What is Actually the Matter with Scotus? Landulphus Caracciolo on Objective Potency and Hylomorphic Unity

WILLIAM DUBA

WHAT IS ACTUALLY THE MATTER WITH SCOTUS? LANDOLFO CARACCIOLO ON OBJECTIVE POTENCY AND

HYLOMORPHIC UNITY

The southern French Franciscan Peter Auriol finished his Parisian lectures on the Sentences in 1318, having laid out his unique philosophical and theological vision before his largest audience, and perhaps meeting the fiercest resistance yet from the defenders of the doctrine of John Duns Scotus. The Neapolitan Landolfo Caracciolo led the defense in his own lectures on the Sentences, applying Scotus' ideas and texts to the cause of repelling Auriol's position. While known to modern scholarship since Scaramuzzi 1, Caracciolo has been little studied; indeed, only this year has work begun on cataloguing his major theological and philosophical work, his Commentary on the Sentences2

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This paper considers an issue, the nature of prime matter, where Scotus provides an engaging solution to a problem, which Peter Auriol vigorously refutes, advancing his own view. Landolfo then counters Auriol's criticism, using many of the same arguments Scotus used in the first place. While all three Franciscans argue their points through a broad use of Aristotelian texts and commentators, their doctrinal

1 In addition to D. SCARAMUZZI, ll pensiero di Giovanni Duns Scoto nel Mezzogiorno d'ltalia, Collegio S. Antonio, Rome 1927, pp. 67-75, on Landulph's philosophy see: S. KNUUTILLA, A. LEHTINEN, «Change and Contradiction: A Fourteenth-Century Controversy», Synthese 40 (1979) 189-207; C. SCHABEL, «Landulphus Caracciolo and a Sequax on Divine Foreknowledge», Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Litteraire du Moyen Age 66 (1999) 299-343; id., «Landulph Caracciolo and Gerard Odonis on Predestination: Opposite Attitudes toward Scotus and Auriol», Wissenschaft und Weisheit 65 (2002) 62-81; id. , «Parisian Commentaries from Peter Auriol to Gregory of Rimini, and the problem of predestination», in G.R. EVANS (ed.) , Mediaeval Commentaries on the 'Sentences' of Peter Lombard. Current Research, vol. 1, E.J. Brill, Leiden-Boston-Ki.iln 2002, pp. 221-265; id., «Landulph Caracciolo», in J.J.E. GRACIA, T.B. NOONE (eds .), A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, Oxford 2003, pp. 409-410.

2 C. SCHABEL, «The Sentences Commentary of Landulpus Caracciolus, OFM», Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale 51 (2009), forthcoming .

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«centers of gravity» lie in different parts of the Aristotelian tradition. Scotus' primary interest lies in the Metaphysics, in particular the books on substance as they appear in the Greek-Latin translation. Auriol provides a broadside attack of Scotus' understanding of Aristotle. joining extensive discussions from the Physics · to those from the Metaphysics, but chiefly as understood through the Arabic-Latin translation of the text and commentary of Averroes. Landolfo, while unafraid of discussing the interpretation of the classic loci in Aristotle's work, goes after Auriol's reading of Averroes' commentary on the Physics.

The story unfolds in three acts: first I will briefly trace Scotus· view. Then Peter Auriol- I suppose the villain of the piece- will come on stage and tear it apart. Finally, in his moment of glory at Paris, the bachelor theologian from Naples, future provincial minister there, and ultimately archbishop of Amalfi, will rise to defeat the Proven<;al menace and protect the honor of Scotism. This melodrama wants a stage. and props, or, to mix metaphors: the matter and form of their debate needs a quick exposition.

This paper examines the discussions of John Duns Scotus, Peter Auriol and Landolfo Caracciolo on prime matter as treated in their respective commentaries on book II, d. 12 of the Sentences. For Scotus. authentic treatments of this distinction survive both in the early Lectura and the later Reportata Parisiensia, reflecting his teaching at Oxford and Paris; he also discusses the issue in his Metaphysics commentary. For book II of Peter Auriol's commentary, the major redaction survives and is reproduced from a poor manuscript in the 1605 Rome edition. This text is linked to his teaching at Paris, although it shows signs of being reworked and, on this issue in particular, his discussion is heavily informed by his early Tractatus de principiis naturae, composed at Bologna in 1312. There is also a minor version witnessed by Citta del Vaticano, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, vat. lat. 6768, known as a witness to the «Bologna A verroists», for what the other half of the codex contains3

. In comparison, only book III of Landolfo Caracciolo's

3 On redactional issues pertaining to Peter Auriol's Sentences commentaries, see L. NIELSEN, , «Peter Auriol's Way with Words: The Genesis of Peter Auriol's Commentaries on Peter Lombard's First and Fourth Books of the Sentences», in G.R.

LANDOLFO CARACCIOLO ON OBJECTNE POTENCY AND HYLOMORPHIC UNITY 271

Sentences commentary survives in more than one redaction; although book II exists in a Rome incunable, the text suffers from numerous lacunae, necessitating recourse to the manuscripts.

Now, to the form, that is to matter: Scotus argues that prime matter exists in actuality, and some of his Aristotle-minded contemporaries disagreed. His argument comes about in resolving the difficulty posed by the pairing of matter and form, on the one hand, and potency and actuality, on the other, in Aristotelian metaphysics. The notion of creation ex nihilo further complicates this difficulty. Scotus' solution addresses these issues, and my explanation is necessarily schematic and presents the situation as understood by Scotus' contemporaries.

Matter and form: Aristotle seeks to reconcile two conflicting demands on sensible substances, namely that one thing be distinct from other things, yet capable of becoming other things. For example, wine is not vinegar, but wine is capable of becoming vinegar, so that it would be true to say «what was wine is what is vinegar». So we speak of this substance in two ways: what it is, wine, and what it can become, vinegar-to-be. Aristotle's reconciliation consists in arguing that sensible substances are composites of two principles: matter and form. The form makes the composite what it is, as the form of wine makes wine to be wine, while the matter is what «receives» the form and guarantees change, ensuring that this wine is capable of becoming vinegar. But how can this hylomorphic composite be fundamentally one? One of Aristotle's explanations is that matter and form are not two separate parts, but rather two aspects of the same thing, related as potency (matter) and actuality (form)4

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Potency and actuality: according to a common reading of the first chapter of book IX of the Metaphysics, all being is divided into potency and actuality: what is, either is in actuality, or in potency. One meaning

EVANS (ed.), Mediaeval Commentaries on the 'Sentences' of Peter Lombard. Current Research, vol. 1, E.J. Brill, Leiden-Boston-Koln 2002, pp. 149-219. The Vatican manuscript also contains an abbreviated copy of Landolfo' s principiallecture on book II: see Schabel, «The Sentences Commentary».

4 The discussion here is summarized from W. DUBA, «Aristotelian Traditions in Franciscan Thought: Matter and Potency According to Scotus And Auriol», in I. TAIFACOS (ed.), The Origins of European Scholarship, F. Steiner, Stuttgart 2006, pp. 147-161.

272 WILLIAM DUBA

of potency is that of active and passive potency: that is, the power to act ' and the capacity for being acted upon. Acti_ye and passive potency refer

to one relation between agent and patient, but from different sides: passive potency refers to the patient, which is capable of change, and therefore contains matter; active potency refers to the agent. Both the extremes of this relation must exist: an active potency cannot exist without a passive potency, and vice versa.

In substantial generation, matter receives form through the activity of an agent. Therefore the substance relates to an informing agent that exercises its active potency. One solution therefore identifies this passive potency with matter's potency with respect to the actuality of the form. The division of beings into beings-in-potency and beings-inactuality becomes a division into matter and form. This solution has many problems, but it presents a superficially neat picture of potency and act.

However superficially neat, this symmetric solution will not work with Christian doctrine as understood by our Franciscans5

. For they hold that matter is a positive being created by God. Indeed, creation is different from generation in that God creates matter. So if God's creative power is an active potency, then the corresponding passive potency cannot be matter, since creation requires that, prior to creation, there be nothing in external reality that corresponds to God's power.

Duns Scotus adopts a solution that distinguishes between thl:.' potency that matter has, and the passive potency corresponding to an active power. The passive potency that something has to become something else is subjective potency, and matter has this subjective potency. The passive potency corresponding to an active power is «objective potency». A pile of wood, for example, is a house-in-potency in the sense of subjective potency, but a house-in-objective potency i~

what corresponds to the architect's power to build a house. Scotus' division between objective and subjective potency has soml:.'

side effects. When Aristotle states that all beings are in potency or actuality, Scotus understands the former to refer to objective potenc . .

5 For the most recent survey of medieval theories of matter and form, with a full bibliography, see C. KbNIG-PRALONG, «Matter/Form» in H. Lagerlund (ed.). T/ le Springer Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy, forthcoming.

