UNITEDNATIONS HS

PUN-HABITAT

Governing Councilof the United Nations HumanSettlements Programme

Distr.GENERAL

HSP/GC/19/INF/724 March 2003

ENGLISH ONLY

Nineteenth session*

Nairobi, 5 - 9 May 2003Item 4 of the provisional agenda**

Activities of theUnited Nations Human Settlements Programme:progress report

HOUSING SITUATION AND HOUSING NEEDS ASSESSMENT IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

Note by the secretariat

At its eighteenth session held in February 2001, the Commission on Human Settlements adopted resolution 18/12 on illegal Israeli human settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories. The report attached to the present note is a direct follow-up by UN-HABITAT of the action plan to execute the operative paragraphs of that resolution and deals with the housing situation and housing needs in the occupied Palestinian territories. The text of the report has been produced as submitted by the consultant and without any formal editing.

* In its resolution 56/206 of 21 December 2001, the General Assembly transformed the Commission on Human Settlements into the Governing Council of the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly. This session has been designated as the nineteenth instead of the first session of the Governing Council to signify the continuity and relationship between the Governing Council and the Commission on Human Settlements.

** HSP/GC/19/1.

K0360897 150403

For reasons of economy, this document is printed in a limited number. Delegates are kindly requested to bring their copies to meetings and not to request additional copies. This document is printed on environment friendly paper.

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

BY

Åge A. Tiltnes & Elias Magembe

SUBMITTED JANUARY 2003

2

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

ContentsFOREWORD.......................................................................................................................................4LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS......................................................................................51 INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................................62 THE PALESTINIAN POPULATION AND ECONOMY............................................................................7

Population size and distribution...................................................................................................7Household size and composition..................................................................................................7Population and household forecasts.............................................................................................7The Palestinian economy.............................................................................................................8Poverty.........................................................................................................................................9

3 CURRENT HOUSING SITUATION......................................................................................................9Dwelling types and house ownership...........................................................................................9Dwelling size and density..........................................................................................................10Amenities and sanitation............................................................................................................11Israel’s occupation policies........................................................................................................11Cost of housing..........................................................................................................................13Current and future needs for housing.........................................................................................13

4 HOUSING DEVELOPMENT: STAKEHOLDERS, POLICIES AND FUNDING..........................................16Incremental house construction with limited capital the norm..................................................16The quest for a Palestinian national housing policy...................................................................17Some major public and lending institutions...............................................................................18

5 CHALLENGES AND CONSTRAINTS IN HOUSING DEVELOPMENT....................................................206 THE WAY FORWARD....................................................................................................................22REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................24

APPENDIX 1 TERMS OF REFERENCE...............................................................................................29APPENDIX 2 MEETING LIST............................................................................................................33APPENDIX 3 THE POPULATION IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES..............................36APPENDIX 4 THE HOUSING SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES.................42APPENDIX 5 OBTAINING A HOUSE IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES.........................69Appendix 6 Case studies from the West Bank and Gaza Strip......................................................70

3

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

ForewordDuring February 2001, the eighteenth session of the Commission on Human Settlements adopted resolution 18/12, titled “Illegal Israeli human settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories.” This report is made under the direction of UN-HABITAT as part of their action plan to execute the operative paragraphs of the resolution.

Two reports were commissioned by UN-HABITAT: (i) a housing situation/needs assessment report (Terms of Reference in Appendix 1) and (ii) a report discussing the possibilities for establishing a Human Settlements Fund for the Palestinian people. The second study was carried out by Anne Ruden. The two teams cooperated closely during fieldwork and interviews, sharing information and discussing significant aspects of their respective assignments. We would like to thank Mrs. Ruden for sharing with us her expertise and for valuable input to our report.

The fieldwork was carried out in two periods between 14 October and 20 November 2002. Information was gathered mainly through meetings and interviews in addition to review of written material. We held meetings with several Ministries of the Palestinian Authority, various public and private agencies, Palestinian, Israeli and international NGOs, and international agencies such as UNRWA, UNDP, UNSCO, EU and the World Bank (see complete meeting list in Appendix 2). We are greatly indebted to all those who set aside time and were willing to share their knowledge and insights about the housing situation and human settlements policies with us.

While in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the team relied heavily on excellent local support from the Fafo offices, which secured maximum access to information under difficult circumstances and under a limited time frame. The Fafo staff also conducted own field interviews and collected information between and after the field visits of the two teams. Thanks go to Akram Atallah, Mona Christophersen and Roula Haddad in Jerusalem, as well as Hani El-Dada in Gaza City.

Finally, we would like to express our gratitude to UN-HABITAT in Nairobi for feedback on early fieldwork notes and outlines of the report. Particular thanks go to Shekou Sesay, who has been our contact person and chief discussant. We were fortunate to have him with us on our second mission to the Occupied Palestinian Territories, benefiting immensely from his vast experience, his liaisoing with Nairobi, and being an outstanding conversation partner on issues with a bearing on the report.

Notwithstanding the invaluable input of many institutions and individuals, the consultants alone bear the full responsibility for the report.

Åge A. Tiltnes, Team Leader

Amman, 13 January 2003

4

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

ARIJ Applied Research Institute JerusalemCHF Cooperative Housing FoundationGDP Gross Domestic ProductICBS Israeli Central Bureau of StatisticsIDF Israeli Defence ForcesILO International Labour Organization JCSER Jerusalem Centre for Social and Economic RightsJD Jordanian DinarLAW Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the

EnvironmentMoH Ministry of HousingMOHPW Ministry of Housing and Public WorksMOLG Ministry of Local GovernmentMOPIC Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation NGO Non Governmental OrganisationOPT Occupied Palestinian TerritoriesPA Palestinian AuthorityPASSIA Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International AffairsPCBS Palestinian Central Bureau of StatisticsPECDAR Palestinian Economic Council for Development and ReconstructionPHC Palestinian Housing CouncilPMHC Palestinian Mortgage Housing FoundationSCBS Syrian Central Bureau of StatisticsUN United NationsUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUN-HABITAT United Nations Human Settlements ProgrammeUNRWA United Nations Relief & Works Agency for Palestine RefugeesUNSCO United Nations Special Coordinator’s OfficeUSAID US Agency for International DevelopmentUSD American dollar

5

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

1 Introduction1 The past two years saw a stalemate in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process turn into open conflict with

hostilities from both sides. Human suffering is at its highest since the Oslo accords. Israel’s closure policies and military operations in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) have strangulated the Palestinian economy, driven Palestinian unemployment rates to new heights, and pushed 60-80% of the population into poverty, besides having destructive effects on other aspects of Palestinian society, such as education and health. A recent report observed that the Israeli policies in the OPT have had “devastating effects on the housing sector, including needed construction”, as it has become virtually impossible to build in the absence of free movement of people and materials. Consequently, investments have decreased and capital withdrawn from the housing market, while investment is being spent to cover losses and meet more immediate needs in terms of dwellings. (Kothari 2002:14).

