Chapter 16

The Regional Answers and Governance Structure for Dealing with Foreign Fighters: the

Case of the EU

Gilles de Kerchove and Christiane Höhn

Abstract The EU had already started to address the foreign fighter threat as early as spring

2013, its approach having been the blueprint for UN Security Council Resolution 2178. The

EU is mobilising a whole range of policies. Following the terrorist attacks in Paris in early

2015, EU leaders set out an ambitious agenda based on a comprehensive strategic vision with

three pillars: ensuring the security of citizens¸ preventing radicalisation and safeguarding

values and cooperating with international partners. Work is ongoing in different Council

formations (in particular Interior, Justice, Foreign Affairs, Education, General Affairs) to

operationalise the various measures. In June 2015, Interior Ministers decided to prioritise

strengthening the Schengen Framework, to create an internet referral unit at Europol, and to

improve information exchange and strengthen the work related to firearms. On the criminal

justice side, rehabilitation in the judicial context is urgent. Internationally, assisting Tunisia is

a top priority since the recent attacks in Tunis, along with mobilising further capacity building

assistance for the region and addressing the situation in Libya. Allocation of resources and

strategic decisions are necessary to achieve the ambitious goals.

Keywords Schengen Eurojust Europol Rehabilitation Strategic Communications

Capacity Building Education InternetInformation Sharing Radicalisation

Gilles de Kerchove is the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator. Dr. Christiane Höhn is the principal adviser of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator.

Gilles de Kerchove and Christiane HöhnCouncil of the European Union, Rue de la Loi 175, 1048 Brussels, Belgium. E-mail: gilles.dekerchove@consilium.europa.euE-mail: christiane.hoehn@consilium.europa.eu

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the Council of the European Union.

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Contents

16.1 Introduction...................................................................................................................216.2 The Foreign Fighter Threat.........................................................................................516. 3 The EU Response..........................................................................................................7

16. 3.1 Ensuring the Security of Citizens............................................................................816. 3.1.1 Reinforcing the Schengen Framework..............................................................916.3.1.2 EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) System....................................................1316.3.1.3. Information Sharing and Operational Cooperation.........................................1416.3.1.4 Judicial Approach............................................................................................15

16.3.2 Prevention of Radicalisation and Safeguarding Values.........................................2316.3.2.1 Underlying Factors...........................................................................................2316.3.2.3 Radicalisation Awareness Network – Centre of Excellence............................27

16.3.3 Cooperating with the EU’s International Partners..................................................2716.3.3.1 Strengthening Counter-Terrorism Cooperation with the MENA Region........2716.3.3.2 Anti-ISIL Strategic Framework and Iraq/Syria Foreign Fighters Strategy.....34

16.4 Conclusion....................................................................................................................34References............................................................................................................................35

16.1 Introduction

As early as the spring of 2013, the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator raised the alarm bells

about young Europeans going to Syria to get trained and join the jihad with terrorist groups

such as Jabhat-al-Nusra and Da’esh, the latter also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the

Levant (ISIL)1. While such fighting abroad has existed in the past (in Afghanistan, Somalia,

Bosnia), the scale of the problem has changed and the numbers are now exponentially higher.

Foreign fighters originate in particular from Western Europe and North Africa, the Middle

East, the Gulf, Turkey, the Balkans and Central Asia.2

This can be explained by easy access to Syria, a more urban environment (compared to

Afghanistan for example), and the highly professional social media use of Da’esh.3 Not only

are the postings high in number and spreading quickly, the videos and magazines are very 1 For an assessment of European Foreign Fighters and the EU policy response from the US perspective see Congressional Research Service Report, European Fighters in Syria and Iraq: Assessments, Responses, and Issues for the US, April 2015, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44003.pdf. Accessed 25 May 2015; See also Hegghammer, 2013.2 See the UN Monitoring Team report on Foreign Terrorist Fighters for a worldwide overview of the phenomenon: Analysis and recommendations with regard to the global threat from foreign terrorist fighters, S/2015/358, 19 May 2015, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/358. Accessed 29 May 2015. See also Chapter 2 by Bakker/Singleton in this volume.3 See Chapter 6 by Weimann,in this volume.

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professionally done. The cruelty, including the killings shown in the videos, is unprecedented.

The declaration of the so-called Caliphate and the Da’esh narrative are attractive to many

youths. Da’esh has capacities never seen before in a terrorist group including the control of

territory, establishment of a brand which is attracting high numbers of foreign fighters,4

financial resources5, military equipment, and an alliance with militarily experienced former

Baathists and Sunni tribes in Iraq. Local and regional terrorist groups have declared allegiance

to Da’esh such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, several Ansar al Sharia groups in Libya6 and

Ansar-Bait-al-Maqdis in the Sinai (Egypt).

During the last two years, the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council has worked

hard to address the foreign fighter threat, based on a set of 22 measures adopted by the

Council in June 2013. The 22 measures cover issues such as better understanding the

phenomenon, prevention of radicalisation, strategic communications, counter-narratives,

dealing with returnees, rehabilitation, improving information exchange, detection of travel,

improving border security, criminal justice responses, and cooperation with third countries.

As a result the EU is pioneering a regional approach to foreign fighters.

In addition to the work at EU level, a group of Member States most affected by this

phenomenon has regularly met from 2013, under the leadership of Belgium and France, to

exchange information on the threat, compare notes on policy measures and discuss areas

where intensified cooperation is needed. In July 2014, the Ministers of these countries

approved a set of measures aimed at improving the use of the second generation Schengen

Information System (SIS II), targeted border controls, transmission of information to Europol

for joint analysis, sharing of information about foreign fighters among national authorities as

well as practical cooperation and exchange of information, for example on the use of

passenger data (Passenger Name Record (PNR) and Advance Passenger Information (API)).

The work of this group has paved the way for progress at EU level: while all these measures

are to be implemented by the competent national authorities, they were also promoted at EU

level.7

The Member States are the key actors in counter-terrorism; the EU is playing a

supporting role. According to Article 4 (2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), national

security (i.e. the work of the intelligence services) remains the sole responsibility of the

4 See Thomas Hegghammer, Syria’s Foreign Fighters, foreignpolicy.com, 9 December 2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/09/syrias-foreign-fighters/. Accessed 25 May 2015.5 For example it controls oil fields with substantive daily revenues.6 Gartenstein-Ross and Barr 2015.7 Justice and Home Affairs Council, Thursday 9 and Friday 10 October in Luxembourg, Council of the European Union, Background note, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/jha/145004.pdf. Accessed 29 May 2015.

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Member States,8 while with the Lisbon Treaty internal security has become a shared

competence, where legislation can be adopted following the community method (proposal by

the Commission, adoption by the Council and the Parliament).9 Because of the free movement

without border controls in the Schengen area and the international reach of the jihadist

networks, cooperation and information exchange in the EU context is key. The case of

Nemmouche (Syrian returnee who allegedly killed four persons at the Jewish museum in

Brussels) illustrates this: a French foreign fighter returning from Syria, he entered the EU in

Germany at Frankfurt Airport and allegedly committed an attack in Belgium.

The 22 measures adopted by the Council are exactly the areas covered in UN Security

Council Resolution 2178,10 adopted under the leadership of President Obama under Chapter

VII of the UN Charter in September 2014 and therefore legally binding. These are also the

areas covered in the policy document Hague/Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for

a More Effective Response to the FTF Phenomenon,11 adopted by the Global

Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) earlier in 2014. One can argue that the EU’s approach,

which was the most advanced of any regional or international organisation at the time,

became the blueprint for both.

After the attacks and operations since the beginning of 2015, the EU has mobilised

even further.12 On 12 February 2015, EU leaders endorsed an ambitious approach based on a

comprehensive strategic vision with three pillars: 1) ensuring the security of citizens; 2)

preventing radicalisation and safeguarding values; and 3) cooperating with the EU’s

international partners.13

On 28 April 2015, the European Commission adopted the European Agenda on

Security,14 setting out the Commission’s priorities in internal security for the coming years.

Counter-terrorism including prevention of radicalisation and addressing the foreign fighters

threat is one of the priorities.

8 See Chapter 17 by Bonfanti in this volume. 9 Title V of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), see also art. 75 TFEU.10 See Chapter 14 by de Guttry in this volume. 11 The Hague – Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Responseto the FTF Phenomenon https://www.thegctf.org/documents/10162/140201/14Sept19_The+Hague-Marrakech+FTF+Memorandum.pdf. Accessed 25 May 2015.12 See the Council website on EU response to foreign fighters. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/foreign-fighters/ . A ccessed 25 May 2015.13 Informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government Brussels, 12 February 2015 – Statement by the members of the European Council; http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/150212-european-council-statement-fight-against-terrorism/. Accessed 15 May 2015.14European Agenda on Security http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/basic-documents/docs/eu_agenda_on_security_en.pdf. Accessed 29 May 2015.

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EU integration tends to progress as a reaction to crises and in the past, counter-

terrorism has been the driver for the development of many broader JHA tools such as the

European Arrest Warrant. To achieve meaningful results, as the EU leaders requested,

requires mobilisation of resources, setting priorities for action and commitment of all

stakeholders to advance quickly.