LANDOLFO CARACCIOLO ON OBJECTIVE POTENCY AND HYLOMORPHIC UNITY 273

Matter therefore has some distinct actuality that is opposed to objective potency, an actuality that consists precisely in subjective potency, such that, when combined with form, two distinct actualities constitute a composite6

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Peter Auriol first considers the issues of matter and form in his 1312 Tractatus de principiis naturae. There, he explicitly sets as his task to demonstrate the harmony (with a few exceptions) between Aristotle and Averroes, on the one hand, and the revealed truth, on the other7

. The treatment that Caracciolo would have encountered, however, would have been that deriving from his lectures on book II of the Sentences in the academic year 1317-1318. Considering the question «Whether the essence of prime matter in itself absolutely lacks all actuality», Peter Auriol lays out the opinions on the subject, finishing by expressing the position of «others, who follow the mind of Aristotle and the Commentator». He is referring to himself. Auriol declares that «matter has an essence lacking any essential actuality, such that it has in its description no actuality whatsoever, but is a purely potential and purely modifiable thing. Nor by this is it nothing [ ... ]»8

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In contesting Scotus' assignment of actuality to matter, Auriol relies heavily on Averroes' Physics commentary, presenting four arguments that matter does not have determinate being (and by extension, actual being). First, matter is something purely potential. Second, for matter to be something between pure being and nothing, it cannot have a determinate nature9

. In these first two cases, Auriol employs

6 R. CROSS, The Physics of John Duns Scotus. The Scientific Context of a Theological Vision, Oxford University Press, Oxford I998, pp. I7-23; W. DUBA, «Aristotelian Traditions», op. cit., pp. 153-I55.

7 Petrus Aureoli, Tractatus de principiis naturae, prologue (Citta del Vaticano, BA V, vat. lat. 3063, f. Ira). Thanks to Prof. Martin Bauer for generously allowing me to consult a preliminary transcription.

8 Petrus Aureoli, Commentarium in Secundum, Tertium, Quartum Libras Sententiarum, Romae I605, p. ISla: «Alii vero sequentes dicta ad mentem Aristotelis et Commentatoris, non euntes nee aspicientes ad actum existendi, sed ad naturam propriam essentialem, dixerunt quod essentia materiae non est essentia formae, tamen materia habet talem essentiam quod illa caret omni actu essentiali, ita quod intrinsece infra propriam rationem nullum omnino habet actum, sed est res pure potentialis et pure modificabilis; nee ex hoc est nihil, quoniam nihil nee est actus nee actuale».

9 Ibid., p. I5Ib: «Prima <propositio> est quod materia prima essentiam nullam habet, nee dicit naturam determinatam et distinctam et in actu, sed dicit purum

274 WILLIAM DUBA

authoritative arguments from the same sources, above all, Averroes' commentary on book I of the Physics, comments 68770, that is, the on the last part of Physics I:7, where Aristotle argues that matter is the substrate to the generation and corruption of substantial forms. The third argument derives from Metaphysics VII:3: matter is whatremains after every determinate actuality has been removed, therefore matter does not have determinate being10

• Finally, returning to the Physics, Auriol argues that if matter had determinate being, an intellect, at least that of an angel, could point to it. But since, as A verroes explains (and in a somewhat circular fashion for Auriol's argument), matter is not a being in actuality, it cannot be attained by any action, including the intelled 1•

In denying actuality to matter, Auriol seeks to strengthen the unity of the composite. One of the weaknesses of Scotus' position, Auriol observes, is that it makes objective potency and its corresponding actuality the sense in which all beings are either in potency or actuality, according to Metaphysics IX. But if so, the division of being would depend entirely on an external factor, the agent, and one half of the division, Scotus' objective potency, would refer to beings that do not really exist. In other words, Aristotle's division would no longer be a distinction among modes of existence, but rather among the ways one describes non-existent and real beings.

potentiale et terminabile, ita quod illa est interminate et indistincte res materialis ... »; p. 152b: «Secunda ratio principalis est haec. lllud quod est medium inter purum ens et nihil non potest importare naturam determinatam et distinctam; sed materia est huiusmodi; ergo ... » .

10 Ibid., p. 155a: «Tertia ratio principalis est ista: illud quod non est quid in actu determinatum non habet entitatem terminatam; sed materia non est quod in actu determinatum; ergo. Minor patet VII Metaphysicae, ubi dicitur quod materia non est quid, nee quantum, etc.».

11 Ibid., p. 155b: «Quarta ratio principalis est ista: in quo est entitas aliqua determinata et distincta, quantumcumque sit parva, illa res est demonstrabilis per intellectum, puta saltern Angelicum intellectum; condicio enim intellectus est quod statuat et terminet rem intellectam. Sed materia apud nullum intellectum nata est terminari. Ergo. Maior patet ex terminis. Minorem probo per Philosophum et Commentatorem, II Physicorum, commento 13 et ill Physicorum, commento 9. Commentator enim exponit illud Philosophi, quod generatio non est motus, quia quod est non-ens non movetur; sed materia, quae est subiectum generationis, est non-ens. lbi Commentator exponit cum modo materia est non-ens, 'non-ens', in quit, 'quia non actu; actus autem est ens simpliciter'».


Landolfo Caracciolo rises to Auriol's challenge in his commentary on book II, distinction XII, q. 1. After quickly arguing that matter is a true being, he addresses Auriol head-on in arguing that matter has a determinate nature, before concluding that matter and form are two distinct realities that constitute the unity of the composite. Landolfo dedicates the weightier part of the question to the debate with Auriol: he cites all four of Auriol's arguments, then he presents his 'own' opinion, marshalling Scotus' arguments to demonstrate that matter does have a determinate nature. Finally, he refutes Peter Auriol's arguments, suggesting that Peter has misunderstood Aristotle, A verroes and Augustine. In effect, he summarizes Auriol, gives arguments from Scotus for why Auriol is wrong, then argues that Auriol misrepresents

his sources. Landolfo' s opinion comes directly from Scotus, and can be reduced

to three parts: First, he states what objective and subjective potency are. Second, he repeats Scotus' list of authoritative arguments describing what constitutes the entity of matter, and then applies each of those arguments to demonstrate that matter has a determinate nature. Finally, he gives a confirming argument, moving from the admission that matter is a type of being distinct from other types to claiming that it must have

a determinate nature. Landolfo describes succinctly the difference between objective and

subjective potency, and the corresponding actualities:

There are two kinds of being-in-potency, namely as the term and as the subject. The first, which is as the term, is called obj_ective P?tency; the second, as the subject, is called subjective potency, and 1s receptiVe of some perfection. This distinction is made clear fro_m ~ook I of the Physics. For something comes to be in one way from pnvatwn, and another from t_he subjected matter. For when I say 'the form of fire is in potency, and actuahty comes to be from that form being in potency,' I do not mean a potency that is anything, because the form of fire before its production in actuality is completely (mere) nothing. But when I say 'matter is i~ potency to the fo~·m of fire ' , I signify that some positive entity can be subjected to the actuahty and form of fire.

There are two kinds of actuality, just like potency, because potency is said with regards to actuality, Metaphysics IX._ For th~re is a~ actuality that corresponds to objective potency, as there 1s now m actua_hty the for~ ?f whiteness that before was pure nothing, and in such thmgs what lS 1_n potency, afterwards comes to be in actuality by the agent. <And> there 1s

276 WILLIAM DUBA

another actuality with respect to actuality, namely the actuality of a true possible entity when subjected to some perfection and forn1112

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Taking the case of Physics I, in substantial change there are three principles: form, its privation and matter. Potency-actuality can describe the relation between pre-existing matter and form, and thus understood is subjective potency and actuality. Or the pair can describe the relatio~ between pre-existing privation and form or matter, since matter, like form, is a substance and a positive being. This relation of objective potency and actuality is between privation and substance. As an aside, this summary mostly coheres with Scotus' view, and also lays bare where Auriol's criticism comes from: being in objective potency, Landolfo declares, is mere nihil, completely nothing.

Landolfo, having posited the distinction between objective and subjective potencies, and their corresponding actualities, lists «eight conditions» that have been attributed to the entity of matter by «the philosophers and saints.» Not by coincidence, these conditions find a close correspondence in John Duns Scotus' discussion what sort of being matter has, both in the Lectura and in the Reportata Parisiensia:

Scotus, Rep. Par. II, d. 12, q. 1 (Vives, pp. 6-7)

Secunda videndum est quale ens est materia? Dico quod est ens in potentia. Sed hoc dupliciter potest intelligi, nam aliquid dicitur esse in potentia sicut terminus potentiae, et ad illud est potentia. Aliud vero dicitur esse in potentia sicut subiectum potentiae, et imperfectum est in potentia ad aliud, ita quod in se est aliquod ens natum suscipere perfectionem et actum ab alio.

