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© 2005 Towers Perrin©Towers Perrin
Status of the Medical Malpractice Marketplace
Jeremy Brigham, FCAS, MAAAJeremy Brigham, FCAS, MAAA
2005 Casualty Loss Reserve Seminar – Boston, MA2005 Casualty Loss Reserve Seminar – Boston, MA
September 13, 2005September 13, 2005
2
Introduction
The Medical Malpractice Environment
Commercial Insurance Market Response
Healthcare Industry Response
Legislative Response
3
Late 1970s Most private insurers exit the market,
causing availability/affordability crisis for health care providers
“Bedpan” mutuals formed Emergence of physician-owned
insurers in response to “availability crisis”
The medical malpractice insurance market hasundergone significant change over the past three decades
1970s 1980s
Mid-1970s Period of “crisis”
Rising claims Inadequate rates
Wage/price control guidelines Stock market falters CA doctors strike
Mid-1980s Period of crisis for health systems
Significant rate increases (20%+)
Reduced reinsurance capacity “Affordability crisis”
Mid-1980s Effort to ease exploding claims cost
Increased diagnostic testing Improved peer review Focus on risk management
Companies consent to claims made Second batch of tort reforms
MarketConditions
Evolution of the Medical Malpractice Insurance Market
Competitive Responses
Late 1970s Initial tort reforms Malpractice frequency/ severity
subsidies
Early 1980s Soft market
conditions Erosion of early
tort reforms
Late 1980s Inflation declines; loss cost trends
ease; frequency declines Second wave of provider-owned
companies emerge to provide needed coverage
Captive formation accelerates RRG/PG legislation passes
4
The medical malpractice insurance market has undergone significant change over the past three decades
1990s 2000 Today
Early – Mid-1990s Low inflationary period Loss cost trends — low and stable Managed care attacks medical cost inflation Prolonged soft market conditions
Late 1990s Period of “crisis”?
Rising claims Inadequate reserves
Managed care backlash
Mid-1990s Flood of companies into the market To compete, prices driven
down/mispricing common
2000 – today Several insurers exit market New capacity emerges Provider-owned companies’ capacity
diminishes and rebounds Accelerated movement toward alternative risk
financing (i.e., captives, self-insurance trusts)
MarketConditions
Competitive Responses
Evolution of the Medical Malpractice Insurance Market
Early-Mid 2000s Low inflationary period Concern over claims “severity” Large rate increases
5
The Medical Malpractice Environment
Claim frequency is generally flat
6
The Medical Malpractice Environment
However, claim severity has been escalating…
7
The Medical Malpractice Environment
…and premiums did not keep upwith claim costs
Total claim costs
Premiums
Rate increases reflect “catch up”
8
Malpractice Jury Awards Began an Upward Spiral in 1998
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Year
Me
an
Ju
ry A
wa
rds
($
mill
ion
s)
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.75
Me
dia
n J
ury
Aw
ard
s (
$m
illio
ns
)
Mean Median
9
Comparison of Large Awards – Top 10
1997
$27,570,327
$23,530,746
$19,275,466
$18,924,000
$15,700,000
$15,317,000
$15,000,000
$14,460,000
$12,381,670
$11,500,000
$173,479,209
2000-2001
$269,000,000
$108,000,000
$100,000,000
$75,000,000
$60,686,150
$49,594,684
$41,444,531
$32,767,410
$31,100,000
$30,000,000
$797,492,775Total
Source: Jury Verdict Research
10
Where are the Most Troubled Claims Occurring?
Radiology – failure to diagnose
OB/GYN
Emergency Medicine
Neurosurgery/Orthopedics
Bariatric surgery
Batch claims
11
Medical Malpractice Awards, 1997-2003
$2,252,645
$975,000 $1,000,000
$687,500 $648,000
$500,000
$0
$500,000
$1,000,000
$1,500,000
$2,000,000
$2,500,000
Childbirth Diagnosis Medication PatientRelationIssues
NonsurgicalTreatment
NegligentSurgery
Source: Jury Verdict Research
12
Variable by Locale
Healthcare is local
Malpractice is local
Chicago, Philadelphia, Miami difficult for everyone
Indiana, Wisconsin, California less difficult
Problems and solutions are different
13
AK
CT
TX
NMAZ
NVUT CO
ORID
WY
MT
WA
KS
NE
SD
ND
LA
OKAR
MS AL
TN
KY
OH
MO
IA
MNWI
IL IN
MI
FL
GA
SC
NC
VAWV
ME
NY MARI
NJ
DEMDDCCA
PA
VTNH
HI
Effective reforms halting crisis *
States showing problem signs
States in crisis
States currently OK
May 2005
© 2004 American Medical Association . All rights reserved. The American Medical Association Crisis Map, while copyrighted, may be reproduced and distributed, without modification, for non-commercial purposes so long as all information and copyright notices are included.Commercial use requires permission.
*In addition to a cap on non-economic damages, Texas voters passed a constitutional amendment.
Source: AON
American’s Medical Liability Crisis: A National View
14
Commercial Market Response
Recap of financial results
Commercial market response
Where are we in the cycle now?