2 Nevertheless, the humanitarian crisis resulting from the current Israeli policies in the OPT will not be the main focus of this report, although it shall receive its due attention. The reason is that the Al-Aqsa (2nd) intifada can be considered an exceptional situation and the negative effects of Israel’s response to it on the housing sector may well be resolved if the intifada is to cease soon. If the international donor community responds timely to emergency appeals from the Palestinian Authority (PA), the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and other UN agencies working in the OPT, damages to date can be repaired without serious long-term effects of the housing situation.

3 Instead, we shall picture the general human settlements conditions. In doing so we shall, among other things, present statistics that show that crowding is the biggest challenge, especially in the Gaza Strip and among Palestinian refugee camp dwellers; that the vast majority of Palestinian homes in the OPT is supplied by infrastructure amenities (electricity, safe water and sewage disposal systems), although the quality is not always acceptable; and that there is a need to build about 80,000 new dwellings and to renovate and extend another 50,000 shelters to alleviate the current, inadequate housing conditions.

4 Furthermore, we shall take a look at factors that stand in the way for solving this problem. Land ownership and its related legal ramifications continue to be a major constraint that heavily impacts on the ability of many Palestinians to develop and improve their housing situation. This is true in East Jeru-salem, where it is very difficult to get a building permit, but also in areas under Palestinian jurisdiction where there is very limited land available for housing development.

5 Coupled with the land constraint is the problem of funding for house building and improvements. Since many people cannot legally prove their land ownership for mortgage purposes, they cannot qualify for loan arrangements offered by private banks. Without the needed collateral, these individuals have relied mostly on own savings, support from relatives and, to some extent, soft-loans, grants and other assistance provided by religious or civic groups.

6 The majority of Palestinians continue to undertake house construction on a self-help basis, in many cases involving close relatives and family members. There is broad consensus that this could be both a viable and sustainable approach, provided it is undertaken in an enabling environment and with support from both governmental and non-governmental agencies, assuming the future best-case scenario and the presence of a positive political and economic climate in the region. We shall describe in some more detail housing tenure, common strategies to obtain a residential dwelling and ways to fund such under-takings in this report. What's more, we shall present some of the key players in the human settlements sector, including a look at housing planning and policymaking. But before we commence with issues directly relevant to housing, we need to present some background information on the population of the OPT, as well as describe the prevailing economic situation.

6

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

2 The Palestinian population and economy2.1 This section gives an introduction to the Palestinian population of the OPT, serving as a background for the understanding of current and future housing needs. More details, including detailed references, are found in Appendix 3. We also describe very briefly the economic situation of the population, with an emphasis on the current harsh living conditions and poverty, resulting from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the closure policies that Israel has imposed on the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Population size and distribution2.1 The Palestinian population under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority (PA) can be found in two physically de-linked areas: the inland West Bank (of the Jordan River) and the coastal Gaza Strip, with about 64% of the population in the West Bank and the remaining 36% in Gaza. The refugee part of the OPT population is considerable at more than 41% (PCBS 20001:Table 9). At the time of the 1997 Population Census, 53% of the population lived in urban areas, 31% in rural areas, and 16% of the population lived in refugee camps (PCBS 2000a:Table 3). The vast majority of refugee camp dwellers are refugees. The Census found a population of about 2,832,000.

Household size and composition2.2 Overall, Palestinian households are large with an average household size of 6.4 persons. Households are larger in the Gaza Strip (6.9 persons) than the West Bank (6.1 persons). There is generally little variation in size within the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, but refugee camps have larger households than villages and towns (1997 Census). The above figures are slightly higher than for Jordan with average household size at 6.2 (Khawaja and Tiltnes 2002), but considerably higher than for Israel at 3.5 (ICBS 2002: Table 5.1).

2.3 The majority (70%) of households in the OPT have a nuclear structure, while about one-fourth of households are extended (household that includes a nuclear family and other relatives of the household head). Extended households are more common in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, and more common in refugee camps than elsewhere. Households that include unrelated persons are very rare (1-2%). Two-family households are relatively common in the OPT, amounting to about 13% of the total. They are more widespread in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, and also more common in refugee camps.

2.4 The establishment of a new household in the OPT is primarily linked to marriage, as living with parents has been the traditional norm for the never married. This is especially the case for women, where establishing an independent household is generally seen as inappropriate. Marriage age has only seen a slight increase over the last 40 years with median and mean age at first marriage for the OPT at 23 and 24 for men and 18 and 19 for women respectively, and with men tending to marry a bit earlier in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank.

Population and household forecasts2.5 There have been made several projections of population growth in the recent past, but they have, in our view, either assumed too high fertility or net in-migration following a peace settlement, which seems unlikely in the near future. Besides, introducing migration into the projections involve so much guesswork that it is not worthwhile. It is better to model the population as it develops (or we think it may develop) without migration. Then, if migration should occur in conjunction with a final status agreement, one would consider that part of the population as a separate issue, and correct the population figures accordingly. We shall assume that the average annual population growth is 2.6% for the West Bank, 3.75% for the Gaza Strip, and 3% for the OPT overall, and that mortality remains at today’s level.

