“Village Elections, Violence and Islamic Leadership in Lombok, Eastern Indonesia” (2012) 27 Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 285

SOJOURN: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia Vol. 27, No. 2 (2012), pp. 285–309 DOI:10.1355/sj27-2d©2012ISEAS ISSN0217-9520print/ISSN1793-2858electronic

Village Elections, Violence and Islamic Leadership in Lombok,

Eastern Indonesia1

Jeremy J. Kingsley

Indonesia has undergone a major political transformation over the past decade from authoritarianism to democracy with significant power being delegated to the provincial and local levels. One of the consequences has been the development of rivalries between local elites over the rewards of this decentralization, which can potentially lead to violence. From a conflict management perspective, this article examines one of these localized conflicts that emerged from political machinations on the eastern Indonesian island of Lombok in a village just outside the capital city, Mataram, and the strategies utilized to restore calm. Specifically considered will be the actions of state officials and community leaders, as well as the adat (customary) practices employed and the pivotal role of local Muslim religious leaders, Tuan Guru.

Keywords: indonesia, village elections, leadership, lombok, conflict management.

Over the last decade, Indonesia’s process of democratization and decentralization has brought local political empowerment to many parts of Indonesia, including the island of Lombok (see Crouch 2002; Nordholt and Asnan 2003; Mietzner 2007; Schmit 2008; Holtzappel and Ramstedt 2009; Miller 2009; Buehler 2010). Located east of the islands of Java and Bali, Lombok and the island of Sumbawa together constitute the Indonesian province of Nusa Tenggara Barat (NTB). The seismic political transformation that has occurred in Indonesia since the end of authoritarianism in 1998 and the governance reforms that followed created much change on

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Jeremy J. KIngSLey286

Lombok. One of the consequences has been intense competition between local political elites.

This article seeks to explore these issues of political competition, and their potential for violence, through a case study of social instability and demonstrations that affected the West Lombok village (desa) of Bok in July 2008.2 During this time, serious allegations against a village official led to demonstrations that threatened to explode into violence. By investigating this event in detail, it is hoped that the nuanced, localized and often volatile nature of post-Soeharto Indonesian electoral politics can be illuminated.

Tensions over the spoils of decentralization create potential for conflict in Indonesia, particularly during election periods (Suryadinata 2002; Kompas, 18 February 2008; Lombok Post, 8 June 2008; Jakarta Post, 25 June 2010; Kalla 2010; International Crisis Group 2010). These elections and their outcomes have provided “lucrative opportunities” which have seen “new forces emerge and old ones resurrected” (International Crisis Group 2010). There have been incidents of violence and unrest reported during past elections in Lombok in 1999 and 2003 (Kingsley 2010, pp. 167–72) and violence connected to local elections is now an ongoing concern for political leaders and law enforcement agencies across Indonesia (Nasution 2010; 2011, pp. 18–21). This is not surprising given the continual electoral cycle across Indonesia, whereby an election takes place almost daily somewhere across the archipelago at the local, provincial or national level of government (Kalla 2010).

A rich body of literature on communal and political violence in Indonesia has emerged over the past decade or so, in the aftermath of the fall of President Soeharto (Colombijn and Lindblad 2002; Bertrand 2004; Snitwongse and Thompson 2005; Purdey 2006; Coppel 2006; Sidel 2007; Davidson 2008; Varshney 2010). The scholarship to date has dealt primarily with the rationale and con-sequences of violence. This article however focuses largely on conflict management or, in other words, how conflict was resolved in the Lombok village of Bok.3 There are many different ways of consider-ing conflict management, one of which is the process of cooperation


Village elections, Violence and Islamic Leadership in Lombok, eastern Indonesia 287

between state officials and non-state players (such as Tuan Guru). This particular focus corresponds to conceptual frameworks developed by John Paul Lederach. His theoretical approach demands the utiliza-tion of intricate relationships between key socio-political players and institutions to foster peace building or dispute resolution (Lederach 1997, pp. 37–55). In Bok, the leadership team was based on an ad hoc partnership between state and non-state leaders, which facilitated the resolution of the social disturbances that occurred. Formal state processes are not irrelevant; however, they often do not provide an adequate response to social tensions and communal/political conflict in Indonesia. The fluid and flexible approaches highlighted in this article identify effective avenues for conflict management in Indonesia and beyond.