Prima potentia vacatur obiectiva, secunda dicitur subiectiva, nam alio modo superficies est in potentia ad albedinem, et alio modo albedo est in potentia antequam sit; et aliquando istae duae potentiae non sunt realiter diversae, quia respectu agentis naturalis nunquam est potentia obiectiva,

Landolfo Caracciolo, In II Sent., d. 12, q. 1

[19]Teneo oppositum, dicendo quatuor propositiones.

[20]Prima propositio: quod duplex est ens in potentia, videlicet ut terminus et ut subiectum. Prima, que est ut terminus, dicitur potentia obiecti va; secunda, ut subiectum, dicitur potentia subiectiva, perfectionis alicuius receptiva. Distinctio ista patet ex I Physicorum. Aliter enim fit aliquid ex privatione, et aliter ex subiecta materia. Cum enim dico 'forma ignis est in potentia et ex ea ente in potentia fit actus,' non significo potentiam que sit aliquid, quia forma ignis ante eius productionem in actu est mere nihil. Sed cum dico 'materia est in potentia ad formam ignis,' significo ali quam

12 Landolfo Caracciolo, In II Sententiarum, d. 12, q. 1, nn. 20-21, below.


nisi fundata in potentia subiectiva, quia entitatem positivam posse subici actui et nihil potest fieri ab agente naturali, nisi de forme ignis. potentia subiectiva; sed possibile est [21] Secunda propositio: quod potentiam obiectivam esse sine subiectiva, duplex est actus sicut potentia, quia sicut patet in creatione, ubi tantum est potentia dicitur ad actum, IX potentia obedientialis. Methaphysice. Est emm actus qui

respondet potentie obiective, ut forma albedinis modo est actu que ante erat purum nihil, et in talibus id quod est in potentia postea per agens fit actus. Est etiam alius actus respectu actus, scilicet vere entitatis possibilis subici ali cui perfectioni et forme.

... Qualiter ergo materia est ens in [22]Tertia propositio: quod entitati

potentia? materie attribuuntur octo condiciones per philosophos et sanctos.

Dico quod materia est per se Materia enim prima est principium principium, ex I Physicorum, text. 52. naturale seu physicum, ut Philosophus

probat I Physicorum, et ex hoc deducit quod est natura in principia II.

Est etiam per se causa, ex II [23]Item, secunda: materia est causa Physicorum, text. 7 et V Metaph., text. 28. intrinseca, ut probatur II Physicorum et V

Methaphysice. Est etiam per se pars compositi, ex [24]Item, tertia: materia est per se

VII Metaph., text. 2. pars compositi, ut probatur VII et VIII Methaphysice.

Et est per se subiectum generationis, [25]Item, quarto: est per se ex V Physico rum, text. 17, subiectum mutationis que est generatio, ut

probatur V Physico rum. manens idem in tota mutatione, ex I [26]1tem, quinto: materia per se

Physicorum, text. 7 et 8. manet eadem sub utroque termino mutationis, ex VI Physicorum; illud enim quod mutatur est idem manens aliter nunc quam prius, et illud est materia.

Et ut probatum est per terti am [27] Item, sexto: quam vis materia sit rationem, est etiam terminus creationis, ingenita, id est improducta per veram per Augustinum XII Confess. et etiam per mutationem, ut Philosophus vult, I Aristotelem I Physicorum, text. 60, est Physico rum, tam en per creation em ingenita et incorruptibilis. materia producta est, ut Augustinus vult in

principia XI libri Confessionum. ... Dicitur etiam esse ens in potentia, [28]Item, septimo: materia per se est

quia ens receptivum actus substantialis receptiva actus substantialis, et eo primo, et accidentalis mediante forma mediante recipit consequentes substantiali, et ideo licet ali quo modo perfectiones, ut expresse habetur a dicatur ens in actu, prout ens in actu Philosopho, I Physicorum. distinguitur contra esse in potentia suae

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causae, quia est ali quid extra causam suam, tamen distinguitur contra actum distinguentem et completum speciei, et \

ideo describitur per ens in potentia, quia est maxime receptivum actus, non quod ornnino non sit ens, nisi in potentia, sicut anima Antichristi.

[29]Item, octavo: materia est res distincta a forma, ut expresse probat Philosophus, I Physicorum; manet enim res materie corrupta re forme. Unde VIII Methaphysice dicit formam et materiam esse duas substantias; patet quod Deus posset corpus adnihilare, anima rationali manente, ymmo quacumque forma manente, posset adnihilari materia.

Landolfo uses each one of these conditions to form an argument that matter has a proper, determinate nature, «rather, the most determinate actuality of being». Caracciolo effectively argues that each one of these conditions describes matter with distinct characteristics that entail a distinct entity. For example, to the fifth argument: «matter in itself remains the same under both terms of change», Landolfo argues:

Fifth: what remains the same under both terms of change is distinguished from both terms, and is determinate being; matter is this sort of thing, as I have proven; therefore etc. For how can it stay the same across the whole course of change, however ~reat the terms may vary, unless by having proper and determinate entity1 ?

Now Landolfo challenges Auriol directly. To Auriol's statement that matter is purely potential, therefore it does not have a determinate nature, Landolfo replies that there are two natures, corresponding to the two actualities: «the nature having the actuality of form and the composite», and the nature «having some actuality of being only that (tantum quod) it can terminate a real production». Then Landolfo charges Peter with perverting Averroes. Auriol refers to Averroes' commentary on Physics I:7 in support of his position, as (to cite directly from the reportatio) «prime matter has the capacity (innata est) to

13 Landolfo Caracciolo, In II Sent., d. 12, q. 1, n. 35, below.


receive all forms, and therefore does not have a proper nature. Hec sunt verba sua»14

• In response, Landolfo quotes the whole passage from Averroes' commentary, showing that Averroes actually says, «If therefore prime matter has the capacity to receive all forms, it is necessary that it be all forms in potency, and that it not have in its substance a proper form by which it is matter.» That is, Auriol reports A verroes as saying that matter does not have a proper nature, but Landolfo supplies the text to make it clear that a proper form is meant. Moreover, the section begins (following the lemma of Aristotle) «This nature, which is prime matter, is one principle ... ». Therefore, he retorts:

It is clear that the Commentator called matter a nature and a principle from which substance is composed, and what is subjected to the transmutation that is generation, and consequently, it must be a determinate nature and a substance. But the Commentator denied that matter has actuality in the sense of a composite or a form. Whence he says that «in its substance» matter does

14 Petrus Aureoli, Reportatio in II Sententiarum, d. 12, q. 1 (Citta del Vaticano, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, vat. lat. 6768, f. 40rb): «Commentator enim primo Physicorum commento 69 dicit sic: prima materia nata est recipere omnes formas, et ideo non habet propriam naturam». Thanks to Kurt Boughan for graciously allowing me to consult his preliminary transcription of this manuscript; id., Commentarium in Secundum ... , d. 12, q. 1 (Romae 1605, p. 151b): «Minorem autem probo per Commentatorem, I Physicorum, commento 68, ubi dicit quod materia prima recipit omnes formas, et sequitur necesse esse ut non habeat formam aliquam nee propriam naturam. Haec verba»; Averroes, Long Commentary on the Physics, I, comment 68 (Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis, Venetiis, apud Junctas, 1562, vol. 4, f. 40L-M): «Deinde dicit: Ista igitur natura est unum principium, etc. idest et ista natura, quae est prima materia, est unum principium commune omnibus entibus transmutabilibus quae alterantur in invicem, sed non est una in se, ita quod sit aliquod compositum ex materia et forma. Nam, si haberet formam propriam, nullam aliam recepiret, ipsa permanente, sed statim corrumperetur quam cito alia forma generaretur, et etiam quicquid recipit aliquid non recipit ipsum secundum quod est in actu, sed secundum quod est in potentia. Si igitur prima materia innata est recipere omnes formas, necesse est ut sit in potentia omnes formae, et ut non habeat in sua substantia formam propriam qua est materia, et est, si esset aliquod existens in actu, id est habens formam, tunc generatio in substantia esset alteratio, et formae essent accidentia». In truth, the version of Auriol's work that Landolfo cites is an open question: when summarizing Auriol's four propositions, Landolfo's text is almost word-for-word identical with the printed Reportatio. Auriol's printed Reportatio, however, includes responses to an adversary's critiques, including an interpretation of the Augustine authority similar to that given by Landolfo [43], which responses Landolfo doesn't consider.

280 WILLIAM DUBA

not h~ve a proper form by which it is matter, nor is it existing in actuality, «that 1s havmg form», as he himself explains15.

The distinction between Landolfo and Peter on this passage lies in how they understand actuality. For Auriol, having a distinct nature (as opposed to an indistinct nature) means having actuality in the sole ontological sense, that is, as a form. For Landolfo, having actuality can mean ~aving «~ctuality of the form and the composite» and having «actuality of bemg». Landolfo uses this distinction to reply to Auriol's other authorities that claim that pure potentiality does not have actuality.

