Marine Corps Installations,AugiSS-Nov7l" (RefSec, MCHC, Washington, D.c.); CMC Refer-ence Notebook 1974, Lb l1-H-9, "Summary of Significant RacialIncidents at Maeioe Corps Installations"; Shaw and Donnelly, pp.69-83; Brown comments; Fegan inrvw.13. Fogleman comments.14. LtCol Mark B. Pizan, Comments on draft ms, 13Apr90 (Viet-nam Comment File).15. HQMC Manpower study, p. 3.16. RAdm Wycliffe D. Toole,Jr., Comments on draft ms, 29Nov89(Vietnam Comment File).17. "D Company Has ibemula For Morale:' Okinawa Marine, 14Jul72(Vietnam Comment File).18. Ynacay comments.19. LcCol Eddie R. Maag, Comments on draft ms, 28Dec89 (Viet-nam Comment File).20. LtCol Gary D. Solis, Marines and Military Laos in Vietnam; Th-al by Fire (Washington, D.C.: Hisr&MusDiv, HQMC, 1989), pp.231-244; Cosmas and Murray, op. cit., pp. 344-369.21. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Chicago: Encyclopedia Briteanica,Inc.), 1952, p. 85.22. Brown comments,23. CNA MarAcrySEA, pp. 57-58.24, Rush, op. cit., p. 71.

Beans, Bullets, and AvGas: logistics

Unless otherwise noted, material in this section is derived fromFMFPac MacOpsSEA and CNA MarActySEA.

25, Col Stanley G. Pests comment, CSC symposium; SMA Hise-Sum 1972, pp. 4.5.26. Brown, pp. 10-11.27, Millet comment.28. FMFPac MaeOpsSEA, pp. 2-29 to 2-30; CNA MarActySEA, pp.16, 57-58.29. TFD Brief, Tab H, Operations.30. CNA MarAcrySEA, p. 78.31. FMFPac MarOpsSEA, pp. 2-29 to 2-31.32. CNA MarActySEA, p. 93.33. USAF Tactical Air Command Project 3782, "Bare Base Mobili-ty"; CNA MarArtySEA, pp. 14, 95-10!.34. FMFPac MarOpsSEA, p. 3-27.35. CNA MarActySEA, pp. 99-101.36. CNA MarAccySEA, pp. 93-94.

Thunder from the Sea, Fire from the Sky

Unless otherwise noted, material in this section is from Opera-tions Analysis Group, "Defense of Hue and Quang Tn City, The

NOTES 261

1972 NVN Invasion of MR-i:' ONR study CNS 1035, May74, here-after CNA Defense of Hue; and CHECO Invasion 72.

37, Price comments.38. Gray memo; CNA Defense of Hue, pp. 1-2.39. MarAdvU Turnover Balder, Artillery advisor memo to ASMA,21Mar72; SMA memo to CGFRAC, 23Jan73 (MarAdvU File).40. CNA MarActySEA, pp. 62ff.4i. Gray comments; Ripley intvw; CNA MarActySEA, p. 14.42. Jones comments; MarAdvU Turnover Folder, SMA memo,26Dec72, (MarAdvU File).43. Nguyen Ngoc 1-bang, relevision intvw by Morley Safer, 19Mar89,CBS "60 Minutes" (Vietnam Comment File).

r in the Ether

Unless otherwise noted, material in this section is derived fromlstRadBn ComdC, Mar72-Jan73, and LtColJohn K. Hyatt,Jr., Com-ments on draft ms, 10Aug88 (Vietnam Comment File),

44. CNA MarOpsSea, pp. 58-61.

PART VReprise and Assessment

CHAPTER 14CEASEFIRE AND CONSOLIDATION

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived fromCincPac Comdflist73; MACV ComdHist73; FMFPac MatOpsSEA;SeventhFlt ComdHist73; MarAdvU Files; and the Defense AttacheOffice Saigon, "History of the Defenae Attache" (National RecordsCenter, Suitland, Md.), hereafter DAOI-bist.

The Final Act

1. Metager intvw and comments.2. Van Fleet, Aviation, p. 17.

3. DRVN, op. cit., Foreign Ministry statement, 29Dec72, p. 19.4. Office of the White House Secretary, "Agreement on Ending thtWar and Restoring Peace in Vietnam," 24Jan73. Articles 1 through23 and amended protocols, hereafter Peace Accords (Vietnam Com-ment File).5. SeventhFlc ComdHisr73, "Planning Decisions and Conclusions:'p. 2.6. Besch comments.

Operation Countdown, 'On the Land . - -

7. Sub Unit One, 1st ANGLICO Navy Unit Commendation cita-tion (RefSec, MCHC, Washington, D.C4.8. FMFPac MarOpsSEA, p. 6-5.9. Sub Unit One CnmdC, Feb73, p. 3.10. CMC msg to FMFPac, 9Feb73; MACV mag to FMFPac, 4Mar73;Jones comments.11. MarAdvU HiatSum72, pp. 2-3; MarAdvU Phase Down log,28Jan73-16Feb73; Daily OpSum Folder, Feb73 (MarAdvU File).

Logistics), Memo fur the President, 17Nov72 (Vietnam CommentFile),13. MarAdvU HistSum72, p. 4; Ordnance/Mainrenace Folder,CWO3 Bobby E. Dusek memo, 16Feb73; MarAdvU Turnover Ejlder,Narrative Evaluation of VNMC, 2dQtrFY73, pp. 4-5 (MarAdvU File).14. DAOHist 2dCYQ73, pp. 78-83; FMFPac MarOpsSEA, p. 5-16.1). Marine Advisory Unit Navy Unit Commendation citation (Ref-Sec. MCHC, Washington, D.C.).16. FMFPac MarOpsSEA, p. 6-19,17. SMA After Action Report to ComNavFnrV, 27Mar88, hereafterSMA AAR, pp. 4-5 (MarAdvU File).18. SMA msg to ComNavkrV, 13Mar73 (MarAdvU File); DAOHist,1stCYQ73, pp. 8-14; FMFPac MarOpsSEA, pp. 6-14 to 6-19.19. DAOHist, IstCYQ73, p. 80.20. DAOHist, IstCYQ73, p. 21.21. MajGen John E. Murray, Comments on draft ms, 3Feb90 (Viet-nam Comment File).22. DAOHist, 1srCYQ73, p. 1.

Operation Countdown, ', - - and Sea'

23. Williamson comments.24. 9thMAB ComdC, Jan73, p. 1.

25. ComSeventhFlt msg to 9chMAB, 31Jan73 (Vietnam CommentFile).26. 9thMAB ComdC, Feb73, p. 3-1.27. Ibid.28. FMFPac MarOpsSEA, pp. 6-1 to 6-5; 9thMAB ComdC, Jan73,

pp. 1-4.29. Col Ray A. Stephens, Comments on draft ms, 12Dec89 (Viet-nam Comment File).30. FMFPac MarOpsSEA, p. 6-i4,31. FMFPar MatOpsSEA, p. 5-15.32. FMFPac MarOpsSEA, p. 6-20.

Operation Countdown, ', . and Air'

33. Kenneth P. Werrell, "U.S. Marine Corps Aviation and NorthVietnam:' ms, 1989, p. 18 (Vietnam Comment File).34. New York Times, "U.S. Planes Bomb IDa Nang by Mistake,Wounding 10:' 8Jan73, pp. 1, 6.35. FMFPsc MarOpsSEA, pp. 6-6 to 6-7; MAG-12 ComdC, Jun73,

pp. 6-7,36. MAG-12 CumdC, Jun73. p. 6.37. Ibid.38. FMFPac MatOpsSEA, pp. 6-6 ro 6-8; MAG-12 ComdC, Jan73,

p. 7.39. MAG-12 ComdC, Jan73, pp. 6-9.40. MAG-12 ComdC, Jan73, pp. 4, 8-9; Jun73, p. 8.41. MAC-iS ComdC, Jun73, p. 5.

42. TFD AAR, p. 115.43. Nguyen Khac Vien, ed., Indochina: The 7972-73 Turning Point(Hanoi: Xunhasaba, 1974), p. 22.

CHAPTER 15IN ENEMY HANDS

Unless otherwise noted, this chapter is based on HQMC(INTC),"Experience of POWs," study dtd 1973, hereafter POW study;

12. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and 11chCJT, "Camp hscation Study' 22Sept71, hereafter Camp atudy;


lbucth Allied Prisoner of War Wing Debrief, 16Apr73, hereafterPOW debrief; and HQMC(M), "US Marine Prisoners of War andMissing in Action Summary:' 17Oct72, hereafter POW summary.Additional material resides in the Judge Advocate Division files forspecific prisoners and subjects, hereafter JAR Files. OperationHomecoming material is detived from JCS Hist73; CinCPacComdHisr73; Thirtrrnth Air Rsrce Joint Homecoming ReceptionCenter AAR, 6Jun73, hereafter ThirteenchA.F AAR; III MAF Opec-asion Homecoming AAR, 5Apr73, hereafter IIIMAF AAR, and Ma-rsne Corps Operation Homecoming AAR, 25Jul73, heteaftet HQMCAAR. See also DOD, Operation Homecoming:' CommandersDigest, Mat73; and Berger, op. cit., pp. 321-339. See also the vari-ous hearings by the Subcommittee on National Security Policy andScientific Developments of the House Commictee on Foteign Af-fairs, 1971 through 1973.

Combatants or Hostages?

1. POW summary. p. 1.

2. Communist "pointy-talkee" card captured in 1969 in MR 1 froman NYA medic; Maj Edward J. Wages, Comments on draft ms,20Nov90 (Vietnam Comment File).3. Defense Intelligence Agency, 'Citizens and Dependents, Cap-tured, Missing, Detained or Voluntarily Remained in SEA," 10Nov79(RefSec, MCHC, Washington. D.C.); and POW summary.4. CMC Reference Notebooks 1971-1972, Tab Ill-H-7, 'InformationConcerning PW Mail:'5. RAdm Horace B. Robertson, Jr., memo to SecNav, 16Jul73 OARFile); CMC Reference Notebooks 1971-1972, 'lab 1ll-H-7, "PW 'heat-ment in North and South Vietnam"; "PW Statistics and MarinesWho may he Assisting the Enemy"; HQMC(INTC) memo, 14Mar79,"Comment and Report of American Collaborators and Desertersin South Vietnam:' hereafter INIC comments. Also Bemard B. Fall,"Communist POW Treatment in Indochina" (Norfolk: CompositeInterrogation Translation Team, FMFLsnt), Jan61; and [Cdr JohnM. McGrath, Prisoner of War (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press,1975), for conditions in captivity.6. POW study, pp. H-19 to H-19f7. MsjJoseJ. Anzaldua inrvw by MCAS New River Public AffairsOffice, Marines, Sep85, pp. 6-9.8. Maj Bruce R. Archer intvw by MCDEC Public Affairs Office,12Mar87 (Vietnam Comment File).9. Maj PaulJ. Montague, Comments on draft ms, 16Nov89 (Viet-nam Comment File).10. Dougla.sK. RamseyltrtoGenRobertll, Cushman,Jr., 3Apr73,hereafter Ramsey Itt, p. 3, in Capt Donald G. Cook biographic file(RefSec, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).11. Anzsidua intvw,12. POW stody, pp. H22 to H24; Also, Frank Bormann, "U.S.Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia:' Congressional Record, 22Sep70,p. H9019.13. ICdt William Berg, "Injuries and Illnesses of Vietnam WarPOWs: Marine POWs' Military Medicine, Sep77, pp. 678-80.i4. POW study, Tab-Wing Polities.15. LtCol Harlan P. Chapman, Comments on draft ms, 18Jan90(Vietnam Comment File).16. POW study, Tab-SRO Policy Son Tay.17. LtCol Orson G. Swindle, Comments on draftms, 15Nov89; POWdebrief, passim; VAdmJames B. Stoclrdale, Comments on draft ms,28Jan89 (Vietnam Comment File).18. "I heard the tapes he made ...." (Chapman comments).

19. Col Edison W. Miller, Comments on draft ms, 21Jan90 (Viet-nam Comment File).20. POW study, p. S14.21. Hank Whittemore, "Fear Can Be Your Best Friend:' Parade Maga-zine, 19Apr85, p. 5.

22. Miller comments.23. RAdm Horace B. Robertson, Jr. memo to SecNav, 16Jul73 OARFile); LeCol Edson W. Miller biographical file and POW subject files(RefSec, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).24. Anasldus intvw, p. 8.

Egress Recap and Other Contingencies

25. MsjGen Leroy,J. Manor lrr to Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans andPolicies, HQMC, 12Oct72 (Vietnam Comment File). See also Ben-jamin F. Schemmer, The Raid (New York: Harper & Row, Publish-ers, 1976), pp. 261-263.26. HQMC AAR, p. 2.27,CinCPaclnst 3461.1C, 3Aug72 and ThirteenthAF OPlsn EgressRecap, 1Dec72.28. ThirteenthAF AAR, pp. 1-25 for background and conduct, pp.26-45 for conclusions.29. The White House, "Set Sheet: International Commission ofControl and Supervision:' 24Jan73 (Vietnam Comment File).30. ThireeenthAF AAR, p. 7.31. Col John W. Claybome, Comments on draft ms, 29Dec89 (Viet-nam Comment File).32. Anzaldua intvw.33. JCS msg to CinCPac, 25Jan73 (Vietnam Comment File).34. JCS Hist73, pp. 714, 721.35. Peace Accords, Article 8, p. 3.36. JCS Histl3, p. 723.


37. Clayborne comments.38. POW study, Tab-Go Home Guidance.39. ThirteenthAF AAR, pp. 15-21, 15-25.40. LeCol William C. Howey, Comments on draft ms, 17Nov89 (Viet-nam Comment File).41. Howey comments.42. Clayborne comments.43. ThirteenthAF AAR, p. 13.44. IIIMAF AAR, p. 29.45. Clayborne comments.46. ThirteenthAF AAR, p. 15-45.47. Howey comments.48, Chapman comments.49. IIIMAF AAR, p. 25.50. CMC Itt to Casualty Assistance Call Officers, 6Dec72.

Welcome Home Marine

51. Capt William F. Thomas, Jr., Cnmmenrs on drafrms, 20Dec89;MCB Camp Pendleton, "Historical Documentation of Phase IllPrisoner of War Repatciation Activities:' 5Jun73, in HQMC AAR(Vietnam Comment File).52, Operation Homecoming (Public Affairs), 20Apr73, in HQMCAAR.53. Capt Donald G. Cook biographical file (RefSec, MCHC,Washington, D.C.).

NOTES 263

54. Ramsey itt, p. 3.55. Ramsey irr, p. 2.56. Stockdale comments.57. Clayborne comments.58. Miller tomments.59. Stockdale comments.60. RAdm Merlin H. Staring memo to SecNav, 16Jul73; CoiJamesR King memo to ACMC, 1Aug79 OAR File).61. Scockdaie comments.62. Miller comments.63. RAdm Horace B. Robectson,Jr. memo to SecNav, 22Jun73; ColJohn R. DcBatr memo to CMC, 5Jul73 and 2Aug73 OAR File).64. BGen Waltecj. Donovan memo to CMC, 29May85 (JAR File);HQMC(PA), 'Fact Sheet; Operation Homecoming; Disciplinary Ac-tion Against Returnees" (Vietnam Comment File).65. Report of Defense Review Committee for the Code of Conduct(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1976), pp. 15-17, here-after Code of Conduct review (Vietnam Comment File).66, Code of Conduct review, p. 16.

67. CinCPac ComdHist73, pp. 599-603.68. Time, 19Feb73, p. 13, in CinCPat ComdHist73, p. 600.

Code of Conduct

69. Foc Vietnam era SERE doctrine see DA, FM21-76 Survival, Eva-non, Resistance, and Escape, Mar69; FM21-77AJoint World WideEvasion and Escape Manual; and DAPAM3O-101 Communist In-terrogation, Indoctrination, and Exploitation of Prisoners of War.May56.70. CIVIC Reference Notebooks 1971-1972, Lb III-F-1-0, "Code ofConduct."71. Ibid., pp. H-22 to H-29.72. POW study, Tab-Code of Condutt.73. Code of Conduct review, p. 17. Also Maj Terrence P Murray,"Code of Cnndutt—A Sound Doctrine:' Marine Corps Gazette,Dec83. pp. 56-62; and Maj Edward F. Wells, "Operatinn Homecom-ing" (ms, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), 1985.74. Montague comments.

MIAs: The Joint Casualty Resolution Center

75. SecNav memo to CMC/CNO, 6Jul73 (JAR File).76. OASD(ISA) memo to SecDef, 4May77 (JAR File).77. LtCol Richard H. Esau,Jr., "Da Nang After the Armistice," Ma-rine Corps Gazette, Jul74, pp. 49-50.78. INTC comments, p. 36.79. Garwood Iblder (JAR File); HQMC, "Return of PFC Robert Rus-sell Gaewood, USMC, from Vietnam:' AM, 20Apr79; MCB CampLejeune. "Public Affairs and the GCM of PFC Robert R. Garwood,USMC:' AAR, 5Mar81; and PFC Robert R. Garwood biographicalfile (RefSec, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).80. SecDefmsg to CMC, 30Jun82; SeeDefmsg to SecNav, 25Mar83;SeeDefmsg to CMC, 11Jul85; and OASD(ISA), "Status Reviews andAccounting for Servicemen Missing in Southeast Aaia' 4May77. Seealso OASD(PA). "Americans Unaccounted for in Indochina' 2Jan89;"Joint Casualty Resolution Center:' 2Jan86; "U.S. Army Central Iden-tification Laboratory:' 2Jan86; "Remains Identified as American:'2Jan86; "Technical Talks," 24Feb86; "Principal Sources of POW/MIAInformation' 24Feb86; and "Official U.S. Government Live Sight-ing Position:' 24Feb86 (Vietnam Comment File).

CHAPTER 16CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived fromCincPac ComdHist73; MACV ComdHist73; FMFPac MarOpsSEA;SeventhFlt Conidflist73; MAU Files; and the Defense AttacheOffice, History of the Defense Attache (National Records Centee,Suieland, Md.), hereafter DAOHist. See also Brig F B. Setong, "The1972 Easter Offensive," Southeast Asian Perspectives, Summer 74;Sic Robert Thompson, Peace a Not at Hand (New York: DavidMcKay Company, Inc., 1974); and Nguyen Khac Vien, ed., Indochi-na; The 1972-7.3 Turning Point (Hanoi: Xunhasaba, 1974).

Operation End Sweep

Unless otherwise noted, material in this section is derived fromFMFPac MacOpsSEA; SevenrhFlt CnmdHist73; Office of NavalResearch, "Operation Endsweep' ONR study CRC 277, Feb75(CNA, Washington, D.C.), hereafter CNA Endsweep; andHMM-165, HMM-164, HMH-463 ComdCs, Feb-Aug73. See alsoRAdm Brian McCauley, "Operation End Sweep' Naval InstituteProceedings, Mar74, pp. 19-25, hereafter McCauley, Endsweep; andLtCol John Vsn Nortwiek, "Endsweep," Marine Corps Gazette,May74, pp. 29-36, hereafter Van Nortwick.

1. FMFPac MarOpsSEA, pp. 5-14 to 5-17; Capt Paul L, Gruendl,comments on draft ms, 10Dec89 (Vietnam Comment File).2. McCauley, Endsweep, p. 23.3, Gruendl comments.4. HMM-165, Special Operation Report (Endsweep), 21Aug73, pas-sim, hereafter HMM-165 SOR.5. FMFPac MarOpsSEA, p. 6•l2.6. CNA Endsweep. pp. Cl to C3.7' CNA Endsweep, pp. B-t to B-3.8. JCS Historical Division, Comments on deafr ms, 5Dec89 (Viet-nam Comment File).9. HMM-165 ComdC, Feb73, p. 21.10. Brown, pp. 8-9.11. CNA Endsweep, p. 5-7,12. HMM-165 ComdC, Feb73, p. 22.13. Van Norewiek, pp. 31-32.14. HMM-165 ComdC, Feb73, p. 22.15. Gruendl comments.16. CNA Endsweep, p. E•9,17. JCS comments.18. HMH-463 ComdC, Jun73, p.7; HMM-165 SOR, p. 14.

