Was the rise of European global dominance in the17th and 18th centuries inevitable? What factors

worked in favour of these imperial forces?

Introduction

The World we live in now is largely the result of the last

few centuries of the Western rise to power and the resultant

turmoil that has reformed the old political boundaries in favour

of the European colonisers. Although many of the former colonies

are now independent nations, the echoes of European presence will

still remain for many centuries or even millennia in the form of

spoken languages, cultural, technological, even biological or

genetic influences. Countless scholars have tried to explain the

peculiar phenomenon of the rapid expansion of this tiny part of

Eurasia, which, in light of its distant Eastern neighbours such

as Arabs, Indians or the Chinese, seemed like a technologically

and socially backwater region before the Industrial Revolution.

Some, like David Landes, constructed intricate timelines,

stretching back as far as the beginning of agriculture in the

Near East to provide a narrative in which the global dominance of

technologically and socially superior Europeans seems like an

inevitable climax of a step-by-step process, sometimes briefly

interrupted by an occasional war or epidemic (Landes, 1998,

p.96). Others adopted a more sceptical view, saying that Europe

was not in any way supreme to other great powers of the World and

its dominance in the 17th and 18th centuries was a mere accident,

a one-time lucky correlation of environmental, political and

social circumstances that turned the tides of history. In this

essay I will aim evaluate the relative importance of the factors

that allowed Europeans to begin their World dominance by the

1800s and find out if it really was inevitable.

Biological and military superiority

The New World

The great majority of researchers of this topic attribute

the conquest of the rest of the World by European to the most

direct cause- their superiority in military technology and

logistics which helped to directly subdue less developed nations.

The starkest example is one of the first campaigns of European

colonisation- the Americas. Both the small Indian tribes and more

advanced civilisations like the Inca or Aztecs had little in

terms of weaponry to counter the invaders as most armaments were

still made of wood and stone . While the Incas had more advanced

metallurgy and employed some bronze armaments (Cooke et al.,

2008, 1660-1661), they were still no match for European steel.

Another major advantage were the gunpowder weapons which,

although inaccurate, produced a staggering psychological effect

with loud bangs and smoke as well as facilitated sieges. The

Spanish cavalry was similarly frightening in assaults, but also

facilitated transportation and coupled with vastly superior ships

gave Europeans an edge in logistics as supplies and soldiers

could be rapidly transported to any hot spot in need (Diamond,

1997, p.259).

However, we also need to consider the Europeans’ most

deadly weapon- germs. After living in close contact with domestic

animals for thousands of years, they developed immunities to

otherwise deadly animal-transmitted diseases like measles,

influenza or smallpox. The Indians had no comparable domesticates

except for Andean alpacas, therefore they were caught off guard

(Diamond, 1997, p.354); even before conquistadores reached most

settlements, the natives were being decimated. In less than a

hundred years, 90% of the Central and South American population

had succumbed to the epidemics (Trigger, Washburn, 1996, p.361-

369) (fig.1). The colonisers, contrarily, multiplied in huge

numbers and lived long lives, sometimes even up to 80 years as

former pathogens like cholera or influenza were left behind.

Their domesticates were similarly thriving in pristine biotas-

weeds were absent and so were cattle germs and parasites (Crosby,

Worster, 1986, p.275, 281-282).

Fig. 1 (2015) The decline of Native Central Americans.

The Old World

Some may argue that defeating already decimated Neolithic Indians

is not a huge achievement, but we should not forget that

Europeans had no such biological advantage while establishing

African or Asian colonies as their post-medieval military

technology started to become dominant in the Old World as well.

After the battle of Lepanto in 1572, for example, Venetian cannon

founders decided that captured Ottoman guns were more useful

remelted than reused as they were of such low quality (Hoffman,

2012, p.2). From the 16th century onwards, Europeans were the

World’s main manufacturers of weapons, even selling them to the

Chinese, then inventors of gunpowder. But how could a fragmented

Sub-continent outcompete such great powers as China or India?

According to scholars like Kennedy, this fragmentation was their

biggest advantage; it created a military and market “tournament”

of states in perpetual warfare, which in turn encouraged constant

military innovation and exchange of ideas (Kennedy, 1987, p.16-

24). While other Eurasian powers mostly fought to either defend

or slightly expand their lands, major European states of the

16th-18th centuries aspired to total domination over the continent

(Hoffman, 2012, p.6). Warfare became more of a royal sport as

monarchs suffered no repercussions in case of a loss (Hale, 1985,

p.29-32) (fig.2).