The Pressures of leadership

I am tired. Very tired! I just want the demonstrations and threats to be over…

Zaini made this comment as he slumped down on a couch next to me in July 2008 after over two weeks of rolling demonstrations in his village of Bok, West Lombok. The smiling face that usually greeted me remained, but it was obviously strained. The protests were taking their toll, and he felt under siege. Zaini, a senior community leader in Bok, along with several other local leaders, were at the epicentre of the social tensions and demonstrations occurring in the village (interview with Imran, Bok, West Lombok, 26 August 2008). The way in which Zaini and other members of Bok’s leadership put an end to several weeks of demonstrations and social conflict show how state and non-state leaders can combine to develop an intricate conflict management process. The events in Bok, I argue, exemplified broader dispute resolution patterns in Mataram and West Lombok, where adat (traditional rules and social processes) are integral to the eventual resolution of conflict. Additionally, this process highlights the importance of local Muslim religious leaders, Tuan Guru, whose potent socio-political and religious authority was



deployed to assist with the resolution of the social tensions and conflict in this village.4

One of the central aspects of daily life and social ordering in Lombok is, without question, religious affiliation and ritual (Kitamura 1999, p. 97; Mahyuni 2006, p. 89). The implication of this state of affairs is that the role of the Tuan Guru cannot be ignored when considering socio-political and religious matters.5 The respect accorded to Islam among the Sasak6 is omnipresent. There are even inbuilt linguistic mechanisms in Bahasa Sasak7 that identify the importance of Islam. For instance, there are special forms of address and speech patterns used when speaking to someone who has been on the Muslim pilgrimage of hajj (Mahyuni 2006, pp. 89–93). Religion and its rituals on Lombok demarcate the social boundaries of life as “ritualized behaviour circumscribes and delineates danger areas and marks cultural limits” (Ecklund 1977, p. 69).

Tuan Guru are more powerful, in many ways, than state actors, such as political leaders and police officers, a point which was highlighted by Judith Ecklund who noted forty years ago that “religious leaders [Tuan Guru] have established localised followings of villagers over which they have more effective control than do representatives of the local government” (Ecklund 1979, p. 254). Tuan Guru’s high social status and socio-political influence on historical and contemporary Lombok affairs has been widely acknowledged (Ecklund 1977; 1979; Cederroth 1981; Ryan 1999; Budiwanti 2000; Avonius 2004; MacDougall 2005; Asnawi 2006). The dominant role of Tuan Guru in Lombok today has also been noted by Tuti Harwati et al., who noted that “Sasak society is a community that greatly respects the position of Tuan Guru” (Harwati et al. 2007, p. 63). Tuan Guru, it has been suggested, have a “cult-like” status (Ecklund 1979, p. 253). In short, the role of Tuan Guru is embedded into the communal fabric of Lombok and allows them to act as respected social mediators.

The village of Bok is situated in West Lombok, just outside the island’s largest city, Mataram. The social troubles considered in this case study relate to attempts to remove one of Bok’s Kepala Dusun (head of a hamlet within Bok)8 and were connected to political



manoeuvrings within the village in the lead-up to the election for a new Kepala Desa (village head). The incumbent Kepala Desa, Eni, was not standing for re-election, thus leaving an open field for contenders. Politics became decidedly dirty, with the potential candidates trying to discredit possible adversaries, one of whom was the Kepala Dusun (interview with Eni, Bok, 16 August 2008). Several community leaders told me that the protests were attempts to manipulate popular emotions in Bok to obtain political advantage ahead of the village elections (field notes, 28 July 2008).

The protests in Bok emerged without much warning in early July 2008 and lasted several weeks. In response, leading state and non-state community figures created a leadership group to curb the disturbances. It was an ad hoc arrangement but it formed the backbone of the conflict management processes that were used (interview with Zaini, Bok, 16 July 2008; Interview with Eni, Bok, 16 August 2008; Interview with Abdullah, Bok, West Lombok, 26 August 2008). This leadership group was made up of the Kepala Camat,9 the Kepala Desa, the local police liaison officer, the local military liaison officer, two key non-state community leaders (including Zaini), one of the village Penghulu (Abdullah), and several staff of the village office (including Imran). Local non-state religious leaders, Tuan Guru, who later became involved in calming tensions, were not part of this leadership group. Rather, the Tuan Guru were called upon to help out at strategic moments. They were relied upon to assist with soothing emotions and to ensure the participation of all parties in the conflict management process (interview with Zaini, Bok, 16 July 2008).