Landolfo applies a similar solution to the example from Metaphysics VII:3, that when a substance is stripped of all determination, what remains is not something determinate in actuality:

~o the_ third argun:ent, 'd~terminate in actuality' can be taken in two ways: elt~er m the_ actuabty that IS the form or the composite, or in the actuality of bemg that 1s true substance. And therefore, 'what is not determinate in ~ctuality is not determinate being' is false in the first sense of actuality, that Is, for the actuality of the form of such a composite. But it is true in the second sense. And when the Philosopher says that matter «is not a what or a how much or a how», it is clear that he is denying it the things of a compos_ite; for according to him only compounds have 'what'. He posited that an Idea could not be defined, because it is simple 16•

Landolfo' s defense starts to show the strain: he relies on the distinction between actuality as form or composite and «the actuality of being that is true substance». Yet when Landolfo argues that Aristotle's examples serve to deny matter the things of the composite, Auriol might find the latter part of this argument more a concession than a refutation. For, in that case, would not being determinate be one of those «things of a composite»?

Landolfo saves his strongest words for Auriol's last arcrument that b ' ,

if matter had determinate being, at least an angel could understand it, but this is not the case:




For it will be said immediately that God can make matter without form, therefore all the more could matter be understood in itself and distinctly. Whence it is a fraud (truffa) to pretend that the divine intellect or an angelic one cannot cognize matter distinctly17

.

The divine intellect at least must know what matter is, so to say that matter is not conceivable is an outright trick. Moreover, adducing Averroes' comment that matter can only be known by analogy does not hold, because matter is a substance, and the only way we know any substances is through the cognition of accidents.

This then, is Landolfo's defense of Scotus against Auriol: matter has a determinate nature because we conceive of it as fulfilling determinate functions. Potency divides in to objective and subjective types, but perhaps more importantly, so does actuality. Whenever Aristotle or A verroes argues that matter does not have actuality, Landolfo says we are to understand actuality in terms of the actuality provided by the form, as opposed to the actuality of being.

In this discussion, Caracciolo carefully avoids Auriol's major criticism: The distinction between objective and subjective potency has the side effect of identifying the potency that divides being with objective potency. As mentioned earlier, Scotus argues that the division of being into potency and actuality that appears in Metaphysics IX: 1 refers to objective potency and the actuality of being. Auriol criticizes this as breaking a fundamental division of being.

Landolfo Caracciolo is aware of Auriol's position, but does not address it, at least not here. At the end of his series of proofs that matter has a determinate nature, Landolfo tacks on an argument that grants for the sake of discussion Auriol's interpretation of Metaphysics IX18

•

Suppose that all existing things do divide into being-in-potency and being-in-actuality, such that actuality and potency are differences that divide being. 'Actuality' and 'potency' must have determinate natures if they are going to be predicated of 'being' in such a way as to divide it. So, if Auriol holds that matter is being-in-potency in this sense,

17 Landolfo Caracciolo, ln ll Sent., d. 12, q. 1, n. 46, below. 18 Landolfo Caracciolo, In II Sent., d. 12, q. 1, n. 39, below.

282 WILLIAM DUBA

Landolfo challenges, he must also hold that matter has a determinate nature.

In discussing hylomorphic theory, Landolfo Caracciolo reveal himself to be an ardent defender of John Duns Scotus. Confronted wit~ Peter ~uriol' s systematic criticism of Scotus' views, Caracciolo su~~anzes Auriol point for point, and refutes him. For his own positive positiOn, he renders Scotus' arguments and citations in his own word b s,

ut closely follows his master; this process can be seen even mor clearly in cases where Caracciolo does not engage a contemporar~ a~versary. For example, Auriol agreed with Scotus that matter can exist Without form; the next question in Caracciolo's commentary, «Whether matter. can exist witho~t form», does not add any significant sections or extensive arguments With respect to Scotus' treatment in the Reportata Pa~i~iensi~. B~t Landolfo, while clearly following Scotus, expresses the posi~IOns ~n his words. Judging from his treatment of the questions dealmg With matter, Caracciolo's understanding of his task was to provide a clear and systematic explanation of Scotus' doctrines and where necessary, defend them from contemporary criticism.' Thi~ Southern Italian Scotist sought not to simplify Scotus, but to keep him up-to-date.

Universite de Fribourg


EDITION

To aid in understanding Landolfo's project, I have edited the first two questions of distinction XII of his commentary on book II of the Sentences, namely «Utrum materia dicat aliquam entitatem» and «Utrum materia possit esse sine forma». Question 2 is largely a paraphrase of John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia II, d. 12, q. 2 (ed. Vives, vol. 23, pp. 14-20), and is provided here as an example of Landolfo's approach to Scotus when he is not engaging his contemporaries.

This edition is based on the printed edition and two manuscripts, indicated by the following sigla19

:

M: Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, H 218 Inf., ff. 59ra-60vb W: Wien, bsterreichische Nationalbibliothek, 1458, ff. 63va-65va V: Liber secundus sententiarum secundum fratrum Landulphum de

Neapoli [Venice 1480], no foliation, (page numbers are with reference to the first page of the distinction).

I have only indicated variant readings that offer a significantly different understanding of the text.

19 I am using the sigla provided in Schabel, «The Sentences Commentary» .

284 WILLIAM DUBA

LANDULPHI CARACCIOLI IN SECUNDUM SENTENTIARUM.

<Distinctio XII> ~ec de angelice nature, etc. Ista est distinctio XII in qua Magister.

termmata [A 59rb] parte in qua egit de natura creata mere spirituali, hie de mere corporali. Et quero20

<Quaestio 1> Utrum materia dicat aliquam entitatem.

[1] Quod non, quia quod est minus minima ente non est ens; talis autem est materia, ergo etc. Probo minorem, quia materia est minor accidente, cum accidens sit actus; accidens est minimum ens .

[2] Contra: Aristoteles, I Physicorum21•

[3] Respondeo ad questionem inquirendo tres conclusiones.

<Conclusio 1: Si materia est verum ens> [4] Prima conclusio inquirenda: si materia est verum ens. [5] Et dico quod sic, primo quia principium physicum per modum

causalitatis intrinsice non potest esse nihil; materia est [X lb] huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet. Minor est Philosophi, I Physicorum22

,

quia materia est unum de tribus principiis, non per accidens ut privatio, sed per se intrinsice, ut patet ex II Physicorum et V Methaphysice23

, ubi distinguit quatuor genera causarum.

[6] Secundo subiectum vere mutationis24 est verum ens; materia est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia nihil nulli subicitur. Minor est Philosophi, I, II et V Physicorum25

.

20 quero] 2 (sup. lin.) questiones W 21 Aristotele~, Physica I, c. 7 (191a7-8); cfr. Les Auctoritates Aristotelis (ed. J.

!"fAMESSE, Louvam 1974, p. 142, n. 29): «Materia non cognoscitur nisi per analogiam, 1d est ~er comparationem ad formam».

2 Aristoteles, Physica I, c. 7 (190b17-191a22). ~: Arist~teles, Physica II, c. 7 (198a21-31); Metaphysica V, c. 2 (1013a24-25).

mutatwnis]transmutationis W 25 Cfr. supra, nn. 3-4.


[7] Tertia pars veri entis realis est verum ens; materia est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia ens reale non componitur ex nonente. Minor est Philosophi, VII et VIII Methaphysice

26•

[8] Quarto id est verum ens cuius est per se passio verum ens; materia est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet: nulla passio est maius ens proprio subiecto, ideo non-~ntis ~on est ~assio veru~ ens. Min~r est Philosophi et Commentatons ub1que, qm multas ass1gnant passwnes materie, ut esse in potentia ad formam, esse actuabile a forma, etc.

<Conclusio 2: Si entitas materie dicit aliquam naturam terrninatam> [9] Secunda conclusio inquirenda: si entitas materie dicit aliquam

naturam terminatam27 ita quod sit aliqua actualitas terminata, non quod

sit forma, sed aliquod ens actu. <Opinio Petri Aureoli>

[10] Et dicit una opinio28 hie quod non probatur aliquibus rationibus quas dicunt communes Philosophi, Commentatori et Augustini. Ratio prima: illud quod non habet naturam propriam non habet naturam terminatam et distinctam; sed materia non habet propriam naturam; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia nihil habet terminatam naturam nisi habeat naturam propriam. Minor probatur tripliciter. Primo per

29 0 0 0 0

Commentatorem, I Physicorum, commento 69 : matena pnma rec1p1t omnes formas, ideo necesse est ut non habeat formam propriam nee

propriam naturam. [11] Secundo per Commentatorem, XII Methaphysice,

commento 18.30 Dicit quod Aristoteles intendit demonstrare quod

materia nullam habet propriam naturam. [0 63vb] (12] Tertia per Augustinum, XII Confessionum, c. I et II et

III31 : «Tu Domine docuisti me priusquam hanc informarem materiam

26 Cfr. Aristoteles, Metaphysica VII, c. 3 (1029a4-5); VIII, c. 1 (1042a25ff.). 27 terrninata]deterrninata W 28 Petrus Aureoli Reportatio in II Sententiarum, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1 (ed. Roma 1605,

p. 15lb-155b; cfr. w_' DUBA, «The Legacy of the Bologna Studium in Peter Auriol's Hylomorphic Theory», forthcoming.