Conditional on: Being at war Losing war

Period 1500-1799 1800-1919 1500-1799 1800-1919

Austrian

Dominions

0.00 0.07 0.00 0.2

France 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.67

Great Britain 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

Hohenzollern

Dominions

0.00 0.06 0.00 0.5

Spain 0.00 0.1 0.00 0.33

Fig. 2 (2012) The probability that a major European ruler will be deposed

after losing a war.

Due to widespread espionage and rapid market exchange,

technological novelties of one state were nearly instantly

adopted throughout the continent, therefore constant innovation

was required to keep up with one’s opponents (Guilmartin, 1974,

p.253-254). Gutenberg’s printing press also eased the idea spread

as it was superior to the elite restricted writing systems of

South America and the inefficient ideographic Chinese printing

press (Zhang, 2007, p.103). A vivid example of the “tournament

effect” is Japan, where, after the introduction of firearms in

1543, numerous military novelties like volley fire and artillery-

resistant fortifications were devised during a period of

incessant warfare between regional warlords. When the country was

unified at the end of the 16th century however, the tournament

stopped and innovation stopped with it (Hoffman, 2012, p.16).

Another major factor in the development of gunpowder

weapons is the enemies one has to face. Because vast empires like

the China or the Mughals often encountered nomads against which

gunpowder was useless (hitting a skilled horseman with a musket

is nearly impossible and they had no cities to besiege), they

could not concentrate all resources on firearm development

(fig.3). Europeans, however, mostly fought the Ottomans or

themselves, so they could fully invest their intellectual and

financial resources to refine their tactics and technology

(Chase, 2003, p.1-27, 35-41).

Fraction of years at war against foreign

enemies

Country With wars against

nomads

Without wars against

nomads

China 0.31 0.08

France 0.52 0.52

Great Britain 0.53 0.53

Spain 0.81 0.81

Austrian dominions 0.24 0.24

Fig.3 The type and frequency of foreign wars of China and European countries.

Economic superiority

After the fortunate Spanish conquest of South America, they

were left not just with vast expanses of agricultural land (which

had to be worked by African slaves, as most Indians were dead),

but also with hoards of silver and gold. Both remelted artworks

and mines around settlements like Potosí provided them with these

precious resources (Marks, 2002, p.76-78). This newly acquired

wealth was mostly used by Spanish Habsburgs for incessant costly

warfare over European domination, which ultimately left their

states in ruin. The increasing amounts of circulating gold and

silver also contributed to inflation and debasement of most

European currencies. Coincidentally, Chinese paper currency was

likewise being debased around that time and Ming emperors had to

import increasing amounts of Japanese and European silver to

manufacture new money (fig.4). As the Chinese had the World’s

most advanced industry and produced more than 75% of all traded

products before the 1700s, their dirt cheap goods like metalwork

and textiles overflowed the European market in exchange for the

silver, driving local manufacturers into bankruptcy (Marks, 2002,

p. 79-81) (GlobalResearch webpage).

Fig.4 (1998) The production and exports of silver in the World (in tonnes).

Therefore many monarchs adopted the policy of mercantilism-

limiting imports and encouraging exports of national manufacture.

This served two main purposes: the protection of the states’

economies from cheap Asian produce and the accumulation of

gold/silver bullion instead of relying on colonial supplies in

case of another expensive war (McNeil, 1982, p.113).

According to some historians, the need to outmatch the quality

and price of external goods also gave a stimulus for the

sponsorship of technological innovation in countries, actively

engaged in Asian trade networks (Marks, 2002, p. 92).

In theory, these technological advancements should bolster

the economy and ensure a region’s growth, but there is slightly

different view on the matter, proposed by D. North and P. Thomas.

They argue that technological development, better education,

accumulation of capital were not the stimuli of economic growth-

they were its products. Efficient economic organisation, namely

the “establishment of institutional arrangements and property

rights that create an incentive to channel individual economic

effort into activities that bring the private rate of return

close to social rate of return” (North, Thomas, 1973, p.2) was

the key to the success of some European states and failure of the

rest of the World. This means that innovation (with its

associated costs and possibility of failure), had to be as

lucrative to the innovator as it was to the society. That was

ensured by the creation of efficient patent laws in the 17th-18th

century England and the Netherlands. The fading feudal

relationships, more liberal guild regulations, establishment of

national banks and business insurance providers similarly allowed

more mobility for labour and trade (North, Thomas, 1973p.155-

157).