The roles taken by leaders within this group depended on their individual strengths and socially accepted roles. For instance, reli-gious leaders such as the Tuan Guru and Penghulu10 took on the task of calming the situation once events became more serious in the second and third week. Their role was to take the heat out of the issues for the main protagonists and their followers.11 Community leaders then worked to mediate towards reconciliation between the parties, assisted by the religious leaders (Field notes, 10 August



2008). Nevertheless, the efficacy of Muslim religious leaders, such as Tuan Guru, in mediating social tensions across Indonesia will always depend upon the unique social, political and economic circumstance of a particular conflict situation and the actors involved. On one hand, they may function as respected social mediators who help resolve social tensions through democratic processes and community activities, as noted in many parts of Indonesia (Riza 2011; Alfirdaus 2012). On the other, some Muslim religious leaders have played more aggressive and negative roles in other parts of Indonesia (See International Crisis Group 2002; Sudrajat 2006; Budiwanti 2009). The reality is that religious leaders can be peacemakers or peace-breakers (Kingsley 2012a).

An important feature in the state and non-state partnership that developed was the influential involvement of a local military liaison officer (Babinsa) and local police liaison officer (Babinmaspol ). These two officers were stationed in the village and supported the leadership of Bok during these tense times. They provided a bridge between state law enforcement and security institutions and the village leadership. These officers advised the local leadership group and communicated with police headquarters in Mataram. Their role became increasingly important as events intensified and local leaders needed protection from aggressive crowds (Field notes, 10 July 2008). The police liaison officer, in particular, played an influential and constructive role, contrary to widespread popular negative perceptions about state law enforcement agencies and their inadequate performance.12 This officer was closely engaged with the local leadership before these events and had an intimate knowledge of village affairs.13 It was this embedded role that provided him with both legitimacy and the ability to play an effective role in the leadership group (interview with Eni, Bok, 16 August 2008).

This approach to community-engaged policing, though accepted by senior police officers, is often not implemented on the ground, at the village level (National News, 4 September 2007, p. 7). Farouk Muhammad, the former NTB police chief (Kapolda), told me that the police would only be effectual when they were fully engaged as



part of their community’s life. He felt that they have not yet done this (interview with Farouk Muhammad, Mataram, 3 November 2007). This situation exemplifies the possibility of more effective approaches to policing than those currently used in many parts of Lombok, and for that matter, more generally in Indonesia.

local Political Rivalries

Decentralization and the devolution of power in Indonesia has meant that greater scope for conflict has emerged in recent times between leadership rivals at all levels of government, including local village politics (Maulani, Kompas 2007, p. 11). The social tensions that developed in Bok and the demonstrations that threatened to spiral out of control were connected to this form of localized political competition. Similar situations have occurred elsewhere in Lombok. For example, in early 1999 the village of Sukamulia, East Lombok, was affected by a dispute over village subsidies and transportation that led to violent protests (Lombok Post, 25 April 1999, p. 9). More recently, the village of Spakek in Central Lombok was the site of an intense local dispute about electoral procedures during local elections for Kepala Desa (Lombok Post, 5 March 2008, p. 1). Similarly, in 2008, police were also needed to intervene in the village of Kateng, Central Lombok, to stop demonstrations over alleged corruption and malfeasance in this village’s administration (Lombok Post, 14 May 2008, p. 1).

Returning to Bok, the problems here stemmed from accusations against one of the Kepala Dusun14 who was alleged to have either inflated the price of government subsidized rice or failed to distribute the rice properly among poor villagers. The exact nature and details of these initial allegations were sketchy. If true, however, the accusations were very serious. Rice is the basic staple for villagers and rice subsidies are one of the most important anti-poverty measures offered by national and provincial governments across Indonesia (Daly and Fane 2002, pp. 310–32). As a consequence of the allegations, some local residents demanded the Kepala Dusun’s resignation. These



accusations came to the attention of Bok’s leadership on the morning of the first day of demonstrations. By late afternoon two trucks of demonstrators had been mobilized and had begun rallying to the cause (interview with Zaini, Bok, 16 July 2008.). The action took place outside the home of the Kepala Desa, Eni, with demonstrators keeping a large part of the village up all night with their boisterous and vitriolic protests (interview with Eni, Bok, 16 August 2008).

On the first evening of the protests there was initially a dispute within the leadership group about how to respond to the protestor’s demands. Two alternative strategies were developed at the impromptu meeting held at Eni’s home. One group argued that there was a need for a quick resolution. Those advocating this position wanted to dismiss the Kepala Dusun and just “move on”. The remainder wished to allow temperatures to cool down before considering the demonstrators’ allegations and responding to them in a thoughtful manner (interview with Imran, Bok, 26 August 2008). The key advocate for a quick resolution of the dispute was the Kepala Camat.15 He was new to the job and was concerned that if the situation escalated he could be seen as weak and unable to take effective action. He told the leadership group that an intensification of the demonstrations and an explosion of violence would reduce his capacity to resolve social tensions in the future (interview with Imran, Bok, 26 August 2008).