After a short overview of the threat, this Chapter will set out the various aspects of the

EU’s response to the foreign fighter phenomenon. The report by the EU Counter-Terrorism

Coordinator to the Council and European Council of June 2015 provides a comprehensive

overview of EU action to implement the statement of Heads of State or Government of 12

February 2015.15

16.2 The Foreign Fighter Threat16

While the core of Al Qaeda has reduced since 9/11, the terrorist threat has developed in three

ways: proliferation of franchises and regional affiliates rising to power, the rise of Da’esh and

the threat from foreign fighters. Contributing factors are that after the Arab Spring the security

services in some of the countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have been

weakened, and one can also point to the use of areas with weaker government control such as

in Sinai, Libya, Syria, Iraq and Yemen as safe havens by terrorist groups which capitalise on

conflicts. In August 2014, the European Council confirmed the threat Da’esh poses to the EU:

The European Council believes that the creation of an Islamic Caliphate in Iraq and

Syria and the Islamist-extremist export of terrorism on which it is based, is a direct

threat to the security of the European countries. The European Union is determined to

contribute to countering the threat posed by ISIL and other terrorist groups in Iraq and

Syria, as called for by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2170.17

Initially, most foreign fighters joined Jabhat al Nusra in Syria. Some may have been

inspired to go to Syria to fight the Assad regime and only became radicalised there. Over

time, Da’esh became the terrorist group of choice for foreign fighters. Foreign fighters

15 Follow-up to the statement of the Members of the European Council of 12 February 2015 on counter-terrorism: Report on implementation of measures, Report by the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator to the Council and the European Council, 10 June 2015 http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9422-2015-REV-1/en/pdf. Accessed 1 August 2015.16 See the UN Monitoring Team report on Foreign Terrorist Fighters for a worldwide overview of the phenomenon: Analysis and recommendations with regard to the global threat from foreign terrorist fighters, S/2015/358, 19 May 2015, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/358. Accessed 29 May. See also Chapter 2 by Bakker and Singleton in this volume. See the UN report FN 3.17 Conclusions of the European Council of 30 August 2014, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/144538.pdf. Accessed 25 May 2015.

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themselves are recruiting their friends and others to follow them via Facebook and other

social media, creating a snowball effect.18

Overall, according to the UN Monitoring Team report, which relies on a ‘robust and

detailed’ evidence base through the intensive engagement with the intelligence and security

services of UN Member States and country visits, there are more than 25,000 foreign fighters

today originating from more than 100 countries, and hence this threat has become an urgent

global security matter.19 Da’esh has been able to recruit at least 20,000 foreign fighters, more

than any other terrorist organization – and numbers keep growing. The UN Monitoring Team

writes ‘ISIL currently attracts most global foreign terrorist fighters, a situation that can

partially be explained by the potent combination of Al-Qaida ideology, a regional agenda and

the project of a so-called “caliphate”.’ Most foreign fighters are in the Syria/Iraq20 theatre.

Some foreign fighters are also in Libya, mainly from the Middle East and North

Africa. Libya now has become a popular destination for Tunisians for example, while in the

past Tunisian foreign fighters travelled mainly to Syria and Iraq. Foreign fighters train in

terrorist training camps in Libya. However, hundreds of returning foreign fighters from

Syria/Iraq have also contributed to the takeover of cities in Libya and the extension of Da’esh

control there.21

As can be seen in the internet publications and messages by Da’esh, the terrorist

organisation also wants to inspire those who are prevented from travelling to Syria and Iraq to

carry out attacks at home.

The rivalry between Da’esh and Al Qaeda for preeminence as the global jihadist

terrorist organisation may add to the threat. While Al Qaeda had been the leading jihadist

terrorist organisation for more than a decade since 9/11, Da’esh is on the rise and their

announcement of an intention to establish the so-called Caliphate, which Al Qaeda had not

pursued, is attractive to many.22 Both terrorist groups and their affiliates might feel the need to

underline their capabilities and relevance with attacks, including in the West or against

Western targets. Regional affiliates have been the backbone of Al Qaeda for the last few

years, when Al Qaeda central was weakened due to the counter-terrorism efforts of the US

18 See Chapter 6 by Weimann in this volume.19 http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/358. Accessed 29 May 2015.20 See UN Monitoring Team Report for Iraq and Syria: between 20,000 and 22,000 foreign terrorist fighters in that conflict zone alone.21 See Daveed Gartenstein-Ross & Nathaniel Barr, Dignity and Dawn: Libya’s Escalating Civil War, ICCT Research Paper, February 2015; http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Gartenstein-Ross-Barr-Dignity-and-Dawn-Libyas-Escalating-Civil-War-February2015.pdf. Accessed 25 May 2015.22 See also Byman and Williams 2015.

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and its allies, including European countries and the EU. Now Al Qaeda is losing a number of

its regional affiliates which have declared allegiance to Da’esh. This trend is continuing.

Returnees can be particularly dangerous because they have been trained to fight, are

even more radicalised and have an international jihadist network. Not all returnees, however,

will pose a threat: some will be traumatised and suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

(PTSD), others may be disappointed from their experience or feel they have fulfilled their

duty as a Muslim and just want to reintegrate back into life.23 Nonetheless, even if only a

small percentage of returnees want to commit attacks, this is a challenge for the security

services: there might not be enough evidence to prosecute the returnees and surveillance

requires a lot of manpower, and hence cannot be done for large numbers. It is also a challenge

to determine under which category each returnee falls and to detect returnees re-entering the

EU.

16. 3 The EU Response24

As mentioned, in June 2013, the JHA Council adopted a package of 22 measures suggested by

the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, which formed the basis for the EU’s response.25 Since

June 2013, every JHA Council has discussed the foreign fighter issue and work on the

different strands of action has progressed. In August 2014, the European Council also drew

attention to the foreign fighter threat, endorsed the 22 measures and highlighted the

importance of their accelerated implementation.26

The first step was to gain a better collective understanding of the phenomenon: the

profile, motivations and method of recruiting of Europeans who leave to fight in Syria, as well

as travel routes and which groups the fighters join in Syria and Iraq. Member States are

sharing strategic information via the Intelligence Centre (EU INTCEN) in the European

External Action Service (EEAS), which produces regular assessments. Member States are

23 See also Chapter 8 by Coticchia in this volume. See also Bakker, Paulussen and Entenmann 2013. See also Briggs and Silverman 2014.24 On the EU response to foreign fighters see also the website of the Council of the European Union http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/foreign-fighters/. Accessed 31 May 2015.25 Press release after the Council. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/137407.pdf . Accessed 25 May 2015.In June 2013 the Justice and Home Affairs Council upon suggestion of the EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator, in close collaboration with the services of the Commission and the EEAS, adopted a package of 22 measures on many aspects, on how to prevent the flow of foreign fighters, improve the detection of suspicious travel, provide the adequate criminal justice response and engage more closely with third countries. Justice and Home Affairs Council, Thursday 9 and Friday 10 October in Luxembourg, Council of the European Union, Background note, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/jha/145004.pdf. Accessed 29 May 2015.26 Conclusions of the European Council of 30 August 2014, para 18 (page 6) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/144538.pdf. Accessed 25 May 2015.

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sharing operational information on foreign fighters via Europol, which also allows a better

overall picture to be developed.

In the strategic approach of EU Heads of State or Government in response to the Paris

attacks, the EU’s measures have been grouped into three broad categories: prevention,

repression and international cooperation.27 Underlying this is the recognition that security, law

enforcement and criminal justice measures are important, but not sufficient. Broader

underlying factors in society also need to be addressed: political, social and economic

integration, educational and job opportunities, values such as human rights and the rule of law

(the Charlie Hebdo attack was also an attack on the freedom of speech, freedom of the press

and freedom of expression), as well as inter-faith dialogue and tolerance. It is recognised that

working with international partners is necessary to address the problem.

The EU Heads of State or Government refer to the fact that the Council has stepped up

its work on counter-terrorism recently: the Riga Joint Statement28 of JHA Ministers was

adopted following the informal meeting of JHA Ministers in Riga on 29 and 30 January 2015.

It sets out a number of measures in the JHA area which should be implemented. Conclusions

of the Foreign Affairs Council on Counter-Terrorism were adopted on 9 February 2015,29

setting out an ambitious programme to step up EU counter-terrorism cooperation with the

countries in North Africa, the Middle East, the Gulf, Turkey and the Balkans in particular.

In response to the attacks in Paris, the EU system has focused even more closely on

terrorism. With regard to home affairs, this means above all speeding up and amplifying

measures that are already in the pipeline or being discussed, or better using available tools.

With regard to justice, the ‘soft’ side (prevention, underlying factors) and foreign affairs, the

EU’s ambition has been considerably raised.

As EU leaders stressed in their statement of 12 February 2015, all measures have to

comply with human rights and rule of law. It is important to uphold the values that the

terrorists aim to attack. This is also a key principle of the EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy30

of 2005.

27 Informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government Brussels, 12 February 2015 – Statement by the members of the European Council; http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/150212-european-council-statement-fight-against-terrorism/. Accessed 15 May 2015.28 Riga Joint Statement following the informal meeting of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers in Riga on 29 and 30 January, https://eu2015.lv/images/Kalendars/IeM/2015_01_29_jointstatement_JHA.pdf . A ccessed 28 March 2015. 29 Council Conclusions on Counter-Terrorism, Foreign Affairs Council, 9 February 2015 hhttp://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/150209-council-conclusions-counter-terrorism/. Accessed 3 August 2015.30 The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, doc 14469/4/05 Rev 4 http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST+14469+2005+REV+4 . A ccessed 25 May 2015.