19. Van Norewick, p. 33 (which does not reflect cbmmand chro-nology totals).20. HMH-463 ComdC, Jun73, p. 7. See Van Noctwitk and HMM-165SOR for detailed lessons learned.21. SeventhFlt OpOrd 9.73, 26Jul73, and SeventhFlt Comdl-list73,End (2), p. 1.

22. McCauley, Endsweep, p. 23.

Task Force Delta, The Tigers Depan

Unless otherwise noted, material in this section is derived fromthe TFD AAR, TED Brief, and MAG-l5 ComdC, Jan-Sept73.

23. FMFPac MarOpsSEA, pp. 6-6 to 6-8; MAG-15 ComdC, Jun73,

p. 10.


24. MAG-15 ComdC, Jun73, End (1), p. 4.25. TFD ComdC, Sept73, p. 11-i.26. 'lTD AAR, pp. 1-28w 1-30; Maj George R. Dunham, "TheKhmer Flex Their Muscle" (ms, MCHC, Washington, D.C.) pp.28-33.27. lTD Brief, Tab E; TFD AAR, pp. 3-1 to 3-5.28. TFD AAR, pp. 6.1 to 6-14.29. Maj John T. Dyer, "Impressions of a 'Rose Garden: " Fortitu-dine, Fall 1973, pp. 4-6.30. Brown, pp. 10-lI, 13; SeeDef Icr to MajGen Brown, 7Sept72;Brown comments.31. FMFPac, Human Affairs, passim; EIQMC Manpower study, pp.2-4.32. TFD ComdC, Sept73, p. lI-i.33. TFD ComdC, Sept73, p. 111-2.34. BGen Manning T. Jannell, Comments on draft ms, 29Oct89(Vietnam Comment File).35. CGMACThai msg to SecDef, 21Sept73 (Vietnam Comment File).36. Jannell comments.37. TFD AAR, pp. 1-15 to 1-21.

To What End?

Unless otherwise noted, material in this section is derived fromLtCol Gerald H. Turley, "Time of Change in Modern Warfare," M-

n'ne Corps Gazette, Dec74, pp. 16-20; BGen Edwin H. Simmons,"The Marines: Now and in the Future:' Naval Review 1975, pp.102-117; MajGen Bernard E. 'Jlainoc, "New Thoughts on War," Ma-tine Corps Gazette, Dec80, pp. 49-51; and Allan R. Millete, "TheU.S. Marine Corps, Adaptation in the Post-Vietnam Eta:' ArmedForces and Society, Spring 83, pp. 363-392.

38. Douglas Pike, PAVN.' People's Army of Vietnam (Novato, Calif.:Presidio Press, 1986), pp. 48-49, 103, 229; also ColGen Van TienDung, "Some Problems Concerning the Art of Military Campaignsof the Vietnamese People's War[ PeoplelArmy Magazine, Dec73,pp. 61-65 (Vietnam Comment File).39. LtCol Andrew D. DeBona comments, CSC symposium.40. Peter Bcaestrup tomments, CSC symposium.41. FMFPac MarOpsSEA, p. 6-14, and SMA msg to CTF76&79,30Jun72 (Vietnam Comment File).42. HQMC, "Contingeney Operations involving U.S. Marine Forcesin Evatuation or Rescue Missions, 1956-1975:' study, 21Apr81 (Ref.Sec, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).43. Metagec iotvw.44. MCCC Chcon, 12 Jul 73, Tab 4i-io; OASD(C) Airlnss, Tables351 and 352; CMC Reference Notebook 1975, Tab Il-H-I, "USMCCasualties in SEAsia."4s. Col Harry G. Summers,Jr., On Strategy (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.:U.S. Army War College, 1981) p. 1.

Appendix A

Command and Staff ListMarine Advisory Unit

VNMC Advisor Assignments1Mar72- 30 Sep72

Capt James B. Archer InfantrytCapt Russell F Bailes, Jr Unit Hq, EngineerMaj James D. Beans Infantry

Ma) Walter E. Bonmer Infantry

Ma) Gerald W. Boston infancry*

Capt James A. Brabham, Jr EngineerCWO3 Sheila R. Bray, Jr Engineer

CWO3 Ferris D. Brown EngineerMa) Jack R. Campbell, Jr Infantryt

Capr Reid 0. Caclock lnfantry*

Ma) Paul L. Carlson Infantryt

Capt Philip C. Cisneros lnfantry*

Capt William A. Clark III InfantrySSgt Richard F, Clemens Unir HqMaj Robert C. Cockell InfantryCapt Clelland ID. Collins, Jr Infantry

Ma) Patrirk G. Collins InfantrytCapt Allen M. Coward Motor Transport

Sgt Bobbie G. Crowl Unit HqI-IMC E. F. Currier, USN Medical

Maj Andrew ID. Debona Infantry

Capt Gary ID. Dockendnrff 0-1

CWO3 Bobby F. Dusek CommunicationsMa) Jon T. Easley G-4, Training

Capt Clark ID. Embrey Infantry

Capt Robert S. Evaaick Artillery

Sgr Gary NI. Faureck Unit HqLtCol Walcet D. Fillmore Assistant SMA

HMC Ronald C. Fitzgerald, USN Medical

CWO2 George NI. Francis Unit HqGySgt David F Fureigh Unit HqMa) Thomas B. Gnibus Artillery

Ma) Charles J. Goode, Jr Training, Infantry, Unit HqCapt Samuel T Gray Supply

GySgt Ronald C. Guilliams Motor Transport

Capt Ronald C. Hatringron infantry

Capt David D. Harris Infantry

tTemporary assignment.

Ma) William R. Hart Artillery

Capt Stephen M. Harrnerc Infantry

SSgr Jerry W. Harvey Unit HqSSgt Richard L. Helm CommunicationsMa) Porrer K. Henderson lnfantry*

CWO3 James B. Hill Ordnance

Capt Richard W. Hodory Infantry

Capt Terry L. Howard Supply

Ma) Emmett S. Huff, Jr InfantryCapt Frank M. Izenour, Jt 0-3, G-2Capt Harry Jensen, Jr Infantryt

Capt James E. Jnhnson Infantry

Lt(jg) Wesley J. Johnson, USN Medical

Ma) Clyde J. Johnston Artillery

Maj Duncan H. Jones Artillery

Capt Walter E Jones infantcy

Maj Jim R. Joy Infantry, G-3

Maj Gordon W. Keisec infantry

Ma) Robert ID. Kelley Infantry, OlC RearMa) William M. Keys Infantry

Capt Charles W. King Infantry, Unit HqCapt Earl A. Kruger Infantry

Capt John J. Lacy G-1, PsyOps, Training

Sgt Robert R. Langdon Unit HqCapt Steven P. Lindsey Infantry

Capt Alastair J. Livingston InfantrytCapt Lawrence H. Livingston Infantry, Training

GySgt John C. Lowery Unit HqCapt Charles A. Lyle Infantry

Sgc Daniel L. Mason Unit HqGySgr Robect L. McElyea Unit Hcj

GySgt Roscoe A. McGuire Unit HqMa) Robert C. Mclnteer Amphibious SupportMa) Paul A. McLaughlin Artillery

Capt Eric W. Meager Infantryt

Sgt Charles J. Miller Unir HqCapt William H. Miller Motor Transport

Capt Charles P. Minor III InfantrytCapt Peter S. Mocosoff Infantry

GySgt James A. Morris Unit HqCapt John ID. Murray Infantry

Capt Allen ID. Nectleingham Infantry

Capt Phillip C. Norton Infantry

Maj Joseph J. O'Brien Infantry

Capt Jerome X. O'Donovan, Jr Infantry

LCdr R.S. Oldham, USN Medical

Capt Thomas F. O'Tnole, Jr 0-2Capt Robert A. Packard, Jr Infantry

Ma) Donald C. Pease Infantryt

265

Marine Advisory Unit(MarAdvU)

lJul7l-3lMar73

SMA Col Francis W. TiefCol Joshua W. Dorsey III

lJul7l-tOJuI7lllJul7 1-3 1Mar73


Capt Harry W. Peterson Ill. InfantrytCapt George Philip III ArtilleryMaj John Pipta ArtillerySgt Calvin L. Pitchford Unit HqCWOI William T Pope OrdnanceLtCoI James A. Poland 0-3Maj Stanley G. Pratt 0-4Maj Donald L. Price InfantrySSgt Paul A. Prusak Unit HqCapt David S. Randall, Jr ArtilleryCapt Charles L. Redding lnfantry*Capt Robert K. Redlin InfantryCapt Ronald R. Rice InfantryCapt John W. Ripley InfantryCapt Joe D. Robinson InfantryCapt Wayne B. Rollings Infantry*Maj Geoffrey H. Root G-4Maj Richard B. Rothwell InfantryCapt James W. Seal InfantryCapt Merlyn A. Sexton InfantryMaj Robert E Sheridan Training, Infantry

Maj Robett D. Shopraw 0-4Capt Ray L. Smith InfantryCapt William]. Spangler Infantry*GySgr Bernard ,J. Stural Unit HqMaj William T. Sweeney InfantryLtCoI William G. Swigert Assistant SMAGySgt Joseph Sykora, Jr Unit HqCapt John W. Theisen 0-2Ma; James M. Tulley Unit HqLtCol Gerald H. Turley Assistant SMA, 0-3Ma; William R. Warren Infantry, Unit HqCapt Marshall R. Wells Infantry, G-3Maj Oliver M. Whipple, Jr Amphibious Support, InfantryCapt Jonathan W. Wilbor lnfantry*Capt William D. Wisrhmeyet InfantrySgt William ID. Wiserarver Unit HqMaj Regan R. Wright InfantryCapt Thomas Zalewski CommunirationsCapt Jon L. Zellers Infantry

tTemporary assignment.

Appendix B

Command and Staff ListMarine Ground Units

Sub Unit One1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company

(SU1, 1stANGUCO)1Ju171.14Mar73*

1Ju171-24Jul71

25Ju171.14Jul72

17Ju172-14Mar73

25Feb72-3Jun724Jun72-31Ju172

llAug72-28Jan7329Jan73-14Mar73

1Ju171-7Dec7l

8Dec7l-310cr72lNov72-14Mar73

lJul7I-23Jan7324Jan73-14Mar73

lJul7l-l6Nov7ll7Nov7l-7Dec7lSDec7l-lOApr72

llApr72-BMay729May72.310ct72lNov72-14Mar73

1Jo171-lONov7l

llNov7 1-2 5Oct72

260ct72-14Mar73

Hq, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade(9thMAB/CTG 79.1)

3Apr72 9Feb73t

3Apr72-15Nov7216Nov72-9Feb733Apr72-2 7Jul7228Jul72-9Feb73

3Apt72.14Jun7215Jun72-2Aug723Aug72-9Feb733Apr72.l2Jun72

13Jun72-llAug7212Aug72-9Feb733Apr72-200ct72210ct72-9Feb733Apr72-llAug7212Aug72.23an73

3Jan73 -9Feb733Apr72 •llAug7 2t*

Hq, 31st Marine Amphibious Unit(31st MAli/aG 79.4)

1Jan72.31Mar73

CO Col Walter C. KellyCol Donald E. NewtonCol Thomas J. Stevens

XO LtCol Glen T. BeauchanipLtCol Thomas F. BradleyLtCol Gait L. Fenenga

5-1 CWO2 Donald J. MosseyMaj Jules C. Rivera, Jr.CWO2 James N. DeirrichlstLr Leonard L. Touney2dLt Billy R. Newman

S-2 Ma) Grady .V. GardnerMa) William L. ShearerMa) William P EshelmanS-S Ma) James H. YarnellMa) Julian P. StienonMa) John W. O'DonnellMa) Joseph W. Gibbs IllMa) Robert J. Graham

S-4 Ma) Berlis F. EnnisMa) Harold E. ItrhkawichMaj Bobbie K. Brodie

Hq, 33d Marine Amphibious Unir(33d MAU1CTG 79.5)

18Apr72-26Apr735

CO Col Roberr J. PerrichCol Charles T. Williamson

XO LtCol Julius M. I.ewis, JLLtCol Bobby T [add

5-1 Ma) Dougal A. Cameron IIICWO2 James R, MilnerCWO3 John M. Larson

S-2 Ma) John F DelaneyMa) Henry W. AustinCapt Jerrold T. Irons

S-3 Ma) Wdliam H. LeonardMa) Dougal A. Cameron IIIMa) Raymond M. KosreskyMa) Jerry D. PetersonMa) David J. McGraw

5-4 Ma) DavidJ. RyanMa) Leonard K. SiusherCapt Emile W. Hoffman

*Deactivated 26Apr73.

lJan72-31May721Jun72 -28Nov72

29Nov72-31Mar73lJan72-31Mar72

lApr72-24Nov7225Nov72-31Mar73

1Jan72-21.Feb72

22Feb72- 6Mar727Mar72.16Jan73l7Jan73-9Feb73

lOFcb73-3lMar731Jan72-20Jan72

2 1Jan72 .2 3 Sep72

24Sept72 -3 1Mar731Jan72-4Jan72

4Mar72-31Mar72lApr72-7Ju172

SJul72-15Mar7316Mar73-31Mar73

lJan72-28Jan72293an72-IONov721lNov72-3lMar73

lMay72-4Aug725Aug72-26Apr73

lMay72-15ep7225ep72-26Apr73lMay72-31May72123un72-3lDcc72

1Jan73-26Apr7317Apr72-lGAug72123un72-l6Aug72IlSep7 2-2 6Apr73l3Apr72-5May72

6May72-7Jun7212Jun72 4 Aug 7 2

5Aug72-14Jan73lSJan73.26Jan73

l3Apr72-5May72l2Jun72-12Nov7213Nov72.26Jan73

CO LtCol Eugene E. ShoultsLrCol DWayne GrayLrCol George E, Jones

XO Ma) Edward J. Dyer, Jr.Maj Glen GoldenMaj John S. VogrMa) William A. Hall

SgtMaj lsrSgr Elvis W. LanelstSgr Ernest BenjaminlsrSgt Kenneth R. Buehi

S-i isrLr Richard E. SrorrlstLt John H. Cole, Jr.

S-S LCdr Richard M. Kreassing, USN[tog) David P. Throop, USNCapt Ronald W. Marsteller[tog) David P. Thrnop, USNLt Robert I. Still, USNlstLr William E. Corcoran

S4 CWO3 Joseph R. MorrisserreCWO4 Roy K. HarrislstLr Frank Rivas, Jr.

*Deacti sated with return to PMFPac on 14Mar73.

CG BGcn Edward J. MillerBGen Paul G. Graham

C/S Col Sumner A. ValeCol Kenneth G. Fiegener

G-l LrCol William C. BradleyCapt Herbert F. PoseyMa) David D. Johns

G-2 Ma) James A. MillerMa) William I. FerrierMa) Fred L. Edwards, Jr.

G-3 [.tCol James L. ShanahanLtCol James L. Day

G-4 LrCol Frank S. CannonLrCol Richard L. EtterLrCol Jimmie R. Phillips

G-5 LrCol George B. Crist

*Deactivated with return to HI MAP on 9Feb73.**Command Chronologies incomplete.

267


CO LeCol Clyde D. DeanLtCol Floyd A. Karker, Jr.

XO Maj Robert P. HamiltonMaj Herbert L. Seay

H&S Capt Robert E. HappyA Co Capt Joseph E. Freed

IstLe Charles C. EmmonsB Co Capt Robert W. CarswellC Co Capt Donald R. Huskey

lsrLt Donald L. MartiniseLt John H. Young

D Co Capt John S. Leffen, Jr.lstLt James G. Zumwale II

CO LtCol John PhillipsLtCol Robert W, Kirby

XO Maj John W. HemingwayMaj Henry W. Tutterow, Jr.Maj Robert R. Babbin

H&S Capt Robert T. WillisIstLe Robert W. ClarktstLe Everitt P. Clark, Jr.

F Co Capt Canton W. Fulford, Jr.Capt Robert G. NunnallylstLt Robert P. McAleerCapt Fred R. CrowleyCapt William J. Johnston Ill

F Co Capt Guy A. Pete. Jr.Capt William R. J. MaaciangelolscLc Allan H. Varga.sCapt Larry S. Schmidt

G Co Capt George S. FordCape Carlos D. EspinozalseLt Peter R. DornCape laurent J. Jansen

H Co Capt Brure F. GriesmerCapt George J. Esehenfeldee

CO LeCol William R. Von HartenLeCol Bruce A. Truesdale

H&S Capt John S. lawery, Jr.IstLt Dennis J. HellmanCapt Walter F. DeeselstLt Thomas F. Mitchell, Jr.Capt Thomas A. Hobbs

I Co Capt Samuel M. GarlandK Co Capt Jack M. Moore

tstLe Paul R. OeringerCapt Eugene G. Meiners

L Co Capt Harry C. Dolan

lJan72-t6Aug7217Aug72-31Dec72

1Jan72 -9Aug72lOAug72-31Dec72

lJan72-31Dec721jan72 -12Ju 172

13Jul72-31Det721Jan72-28Aug72

tJan72-9Jun72loJu n7 2-12ju1 72

13Ju172-31Dec721Jan72-IJul72

2Jul72.3 1Dec72

lJan72.2 3Jun7224Jun72-31Dec72

1Jan72-21Jul72

22Ju172-27Dec7228Der7 2-3 1Dec72

1Jao72-29Mar72

30Mar72-24Nov7225Nov72-31Det72

1Jan72-7Ape728Apr72-13Apr72

14Apr72-22Ape7223Ape72-19Der7220Dec72-3 1Dec72

tJan72-3 1Jan721Feb72-13Apr72

14Apr72 -19Dec72

20Dec72-3 1Dec72lJan72-3Apr72

4Apr72-t3Apr7214Apr72-22Apr7223Apr72-31Dec72

iJan 72. 30May72lMay72-3tDec72

lJan72-30Jun72t40cr72-3lDec7 2

lJan72-22Feb7223Feb72-8Mar72

9Mar72-12May7213May72-t4Jun7215Jun72-3 1Dec72

tJul72-31Dec72lJan72.24Apr72

25Apr72-t4Jun7215Jun72-31Dec72

lJan72.12May72

latLa Perry S. ShimanoffCapt Rithard T Kohl

M Co Cape Walter E. DeeseCapc Dennis B. FryeearCapt Thomas F. Mitchell, Jr.

1st Battalion, 9th MarineslJan72.31Dec72

CO LeCol Phillip B. FriedrichsLeCol Robert A. Monfort

XO Maj Joseph P. HoarMaj Phillip A. ForbesMaj Bayliss L. Spivey, Jr.

H&S Cape RobertJ. ArboledalstLc Robert W. GearyCapt Howaed W. Langdon, Jr.

A Co IstLe Charles DemelloIseLt John C. Dowell

B Co IseLe Charles D. MelsonCapt LynnJ. KimballiseLe Robert G. Sikorski

C Co Capt John D. HaalaodIseLt Paul R. GeedesCapt Robert E. Logan, Jr.