States like Spain and France failed to ensure the safe

usage and transfer of private possessions and ideas, as property

seizure and confiscation as well as alteration of contracts was

widespread in both countries (Klein, 2007, p.332). Therefore

their agricultural and commercial progress was eventually stunted

when the growing 17th-18th century population resulted in the

raised cost of land and diminishing wages (North, Thomas,

1973p.127-131) and people were largely driven out of productive

pursuits.

While exploring both views we can observe that, firstly,

“Europe” cannot be taken as a separate entity, as the continent’s

major states were vastly different in terms of their development

in the early modern period. Secondly, an explanation based on

their innovative superiority always stumbles upon the “chicken or

the egg” problem. In this case, however, it would be more logical

to assume that an efficient economy stimulated innovation and not

the other way around. One example is the search for a way to

determine longitude in long sea voyages. Although huge rewards

were offered by the Spanish and English crowns, the problem was

only solved more than 150 years later when John Harrison came up

with the marine chronometer in the 1750s (Betts, 2006, p.7-8).

How much quicker could it have been invented, had there been

efficient property laws?

The Geopolitical situation

In any case, the search for the explanation of European

dominance should not only be focused on the sub-continent itself.

It had many competitors, some of which, like China or India, were

much more powerful and could suppress any attempts of

colonisation on Eurasia. Of course, one could say that the

initial conquest of the Americas was a huge step forward, but why

were Europeans the first to do it?

Between the 1405 and 1433 a fleet of Chinese “treasure

ships” under the command of the admiral Zheng He dominated the

Indian Ocean. It was the largest armada ever assembled and could

annihilate any possible competitors without much effort. The

fleet engaged in large scale trade and exploration of Indonesia,

Central Asia and East Africa (fig.5), but did not leave any

colonies behind the way Europeans did (Marks, 2002, p.46). While

there is no univocal explanation as to why the Chinese were so

disinterested in further expansion, possibly even to the

Americas, it mostly assumed that they simply had no need. As

China had extremely advanced agriculture and industry, there was

little in terms of goods that any lands beyond the Indian Ocean

could offer (Bentley, 1998, p.238-242). The Europeans, however,

needed direct access to trade routes from Asia (which were

blocked by the Ottomans), so Columbus’ suggestion to sail West

appealed to the Spanish crown as the competing Portuguese were

the first to secure a sea route around the Cape of Good Hope

(Marks, 2002, p.60).

Fig. 5 (2010) The voyages of Zheng He around the Indian Ocean.

Due to increasing costs and internal imperial struggles,

the “treasure fleet” had to be withdrawn after nearly 30 years of

operation. As the Indian Ocean was otherwise an oasis of unarmed

trade, this action removed any possible competition for heavily

armed Portuguese and Dutch ships, which could freely sail and

conquer (Finlay, 1991 p.3-6). Furthermore, the collapse of

African states like Mali and the increasing instability of the

Indian Mughal Empire in the 17th century made their rich coastal

lands lucrative targets for the conquerors who could now start to

monopolise the trade. (Jensen, 1997, p.91-93) (Marks, 2002,

p.52).

In sum, there were many factors that gave Europeans an edge

over other societies, but it still took them hundreds of year to

completely subdue their adversaries. Hence, the essential

question here is whether the factors acted as catalysts, simply

speeding up the “inevitable” European domination or did they

require additional fortunate events to be able to shift the

World’s power balance?

European dominance as a series of lucky accidents

The “California school” of American historians adhere

precisely to the latter explanation. They argue against the

rooted view of the “big differences” between Europeans and the

rest of the World, be it in early technological advances, forms

of state organisation, social structures, agriculture or

geographical position. According to scholars like Frank,

Europeans were completely peripheral until Columbus’ fortunate

mistake of finding the Americas instead of India. Even when

Europe “used its American money to buy itself a ticket on the

Asian train” (Frank 1998, p. xxv), it still just barely reached

the level of development of China or India and was still far from

surpassing them. Until the late 18th century, both China and

India (despite some internal unrest) had booming agricultural and

industrial economies, experienced autonomous traders, talented

scientists and a high standard of living, akin to the most

advanced Western European states. According to Jack Goldstone,

there were two most important factors that allowed some European

countries to step beyond this state of an advanced pre-industrial

urban society: cultural changes after the first colonial

endeavours and liberation from photosynthesis as the sole source

of fuel (wood) (Goldstone, 2000, p.179-180).