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16. 3.1 Ensuring the Security of Citizens

16. 3.1.1 Reinforcing the Schengen Framework

The Context

It is important to detect foreign fighters who are leaving or re-entering the EU. This means,

controls on the external Schengen borders need to be efficient and comprehensive, both with

regard to persons and documents. In order to detect known or suspected foreign fighters, use

of the Schengen Information System (SIS) II databases is crucial: a maximum amount of

information related to foreign fighters needs to be entered into the databases. Information

about terrorist suspects such as the names can be entered by law enforcement (Article 36 II of

the SIS II Regulation31) or security services (Article 36 III of the SIS II Regulation). It is also

important to utilise the document databases (lost and stolen travel documents), both in the

Schengen context and INTERPOL. Second, it is important to actually check the databases

when persons cross the EU external borders. For that, it is essential for border posts to have

electronic connection not only to the SIS II, but also to the INTERPOL databases. The

policies in place for the frequency of checks are also crucial.

Schengen is part of the solution, not the problem. The free movement inside the

Schengen area is one of the major achievements and values of the EU. To maintain Schengen

and at the same time a high level of security, controls at the Schengen external borders are

being strengthened and the Schengen flanking measures, in particular common databases,

have to be used to the fullest extent. The European Agenda on Security sets out what has been

achieved in this context and what the priorities for the Commission are moving forward.

A lot of work has been undertaken on this over the past two years and progress has

been made. Experts in the Working Party for Schengen matters in the formation of

SIS/SIRENE,32 which deals with issues related to the use of the Schengen Information System

(SIS) and cooperation with the SIRENE bureaux,33 as well as experts in the Working Party on

31 Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on the establishment, operation and use of the second-generation Schengen Information System (SIS II). http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32007D0533&from=EN. Accessed 8 July 2015.32 SIRENE stands for Supplementary Information Request at the National Entries. Each State operating the SIS has set up a national SIRENE Bureau, operational 24/7, that is responsible for any supplementary information exchange and coordination of activities connected to SIS alerts. See the Commission's website which explains in more detail the SIS II. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen-information-system/sirene-cooperation/index_en.htm. Accessed 8 July 2015.

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Frontiers have been involved, which deal in particular with measures relating to the crossing

of external and internal borders of the Schengen states.34

The group of most affected countries (see above) has worked considerably on this

issue as well. At the October 2014 JHA Council, the recommendations of this group were

adopted by the EU,35 moving forward EU work in a number of areas, including strengthening

the Schengen framework. For example, the Commission was invited to update the Schengen

Borders Handbook regarding the circumstances of non-systematic checks on persons so as to

have a common interpretation and also to develop common risk indicators for non-systematic

checks. Member States have been invited to undertake systematic controls of the validity of

travel documents against the relevant databases. All this was further developed in 2015 as the

Riga Statement of 29 January 2015 points out. 36 On 12 February 2015, the Heads of State or

Government asked that

full use be made of the existing Schengen framework to reinforce and modernize

external borders' control: we agree to proceed without delay to systematic and

coordinated checks on individuals enjoying the right of free movement against

databases relevant to the fight against terrorism based on common risk indicators; the

Commission should issue rapidly operational guidelines for this; we will also consider

a targeted amendment to the Schengen Borders Code where necessary to provide for

permanent checks, based on a proposal by the Commission.37

Feeding the Databases

These commitments are based on earlier, preparative work: under French leadership, work has

taken place since 2013 related to SIS II, resulting in considerable increase in the use of the

system to signal (aspiring) foreign fighters: law enforcement and security services can enter 33 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/preparatory-bodies/working-party-schengen-matters/. Accessed 8 July 2015.34 This includes questions related to the EU agency for the management of external borders, Frontex. A special formation of the working party deals with travel documents and questions related to false and authentic documents online (FADO). http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/preparatory-bodies/working-party-frontiers/. Accessed 8 July 2015.35 Council of the European Union, 3346th Council meeting Justice and Home Affairs, Main results of the Council, Luxembourg, 9-10 October 2014, Presse 505: ‘Regarding checks at external borders, the Council agreed to improve such checks under the existing legal framework without further delay. The Council also agreed on a number of specific actions that will help to speed up the implementation of the already approved measures. Those actions do not only relate to the work done at EU level so far; they also include the conclusions of the work of the Ministers of Interior of the member states most affected by the foreign fighters phenomenon.’36 https://eu2015.lv/images/Kalendars/IeM/2015_01_29_jointstatement_JHA.pdf . A ccessed 28 March 2015.37 Informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government Brussels, 12 February 2015 – Statement by the members of the European Council; http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/150212-european-council-statement-fight-against-terrorism/. Accessed 15 May 2015.

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persons into the database either for discrete surveillance and notification or for arrest. In

principle, the system worked in the case of the terrorist suspect Nemmouche, who was

checked when he entered the EU at Frankfurt airport and signalled to the French authorities.

However, there was no arrest warrant for him, so he continued his travel and allegedly

committed the attack in Brussels. Therefore, in this case, the problem was not Schengen, as he

was detected entering the EU, but the fact that the criminal law in place did not allow him to

be charged with a crime related to foreign fighting (membership of a terrorist group for

example) for lack of evidence available to law enforcement authorities.

A number of Member States have taken administrative measures which include travel

bans and removal/invalidation of passports and identity cards for aspiring foreign fighters. In

this context, the SIS II related documents database is important, as persons subject to a travel

ban as well as persons using forged, lost or stolen travel documents can be detected.

INTERPOL

As the SIS II only includes EU and Schengen countries, INTERPOL38 is particularly

important for cooperation and information exchange with non-EU non-Schengen countries.

For example, foreign fighters having double nationalities known to the authorities of a partner

country might enter the EU, which a check of the INTERPOL database would indicate.

Foreign fighters originating from the EU transit third countries. The partner countries could

detect these foreign fighters at border crossings if the information on foreign fighters is shared

via INTERPOL and if their border posts are connected to INTERPOL databases.

In addition to the SIS II databases, it is important to check and feed INTERPOL

databases, such as the Stolen and Lost Passports database (SLTD) and police information

about persons. INTERPOL has a diffusion system that allows the country entering

information to decide which other countries will receive it, hence not all INTERPOL Member

States receive all the information about persons and suspects automatically. The country that

shares the information remains in control of the recipients. With regard to concerns about data

protection and human rights for example, it is important to be able to control who can access

the information.

More systematic Checks of Databases at Schengen External Borders Based on Common

Risk Indicators

38 On INTERPOL and what it offers see http://www.INTERPOL.int/en . A ccessed 25 May 2015.11

While full border checks of all databases can be carried out at Schengen external

borders with regard to non-EU citizens not permanently residing in the EU and with regard to

documents databases, Article 7.2 of the Schengen Borders Code allows non-systematic checks

of persons databases for persons enjoying the Schengen right of free movement at the external

borders. This provision was drafted at a time when the threat was thought to come from

outside the EU and when technology would not have allowed systematic checks. To detect a

known foreign fighter re-entering the EU, it is necessary to carry out a check of the SIS II

database to see whether he has been flagged by other Member States.

To address this, the Commission has been leading an exercise with Member States and

EU agencies to develop common risk indicators, as required by the Heads of State and

Government and the Council (see above). These will help border officials to make

assessments based on common criteria how to focus controls, for example from which cities

and regions there should be systematic controls when persons enter the EU. The common risk

indicators were finalised in June 2015.

Based on these risk indicators, more systematic and coordinated controls will be

carried out on all persons and all databases.39 The risk indicators have to be translated into

guidelines for border guards and need to be regularly updated. Frontex and Europol will be

involved to operationalize the risk indicators, to keep them updated and assist to coordinate

implementation.

The Commission has also updated the Schengen Handbook to provide a common

interpretation of Article 7 (2) Schengen Borders Code on what types of checks are possible

and should be carried out.40 More systematic checks based on risk indicators are possible.

Human rights concerns have been expressed by some with regard to the development of risk

indicators related to profiling and the Schengen right of free movement. However, the right of

free movement does not seem affected, as there are already border controls for all persons

entering the Schengen area. The question is only the intensity with which these controls are

carried out: travel documents are checked by the border guards for each person entering the

Schengen zone, the question is whether this is only a minimum check (sight control) or also a

check of the relevant databases. Technology exists (and is being further developed by some

39 Outcome of the Council Meeting 3376th Council meeting Justice and Home Affairs Brussels, 12 and 13 March 2015, 7178/15, Press 21.http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/jha/2015/03/12-13/ . A ccessed 29 March 2015.40 Commission Recommendation of 15.6.2015 amending the Recommendation establishing a common ‘Practical Handbook for Border Guards (Schengen Handbook)’ to be used by Member States' competent authorities when carrying out the border control of persons (C (2006) 5186 final).

12

companies in the context of the EU’s Smart Borders Initiative)41 which allows scanning of the

passport and checking it against all relevant databases within a few seconds, so that impact on

travel flows is minimised. Risk indicators avoid the need for checks of police databases for all

persons entering Schengen (which is not allowed under the Schengen Borders Code), but

employ them in a targeted way, for example at specific border crossing points or for flights

from specific destinations.

Targeted Amendment to the Schengen Borders Code?

As the Heads of State or Government stated on 12 February 2015, a targeted amendment to

the Schengen Borders Code will be considered where necessary to provide for permanent

checks, based on a proposal by the Commission.

16.3.1.2 EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) System

On 12 February 2015, the EU Heads of State or Government reiterated their request that ‘EU

legislators urgently adopt a strong and effective European Passenger Name Records directive

with solid data protection safeguards.’42A PNR is necessary to know in advance when/where

known foreign fighters will arrive and to detect unknown foreign fighters.43

The Commission’s proposal on an EU PNR system was presented in February 2010.