D Co Capt Dennis R. KendigistLe Peter]. CammaranoCapt Donald R. Dunagan

2d Battalion, 9th MarineslJan72-31Dec72

CO LeCol John C. GonzalesLeCol Jerome P TrehyLtCol Ray A. Stephens

XO Maj Richaed A. JohnsonMaj Edwatd H. BoydMaj Richard W. Maesden

H&S Capt Richard D. Camp, Jr.Cape Albert P. JohnsCapt John M. HolladayCapt Paul L. SneadtstLt Donald Thomley

E Co istLe Kevin G. CrouthamelCapc Robert G. NunnallyCape John M. Holladay

F Co iseLt Robert A. ThomaststLt Andrew N. PrattCapt William R. J. MasiangeloIseLe Andrew N. PrattCapt Albert P. Johns

G Co IseLe Askold I l-IaywasCapt Peter N. ViditolseLc Gary M. Alden

H Co Capt Coy I Best, Jr.lstLt Thomas J. ShorelseLt Leo W. BillingsCapt Carlos D. Espinoza

l3May72-14Jun72lSJun72.3tDer72

lJan72-8Mae729Man72-14Jun72

t5June72.31Dec72

Jan72-2Jul723Jul72-3lDet72lJan72-18Jun72

19Jun72-24Aug7225Aug72-31Der72

lJan72-14Apr7215Apr72-195ep72

205ep72-31Dec721Jan72-13Apr72

14Apr72- 31Dec72

1Jan72-13Feb72

14Feb72 -24jun7225Jun72-31Dec72

lJan72-lSep722Sep72 -9Sep72

tOSep72-31Dec72lJan72-lSep72

25ep72-t4Sep72155ep72-3lDec72

tjan72-22Mar7225 Mac72-2 7Jul72

28Jul72-31Dec72

Uan72.8Mar729Mar72-17Der72

18Dec72-31Det72tjan72-tOApr72

tlApr72-170ct72l8Ott72-l9Nov72

20Nov72-19Dee7220Dec72-31Dec72

lJan72-13Apr7214Ape72-t9Nov72

20Nov72-3 1Dec72IJan72-SMar72

7Mar72-l3Apr7214Apr72-30Jun72

1Jul7 2-1 7Oct72

18Oct72- 31Dec721Jan72- 28Mar72

29Mar72-1 7Oct72180ce72-31Dec72

1Jan72 .5Feb72

óFeb72-lMae722Mar72-12Apr72

13Apr72-31Der72

1st Battalion, 4th MarineslJan72.3lDet72

2d Battalion, 4th MarineslJan72-3lDer72

3d Battalion, 4th MarineslJan72-31Dec72

COMMAND AND STAFF, GROUND 269

3d Battalion, 9th Marines1jan72-31Dec72

CO LtCol George B. CristLrCol Ronald A. ClarkLtCol Richard J. Alger

XO Maj Richard C. OssenfortMaj Daniel li. Mullally, Jr.Maj Samuel E. Black

H&S Capt Thomas D. MaccmlstLc David E. YlasaklstLt George W. BallCapt Robert E. Tschan

Co I Capt Richard A. CrowelstLt John G. Nemec, Jr.lath Frederick C. Williams

1Jan72-16Jan72

17Jan72-100rr72llOct72-31Dec72

lJan72-15Jul7228Ju172-9Nov72

10Nov72 -3 1Dec72

lJan72-l3Mar7214Mar72-l8Apr7219Apr72-5May726May72-31Dec72

lJan72-20Apr7221Apr72-3May724May72-19May72

Capt Michael S. KellyCo K Capt Richard J. Muller

lsrLt Carl J. loguidiceCapt Nathaniel R. Hoskot, Jr.

Co L Capt Gary W. McDowelllstLr Jeffrey M. ParkinsonlsrLr Roger F HarrisCapt Philip F. Reynolds

Co M Capt Klaus D. SchreiberIstU Raymond M. KruselsrLr Gregg C. KubulstLr David E. ViasakCapt Thomas D. Martin

*3 MAG-12. 25Aug72.**T MAG-12, 21May72.

MAG-15, 4Jun72.MAC-is, 3Jun72.

20May72.24Aug72*

1Jan72-21Feb7222Feb72- 5Apr72

6Apr7220May72**

1Jan72-lMar722MarY2-4May72

SMay72-25May7226May723Jun72***

1Jan72- 3Jan72

4Jan72-22kb7223Feb72-17Apr72

l8Apr72-24May7225May72.2Jun72****

Appendix C

Command and Staff ListMarine Air Units

Hq, Task Force Delta24May72 •2 lJSep73*

l-lq, Marine Air Group 15 (Forward) (MAG-15)IApr72-2 1Sep73 *

CG EGen Andrew W. O'DonnellBGen Robert W. ihylorEGen Manning T Jannell

C/S Col Richard F. Hawes, Jr.LtCo! Guy It. CanipoLtCo! Louis W. Schwindr

G-l Capt Matthew Pallo, Jr.CWO2 Dennis Egan

G-2 Maj James M. BarnhartG-3 LtCoI Mervyn J. Burns

Maj Paul M. ColeMaj Arthur P. Loring, Jr.LrCol Robert PlantLtCol Norman A. Smith

G-4 LrCol Vinci! W. HazelbakerLrCol Robert C. Tashjian

G-5 Capt Theodore D. Owens3/9 Security Element

Maj John M. CampanelliMaj Kenneth N. Zilce

CO Col Dean C. Macho1(0 LtCol John M, Rapp

LtCol Eddie R. MaagLtCol Harold L. Jackson, Jr.

S-I Maj Theodore It. McElroyCapt Marvin F. Pixton III

Maj John V. ClineMaj John H. Ditto

5-2 CWO2 Arnoldu V. Serrata5.3 Maj Richard T. Poore

Maj Kenneth D. HollandMaj Jack L. Omer

5-4 Maj Angelo M. InglisaMaj Robert C. BlackingronMaj James B. Harrison, Jr.

3/9 Security ElementCapt Nathaniel It. Hoskot. Jr.Capt Michael S. Kelly

*Date returned to 1st MAW

270

10Jun72.22Aug7223Aug72 -13Aug73

14Aug73-2Nov7324May72-3OSept72

10ct72-28Aug7329Aug73-2Nov73lOJun72-15May73

16May73- 2 Nov73

IQJun7 24 2Sept72lOJun72-lONov72

llNov72-3Feb734Feb73-1Jun73

2Jun73 28Aug7329Aug73-2Nov73lQJun72-28May73

29May73-2 1Sept73

l9Aug72-l2Sept72

2QJun72-25Nov7226Nov72-2lSept73

17May72 -1Feb73

l7May72.95ep72105ep72-29Jan73

30Jan73 -11Feb73

17May72-27Jul7228Jul72-3 1Jul72

lAug72-19Dec7220Dec72-lFeh73

l7May72-31Dec7217May72-31Jul72lAug72-29Jan7330Jan73-lFeb73

17May72.llSrp72i2Sepr72-29Jan73

30Jan73-lPeb73

21May72-24Aug722 5 Aug72-? Fe b7 3

CO Col Keith O'KeefeCol Aubrey W. Talbert, Jr.Col Darrel E. Ejorkiund

XO LtCol Don A. MickleLrCul Rodney 0. LawrenceLtCol Don 3. Slee

LrCol Arvid W. RealsenS-I Maj Daniel C. Escalara

LrCol John T TylerMaj Martin W. MeredithCapt Brute B. Welch

S.2 Capt Donald L. SchusseleCapt Brute M. WinrentsenCWO2 Thomas R. BurnhamCWO3 Richard D. Webb

5-3 Maj Joseph B. WuertaLrCol Ernest 3. AndersenMaj Arthur P. listing. Jr.LtCol Robert Plant

S-'1 Maj Jack P. SmithMaj William F. TremperMaj William J. CooperMaj Jay N. Bibler

3/9 Security ElementCapt Philip F Reynolds

*Date returned to 1st MAW

CO LrCol Kent A. McFerrenMaj Gerald DejongLtCol Henry C. Ivy, Jr.LtCol Charles V. Smillie, Jr.

XO Maj Thomas K. DuffyMaj Getald DejongMaj Jay N. BihlerMaj William 3. CooperMaj Philip R. Kruse

OIC Maj Francis t O'ConnerMaj Anton E. Therriaulr

lApr72-SAug729Aug72-24Ju17325Ju173-21Sep73lApr72-5May726May72-? Sep7285ep72-8May73

9May73-215ep73lApr72-20Feb722lPeb72-20Jul722lJul72-20Apr7321Apr73-215ep73lApr72-l5Apr7216Apr72-31Ju172

lAug72-12Der7223Jun73-215ep73

lApr72-5Jun726Jun72-5May73

6May73-26May7327May73-2l5ep73

lApr72-2Jul723Jul72-31Aug72

ISep72-24Apr7325Apr73•2l5ep73

25May72-I9June72

lApr72-23Jun7224Jun72-l4Jul72

15Jul72 -2Jul723Jul73-215ep73

tApr72-2 7Apr7219May72.23Jun72185ep72-25Apr7326Apr73-lAug732Aug73-2 1Sep73

83un72-GAug727Aug72-50ct72

*Deactivaled with return to III MJtF on 2Nov73.

Hq, Marine Air Group 12 (Forward) (MAG-12)l7May72-lFeb73t

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 115 (VMFA-115)IApr72-215ep73

Marine Aerial RefuelerTransport Squadron 152 (VMGR-152), Detachment Delta

SJun72-215ep73

COMMAND AND STAFF, AIR 271

Capt Andrew D. LarsonCapt David D. HundleyCapt Larry W. AllenCapt Harry F. Clernence, Jr.

CO LeCol Edward C. HcrtbergMaj David J. MooreLcCol Edward C. HectbergLtCol Donald E. Schneider

XO Maj David J. MooreMaj Achille J. Verbeclt, Jr.Maj David J. MooreMaj Harrison A. Makeever

60ce72-12Dec7213Dec72-31Jan73

lFeb731Aug732Aug73-2lSept73

164 (HMM-164)

lJan72-llJan7212Jan72-2 7Jan7228Jan72-31Ju172lAug72-3 1Dec72

lJan721lJan7212Jan72- 27Jan7228Jan72.17Jul72

18Aug7 23 1Dec72

LtCol Eddie R. MaagLrCol Rodney 0. LawrenceMaj James lii. Mead

XO Maj Daniel C. EscaleraMaj Jacob K. Albrighc, Jr.Maj William T McFallMaj Dave G. Drewelow

CO LrCol Kevin M. JohnstonLtCol John J. Caldaa, Jr.

XO Maj Thomas L. ElserMaj John T. Cline

lOMay72-85ep7295epr72-19Apr73

2OApc7321Sept73lApr72-31May72

Uun72.lOSep72115cp72.14Jun7317Jun73.218ep73

17May72 7Sep 728Sep72 .lFeb 73

l7May72-31Dec72lJan73.IFeIs73

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165 (HMM.165)1Jan72-31]ul73t

CO LrCol Paul L. MoreauLtCoI Charles H. F. EggerLtCol Arthur B. Colbert

XO Maj Donnie M. GriffayMaj Thomas A. B. GoldsboroughMaj Davis SayesMaj Robert P. Rogers

tOpcoa IF 78, 1Feb73 antil 24Jul73.

Marine Attack Squadron 211 (VMA.211)17May72-lFeb73

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 212 (VMFA.212)lApc72.30Jun72t

*Unit departed RVN for Hawaii, 24Jun72.

Marine All Weacher Attack Squadron 224 (VMA[AW].224)1Jan72 .3 1Jul72t

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 333 (VMFA-333)1Jul72.4Mar73*

CO LeCol John K. CochranMaj Lee T. Lasseter

XO Maj Lee T. Laasetcr?vlaj ThomasJ. Lyman, Jr.

Marine Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 (HMA.369)14Jun72-26Jan73t

CO Maj Dawson P HansenMaj David L. Rost

XO Capt Ronald G. OsborneMaj James H. MarshallMaj Dawson P Hansen

tOpCo,i IF 77, 22Jun72 untd 26Jan73.

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 463 (HMH-463)1Jan73 .3 IJul7 3*

CO Maj John Van Norrwirk IllMaj William]. Smirh

2(0 Maj William J. SmithMaj Bruce L. Shapiro

tOpCon IF 78. 1Feb73 until 24Jul73.

CO LrCol Billey R. SeandlcyLeCol Ralph E. Brubaker

XO LtCol Ralph B. BrubakerMaj Robert L. Gondek

1Jan72 -1jul722Jul7 2-3 1Jul72

lJan72-29May7230May72-31Jul72

Marine All Weather Attack Squadron 53320Jun72-215ep73

CO LtCol James C. BrownMaj Kent C. BatcmanMaj Ronald F. Merrihew

2(0 Maj John A. MartinMaj Kent C. BatemanMaj Ronald F. MerrihewCapt Ronald M. DAmuraMaj Thomas W. Krimminger

(VMA[AW].533)

20Jun72.19Apr7320Apr73-24Jon7325Jun73-2l5ep7320Jun72-31Ju172tAug72-19Apr73

29Apr73 -24Jun 7325Jun73.30Jun7331Aug73-215ep73

Marine Medium Helicopter SquadronlJan72-31Dcc72

Marine Attack Squadron 311 (VMA.311)17May72-lFeb73

1Jan72 .l5Jun7 2

lGJun72-lMay732May73-31Jul73lJan72.15May72

ldMay72.30Jun721ju172.lOOct72

110re72.31Jul73

1Jul72-23Dec7224Dec724Mar73

1Jul72-23Dec7224Dec72-4Mar73

tDep loyed for operations in southeast Asia on the USS America, 1Jul72 until 4Mar73.

CO LeCol Willis F. Wilson, Jr.LeCol Delbert G. Ran ney

3(0 Maj Richard A. BishopMaj Donald M. FerrisMaj Lonnie S. UnderhillMaj William I-I. Homer

17May72-23May7224May72-lFeb73

17May72-l3Apr7214Apr72-6May72

7May72-8Jul729Jul72 1Feb73

CO LeCol Richard D. RevicXO Maj James B. Leonard, Jr.

ldJun72-230ct7224 Oct 7 2. 2 6Jan73

16Jun72 .17J un72

18Jun72 -2 3Oct72240ce72.26Jan73

IApr72.30Jun72lApc72-303un72 lJan73-4Jon73

5Jun7 3.3 1Jul73lJan73-4Jun73

SJun73-3 1Jul73

tDeployed for operations in Southeast Asia on the USS CoralSea, 8Dec71 until 11Jul72.

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 232 (VMFA-232)lApr7 2-2 1Sep73

CO LtCol Joe L. Gcegorcyk lApr72-9May72

272

Appendix D


Marine prisoners-of-war recovered prior to Operation Homecoming*

Cpl Santos). Agosto captured 12May67 released 23Jan68Sgr James Dodson captured 6May66 escaped 5Jun66LCpI Walter Eckes captured 10May66 escaped 20Jun66LCpI Walter D. Hamilton captured 18Oct65 escaped 29Oct65Sgt Frank C. lodice captured 30May68 escaped 1Jun68LCpl Steven D. Nelson captured 7Jan68 escaped 21Jan68Pvt Joseph S. North, Jr. captured 18Oct65 escaped 29Oct65Sgt Albert). Potter captured 30May68 escaped Uun68Maj Richard F. Risner captured 20Sep68 escaped 22Sep68Pvt Michael R. Roha captuted 7Jan68 escaped 21Jan68Sgt Jon M. Sweeney captured 19Feb69 released 17Sep70Cp! William P. Tallaferro captured 6Feb68 escaped 13Feb68

*Ranks at time of capture

Marines missing-in-action during operations in 1972*

CWO2 Bruce F. Boltze lost 6Oct72 over waterCapt Donald C. Breuer losr 20Nov72 LaosCapt Ralph). Chipman lost 27Dec72 North VietnamlsrLr John M. Christensen lost 13Apr72 over waterCapt John W. Consolvo, Jr. lost 7May72 South VietnamlsrLr Sam G. Cordova lost 26Aug72 LaosCpl Kenneth L. Crody lost 11Jul72 South VietnamIsth Ronald W. Fbrrester lost 27Dec72 North VietnamSSgr Jerry W. Hendrix lost 11Jul72 South VietnamlstLt Scott D. Ketchie lost 9Apr72 LaosCapt David L. Leer lost 13Apr72 over waterlsrLt Joseph W. McDonald lost 3May72 North VietnamCapt John R. Peacock 11 lost 12Oct72 North VietnamlstLt Larry F. Potts lost 7Apr72 South VietnamlstLr William M. Price lost 12Oct72 North VietnamlstLt Dwight G. Rickman lost 25Dec72 South VietnamCapt Leonard Robertson lost 7Jul72 South VietnamCapt David B. Williams lost 3May72 North VietnamCpl James F Worth lost 1Apr72 South Vietnam

*Ranks at time of loss.

OPERATION HOMECOMING 273

Marine returnees during Operation Homecoming*

Capt William K. Angus captured 11Jun72 released 28Mar73Sgt Josef. Anzaldua captured 2 3Jan70 released 27Mar73Capr Bruce R. Archer captured 28Mar68 released 16Mar73Capr Paul G. Brown captured 25Jul68 released 14Mar73

Sgt Leonard R. Budd, Jr. captured 21Aug67 released 5Mar73Sgt Richard (1 Burgess captured 25Sep66 released 5Mar73LrCol Harlan P. Chapman captured 5Nov65 released 12Feb73

SSgt Frank E. Cius, Jr. captured 3Jun66 released 5Mar73SSgr John A. Deering captured 3Feb68 released 5Mar73Capr James V. Dibernardo captured 3Feb68 released 5Mar73LtCol John 1-I. Dunn captured 7Dec65 released 12Feb73Pvr Fred L. .Elbert, Jr. captured 16Aug68 released 16Mar73Capt Lawrence V. Friese captured 24Feb68 released 14Mar73Sgt Robert R. Helle captured 24Apr68 released 16Mar73Sgt Abel L. Kavanaugh captured 24Apr68 released 16Mar73

lstLt Alan J. Kroboth captured 7Jul72 released 27Mar73LrCol Jerry W. Marvel captured 24Feb68 released 14Mar73LrCol Edison W. Miller captured 13Oct68 released 12Feb73Maj Paul J. Montague captured 26Mar68 released 16Mar73SSgt Alfonso R. Riare captured 26Apr67 released 16Mar73Sgt Ronald L. Ridgeway captured 25Feb68 released 16Mar73Maj Orson G. Swindle III captured 11Nov66 released 4Mar73Sgt Dennis A. Tellier captured 19Jun69 released 27Mar73CWO3 William E. Thomas, Jr. captured 19May72 released 27Mar73Capt James P. Walsh captured 26Sep72 released 12Feb73

Capt James H. Warner captured 30cr67 released 14Mar73

*Ranks at time of release.

Marines recovered after Operation Homecoming

PFC Robert R. Garwood caprured 28Sep65 returned 21Mar79

III MAF Operation Homecoming Marine Processing Team8Jan73- 2Oct73

Depury Commander Col John W. ClayborneTeam Chief Maj John J. PaganelliAsst Team Chief Maj Richard L. BrownAdmin Team Capt Gerald S. Duncan

Capt Robert B. SpikerSSgt Richard V. AndersonSgt Thomas W. BohnenkampSgr Frank R. LawsonSgr Orville J. Pierce


Chaplain Capt S. R. Hardman, USNCdt J. G. Newton, USN

Medical Team Capt M. A. Vasquez, USNCdi P. 0. O'Halloran, USN[-IM1 T. J. Taylor, USN

Public Affairs 2dLt Thomas E. KingryLegal LtCol Joseph A. Mallery, Jr.

Maj Neal T. RountreeFinance CWO2 Lawrence T. MullinDebrief Team Capt William C. Howey

CWO3 Vaughan B. DelkCWO3 Claude R. Cordell, Jr.GySgt Cleslie H. EvansGySgt Lloyd H. Link

Uniform Team MSgt Fred A. NorvellSSgt William C. DahlquistSSgt Ronald B. Clemons

Escort Team Chief LtCol Melvin H. Saurter

FMFPac POW Action Officer Maj Thomas Y. Barton, Jr.