29 Avenoes, Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis Physicorum I, comm. 69

(Iuntina ed., f. 40M). 30 rectius Avenoes, Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis Metaphysicae XII,

comm. 14 (Iuntina ed., f. 301D).

286 WILLIAM DUBA

formares atque distingueres non erat aliquid non color non figura . ' • , non specieS».

[13] Rat_io secunda: Illud quod est medium inter purum ens et nihil _non potest_ Importare determinatam naturam atque distinctam: maten~ est humsmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia quod est detenrunatum ens est purum ens, ita quod per nihil adveniens intrins·c . 1 e sit ens, ymmo ollllle adveniens ei manet extrinsice. Minor probatur per Commentatorem, I Physicorum, commento 7832

: «Ens», ait, «in potentia non est pura privatio nee est purus actus. Antiqui enim ignoraverunt quod inter esse purum et non-esse est medium, aut alia natura». . [14] Item, commento 7933 dicit quod antiqui philosophi tgnoraverunt naturam materie, quia non distinxerunt inter naturam et privationem. Primo enim concedunt materiam non esse, quia assentiunt rationi Parmenidis dicentis quod quicquid est preter ens est nihil, et quod Ollllle quod est ens est unum. Secunda vero, quia dicunt ipsam esse unam numero et propter hoc est una diffinitione, et secundum hoc est aliquod entium. Et subdit quod secundum primum sermonem concesserunt privationem esse in substantia materie, et secundum alium s~n.nonem neg~verunt privationem esse in substantia eius, et sequitur «Igttur natura ems est composita ex esse et non-esse».

[15] Item, commento 7034, «modus essentie eius», id est

materie, «est quod non est demonstratum35 in actu, sed est medium inter non-ens simpliciter et ens in actu».

[16] Item ratione, quia si materia esset aliqua determinata natura et propria, sequeretur quod aliquid esset inferius in entitate ipsa materia, scilicet illud quod esset indeterminate omne generabile et corruptibile, quod est impossibile.

[17] Ratio tercia: quod non est quid determinatum in actu non habet naturam propriam et determinatam - patet per se; sed materia est

~~ Augustinus Hipponens~s, Confessiones XII, c. 3 (CSEL 33, p. 312). . A verroes, Commentarzum magnum in Aristotelis Physico rum I, comm. 78

(Iuntma ed., f. 44G). 33 A C . verroes, ommentanum magnum in Aristotelis Physicorum I comm. 79

(luntina ed., ff. 44M-45C). ' 34 A C . verroes, ommentanum magnum in Aristotelis Physicorum I comm. 70

(luntina ed., f. 41E). ' 35 demonstratum]determinatum W


huiusmodi [A 59va], ex VII Methaphysice36

: «Materia nee est quid nee

ntum nee quale nee aliud decem generum»; ergo etc. qua · d · [18] Ratio quarta: Quod est ent~tas etermmata et _e~t demonstrabile per aliquem intellectum; matena non e~t demonstrabths per aliquem intellectum; ergo etc. Maior patet ex ~;· Mmor prob~tur per Commentatorem, II Physicorum, commento 13 , e~ V Physzcorum,

to 83s exponendo illud Philosophi: «Generatlo non est motus, corrunen , . . .