In April 2012, the Council agreed on its general approach. The rapporteur of the European

Parliament issued his report in February 2012 and the vote in the Civil Liberties, Justice and

Home Affairs (LIBE Committee) took place in April 2013, rejecting the Commission

proposal. In June 2013, the Plenary sent the file back to the LIBE Committee. In its

Resolution of 11 February 2015 on anti-terrorism measures, the EP ‘commit[ted] itself to

work towards the finalization of an EU PNR Directive by the end of the year’, breaking the

long deadlock on the proposal. The LIBE Committee of the European Parliament approved a

draft PNR Directive on 15 July 2015. This gives the rapporteur a mandate to start negotiations

with the EU Council of Ministers to agree on the draft Directive in three three-way talks

between Parliament, Council and Commission negotiators (‘trilogues’).44

41 EU 'Smart Borders': Commission wants easier access and enhanced security, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1234_en.htm . A ccessed 25 May 2015.42 Informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government Brussels, 12 February 2015 – Statement by the members of the European Council; http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/150212-european-council-statement-fight-against-terrorism/. Accessed 15 May 2015.43 On the PNR system see also European Agenda on Security, p. 7 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/basic-documents/docs/eu_agenda_on_security_en.pdf. Accessed 29 May 2015.44 See press release: Passenger Name Records: MEPs back EU system with data protection safeguards, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/de/news-room/content/20150714IPR81601/html/Passenger-Name-Records-MEPs-back-EU-system-with-data-protection-safeguards. Accessed 3 August 2015

13

EU Member States, the Commission and the EU CTC have engaged as a priority with

the European Parliament to move forward on this issue. In the meantime, the Commission has

provided funding to 14 Member States to set up national systems.

16.3.1.3. Information Sharing and Operational Cooperation

Information sharing and operational cooperation on foreign fighters is another priority, for

which the EU provides platforms and frameworks. Using these common platforms and

sharing information requires trust among the Member States.

On 12 February 2015, the Heads of State or Government45 asked that ‘law

enforcement and judicial authorities step up information sharing and operational cooperation,

including through Europol and Eurojust.’

Europol,46 the EU’s law enforcement agency, has created Focal Point Traveller, a

specific database where information about foreign fighters is shared among Member States

and with partner countries which have acceded to the Focal Point such as the US and

Australia as well as INTERPOL and Eurojust. Focal Point Traveller can provide interesting

links in foreign fighter investigations. Within Europol, working group Dumas on foreign

fighters aims at strengthening operational cooperation and information exchange.

It is a challenge that the tasks of police and security services are different across the

Member States, so that some Member States, where police have early preventive powers,

share more information than others, where security services are in the lead.

Information sharing within Europol is being further improved. In the Riga statement,

JHA ministers requested Europol to ‘provide a suitable information-exchange and data-

matching environment to streamline current procedures, avoiding duplications’. Discussions

on how to achieve this are ongoing. In the European Agenda on Security adopted in April

2015, the European Commission supports setting up a

European Counter-Terrorism Centre within Europol to step up the support

provided at EU level for Member States, within a secure environment with the

highest confidentiality in its communication. The Centre would include (1)

Europol’s Focal Point Travellers on foreign terrorist fighters and related

45 Informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government Brussels, 12 February 2015 - Statement by the members of the European Council, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/150212-european-council-statement-fight-against-terrorism/. Accessed 15 May 2015.46 On Europol’s mandate and activities see https://www.europol.europa.eu/

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terrorist networks, (2) the EU-US Terrorist Financing Tracking Programme

(TFTP),47 (3) FIU.NET, the decentralised computer network supporting

Financial Intelligence Units, which will be embedded in Europol in 2016, and

(4) Europol’s existing capabilities on firearms and explosive devices.

The work of security services takes place outside of the EU context, national security

remaining the sole responsibility of the Member States (Article 4 (2) TEU). The Heads of

State or Government also asked that ‘Member States’ security services deepen their

cooperation’.48

16.3.1.4 Judicial Approach

The criminal justice response, building on the EU’s acquis for cooperation in criminal

matters, is an important part of the EU’s overall response to foreign fighters. EU Ministers of

Justice and the Committee in the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters

(CATS) have repeatedly discussed the issue. The judicial response is not yet adequate to the

threat; the number of convictions of foreign fighters remains low (but is increasing and many

investigations and prosecutions are ongoing). This is due to a number of challenges related to

incrimination, gathering of evidence and international cooperation. Given the cross-border

nature of many of the investigations and prosecutions, as well as the possibility of trans-

national recruitment and facilitation networks, judicial cooperation on foreign fighters in the

EU context with its advanced tools based on mutual recognition and with international

partners is crucial.

Eurojust

In the context of Eurojust,49 the EU’s judicial cooperation unit, operational cooperation

between Member States can be facilitated for example through case coordination and Joint

Investigation Teams.

47 Europol can request information in the context of the EU-US Terrorist Financing Tracking Programme, also on behalf of Member States, which provides leads for terrorist investigations. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/tftp/index_en.htm. Accessed 30 May 2015. See also the joint EU-US on the value of the data provided from TFTP of 2013 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/docs/20131127_tftp_annex_en.pdf. Accessed 30 May 2015.48 Informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government Brussels, 12 February 2015 - Statement by the members of the European Council, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/150212-european-council-statement-fight-against-terrorism/. Accessed 15 May 2015.49 For Eurojust mandate and activities see http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/Pages/home.aspx . A ccessed 25 May 2015.

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Eurojust has organised several tactical and strategic meetings on foreign fighters and

presented two reports to the Justice and Home Affairs Council,50 which allowed policy makers

to draw on the input and analysis of prosecutors and investigators. These meetings allow

prosecutors and investigators of Member States to discuss tactical and strategic challenges

with regard to investigation and prosecution of foreign fighters, to exchange best practices,

exchange information and strengthen cross-border cooperation.

The Eurojust Terrorism Convictions Monitor analyses relevant case law and provides

an overview of the legal challenges in foreign fighters cases across the EU. This is an

interesting tool for judges and prosecutors in Member States who get an easily accessible

overview of how courts in other EU Member States deal with the legal questions in terrorism

and foreign fighter cases. It allows a comparative analysis, for example on the interpretation

of the crimes, the evidence, the sentences and the question of whether and if so how

international humanitarian law is applicable to foreign fighters.51

Information sharing on foreign fighters is important also in the context of Eurojust.

Exchange of information on prosecutions and convictions with Eurojust as set out in Council

Decision 2005/671/JHA of 20 September 2005 concerning terrorist offenses is encouraged, as

well as related to trafficking in firearms and cybercrime according to Article 13 of the

Eurojust Decision. The network of national correspondents for Eurojust for terrorism matters

(with a contact point in each Member State) is used to foster the exchange of judicial

information and best practice in terrorism cases. The national correspondents are associated to

the work of Eurojust and meet regularly at Eurojust.

Criminalisation: Update of the EU Framework Decision

Definition of the offences is an important issue.52 For the criminal justice response to be

effective, the legal framework has to be adapted when the terrorist threat evolves. This

happened for example in 2008, when the EU updated the EU Framework Decision of 2002 for

the first time.53

Today, it is crucial to adapt the legal framework to be able to prevent foreign terrorist

fighters from travelling and allow for prosecution after their return. Receiving terrorist

50 These reports are not public.51 For an analysis of this topic see Krähenmann, 2014.52 In this context see Chapter 9 by Sommario and Chapter 10 by Heinsch in this volume.53 Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism as amended by Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008. Inter alia, the following terrorist related offenses were added in 2008: public provocation to commit acts of terrorism, training for terrorism and recruitment for terrorism.

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training is not criminalised in the current EU Framework Decision on Combatting

Terrorism,54 for example, and neither is preparation to travel abroad for terrorist purposes.

Given the difficulties of prosecuting foreign fighters before departure or after return based on

the existing criminal laws, a number of EU Member States have updated their national

criminal law to better address the foreign fighter phenomenon.

UN Security Council Resolution 2178 legally requires criminalisation of behaviours

related to foreign terrorist fighters. Updating the EU Framework Decision would allow

UNSCR 2178 to be collectively implemented. Without an update, the Framework Decision

can no longer be the yardstick for the minimum required criminalisation of terrorism across

the EU. Harmonised criminalisation of foreign fighter related offenses across the EU would

provide a common legal framework, which would be an important reference point for the EU

agencies and facilitate cross-border cooperation. Differences in criminalisation without

common minimum standards risks prosecution gaps. It would send a strong political message

and would be an inspiration for third countries as to how the Resolution can be implemented

in full compliance with human rights. The EU actively participated in the negotiations on the

Additional Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism55 to implement UNSCR

2178, which will also have an impact on the EU acquis. The Commission announced in the

European Agenda on Security:56

More coherent laws against foreign terrorist fighters-related offences across the

EU would address the cross-border practical and legal challenges in the

gathering and admissibility of evidence in terrorism cases, and to deter

departures to conflict zones. The Commission will launch an impact

assessment in 2015 with a view to updating the 2008 Framework Decision on

Terrorism in 2016.

When implementing UNSCR 2178, it is important to fully respect human rights and

fundamental freedoms and not have an overly broad definition of the crimes. This will be an

important consideration for the EU when amending the Framework Decision.

54 Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism as amended by Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008.55 Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/ProtTerrorism.htm . A ccessed 25 May 2015.56The European Agenda on Security http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/basic-documents/docs/eu_agenda_on_security_en.pdf. Accessed 29 May 2015.

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Gathering of Evidence and International Cooperation

Collection and use of evidence with regard to foreign fighters poses practical and legal

challenges: evidence from the battlefields in Syria and Iraq is difficult to obtain, collection

and use of internet based evidence is challenging and cross-border legal assistance is often

necessary to get access to evidence (foreign fighters transit through other countries and

internet providers might be located abroad).