HQMC POW Action OfficersPolicy, G-1 Maj William B. ClarkCasualty, G-1 Capt James A. JohnsonIntelligence, G-2 Capt Thomas H. MarinoPublic Affairs Capt James A. AmendoliaJudge Advocate Maj David M. Brahms

Appendix E

Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC)January 1972 - January 1973

CMC LtGen Le Nguyen Khang XO Maj Nguyen Van DongBGen Bui The Lan

Medical BattalionAsstCMC Cot Bul The LanCol Nguyen Thanh Tn

C/S Cot Ie Dinh Que CO Maj Nguyen Van TheXO Maj Iran Manh TuongIG Inspector Cot Ton That Soan

Maj Nguyen Van Hay Maj Nguyen Manh Tuong

AdjGen Maj Nguyen Van Dien Amphibious Support BattalionAsst Capt Nguyen Van HanhSocial Welfare Capt Tran Thi Huy L WACF CO Maj Phan Van SatDC/S Ops and Log LtCol Nguyen The Luong XO Maj Vuong Van Tai(C/S Forward) Cot Pham Van ChungG-i Capt Tran Van Nuoi Engineer BattalionAsst Capt Nguyen Van HanhG-2 Maj Le Van Hien CO Maj Do Van TyAsst Capt Tran Kim Hoang XO Capt Cao Van TamG-3 LtCol Do Ky Maj Dang Van TuyenAsst Maj Tran Van HienG-3 TOC LtCol Nguyen Huu Cat Long Range Reconnaissance Company 147G-3 Ops Maj Le Van CuuG-3 Plans Maj Phan Cong Ton CO lstLt Phan Van ThanG-3 Trng Capt Le Hoang NghiG-4 Maj Nguyen Van Nhieu Long Range Reconnaissance Company 258G-4 Trans Maj Ngo Nhat ThangG-4 Ptans 2dLt Nguyen Van Le CO Capt Duong Van BuuDC/S Poiwar LtCol Bui Van PhamPsywar Capt Le Dinh Bao Long Range Reconnaissance Company 369Psyops Trng Capt Huynh Van PhuDivArty/FSC LtCoI Nguyen Van Truoc CO Capt Tran Van ChiAsst Maj Vo Dang PhuongDivCEO LtCol Hoang Ngoc Bao Brigade 147Asst Maj Nguyen Nhu Chu

CO Col Nguyen Nang BaoHeadquarters Battalion XO LtCol Phan Van Thang

LtCot Nguyen Xuan PhucCO LtCol Vo Kinh

LtCoI Pham Nha Brigade 258XO Maj Dang Van Hoc

CO Col Ngo Van DinhCommunications BattalionXO LtCol Do Dinh Vuong

CO LtCol Hoang Ngoc Bao itCol Do Huu Tung

275


COxO

Col Pham Van ChungLtCol Nguyen The Luong

LtCol Pham NbaLtCol Doan Thuc

1st Infantry Battalion

Maj Nguyen Dang TongMaj Nguyen Dang Hoa

Maj Doan Due NghiMaj Nguyen Cao Nghiem

2d Infantry Battalion

LtCol Nguyen Xuan PhucMaj Tran Van HopMaj Tran Van Ho

Maj Le Quang Lien

3d Infantry Battalion

Maj Le Ba BinhMaj Nguyen Van Canh

Capt Duong Van Hung

4th Infantry Battalion

Maj Tran Xuan QuangLtCol Nguyen Dang Tong

Maj Nguyen Dang HoaMaj Pham Kim Tien


LtCol Ho Quang Lich COMaj Tran Ba

Capt Ngo Thanh Huu

COMaj Do Huu Tung XOMaj Tran Van Hien

Maj Nguyen Van CanhMaj Nguyen Van Su

Maj Vo Tn HueMaj Nguyen Van Kim

Capt Nguyen Van KimCapt Ton That Tran

Maj Nguyen Van ThanCapt I.e Van Huyen

Maj Nguyen Phuc Dinh

LtCol Nguyen Kim DeMaj Pham Cang

LtCol Doan Trong CaoMaj Nguyen Huu Lac

LtCol Dang Ba DatMaj Truong Cong Thong

LtCol Iran Thien HieuCapt Ha Tien Chuong

Maj Iran Ngoc ToanLtCol I.e Ba Binh

LtCol Nguyen Due AnCapt Le Van Do

Capt Tran Xuan Bang

Brigade 369



CO

xO

CO

xO

CO

xO

CO

xO

CO

xO

xO

CO

xO

COxO

COxO

COxO

COxO

COxO


1st Artillery Battalion

2d Artillery Battalion

3d Artillery Battalion

Song Than Base

CO

6th Infantry BattalionTraining Center

Appendix F

Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

A-i—Douglas Skyraidee, a single-engine, propeller-driven attackaircraft.

A-4—McDonnell Douglas Skyhawk, a single-seat jet attack aircraftin service on board carriers of the U.S. Navy and with land-basedMarine attack squadrons.

A-6—-Grumman Intruder, a twin-jet, twin-seat attack aircraft spe-cifically designed to deliver weapons on targets completely ob-scured by weather or darkness.

A-7-—Vought Corsair, a single-seat, jet attack aircraft.A-37—Cessna Dragonfly, a twin-jet, dual-seat, light attack aircraft.AAA—Antiaircrafr Artillery.ABCCC—Airbornc Battlefield Command and Control Center, a

U.S. Air Three asreraft equipped with communications, data link,and display equipment; it may be employed as an airborne com-mand post or a communications and intelligence relay facility.

AC-47 Douglas Spooky, a twin-engine, propeller-driven gunshiparmed with four 7.62mm mini-guns and illumination.

AC-1I9---Fairchild Shadow and Stinger, a twin-engine, propeller-dnven gonship armed with four 7.62mm mini-guns and illu-mination.

AC-130—Iocltheed Spectre, a four-engine, turboprop gunship armedwith 20mm and 4Omm guns, illumination, and infrared capa-bility.

ACCS—Aitborne Command and Control Squadron.ACBLT—Air Contingency Battalion Landing Team, also Air BLT.ACT—U.S. Air Cavalry 'Hoop.ACTIV—Army Concept Team in Vietnam.ADC—Assistant Division Commander.AdminO —Administrative Officer.Adv—Advanred.AH-1J—Bell Sea Cobra, twin-engine, single rotor helicopter spe-

cifically designed for helicopter escort and gonship support with20mm cannon, rockets, and flares.

AID —Agency for International Development.AIK—Assiatanre In Kind.Air America—U.S. Government-sponsored proprietary air transport

company.AK-47 —Kalashnikov-designed, gas-operated, air-cooled, magazine-

fed. 7.62mm automatic rifle, with an effective range of 400meters. Standard rifle of the North Vietnamese Army.

AIC—Area logistical Command.A&L CO—Administrative and Direct Support Logistics Company.Alladsn —Air Force FAC operating at night using starlight scope and

flares to control night air strikes.AlMar—All Marines, a Commandant of the Marine Corps bulletin

directed to all Marine Corps personnel.AID—Air Liaison Officer, a naval aviator/flight officer attached to

a ground unit who is the primary advisor to the ground com-mander on air operation matters.

AMTI—Aieborne Moving Target Indicator on the A-6 aircraft.ANGLICO—Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, a unit com-

posed of Marine and Navy personnel specially qualified for con-trol of naval gunfire and close air support. ANGLICO personnel

normally provided this service while attached to L'S. and al-lied units.

AO—Air Observer, brief for naval aviation observer (tactical), anindsvidual whose primary mission is to observe from light air-craft in order to adjust supporting arms fire and to obtain information.

AO—Aeea of Operations.AOA—Amphibioos Objective Area, a defined geographical area wi-

thin which is located the area or areas to be captured by an am-phibious task forre.

AOE—Fast Combat Support Ship.Apache—Call sign of"A" Troop, 7/i Air Cavalry Squadron (ACS).APC—Armored Personnel Carrier.APD —Airborne Personnel Derertor.Arc Light—Code name for 8-52 bombing missions in South

Vietnam.ARG—Amphibioos Ready Group.ARRS—Aeeospare Rescue and Recovery Squadron.Arty—Artillery.ARVN—Army cf the Republic of Vietnam (Sooth Vietnam).ASP—Ammunition Supply Point.ASPE —Assault Support Patrol Boat.ASRT—Air Sopport Radar Team, a subordinate operational com-

ponent of a tactical air control system which provides ground-controlled precision flight path guidance and weapons releasefor attack aircraft.

Alt —Atmored Troop Carrier, nicknamed "Tango boat."AltO—Air flansportation Coordination Officer.ATSB—Advanced Tartical Support Base.A/W—Aotomaeie Weapons.Autumn Mist—A helicopter defoliation mission using one UH-1

spray aircraft which may or may nor be arcompanied by a lightfire team.

Barrel Roll — Codename for air interdiction operations in Laos.B-3—North Vietnamese military command established in the Cen-

tral Highlands of South Vietnam to control military operationsin Konrum, Dar Lac, and Pleiko Provinces.

B-40 — Communist rocket-propelled grenade launcher.B-5—Nnrth Vietnamese military command established along the

Demilitarized Zone,8-52 — Boeing Stratofortress, U.S. Air Force eight-engine jet, swept-

wing heavy bomber.BA—Base Area.DCC — Border Control Centers.BDC—Baac Defense Commander.BGen — Brigadier General,Bronco—Rockwell International OV-l0, twin-engine, turboprop

counterinsurgency aircraft.BLT—Battalion Landing Team.Bn—Battalion.Brig— Brigade.

277


Bushmaster—An operation conducted by a company-sized unit in-serted into an area, to establish a clandestine base of operationsand to interdict enemy infiltration routes using coordinatedplatoon-sized night ambushes.

C-) — Lockheed Galaxy, fouc-engine jet tcanspoct airtcaft.C-7—De Havilland Caribou, twin-engine, propeller-driven trans-

port aircraft.C-117 — Douglas Skytcain, a twin-engine, propeller-driven transport

aircraft. The C-117 was an improved version of the C-47, themilitary version of the DC-3.

C-123—Fairchild Pcovidec, twin-engine, propeller-driven transportaircraft.

C130—Lockheed Hercules, a four-engine, turboprop transportaircraft.

C-141—Lockheed Starlifrer, a four-engine jet transport aircraft.Capt—Captain.CARE—Co-operation foe American Relief Everywhere.CAS—Close Air Support.CBU—Clusrer Bomb Unit.CCB—Command and Communications Boat.CCC—Combined Campaign Plan.Cdr— Commander.CEC—Construction Engineer Corps.CG—Commanding General.CH-46—Boeing Vertol Sea Knight, a twin-engine, tandem-rotor

transpote helicopter, designed to catty a four-man crew and 17combat-loaded troops.

CH-47 — Boeing Vertol Chinook, a twin-engine, tandem-rotor trans-port helicopter, designed to tarry a four-man crew and 33combat-loaded troops.

CH-53—Sikorsky Sea Stallion, a twin-engine, single-rotor, heavytransport helicopter with an average payload of 12,800 pounds.Carties crew of three and 38 combat-loaded troops.

ChiCom—Chinese Communist.Chieu Hoi —"Open Arms" program which welcomes returnees to

the side of the Government uf South Vietnam.CIA—Central Intelligence Agency.CICV— Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam.CID — Criminal Investigative Division.CIDG—Civilian Irregular Defense Geoups, mercenaries of Viet-

namese, Laotian, and Cambodian descent who fight primarilyaround their own villages.

CinCPac—Commander in Chief, Pacific.CinCPacflt—Commandec in Chief, Pacific Fleet,CIT—Counter-Intelligence Team.Class 1, 11, III, cc al—Categories of military supplies, e.g., Class

I, rations; Class II, petroleum-oil-lubricants; Class V, ammu-nition.

Claymore—M18A1 U.S. dicectsonal antipersonnel mine.CMC—Commandant of the Marine Corps.CMD—Capital Military District.CMH—Center of Military History. Department of the Army.CNO—Chief of Naval Operations.CO — Commanding Officer.COC—Combat Operations Center.Col — Colonel.Combat Skyspot— High-altitude, radar-directed, level-flight bomb-

ing employing various types of aitctafr.ComdC — Command Chconology.

ComdHise— Command History.Comm — Communications.ComNavEbePar—Commandec, Naval Thrces, Pacific.ComNavFotV—Commander, Naval Itsrces, Vietnam.ComUSMACV— Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command,

Vietnam.ComIJSMACThai —Commander, U.S. Military Activities Command,

Thailand.CORDS — Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support.COSVN—Ceotral Office of South Vietnam, the nominal Com-

munist military and political headquarters in South Vietnam.CP—Command Post.CPX— Command Pose Exercise.CRC—Control and Reporting Center, an element of the U.S. Air

Rstce tactical air control system, subordinate to the Tactical AirControl Center, which tondurts radar and warning operations.

CR5—Catholic Relief Service.CRDC — Central Revolutionary Development Council.CRIMP— Consolidated Republic of Vietnam Improvement and

Modernization Plan.CRIP—Civilian Reconnaissance Intelligence Platoon.CS—Riot agent, also known as "teat gas?'CSC — Communications Service Company.CTZ—Corps Tactical Zone.CV— Multipurpose airttsft tartiet.CVA—Attack aircraft carrier.CZ—Coastal Zone.

DAO—Defense Attache Office.DASC—Direct Air Support Center, a subordinate operational com-

ponent of an air-control system designed for conttol of close airsupport and other direct ait-suppore opetaeions.

DC-8 — MrDonnell Douglasjet Trader, a four-engine, jet cargo andpassenger transport aircraft.

D-Day—Day scheduled for the beginning of an operation.DD — Destroyer.

DDG—Guided Missile Destroyer.DE — Escort Destroyer.DIA—Defense Intelligence Agency.Div—Division.DMZ—Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Vietnam.DOD—Department of Defense.DRV—Democratit Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam).DSA—District Senior Advisor.DTA—Division Tactical Atea.Dtd — Dated.DTZ—Divisinn Tactical Zone.Duffel Bag—Acoustical sensors used for surveillance.Duster—Nickname for the 11.5. M42 tracked vehicle which mounts

dual "iOmm automatic weapons.Dust Off— Medical evacuatioo by helicopter.

EA-6 — Grumman Prowler, the electronic watfate version of the A-6AIntruder.

Eagle Flight—Air-cavalry-type operation using gunships and lighehelicopters to initiate contact, followed by helo insertions intocontact areas.

Eagle Float—Troops embarked on rivet assault etafe (RAC) who areinserted into a battle area on command.

GLOSSARY 279

EB-66 — Douglas Destroyer, twin-engine, jet, electronic warfare ver-sion of the B-66.

EC-130-.-Lockheed. a four-engine, turbo-prop, electronic warfareand communications version of the C-130 Hercules,

ECM —Electronic Countermeasures, a major subdivision of electronicwarfare involving actions against enemy electtonic equipmentor to exploit thr usr of electromagnetic radiations from suchequipment.

ECCM—Elerrconic Counter Countermeasures, the procedures andequipment used to protect communications and electronicequipment from interference or exploitation by an enemy.

EUNT—Eleccronic Intelligence, chc intelligence information gainedby monitoring radiations from enemy electronic equipment.

Engr—Engineer.ENIFF—Enemy Initiated Fire Fight.EOD—Explosivc Ordnance Disposal.ETA, ETh—Estimaced Time of Arrival and Estimated Time of

Departure.

F-4—McDonnell Phantom II, a twin-engine, two-seat, long-range,all-weather jet interceptor and attack bomber.

P.5 —Northrop Freedom Fighter, a twin-engine, single-seat, jet fight-er aircraft.

FAC—Ibrward Air Controller.FAC(A) — Rsrward Air Controller (Airborne).FANK—&rce Annee Nationale Khmer, the Cambodian Army.FDC—Fire Direction Center.Firefly—A light fire team (LFI') with a flare oc a light ship employed

in a night airfield defense.FMFPac—Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.RD—Forward Observer.Freedom Deal—Codenamc foe air operations in Cambodia.FRC—Federal Records Center.Front 4—Communist military headquacters responsible for Quang

Nam Province.P58 — Fire Support Base.FSCC—Fice Support Coordination Center, a single location involved

in the coordination of all forms of fice support.FSR—Force Service Regiment.Fwd—Thrward.FWMAF— Free World Military Assistance Forces.FWMF— Free World Military Force.FY—Fiscal Year, for example "FY-72"

G-1, -2, et al—Military staff positions on a general staff, e.g., G-1would refer to the staff member re' sonsible for personnel; 0-2,intelligence; 0-3, operarions; G-1 logistics; and G-5, civil af&irs.

Gen — General.Grenade Launcher—U.S. M79 or M203 single-shot, breech-loaded,

shoulder weapon which fires 40mm projectiles and weighs ap-proximately 6.5 pounds when loaded; it has a sustained rateof aimed fire of five o seven rounds pee minute and an effectiverange of 375 meters.

Gun, 175mm—U.S. M107 self-pcopelled gun which weighs 62,000pounds and fires a 147-pound projectile to a maximum rangeof 32,800 meters. Maximum rate office is one round every twominutes.

GVN—Government of Vietnam (South Vietnam).

H&l — 1-lacassing and Inrerdietion fires.H&MS — Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron.H&S Co—Headquarters and Service Company.HC(A) — Helicopter Commander (Airborne).HDC—Hclicopcer Direction Center.HE — High Explosive.HEAr—Helicopter Employment And Landing Table.HH-3 — Sikorsky Sea King, a single-rotor, helicopter used for com-

bat search and rescue.HH-53—Silcorslcy Sea Stallion, twin-engine, single-rotor helicop-

ter used for search and rescue in combat configurations.H-Hour—Specific rime an operation begins.HLZ—Helicoprer Landing Zone.HMH—Macine Heavy Helicopter Squadron.HMM—Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron, also the basis of com-

posste squadrons with deployed forces.Hoi Chanh—A Chieu Hoi rallier.Hook—CH-47 helicopters from an assault supply company (ASHC).Howitzer, 8-ineh—U.S. M55 self-propelled, heavy artillery piece with

a maximum range of 16,900 meters and a care of fire of oneround every nvo minutes.

Howirzer, 105mm—U.S. MIOIAI rowed, general-purpose light ar-tillery piece with a maximum range of 11,000 meters and maxi-mum tare of fire of four rounds per minute.

Howitzer, 155mm—U.S. MI14A rowed and M109 self-propelledmedium artillery with a maximum range of 15,080 meters anda maximum tare of fire of three rounds per minute. The newerand heavier self-propelled M109 was largely road-bound, whileche lighrer, cowed M1I4A could be moved either by truck orby helicopter.

HST— Helicopter Support Team.Huey—Bell Iroquois UN-I series of helicopters.HQMC— Headquarters Marine Corps.

ICCS—Inrernarional Commission of Control and Supervision, es-tablished by the Paris Peace Accords of 1973 to supervise theimplemenrarion of the accords. Composed of members fromCanada, Hungary, Poland, Indonesia, and Iran.

I MAF—I Marine Amphibious Force.mccl — Intelligence.Inrvw— Interview.lOD—Inregeated Observation Device.ITT— Interrogator/Translator Team.

3-1, -2, er al—Designation for members of a joint staff which in-cludes members of several Services, 3.1 refers to the staff mem-ber responsible for pecsonnrl;J-2, intelligenee;J-3, operations;3-4, logistics; and 3-5, civil affairs.

JCRC —Joint Casualry Resolurion Center.JCS—.Joinc Chiefs of Sraff (U.S.).JGS —Joint Genetal Staff (South Vietnamese).JMC—Joinr Milirary Commission. The Four Parry JMC represent-

ing the United Stares, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and rheProvisional Revolutionary Government established by the 1973Paris Peace Accords. See also the Two Parry JMC of RVN andthe PRO.