2.6 Our population estimate takes as a premise the Population Census, which on 8-9 December 1997 found a population of approximately 2.6 million people. A post-Census survey established an undercount of 2.4%. When the undercount and a population of about 210,000 in annexed East Jerusalem were added, a total of about 2.9 million emerged. Then, a reverse-projection from the

7

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

Census date in December to mid-year 1997 brings the population figure down with more than 50,000, and we get the picture in Table 1.

2.7 The need for housing and related needs for infrastructure depends to a large extent on the number of households rather than directly on the number of people. This is because it is the household that often is the unit of consumption of public goods. The number of households in the future depends both on the total population size and how people in different age groups form households. This is difficult to project, because household formation is related to many social and economic factors such as kinship, marriage age, income, education opportunities, structure of the labour market and types of industry in an area, etc. as well as characteristics of the housing market such as the supply of dwellings and their cost.

2.8 The forecasts of households in the OPT has been made in a very straightforward way. We have assumed that the average annual household growth rate for the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the OPT overall is identical to the population growth rate. We foresee no change in the average household structure and keep this variable and other household formation factors constant. Therefore, under the assumption of stable household sizes, the number of new households each year will equal the population increase divided by household size for that year. We have applied the household size as it was found in the 1997 Census. The projected number of households and the number of new households during the period 1997-2010 are displayed in Table 1 together with our population projections.

Table 1 Population and households’ projections for the years 1997-2010

The Palestinian economy2.9 The Palestinian economy has been closely integrated with Israel since the 1967 Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories. Trade between the OPT and Israel effectively became internal and a large share of the Palestinian labour force was employed in Israel proper or in the Israeli settlements. The result is a high degree of dependence on the Israeli economy, with 96% of Palestinian exports destined for Israel and labour flows into Israel accounting up to one-quarter of total Palestinian employment. Despite high expectations following the Oslo peace accords, economic performance was modest at best and suffered periods of sharp decline due to Israeli security measures whereby the West Bank and Gaza Strip were cut off from Israel and each other. When security measures eased in 1998, 1999 and the first part of 2000, the Palestinian economy experienced a 5% yearly GDP growth (World Bank 2002c).

2.10 However, as a result of tensions and civil strife after September 2000, there is a severe economic crisis in the OPT today. Closures and confrontations have resulted in a drop in trade, employment and investment, and a doubling of already high transportation costs. The labour force participation rate is currently 2 percentage points lower than in 1999 at 42%; employment in Israel plummeted from 145,000 persons in Israel, settlements and industrial zones before the

8

Year West Bank Gaza StripPalestinian Territory

Total households

New housholds

Total households

New housholds

Total households

New housholds

1997 1,822,021 1,010,158 2,832,179 298,692 146,400 442,528

1998 1,869,394 1,048,039 2,917,144 306,458 7,766 151,890 5,490 455,804 13,2761999 1,917,998 1,087,340 3,004,659 314,426 7,968 157,586 5,696 469,478 13,6742000 1,967,866 1,128,116 3,094,798 322,601 8,175 163,495 5,909 483,562 14,0842001 2,019,030 1,170,420 3,187,642 330,989 8,388 169,626 6,131 498,069 14,5072002 2,071,525 1,214,311 3,283,272 339,594 8,606 175,987 6,361 513,011 14,9422003 2,125,385 1,259,847 3,381,770 348,424 8,829 182,587 6,600 528,402 15,3902004 2,180,645 1,307,092 3,483,223 357,483 9,059 189,434 6,847 544,254 15,8522005 2,237,341 1,356,108 3,587,720 366,777 9,295 196,537 7,104 560,581 16,3282006 2,295,512 1,406,962 3,695,351 376,313 9,536 203,907 7,370 577,399 16,8172007 2,355,196 1,459,723 3,806,212 386,098 9,784 211,554 7,647 594,721 17,3222008 2,416,431 1,514,462 3,920,398 396,136 10,039 219,487 7,933 612,562 17,8422009 2,479,258 1,571,255 4,038,010 406,436 10,300 227,718 8,231 630,939 18,3772010 2,543,719 1,630,177 4,159,150 417,003 10,567 236,257 8,539 649,867 18,928

PopulationPalestinian Territory

HouseholdsWest Bank Gaza Strip

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

2nd intifada to 33,000 in the second quarter of 2002; unemployment was between 34% (standard ILO definition) and 45% (‘adjusted’ or ‘relaxed’ definition, where discouraged workers are included) in the second quarter of 2002. Real GDP fell by 6% in 2000, and by an additional 12% in 2001 with critical implications for welfare (UNSCO 2002, World Bank 2002b, 2002c).

Poverty 2.11 Poverty has climbed from an already high level of 21% before the intifada (World Bank 2002a) to 55% in the West Bank and 70% in the Gaza Strip (UNSCO 2002). Poverty has been found to vary dramatically among districts, and between localities in the same district. In general it is highest in Gaza and lowest in Jerusalem. The five most affluent localities are all found in the urban centres such as Jerusalem, Ramallah and Nablus. Poverty is a particular problem in the southern parts of the Gaza Strip (Rafah) and the northern-most and southern-most parts of the West Bank. The share of the population living in poverty in the Gaza Strip is more than twice as high as in the West Bank (World Bank 2000, 2001). The World Bank (2002a) has estimated that two-thirds of the ‘new poor’, those who have become poor since October 2000, are to be found in the Gaza Strip.

3 Current housing situation3.1 This section shall describe the housing situation in the OPT. Topics are type of dwelling, tenure, housing density, infrastructure and housing costs. We shall also look at Israel’s settlements and land seizure, her demolition policy, the impact of bypass roads and Israel’s closure policies on housing. The final issue is current housing needs. More details are found in Appendix 4.

Dwelling types and house ownership3.2 Normally, oriental households, as those in the OPT, would rather live in independent, separate houses than to share the house with other households. But, apartments have become more common over the past decade, and figure quite prominent in available statistics: almost 50% live in a multi-dwelling housing structure. Apartments are twice as common in urban compared to rural areas (PCBS 2000b, Appendix 4:Table 1).