After the rapid population growth and the flood of colonial

silver in 15th-16th centuries all over the World, the tax rates

could not keep up, weakening major powers like the Ottomans,

Habsburgs and the Chinese. The peasants began lacking land, the

free cities grew richer and more unruly. After large scale civil

unrest in the 17th century, major conservative directives were

imposed by the governments: China adopted a rigid Confucianist

philosophy, the Ottomans rejected liberal Western influences and

promoted traditional Sunni Islam and Europe faced the Counter-

Reformation that impeded progress (Goldstone, 1991, p.5-19).

Thanks to a series of lucky accidents, however, Protestantism

held out in England and the Netherlands. The Anglican Church in

particular actively promoted a mechanical worldview which allowed

more experimentation freedom for scientists like Newton or Boyle.

In turn, this freedom led to the second crucial accident- Thomas’

Newcomen’s steam pump (fig.6), invented in 1712 and improved by

Watt in 1765 (Goldstone, 2000, p.183-186). It allowed the English

to move past the constraints of an organic economy (being

dependent on wood for fuel), especially because their coal

deposits were readily accessible, while Chinese coal was

difficult to acquire and transport (Vries, 2001, p.422).

Furthermore, the European focus on agricultural labour

productivity (per worker) instead of Chinese land productivity

(per unit of land) allowed more people to be freed up for the new

mineral industry. Consequently, the fortunate Industrial

Revolution and social changes allowed Europeans to dominate not

just militarily, relying on assassinations and ruse to eliminate

their adversaries, but also technologically and intellectually

all over the World.

Fig.6 (2012) Thomas’ Newcomen’s steam pump.

Conclusion

As the old and often repeated proverb says: “history is

written by the victors”. Because the victors in this situation

are the Europeans themselves (or, more precisely, England, Spain,

France and the Netherlands), it is hard for any historians and

archaeologists to make bias-free assumptions about their rise to

power. All in all, the full answer to the main question is very

dependent on the way define “dominance”. If it is

military/territorial dominance, then, surely, it was inevitable

due to constant internal conflict and rapid transmission of

ideas. But then why the medieval Mongols were not considered the

World’s dominant people after the conquest of vast swathes of

land? If however, we see dominance as technological and

economical superiority, then it was more dependent on a series of

fortunate events that only gave crucial results at the clash of

the 18th and 19th centuries. Although the analysis of this topic

is mostly conferred to historians, there should undoubtedly be

much more archaeological involvement, as textual sources,

especially the ones written by conquerors often tend to be

subjective. Therefore the question of why and how the Europeans,

like the homo sapiens 14,000 years ago achieved World dominance

will only be answered when we accumulate a substantial base of

objective evidence and further explore the underlying processes

that effected the image of the World we live in.

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IllustrationsFigure 1. The decline of Native Central Americans. (2015) At: https://globalhistorycullen.wikispaces.com/Everything+Latin+America (Accessed on 2015.03.15).

Figure 2. The probability that a major European ruler will be deposed after losing a war. (2012) In: Hoffman, P. T., 2012. Why Was It Europeans Who Conquered the World? Page 27. The Journal of Economic History, 72(03), p. 1-49.

Figure 3. The type and frequency of foreign wars of China and European countries. (2012) In: Hoffman, P. T., 2012. Why Was It Europeans Who Conquered the World? Page 31. The Journal of Economic History, 72(03), p. 1-49.

Figure 4. The production and exports of silver in the World (in tonnes). (1998) At: http://www.zum.de/whkmla/sp/1314/soho/sshlog.html (Accessed on 2015.03.15)

Figure 5. The voyages of Zheng He around the Indian Ocean. (2010)At: http://factsanddetails.com/china/cat2/sub90/item45.html (Accessed on 2015.03.15)

Figure 6. Thomas’ Newcomen’s steam pump (2012). At: http://www.brighthubengineering.com/manufacturing-technology/71480-the-invention-of-the-steam-engine/ (Accessed on 2015.03.15)