JUSPAO—Joinc U.S. Public Affairs Office.

K Ba A platoon of gunships, one command and control ship.


Group of the Center

and at least five troop-carrying helicopters available for use bySouth Vietnamese provincial governments.

KC-130—Lockheed, in-flight refueling tanker configuration uf theC-130 Hercules.

Khmer Rouge—Cambodian Communists.KIA—Killed in Action.Kit Carson Scouts— Former Viet Cong who came over to the South

Vietnamese side and served with allied units.

LAAW—U.S. M72 light antitank assault weapon, also know as lightantitank weapon (LAW).

ICC—Amphibious Command Ship.1CM—Landing Craft, Mechanized, designed to land tanks, trurks,

and trailers directly onto the beach. Also known as a "Mike boat?'ICPL— Landing Craft, Personnel, Large.ICE—Landing Craft, Utility.JCVP—Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel, a small craft with a bow

ramp used to transport assault troops and light vehicles to thebeach. Also known as a "Papa boar?'

1GB—Laser Guided Bomb, popularly known as "smart bombs?'L-Hour—The specific time helicopters land in a helicopter landing

zone (USMC); launch hour, when an aircraft leaves the ground(USA F).

Linebacker—Codename for the air and surface interdiction opera-tions against North Vietnam in t972.

LKA—Amphibious Cargo Ship.lOC—Lines of Communication.LOH—OH-6 Light Observation Helicopter.101—Letter of Instruction.LORAN—Long Range Navigarion, a system of radio stations at

known positions used for air and sea guidance.LPD —Amphibious Transport Dock, a ship designed to transport

and land troops, equipment, and supplies by means of embarkedlanding craft, amphibious vehicles, and helicopters. It has botha submersible well deck and a heliroprer landing deck.

LPH—Amphibious Assault Ship, a ship designed or modified totransport and land troops, equipment, and supplies by meansof embarked helicopters.

LRRP—Inng Range Reconnaissance Patrol.ISA—Logistic Support Area.L.SD—1.snding Ship Dock, a landing ship designed to combat load,

transport, and launth amphibious crafts or vehicles together withcrews and embarked personnel, and to provide limited dock-ing and repair services to small ships and crafts, It lacks thehelicopter landing deck of the LPD.

LST—Thnk Landing Ship, a landing ship designed to transport heavyvehicles and to land them on a beach.

LSU—Logiscics Support Unit.Lr—Lieutenant.LeCol —Lieutenant Colonel.L'I'DS—Laset Target Designation System.LtGen — Lieutenant General.Ltr— Letter.

LUFI'— Light fire team (two htlicoprer gunships).LVIt—Landing Vehicle, 'frscked, Command, an amphibian vehi-

cle fitted with radios for use as a command and control facility.LVTE—Landing Vehicle, Trarked, Engineer, a lightly armored am-

phibian vehicle designed for minefield and obstacle clearance.LVTP— Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Personnel; an amphibian vehicle

used to land or transport personnel.Il—Landing Zone.

MAB—Marine Amphibious Brigade.MABLEX—MAB Landing Exercise.MABS—Marine Air Basr Squadron.MAC—Military Airlift Command.Machine Gun, .50 Caliber—U.S. M2 belt-fed, recoil-operated, air-

cooled automatic weapon, which weighs approximately 80pounds without mount or ammunition; it has a sustained rateoffice of 100 rounds per minute and an effective range of 1,450meters.

Machine Gun, 7.62mm—U.S. M60 belt-fed, gas-operated, air-tooled, automatic weapon, which weighs approximacely 20pounds without mount or ammunition; it has a sustained rareoffice of 100 rounds per minute and an effective range of t,000meters.

MACS—Macinc Air Control Squadron, provides and operatesground facilities fur the detection and interception of hostileaircraft and for thr navigational direction of friendly aircraft inthe conduct of support operations.

MACV—Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.MM—Marine Amphibious Force, currently "MEF" (Marine Expedi-

tionary Force).MAG—Marine Aircraft Group.Main Force—Refers to organized Vict Cong battalions and rcgimenrs

as opposed to local guerrilla groups.Maj — Major.MajGen — Major General.MAP— Military Assistance Program.MarDiv— Marine Division.Marines—Designates an infantry regiment, e.g., 3d Marines.MASF— Milicary Assistance Service Funded.MASS—Marine Air Support Squadron, provides and operates fa-

cilities for the control of support aircraft operating in direct sup-port of ground forces.

MAU—Marine Amphibious Unit, not to be confused with the Ma-rine Advisory Unit of the Naval Advisory Group which ad-ministered the advisory effort to the South Vietnamese MarineCorps.

MarAdvU—Marinc Advisory Unit.MAW— Marine Aircraft Wing.MCAF—Mariue Corps Aic Facility.MCAS—Marine Corps Air Srarion.MCCC—Marine Corps Command Center.MCO—Marinr Corps Order.MCOAG—Marine Corps Operations Analysis

for Naval Analyses (CNA).MCSA—Macine Corps Supply Agency.MedCAP— Medical Civic Action Program.MedEvac — Medical Evacuation.MEDTC—Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia.MIA— Missing in Artion.MiG— Mikoyan-Gurevich-designed Soviet aircraft.MiICAP— Military Civic Action Program.Mini-Dust-—Two or more helicopter spray ships accompanied by one

or more light fire teams and employed in enemy base areas.Mini-Package—A platoon of gunships, one command and control

ship, and at least five troop-carrying helicopters available forthe usc of South Vietnamese provincial governments.

MO—Mount Out, loaded and ready classes of supplies for contin-gency use by amphibious forces.

MOA—Mount Our Augmentation.

GLOSSARY 281

Modfoc—Modified Location, radius around a specified point fromwhich naval ships may transit while waiting employment.

Monitor—Heavily armored ICM-6 with 4Omm cannon. 105mmhowitzer, or flame gun.

Mortar, 4.2 inch—U.S. M30 rifled, muzzle-loaded, drop.firedweapnn consisting of tube, bsse.plate. and standard; weaponweighs 330 pounds and has maximum range of 4,020 meters.Rate of fIre is 20 rounds per minute. Also known as the "FourDeuce.

Mortar, 60mm—U.S. M19 smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded weapon.which weighs 45.2 pounds when assembled. It has a maximumrate of fire of 30 rounds per minute and sustained rate of fireof 18 rounds per minute; the effective range is 2,000 meters.

Mortar, 81mm—U.S. M29 smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded weapon,which weighs approximately 115 pounds when assembled; it hasa sustained rate office of two rounds per minute and an effec-tive range of 2,300-3,650 meters, depending upon ammunitionused.

Mortar, 82mm—Communist smooth-bore, single-shot, high angleoffice weapon which weighs approximately 123 pounds; it hasa maximum rate of fire of 25 rounds per minute and a maxi-mum range of 3,040 meters.

Mortar, 120mm—Communist smooth-bore, drop- or trigger-fired,weapon which weighs approximately 600 pounds; it has a max-imum rate of fire of 15 rounds per minute and a maximum rangeof 5,700 meters.

MR—Military Region; South Vietnamese army corps tactical zoneswere redesignated military regions in 1970, e.g., I Corps 'licti-cal Zone (ICTZ) became Military Region I (MR I).

MRB—Mobile Riverine Base.MRF— Mobile Riverine Forte.MR-5—Communisc political and military sector in South Vietnam,

including all of MR 1 (1 Corps). NVA units in MR-5 did notreport to COSVN.

Ms—Manuscript.MSB—Mine Sweeper Boat.MSC—Military Sealift Command.MSD—Mine Sweeper Drone.MSG—Marine Security Guard.Msg—Message.

NAG — Naval Advisory Group.Nail—Call sign for USAF OV-io aircraft.NAS—Naval Air Station.NAIOPS—Naval Air ilaining and Operating Procedures Standardi-

zation.NavLE—Naval Liaison Element.NCC—Naval Component Commander.NCO — Nonrommissioned Officer,NED — Noncombatant Evacuation Operation.NGID—Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer.NGS—Naval Gunfire Support.NJLO—Naval Intelligence Liaison Officet.NKP—U.S. Air Force designation for Nakhnn Phanom Air Base,

Thailand.NLF—Nacional Liberarion Front, the political arm of the

Communist-led insurgency against the South VietnameseGovernment.

NMCB—Nsvsl Mobile Construction Battalion, whose members areknown as "SeaBees,"

NMCC—Nationsl Military Command Center.NOD—Night Observation Device.NPFF— National Police Field Force.NSA—Naval Support Activity.NSD—Naval Supply Depot.Nui—Vietnamese word for hill or mountain.Nung— Southeast Asian tribesman, of a ethnic group of probably

Chinese origin.NVA—North Vietnamese Army, the Peoples Army of Vietnam

(PAVN); often used colloquially to refer to a single North Viet-namese soldier.

0-1-—Cessna Bird Dog, single-engine, propeller-driven observationaircraft.

0-2—Cessna Skynsasrer, dual-engine, propeller-driven observationaircraft.

OH-6 — Hughes C'ayuse, single-rotor light helicopter used for armedreconnaissance and observation. Also known as a "roach,"

OH-SB—Bell Kiowa, single-rotor light helicopter used for armedreconnaissance and observation.

OIC—Officec-ln-Charge.OpCon—Operational Control, the authority granted to a com-

mander to direct forces assigned for specific missions or caskswhich are usually limited by function, time, or location.

OpO—Operation Order, a direcrive issued by a commander rosubordinate commanders for the execution of an operation.

OP—Observation Post.OPlan—Operation Plan, a plan for a single or series of connected

operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession; itis the form of directive employed by higher authority to permitsubordinate consmanders to prepare supporting plans and orders.

OpSum — Operational Summary.OV-10—North American Rockwell Bronco, twin-engine, turboprop

observation and light atrack aircraft.

Paddy Control—Air Force Tactical Radar Control Center for rheMekong River Delta, Incared at Binh Thuy Air Base.

P-3—Lockheed Orion, four-engine, turboprop naval patrol aircraft.PAT—People's Action Team or Political Arcion Team.PATMA—Pacific Air Traffic Management Agency.Pave Nail — Call sign for USAF Dy-b with laser-designator to con-

trol precision guided munitions.PAVN—Peoples Anny of Vietnam (North Vietnam). This acronym

was dropped by the Americans in favor of NVA.PBR—Pateol Boat River.PCF— Patrol Craft Fast, known as a "Swift Boat."Pegasus—CH-47 helicopters employed on a standby basis to drop

hulk eiot agent.PP—Popular Force, Vietnamese militia who were usually employed

in the defense of their own communities.PG—Patrol Gunboat.PGM—Pretision-guided munitions, so-called "smart bombs:'PIIC—Phoro Imagery Interpretation Center.Plaroon of Gunships—Two light fire teams (four helicopter

gunships).POL—Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants.Pol War— Political Wacfare.POW—Prisoner of War.PRC2S —Standard very-high-frequency radio used by Marine ground


units in Vietnam for voice communication over distances up to25 miles.

PRU — Provincial Retonnaissance Unit.PSA—Provincial Sectoc Advisor.PRG—People's Revolutionary Government (Viec Cong).ProvMAG—Provisional Marine Aircraft Group.PSA— Province Senior Advisor.PsyOps — Psychological Operations.

QL—Viecnamese acronym for national highway.

RaBFAC—Radar Beacon for Forward Air Control.RAD—River Assault Division.RAG—River Assault Group.R&R—Rest and Relaxation.RAID—River Assault and Interdiction Division (North Vietnam).RAS—River Assault Squadron.Recoilless Rifle 106mm—U.S. M40 single-shot, recoilless, breech-

loaded weapon which weighs 438 pounds when assembled andmounted for firing; it has a sustained race of fire of six roundsper minute and an effective cange of 1,365 meters.

Regt— Regiment.RF—Regiooal Force, Vietnamese militia who were employed in a

specific region.RF-4—Photogcaphic-reconnaissance model of the F4E Phantom.RF-8A—-Voughr reconnaissance version of the F-8 Crusader.

Rifle, Mi4—U.S. gas-operated, magazine-fed, air-cooled, semi-automatic, 7.62mm shoulder weapon, which weighs 12 poundswith a full 20-round magazine; it has a sustained rate of fireof 30 tounds per minute and an effective tange of 500 yards.

Rifle, M16—U.S. gas-operated, magazine-fed, air-cooled, automatic,5.56mm shoulder weapon, which weighs 3.1 pounds with a20-round magazine; it has a sustained tate of file of 12-15 roundsper minute and an effective range of 460 meters.

REF—Regimental Landing Team.ROK—Republic of Korea.Rolling Thunder—Codename for initial U.S. air nperarinos over

North Vietnam.ROE—Rules of Engagement.Route Packages—Numbered air control areas for the American

bombing campaign in North Vietnam.RPG—Rockec Propelled Grenade.RR—Rural Reconstruction.RSSZ—Rung Sat Special Zone.RVN—Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).RVNAP— Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.RZ— Reconnaissance Zone.

S-I, -2. et al—Refers to staff positions on regimental and battalionlevels. S-i would refer to the staff member responsible for per-sonnel; 5-2, intelligence; 5-3, operations: S-4, logistics; and S-S.civil affairs.

SAC—Strategic Air Command.SACC—Suppotting Arms Control Center.SAM—Surface to Air Missile.SAR—Search and Rescue.SKIS —Short Airfield for Thctical Support, an expeditionary airfield

used by Marine Cocps aviation that includs a portable runwaysurface, aircraft launching and recovery devices, and other es-sential components.

SCAMP—Sensor Control and Management Platoon.Sea-I.ords—Codename for Southeast Asia naval campaign.Seal—Sea, Air, Land, special six- to eight-man naval intelligence

gathering detachment.SEAIO—Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.Seawolves—Naval helicopter gunships operating as light oc heavy

fire teams.SecDef—Secretary of Defense.SecState—Seccetary of State.SeventhAF—Seventh Air Force, the major U.S. Air Force tommand

in Southeast Asia.SeventhFlt—The U.S. Navy fleet assigned to the Western Pacific.Shadow—C-119 aircraft with four 7.62mm miniguns and illumi-

nation.SID—Seismic Intrusion Device, sensor used to monitor movement

through ground vibrations.SitRep — Situation Report.SKS — Simonov-designed, gas-operated, 7.62mm semiautomatic

rifle.Slick— UH-1B helicopter.SMA—Seniot Marine Advisor.SOG—Special Operations Group, MACV's joint unconventional

warfare task force.Song—Vietnamese for river.SOP— Standing Operating Procedure, set of instructions laying out

standardized proceduces.Soetie—An operational flight by one aircraft.SOS—Special Operations Squadron.SOW—Special Operations Wing.Spectre—C-130 aircraft with 20mm and 40mm miniguns. illumi-

nation, and infrared television for night observation support oftroops-

SPG—Special Planning Group.Spooky—C-47 aircraft with four 7.62mm miniguns and flare illu-

mination capability for night support of troops in contact.SptRept — Spot Report.SRF— Ship Repair Facility.558—Swimmer Support Boat, also known as a "Skimmer."Stinger—C-I191C aircraft with 20mm miniguns and illumination

used for night observation in support of troops.SVN—South Vietnam.Swing Ship—UH-ID helicopter assigned to different sectors for ad-

ministrative use.

TA-4—McDonnell Douglas Skyhawk, dual-seat version of the A-4used as trainer and FAC/L&C platform.

T-39—North American Rockwell Sabreliner, twin-engine jet usedas trainer and passenger aircraft.

TAC(A)—Tartical Air Coordinator (Airborne), a designated avia-tor who controls and coordinates air support from an aircraft.

TACC —Tactical Air Control Center, the principal air operations in-stallation for controlling all aircraft and air-warning functionsof tactical air operations.

LkCP—Taccical Air Control Patty, a subordinate opecational com-ponent of a tactical air control system designed to provide airliaison to land forces and for the control of aircraft.

ThDC—Lccical Air Direction Center, an air operations installation

GLOSSARY 283

under the Tactical Air Control Center, which directs aircraft adaircraft warning functions of the tartiral air renter.

TAFDS —Tattical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System, the expedition-ary storage and dispensing system for aviation fuel at tacticalair fields. It uses 10,000-gallon fabric tanks to store the fuel.

TAOC—Tacriral Air Operations Center, a subordinate componentof the air command and control system which controls all airtraffir and air defense operations.

Tank, M48—U.S. 50.7-ton tank with a crew of four; primary arma-ment is a turret-mounted 90mm gun with one .30-raliber andone .50-caliber marhine gun; has maximum road speed of 32miles per hour and an average range of 195 miles.

TAOC—Tacriral Air Operations Center, a subordinate componentof the air command and control system which conteols all airtraffit and air defense operations.

TAOI —Tactical Area of Interest.LkOR—Tactical Area of Responsibility, a defined area of land for

which responsibility is specifically assigned to a commander forrontrol of assigned forces and coordination of support.

lASS—Tactical Air Support Squadron.TCN—Third Country National.U—Table of Equipment.TE —'Iissk Element.

U—Task Force.'113—Task Group.Tiger Hound—Codename for air operations in Laos.10—Table of Organization.'10W—U.S. M220 Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided

antitank missile system.Trail Dust—Air Force C-123 dispensing defoliant or crop destruc-

tion chemical.TSN—Tan Son Nhut, U.S. Air Force designation for South Viet-

namese air base.TU—Task Unit,

U-21—Becrhrraft King Air, twin-engine, turboprop utility and pas•senger aircraft.

UCMJ —Uniform Code of Military Justice.UH-1—Bell Iroquois, single-rotor, light helicopter noted for irs

maneuverability and firepower; carries a crew of three; it canhe armed with air-to-ground rocket packs and fuselage-mounted,elererically fired machine guns. Also known as a "I-lucy."

USA—United States Army.USAAG—U.S. Army Advisory Group.USAF—United States Air Force.USAID—U.S. Agency for International Development.USARV—U.S. Army, Vietnam.USASuppCom—U.S. Army Support Command.USIA—U.S. Information Agency.USIS—U.S. Information Service.USMC—United Stares Marine Corps.USN —United States Navy.USSAG/SeventhAF— United States Support Activities

Group/Seventh Air Force.VC—Vier Cong.Viet Cong—Term used to refer to the Communist guerrillas in South

Vietnam adhering to the NLF and PRG; a conreaerion of theVietnamese phrase meaning "Vietnamese Communists."

VCC—Viet Cong Captured.VCI —Viet Cong Infrastructure,VIS—Vietnamese Information Servire (South Vietnam).VMA—Marine Attack Squadron.VMF(AW)— Marine Fighter Squadron (All-Weather).VMFA— Marine Fighter Attack Squadron.VMCJ—Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron.VMGR—Marine Refueler Transport Squadron.VMO—Marine Observation Squadron.VN—Viernam or Vietnamese.VNAF—Vietnamese Air Force or Vietnamese Armed Forces.VNMC—Vietnamesc Marine Corps.VNMC LSB —Vietnamese Marine Corps Logistics Support Branch

of the Navy Division, U.S. Defense Attache Office, Saigon.VNN —Vietnamese Navy.VT—Variable timed electronic foze for an artillery shell which causes

airburst over s:he target area.

WestPac —Western Pacific.WIA—Wouoded in Action.Wild Wesscl—Codenamc fot special tethniques and aircraft used

to suppress radar systems.WFRC—Washington Federal Records Center.

Zippo—Flame thrower equipped AK or monitot.

284

Appendix G

Chronology of Significant EventsJuly 1971— September 1973

1971

1 July Start of the Consolidation I Campaign.9 july American forces are no longer obligated to defend the region

south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) at the 17th parallel.The U.S. military had moved into this area in 1966 to reinforcethe 1954 Geneva Convention agreement, prohibiting ground orartillery attacks from this buffer zone.