15
General Insurance Industry Trends
Source: A.M. Best, January 2005
16
Medical Malpractice Results
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
140%
160%
180%
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Calendar Year
Combined Ratios Investment Gain Operating Ratios
Medical Malpractice Combined Ratios – A.M. Best
Crisis I Crisis IIICrisis II
17
Medical Malpractice Loss Reserve Development
-$150
$50
$250
$450
$650
$850
$1,050
$1,250
$1,450
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Coverage Year
Fiscal Year 2000 Fiscal Year 2001Fiscal Year 2002 Fiscal Year 2003
Millions
FavorableDevelopment
Adverse Development
18
Increasing claim severity has affected reinsurers results more adversely than primary carriers
Source: A.M. Best.
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
125%
150%
175%
200%
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Coverage Year
Ceded Loss Ratio Direct Loss Ratio Net Loss Ratio
19
Completely Out of the Market Since 1996
Close to $2 Billion in Displaced Premiums
Many Additional Companies Have Retrenched
PeakCompany Peak Year Year Premium
PIE Mutual 1996 $193,210,000
Physicians Reciprocal Group 2003 $ 203,782,000
Frontier 1997 $ 119,702,000
St. Paul 1996 $ 650,361,000
PHICO 1998 $ 212,486,000
MIIX 1999 $ 241,773,000
Reliance 1998 $ 54,217,000
ROA / DIR 2002 $ 69,965,000
Washington Casualty 2001 $ 28,445,000
Farmers 2002 $ 231,074,000
TOTAL $ 1,950,852,217
Other Capacity Issues
Notable Downgrades/ Exits: Kemper (gone) - Washington Casualty (1Q-03) TVIR - Church Mutual (LTC mkt.) (1Q-03) Princeton - Royal (LTC mkt.) (2Q-03) OHIC - Farmers (Hospitals, phys) (3Q-03) SCPIE - MCIS, Lex (PEL/HMO Re)(3Q-03) APAC - ERC (PEL) (3Q-03) Zurich ERC
Source: A.M. Best Company
21
Top 20 of 1996 - % of Writings at ‘05
Rating of B+ or Less20%
Out of Business or Left Market
39%
Still Writing & B++ or Better
41%
22
New Capacity since 9/11
Carrier
ACE Healthcare
One Beacon
Berkley Medical Excess
Endurance Specialty Ins., Ltd.
AWAC
Arch Capital Group Ltd.
Darwin Professional U/W
Renaissance Re (BDA)
Max Re (BDA)
Beazley Program Inc
Aspen Re
23
Commercial Market Response
Significant price increases coupled with increased deductible levels and self-insured retentions Inner aggregate Swing rated contracts
Restricting terms and conditions: Most “occurrence” business has converted to “claims made”
Carriers imposing specific conditions on the reporting of excess loss and potential excess losses
Tail/extended reporting period (ERP) provisions Collateralization for retentions Risk management More exclusions “Follow form” reinsurance of captives less prevalent
24
The “hard market” may have peaked
After several years of substantial double digit rate increases and better results, many carriers will be seeking only inflationary increases
Price adequacy
Market pressure
Regulatory pressure
Increases in Hospital Professional Liability retention levels seen over the past several years are stabilizing
Due to the recent capacity shortages and the market correction, substantial new capacity has entered the market
Commercial carriers, provider owned carriers, captives, RRGs, other alternative risk vehicles
Tort reform may reduce loss costs
Capacity and program structure options are available in all venues ( even difficult ones)
Strict underwriting is helping providers with strong and proven risk management programs
25
Physician Market
Physician market conditions: Double digit increases still occurring in some markets Sub-standard market the only market for some Significant interest in considering alternative vehicles
Hospitals/Systems trying to help physicians with problem
Channeled programs
Win/Win programs – changing the game!!
26
Healthcare Industry Response
Financing Purchasing less limits Alternative risk financing vehicles
Risk management/quality control initiatives Focusing management’s attention on quality Claims practices changing
— engaging patient at time of incident
— mediation
— fast settlements when liability exists Quality initiatives designed to fix problem areas Specialty focused (OB, ER, etc.) quality programs emerging
27
Alternative Risk FinanceRisk Financing Continuum
Guaranteed Cost
Deductible
Retention
Trust
Captive
RRG
Exchange
HIGH
LOW HIGHFinancial Risk/Complexity
Ad
min
istr
atio
n
RRG Reciprocal
Small hospital
s
Low risk States
Large Hospitals/Systems
High Risk States
Multi-state risks
Group program
Fronting required
For Profit
28
Overview of the Insurance MarketHealthcare Captive Formations
Estimate that 90% of the top 100 healthcare systems own at least one captive
Healthcare Captive Statistics:Active Healthcare Captives at Year-end:
2002 2003 Cayman Islands: 197 212 Bermuda: 110 110+ Vermont: 42 62 Hawaii: 13 15 South Carolina: 7 21
Total 369 430 Healthcare RRGs 37 77*
(Included above) *81% of RRGs formed in 2003 were HC
Sources: CIMA / A.M. Best Captive Reports / Domicile Captive Managers / Risk Retention Reporter
29
Legislative Response – Tort Reform
Federal level: House has passed a tort reform bill with caps similar to MICRA, Senate has not yet voted
Laws affecting medical malpractice have been passed in many states: Texas Florida Ohio Mississippi Arkansas Georgia Others, and more on the way
Impact of tort reform Soft vs. hard cap Will it be upheld? Will plaintiff bar find alternate routes? Before/After