quia non-ens non movetur; materia autem que est sub1ectum generatwms est ens» dicit Commentator quod materia non est ens actu; quod

~~~em non es~ ens actu, non est in loco, nee est attingibile aliqua actione,

et per consequens non actione intellectus.

<Opinio propria> [19] Teneo oppositum, dicendo quatuor propositio~es. . [20] Prima propositio: quod duplex est [X 2a] ens_m pot~n~1a,

videlicet ut terminus et ut subiectum. Prima, que est ut ter~nus,. d1c~tur potentia obiectiva; secunda, ut s~b~ect~m: dicitur potentia su~1ectlv3~· perfectionis alicuius receptiva. D1stmct10 _1sta patet ~x I Physz~orum · Aliter enim fit aliquid ex privatione, et ahter ex sub1ecta m~te~Ia. Cu~ enim dico 'forma ignis est in potentia et ex ea ente in po~en~1a f1t act~s, non significo potentiam que sit aliquid, quia forma tgms ~nte e1~s productionem in actu est mere nihil. Sed cu~ dico 'm~t~na est m potentia ad formam ignis,' significo aliquam entltatem posltlvam posse

subici actui et forme ignis. . .

[21] Secunda propositio: quod duplex est actus s1cut potentia:

4o E . t quia potentia dicitur ad actum, IX Methap~y~ice . st emm ac us qm respondet potentie obiective, ut forma al~eduus m_odo est actu que ant~ erat purum nihil, et in talibus id quod est m potentia postea per agens f1t

36 Aristoteles, Metaphysica VII, c. 3 (1029a20-21). . . 37 Averroes, Commentarium magnum in Aristotelzs Physzcorum II, comrn. 13

(luntina ed., f. 521-M). . . . · y comrn. 8 3& Averroes, Commentarium magnum m Anstotelrs Physzcorum ,

(luntina ed., f. 213D-G). 39 Cfr. Aristoteles, Physica I, c. 7 (190bl0-13). 40 Cfr. Aristoteles, Metaphysica IX, c 6 (1048a25-26).

288 WILLIAM DUBA

actus. Est etiam alius actus respectu41 actus, scilicet vere entitatis possibilis subici alicui [0 64ra] perfectioni et forme.

[22] Tertia propositio: quod entitati materie attribuuntur octo condiciones per philosophos et sanctos. Materia enim primo est principium naturale seu physicum, ut Philosophus probat I Physicorum42 et ex hoc deducit quod est natura in principio II43• '

[23] Item, secundo: materia est causa intrinseca, ut probatur II Physicorum et V Methaphysice44•

[24] Item, tertio: materia est per se pars compositi, ut probatur VII et VIII Methaphysice45•

[25] Item, quarto: est per se subiectum mutationis que est generatio, ut probatur V Physicorum46.

[26] Item, quinto: materia per se manet eadem sub utroque terrnino mutationis, ex VI Physicorum47

; illud enim quod mutatur est idem manens aliter nunc quam prius, et illud est materia.

[27] Item, sexto: quamvis materia sit ingenita, id est improducta per veram mutationem, ut Philosophus vult, I Physicorum48 ,

tamen per creationem materia producta est, ut Augustinus vult in principio XI libri Confessionum49•

[28] Item, septimo: materia per se est recepti va actus substantialis, et eo mediante recipit consequentes perfectiones, ut expresse habetur a Philosopho, I Physicorum50 •

[29] Item, octavo: materia est res distincta a forma, ut expresse probat Philosophus, I Physicorum51

; manet enim res materie corrupta re forme. Unde VIII Methaphysice52 dicit formam et materiam

41 respectu]respectu potentie subiective add. in ima col. W

42 Aristoteles, Physica I, c. 7 (191a8-17), c. 9 (192a25-29).

43 Aristoteles, Physica II, c. 1 (193a28-31 ).

44 Aristoteles, Physica II, c. 3 (194b23-26); Metaphysica V, c. 7 (1032b31 -

1033a1). 45Cfr. supra, n. 7. 46

Aristoteles, Physica V, c. 2 (225b25-226a24). 47

Aristoteles, Physica VI, c. 5 (235b6-19) (?). 48 Aristoteles, Physica I, c. 9 (192a27-29). 49

Augustinus Hipponensis, Confessiones XI, c. 5 (CSEL 33, p. 285). 50 Aristoteles, Physica I, c. 9 (192al3-14). 51 Aristoteles, Physica I, c. 9 (192a25-29). 52

Aristoteles, Metaphysica VIII, c. 1 (1042a25-b8).


esse duas substantias; patet quod Deus posset corpus adnihilare, anima rationali manente, ymmo quacumque forma manente, posset adnihilari materia.

[30] Quarta propositio: quod ex istis possunt formari octo rationes que demonstrant materiam habere naturam propriam et determinatam, ymmo53 actum entis determinatissimum.

[31] Prima ratio: naturale et physicum per se princ1pmm distinctum contra ornne aliud est per se nature proprie et determinate -da oppositum: non erit distinctum principium, quia per propriam entitatem unumquodque ab alio distinguitur; sed materia est huiusmodi, ut patuit; ergo etc.

[32] Secunda: causa per se et intrinsica distincta contra alias causas est per se natura propria; talis est ipsa materia; ergo etc. Quomodo54 enim erit per se causa distincta nisi per distinctam et propriam entitatem, maxime cum intrinsice causet, id est per realem et propriam immanentiam proprie entitati55?

[33] Tertia: per se pars compositi distincta contra aliam partem habet per se propriam entitatem, quia ea distinguitur; talis est materia, ut probavi; ergo etc. Nee arguo ego sicut ipsi contra se instant «est pars in actu, ergo est actu», sed arguo quod 'est pars distincta et hoc propria56 entitate, ergo habet propriam naturam et entitatem, et per consequens determinatam'.

[34] Quarta: subiectum mutationis distinctum a mutatione et termino est vere ens propria et determinata entitate, quia sua propria entitate subicitur [A 59vb] et distinguitur; sed materia est huiusmodi, ut probavi; ergo etc.

[35] Quinta: quod manet idem sub utroque termino mutationis distinguitur ab utroque ut est determinatum ens; materia est huiusmodi, ut probavi; ergo etc. Quomodo enim posset in toto decursu mutationis manere idem, variatis quantumcumque terminis, nisi per propriam et determinatam entitatem?

53 ymmo]secundum W 54 quomodo ]maior patet praem. W 55 entitatis ]entitati W 56 propria]prima M

290 WILLIAM DUBA

[36] Sexta: entitas que est terminus unius numero productionis proprie et realis qua non producitur quodcumque aliud est entitas propria et distincta et determinata. Talis entitas est materia, ut

pr_obavi, quia ~er creationem producta est. Contradictio est enim quod ahqua productwne reali materiali57 producatur aliquid ut distinctum ab omni alio, quia hoc potest produci, aliis non productis, et quod non sit ens proprium distinctum.

[37] Septima: quod recipit actum substantialem et, eo mediante, accidentalem est ens distinctum ab eo et proprie nature et determinatissime; sed materia est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Formam enim esse actum in materia non est formam dare materie eius entitatem, sed tam forme [X 2b] quam materie entitatem ut distincta entia principiantia concurrere respectu [0 64rb] unius compositi.

[38] Octava: res distincta a re, ut substantia a substantia, est res omnino proprie et distincte et determinate nature; sed materia est huiusmodi, ut probavi; ergo etc.

[39] Confirmo istas rationes omnes, quia illud quod cadit sub determinata differentia entis et sub vera per se substantia distincta a qualibet alia, necessaria est determinate nature - predicatum includitur in subiecto; sed materia est huiusmodi, etiam secundum adversarios. quia58 dicunt quod cadit sub differentia potentie, quando ens dividitur in actum et potentiam. Sed probatur ratione, quia non est tante latitudinis materia sicut totum ens, cum multa sint immaterialia, ergo cadie9 sub aliquo entis divisivo, et per consequens sub aliqua differentia. Similiter, Philosophus, VIII Methaphysice60

, ponit earn per se substantiam, quia ibi dividit substantiam per se. Magis enim ut61 perfectius est ens-materia62

,

cum sit substantia, quam forme accidentales, cum multarum formarum accidentalium materia sit causa, secundum Commentatorem.

57 materiali om. W 58 quia]qui W 59 cadit]cadet M

<Ad rationes Petri Aureoli>

60 Aristoteles, Metaphysica VIII, c. 2 (1043a13-28). 61 ut]et W 62 ens-materia]ens sub materia W

LANDOLFO CARACCIOLO ON OBJECTIVE POTENCY AND HYLOMORPiflC UNITY 291

[ 40-10] Rationes etiam opinionis non valent. Ad primam, dico ad maiorem quod dupliciter accipitur natura propria, vel pro natura habente actum forme et compositi, vel pro habente aliquem actum entis tantum quod potest terminare realem productionem. Et tunc illud quod non habet naturam propriam utroque modo non habet naturam terminatam, et tunc minor falsa erit. Quamvis enim materia non habeat naturam propriam per actum forme vel compositi, habet tamen talem actum entis quod terminat realem productionem, et est realis pars compositi, et per consequens oportet quod sit natura terminata et distincta.

[41-10] Commenta que allegat omnia sunt ad oppositum, sed gratia brevitatis recitabo primum commentum quod allegatur ab eis, scilicet 6963

, et idem est sententialiter in omnibus aliis. «lsta», ait, «natura que est prima materia est unum principium commune omnibus entibus transmutabilibus que invicem alterantur. Sed non est unum in se ita quod sit substantia simplex existens actu, neque ita quod sit aliquod compositum ex materia et forma, nam si haberet formam propriam, nullam aliam reciperet, illa permanente, sed statim corrumperetur quanta citius forma alia generaretur, et quicquid recipit, aliud non recipit ipsum secundum quod est illud in actu, sed secundum quod est in potentia. Si igitur materia prima innata est recipere omnes formas , necesse est ut sit in potentia omnes64 forme et non habeat in sua substantia formam propriam qua est materia. Et etiam, si esset aliquod existens in actu, id est habens formam, tunc generatio in substantia esset alteratio et forme essent accidentia.» Hec Commentator. Apparet quod Commentator vocat materiam naturam et principium ex quo substantia componitur et quod subicitur transmutationi, que est generatio, et per consequens oportet quod sit terminata natura atque substantia. Sed negat Commentator quod materia tunc65 habet actum sicut compositum vel sicut forma. Unde dicit quod «in sua substantia» non habet formam propriam qua sit materia, nee est «existens actu, id est habens formam», ut ipsemet exponit. Sed quia est innata recipere formas omnes sicut substantia recipit substantiam ad faciendum compositum, ideo materia est in potentia

