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© 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning. Chapter 2 Markets and Politics Thomas Rice

© 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning. Chapter 2 Markets and Politics Thomas Rice

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Page 1: © 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning. Chapter 2 Markets and Politics Thomas Rice

© 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning.

Chapter 2

Markets and Politics

Thomas Rice

Page 2: © 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning. Chapter 2 Markets and Politics Thomas Rice

© 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning.

2

Assumptions of the Ideal Market: The Rational Actor

• Individuals are rational when it comes to their behavior in a given market

• Persons possess the ability to discern which goods or services will improve their situation – Employing all available information, individuals

will choose the best of available options

Page 3: © 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning. Chapter 2 Markets and Politics Thomas Rice

© 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning.

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Realities of the “Health Care Market” The Rational Actor

• “Counterfactual problem” in health care makes it difficult to decide if an alternative decision in care would have yielded a better, or even different, outcome– Market offers few cues

• Few know about different health plans– Good “report cards” on plans hard to come by

Page 4: © 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning. Chapter 2 Markets and Politics Thomas Rice

© 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning.

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Assumptions of the Ideal Market:Predetermination of Preferences

• Preferences are inherent to the very identity of an individual– Produced, as if by magic, through the

“Immaculate Conception of the Indifference Curve”

• Providers of goods and services cannot significantly alter individual preferences

Page 5: © 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning. Chapter 2 Markets and Politics Thomas Rice

© 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning.

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Realities of the “Health Care Market”Variability of “Consumer” Preference• Patient preferences can be “physician-

induced” – Doctors possess far more information than

patient– Extent to which this actually occurs is unclear

Page 6: © 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning. Chapter 2 Markets and Politics Thomas Rice

© 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning.

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Assumptions of Ideal Market: Broad Agreement on Resource Distribution

• Members of society:– Expected to share some degree of consensus

on the way in which goods and services are distributed

• Improvements in the fortunes of others do not cause significant distress on the part of others

Page 7: © 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning. Chapter 2 Markets and Politics Thomas Rice

© 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning.

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Realities of the “Health Care Market”

• Possible resentment at superior care offered some– Vastly superior care available to the wealthy in

American society– Could create envy among those who are not

better off

Page 8: © 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning. Chapter 2 Markets and Politics Thomas Rice

© 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning.

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Realities of the “Health Care Market”

• Possible resentment at superior care offered some– Causes unease among many policy makers

• Who believe provision of care should not be tied to ability to pay

Page 9: © 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning. Chapter 2 Markets and Politics Thomas Rice

© 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning.

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Regulation in Health Care:The Options

• Microregulation– Relies upon direct observation and control of

key actors in market – Actually commonly employed in U.S.

Page 10: © 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning. Chapter 2 Markets and Politics Thomas Rice

© 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning.

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Regulation in Health Care:The Options

• Macroregulation: – Emphasis is placed on broader incentives or

disincentives– Examples include global budgeting

• Largely found in systems elsewhere

Page 11: © 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning. Chapter 2 Markets and Politics Thomas Rice

© 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning.

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Policy Alternatives to “Pure” Market

• Demand-side policies– Seek to regulate pricing of services through

such mechanisms as patient cost-sharing• Consumer-driven health care

Page 12: © 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning. Chapter 2 Markets and Politics Thomas Rice

© 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning.

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Policy Alternatives to “Pure” Market

• Supply-side policies– Seek to control the amount, availability of

services available through controls on “suppliers”

– Measures include global budgeting, limits on quantity of physicians, hospital beds

Page 13: © 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning. Chapter 2 Markets and Politics Thomas Rice

© 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning.

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Markets and Government in Health Care: Cross-National Complexity

• Different countries attach differing ideals to their respective health care systems

• Detection of the level of regulation versus market processes often problematic

Page 14: © 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning. Chapter 2 Markets and Politics Thomas Rice

© 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning.

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Markets and Government in Health Care: Cross-National Complexity

• Even measures of outcomes are imperfect

• Decisions on the role of markets and regulation in health care – Require the consideration of national ideals

and priorities

Page 15: © 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning. Chapter 2 Markets and Politics Thomas Rice

© 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning.

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Chapter 2 Summary

• Economists define the ideal market as:– One in which individuals are rational– Preferences are pre-established– Broad agreement exists on the distribution of

resources

Page 16: © 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning. Chapter 2 Markets and Politics Thomas Rice

© 2008 Delmar Cengage Learning.

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Chapter 2 Summary

• None of these conditions are met in the case of health care

• Various forms of regulation present alternatives in cases of market failure