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© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff1
AgendaPart 1 of 3
A holistic viewWhat
We say we knowWe know what to write
Why How
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff2
What?Guidance begins at the Executive level
Our military culture must reward new thinking, innovation, and experimentation.
President George W. Bush, CitadelSpeech, 23 SEPT 1999
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff3
What?Guidance from the top of the Army
To win this war and to be prepared for any other task our Nation may assign us; we must have a campaign quality Army with a joint and expeditionary mindset. A fundamental underpinning of this mindset is a culture of innovation. "Adapt or Die" contains important ideas that clearly describe some significant challenges to innovation in our institutional culture, as well as the behaviors we seek to overcome them. Equally important, the authors question the status quo. We must be prepared to question everything. As this article states, "Development of a culture of innovation will not be advanced by panels, studies, or this paper. Cultural change begins with behavior and the leaders who shape it." We have the talent to establish the mindset and culture that will sustain the Army as ready and relevant, now and into the future.
GENERAL Peter J. Schoomaker,Chief of Staff, Army
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff4
What?Everywhere you look-cries for change
“Cognitive Reform Is Hard
A process of cognitive and cultural transformation cannot be accomplished in uncoordinated bits and pieces as it is today. If done right, it might well demand change as sweeping and revolutionary as the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The end state of this effort should be nothing less than a revolution in learning throughout the Department of Defense. This much is clear from past efforts, however: reform of this magnitude is essential, long overdue, and undoable without the commitment of the entire military intellectual community.”
“Culture-Centric Warfare”Major General Robert Scales, Jr.
U.S. Army (Retired)Proceedings, September 2004
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff5
What?Do we really know?
We know what we think we want We write and brief great sounding buzz words We put it out there almost as it should happen
without having to change anything else Seems we hope it changes, but we can also
keep the “good ole days” COHORT in the 1980s of major change but
isolated from other institutions Is this occurring now?
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff6
What?“Do we really know?”
How many times have you seen or heard these words or statements? The Army must, “Change the culture” “Create adaptive leaders” “Adjust how we train leaders” “Create an environment that promotes innovation” “Change the personnel system” “Have the best leader development system in the world” “Have a world class leadership program”
But, after coming back to reality you think “Do these people really know what it means to implement
these ideas?” “It’s all talk and I have seen this before; only the names have
changed …”
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff7
What?The Army has defined the Culture
First the National Command authority, Joint Staff and the Army =Strategy defines end state = Expeditionary Army influenced by society & resources
We start with the strategic problem = the culture
We know what we want, or do we think we know?
Cold War Army
Culture
LeadershipI define as the onemost impacted by
culture
Expeditionary Army
What type of Culture is
needed too?
What type of Leader is needed?
GenerationsOf WarOne of many institutions
that must evolve
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff8
What?Expeditionary Army = new culture
Cold War Army
Individual replacements
Doctrine of attrition-massive firepower
Top-down hierarchy & information- centralization
Analytical planning defines result
Heavy and complex tail
Complex, short-shelf life equipment
High training-tempo to offset high personnel-tempo
Joint is “special duty”
Expeditionary Army
Stabilization—unit manningManeuver Warfare doctrine “Trust-tactics” Networking-decentralizationResults drivenInnovation enables constant
modification to doctrine, tactics and force designs
Task organizes lower levelTraining & education determined
by cyclic unit managementJoint is accepted as norm
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff9
What? Cultures are different?- “Adapt or Die”
Today’s Culture
Stress “process”
Forecasting
Risk aversion
Bureaucratic
Top-down
Rank equals success
Change is criticism
=>adherence to process ensures success
Future Army Culture
Stress “innovation”
Experimentation
Prudent risk-taking
Agility
Feedback loops
Contribution valued
Change is evolutionary
=>as long as objectives are achieved
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff10
What?Army defines what?
Future leaders will have a higher level of doctrine-based skills, knowledge, attitudes, and experience …In fact, the complex nature of future operations may require leaders of greater experience and rank commanding at lower levels than ever before.
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5: Force XXI Operations
(October 2001)
The extraordinarily high quality of the Army’s human dimension …must rise to an even higher level in the increasingly complex operating environment of the 21st century…particularly…at the level of the combat battalion.
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-19Objective Force Maneuver Unit of Action Concept
(October 2003)
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff11
Why BOLC*Provide officers with a rigorous framework for leadership
Produce adaptable leaders who embody the Warrior Ethos
Establish a common standard and shared experience built on overcoming adversity and developing respect / confidence with their combined arms peers to produce:
• competent warrior leaders• grounded in combat Soldier tasks • capable of leading Soldiers in today’s COE
*TRADOC’s basic officer leaders course
What?TRADOC defines what?