63 Averroes, Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis Physicorum I, comm. 69 (luntina ed., f. 40L-M).

64 omnes]omnis W 65 tunc]non AO

292 WILLIAM DUBA

omnes forme, potentia scilicet [A 60ra] receptiva non entitativa q · ' , Uia tunc entitas materie fieret forma.

[ 42-11] Idem dicit in sententia ubique et ideo magis est a 1 . L oppos1tum. Unde illud commentum XII Methaphysice66

: «materia non habet propriam naturam», verum est in actu que est forma vel compositum, alias falsum diceret, cum II Physicorum61 probetur quod materia est natura per se distincta contra formam.

[43-12] Ad dictum Augustini, patet quod dicit materiam ante formationem non esse aliquid actu [0 64va] ut forma. Unde exponit statim: «non color, non figura, non species», alias contradiceret68 sibi cum ponat earn verum terminum creationis, ut supra, vel distincta69 ab omni altero ente.

[44-13] Ad secundam rationem, maior includit per se falsum, quia ponit medium inter contradictoria, scilicet inter ens et nihil, quod expresse repellit Philosophus I Posteriorum10

: «Contradictio est oppositio secundum quam non est medium». Medium ergo inter ens et nihil tripliciter accipitur: vel quod nee sit ens nee [X 3a] sit nihil- et tale non reperitur - ; vel quod simul sit ens et sit nihil - et contradictionem implicat - ; vel ideo est medium quia, quamvis sit absolute, eo quod per realem creationem versum est de nihilo, ut a terrnino a quo, in ens, ut ad terminum ad quem, non tamen est tantum ens perfectum sicut alia entia perfectiora, puta composita vel forme, sicut Augustinus loquitur71

:

«Fecisti Domine duo: unum prope te, scilicet primum angelum, et aliud prope nihil, ut primam materiam» - et in isto sensu maior est falsa, quia tale medium inter ens et nihil est terminate et distincte nature, ymmo distincta substantia, nee recipit intrinsice suam entitatem ab aliquo, nee a forma nee ab alio, nisi a Deo creante, ymmo dat alteri intrinsice entitatem ut composito. Et isto modo intelligenda sunt tria commenta quibus probatur minor72

, quod materia non est pura privatio, cum

66 Cfr. supra, n. 11. 67 Cfr. supra, n. 4. 68 contradiceret]contradiceretur M 69 supra vel distincta]supradixi (mg.) distinctam W 70 Aristoteles, Analytica Posteriora I, c. 2 (72a12-13); Auctoritates Aristotelis (p.

312, n. 24): «Contradictio est oppositio cujus secundum se non est dare medium». 71 Augustinus Hipponensis, Confessiones XII, c. 7 (CSEL 33, p. 314). 72 minor om. W

LANDOLFO CARACCIOLO ON OBJECTNE POTENCY AND HYLOMORPHJC UNITY 293

intrinsice sit substantia, nee est purus actus, sicut forma et compositum, sed est ens habens forme et compositi privationem, potens recipere formam ad compositum constituendum, quod ignoraverunt antiqui

philosophi, qui ponebant earn in actu. . , . . [ 45-17] Ad tertiam rationem, 'determinatum m actu duphe1ter

accipitur: vel in actu qui est forma vel compositum, vel in actu entis quod est vera substantia. Cum ergo dicitur «quod non est actu terminatum non est ens terrninatum», falsum est in primo sensu, scilicet pro actu forme talis compositi. Sed verum est in secundo sensu, et tunc minor negatur. Et cum Philosophus dicit quod materia non est quid vel quantum vel quale, patet quod negat ab ea73 compositi; quid enim secundum eum non habent nisi composita. Y deam non posuit posse diffiniri quia est simplex, ex VII Methaphysice

74•

[ 46-18] Ad quartam rationem, concedo maiorem, sed minorem nego. Statim enim dicetur quod Deus potest facere materiam sine forma, ergo multo plus poterit intelligi per se distincte materia; unde truffa est quod intellectus divinus vel angelicus non possit distincte materiam cognoscere. Nee Commentator in quo allegatur est ad propositum. Posito enim quod materia, ex eo quod per se non est in loco, non possit attingi aliqua actione, non est verum hoc de actione intellectus, que locum non concernit nee situationem in cognoscendo. Et cum Aristoteles accipit quod materia cognoscitur in analogia ad formam, dico quod hoc est per accidens, quia nostra cognitio incipit a sensu, qui per accidentia ducitur in cognitionem substantie, ut patet I De anima15

, ideo in actualibus ens

prima deducimur.

<Tertia conclusio: Si materia et forma sit una precise realitas> [ 4 7] Tertia conclusio76 inquirenda si materia et forma sit una

precise realitas. Et quamvis aliqui dixerint quod sic, tamen teneo simpliciter quod sunt due realitates. Probatio: Ille sunt due realitates quarum una accipit reale esse, altera non accipiente, et una perdit reale

73 esse add. sup. lin. W 74 Aristoteles, Metaphysica VII, c. IS (l040a8-27). 75 Aristoteles, De anima I, c. 1 (402b21-22); Auctoritates Aristotelis (p. 174, n.

7). 76 Tertia conclusio] opinio iacobi de craseto (=carceto, Jacques de Quesnoy ?)

adnot. mg. M

294 WILLIAM DUBA

esse, alt~ra non perdente; sed sic se habet realitas materie et forme; ergo etc. Mawr patet ex primo principia, «de eodem esse et non esse»n Minor patet, quia forma desinit esse, materia manente, et similite; accipit esse, ex I Physicorum78

•

[48] Respondetur quod agens, [0 64vb] generando et corrumpendo, totum generat et corrumpit ex toto, sicut Philosophus vult I De generatione79

, ubi distinguit generationem per hoc, quod est totius' ab alteratione, que solum est partis. '

[ 49] Contra: si generatio sit productio totius, accepta utraque eius parte, scilicet materia . et forma, generatio erit vera creatio: consequens est falsum; ergo etc. Probo consequentiam, quia si totum producitur sic quod accipiat esse post non-esse, et hoc pro quolibet positivo incluso in ipso toto, erit productio ex nihilo.

[50] Confirmatur, quia generatio non [A 60rb] est translatio ita quod tota substantia fiat tota substantia, ut totus aer fiat totus ignis, sed sunt ibi quatuor termini, ita quod aer de esse vadit in non-esse cum corrumpitur, et ignis vadit de non-esse in esse cum generatur. Et si hoc de toto intelligitur pro omni parte in eo contenta, erit vera creatio de nihilo. Nee vult Philosophus generationem distingui ab alteratione per hoc quod est totius ut includit ambas partes, sed per hoc quod est compositi, quod est per se substantia que generatur et per se unum. In alteratione autem est unum per accidens, ideo mutatur non unum totum nisi secundum partem.

[51] Secunda ad conclusionem: in [X 3b] quacumque entitate est realitas per quam potest esse et desinere esse et realitas per quam non potest, in ea sunt due realitates quarum una non est altera; sed in entitate compositi sic se habet materia et forma; ergo etc. Maior patet per extrema contradictionis. Minor est Philosophi, VII Methaphysice80:

materia est per quam compositum potest esse et non esse.

77 Aristoteles, Metaphysica IV, c. 3 (1005b23-24); Auctoritates Aristotelis (p. 123, n. 97).

78 Cfr. supra, n. 32. 79 Aristoteles, De generatione et corruptione I, c. 4 (319bl4-17); Auctoritates

Aristotelis (p. 167, n. 3). 80Ari 1 . stote es, Metaphystca VII, c. 7 (1032a20-22); Auctoritates Aristotelis (p.

129, n. 170).


[52] Tertio ponens materiam et formam esse unam realitatem tollit generationem et corruptionem; sed istud tollit totum physicum

cessum· ergo etc. Probatio maioris: generatio est mutatio a non-esse pro , . 81 . in esse, corruptio autem econverso, ex V Physzcorum ; mutat10 autem ·ncludit quod aliquid positivum manens aliter se habeat nunc quam 1 . d prius, ex VI Physicorum82

• Il~ud autem quod manet ~atena est;_ quo vadit ad positionem et privatwnem forma et compos1tu~ est. _S1 ~rgo realitas83 materie esset forma, numquam esset talis mutatw a pnvatwne

in habitum materia manente. [53] Quarto, primum receptivum concausans al~cui primo

recepto, ut concausanti, sunt due realitates simpliciter; matena et f?rma sunt huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia primum recept1vum distinguitur a primo recepto, alias idem reciperet se ipsum, e~ maxime quando unum in recipiendo se habet ut causa concausans alten cause ut recepte. Minor est Philosophi, II Physicorum et V M~thaphy~ice

84

• Aliquod enim causatum est a quatuor causis, et tunc mate~1a ~st ?nm~~ receptivum, forma primum receptum, et sun~ cause .~~trms1ce s1b1 invicem concausantes respectu unius constituend1 compos1t1.

[54] Confirmatur ista, quia anima rationalis est verissima corporis forma, sicut deterrninatum est Extra, De summa trinitate et fi~e catholica, in libro VII85 , et tamen realiter separatur a corpore et matena

quam informat. . [55] Ad argumentum primum principale, dico quod matena

non est minor entitas accidente, quia est vera substantia et causa multorum accidentium. Nee valet, quia accidentia sunt actus; actus est accidentalis. Sed materia est actus entis substantialis, non actus qui est forma vel compositum, sed actu substantia et actu ens vera reali

productione inductum.

81 Aristoteles, Physica V, c. 1 (225al2-20); Auctoritates Aristotelis (p. 152, nn.

152-153). 82 Cfr. supra, n. 28. 83 realitas]entitas add. mg. W 84 Cfr. supra, n. 25. . . 85 DENZINGER, Enchiridion Symbolorum, n. 902 (Fre1burg-1.-B. 2001, P· 1312).

296 WILLIAM DUBA

<Quaestio 2> Utrum materia possit esse sine forma.

[1] Quod non: relatio non potest per se esse, ergo nee materia. Antecedens patet, quia relatio requirit fundamentum et extremu Consequentia patet, quia relatio est actus et forma, cui magis compe~~ per se esse quam materie, que est potentia.

[2] Contra: accidens potest esse sine [0 65ra] subiecto in eucharistia, ergo multo plus materia, que est substantia sine forma.

<Conclusio 1: Opinio die ens quod materia non potest fieri sine forma>

[3] Respondeo dicendo tres conclusiones. Prima ponit opinionem86 dicentem quod materia non potest fieri quacumque virtute sine forma.

[4] Probatur prima: omne quod est per se vel est actus vel habens actum, alias oppositum esset ipsum actu existere; sed materia non est actus, quia esset forma; ergo erit habens87 actum, scilicet formam.

[5] Secunda, omne esse est a forma, secundum Boetium88. Si ergo materia per se sit, hoc erit per formam.

[6] Tertia, materia non habet ydeam sine forma- tam materia quam forma intelligitur per ydeam compositi; sed non habens per se ydeam non potest per se fieri, nee per consequens esse.