Eni and Zaini were on the other side of the debate. They thought that things would probably calm down in the next two or three days and a solution would emerge. If there was any truth to the allegations about the misuse of subsidized rice these could then be carefully investigated (interview with Imran, Bok, 26 August 2008). One further factor supporting their “wait and see” strategy was legal in nature: the Kepala Dusun could only be sacked if serious malfeasance was shown according to Provincial regulations. At this stage, the allegations were still sketchy and did not provide legitimate grounds for the Kepala Desa to act. Several members of the leadership group also expressed the view that sacking the Kepala Dusun without proper investigation was simply unfair. After lengthy deliberation,



the leadership group resolved to adopt Eni and Zaini’s recommend-ations: they would hold off deciding upon anything at this early stage to avoid making mistakes by acting too hastily (interview with Eni, Bok, 16 August 2008).

During this period of instability, the leadership group met regularly at the Kepala Desa’s house to devise a strategy and also to ensure that the protestors did not behave recklessly and attack Eni’s home. At this point, the military and police liaison officers played a critical role in ensuring community safety, as well as protecting Eni and her family. The liaison officers saw themselves as part of the local leadership, although they also reported to Mataram police headquarters. These links between village and police headquarters allowed requests for police assistance to be made quickly, which became necessary as tensions escalated (Field notes, 14 July 2008). This will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

The Temperature Continues to Rise

The problems did not stop after the initial demonstrations, and the protestors came back two days later. This time, the demonstrations were held outside the village office, rather than the Kepala Desa’s home. Over 200 people arrived on the back of trucks. Some of the leadership group began to wonder whether the crowds were being “rented” by provocateurs,16 as many protestors were unfamiliar faces (interview with Zaini, Bok, 16 July 2008).

At this demonstration the protestors provided a letter to the Kepala Desa outlining their grievances and demanding the sacking of the Kepala Dusun for two reasons. First, the Kepala Dusun was alleged to have “stolen” subsidized rice from members of his community. Second, the embattled leader was supposedly “egotistical”, because he often revved his motorbike too loudly, particularly at night (interview with Eni, Bok, 16 August 2008). Allegations that the Kepala Dusun had stolen rice lacked details, however, and while the leadership group was concerned, internal investigations found no problems with the rice allocation within the Kepala Dusun’s hamlet.



In fact, the rice subsidy for eligible families had risen from three kilogrammes per family per month at the start of his incumbency to over nine kilogrammes by the time of the demonstrations. As to the second accusation that the Kepala Dusun was arrogant, this was, at worst, a dispute between neighbours, but not an issue that warranted his dismissal.

The letter from the demonstrators proved problematic in other respects. For instance, questions surrounded the veracity of the 200 signatures in the letter. Many of the signatures looked to have been made by one person (the handwriting appeared to have been the same) (interview with Imran, Bok, 26 August 2008). The most significant outstanding issue was, however, that the protest leaders still had not identified themselves and Eni wanted to know with whom she could negotiate (interview with Eni, Bok, 16 August 2008). When the Kepala Desa spoke to the protestors she asked their leaders to come forward, but they did not. There was a feeling among the leadership group that they knew who was behind these actions, but this could not be confirmed. In many ways, the phantom provocateurs of the demonstration gave credence to a belief among the leadership group that the protests were linked to the local elections rather than any legitimate allegations against a village official. Eni’s claims that the protests were just a “character assassination” of the Kepala Dusun seemed to have weight (interview with Eni, Bok, 16 August 2008).

During the next wave of demonstrations over the following days, the behaviour of the protestors became increasingly threatening. One afternoon, the Kepala Camat and police vehicles were surrounded and not allowed to leave the Kepala Desa’s office. The situation became serious when demonstrators stopped the cars and started rocking them until the occupants were forced to jump out. These officials were threatened, but not hurt. The crowds only dispersed when the police liaison officer stood on the bonnet of his car and negotiated a compromise. He stated that if the demonstrators were able to find more signatures of support then the leadership group would pay further attention to their claims. This compromise took



the heat out of the immediate situation, allowing the leaders to leave safely (interview with Zaini, Bok, 16 July 2008).

The following day, Eni decided that she needed to make her intentions clear to the protestors. From the patio of her home Eni told demonstrators that she would not be threatened and that she refused requests to remove the Kepala Dusun. From Eni’s perspective this was a matter of principle. She was not going to be forced by mobs who wanted to make her act outside her authority as specified in local regulations.17 Unless there were serious breaches of his duties, which Eni believed there were not, she was not permitted to remove the Kepala Dusun. She told the crowd that Indonesia is a Negara Hukum (a state based on law) and she would not be politically blackmailed (interview with Eni, Bok, 16 August 2008). By now, however, Eni was coming under serious political and emotional pressure from the demonstrators,18 which was affecting her health (Field notes, 28 July 2008).