3.3 Property ownership has been regarded as important among Palestinians. Real estate has been seen as a good sector for investment, and property has given many families a sense of economic security in a political situation characterized by instability. More than 80% report that they own their dwelling. However, this figure masks regional differences, as a higher proportion of households own their dwelling in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. To rent a dwelling is more common in towns and other urban areas. For OPT overall, the ownership status of the camps is as for the countryside, with 9 out of 10 reporting they own their dwelling. This is despite the fact that legally speaking, few actually own their homes in the refugee camps, as the land on which the houses stand is not theirs. The land belongs to the Government or private landowners but is rented or granted by the PA for the free use of refugees and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). There is no variation in tenure between Palestinian refugees and non-refugees (PCBS 2000b, Appendix 4:Table 2).1

3.4 A special note on the housing situation of the refugee camps is perhaps in place here. The type of housing initially set up for refugee households in the camps erected after the 1948 Arab-Israeli war to replace tents were “shelters”, or small single detached dwellings. Those who moved into the camps subsequent to this have mostly built their own shelters or purchased them. UNRWA does not own the original camp housing, but refugees are free to use the housing as long as UNRWA is given use of the land upon which it is built. UNRWA’s main role in shelter

1 A Palestinian refugee is one who was forced to leave his or her home in what today is Israel during or in the aftermath of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. Sons and grandsons, and their immediate family (wife, children), also fall in this category. PCBS statistics include both those who are registered as refugees with UNRWA (the vast majority, 96.5% of all household heads) and those refugees that are not (3.5% of household heads) (calculations based on PCBS 2000b:Table 56).

9

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

maintenance is the reconstruction of shelters damaged during natural or manmade disasters, or the rehabilitation and maintenance of shelters of families that are registered as so-called special hardship cases, and hence eligible for poverty support. Since the initial setting up of shelters, the stock of refugee housing in the camps has changed considerably – a necessity given that the population has increased but the camp borders have not. Where they have had the means and permissions, camp refugees have replaced, modified, extended and built additional shelters and houses.

Dwelling size and density3.5 Some 24-30% of Palestinian households live in housing units with 1-2 rooms only, while 40-50% of the households have dwellings of 4 or more rooms (Appendix 4:Table 3). Basically there is no difference between the West Bank and Gaza Strip as regards dwelling size measured by the number of rooms, but there is variation according to type of locality, with urban (non-camp) households residing in the largest dwellings (average of 3.5 rooms), followed by rural (non-camp) households (3.3 rooms), and the camp dwellers living in the smallest housing units (average of 3.1 rooms) (Appendix 4:Table 4).

3.6 Urban households are also best off when it comes to living space, defined as the floor area of the housing unit (123 m2;) again followed by rural areas (109 m2) and with the camps’ households having the least spacious dwellings (103 m2). Households in Gaza on the average have more space than households in the West Bank. Since Gaza households overall have the same number of rooms at their disposal as West Bank households, we may conclude that dwellings there in fact are more spacious (Appendix 4:Table 6).

3.7 Statistics from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) suggest that residential dwellings have become more spacious in recent years (average space increasing gradually from 132 m2 to 140 m2 in the period 1996-2000 (Appendix 4:Table 7).

3.8 However, while households in the Gaza Strip on the average have more space inside their dwellings, the plots of land on which their houses are erected tend to be significantly smaller. For example, while about 4 in 10 West Bank households live in housing units built on plots less than 300 m2, more than 7 in 10 Gaza households live on plots of that size. At the other end of the scale, between nine and ten times as many West Bank households as Gaza households live on plots larger than 500 m2. Furthermore, statistics confirm the compactness of the refugee camps, where more than half the households are residing in housing units built on plots smaller than 150 m2 (Appendix 4:Table 8).

3.9 Any useful description of dwelling density and crowding in addition has to look into the relationship between household size and living space. One indication of density is the number of households sharing the housing unit. Such multiple-household dwellings are rare in the West Bank (2.9%), but more common in the Gaza Strip (16.2%). On the average, the phenomenon also occurs more often in the refugee camps (Appendix 4:Table 9). Perhaps the most widely used measure of density is that of the average number of persons per room. Households in the OPT have at its disposal on average one room per 1.91 persons. Gaza is clearly more crowded than the West Bank, at 2.1 persons per room against 1.8 persons per room. Urban areas appear less crowded than rural areas, which in turn are somewhat better off than refugee camps. Yet the overall picture is one of similarity across regions and location rather than dissimilarity (Appendix 4:Table 11). The refugee non-refugee differential is also insignificant (PCBS 2000b:Table 15).

3.10 Above we stated that Gaza dwellings on the average are a little larger area-wise than West Bank dwellings, but we also just found that the housing density is higher in the Gaza Strip. A ‘combination’ of the two approaches estimating the dwelling area available for each household member, demonstrates that there is no significant difference between the two regions of the OPT. On the average, each Palestinian citizen has 18 m2 at his or her disposal at home (compared to Syrians, who have 14 m2, SCBS 2001: Table 14/6). Urban households (19 m2) have more space than rural (17 m2) and camp households (16 m2) (Appendix 4:Table 12).

10

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

3.11 The above analysis of housing density is for the most part derived from the latest statistics from the PCBS. Based on information from other sources (e.g. Stokke 1998b, Waltz 2000), personal impressions from visits to various parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip over the years and interviews with well-informed persons in the OPT in October and November 2002, we had expected the situation to be a good deal worse in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. Much to our surprise the data do not allow us to make that conclusion. Indeed, the people of Gaza do live under more cramped conditions, with an average of 2.1 persons per room versus 1.8 persons per room in the West Bank, but with equal share of the dwelling area, on the average. However, the disparity between the two regions is smaller than expected and seems to be more related to external space than to the area available to each person inside the dwelling. Now, external space should not be overlooked, as having sufficient outside living area is important for the welfare of the households. For example, that extra space is traditionally important for adults’ social life, and can be used as a children’s playground, to grow fruit and vegetables, to raise chicken, and as an area for various income-generating activities. The refugee camps are particularly cramped, with little or no extra space adjacent to the outer walls of the house and frequently only pathways between the houses instead of wider streets with room for cars. Because a higher proportion of the population in the Gaza Strip lives in camps, they are on the average more adversely affected by dense conditions, including the lack of public space, than people in the West Bank.