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff12
• Capable of fast-paced action• Responsive to changes measured
in seconds• Extremely flexible• Mentally agile• Capable of independent operations• Technologically proficient• Warrior Ethos
Lieutenants of the Future Force will have to enter the Army already equipped with a sufficiently wide and deep base of
knowledge, intellectual skills, and mental capabilities.
What?Cadet Command defines what?
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff13
Attributes: Mental Agility Flexibility Adaptability Physical hardiness Emotional hardiness Followership Dominance
Skills: Decision Making Interpersonal Analytical Synthetic Computer Oral and Written
Communication Information Filtering Research
The bureaucratic understanding of leadership, a checklist: Actions: Team Building Decision Making Values: Selfless Service Respect
“…processes and structures that lend required order and routine to our lives can also hinder innovation. Examples include human resource policies that manage people as inputs rather than outputs, labyrinthine organizational structures that frustrate interdisciplinary networking, and reporting procedures that focus more on things then on ideas.”
BG David A. Fastabend and Mr. Robert H. Simpson “Adapt or Die”The Imperative for a Culture of Innovation in the United States Army
What? Cadet Command check-list response
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff14
What?Break the down the goal further
Leadership is one part, but the most important part
But this is what this entire study is about, how to create new leaders
Cold War Army
Culture
Leadership
Expeditionary Army
What type of Culture?
What type of Leader?
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff15
What?Second but important part-New Leaders
The most important aspect is how we lead (command) the Expeditionary Army=“adaptive leaders What does the lieutenant of the Expeditionary Army look like? How do we recruit them? How do we challenge them? How do we create them? How do we educate & train them? How do we evaluate them? How do we compensate them? How do we sustain them in the Army?
Big question remains?
What type of culturemust exist to act as a
catalyst toward Evolution?
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff16
What?What if it is all talk?
What happens when “Why” moves on, but not we don’t?
The CulturePresent-Strategic
Reform Officer Educationand Training=New ROTC
Goal: Expeditionary
Army
When these do not occurSimultaneously people inbetween become frustrated =ATLDP 2001
Limited changes may occur, some
improvements, butvision is
not achieved
Resistance to cultural change is incredible-many are based on
out-date-assumptions
VISION
An Incredible amount of energyis expended in planning and resources
to make this happen
Sen
ior
lead
ers,
pro
fess
ion
al jo
urn
als,
and
“ex
per
ts”:
“Ch
ang
e th
e cu
ltu
re”
Gu
idan
ce/d
irec
tive
s to
pla
n f
or
chan
ge
Proclamations made, superficial
policies made, butbeliefs, laws, regulations
not changed
Somethingless than planned
achieved, if anything
Maybe anArmy
not ready forthe next
real threat
“Why”
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff17
What?More details, more questions?
To provide decision makers and their staffs: A thorough analyses A different prospective on leadership and how to create it A tool to quantify and understand overused statements seen on
briefs: “change culture” “adaptive leaders” “education, vice training”
In order to: Understand that of all the good things the Army is doing,
Leadership development and creation is the least understoodLeadership development must evolveLeadership development is being restricted by out of date
assumptions Recommend holistic reform of how the Army prepares future
officers Because if we don’t start honestly addressing these issues
now, we (the Army and the country) will be in trouble in the future
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff18
What?Conclusion should lead to more questions?
Okay, we say what? but leads to other questions: Are willing to reexamine:
The concept of “officer”?The force structure that demands so many officers?Laws and policies that support a bloated top-heavy officer
corps?A culture that awards those that intelligently challenge the status
quo?
Are we willing not to “make mission” to achieve quality?Change Neo-Taylorism terms like “production,” “make mission,”
and “checklists” in the way we evaluate? Create the type of accessions system that will cater to, and
continually challenge the types of people that fit these terms?
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff19
WhatConclusion
The Army is good at defining “What”: Admits that our traditional view of war is out of date War and stability operations have merged, creating a need for:
A cadre of officers that must be able to deal with bothBegins the process toward creating the “strategic lieutenant”
Revisits how we define (and conflict with) the concept of selfless service for the Army and
the nation We have to overcome myths when revising our education and training for
cadets: ROTC (leadership development) cannot remain subordinate to the more traditional and
accepted on-campus academic disciplines. Instead, it must: Begin exposing them to complex problem solving, cognitive development earlier Reform every institution that deals with some aspect of creating officers