As the situation intensified, the local religious leadership was deployed. As the crowds dispersed once again, a local Tuan Guru accompanied by two local Penghulu, including Abdullah, swung into action. They began to visit the homes of people believed to be connected with the demonstrations and those supporting the Kepala Dusun, on behalf of the leadership group. Their aim was to reduce tension by reminding people of their religious obligations to refrain from violence or aggression. The leadership group thought that these local religious leaders would likely be able to settle emotions, but despite efforts over several nights things did not appear to be returning to normal (interview with Abdullah, Bok, 26 August 2008).

The demonstrations continued over the next week and in many ways worsened. There were two further “letters of demand” from the protestors and over 150 additional signatures were tendered. Interestingly, the allegation of corruption was removed in the second of these letters and all that remained was the accusation that the Kepala Dusun was “egotistical”. Zaini was not satisfied with the veracity of the signatures, as he recognized only a few names. The



letters nevertheless created the impetus for a further round of rallies (interview with Zaini, Bok, 16 July 2008). One positive factor that emerged was that the second of these new letters finally revealed the identity of those behind the protests. This allowed Eni and the leadership group to confirm with whom they needed to talk. The political angle of the protests also became clearer: the leaders of the demonstrations were potential rival candidates for the position of Kepala Desa at the upcoming village elections (interview with Zaini, Bok, 28 July 2008).19

Despite identifying who was leading the campaign against the Kepala Dusun and their political motivations, the situation continued to escalate. As tension built and the demonstrations grew larger, a change in tactics clearly became necessary. It was at this point that, at the behest of the leadership group, Zaini visited a renowned senior Tuan Guru from Kediri, a nearby town in West Lombok. Zaini sought his advice and asked if he would intervene (interview with Zaini, Bok, 28 July 2008). The seriousness of the situation was also highlighted by the fact that the police liaison officer in Bok, after consultation with police headquarters in Mataram, had twelve police officers deployed to guard the office and home of the Kepala Desa (the Kepala Dusun and his family had by now temporarily sought refuge outside the village). The rallies were now regularly attracting more than 350 aggressive protestors and there were fears at one point that the village office was going to be overrun (interview with Imran, Bok, 26 August 2008). Because of this tense situation, the senior Tuan Guru from Kediri agreed to act with the support of local religious leaders. His assistance came in two parts. First, he gave a Friday sermon at the village mosque about the importance of “social harmony in the democratic era”. Second, he made private visits to all of the key protagonists. One of the Penghulu, Abdullah, explained that the message he presented at these private meetings was simply a reminder of the religious obligation of social harmony. He also made a personal request for them to find an amicable resolution at the mushawara, or community meeting,



that Eni was attempting to organize (interview with Abdullah, Bok, 26 August 2008).

The senior Tuan Guru from Kediri’s intervention two weeks into the crisis proved to be decisive. It is believed that the only reason that the key protagonists attended the mushawara was that the Tuan Guru had personally invited them (interview with Zaini, Bok, 28 July 2008). Additionally, the statements and assertions of this Tuan Guru indicated to all involved in the dispute that they were expected not just to attend the mushawara, but also to find a resolution to the conflict. To refuse a direct instruction of this nature from a senior Tuan Guru would be considered disrespectful and inappropriate. This edict provided the various leaders with izin (permission), and legitimation, to talk and compromise (interview with Zaini, Bok, 28 July 2008).

The senior Tuan Guru influenced not only the protest leaders, but also supporters on both sides. They understood that their leaders were now obliged to be flexible and come to a solution (interview with Eni, Bok, 16 August 2008). This active engagement of the renowned Tuan Guru reveals the strength that can be gained by blending local communal dispute resolution mechanisms with religious authority and the important mediative role that these religious leaders play in resolving social tensions and conflict. This was further shown by the fact that the mushawara was held at the village mosque (interview with Zaini, Bok, 28 July 2008), exemplifying how cultural and religious “patterns of behaviour” and leadership combined to facilitate an atmosphere whereby resolution of the dispute in Bok was possible (Salehudin 2007, pp. 10–12). The next section will review how the dispute resolution processes were undertaken.

Powerful negotiations

Direct negotiations between the protagonists were at the core of the conflict management process applied in Bok. The mushawara, convened by Eni20 was the heart of the dispute resolution process. This meeting allowed the parties to air their grievances and to



hear the other side’s arguments.21 Mushawara have become part of Indonesian legal cultures and have even been received into formal legal structures. These community meetings have also been con-sidered to be part of the “social contract” within communities across Indonesia and have played an important role in decision-making and dispute resolution in Bok (Koesnoe 1969, p. 22).