Amenities and sanitation3.12 In addition to a housing unit’s size, the availability of basic services such as electricity, water and sanitation is important to a household’s welfare. There are few households overall lacking piped water (1.2%), having no disposal system for sewage (0.6%) and not having electricity (0.8%). But there are regional differences, whereby a higher proportion of households in the Gaza Strip rely on private solutions (water systems, cesspits) than in the West Bank. Moreover, there are also urban-rural variations with towns having better access to public services than villages. Rural Gaza stands out as having a particularly poor provision of electricity as compared to other localities. The refugee camps of both regions on the average fare better than other areas (Appendix 4:Table 13).

3.13 The vast majority of dwellings have a separate kitchen, bathroom and toilet, and there is no significant difference between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, rural areas consistently fare worse than urban areas and camps. And, since a lower proportion of households in the villages have piped water, the standard of kitchens, bathrooms and toilets is lower here (Appendix 4:Table 14).

3.14 Above we have not discussed the quality of services, which obviously limits the understanding of the situation. For, anecdotal evidence suggests that the picture painted is too rosy. For instance, the high and increasing salinity of the ground water in Gaza is a cause of concern. And, in Gaza City approximately 70% of the housing units are connected to the sewage network, while the network suffers from serious defects and is in badly need for overhaul and repair (interview with staff at Gaza Municipality). Other quality aspects of housing are not taken into account either. For example, poor or lacking windows and (entrance) doors are found in many homes (interview, representative of CHF International in Gaza). Unfortunately, for the lack of data on the quality of services we cannot analyse this in more depth.

Israel’s occupation policies3.15 The West Bank and Gaza Strip has been occupied and controlled by Israel since 1967. Following the occupation, Israel started to erect settlements, or colonies as many Palestinians prefer to label them, in the OPT. In 1977 there were 20 settlements and 3,876 settlers (as referred by Tufakji 2000). There are today 128 Israeli settlements in the OPT, with 121 in the West Bank and 7 in the Gaza Strip (PASSIA 2002:95), containing a total of 205,600 Israelis (ICBS 2002: Table 2.7).

3.16 There are many legal aspects to the settlement policies of Israel in the West Bank and Gaza. We shall refrain from legal discussions in this report, but would nevertheless like to mention two key aspects, as B’Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied

11

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

territories, sums them up: “Israeli settlement in the occupied territories violates two principles of international humanitarian law: the prohibition on the transfer of civilians from the occupying power to the territory occupied, and the prohibition on creating in the occupied territory permanent change that does not benefit the local population” (2000:73).

3.17 On a further note, the UN Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living has stated that, “the implantation of settlements and settlers [in the OPT] is […] a violation of the basic principles of international humanitarian law and also has been recognised as a violation of human rights norms, particularly economic, social and cultural rights.” (Kothari 2002:10).

3.18 The motives underlying the establishment of settlements have varied over time (security, historical reasons, growing demand for cheap housing, nationalistic and/or messianic reasons). But, whatever the underlying rationale the settlements have been placed in areas that would separate Palestinian population clusters, denying the possibility of Palestinian territorial integrity, in the West Bank as in the Gaza Strip. The many bypass roads that have grown up the past decade have reinforced this effect. While constructed to serve as safe passageways between settlements and major cities and communication hubs in Israel as well as between the larger settlements, these bypass roads have impeded Palestinian mobility and truncated the West Bank. (N. Chazan 2000, M. Shtayyeh 2000, interview with experts at Peace Now).

3.19 For towns and villages in Area A (3% of the West Bank, under the jurisdiction of the PA), building permits are the responsibility of the Palestinian municipalities, and are usually given, provided that the applicant has title to the land.2 This, however, is not always the case, because land titling in the West Bank and Gaza is far from complete.3 According to the World Bank, “the PA could have addressed land title issues more diligently in area A, but disputes over ministries’ mandates held up progress on this issue” (2002c: 61-62). In Area B (27% of the West Bank, under joint Israeli-Palestinian control) it is more difficult to get building permits, and in the Israeli-controlled Area C, it is as a rule not given to Palestinians. But, Israeli settlements get permissions to expand and receive rights to land for agricultural use and for security reasons (LAW 1998, interview with staff of Peace Now). For Palestinians, it is almost impossible to obtain the necessary building permits in East Jerusalem (JCSER 2001a). Building licenses are generally expensive, and may cost at least 6-10,000 USD and up to 25,000 USD in Jerusalem (JCSER 2001b, interview with senior representatives of PHC). Applications for building permits from the Israeli Civil Administration in Area C may take 3-4 years to process (LAW 1998).

3.20 Israel’s occupation policies in the OPT since 1967 have effectively hindered the est-ablishment of new built-up areas for human settlement (and industry) on land outside the town borders as they were in 1967. Thus, expansion of towns has been curtailed leading to increased land demand in the centres, causing land prices to escalate. Apart from making land acquisition harder for all but particularly for low-income households and thus obstructing their prospects for improved housing standards, the ensuing effect has been high density of building structures on small plots of land (Salman 2000, field interviews). The result is rapid urbanisation; perhaps more rapid than the case would have been under a regime allowing cities to expand and new built-up areas to be created.

2 The Gaza-Jericho (Oslo I) Agreement (Cairo, 1994) and Interim (Oslo II) Agreement (Taba, 1995) divided the Occupied Palestinian lands in different zones, giving the Israelis and Palestinians varying degrees of jurisdiction. The Gaza Jericho Agreement defined the Gaza Strip and the West Bank town of Jericho as Palestinian Autonomous Areas, but Israel retained the responsibility for security in certain areas of the Gaza Strip (so-called ‘yellow areas’). The Interim Agreement divided the West Bank into 3 zones of control: “In six West Bank cities (in addition to Jericho) the PA gained civil and internal security control (Area A); in 420 villages the PA was made responsible for civil affairs, while Israel retained security control (Area B); in the remaining territory (Area C) Israel retained its exclusive control. […] In all, Area A amounted to just under 2% of the West Bank, Area B 26% and Area C made up the remaining 72%.” (PASSIA 2002:74-77).3 Most buildings in Gaza are now titled. In the West Bank, land titling is only partly implemented in Area A and B and totally lacking in Area C (interview, senior staff at Gaza Municipality).