9-11 july Narional Security Advisor Dr. Henry A. Kissinger visits China.12 July American troop strength in South Vietnam is at 236,000,

decreasing at a rate of about 14,000 a month.19 July Redeployment of all major Marine Corps units from South

Vietnam is completed.18 August Australia and New Zealand announce the withdrawal of their

combat forces from Southeast Asia.25 August The Army's 173d Airborne Brigade withdraws from South

Vietnam.27 August The Army's 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized)

withdraws from Vietnam. It had operated along the westernarea of the DMZ since January 1971.

8 October Operation Jefferson Glenn concludes, the last significant opera-tion that included U.S. ground forces.

12 November President Richard M. Nixon announces that American militaryforces are now taking a purely defensive stance, leaving theoffensive role entirely up to the South Vietnamese.

29 November An aid agreement with the Soviets is signed by the NorthVietnamese in Moscow.

1 December Start of the Consolidation II Campaign.26 December President Nixon allows the resumption of the bombing of

North Vietnam as peace talks stall.31 December The strength of the American forces in South Vietnam is down

to 156,800. As of this date, 45,626 American military hadbeen killed in action.

1972

1 January General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., Commandant of the MarineCorps, is succeeded by General Robert E. Cushman, Jr.

12 January Long Cheng, Laos, captured by Communist forces using ar-tillery and armor.

25 January New allied peace plan is announced by President Nixon andPresident Nguyen Van Thieu.

CHRONOLOGY 285

21 February President Nixon arrives for talks in China. This results inchanges in U.S. Pacific strategy.

10 March Lon Nd i5 declared President of Cambodia. The U.S. 101st Air-borne Division (Airmobile) withdraws from South Vietnam,the last Army division to leave.

23 March The Paris peace talks are suspended at the behest of theAmerican delegation, to be resumed when the North Viet-namese will engage in deliberations on specific topics.

30 March The Communist Nguyen-Hue Offensive commences with majorattacks across the DMZ. The Vietnam Ceasefire Campaignbegins.

1 April Marine landing forces and amphibious ready groups of theSeventh Fleet arrive off Military Region 1.

3 April Marine reconnaissance squadron detachment arrives at CubiPoint, Philippines to support renewed air operations.

5 April The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) attacks Iac Ninh in Mili-tary Region 3.

6 April Marine Aircraft Group 15 arrives at Da Nang. LieutenantGeneral John D. Lavelle, USAF, is recalled from command ofthe Seventh Air Force for exceeding rules of engagementpolicies.

7 April Lx Ninh is captured and An Inc is encircled by the NVA. Thebombing of North Vietnam is resumed as Freedom Train andLinebacker Operations. The French Government is petitionedby the North Vietnamese in Paris to try to halt Americanbombing.

8 April The 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade arrives in the TonkinGulf.

15 April The bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong in North Vietnam is re-sumed for the first time since 1968. Bombing restrictions arelifted for most other targets.

15-20 April A wave of protests occurs in the United States as a result ofthe increase in fighting in Southeast Asia.

23 April NVA captures Dak To in Military Region 2.27 April Major NVA attacks occur against Quang 'lii City in Military

Region 1. The Paris peace talks are resumed.28 April-2 May NVA attacks on outlying defences of Hue in Military Region 1.

1 May NVA captures Quang Tn City.3 May NVAINLF capture Bong Son in Military Region 2.4 May The Paris talks are again suspended indefinitely by the Ameri-

can and South Vietnamese delegations after the 149th session.8 May Haiphong and other North Vietnamese harbors are mined by

the U.S. Navy. President Nixon offers to withdraw all U.S.forces within four months of a ceasefire agreement.

14 May-25 May Major NVA attacks on Kontum in Military Region 2.16 May Marine Aircraft Group 12 arrives at Bien Hoa.19 May Soviet and Chinese delegations arrive in Hanoi to discuss sup-

port measures.22 May President Nixon visits Moscow.17 June Washington, D.C., office of Democratic National Committee is

burglarized.


21 June American troop strength in South Vietnam down to 60,000.First Marine combat sorties flown from Nam Phong, Thailand.

18 June An Loc is relieved by South Vietnamese forces.19 June South Vietnamese counteroffensive begins in Military Region 2.26 June The 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) withdraws

from Vietnam.28 June South Vietnamese counteroffensive begins in Military Region 1.29 June The 196th Infantry Brigade withdraws from Vietnam, the final

Army ground combat unit to leave. General Fredrick C.Weyand, USA, becomes Commander of the U.S. Military As-sistance Command Vietnam, succeeding General Creighton W.Abrams, USA.

13 July The Paris peace talks are resumed.22 July-15 August The 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade conducts flood relief

operations in the Philippines.18-19 August NVA attack Que Son and capture Fire Support Base Ross in

Military Region 1.1 September Admiral Noel A. M. Gayler, USN, becomes Commander in

Chief of the Pacific Command, replacing Admiral John S.McCain, Jr., USN.

16 September Quang Tn City is recaptured by South Vietnamese forces.26-27 September More private talks are held between Dr. Kissinger and the

North Vietnamese representatives in Paris.8 October A breakthrough in peace talks is announced by Dr. Kissinger.

19-20 October Dr. Kissinger and President Thieu hold discussions in Saigon.24 October Operation Linebacker I ends as bombing north of the 20th

parallel is curtailed as a peace gesture.7 November In U.S. Presidential elections, Presidenr Nixon defeats Senator

George S. McGovern.11 November Direct U.S. Army participation in the war concludes with relin-

quishment of the logistical base ar Long Binh to the SouthVietnamese.

20-21 November More private talks are held between Dr. Kissinger and Le DucTho to design a final peace agreement.

13 December Talks between Dr. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho reach a standstill.14 December President Nixon warns he will resume bombing if negotiations

are not resumed.18-29 December Operation Linebacker II is launched against Hanoi and

Haiphong, the "Christmas Bombing."31 December American troop strength in South Vietnam is at 24,200.

1973

8-12 January Dr. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho proceed with their private talks.15 january With progress in peace talks, President Nixon declares an end

to all U.S. offensive operations against North Vietnam.25 January Joint Homecoming Reception Center activated at Clark Air

Force Base, Philippines.27 January The Americans and North Vietnamese sign the Paris Peace Ac-

cords. The conclusion of the military draft is announced by theDepartment of Defense.

CHRONOLOGY 287

28 January The Ceasefire Campaign ends as the final withdrawal of alliedforces from South Vietnam begins.

30 January Melvin R. Laird is succeeded by Elliot L. Richardson as theSecretary of Defense.

21 February A ceasefire is reached in Laos.25 February Task Force Delta commences combat sorties in Cambodia.

31 January Operation End Sweep mineclearing begins.14 March Sub Unit One, 1st ANGLICO, the last Marine unit to leave

Vietnam, is transferred to Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.29 March The headquarters of the U.S. Military Assistance Command

Vietnam is closed. Marine advisory effort ends. The release ofprisoners of war by the Communists arid the departure of allAmerican forces from South Vietnam is completed.

4 April Joint Homecoming Receprion Center reverts to a standbystatus.

22 May Dr. Kissinger and k Due Tho conclude their discussions onVietnam truce agreement.

13 June A new treaty is signed by the Americans, South Vietnamese,National Liberation Front, and the North Vietnamese in an at-tempt to strengthen the ceasefire.

24 June Ellsworth Bunker is replaced by Graham A. Martin as U.S.Ambassador to South Vietnam.

2 July Elliot Richardson is followed by James R. Schlesinger as Secre-tary of Defense.

14 August Congress declares the cessation of all U.S-funded military ac-tion in Southeast Asia. Marine air combat operations fromNam Phong end.

21 September Marines depart Nam Phong.22 September William P. Rogers is replaced by Dr. Kissinger as Secretary of

Stare. Dr. Kissinger continues his post as National SecurityAdvisor.

Appendix H

Medal of Honor and Navy Cross Citations1971—1973

The President of the United Stares in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OFHONOR posthumously to

COLONEL DONALD G. COOKUNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while in-terned as a Prisoner of War by the Viet Cong in the Republic of Vietnam during the period 31 December1964 to 8 December 1967. Despite the fact that by so doing he knew he would bring about hasher treatmentfor himself, Colonel (then Captain) Cook established himself as the senior prisoner, even though in actualityhe was not. Repeatedly assuming more than his share of the manual labor in order that the other Prisonersof War could improve the state of their health, Colonel Cook willingly and unselfishly put the interests ofhis comrades before that of his own well-being and, eventually, his life. Giving more needy men his medicineand drug allowance while constantly nursing them, he risked infection from contagious diseases while in arapidly deteriorating state of health. This unselfish and exemplary conduct, coupled with his refusal to strayeven the slightest from the Code of Conduct, earned him the deepest respect from not only his fellow prisoners,but his captors as well. Rather than negotiate for his own release or better treatment, he steadfastly frustratedattempts by the Viet Cong to break his indomitable spirit, and passed this same resolve on to the men withwhose well-being he so closely associated himself. Knowing his refusals would prevent his release prior to theend of the war, and also knowing his chances for prolonged survival would be small in the event of continuedrefusal, he chose nevertheless to adhere to a Code of Conduct far above that which could be expected. Hispersonal valor and exceptional spirit of loyalty in the face of almost certain death reflected the highest creditupon Colonel Cook, the Marine Corps, and the United States Naval Service.

288

MEDAL OF HONOR AND NAVY CROSS CITATIONS 289

The President of the United Stares takes pride in presenting the NAVY CROSS to

CAPTAIN LAWRENCE H. LIVINGSTONUNITED STATES MARINE CORPS


CITATION

Fbr extraordinary heroism on 11 July 1972 while serving as Senior Advisor to the 1st Vietnamese Marine CorpsInfantry Battalion during a heliborne assault into enemy-held territory northeast of Quang Tn City, Republicof Vietnam. When the battalion encountered unexpectedly heavy enemy fire while disembarking into the landingzone, and sustained numerous casualties, Captain Livingston moved throughout the hasty positions taken bythe scattered and hesitant element and formed the Marines into an assault force. Despite the continuing heavyconcentration of hostile fire, he began the assault on the initial objective—a treeline approximately 50 yardsdistant. Although blown from his feet by explosions and periodically delayed to reform and redirect his casualty-riddled force, he forged ahead, leading the Vietnamese Marines into the enemy-infested trench lines of theobjective and a subsequent hand-to-hand battle. Upon seizure of the initial portion of the trenchline, CaptainLivingston shed his combat equipment, emerged from the trenchline, and exposed himself to a hail of enemyfire to reach and carry his wounded naval gunfire spotter to a position of relative safety. Captain Livingston'srepeated acts of heroism in the face of heavy fire reflected great credit upon him and the Marine Corps andwere in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.


The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the NAVY CROSS to

CAPTAIN JOHN W. RIPLEYUNITED STATES MARINE CORPS


CITATION

For extraordinary heroism on 2 April 1972 while serving as the Senior Marine Advisor to the 3d VietnameseMarine Corps Infantry Battalion in the Republic of Vietnam. Upon receipt of a report that a rapidly moving,mechanized, North Vietnamese army force, estimated at a reinforced divisional sttength, was attacking southalong Route 1, the 3d Vietnamese Marine Infantry Battalion was positioned to defend a key village in the sur-rounding area. It became imperative that a vital river bridge be destroyed if the overall security of the northernprovinces of Military Region 1 was to be maintained. Advancing to the bridge to personally supervise this mostdangerous but vitally important assignment, Captain Ripley located a large amount of explosives which hadbeen preposirioned there earliet, access to which was blocked by a chain-link fence. In order to reposition theapproximately 500 pounds of explosive, Captain Ripley was obliged to reach up and hand-walk along the beamswhile his body dangled beneath the bridge. On five separate occasions, in the face of constant enemy fire,he moved to points along the bridge and with the aid of anothet advisor who pushed the explosives to him,securely emplaced them. He detonated the .charges and destroyed the bridge, thereby stopping the enemy as-sault. By his heroic actions and extraordinary courage, Captain Ripley undoubtedly was instrumental in savingan untold number of lives. His inspiring efforts reflected great credit upon himself, the Marine Corps, andthe United States Naval Scrvice.

MEDAL OF HONOR AND NAVY CROSS CITATIONS 291

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the NAVY CROSS to

CAPTAIN RAY L. SMITHUNITED STATES MARINE CORPS


CITATION

For extraordinary heroism during the period 30 March to 1 April 1972 while serving as advisor to a Viet-namese command. group numbering approximately 250 Vietnamese Marines located on a small hilltop outpostin the Republic of Vietnam. With the command group repulsing several savage enemy assaults, and subjectedto a continuing hail of fire from an attacking force estimated to be of rwobattalion strength, Captain Smithrepeatedly exposed himself to the heavy fire while directing friendly air support. When adverse weather condi-tions precluded further close air support, he attempted to lead the group, now reduced to only 28 VietnameseMarines, to the safety of friendly lines. An enemy soldier opened fire upon the Marines at the precise momentthat they had balked when encountering an outer defense ring of barbed wire. Captain Smith returned ac-curate fire, disposing of the attacker, and then threw himself backwards on top of the booby-trap-infested wirebarrier. Swiftly, tile remaining Marines moved over the crushed wire, stepping on Captain Smith's prostratebody, until all had passed safely through the barriet Although suffering severe cuts and bruises, Captain Smithsucceeded in leading the Marines to the safety of friendly lines. His great personal valor and unrelenting devo-tion to duty reflected the highest credit upon himself, the Marine Corps, and the United States Naval Service.

COMMAND

OPERATIONAL COMMAND

OPERATIONAL CONTROL

COMMAND LESS OPCON

FOR PLANNING

PLANNING COORDINATION

DESIGNATED C0000INAIINC

AUTHORITY FOR

CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Appendix I

FMF Pacific Command Relationships, 1971

UIIIIUI

a

U.— IUI.IIII

JIREINP UUIU

• a IUI

u. u

*

Adapted from FMFPac ComdC, jan-jun 71

292

Appendix J

USMACV Command Relationships, 1971

Adapted from MACV ComdHist 72, Vol I.

293

I —I

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294

Appendix K

Vietnamese Marine Division, 1972

Adapted from Marine Advisory Unit Matenal

Appendix L

List of Reviewers

Marines

Gen Louis H. Wilson, Jr., USMC (Ret)LtGen I.eslie F. Brown, USMC (Ret)LtGen Clyde D. Dean, USMC (Ret)LtGen Joseph C. Fegan, Jr., USMC (Ret)LtGen D'Wayne Gray, USMC (Ret)LtGen William K. Jones, USMC (Ret)LtGen Louis Metzger, USMC (Ret)LtGen Edward J. Miller, USMC (Ret)LtGen Andrew W O'Donnell, USMC (Ret)LtGen Donn J. Robertson, USMC (Ret)

MajGen Victor A. Armstrong, USMC (Ret)MajGen Walter F. Boomer, USMCMajGen William P. Eshelman, USMCMajGen Donald R. Gardner, USMCMajGen Kenneth J. Houghton, USMC (Ret)

BGen Darrel B. Bjorklund, USMC (Ret)BGen Walter D. Fillmore, USMC (Ret)BGen Paul G. Graham, USMC (Ret)BGen Manning t Jannell, USMC (Ret)BGen Jim R. Joy, USMC (Ret)

Col Kent C. Bateman, USMC (Ret)Col John W. Clayborne, USMC (Ret)Col Patrick G. Collins, USMC (Ret)Col John D. Cummings, USMCCol Kenneth Eli. Fiegener, USMC (Ret)Col Herbert Eli. Fischer, USMC (Ret)Col Charles H. Gallina, USMCCol Charles J. Goode, Jr., USMC (Ret)Col Richard E. Hawes, Jr., USMC (Ret)Col Leo J. Kelly, IJSMC (Ret)Col Robert W. Kirby, USMC (Ret)Col Raymond M. Kostesky, USMC (Ret)Col Jeriy W. Marvel, USMC (Ret)Col Edison W. Miller, USMC (Ret)Col Robert J. Perrich, USMC (Ret)Col Donald L. Price, USMC

Col John M. Rapp, USMC (Ret)Col Richard D. Revie, USMC (Ret)Col John W. Ripley, USMCCol Donald E. Schneider, USMC (Ret)Col James L. Shanahan, USMC (Ret)Col Robert D. Shoptaw, USMC (Ret)Col Charles V. V. Smillie, Jr., USMC (Ret)Col William J. Smith, USMC (Ret)Col Ray A. Stephens, USMC (Ret)Col Thomas J. Stevens, USMC (Ret)Col Aubrey W. Talbert, USMC (Ret)Col Gerald H. Tutley, USMCR (Ret)Col Sumner A. Vale, USMC (Ret)Col Charles T Williamson, USMC (Ret)

LtCol Andrew F. Anderson, USMC (Ret)LtCol Roger W. Badeker, USMC (Ret)LtCol James C. Brown, USMC (Ret)LtCol Mervyn J. Burns, USMC (Ret)LtCol John M. Campanelli, USMC (Ret)LtCol Harlan P. Chapman, USMC (Ret)LtCol Andrew D. DeBona, USMC (Ret)LtCol George S. Ford, USMC (Ret)LtCol Thomas B. Gnibus, USMC (Ret)LtCol Glen Golden, USMC (Ret)LtCol James C. Hardee, USMCLtCol William C. Howey, USMC (Ret)LtCol Emmett S. Huff, USMC (Ret)LtCol John K. Hyatt, Jr., USC (Ret)LtCol George F. Jones, USMC (Ret)LtCol Michael S. Kelly, TJSMC (Ret)LtCol Eddie R. Maag, USMC (Ret)LtCol Harrison A. Makeever, USMC (Ret)LtCol David J. Moore, USMC (Ret)LtCol Ronald S. Neubauer, USMC (Ret)LtCol Nguyen Van Phan, VNMCLrCol George Philip, III, USMC (Ret)LtCol Mark B. Pizzo, USMCLtCol Michael L. Powell, USMCLtCol David L. Ross, USMC (Ret)LtCol Robert F. Sheridan, USMC (Ret)LtCol James D. Simpson, USMC (Ret)LtCol George B. Strickland, USMC (Ret)

295


LtCol Orson 0. Swindle III, USMC (Ret)LtCol William R. Von Harten, USMC (Ret)LrCol Marshall R. Wells, USMCLtCoI William E. Wilson, Jr., USMC (Ret)

Maj Stephen 0. Biddulph, USMCMaj Donald C. Brodie, USMC (Ret)Maj Robert L. Gondek, USMC (Ret)Maj Thomas W. Hoysa, USMCMaj Angelo M. Inglisa, USMC (Ret)Maj Dennis R. Kendig, USMCR (Ret)Maj Paul J. Montague, USMC (Ret)Maj John T. Paparone, USMCMaj Anthony P. Shepard, USMCMaj Edward J. Wages, USMC (Ret)

Capt Edwin W. Besch, USMC (Ret)Capt Alan J. Kroboth, USMC (Ret)Capt William E. Thomas, Jr., USMC (Ret)

SgtMaj Ernest Benjamin, USMC (Ret)SgtMaj Robert S. Ynacay, USMC (Ret)MGySgt Harry G. Lock, USMC (Ret)

Gen Frederick J. Kroesen, USA (Ret)LtGen Howard H. Cooksey, USA (Ret)MajGen John E. Murray, USA (Ret)LtCol William C. Camper, USA (Ret)lstSgt Jimmy D. Evans, USA (Ret)

VAdm Walter D. Gaddis, USN (Ret)VAdm William P. Mack, USN (Ret)VAdm James B. Srockdale, USN (Ret)RAdm Wycliffe D. Toole, Jr., USN (Ret)Capt Paul L. Gruendl, USN (Ret)LCdr Francis C. Brown, USN