The approach taken in Bok is consistent with a dispute resolu-tion framework known as “principled negotiations”, where parties articulate their interests and then listen to the perspectives and arguments of the other side (Ross 2000, pp. 1011–13). By moving beyond merely seeing their own position to actively listening to their opponents, negotiations can lead to new avenues for resolv-ing a conflict (Ross 2000, p. 1011). Common to both principled negotiations and mushawara is the fact that all parties have the opportunity to express their views and emotions. This allows “the air to be cleared” and validates all perspectives (Ross 2000, p. 1012). The aim of principled negotiations is to achieve a resolution that provides “mutual gains”, with all sides to a dispute “walking away” with something (Ross 2000, pp. 1012–13). As will be seen, the mushawara in Bok incorporated these two steps: the articulation of the opposing positions, and the parties to a conflict listening to each other in order to obtain an outcome that involves mutual gains.

The mushawara reinforces an important Islamic principle out-lined by the leading Indonesian Muslim scholar, Nurcholish Madjid, who wrote, “man has a duty to listen to other people’s ideas, and then to examine those ideas critically in order to determine which is the best to follow”.22 Like principled negotiation, listening and expressing a position is integral to resolving disputes. The mushawara in Bok allowed the airing of grievances between the protagonists, ensuring that they felt they had been heard, while at the same time forcing them to listen to the other side of the argument. The forum thus gave people the space for negotiating solutions (interview with Eni, Bok, 16 August 2008). Although the Tuan Guru from Kediri was present, he did not say anything. His presence was an implicit



reminder to those involved that a conclusion to these troubles was expected (interview with Abdullah, Bok, 26 August 2008). Silence is a powerful form of communication within Sasak society. When issuing directives, Sasak of high social status do not neces-sarily need to make their instructions explicit. Silence often provides a mutually understood non-verbal expression of expectations and meaning (Mahyuni 2006, pp. 155–58).

After several hours of in-depth discussion an agreement was reached. The Kepala Dusun, whose alleged wrongdoing had caused the protests, would step down before October (approximately two months after the mushawara and approximately two months before village elections). This outcome was seen as a “win-win” result for all parties. The significance of this compromise cannot be under-estimated as it ensured that the protagonists left the mushawara with their dignity intact and calm returned to Bok (Pusat Penelitian Bahasa dan Kebudayaan Universitas Mataram dan Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Kesejahteraan Rakyat Republik Indonesia 2004, pp. 53–55). Both sides of the confrontation could claim victory. The Kepala Dusun did not resign immediately, but it was understood that he would step down soon. The result was not disadvantageous for the Kepala Dusun, as he had political ambitions to become the Kepala Desa. According to local regulations, if he wanted to run for the position of Kepala Desa it was necessary for him to resign prior to the village elections in any case (interview with Zaini, Bok, 28 July 2008).

This period of social instability in Bok was resolved through discussion relying on a Sasak cultural practice — the mushawara. Despite the tenuous nature of the situation, there was no need to resort to forceful police intervention. Tuan Guru Hajji (TGH) Madani told me that forceful police tactics were often counterpro-ductive in Lombok. While using force may help to disperse a crowd, it does not necessarily solve problems. In fact, an aggressive police response has the potential to heighten anger. In tight-knit Sasak society, which has high levels of social solidarity, friends and fellow village members may feel compelled to enter into the fray



after an aggressive police intervention, resulting in an escalation of the situation. This could lead to a rise in tension, rather than a reduction (interview with TGH Ahmad Madani, Mataram, 21 August 2008). The police liaison officer in Bok therefore implemented a “minimalist” approach, limiting the police’s role to protecting the leadership group. The officer thus became part of the community’s response, rather than acting unilaterally as had occurred previously in another West Lombok village of Penujak. The police response in this village had negative consequences for all involved as it increased the tensions and conflict significantly (Lombok Post, 25 April 1999, p. 1; 26 April 1999, p. 1; 30 April 1999, p. 9).

The conflict management processes utilized in Bok demonstrate the coalescing of state and non-state forces to resolve conflict. Integral to this dispute resolution process were the efforts of religious leaders and their ability to change the dynamics of the situation at a crucial moment. This was particularly important when the protagonists needed to be forced to the negotiating table. The religious leadership created an atmosphere where people felt obliged to participate in good-faith negotiations. Those involved knew their actions were being watched by the influential Tuan Guru from Kediri and that they would be judged sternly if they did not participate with appropriate respect and effort. This is an example of the authoritative role of Tuan Guru, which has been acknowledged as being pivotal for conflict management processes in Mataram and West Lombok (Kingsley 2010, p. 6). Tuan Guru have also been observed in other tense situations in Lombok as ensuring the participation of protagonists in social and legal pro-cesses connected to the avoidance and resolution of conflict (see, for example, Ruhpina 2005, pp. 231–33).