Legal challenges in the gathering and admissibility of e-evidence, which is common in

foreign fighter cases (social media postings), have been identified as one of the areas where

Eurojust could provide added value by facilitating exchange of experiences. Internet-based

evidence is key in many foreign fighter investigations and prosecutions. Cross-border

cooperation is challenging in this context,57 as traditional tools for international legal

cooperation such as Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) may be too slow and cumbersome.

It is important to distinguish for which information formal MLA requests are

necessary and which information can be requested from internet companies directly. MLA

should only be used where necessary in order to avoid clogging the system. Informal

cooperation in the context of drafting MLA requests is important to meet the requirements of

the receiving State. Challenges include the high number of MLA requests, in particular to the

US, where most of the international internet companies are located, as well as the requirement

in US law to set out ‘probable cause’ in case of access to content. Procedures are also

necessary to receive information quickly from internet companies in the case of an attack.

Complex legal questions arise as to the circumstances under which countries can have

direct access to data located in a third country, and whether they can directly request

international internet companies which are active in their country to provide data located in

another country. This is relevant for example in the case of cloud computing or in the case of

international internet companies, which are active across the world and store data in various

locations. Strong data protection rules in certain locations are marketed as a competitive

advantage to consumers. This could be affected by direct access to companies’ data from

abroad.

Interesting in this context is the ongoing Microsoft case58 in the New York Court of

Appeals. The question here is: can US search warrants have direct effect to oblige Microsoft

57 See for example from the Council of Europe: T-CY assessment report: The mutual legal assistance provisions of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, Adopted by the T-CY at its 12th Plenary (2-3 December 2014) http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/Source/Cybercrime/TCY/2014/T-CY(2013)17_Assess_report_v50adopted.pdf. Accessed 1 August 2015. 58 Case 14-2985 Microsoft Corporation v. USA, US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the matter of a warrant to search a certain e-mail account controlled and maintained by Microsoft Corporation.

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to provide data from its data centre in Ireland to US authorities or is making an MLA request

to Ireland necessary, which would then ask Microsoft for the information and send it to US

authorities, if this access is authorised under Irish law? In other words:

can authorities in one country request internationally operating internet companies to provide

access to data stored in another country or does MLA between countries need to be used?

Another challenge is end-to-end encryption which is increasingly used since the

Snowden leaks. This does not allow law enforcement authorities access to the information in

cases when the legal requirements for access to data are fulfilled, for example in the context

of a criminal investigation, as - contrary to classical encryption - the internet companies do

not have the encryption keys either (these are self-generated by the consumer) and cannot

access the information. The European Agenda on Security also focuses on internet-based

evidence.

ECRIS

In the Riga Statement, the JHA ministers also highlighted the importance of further

developing the criminal records information system (ECRIS). This is relevant when persons

with criminal records indicating a violent or terrorism-related past travel in the EU. The

ECRIS system ensures that each Member State holds a central record of its own nationals’

criminal history (wherever offences were committed within the EU) which can be shared with

other Member States when those individuals come to the attention of their law enforcement

authorities. The system is in practice limited to EU citizens and reactive, useful primarily for

specific criminal investigations. Improvements to the system are currently being considered. It

is necessary to make the system more proactive and include third country nationals. In the

European Agenda on Security, the Commission states that it will accelerate the work already

under way to improve ECRIS for non-EU nationals.

Rehabilitation in the Judicial Context59

The need to develop more effective rehabilitation programs was highlighted by EU leaders in

February 2015 ‘we call for initiatives regarding rehabilitation in the judicial context to address

factors contributing to radicalisation, including in prisons’.60 This need is real and urgent.

Ministers of Justice discussed this issue at the March 2015 Council.

59 See de Kerchove 2015.60 Informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government Brussels, 12 February 2015 - Statement by the members of the European Council, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/150212-european-council-statement-fight-against-terrorism/. Accessed 15 May 2015.

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Criminalisation of behaviour related to foreign fighting has expanded in many EU

Member States and internationally via UN Security Council Resolution 2178. Given the high

number of foreign fighters and the broadening of offences, thousands of foreign fighters

(before departure or after return) may potentially be investigated and prosecuted for related

criminal offenses.

However, prisons are a major incubator of radicalisation for the returnee himself but

also for other inmates.61 In addition, evidence that a young European has been fighting

alongside Da’esh or Jabhat al Nusra and not the Free Syrian Army is difficult to collect as EU

Member States are not present in Syria nor cooperate with Assad. Therefore, it is possible that

many will not be prosecuted or, if prosecuted, sentenced to short periods of imprisonment.

Even after longer sentences, the returnees will be released eventually and could pose a threat.

Sending most of the returnees to jail would not be the best solution and only postpone the

problem until after the end of the prison sentence.

If the message is conveyed that all returnees will go to prison, those who want to give

up will not return home. The consequences of not having reintegrated the mujahideen in

Afghanistan and Pakistan when the Russians left Afghanistan were serious: many stayed in

Afghanistan as they were afraid to be arrested and prosecuted if they returned to their home

countries and later moved on to other theatres of war such as the Balkans and Iraq.62

Given the high number of potential returnees, many if not most of whom fall under the

remit of the strengthened criminal provisions related to foreign terrorist fighting and the

problems related to prison sentences pointed out above, it is crucial to design urgently

effective rehabilitation/de-counter radicalisation programmes and to develop a criminal policy

and prosecution strategies.

Rehabilitation programmes could be an alternative to prosecution, a condition for

release from pre-trial detention, an alternative to a prison sentence for someone who has been

convicted (for example as condition for probation or as educative measure under youth

criminal law), or to prepare inmates in prison to get back into normal life.

It is important to assess the risks and situation of each and every returnee in order for

the authorities to determine which course of action is most appropriate. It is important to take

a case-by-case approach. There are different categories of returnees. Some Member States

have set up interdisciplinary platforms (with not only security services but also psychologists,

61 For example Mohamed Merah, who committed terrorist attacks in France in 2013, Mehdi Nemmouche, who allegedly committed the attack on the Jewish museum in Brussels in 2014, and Amedy Coulibaly, who committed an attack in Paris in 2015, were all radicalised in prison.62 For an analysis see de Roy van Zuijdewijn and Bakker 2014.

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sociologists, social workers etc.) to do this. This assessment could and should be linked to the

judicial process.

Those against whom there is evidence that they have committed a crime (war crime,

crime against humanity, terrorism) have to be investigated and prosecuted.

Those who have committed killings, attacks and fought alongside terrorist groups and

those who remain committed to terrorism should be prosecuted and convicted to prison

sentences. Rehabilitation in the form of de-radicalisation or disengagement programmes

should be offered also in prison.63

Depending on the risk assessment and criminal policy/prosecution strategies, those

who have not committed any attacks or killings, have not actively participated in the fighting,

do not remain committed to terrorism and want to get back to normal life, might be offered

rehabilitation programmes instead of prosecution (if this is possible under the national

procedural law – if discretion to prosecute exists) or some form of community sentence. This

is particularly relevant in the context of youth criminal law, which often has the primary

objective of education and reintegration, but also for others.

Those for whom there is not enough evidence for prosecution, but for whom the risk is

regarded nevertheless as high, need to be put under discrete surveillance. This is very

demanding: monitoring someone 24/7 requires at least 20 officers. For those against whom

there is not enough evidence and who are not regarded as posing a risk, rehabilitation,

reintegration programmes and psychological support may also be provided on a voluntary

basis.

Member States in the EU have started to address the need to deal with the high volume

of foreign fighters and to develop rehabilitation programmes, but this is still at an early stage.

There are some interesting experiences, such as rehabilitation of neo-nazis, members of gangs

or sects and the experience of cities which have dealt with a high number of returnees such as

Vilvoorde, Belgium, where a multi-disciplinary platform assesses each returnee and social

services provide targeted interventions for re-integration (in parallel to potential investigation

and prosecution) as well as the rehabilitation centre for returnees in Aarhus, Denmark, where

some foreign fighters have been rehabilitated through individual coaching and mentoring,

counselling, help with readmission to school, meetings with parents and other outreach

63 See the GCTF Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders https://www.google.be/?gws_rd=ssl#q=gctf+rome+memorandum. Accessed 30 May 2015.

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efforts.64 There are also interesting pilot initiatives in France both inside and outside prison.65

However, much more needs to be done.

There are recurring features of rehabilitation programmes such as the importance of a

multidisciplinary approach, the importance of coaching/mentoring and the importance of

involving the families and civil society.66

The EU and Member States are facing many policy challenges, which can be

summarized as follows:

Is there a need to define an EU criminal policy? While some Member States encourage

their citizens to return home and undertake a rehabilitation programme as an alternative to

criminal sanctions, some other Member States take a more repressive stance. There is no

common approach in the EU. The consequences of the various approaches and potentially a

common EU criminal policy with regard to foreign fighters could be discussed among

policymakers and practitioners, including at Eurojust.

Should the ideology play a role in the rehabilitation programme? There is the need to

distinguish between de-radicalisation which aims at changing someone’s ideas and ideology

which is very difficult to do, and disengagement, which aims at changing someone’s

behaviour and to avoid him using violence to impose his ideas. In the context of de-

radicalisation, some Member States for example now experiment with the use of ‘quiet

salafists’ to deconstruct the rhetoric of ‘violent salafists’.