12

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

3.21 “House and property demolition has emerged as a consistent pattern [in the OPT]” (Giacomelli 2001). In October 2001, during its invasion of areas under the control of the PA, Israel renewed its activity of demolishing houses as punishment, a policy it had ceased in 1997. Such demolitions are carried out to punish suspected Palestinian perpetrators of attacks in Israel or against Israeli settlements, and leave the suspects’ family members homeless. In the period 1987-1997 Israel completely demolished 449 houses as punishment, partially demolished 62 houses, completely sealed at least 296 houses and partially sealed 118 houses. In the period October 2001 to 2 December 2002, Israel completely demolished 96 houses, partially demolished 1 and sealed one house, as reprimands (http://www.btselem.org). Since 1987 the Israeli authorities have administratively demolished at least 2,450 Palestinian houses in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and hundreds of other building structures. These are demolitions justified by the lack of building permits (http://www.btselem.org). In April-May 2002, a donor-led damage assessment exercise estimated the number of damaged and destroyed private dwellings in the OPT since the start of the 2nd intifada, for any reason, at 40,000. Of this, 2,800 housing units were totally destroyed as a result of IDF activity and the rest had sustained moderate and serious damages. Since that time the number of damaged dwellings and houses put in ruins has continued to increase due to heavy military campaigns and the reoccupation of major towns and urban areas (United Nations 2002a).

Cost of housing3.22 Judged from information from various sources (consultancy report, World Bank, UNRWA, UNDP, housing projects, own interviews with private house owners, etc.) it appears that reasonable dwellings in the OPT cost anything from 100 USD to over 300 USD per square meter depending on the material chosen, the general quality of the dwelling and its geographic location (and excluding the cost of land and external infrastructure). PCBS data show that for January-December 1998 (the latest figure we have), the average actual expenditure on housing4 for a 7-person household was about 56 USD per month. It varied between the regions, with 60.5 USD in the West Bank and 45 USD in the Gaza Strip. Expenditure on housing as a percentage of total expenditure equalled 7,5% in the West Bank, 6.7% in the Gaza Strip and 7.3% in the OPT overall (PCBS at http://www.pcbs.org/english/ househol/exp_conc.htm).

3.23 There is little available information on the cost of renting a residence. But, PCBS data indicate that the monthly rent is lower in the Gaza Strip (100 USD) than in the West Bank (123 USD), with average monthly rent for OPT overall being 120 USD (http://www.pcbs.org/english/house/house_01/ hou00_ 23.htm ). A second source of information is a consultancy report estimating that “those who do not own their own houses where they live, […] spend up to 20% of their income on rent” (Ziara, Naser and Touqan 1997).

3.24 Israel’s closure policies increase transportation costs, thus driving housing costs up because prices on construction material surge. Furthermore, the closures lead to a drop in construction activity, reducing supply of housing opportunities and increasing prices. According to the World Bank, housing costs increased by 12% during the intifada’s first 15 months (World Bank 2002a, 2202b, PCBS 2002: http:// www.pcbs.org/english/cpi/major_02.htm).

Current and future needs for housing3.25 According to the Draft National Plan of Human Rights – the Housing Sector, “[t]here is still need to define the housing demand for a full picture of the housing situation.” (Shaheen and El-Masry 2002:47). Here we attempt to fill in some of the gaps in this regard.

3.26 The yearly need for housing can be captured by the number of new households forming each year. Our forecasts of households are made under the assumptions, that the average annual household growth rate for the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the OPT overall is identical to the population growth rate and that the overall household structures (nuclear, extended, etc.) are maintained as today. The forecasts are displayed in Table 1 above (after paragraph 2.8).

4 Expenditure data do not include the estimated rent value of owned dwellings.

13

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

3.27 According to the 1997 Census figures the Palestinian population lived in about 401,000 residential dwellings with 6,000 housing units being used for work only, 24,000 being closed and 35,000 vacant. Compared to a total number of 442,000 households at the same time, this may seem low, but is explained by the fact that some households share the same housing unit (3% in the West Bank, 16% in the Gaza Strip). An interesting feature here is the 7.5% vacant dwellings. While some dwellings are empty because they are for rent or for sale, a good share of these dwellings may be ‘out of circulation’ for an extensive period of time due to existing rental laws that give a tenant the right to stay as long as he or she should need or want, even if the owner should want the dwelling for own use.5 A law that enabled more owners to put their empty units out on the market, would increase supply and make housing more accessible to people. Below we shall assume that the relative share of vacant and closed housing units has been stable since 1997, and will remain so in the (near) future.

3.28 Construction of new residential dwellings kept up with demand in the years 1998-2000, with on the average 15,400 new dwellings per year. However, as a direct consequence of the situation with IDF incursions, closures and curfews, and the reduced construction activity that has followed, there is an unmet housing need of at least 15,000 units for the newly established households. Furthermore, although we lack exact statistics here, interviews and own observations have informed us that a considerable share of the recently constructed residential dwellings are empty. Therefore, and assuming about 8% of the housing units licensed 1998-2002 to be vacant, the actual unmet need increases to some 20,000 dwellings.

3.29 The Census was implemented towards the end of 1997. Assuming a building activity in 2002 similar to the previous year, the housing stock in 2002 would be about 462,000 residential dwellings (Table 2). If we compare this figure with the estimated number of households for the same year, 513,000 (Table 1), we realize that there is a shortage of 51,000 dwelling units. Put in a different way, 51,000 households share their living quarters with at least one more household.

Table 2 Estimated housing stock 2002 based on number of housing units in 1997 Census and licensed housing units in the following years (‘vacant’ and ‘closed’ dwellings excluded)

3.30 Assessing needs due to inadequate dwellings we shall assume that each household needs (i) a separate housing unit (i.e. multi-household dwellings should disappear) (ii) a kitchen, (iii) a bathroom (or shower), and (iv) a toilet inside the dwelling. Moreover, (v) no room should host more than 3 persons.