Air Force

LtCol Darrel Whitcomb, USAFR

OthersMr. Dale AndradeLtCol William B. Barker, KSNGMr. Garnett M. BellMr. Peter BtaestrupMt Robert J. DestatteMr. Howard C. H. FengDr. V. Keith Fleming, Jr.Mr. Stephen C. FoglemanDr. Nguyen M. HungDr. Allan R. MillertMr. Douglas PikeMr. David K. Schmidt

Director of Naval HistoryJoint Chiefs of Staff Historical DivisionOffice of Air Force HistoryOffice of the Chief of Military HistoryOffice of the Secretary of Defense Historical Staff

Navy

Army

Appendix M

Distribution of PersonnelFleet Marine Force, Pacific

(Reproduction of Status of Rrces, 31 May 1972)

297

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INDEXKey: boldface type = illustrations; n = footnotes

Ba, Maj Tran, VNMC. 68Ba Ho East, 37Bao, LtCoI Nguyen Nang,

Abrams, Gen Creighton W., USA, 7, 32, 33, 58, 90, 95, 103, 143,148, 151, 153, 157

Aerial (air) observers, 12, i4, 90, 101, 110, 134, 145, 157, 180, 229Ai Tu Combat Base, 36, 47, 50, 55, 66, 68, 76, 78-80

evacuation of, 80Air base defense/security. 157-59, 161-64, i68, 171, 212, 246Air Force Airborne 'I'actiral Data System, 153Air Force Commands and Units

Pacific Air Force, 153Seventh Air Force, 153, 166, 193, 199Eighth Air Force, 199366th Tartical Fighter Wing, 1578th Special Operations Squadron, 16020th Tacrical Air Support Squadron, 92, 110, 1572lsr Air Support Squadron, 161Security Police Squadron, 163Military Airlift Command (MAC), 192Pacific Air 'haffic Management Agency (PATMA), 192, 195. 248

Aircraft typesfixed wingCessna A-37 (Dragonfly), 159Cessna 0-2 (Skyrnaster), 14Gcumman A-6 (Intruder), i66, 176Grumman EA-6A (lntmder), 177, 178thckheed AC-130 (Spectre), 44McDonnell Douglas A-4 (Skyhawk), 159, 160, 160McDonnell Douglas A-i (Skyraider), 53McDonnell Douglas F-4 (Phantom), 44, 153, 155McDonnell Douglas 'IA-4F (Skyhawk), 157North American Rockwell OV-10 (Bronco), 68, 113

YOV-IOD Bronco, 6-7North Vietnamese

MiG-17 "Fresco:' 147MiG-19 'Farmer," 168MiG-21 "Fishbed' 182-83

rotary wingBell AWl (Cobra), 32Bell AH-1J (Sca Cobra), 178, 179, 180, 181Bell UH-1 (Iroquois). 32n, 49, 65, 145, 145Hughes 011-6 (Cayuse), 32Sikorsky SH-3 (Sea King), 143, 144

Alamo (LED 33), 117, 150-51Alpha 2, 46, 46-47, 4s. See also Gio LinhAlpha 4, 47Alpha Strikes, 174America (CVA 66), 177, 181, 184American Ranger (Military Sealifr Command), 195An the, 90, 159-61, 249An Tiem Bridge, 121Anderson, LtCul Andrew E., 71Anderson, Gen Earl Ii., 190Anderson (DD 786), 53, 199nAngus, Capt William K., 222n, 228-29

Anzaldua, Cpl Jose J,, Jr., 218, 221, 223, 225; Sgt, 227, 229Are Light B-52 strikes, 45, 48•49, 74, 110, 113, 118Archer, lstLt Bruce R., 220-21Army Commands and Units

Military Advisory Command, Thailand (MACThai), 246Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), 199

Advisory Team 17, 17Advisory Team 155, 30, 32, 36, 47, i46

SU1, ANGLICO, 421st Regional Assistance Command (FRAC), 7, 33, 48, 106,

143, 147SOG Joint Personnel Recovery Center OPRC), 713d Regional Assistance Command, 161XXIV Corps, 48"Pink Teams:' 1294th Cavalry (Air Cavalry)

'hoop F, 96, 114, 1188th Radio Research Field Station (RRFS), 34, 14314th Signal Company, 92

Army of the Republic of Vietnam Commands and UnitsI Corps, 37

Direct Air Support Center (I DASC), 157, 199Ill Corps, 161Airborne Division, 1191st Division, 162d Division, 173d Division, 32, 36, 47, 50, 61, 63-64, 71-72, 76, 80-813d Air Division, i615th Division, 16121st Division, 1612d Airborne Brigade, 1121st Armored Brigade, 60-61, 68, 76, 783d Armored Brigade, 1612d Regiment, 36, 76, 7856th Regiment, 36, 58, 60, 6457th Regiment, 36, 46-47, 50, 66, 68, 76, 78Ranger Command, 641st Ranger Group, 76, 1233d Ranger Group, 1614th Ranger Group, 22, 68, 76, 795th Ranger Group, 68, 74, 76, 7939th Ranger Battalion, 9420th Tank Battalion, 38, 43, 52, 65-67, 69, 74-75, 78-79

1st Troop, 53, 55, 682d Troop, 68.693d Troop, 53, 68Headquarters Tank Section, 53

Avionics, use of, 164, 171

VNMC, 36, 37, 63, 78-80, 85; Cnl, 129

303


Ca Mau Peninsula, 11, 17Caldon, Capt David L., 179Cam le, 47, 61

159-60, 165-66, 178-79, 190,

John?' 181-83, 183, 184

149, 166, 187, 229, 230

BAT-21, 71-72. See also Mann, (apt David K,, USAFBateman, Maj Kent C., 171, 18Bates, Maj Ralph S., 234Beans, Maj James D., 86Beem, GySgt Floyd)., 158Bell, Maj Frank S., 95Benjamin, SgtMaj Ernest, 15, II'Benjamin Stodden (DDG 22), .49Bennett, Capt Steven L., USAF, 110-ilBerklcy (DDG 15), 149Beach, Capt Edwin W., Ret., 33; 146Diddle (DIG 21), 184Biddulph, lstLr Stephen G., III', 115-17Bien Hoa Air Base, 14, 160-62, 164Binh, Maj Le Ba, VNMC, 50, 5, 65-66, 68Bjorklund, Col Darrel E., 246, !48

Blizzard, Capt David W., 19-20Blue Ridge (ICC 19), 4,6,90, 78, 106, 138, 140, 150-51, 201Bohnenkamp, SSgt Thomas W.. 225Boomer, Maj Waiter F., 24, 31, 34, 37, 45, 50, 99Bowen, BGen Thomas W., Jr., lISA, 49, 65, 88Brady, Capt James W., "Diamo. id Jim?' 181, 184"Bright Light" teams, 71Brodie, Maj Donald C., 95-96Bronars, Maj Edward J., 19Brown, HM2 Francis C., USN, i6Brown, LtCol James C., 166, 188Brown, Maj Joseph, Jr., USA, 5Brown, MajGen Leslie E., 72, 158 159,

236-37, 239Brown, Capt Mithael B., 112Brown, LtCol Raneley A., 195Brubalcer, LrCol Ralph E., 175Bruggeman, lscLc David C., 4647Buchanan (DDG 14), 46, 53, (0-61, 149, 199nBunker, Ambassador Ellsworth, 9, 10Burton, MajJohnJ., 225

"Ceasefire Campaign." See Spring OffensiveChapman, LtCol Harlan P., 222n, 226, 228-29Chapman, Gen Leonard F, Jr., 187Charlie 1, 47, 55Charlie 2, 47Chicago (CG 11), 145

Chu Lai, 14, 17Chung, Col Ngo Van, ARVN, 50, 56Chung, Col Pham Van, VNMC, 31, 32, 59, 64, 74, 79-80, 86, 88, 94Citadel, The, POW Camp, 225Clark, Ramsey, 223Clark, LrCol Ronald A., 158Clark, Maj William B., 223Clarey, Adm Bernard A., USN, 208Clay, Gen Lurius D., USAF, 153Clayborne, Col John W., 225, 228, 232Cleveland (LPD 7), 181, 211, 213, 237Cochrane, LcCol John K., 181, 184Cockell, lslaj Robert C., 66, 76Code of Condurt, review of, 233Combat air patrols, 170-71Command and control of aircraft, 157-58, i6iCommand relations, 7, 9

for air units, 153berween allies, 82

Commando Bolt missions, 175Conaty, ldaj Donald B., 28Cook, Capt Donald G., 231; Col, 232Cooksey, MajGen Howard H., USA, 103, 106, 117-18, '50-51Cooper, VAdm Damon W., USN, 153, 174, 178-79Coral Sea (CVA 43), 7, 174Corbert, Capr David C., 179Cravens, CWO Larry G., 214Crist, LtCol George B., 146Croizar, LrCol Victor J., 23Cua Sot, North Vietnam, 243Cua Viet River, 129-31, 134-36, 149Cummings, Capt John D., "Li'lCunningham, iarLt Randall I-I., 144Cushman, Gen Robert E., Jr., 2, 108,

River, 63Cam Pha, North Vietnam, 177

channel, 243Cambodian Armed Fortes Con mands and Units

Cambodian Army, 2444th Infantry Brigade, 22

Camp Carroll, 55, 58, 59, 60, 54Camp Evans, 94Campanelli, Maj John M., 168Camper, LtCol William C., USA, 32, 58, 64, 78Can Gio, 19-20Can Tho, i4Canonico, CWO Joseph A., 227Carison, Maj Paul L, 129Carlton, Maj John D., 177Cat Bi Airfield, North Vietnar s, 238Cayuga ([ST 1186), 98, 100, 1.9, 151Ceasefire, 211

agreement, 216

Da Nang, 14, 170Air Base, 158

DAO. See Defense Attache Office (DAO)Daugherty, Capt Stanley A., USA, 88Davis, Maj James, USA, 43Davis. Col William J., 223Dc, LrCol Nguyen Kim, VNMC, 129Dean, LtCol Clyde D., 140DeBona, Maj Andrew D., 63, 86; LtCol, 248Defense Attache Office (DAO)

VNMC Logistics Support Branch, Navy Division, 208, 210Demilitarized Zone, 11, 14-is, 18, 30-31, 38, 47Denner, Col James R., USAF, 226, 228Dennis]. Buckley (DD 808), 149Denver (LPD 9), 6, 96, 118, i4, 151, 179Dicke, Capt Dennis M., 27Dinh, LrCol Ngo Van, VNMC, 47, 50, 55-56, 59, 66, 69, 94; Col, 130Dinh, LtCol Pham Van, ARVN, 58"Dirty Dozen." See under Prisoners of war

INDEX 305

31, 58, 64, 92, 93, 94-95,

Friedrich, LeCol Phillip B., 6, 138, 145Friese, Capt Lawrence V., 221

Hwy 9, 52

43, 45, 47-48, 56, 67,

DMZ. See Demilitarized ZoneDolgin, lstLt Gary W., 171Doner, CWO James F, Jr., 180-81Dong Ha, 47, 50, 55-56, 65-67, 76

bridge at, 58, 6i.deseructon ol 57-58, 60

defense of, 64Dong Hoi, North Vietnam, 177, 243Dorsey. Col Joshua W., 111, 25, 26, 28,

108, 133, 190, 208Dowling, IseLt James B., 147, 149Driscoll, Lt(jg) William P., USN, 144Drug use, 186Dubuque (LPD 8), 181Due Pho, 17Dudley, Capt Andrew S., Jr., "Scoety[ isi-84Duluth (LPD 6), 98, 100, 102, 149Dunham, lsrLe George R., "Ross:' 171Dunn, Jerry, 87Dunn, Maj John H., 222; LeCol, 226Dyer. Maj Edward J., 14, 68Dyer, Maj John T, USMCR, 246

Easley, Maj Jon T., 43, 50, 69Easter Offensive. See Spring OffensiveEgger, LeCol Charles H. F, "Doe," 106, 148, 237-38Egress Recap. See Homecoming under OperationsEisenstein, lsrLrJoel 8., 42, 46, 53Elbert, Pvt Frederick L., Jr., 232Electronsr warfare, 177-78Elephanr Valley, 17Elwood, LtGen Hugh J., 223Embrey, Capt Clark D., 6oEngland(CG 22), 182, 184Enhance Plus, See Projert Enhance PlusEquipment maintenance, 190Evacuations, 6, 80, 83-84, 138. 142-43, 146

Noncombatant cvaruaeion operations (NEO), 249Evans, SFC Jimmy D., USA, 37Everett F Larson (DD 830), 149Eversole (DD 789), 149Exerrise Golden Dragon, 6, 138

Fegan. MajGen Joseph C., Jr., 146, 158. 188, 190Fillmore, LtCoI Walter D., 115, 208, 210Fire Support Bases

Barbara, 37, 67Bastogne, 33, 74, 80Fuller, 47Holromb, 37, 47Jane, 64, 67-68, 74, 78Nancy, 37, 67Pedro, 66-67, 69-71Sally, 67, 96Sarge. 34, 37, 42, 42, 44, 45

Fire support coordination, 197-99ibgleman, 2dLt Srephen C., io6Fonda, Jane, 222, 223Forward air controllers, 101Frederick, CWO John W., Jr., 223

Gaddis, RAdm Walter D., USN, 90, 138, 140, 146, 149Gardner, Maj Donald II., 21, 21-23Garrert, Lr(jg) Aaron D., USN, 17Garwood, PFC Robert R., 234, 234, 235nGia Lam Airfield, North Vietnam, 226Giai, BGen Vu Van, ARVN, 32, 32, 34, 36,

72, 80, 82-84Giang Song River, North Vietnam, 243Gio Linh, 31, 46Gnibus, Maj Thomas E., 84Golden, Maj Glen, 72, 80. 82-84, 97, io6Gonzalez, LtCol John C., 146Goode, Maj Charles 3., 84Graham, BGen Paul G., 188, 210-11, 225, 236Gray, LeCol D'Wayne, 11-12, 13, i4-i6, 18, 46, 56, 58, 68, 72, 90,

106, 108Green Forest (Military Sealift Command), 248Gregorcyck, Col Joe L., 155Griswold, lsth Terry, USA, 112Gruendl, Cdt Paul L., USN, 236Guy, Ltcol Theodore, USAF, 232

Hai Lang, 67, 84, 86-87, 127Haiphong, North Viernam, 174, 178, 182, 238

channel, 238-39, 243Harbor, 177

Hamner (DD 718), 53Hanoi, North Vietnam, 174, 178Hanoi Hilton. See Hao La Prison (Hanoi Hilton)Hansen, Maj Dawson P., "Rusty:' 179-80Hanson (DO 832), 100, 149Hao La Prison (Hanoi Hilton), 221, 225Harris, Capt David D., 119Hart, Maj William R., 130Hayen, lstLt Edward G, Ill, 119Heim, MSgt Donald E., 14, 16Heon, LeCol Normand, USA, 43, 47Hernandez, Cpl Jose F, 115-16Herrberg, LeCol Edward C., 95, 140Higbee (DD 806), 147Highways

Hwy 1, 53, 55, 64, 67, 76, 78-79, 85, 86. 104

Hwy 13. 161Hill, Capt Stephen D., i45Hoa, Maj Nguyen Dang, VNMC, 70, 115Hodory, Capt Richard W., 96-97Hoi An, i4Hollingsworth, MajGen James F, USA, i6iHolloway, VAdm James L.. III, USN, 117, 150-51, 178-79, 239Homecoming Operations Center, 223Hon Gai, North Vietnam, 177, 238, 243

channel, 240Hon L,a, North Vietnam, 243

NVA air defense of. 180Hope, Bob, 213-14Hoskor, Capt Nathaniel R., Jr., i6i


Howard, CWO Guy M., IiHowey, Capt William C., 226, fl8Hue, 64, 66, 74, 88, 94Fluff, Maj Emmett 5., 78, 80-81, 84-85, 87-88HulI(DD 945), 149Human Relations Program, 188Huong Dien, 93

Impervious (MSO 779), 243Inchon (LPH 12), 237-38, 243lnglisa, Maj Angelo M., 162Izenour, Capt Frank M., Jr., 201

James, Maj Joseph L, 238Jannell, BGen Manning T, 246 248JHRC. See Joint Homecoming I ecepcion Center (JHRC)Jobin, lsrLt Edward J,, 214Johnson, LtCol Kevin M., 159-CoJohnson, Capt Roger D., USN, 56Joint Casualty Resolutinn Center (JCRC), 234Joint Homecoming Reception Center (JHRC), 225-26Jones, MSgt Clenton L., 10Jones, LcCol Duncan M., 103Jones, LrCol George E., "Ed:' 111, 134, 199, 206, 206Jones, LtGen William K., 6, 6-, 72, 145, 147-48, 153, 162, 186,

194 -9 5

Joy, Maj Jim R., 36, 45, 50, 60, 78-80, 83-85, 87Juneau (LPD 10), 123, 151, 152, 152Jurak, I.Cpl Michael, 112

Kavanaugh, Sgt Able L., 232Keiser, Maj Gordon W., 127Keller, Capt. 10Kelly. Capt Michael S., 211Kelly, Maj Robert D., 127Kelly, Col Walter C., 6, 138, 143Keys, Maj William M., 135Keystone Oriole Alpha, 9Khang, LrGen Le Nguyen, VN4C, 26, 6, 72, 92Khe Gio, 47Khe Sanh, 32Khmer Rouge, 213, 244, 254Kieu, Maj, ARVN, 55Kirby, LrCol Robert W., "Rip:' 123, 151Kissinger, Dr. Henry, 10, 204Kotesky, Maj Raymond M., 6Kreassig, LtCdr Richard M., Of N, 18Kroesen, MajGen FrederickJ., J ., USA, 33, 48, 61, 64, 71, 72, 83,

92, 103, 143, 146, 148, 199Kruger, Capt Earl A., "Skip:' (0, 78, 80-81, 84, 88Ky, LcCol Do, VNMC, 98

Larh Huyen River, North Viers am, 238Laird, Secretary of Defense Me yin R., 208Lain, LtGen Hoang Xuan, ARI'N, 33, 33, 37, 45, 64, 71-72, 74,

83, 92. 147Lan, LrCol Eui The, VNMC, 12; Col, 28, 95-96, 98; BGen, 93, 103,

108, 113, 118, 121, 123, 127-, 8, 130, 133, 134, 150-51, 197, 199,208

Lanagan, BGen William H., Jr., USA, i6, 57, 72, 90Land, Maj Edward J., Jr., 9, 10Landing Zones

Blue Jay, 114Columbus, 100, 104Crow, ii4Delta, 96Flamingo, 110Hawk, 110Lima, 118Tango, 96Victor, 118

Laos

Barrel Roll area, 171Steel Tiger area, 171

Lapoinr, Lt John M., USN, 76Lasseter, Maj Lee T., "Bear;' 181-83, 183, i84Leavitt, HMC Donovan R., USN, 76Lee, LtCol Victor M., 236Lich, LtCol Ho Quang, VNMC, 68Linnan, Sgt Michael L., 10Livingston, Capt Lawrence H., 66, 69-70, 76, 102, 115-16Livingston, lscLt Scott, USA, 30Logistics, 190, 193-94Long Beach (CGN 9), i45Long Binh, 14, 161Long Tau River, 19-20Lust, Col Nguyen Trong, ARVN, 60Luc, Capt. VNMC, 95Luom, Sgt Huynh Van, VNMC, 56Luong, LtCol Nguyen The, VNMC, 94, 129Luong Lang POW Camp, 222-23Ly, LtCol Ton Ta, ARVN, 52

Maag, LcCol Eddie R., 188Macho, Col Dean C., i6i, 163-64, 211, 213-14Mack, VAdm William P., USN. 6, 138, wo, 143-47, 153, 174, 177,

190

Mai Loc Combat Base, 31, 36, 40, 50, 55, 60evacuation of, 63

Makeever, Maj Harrison A., 145Manitowoc (LST 1180), 98, 118, 149Mann, Capt David K., USAF, 61