How can it be ensured that security/intelligence services do share their information

with local police and social workers (debriefings of returnees explaining why someone went

to Syria and why they returned are very useful to design a proper response)? The ‘info box’

system in the Netherlands which is a platform designed to facilitate this information exchange

among the different stakeholders is effective in this respect.67

How can it be ensured that all actors in the criminal justice chain are aware, trained

and supported with regard to returnees?

64 On the programme in Aarhus see Andrew Higgins, For Jihadists, Denmark Tries Rehabilitation, The New York Times, 13 December 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/14/world/for-jihadists-denmark-tries-rehabilitation.html. Accessed 30 May 2015.65

Sylvain Mouillard, Deux visages de la déradicalisation, Libération, 20 February 2015 http://www.liberation.fr/societe/2015/02/20/sonia-imloul-mediatrice-des-familles-deux-visages-de-la-deradicalisation_1206834. Accessed 30 May 2015.66 Veldhuis, 2012. See also the RAN Declaration of Good Practices for Engagement with Foreign Fighters for Prevention, Outreach, Rehabilitation and Reintegration, http://www.icct.nl/download/file/RAN-Declaration-Good-Practices-for-Engagement-with-Foreign-Fighters.pdf. Accessed 25 May 2015.67 https://www.aivd.nl/onderwerpen/terrorisme/ct-infobox/. Accessed 1 August 2015.

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De-radicalisation and rehabilitation programs need to be developed in prisons for the

returnees. It has to be decided where to locate returnees, and whether to segregate them from

ordinary inmates or not. It may also be necessary to increase the number of Muslim chaplains

active in prison and train them better.

In prisons, early detection of signs of radicalisation of other inmates has to be

improved by training prison staff and linking them with the intelligence community. This has

been done in some Member States. But this is challenging as the members of the new

generation of jihadists tend to disguise their convictions (taqiya), hence showing no visible

signs of their radicalisation.

Justice Commissioner Jourova has mobilised resources to assist Member States. She

will organise in October 2015 a high level conference to exchange views and best practices

and has earmarked up to 5 Million Euros in the Justice programme to train practitioners in the

criminal justice system.

Eurojust, the European organisation of prison and correctional services (EuroPris) and

the Confederation of European Probation (CEP) will also be mobilised in this context, as well

as the Radicalisation Awareness Network, which also works on rehabilitation, de-

radicalisation and disengagement.68

16.3.2 Prevention of Radicalisation and Safeguarding Values

16.3.2.1 Underlying Factors

In February 2015, EU leaders called for ‘communication strategies to promote

tolerance, non-discrimination, fundamental freedoms and solidarity throughout the EU,

including through stepping up inter-faith and other community dialogue, …initiatives

regarding education, vocational training, job opportunities, social integration’.69

This ‘soft’ side is indeed crucial: underlying factors need to be addressed, which pose

difficult questions for European societies such as integration, opportunities, tolerance,

communicating European values, and intra and inter-faith dialogue. Many factors can

contribute to radicalisation, including perceived marginalisation and lack of opportunities.

There are several policies which are important as such and should not have a counter-

68 See European Agenda on Security http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/basic-documents/docs/eu_agenda_on_security_en.pdf. Accessed 29 May 2015.69 Informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government Brussels, 12 February 2015 - Statement by the members of the European Council, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/150212-european-council-statement-fight-against-terrorism/. Accessed 15 May 2015.

23

terrorism label. These need to be mobilised to create a context in which radicalisation no

longer thrives. Positive role models for youth are important. EU flagship projects to provide

opportunities should be identified.

To achieve this, it is important that the European Commission mobilises a broad range

of policies, which the Commission plans to implement as stated in the European Agenda on

Security. This has already started and several activities have been carried out.

First of all, on 3-4 March 2015 in Manchester, the Radicalisation Awareness Network

(RAN) Prevent working group organised a conference on schools and their contribution to

preventing radicalisation, and on the empowerment of teachers and schools to deal with

radicalisation and violent extremism in classrooms with over 90 educators from EU Member

States. The educators adopted a Manifesto for Education70 which fed into the first ever

meeting of EU Education Ministers on radicalisation in March 2015.

Furthermore, EU Education Ministers met in Paris on 17 March to discuss prevention

of radicalisation and agreed to a common approach,71 supported by the mobilisation of EU

programmes, in particular Erasmus+, which not only finances educational exchanges, but also

other educational, sports and youth programmes. Tibor Navracsics, Commissioner for

Education, Culture, Youth and Sport, welcomed the political commitment made by the EU

Education Ministers and the European Commission in Paris to join forces in tackling

radicalisation72.

The EU Fundamental Rights Agency has also worked on tolerance, non-

discrimination, fundamental freedoms and solidarity and can contribute to develop further EU

work and support in this area. The Commission will organize a conference on ‘Tolerance and

respect: preventing and combating antisemitic and anti-Muslim hatred in Europe’ in early

October 2015 and has regular dialogue with faith-based organisations.

70Manifesto for Education – Empowering Educators and Schools, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/docs/manifesto-for-education-empowering-educators-and-schools_en.pdf . A ccessed 29 March 2015.71 Declaration on Promoting citizenship and the common values of freedom, tolerance and non-discriminationthrough educationhttps://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/cwt/files/dp_mobilisation_europeenne_20150317.pdf . A ccessed 29 March 2015.72 Commissioner Navracsics, Statement - 17 March 2015 ‘Education to help tackle radicalisation, EU Commission and Ministers agree’: ‘Working together at European level, we can share the best ideas, learn from and inspire each other. To address radicalisation, I plan to prepare the ground for inclusion, diversity and civic values in our schools to be at the centre of the new EU priorities for education and training I will present later this year. I also want to ensure we use the Erasmus+ funding programme in a more targeted way to help these efforts.’

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16.3.2.2 Internet

Given the highly professional social media use of Da’esh, radicalisation on the internet needs

to be addressed urgently and in different ways.73

Counter-narratives are necessary. For several years, some Member States, in particular

the UK, have successfully deployed counter-narrative work, using cutting edge methods from

private sector advertising. The government is often not the most credible communicator, so

they also assist interested NGOs and faith-based organisations in professionalising and

amplifying their communications. Over the years, a relationship with trusted organisations has

been formed.

This positive experience is now being replicated at EU level. The Commission is

financing a team of experts, members of the Syria Strategic Communications Advisory Team

(SSCAT) which assists interested Member States to develop effective communication to

counter the Da’esh message, working also with civil society. The team, under Belgian

leadership with UK experts visits Member States to assist in the delivery of tailor-made and

context-specific communications products, building on what Member States want to do. Part

of the cycle is also researching target audiences and measuring the impact of campaigns on

focus groups, which need to feed back into further fine-tuning of communication products and

channels. A SSCAT network (Member States, SSCAT team and EU institutions) has also

been created, which meets regularly and discusses the strategic challenges of communications

and lessons learnt. Da’esh communications often appeal to basic emotions. Successful

counter-narratives for young target audiences do the same, for instance by showing the

suffering of families whose children have left to join Da’esh in Syria or testimony of

disillusioned returnees.

In addition to counter-narratives, it is also important to detect and remove terrorist

content from the internet as quickly as possible. This is a challenge given the huge volume of

social media traffic and the high rate of re-tweeting and further distribution of Da’esh videos

and messages. Internet companies have their own terms of reference, which draw the line

between acceptable and unacceptable content on the platform. The UK has pioneered a

system where highly trained officers of Scotland Yard use software to scan social media and

identify terrorist content that goes against the terms of reference of the internet companies.

This content is then being referred to the companies, which in over 90 % of the cases have

decided to take it down. Hence, this approach is collaborative, based on the companies own

terms and conditions and not based on forced removal, which might be challenging given the

73 See Chapter 6 by Weimann in this volume.25

volume. The approach has been effective given the success rate of removal of over 90 %. In

addition, it is removed from the internet worldwide and not only in the jurisdiction, and can

happen much faster than judicially mandated removal.

There is the need for an EU-wide capability operating in various EU languages. In

February 2015, the EU leaders called for ‘adequate measures to be taken, in accordance with

national constitutions, to detect and remove internet content promoting terrorism or

extremism, including through greater cooperation between public authorities and the private

sector at EU level, also working with Europol to establish internet referral capabilities.’74

In March 2015, the JHA Council decided to set up an Internet Referral Unit at Europol

by 1 July 2015,75 which would support the Member States in identifying and flagging terrorist

content to internet companies for take down, based on the terms and conditions of the

companies. This will proceed in close partnership with the companies. The unit will work in

cooperation with the corresponding units of the Member States and also provide strategic

analysis which might allow for a more proactive approach - as taking down is reactive. It will

also support investigations and prosecutions, de-conflicting provisions are foreseen as well.

The Internet Referral Unit (IRU) at Europol was launched in its pilot phase on 1 July 2015

and will operate at full capacity on 1 July 2016.76 Europol has already established close

cooperation with the internet industry in the context of EC3,77 its cyber crime centre, where

Europol has developed considerable expertise in support of the Member States.