The religious leaders thus underwrote the conflict resolution process, ensuring that the protagonists attended the mushawara, came to an agreement and felt obliged to adhere to it. They did this through their social influence, rather than direct involvement in the mushawara. The Tuan Guru increased the legitimacy of the process itself, as “mediation, will build no more than superficial



temporary truce unless the process is managed to allow the parties to discover a common bond deeper than the process alone” (Ackerman 2002, p. 89). That common bond here was the watchful eye of the Tuan Guru and the respect all parties involved had for the religious authority he represented.

Conclusion

Conflict management processes adopted at the grassroots level in the village of Bok emphasize the stress that conflict can cause to those involved and the flexibility required to prevent or resolve violence of this nature. The leadership group was aware that despite the stressful nature of events they needed to respond without rigidity. If one approach, such as the initial intervention of religious leaders, was unsuccessful, then new tactics would be applied. These localized and fluid strategies are vital during Indonesia’s new democratic era when the influence of local authorities and political elites has increased, and when protest and public criticism are considered legitimate forms of political behaviour.

State legal responses (such as statutes, police action and even prosecution in court) are important for election management in post-Soeharto Lombok. Yet the strategy used to control the tensions in Bok illustrated a method for maintaining social stability through partnerships between state and non-state actors who have high levels of social standing, such as local Muslim religious leaders, Tuan Guru. These religious leaders were essential for avoiding large-scale police intervention. Tensions in Bok were ultimately diffused without the need for direct police intervention, which can cause an escalation of social disturbances in Indonesia.

The importance of conflict avoidance and the effective resolution of disputes during election periods in Indonesia when access to power, influence and wealth is being contested should not be underestimated. Combining state and non-state actors and institutions in fluid, flexible and socially appropriate ways congruent with local circumstances is essential if conflicts are to be avoided or resolved.



Appendix: nTB government structure — 2008

Level 1 Province (Provinsi): NTB — Head: Governor (EO)

Level 2 City (Kota) — Head: Mayor (Walikota) (EO).1. Mataram2. Bima

Regency (Kabupaten) — Head: Bupati (EO).1. West Lombok; 2. Central Lombok; 3. East Lombok; 4. West Sumbawa; 5. Sumbawa; 6. Dompu; 7. Bima; 8. North Lombok (established in 2008).

Level 3 Kecamatan — Head: Camat (AO, by Walikota)1. Ampenan; 2. Mataram; 3. Cakranegera; 4. Sekorbela (established in 2007); 5. Sandubya (established in 2007).

Kecamatan — Head: Camat (AO, by Bupati )There are 16 Kecamatan in West Lombok.

Level 4 Kelurahan — Head: Lurah (AO, by Walikota).

Desa — Head: Kepala Desa (EO).West Lombok has approximately 125 Desa.

Level 5 Lingkungan — Head: Kepala Lingkungan (Kaling) (AO, by Walikota)

Dusun – Head: Kepala Dusun (EO).Desa Bok has six Dusun.

Level 6 RW — Rukun Warga — Head: Kepala RW (approximately 300–700 people)

RW — Rukun Warga — Head: Kepala RW

Level 7 RT — Rukun Tetangga — Head: Kepala RT (approximately 100–300 people)

RT — Rukun Tetangga — Head: Kepala RT

Abbreviations: “EO” means “Elected Official”; “AO” means “Appointed Official”.

noTes 1. This article is based on fifteen months of fieldwork in Mataram and the

surrounding areas of Lombok, during 2007–8, which was supported by an ARC Federation Fellowship Doctoral Scholarship and Endeavour Australia Cheung Kong Fellowship. The author would like to acknowledge Tim Lindsey, Grace Baey and Maria Platt, as well as the anonymous reviewers and editorial staff of Sojourn, for their thoughtful feedback at various stages of this article’s preparation.



2. Bok is a village in West Lombok and has been de-identified in accordance with the requirements of the University of Melbourne Ethics Committee for this research. Accordingly, all names in the case study are pseudonyms.

3. In a recent article, I considered how conflict was avoided rather than delin-eating the terrible consequence of violence, which is commonly at the core of analysis about communal and political conflict in Indonesia (see Kingsley 2012a). This article takes a similar approach to recent scholarship that has focused on how conflict has been avoided in parts of India (see Ashtush Varshney 2002).

4. The role of Tuan Guru were important in Bok, where the population is exclusively Muslim.

5. I have discussed the socio-political importance of Tuan Guru on Lombok in several publications (see Kingsley 2010; 2012a, p. 9; 2012b).