See also BAT-21Marine Air Command and Control System. 11Marine Corps Commands and Unics

Air4, 153, 158, i641st Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW),

3d Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW)3d Redeye Platoon, 147

Marine Aircraft Group (MAG)MAG-12, i6o-64, 192, 194, 213-14, 249

lbrward, 159Logistic Coordination Cenrer (Rear), 214

MAC-iS, 90, 157-58, 166, 173, 192, 194-95, 216, 244,246, 249Rsrward, 155

MAG-36, 2Provisional Marine Aircraft Group (ProvMAG) 10, 149

Thsklbrce Delta, 165-66, 168, 171, 173, 195, 214, 216, 244-45,248

INDEX 307

(BLT) i/4, i4o, 149

(BLT) 2/4, 4, 151(BLT) 3/4, 6, 213

(B111') 1/9, 2, 6, 138, 145-46(811) 2/9, 149

Operation Plan 1-73, 246Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron (H&MS)

H&MS-12, 160H&MS-15, 155, 165, 177

Detachment Alpha, 168Detaehmenr Bravo, 168, 194Detachment Charlie, 168

H&MS-36 Detarhment, 166Marine Aeriai Refueler Transport Squadron (VMGR)

VMGR-152, 165-66, 177. 192, 248Detachment Delta, 193. 245

VMGR-352, 193Marine Air Base Squadron (MABS)

MABS-12, 160MABS-15, 155, 165

Sub Unit 1, 168, 171Marine Air Control Squadron (MACS) 4, 9, UMarine All-Weather Attack Squadron (VMA(AW))

VMA(AW)-224 "Bengals' 7, 174-75, 177VMA(AW)-533, 166, 171, 245, 248

Marine Attack Squadron (VMA)VMA-211 "Avengers:' 159, 162VMA-311 'Tomcats," 160, 162

Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron (VCMJ)VCMJ-1 "Golden Hawks;' 153, 177-78VCMJ-2, Detachment X, "Playboys:' 177-78

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA)VMFA-115 "Silver Eagles:' 153, 155, 166, 171, 216, 245,

248

VMFA-2l2 "Lancers:' 157, 192VMFA-232 "Red Devils:' 153, 155, 166, 171, 245, 248VMFA-333 "Shamrocks," 181, is4

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH)HMH-462, 237HMH-463, 236-38, 244

Marine Helicopter Attack Squadron (HMA) 369. 178-79, 181Marine Light Helicopter Squadron (HML) 367, 6

Detachment Bravo, 96, 145Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM)

HMM-164, 4, 6, 95-96, 99-100, 110, 114, 118, i4o, 148-50,2 10-11

HMM-165, 4, 6, io6, 110, 114, i45, 150-51, 237-38,243-44

Airborne Mitse Countermeasure (AMCM) UnitCharlie, 238, 243Delta, 243Inchon, 238

Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF)Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac), 4, 9, i4sIII Marine Amphibious Force (MAP), 2,4, 6, 9, 72, 90, 1383d Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB), 49th Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB), 4, 6, 90, 95, 106,

110, 138, 142, 146-52, 211, 236, 24831st Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU), 2, 4, 6, 50, 138,

149-50, 210-11, 213, 24433d Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU), i40, 146, 149-52, 210,

213

331st Marine Amphibious Element (MAE), 6Special L'tnding Force (SLF), 2

Ground3d Marine Division, 2, 4, 72, 158

Sensor Control and Management Platoon, 163Regimental Landing Team (RLT) 4, 1494th Marines, 2

Battalion Landing TeamLVT Platoon, 100

Battalion Landing TeamBattalion Landing Team

9th Marines, 2Battalion Landing TeamBattalion Landing Team3d Battalion, 158, 161

Company 1, 162Company K, 161-62Company L, 159. 168Company M, 159, i6s

Battalion Landing Team (BLT) Alpha, 213Battalion. Landing Team (BLT) Bravo, 4, 6, 138Battalion Landing Team (BLT) Delta, 146, 1491st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 207Sub Unit One, 1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Compa-

ny (ANGUCO), 1-6,9, 11-16, 18, 46-47, 53, 72, 90, 92,io4, 107, 111, 121, 133-34, 157, 197, 199, 206, 246Shore Fire Control Party 1-3, 17

Other3d Force Service Regiment (FSR), 4, 207Marine Advisory Unit, Naval Advisory Group, 9, 23, 25-28,

30, 92, 117, 136, 197, 206-208Marine Security Guard Battalion (MSG)

Company B, 9-101st Radio Battalion, 92

Detachment N, 200Marine House, Saigon, 10Marine Tactical Data Communications Center (TDCC), UMarine Tactiral Data Control Center. See Southeast Asia Tactical

Data System Interface (SEA'FDSI)Marine Tactical Data System (MTDS), 11MarLng. See LogisticsMartin, Capt Thomas D., 168MrCain, Adm John S., Jr_ USN, 6, 138, 140, 146, 148, 151, 153McCauley, RAdm Brian, USN, 236, 238-39, 243McFerren, LtCol Kent A., 155McLaughlin, MajGen John N., 229Mekong

Delta, 14, 19Thctical Zone (MDTZ), 19

advisors in, 21River, 22

Mekong, merchant ship. 21Messiek, Maj John H., 229Metcalf, Col DonaldJ., USA, 30, 42-43, 47-48, 50, 58, 80, 82-84Metzger, LtGen Louis, 6,7, 9, 138, 145, 153, 158-59, 161, 165, 170,

177, 179, 185, 190, 193, 199, 204, 236-37, 249Missing in action (MIA), 234-35Mieu Giang River, 53Military Region 1, 2, 15, 27Military Region 4, 17Miller, LtCol Edison W., 222, 232Miller, EGen EdwardJ., 6,93,96, 98, 108, 122, 134, 138, 140, 140,

144, 146-48, 151, 152, 188, 189, 190-91, 199-200Miller, PlC MarkJ., 214Mint sweeping


equipmentmagnetic orange pipe (M DP), 239MK1O5 towed sled, 238

operations, 211Mining of North Vietnamese ha hors, 177Mobile (LKA 115), 149, 195Moctobi (A'I'F 105), 243Monkey Mountain, 11Montague, Capt Paul J., 221, 233Moore, Maj David J., 96. 149Moore, LtGen William G., USA 225Moorer, Adm Thomas H., USN, 148, 225Morale problems, 185-86, 188Morton (DD 981), 17MTDS. See Marine Tactical Dats System (MTDS)Mullinix (DD 944), 149Murray, SSgt Freddie L., 20Murray, Capt John D., 38, 42-42Murray, MajGeo John S., USA, 208, 210My Chanh, 82

Bridge, 86destruction of, 88

Line, 94, 97-98, 100, 102-102River, 88, 95-96, 101, 147

Nam Phong, Thailand, 164, 166, 167, 168, 170-71, 172, 194, 212,214, 214, 215, 246build up of, 195closing of, 246, 248opening of, 165See afro "Rose Garden"

Naval gunfire support, 17, 80-8::, 133, 135, 199airborne spotcers, i4sVietnamizarion of, 17

Navy Commands and UnitsAir

Fleet Air Reconoaissaoce Squadron (VQ) I, 177

Helicoptet Combat Suppsrt Squadron (HC) 7, 143-44Light Attack Squadron ("AL) 4, 6, 14Medium Helicopter Squadron (HM) 12, 236

Other

Sea

Naval Forces Vietnam, 1, 208Naval Advisory Group, 1', 36, 208

Marine Advisory Unit, 9, 23, 25-28, 30, 92, 117, 136,197, 206-208

Mobile Construction Batialioo 5, 165

Commander in Chief, Pscific (CioCPac), 7, 9Pacific Fleet, 7, 9Seventh Fleet, 2, 7, 142, 145, 147-48, 199

Amphibious Ready C coup (ARG)Alpha, 2, 151, 23.1Bravo, 2, 6, 149, 138Charlie, 140, 149Delta, 140

Fleet Air Support Unit (FASU), 191-92, 194Task Force 74 (Contirgeocy Force), 6Task Force 76 (Amphi )ious lksrce), 143-44, 148, 150-52Task Force 77 (Attack C airier Strike Force), 143, 174, 180,

184

Task Force 78 (Mine Countermeasure Force), 211, 236-38,243

Underway Replenishment Group, 190Amphibious Squadron (Phibron) 5, 138Amphibious Squadron (Phibron) 7. 140Destroyer Squadron 3, 56Mine Flotilla 1, 236Naval Gunfite Support Task Unit, 53, 199

Navy Tactical Data System (NTDS). 153Nettleingham, Capt Allen D., 101Neubauer, Capt Ronald 5., 19, 20New Jersey (BB 62), 13New Orleans (LPH Ii), 237-38Newport News (CA 148), 81, 103, 181, 199Newton, Cot Donald E., 150Nba Trang, i4 Nhon, Col, ARVN, 122Nielson, WO Ben, USA, 46Night observation gunship system (NOGS), 6Nixon, President Richard M., 204, 225. 229, 231Nixon Doctrine, 2NOGS. See Night observation gunship system (NOGS)Norris, Lt Thomas R., USNR, 72nNorth Vietnamese Army (NVA), 31, 34, 38, 44, 74

Commands and Units11-5 Front, 38, 155Tn' Thien Hue Front, 33n2d Division. 335th Division, 1607th Division, 1609th Division, 160304th Division, 38, 74, 76, 80, 94, 155308th Division, 38, 55, 74, 94, 119, 121, 155312th Division, 119, 128320th Division, 33n3208 Division, 115, 1193248 Division, 38, 74, 94, 155325th Division, 100, 102, 11934211 Division, 33711th Division, 1219th Regiment, 4228th Regiment, 10024th Regiment, 5827th Regiment, 47, 13333d Infantry Regiment, 16036th Regiment. 5248th Regiment, 13366th Regiment, 45, 63, 96748 Regiment. 16088th Regiment, 102101st Regiment, 133202d Armored Regiment, 94203d Armored Regiment, 94274th VC Regiment, 160702d Command Group Headquarters, 33Long Cbau Unit, 4s

use of armor, 47nNorvell, MSgt Fred A., 225N1'DS. See Navy Tactical Data System (NTDS)Nui Ba Ho, 37, 42-45Nui Dat, 14NVA. See North Vietnamese Army (NVA)

INDEX 309

o KheBridge, 80, 86River, 87

O'Brien, Maj Joseph J., 130O'Donnell, BGcn Andrew W., 164n, 165-66,Ogden (LPD 5). 243O'Keefe, Col Keith, 155, 158, 159Okinawa (LPH 3), 96, 99, 110, 114, 118, 142,Oklahoma City (CLG 5), 12, i4Operations

Countdown, 206-207, 210-11, 213, 216Eagle Pull, 244End Sweep, 236-39, 241, 243-44Heroic Action, 147-48Homecoming, 223, 225-27, 229, 231Homecoming Marine, 229, 233Lam Son 719, 30Lam Son 810, 27Lam Son 72 (Counteroffensive), 106, 109, 110,Linebacker, 222Linebacker II, 204Marine Hunter Killer (MarHuk), 179-81Pocket Money, 177, 179Rolling Thunder, 153Song Than 5-72, 95-97Song Than 6-72, 98400, 102, 149Song Than 8-72, 103-104Song Than 9-72, 106nSong Than 8A-72, 104-105Sunset, 246Tran Hung Dao 18, 21

Osborne, Capt Ronald G., 179"Outer Seven?' See under Prisoners of warOwens, CWO James R., 189Owens, MajGen Robert G., Jr., 153, 177

Paglioni, lsrLt Lawrence 3. "Hal:' 144Paparone, Isilt John T, 100Paris Peace Conference, 204Parnell, EGen Edward A., 229Patton, Cpl John E., 111Paul Revere (LPA 248), 151, 152, 201, 209Peace, SSgr Frank H., i64Peace accord, 204"Peace Committee?' See under Prisoners of warPerrich, Col Robert J., 140, 149-50Personnel ceilings, 191PE See Popular Forces (PF)Philip, Capt George, Ill, 33, 86, 101, 129Phillips, Capt Clarence W., 201Phnom Penh, Cambndia, 21

shipping toambushes on, 23security for, 22

U.S. Embassy in, terrorist attack on, 10Phu, Commo Nghirm Van, VNN, 22Phuc, LtCol Nguyen Xuan, VNMC, 80Phuc Yen Airfield, North Vietnam, 182Pike, Douglas, 248Pizza, 2dLt Mark B., 188

Poggemeyer, MajGen Herman, Jr., 229Point Defiance (LSD 31), 118, 149Poland, LtCol James A., 100Popular Forces (PF), 19-20Powell, lsth Michael L., 144Pratt, Maj Stanley G., 190Price, Maj Donald L., 31, 64, 68,Prisoner retovery operations, 223Prisoners of war, 217, 218

behavior of, 223ramps

Citadel, The, 225Hoa In Prison (Hanoi Hilton), 221Luong Lang, 222-23in North Vietnam, 220Son Tay, American raid on, 221Tam Ky Complex, 218

rharges against, 232-33"Dirty Dozen:' 220, 225"Outer Sever," 222

"Peace Committee:' 222prison cells, 219release of, 225-26return of, 229techniques of resistance, 222treatment of, 218, 219, 220-21

Project Enhance Plus, 207-208Providence (CLG 6), 149Pueno Rico (Military Sealift Command), 248

150, 152, 158bridge at, 79-80Citadel, 48, 50, 118, 119, 121, 123, 125, 126, 127

final assault on in counteroffensive, 123evacuation of, 82-84fall uf, 90final assault on in counteroffensive, 123

Quang Xuyrn, 19

Race relations, 187racial incidents, 187, 245

Raids and demonstrations, 145-46, 148, ISO, 152Ramsey, Douglas K., 231Randall, Capt David 5., 60'Ray's MAE' 6Redlin, Capt Robert K., 102Redman, LtCol Charles B., 236Regional Forces (RF), 19-20, 31, 97Republic of Korea Marine Corps, 2t1 Brigade, 14-15Revie, LrCol Richard D., 153, 157Reynolds, Capt Philip F., 168RE See Regional Forces (RF)Riate, SSgt Alfonso R., 232

166, 171, 194-95

149-50

11345, 116, 149-50

74, 79-80, 86, 98; Col 197

Quars Id Airfield, 163Quang, Maj Trao Xuan, VNMC, 37, 50Quang Hung, North Vietnam, 243Quang Khe, North Vietnam, 177Quang Tn, 14, 76, 79-81, 113, 113, 118, 121, 124, 126-27, 128, 130,


Rice, Capt Ronald R,, 63Rickman, lstLt Dwight G., 134Riddle, HIM3 James, USN, 76Ripley, Capt John W., 50, 52, 53,'Road of Death:' 161Robertson, LcGen Donn 3., 4Robinson, LtCol James C., 236'Rose Garden:' 171, 245 See a/s

Ross, Maj David L., 180-81Rothwell, Maj Richard 0., 121Routes

555, 97, 104, 113, 131557, 6856o, 113, 117, 119, 121, 128-19

Rung Sat Special Zone. 19advisors in, 19-20

Rush, lstLt Laurence W., 144, 149Ryan, MajGen Michael P., 225

55-57, 6o, 67, 67-68

Nam Phong, Thailand

Data System Interface

Vale, Col Sumner A., 96, 106Van Norrwick, Maj John, III, 236, 238, 244Vancouver (LPD 2), 243VC. See Vice Cong (VC) Vessel types

1CM (landing craft mechanized), 98LPD (landing platform dock), 99, 102LVT (landing vehicle tracked), 102PBR (patrol boat riverine), 23

Vien, Gen Cao Van, ARVN, 32Viet Cong (VC), 19-20Vietnamese Air lisece Commands and Units

Base Defense Ibrce, 163

Tactics, airAlpha Strikes, 174Arc Light B-52 strikes, 45, 48-49, 74, 110, 113, 118Combat air patrols, 170-71Commando Bolt missions, 175

Talbert, Col Aubrey W,, Jr., "TaL" 170, 171, 213, 216, 244, 246'1km Ky Complex, POW camp, 218Tan, MajGen I.e 'flung, NVA, 33Tan Chau, 21Tan Son Nhut, 161Tay Ninh City, 16Taylor, BGen Robert W., 170, 171, 244TDCC. See Marine Thccical Data Communications Center (TDCC)Tellier, Sgr Dennis A., 227Thach Han River, 121, 126, 130, 135

destruction of bridges across, 81Thai, Col Hoang Huu, NVA, 240Thanh Hoa, North Vietnam, 174, 177, 243Thieu, President Nguyen Van, South Vietnam, 10, 83, 92, 103, 111,

118, 126, 150Tho, Le Duc, 204Thomas, CWO William E,, Jr., 229, 230Thorsness, Maj Lao, USAE 223Tief, Col Francis W., 25Tong, LtCol Nguyen Dang, VNMC, 135Tonkin Gulf, 174bole, RAdm Wycliffe D., Jr., USN, 150, 151, 152, 188Training, 15, 28, 188-89

Marine Advisor Course, 24Military Assistance Training Advisor (MATA) Course, 24

Traufler, SSgt Francis N., 190Tn, Col Nguyen Thanh, VNMC, 134-35Tnjt'o/i(LPH 10), 4, 106, 110, 114, 138, 142, 144-45, 150-51, 243-44'Iluong, LrGen Ngo Quang, ARVN, 92, 92, 94.95, 106, 11718, 123,

133, 147-48, 150-51Tulley, Maj James M., 19, 104Tung, LtCol Do Huu, VNMC, 105, 126Tung, Maj Do Huu, VNMC, 67, 70Turberville, Sgt Charles W., 10Tutley, LrCol Gerald H. "Gerry:' 36, 36, 37, 42-43, 47, 49-50, 55-56,

58, 60-61, 64, 88, 94, 114, 115, 135-36, 138, 148Turner Joy (DD 951), 135Tuscaloosa (1ST 1187), 195

United States Agency br International Development (USAID), Sai-gon office of, 10

Ut, Capt Tran, ARVN, 112

Salzer, RAdm Robert S., USN, 9, 26, 28, 64Samuels, ECpl Donald I.,, 188

Sandoval, Cpl Anthony, 15Saratoga (CVA 60), 177Schenectady (1ST 1185), 98Schultz, Chief Radarman Dutch 182Search and rescue operations, 144-45SEATDSI. See Southeast Asia Tactical

(SEATDSI)Shanahan, LtCol James L., 140, 146Shepard, lstLt Anthony P., 112

Sheridan, WO Robert, USA, 4647Sheridan, Maj Robert E, 31-32, 4, 85, 88, 98, 101Shields, Dr Roger B., 223Shipping to Phnom Penh

ambushes on, 23security for, 22

Shoemaker, Sgt Roger, USA, 76Shoptaw, Maj Robert D., 98Shoults, LeCol Eugene B., 9, 11

Sifuenres, Capt Raul A., 243Signal Intelligence (Siglnt), 34, 42, 149, 199-201Smith, Capt Ray L., 24, 37, 44-iS, 6oSmork, Maj James E., USA, 37, 52, 53, 56-57, 60, 65, 67Son Tay prison camp, American raid on, 221Southeast Asia 'lictical Data Sys em, 153Southeast Asia Tactical Data Sys em Interface (SEATUSI), 9,Spring Offensive

communications problems during, 42-43start of, 37-38, 42-45

St. Louis (LKA 116), 118, 149Standley, LeCol Billy R., 174Stephens, Col Ray A., 211Stewart, Cdr Douglas A., USN, 19Stockdale, RAdm James B., USI", 231; VAdm, 173Joseph P Strauss (DDG 16), 46, 53, 61"Street Without Joy' 104. See so Wunder BeachSummers, Cnl Harry G., Jr., US. , 249Sweeney. Maj James R.. 134Swift, Sgr Joe D., 53Swindle, Capt Orson G., 111, 22:

11