5 The Jordanian “Renter and Owner Law (No. 62) for the year 1953” is still applied in the OPT. According to paragraph 4-1, the courts as a rule cannot issue a decision to force any tenant out of a rented house (property) even if the contract date has expired. Such a decision can only be taken given the following conditions: (i) If the tenant has not paid the rent, within 30 days from receiving an order from the owner or from the court; (ii) If the tenant has damaged the house or allowed others to damage the house; (iii) If the tenant has used the house (property) for illegal purposes; (iv) If the tenant has rented the property or part of it to others, or left the property empty for more than 6 months; (v) If the owner needs the property to live in it, and the tenant has found another, comparable house at a similar price in the same area, and the court has found it acceptable; (vi) If the owner wants to carry out substantial changes such as re-building the house, and has informed the tenant in a written statement 6 months in advance; and (vii) If the tenant built his own dwelling that could be used by him. (The above is our own translation from Arabic).

14

Estimated housing stock 2002

1997 Census - Base 401,275

New dwellings 1998 15,504

New dwellings 1999 17,278

New dwellings 2000 13,438

New dwellings 2001 7,646

New dwellings 2002 (estimate) 7,500Total no. of dwellings 2002 462,641

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

3.31 ‘Multi-household dwelling’ (i) is a good measure of poor housing, because it indicates a form of living arrangement where two or more households camp together out of necessity rather than choice. Items (ii)-(iv) are unambiguous and easy to quantify. That a separate kitchen, bathroom and toilet are basic requirements of a decent, modern residential dwelling is indisputable. These three items also capture the availability of tapped water and a sewage system, whether through private solutions or connection to public networks. Item (v) implies that any shelter with a higher density than 2.99 persons per room is considered inadequate. This is frequently used as a cut-off point and measure of housing density in the region, including in the OPT.

3.32 Table 3 displays the housing situation per date (2002). If we accept that ‘multi-household dwelling’ is a solid indicator of housing shortage, then the OPT is currently short of no less than 51,000 housing units. This figure is the discrepancy between the estimated number of households and the number of available dwellings, that is dwellings in actual use, in 2002, and has already been presented above. The Table furthermore shows that about 105,000 households are overcrowded (having 3 or more persons per room). It also indicates that there are 7,000 households without a kitchen, almost 12,000 households lacking a separate bathroom, and 2,500 households in need of an inside toilet.

Table 3 Proportion and number of 2002 households by certain housing indicators and region

3.33 It is likely that a substantial proportion of the 51,000 multi-household dwellings also are overcrowded (density of 3 or more). We assume that a missing kitchen, bathroom and/or toilet frequently are found in the same households, and that these attributes tend to go together with crowded conditions. How much of the housing problem defined by inadequate housing standards can be solved through housing renovation and extension, and how many new dwellings ought to be built? For 51,000 multi-household dwellers there is no way out but to acquire a separate housing unit, which means that as many new apartments or houses have to be built. If 30,000 of the multi-household shelters were also crowded, their housing density problem will be solved with the creation of the 51,000 new housing units. There are some 75,000 cramped dwellings (equivalent to 75,000 households) left. Assuming that only 4,000 shelters of those lacking kitchen, bathroom or toilet are not overcrowded, we will have a total number of 79,000 inadequate dwellings, plus the 51,000 as defined by the multi-household dwellers, which gives us a grand total of 130,000 inadequate or lacking units.

3.34 While a considerable lower figure than that of other studies, 130,000 missing or inadequate housing units is a sizeable number and equals 28% of the total housing stock of the OPT in 2002 (excluding ‘vacant’ and ‘closed’ units). In many cases, the only solution to a housing problem is a new dwelling. We have already mentioned the case of the multiple household residential units. But there are other circumstances too, where construction something new is the only way forward, for example if the present place of living is beyond repair (some un-safe houses in the old parts of some West Bank towns), or if horizontal and vertical extension is impossible (which is the case for many refugee camp shelters). If one-forth of the inadequate housing units other than the multiple-household dwellings is of this category, it suggests that a total of 71,000 new shelters have to be built to alleviate the substandard housing conditions of 2002, while another 59,000 units need renovation and/or extension.

15

Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage NumberLack kitchen 1.4 4,754 1.6 2,816 1.4 7,182

Lack bathroom 2.6 8,829 1.9 0 2.3 11,799

Lack toilet 0.4 1,358 0.7 1,232 0.5 2,565

3 or more persons per room 18.8 63,844 24.3 42,765 20.6 105,680

Multi-household dwelling 2.9 9,848 16.2 28,510 7.1 36,424

Housing indicatorProportion and number of households

West Bank (339,594) Gaza (175,987) OPT (513,011)

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

3.35 Our housing needs estimates so far have been based on the situation in 1997, and has not taken into account the effect of the Israeli occupation and military activities since then and their effect on housing. Some 40,000 private and refugee homes were reported damaged and destroyed during the first 18 months of the intifada. Of these, 2,800 had been completely demolished by the IDF, while the rest had suffered damages of varying degree of severity (United Nations 2002a:46). Although house demolitions and damages are devastating to the individual families affected, we will suppose no special impact from such Israeli offences during the intifada on the housing needs assessment, because we believe humanitarian assistance to the OPT and emergency repair and construction projects carried out by the UNDP, UNRWA, the PA and others will fill (most of) the housing needs and gaps in the housing provision created by the recent Israeli destruction (-- although by late November 2002 the grand majority of totally damaged housed had not been re-built; interview with World Bank official).

3.36 However, the intifada has deprived the Palestinian population in the OPT from some 20,000 housing units due to slowdown in the construction sector. If the current stalemate in the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians should last, the closure policies of the Israelis continue, and the Palestinian construction sector as a consequence should not pick up and improve its performance in the production of private housing, the situation will deteriorate. For each year the output stays at its 2001 level, 8-10,000 new households will be denied their right to separate housing. The effect will be a higher proportion of extended households and multi-household dwellers and increased residential density. Moreover, if the current, difficult situation in the OPT should persist and if the international donor community should not manage to close the housing gaps generated by Israeli closure policies and IDF actions, the housing problem will aggravate even further.