In October 2014, the Commissioner for Home Affairs organised a meeting of the EU

Ministers of Interior with the internet industry. Such exchanges are important and useful. The

Commission is preparing to set up a forum with the internet industry as set out in the

European Agenda on Security.78

74 Informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government Brussels, 12 February 2015 - Statement by the members of the European Council, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/150212-european-council-statement-fight-against-terrorism/. Accessed 15 May 2015.75 Outcome document of the JHA Council of 12-13 March 2015: ‘Regarding the issue of internet content promoting terrorism or violent extremism, Ministers agreed on the expediency of Europol taking on additional responsibility in this field as early as possible and have asked the Agency to set up an EU Internet Referral Unit which should be operational by July 2015.’ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/jha/2015/03/12-13/. Accessed 30 May 2015.76 See press release: Europol Internet Referral Unit to Combat Terrorist and Violent Extremist Propaganda, https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/europol%E2%80%99s-internet-referral-unit-combat-terrorist-and-violent-extremist-propaganda . A ccessed 3 August 2015.77 On EC3 see https://www.europol.europa.eu/ec3 . A ccessed 3 August 2015.78 The European Agenda on Security, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/basic-documents/docs/eu_agenda_on_security_en.pdf. Accessed 29 May 2015. ‘Furthermore, the Commission will launch in 2015 an EU-level Forum with IT companies to bring them together with law enforcement authorities and civil society. Building upon the preparatory meetings organised in 2014, the Forum will focus on deploying the best tools to counter terrorist propaganda on the internet and in social media. In cooperation with IT companies, the Forum will also explore the concerns of law enforcement authorities on new encryption technologies.’

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16.3.2.3 Radicalisation Awareness Network – Centre of Excellence

In order to help the first-line local practitioners and to facilitate the exchange of experiences

and best practices between them, the European Commission set up the EU-wide RAN,79

officially launched in September 2011 by the then Commissioner for Home Affairs

Malmström. Several working groups deal with various aspects of prevention of radicalisation,

including the identification of good practices with regard to foreign fighters. In the autumn of

2015, the RAN-Centre of Excellence will be established which will put experience at the

disposal of interested Member States to further develop programmes in the context of

prevention of radicalisation. It will ‘act as an EU knowledge hub to consolidate expertise and

foster the dissemination and exchange of experiences and cooperation on anti-radicalisation.

It will add a new practical dimension to the cooperation between stakeholders on anti-

radicalisation.’80

Prevention of radicalisation is one of the four pillars of the EU's counter-terrorism

strategy, in addition to ‘Protect, Pursue and Respond’.81 A Revised EU Strategy for

Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to terrorism was adopted by the Council in June

2015.

16.3.3 Cooperating with the EU’s International Partners

16.3.3.1 Strengthening Counter-Terrorism Cooperation with the MENA Region

On 12 February 2015, the EU leaders expressed the need for the EU ‘to engage more with

third countries on security issues and counter-terrorism, particularly in the Middle East and

North Africa and in the Sahel, but also in the Western Balkans, including through new

capacity building projects (e.g. border controls) with partners and better targeted EU

79 Information about the RAN, its working groups and the good practices it has developed can be found here: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/index_en.htm. Accessed 30 May 2015. Background: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/docs/fight-against-radicalisation/role_of_ran_en.pdf. Accessed 1 August 2015.80 European Agenda on Security http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/basic-documents/docs/eu_agenda_on_security_en.pdf. Accessed 29 May 2015.81 The EU Counter-terrorism strategy http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/ . Accessed 1 August 2015.

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assistance.’82 In March 2015, the European Council highlighted the commitment to step up the

EU’s counter-terrorism response with regard to Libya83 and Tunisia.84

The basis for action are the Conclusions on Counter-Terrorism adopted by the Foreign

Affairs Council on 9 February 201585 under the leadership of High Representative of the EU

for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HRVP)

Federica Mogherini, which set out an ambitious agenda. They show the EU’s political

commitment to step up counter-terrorism cooperation in particular with the MENA countries,

the Gulf, Turkey and the Balkans, as a matter of priority.

The Conclusions call for mainstreaming of counter-terrorism in the EU’s foreign

policy which is an important step forward as this means that counter-terrorism concerns

should be an integral part of the EU’s approach to relevant countries and region.

The Context

The EU recognises the terrorist threat faced by the MENA countries, as well as Turkey, the

Balkans and the Gulf, and the high numbers of foreign fighters from these countries, which

risk de-stabilisation. Tunisia for example is one of the countries worldwide with the highest

per capita number of foreign fighters, which poses a threat upon return, as the attacks in Tunis

and Sousse in 2015 have shown. It is important to work with the countries which are theatre

of operations (Iraq and the liberated parts of Syria), with countries from which foreign

fighters originate, transit countries such as Turkey and the countries which face instability

from the situation in Syria/Iraq and Libya.

After the Arab Spring, the EU’s main focus for cooperation with the countries in the

region was not on security (although support to security sector reform was mentioned in the

joint communication of the Commission and High Representative ‘A new response to a

changing neighbourhood’86 of May 2011), but this is now changing. The EU’s partners are

82 Informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government Brussels, 12 February 2015 - Statement by the members of the European Council, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/150212-european-council-statement-fight-against-terrorism/. Accessed15 May 2015.83 European Council Conclusions 19 March 2015, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/03/20-conclusions-european-council/. Accessed 31 March 2015. (‘The EU will step up its engagement on counter-terrorism in the region, with relevant partners.’)84 Statement of the European Council on Tunisia, 19 March 2015 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/03/20-statement-european-council-tunisia/. Accessed 31 March 2015. ‘The European Union and its Member States will intensify cooperation with Tunisia to counter this common terrorist threat’.85Council conclusions on counter-terrorism, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/150209-council-conclusions-counter-terrorism/. Accessed 31 May 2015.86 http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/com_11_303_en.pdf. Accessed 31 May 2015.

28

keen on EU counter-terrorism support. Overall, the Conclusions show a great willingness of

the EU to invest in counter-terrorism in the MENA region, increase engagement and build

stronger counter-terrorism partnerships. Counter-terrorism and security issues also figure

prominently in the ongoing review and update of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

EU counter-terrorism cooperation complements the bilateral cooperation of Member

States with partner countries. Projects are either implemented by international organisations

such as the United Nations (and also involve experts of Member States and Agencies), the

European Police College (CEPOL, which has a network with all police academies in the

Member States) or consortia of Member States agencies with Member States experts.

Cooperation and providing assistance can only succeed in partnership, so it is important for

partner countries to indicate areas of interest for cooperation. The EU built the area of

freedom, justice and security by bringing practitioners together. Counter-terrorism is a

sensitive area and cooperation requires trust. The EU’s counter-terrorism capacity building

projects and workshops aim also at bringing counter-terrorism practitioners from both sides of

the Mediterranean together, so that they get to know each other, learn from each other and

develop trust which is the prerequisite for working together more closely.

Over the past few years, the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator has strengthened

relations with the region through many visits. In early 2014, the EU Counter-Terrorism

Coordinator, in cooperation with the EEAS and the Commission, initiated informal meetings

twice a year on foreign fighters with the countries south of the Mediterranean. The

Conclusions suggest a ministerial format of this so-called ‘Euromed’ group.

Some question the impact of counter-terrorism cooperation on human rights. By

engaging on counter-terrorism with partner countries, the EU shares good practices for

effective and human rights and rule of law compliant counter-terrorism legislation and

policies. Counter-terrorism cooperation is actually promoting human rights compliance and

taking place in the broader context of support to security sector reform. The EU’s cooperation

puts emphasis on areas such as for example the law enforcement and criminal justice

approach, development and implementation of comprehensive counter-terrorism strategies

including prevention of radicalisation, addressing terrorist financing, information exchange,

international cooperation, terrorism and border security, aviation security, and development of

‘smart’ counter-terrorism policies based on strong analytical assessments and rule of law and

human rights compliant security services.

Implementation of the Council Conclusions of 9 February 2015 on Counter-Terrorism

29

As a first step to strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation, security/counter-terrorism experts

were posted in a number of key EU delegations in the MENA region in the summer 2015. 87

As counter-terrorism is a relatively new area of engagement for the EU delegations, these

experts - seconded from Member States - will play an important role in building and

maintaining regular relationships with the relevant authorities in the host country, and help to

identify capacity building assistance and facilitate exchanges between the law enforcement,

judicial and security experts of the Member States located in the host country. They will play

a key role facilitating the implementation of the Council Conclusions.

The Conclusions also call for setting up targeted and upgraded security and counter-

terrorism dialogues88 which would aim to bring together all relevant actors on both sides to

discuss in a comprehensive way counter-terrorism policies, challenges, strategic assessments

and potential areas for cooperation. On the EU side this would include the EU CTC, the

EEAS, the relevant Directorates-General of the Commission, and the agencies (Europol,

Eurojust, and where relevant CEPOL and Frontex). These dialogues would be complementary

to the already existing security and justice sub-committees under the ENP, where terrorism is

only one of many different topics and which have so far not been a forum for in-depth

discussion among the key persons responsible for counter-terrorism.

The Conclusions also highlight the importance of organising counter-terrorism

workshops with the partner countries which would bring together practitioners and policy

makers from the EU, Member States and the partner country. Those could be general

workshops on various aspects of counter-terrorism such as was carried out in February 2015

with Lebanon and in June 2015 with Turkey or more targeted workshops on a particular topic,

such as implementation of UNSCR 2178.

On the basis of the dialogues and workshops, counter-terrorism action plans89 will be

developed mapping the way forward for counter-terrorism cooperation.

Most important is increasing counter-terrorism capacity building support, including

how to deal with foreign fighters and returnees. Several regional counter-terrorism projects

with the MENA region have already started, in particular in the area of rule of law based

investigations and prosecutions of terrorist offenses as well as the law enforcement and

judicial aspects of implementation of UNSCR 2178 on foreign fighters. A number of regional

and bilateral counter-terrorism projects have been approved and are under preparation. A

87Council conclusions on counter-terrorism http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/150209-council-conclusions-counter-terrorism/. Accessed 31 May 2015.88 Ibid.89 Ibid.