6. Sasak are the indigenous ethnic group of Lombok. 7. Bahasa Sasak is the language of the Sasak. 8. The village’s leadership structure is outlined in the “Appendix: NTB Govern-

ment Structure — 2008”. 9. A Kecamatan is a sub-regency, headed by a Kepala Camat. In the Indonesian

governance hierarchy it sits just below the Kabupaten, headed by the Bupati. To understand the local governance structures that were applicable during the disturbances in Bok, see “Appendix: NTB Government Structure — 2008”.

10. Penghulu (state-appointed religious leaders) and Tuan Guru (local non-state religious leaders) are both Muslim religious leaders in Lombok, although Tuan Guru have higher social status. These positions, however, are not mutually exclusive roles, as Tuan Guru are sometimes also Penghulu.

11. This role for Tuan Guru as social stabilizers was also discussed during interviews with other community leaders in Mataram. See Interview with Mukhsin, Mataram, 14 July 2008; Interview with Andi, Mataram, 4 August 2008.

12. Concerns about the role and operation of police liaison officers in local villages in other parts of Indonesia have centred on them pressuring or bullying villagers on behalf of political or commercial interests. See Bebbington et al. 2006, p. 1969; International Crisis Group 2012.

13. The role of negotiation in social disputes, rather than the use of force, and close engagement between police and local community leaders has been con-sidered a priority by many leading Indonesian police officers in relation to conflict avoidance and resolution. See Masmiyat 2007, pp. 29–36.

14. The Kepala Dusun’s status is immediately below that of Kepala Desa in the Indonesian governance hierarchy. See “Appendix: NTB Government Struc-ture — 2008”.



15. The Kepala Camat is immediately senior to the Kepala Desa in the Indonesian governance hierarchy. Despite this, the Kepala Camat is, in many ways, a less significant position because they are appointed rather than elected. See “Appendix: NTB Government Structure — 2008”.

16. Lombok’s population has experienced high-levels of socio-economic dis-advantage — see Kingsley (2012a, p. 4). It has been argued by senior political figures in Lombok that poverty renders socio-economically disadvantaged people more liable to be co-opted by political actors who use them as a “rent-a-crowd” in order to advance a particular political agenda. The former NTB governor, Lalu Serinata, for example, believed that money was distributed to secure participants for the January 2000 riots in Mataram and West Lombok — Interview with Lalu Serinata, Mataram, 8 January 2008. I also witnessed, early in my time in Lombok, the distribution of money at a demonstration that turned violent outside the attorney general’s office in Mataram.

17. For discussion of the legal status and requirements of village administration in Indonesia, see Bratakusumah and Solihin 2004, pp. 24–29.

18. I do not believe that Eni’s gender was a major factor in the social disturbances in Bok; rather from my understanding of events the vacancy of village head, created by her decision not to re-contest the upcoming elections, was the primary political motivation behind these events. With this said, patriarchal power structures do dominate in Lombok. The rationale for Eni’s unusually prominent standing derived from her character and influential family. For a discussion of patriarchal power structures in Lombok, see Ecklund 1977; Bennett 2005; Smith 2009; Platt 2012a; Platt 2012b.

19. Eni also considered local political manoeuvring to be the rationale for the demonstrations.

20. One of a Kepala Desa’s key roles is to facilitate communication within a com-munity. This is particularly important at times of social instability and crisis. See Suthedja and Swalem 1981, pp. 32–35.

21. These community meetings are a pivotal part of problem solving in Mataram and West Lombok — Konsortium Pengembangan Nusa Tenggara 2007, pp. 18–19.

22. This assertion is based on Qur’anic verse 39: 17–18. See Madjid 2005, p. 217.

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Interviews

Interview with Farouk Muhammad, Mataram, 3 November 2007.Interview with Lalu Serinata, in Mataram, 8 January 2008.Interview with Mukhsin, Mataram, 14 July 2008.



Interview with Zaini, Bok, West Lombok, 16 July 2008.Interview with Zaini, Bok, West Lombok, 28 July 2008.Interview with Andi, Mataram, 4 August 2008.Interview with Eni, Bok, West Lombok, 16 August 2008.Interview with TGH Ahmad Madani, Mataram, 21 August 2008.Interview with Imran, Bok, West Lombok, 26 August 2008.Interview with Abdullah, Bok, West Lombok, 26 August 2008.

Jeremy J. Kingsley is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Asia Research Institute, national University of Singapore, Bukit Timah Campus, Bukit Timah Road, Singapore 259770, email: [email protected] / [email protected].


Documents

“Village Elections, Violence and Islamic Leadership in Lombok, Eastern Indonesia” (2012) 27 Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 285