[7] Quarto, analogica in aliquo non habent per se talem rationem nisi in prima totius analogie, per Philosophum IV Methaphysice89•

Sanitas dicitur de urina, potione, instrumento et humano corpore, et ultimo solum inest sanitas forma90

• Cum ergo esse dicatur de materia et forma analogice, per consequens competet forme per se esse et non materie.

[8] Quinto, si materia haberet91 esse sine forma, compositum non esset unum, quia haberet in se plura esse. Consequens est falsum ex Vlll92 Methaphysice93

, ergo etc.

86 . . ] th opmwnem omas adnot. mg. M 87 habens]quia habens M quia habet V :: [P~.-]Boethius, De unitate et uno (PL 63, cols. 1075-1078; col. 1075).

Anstoteles, Metaphysica IV, c. 2 (1003a33-b6). 90 fonna]fonne V 91 haberet]haberetur M


[9] Sexto, forma materialis non potest fieri sine materia, ergo nee econverso. Consequentia patet, quia plus dependet materia a forma quam econverso. Antecedens patet, quia si farina materialis esset sine materia, esset spiritualis, non materialis.

<Conclusio 2: Potentia divina potest fieri materia sine forma> [10] Secunda conclusio. Teneo oppositum, quod potentia [A

60va] divina potest fieri materia sine forma. Probatio: illud est possibile potentie divine quod nullum implicat impossibile; sed materiam esse sine forma est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia secundum sanctos nihil est impossibile divine potentie quod ex parte sua nullam implicat impossibilitatem. Minor probatur94

, quia omne absolutum, maxime in genere substantie, prius alio potest sine repugnantia esse sine illo - nulla enim ibi95 apparet connexio necessitatis prioris ad posterius -; materia autem prior est et absoluta ipsa forma, quia subiectum recipiens prius est perfectione recepta; ergo etc.

[11] Secunda, omne illud quod connectitur alteri non sicut danti sibi intrinsice esse, sed precise ut sibi concausanti respectu tertii, potest divina [X 4a] potentia esse sine illo; sic se habet materia respectu forme; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia non est necessaria connexio unius ad alterum in essendo per hoc quod aliqua sunt concause, nihil invicem intrinsice recipientes. Minor patet, quia forma non dat materie intrinsice esse, cum entitas materie habeatur sola creatione; sed forma concurrit cum materia respectu compositi constituendi ut due intrinsice compositi cause.

[12] Tertia, quando aliqua duo sic se habent quod unum causatur immediate a Deo et non potest causari a natura, reliquum causatur a natura, per divinam potentiam potest primum sine altero fieri; sed sic se habent materia et forma; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia causatum immediate a Deo potest ab eo96 conservari, remota quocumque causato a natura, maxime quia causatum a Deo non subest nature. Minor patet,

92 VIII] IV W 93 Aristoteles, Metaphysica VIII, c. 6 (1045a8-b27). 94 probatur]patet W 95 ibi]hic W 96 ab eo om. W

298 WILLIAM DUBA

quia materia causatur a Deo immediate, nee subest causalitati nature: forma autem sic; ergo etc.

[13] Quarto, quando aliqua duo absoluta, maxime in gener~: substantie, causantur contingenter ab aliquo libere producente, utrumque potest causare, unum non causando aliud, et econverso; sed libere Deu~ causat materiam et formam, que absoluta sunt in genere substantie; ergo causando materiam non oportet causare formam. Maior patet, quia ex quo contingenter et libere se habet ad utrumque potest velle unum er nolle97 reliquum, et sic unum causare, alio non causato. Minor patet de se; [65rb] mirum est quod Deus volendo materiam cogatur necessaria velle formam.

[14] Quinto, non maior entitas requiritur ad posse per se distincta productione produci quam ad posse per se esse; sed distincta creatione materia producitur; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia terminus per se realis productionis est esse, et hoc sufficit ad per se esse secundum adversarios, ut Augustinus vult XI Confessionum98

, habebit verum esse et existere, quia solum existens producitur; ergo poterit per se esse.

[15] Sexto, quandocumque sunt alique due productiones non se invicem necessaria consequentes a duobus agentibus non necessaria se respicientibus, terminus prime productionis potest esse sine termino secunde; sic est de materia respectu forme; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia termini non sunt plus necessaria connexi quam productiones vel producentia, quia termini accipiunt ab eis esse et productiones sunt propter terminos. Minor patet, quia materia est terminus creationis; sed forma generationis et generatio non necessaria connectitur nee sequitur creationem nee generans ipsum creans. Poterit ergo esse creatio materie sine generatione forme.

[16] Confirmatur septimo, quia pone quod non sit generans in uni verso et Deus vellet producere materiam et non formam, esset per se materia, nulla forma existente, nisi dicas quod Deus cogatur velle unam substantiam volendo aliam, cuius contrarium ego et angelus velle possumus.

[17] Octavo, quia materia potest fieri divina potentia sine omni eo quod non necessaria respicit; sed formam non necessaria

97 nolle]non velle W 98 Cfr. Augustinus Hipponensis, Confessiones XI, c. 5 (CSEL 33, p. 275).


respicit; ergo etc. Maior patet, quod solum illud implicat repugnantiam. Minor patet, quia quod contingenter se habet ad totum genus contingenter se habet ad omnes eius species; sed materia contingenter se habet ad totum genus formarum; ergo contingenter se habebit ad omnes formas99, et per consequens non necessaria. Maior patet, quia contradictio est quod contingenter se aliquid habeat ad totum genus et tamen necessaria sibi determinet species aliquas illius generis, cum quelibet species sit in genere et includat [A 60vb] ipsum. Minor patet, tum quia Philosophus et Commentator hoc vult, I Physicorum, commento 69 100

, materia nullam formam unam sibi determinat; tum quia ad sensum hoc patet quod materia modo recipit hanc, modo illam formam secundum quod agentia diversa sunt; tum quia alias materia dependeret essentialiter ad multa, ymmo essentialiter ad infinita eiusdem speciei, cum infinitarum formarum eiusdem speciei sit receptiva.

<Conclusio 3: Ad argumenta aliae opinionis> [18-4] Tertia conclusio. Ad primum argumentum opinionis,

duplex est actus: unus qui est forma, et proprie ille actus dicitur ad aliquod receptivum, quod est potentia subiectiva; alter qui est entis qui distinguitur contra esse in potentia. Exemplum: albedo dupliciter dicitur actus: vel respectu parietis quem actuat, et sic primo modo, vel respectu potentie sue et privationis antequam esset, quando dicebatur albedo in potentia. Cum ergo dicis: 'Omne quod est vel est actus vel habens actum', concedo secundo modo, non primo, quia materia que [X 4b] est substantia, VIII Methaphysice101

, non est actus qui est forma, tamen est actus entis qui eductus est per realem productionem creationis. Et tunc minor est falsa, scilicet quod materia non sit actus, quia est actus entis, quod sufficit ad per se esse.

[19-5] Ad secundum, concedo quod omne esse perfectum est a forma dante perfectum actum, et hoc vult ipse Boetius quod esse quod est specificum sit a forma, vel si loquitur de omni esse, loquitur de facto,

99 omnes formas]omnem formam M 10° Cfr. supra, n. 44. 101 Aristoteles, Metaphysica VIII, c. 6 (1045a27-31).

300 WILLIAM DUBA

quia materia non est sine forma; alias falsum diceret102, quia etiam

materia suo modo dat verum esse materiale substantiate composito. [20-6] Ad tertium, nego antecedens. [0 65va] Dico quod

materia habet ydeam in Deo. Quod patet, tum quia est distincta substantia, tum quia propria productione producitur, secundum Augustinum.

[21-7] Ad quartum, maiorem nego. Multa enim sunt analogica103

- ymmo 104 pene omnia - quorum quodlibet formaliter et intrinsice habet quidditativam rationem eius in quo analogantur. Patet quod substantia et accidens - quodlibet est formaliter ens -, et Deus et creatura, et tamen in istis ab aliquibus ponitur analogia. Nee sanitas dicitur de urina, potione et humano corpore secundum unam rationem in qua analogantur, sed penes diversos omnino conceptus aliquo ordine. Ideo non est simile.

[22-8] Ad quintum, dico quod per se esse quod habet materia sine forma non habet in composito, quia quamvis istud non sit acceptio alicuius entitatis nove, tamen est negatio in materia ad essendum cum alio; ideo materia dicitur per se esse que, cum alio actuante ipsum, non est, et tale non est in composito, cum sit ibi actus forme; ideo facit unum vere compositum, quia non est ibi per se esse, sed cum alio esse.

[23-9] Ad sextum105, nego antecedens. Dico quod forma ignis

posset fieri sine materia. Cum dicis quod esset forma spiritualis, nego, quia forme non dicuntur materiales per hoc quod actu sunt in materia, vel spirituales quia actu non sunt, ymmo nee quia possunt esse, quia tunc anima rationalis quandoque esset forma materialis, cum possit esse in materia, et quandoque actu sie06

• Forma ergo dicitur materialis que nata est educi de potentia materie et actione generantis vel generationis, et tales essent ille forme, quamvis separate a materia.

[24-1] Ad argumentum principale, quamvis communiter dicatur quod materia est minimum ens, credo quod est falsum, quia omne accidens est inferius ens materia, cum sit substantia et causa multorum

102 diceret]dicetur M 103 analogica]analogia AX 104 ymmo om. AX 105 sextum]dico et add. W 106 actu sit]mut. in esset spiritualis quando anima est separata actu mg. W

ACCIOLO ON OBJECTIVE POTENCY AND HYLOMORPHIC UNITY 301 LANDOLFO CAR

"d 11·um· minus ergo ens est relatio quam materia; ideo posito quod accl en ' . I t" · ·t f1· eri separata non sequitur de matena. terum e 1am relatw non possl ' . . . . f

· · est ad aliud multa requint, sc1hcet qmd re erat ut relatw, qma ' d

d t met ad quid referat scilicet107 extremum. Secus est e ente fun amen u ' . absoluto quod est substantia, ut matena.

107 scilicet]quia W

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