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comprehensive overview of the various projects can be found in the EU Counter-Terrorism

Coordinator's June 2015 implementation report of the Statement of the Members of the

European Council of 12 February 2015.90

Following the engagement by HRVP Mogherini, the visit by the President of the

European Council Tusk, accompanied by the CTC, to Tunis on 31 March 2015 and building

on an several visits by the CTC, a counter-terrorism assistance package to Tunisia is under

preparation. From autumn 2015, the EU will also support Tunisia in security sector reform.

Counter-terrorism will be mainstreamed into this project, which has been accelerated and is

based on a joint peer review of the security sector. It is important to assist Tunisia in its

democratic transition.

Libya91 is a particular threat, hosting Da’esh affiliated and other terrorist groups. It is a

challenge, as direct action on the ground is difficult without a unity government as a partner.

Libya has become an important destination for foreign fighters from the MENA region and

risks destabilising the neighbours. Containment is necessary, hence there is the need to work

with its neighbours such as Tunisia, but also Algeria, Egypt and Nigeria (under the EU’s

Sahel Strategy). The EU plans to develop a counter-terrorism strategy for Libya as soon as the

political conditions on the ground allow.

The Conclusions call for a greater involvement of the JHA agencies (such as Europol,

Eurojust, Frontex and CEPOL) with the MENA countries.92

Operational information exchange is difficult given the high data protection

requirements which are a pre-condition for the exchange of personal information between the

EU agencies and third countries. In order to prepare the ground for more information

exchange, assistance to third countries to develop strong data protection and privacy

frameworks could be considered. However, strategic cooperation between the agencies and

third countries could already be increased, such as study visits of officials to Europol and

Eurojust, workshops and proactive engagement with Eurojust focal points in third countries.

Deployment of liaison officers in third countries is possible under the current mandates of the

90 Follow-up to the statement of the Members of the European Council of 12 February 2015 on counter-terrorism: Report on implementation of measures, Report by the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator to the Council and the European Council, 10 June 2015 http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9422-2015-REV-1/en/pdf . Accessed 1 August 2015.91 See also Gartenstein-Ross and Barr, 2015.92 Council conclusions on counter-terrorism, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/150209-council-conclusions-counter-terrorism/. Accessed 31 May 2015. ‘The EU will work to develop frameworks for information exchange and ways for the EU agencies to engage more strategically with the countries in the region to strengthen law enforcement and judicial cooperation.’

31

Europol and Eurojust and could be considered in due course if budgetary resources allow.

One solution might be the double-hatting of Member States’ liaison officers and magistrates

already on the ground.

Working with Europol and Eurojust allows the third countries to enter into contact

with law enforcement and judicial officials of all 28 Member States, and hence to tap into an

interesting network. Third countries can also be associated to the coordination of

investigations or prosecutions which concern them at Eurojust. This means that Eurojust can

already facilitate cooperation on specific cases with relevant partner countries. Some partner

countries, including in the MENA region, have appointed Eurojust contact points.

A question which needs to be considered is also how to strengthen Mutual Legal

Assistance and Extradition (MLAE). Accession to the relevant Conventions of the Council of

Europe could be promoted.

The Conclusions also require the EU to play a proactive role in multilateral

cooperation in the context of the UN, GCTF and the global CVE summits hosted by the US.

The EU is also participating in the anti-ISIL coalition.

Addressing the Underlying Factors

The EU leaders called for ‘a dialogue among cultures and civilizations to promote

fundamental freedoms together’. The Conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council on Counter-

Terrorism also recognise that counter-terrorism cooperation alone is not enough.

The context and underlying factors also need to be addressed. Those can be counter-

terrorism relevant actions which do not have a terrorism label, but contribute positively. This

will happen through a variety of ways:

The Conclusions also call for

improving strategic communication, developing an outreach strategy to the

Arab World, including developing counter-narratives to terrorist propaganda,

promoting fundamental rights, and taking into account the increasingly

frequent misuse of the internet in radicalisation, engaging through social media

and enhancing communication in Arabic. In this process, we can draw on the

expertise of the Syria Strategic Communications Advisory Team.93

93 Council conclusions on counter-terrorism, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/150209-council-conclusions-counter-terrorism/ . Accessed 31 May 2015.

32

Under the leadership of the EEAS, a task force has been set up in the context of which

experts from the EEAS, the Commission, the CTC, and the EU delegations, with the

assistance of the SSCAT, are exploring how to improve and make more strategic EU

communications in the MENA region to develop a communications and outreach strategy,

building on and further developing existing efforts.

The Conclusions also require ‘[f]acilitating interfaith dialogue, civil society dialogue,

people-to-people contacts, academic and cultural exchanges.’ Reflections on how to

implement this important aspect are ongoing.

The Conclusions state that ‘CT, including prevention of radicalization, will, where

appropriate, be mainstreamed into programming of assistance, making full use of the OECD

guidelines on terrorism prevention.’ This is important, as in countries where terrorism is an

issue, counter-terrorism needs to be mainstreamed into the general programming of

assistance. In addition, many EU projects deal with security sector reform, justice, border

security, and civil society. Counter-terrorism aspects could be included, which is possible

under the OECD guidelines ‘A Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention:

Key Entry Points for Action (2003)’.94

The Conclusions also state that ‘the EU delegations in the region have been asked to

work with their host governments to identify quickly opportunities for twinning95 and

TAIEX96 projects in the counter-terrorism context’.97 For example, in the past, a successful

twinning between the EU (with Member States experts) and Morocco helped to establish and

develop the Financial Intelligence Unit in Morocco, which has received positive feedback

from the Financial Action Task Force.

The Conclusions also commit the EU to ‘[a]ddressing the underlying factors of

radicalization by supporting initiatives across the region with regard to youth, education,

vocational training, job opportunities, civil society, security sector reform, role of women.

The EU will work with faith-based organizations, as appropriate.’98

94 This Reference Document looks at how aid can be delivered more effectively through simplifying and harmonising donor procedures http://www.oecd.org/dac/dacguidelinesandreferenceseries.htm . Accessed 31 May 2015.; for an analysis see the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator’s discussion paper of June 2012 (security and development) http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%209990%202012%20INIT. Accessed 31 May 2015..95 European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/tenders/twinning/index_en.htm. Accessed 31 May 2015.96 TAIEX is the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instrument of the European Commission. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/tenders/taiex . Accessed 31 May 2015.97 Council Conclusions on Counter-terrorism http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/150209-council-conclusions-counter-terrorism/ . Accessed 31 May 2015.98 Ibid.

33

16.3.3.2 Anti-ISIL Strategic Framework and Iraq/Syria Foreign Fighters Strategy

In October 2014, the Foreign Affairs Council adopted a counter-terrorism strategy for Syria

and Iraq, with a particular focus on foreign fighters.99 It highlights the importance of

stemming the foreign fighter flow, the political dimension, prevention of radicalisation,

addressing the financing of ISIL, sharing best practices, working on counter-narratives, social

media, empowering religious leaders and civil society, implementation of UNSCR 2178,

aviation and border security, and engaging with key partners in the region and globally.

In March 2015, the Foreign Affairs Council adopted the EU regional strategy for Syria

and Iraq as well as the ISIL/Da’esh threat,100 a broader strategic framework. Inter alia, the

framework aims to

address the commonalities of the crises in Iraq and Syria (principally the

terrorist threat and the serious humanitarian implications that these crises have

provoked) as well as their specificities; encourage the countries of the region to

take particular responsibility for ending the crises and tackling Da’esh’s and

other terrorist groups’ violent extremism which threatens them in the first

place, and offer appropriate EU support to their efforts; recognise the inherent

limitations of security and counter-terrorism intervention, however necessary

military action may be in the short term. The EU’s response therefore

emphasises the need for a sustained and comprehensive engagement to address

the underlying dynamics of the conflict through diplomatic engagement and

long-term support for political reforms, socio-economic development and

ethno-sectarian reconciliation.101

The EU is participating in the anti-ISIL coalition, including the working group on foreign

terrorist fighters, and works closely with international partners such as the US to address the

foreign fighters threat. The EU is also active in the context of the GCTF Working Group on

Foreign Terrorist Fighters, co-led by the Netherlands and Morocco.

99 Outline of the counter-terrorism strategy for Syria and Iraq, with particular focus on foreign fighters, doc 5369/15, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5369-2015-INIT/en/pdf . Accessed 29 March 2015.100 Council document 7267/15 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/foreign-fighters/ . Accessed 31 May 2015.101Outline of the counter-terrorism strategy for Syria and Iraq, with particular focus on foreign fighters, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5369-2015-INIT/en/pdf. . Accessed 1 August 2015.

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16.4 Conclusion

The EU is taking the foreign fighters threat very seriously and has mobilised a broad range of

policies in response. The basis is a thorough understanding and analysis of the phenomenon,

which allows for a broad and strategic response, in which the EU supports the Member States.

As the most integrated regional organisation, which mobilised the foreign fighter threat early

on, it can be argued that the EU’s response to foreign fighters has served as a model for the

multilateral framework, in particular UNSCR 2178.

Counter-terrorism specific measures are not enough. Broader underlying factors,

which are relevant to the context in which radicalisation takes place, need to be addressed as

well in the EU and partner countries. The European Commission in its European Agenda on

Security also prioritises a comprehensive response to the foreign fighter threat.

Implementation of measures has been progressing steadily since June 2013 and since the Paris

attacks in January 2015, political focus has increased even more. Many of the issues that need

to be tackled are technical and complex, hence a thorough understanding of the required steps

for implementation both at EU and Member States is key to achieve the objectives.

The EU leaders are expecting results. Member States and EU institutions now face the

challenge to progress quickly and allocate appropriate resources.

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