4 Housing development: Stakeholders, policies and fundingIncremental house construction with limited capital the norm

4.1 The traditional way for Palestinians to get a home, except for among the well-to-do, is through incremental building, whereby one engages in construction activities on a self-help basis whenever funds are available. Typically a household saves money over a number of years before for example constructing a first floor, or extending the house it owns vertically or horizontally. It is quite common for the owner to carry out a substantial part of the work himself, sometimes with help from relatives. The construction costs could be covered by savings, in the form of gold or other assets, deposits in a formal bank or savings in informal savings clubs (jamiyya). Since the establishment of the PA, however, it has been possible to obtain commercial loans from banks in the OPT and to borrow money from other credit institutions set up to support the housing sector. Alternative strategies to the traditional incremental and self-help based individual way of constructing houses have also been tried. Cooperative approaches whereby for example colleagues at a working place save money in a jamiyya, jointly buy land, apply for building permit, and set up apartment buildings to acquire one dwelling unit each, have become more common, especially in Jerusalem and the larger West Bank cities. However, this method is confined to the middle and perhaps only upper middle and high-income segments of the population. There exists no umbrella organisation above these cooperatives and no cooperation between them. Neither does it seem to be any laws and guidelines to regulate their activities, nor policies to meet their needs (interview with person involved in cooperative housing activities for several years). For some more details on the self-help, incremental and other approaches towards acquiring a residence, see Appendix 5 and 6.

4.2 As indicated, by and large, it is the individual people at various levels of the Palestinian society who continue to sustain the development strides, mainly through self-help efforts. Given the magnitude of the housing issues and the constraints imposed by the Israeli government, it is clear that the meagre resources of the Palestinian individuals cannot cope with the problem at the required pace to meet the prevailing huge demand.

16

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

4.3 One of the most compelling arguments and rationale used by the critics of ‘incremental housing’ or self-construction, as opposed to formalized sources of housing finance for the OPT is the fact that the process of house acquisition, whether by or through purchase indeed becomes very expensive. Incremental house construction not only takes a long time, but it is argued that, its intrinsic value is curtailed by inflation and other economic growth inhibitors, hence lowering the capital investment yield and value of return over time. A house constructed over a long period of time means that such an important capital investment and asset remains idle for many years, without yielding due returns for investments made and user value expectations. Moreover, the argument goes, the absence of affordable housing finance facilities also means that the poor segments of society are ultimately squeezed out of the house ownership range of possibilities.

4.4 Yet as we shall see, credit is out of reach to a large portion of Palestinian society owing to low supply of loans, lack of collateral and the conditions of repayment, in particular high interest rates. There are very few, if any, tangible indigenous agencies and mechanisms for making affordable housing finance for a considerable proportion, perhaps the majority, of the Palestinian people. Thus, despite the possible drawbacks and deficiencies of the ‘incremental’ housing approach, and taking into account the circumstances currently obtaining in the housing industry in the OPT, it seems logical and prudent to continue putting much faith and support into the ‘self-housing’ approach. Through this kind of approach, many more potential individual house builders may be enabled and assisted to ‘help themselves’ rather than becoming dependently expectant on massive but non-sustainable house provisions and solutions. Thus, the need to balance the two approaches juxtaposed.

4.5 Below we shall take a brief look at some of the credit institutions and describe actors involved in defining housing policies for the West Bank and Gaza Strip. We start with the issue of a national housing policy.

The quest for a Palestinian national housing policyThe degradation of the urban environment in Bethlehem city and its surrounding area is symptomatic of the absence of clear policy guidelines, standards and controls, weak institutions with clear mandates, absence of coordination, ignorance about the environment and physical, economic and social consequences of irreversible environmental damage. Bethlehem suffers weak institutions responsible for planning, provision and maintenance of urban infrastructure and services. […] In all Palestinian cities including Bethlehem, the responsibility for the various aspects of urban and environmental developments, is currently dispersed among the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Local Administration, with little or no coordination between them. (Salman 2000:172, 173).

4.6 The absence of a single, coherent national policy or plan for housing development in the OPT, which has been noted by many (Abu Arafa et al. 2002, Waltz 2000, field interviews), has contributed to the present state of haphazard and un-coordinated piecemeal efforts being exerted to tackle the human settlement challenges facing the Palestinian people. The availability of such a broad road map could have helped to harmonize and rationalize these efforts and given compass direction of different stakeholders.

4.7 Efforts from both national and international experts have been under way for some time to formulate national policies and strategies. But, the intifada has obstructed most initiatives by making it extremely difficult for relevant parties such as line ministries, politicians, professionals and civil society organisations to meet and discuss the many pertinent issues. Besides, especially during the past two years the priority at all levels has been given to emergency concerns and actions, making any overarching, political, technical and legal exercise in the field of housing

17

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

irrelevant in the views of many.6 Nevertheless, we have grouped topics that have been mentioned by others (Abu Arafa et al. 2002, Waltz 2000, interviews) as key to formulating a broad national policy as follows:

Guidelines on how to address and solve the problem of house overcrowding and high densities;

Regulation and rationalization of land use and strategies for how to deal with the question of land ownership rights, tenancy rights, mortgage guidelines etc. in the face of continuing Israel land confiscation and seizure;

Guidelines and principles for national and international resource mobilization, capital accumulation, credit and banking arrangements as well as debt repayment mechanisms for housing finance arrangements and enforcement;

Improved accessibility to basic services such as clean water, minimum standards of sanitation and environmental safety, acceptable level of basic infrastructure provisions including safe disposal of solid waste material and waste water; and

Guidelines for prioritising the use of meagre natural resources and the provision of services and support to marginalized groups and spatial locations that are traditionally left out, such as rural and fringe areas.

Some major public and lending institutions4.8 The Ministry of Housing (MoH, from October 2002 merged with the Ministry of Public Works to become the Ministry of Housing and Public Works, MOHPW) was set up in 1994 to occupy the planning and coordinating role for the housing sector, including help draft laws and regulations (interview, senior advisor at MOHPW). It has also had as its mandate to provide low-income groups with housing (Waltz 2000:9). A consultant working with the Ministry for two years concludes that the MoH has identified existing challenges for the housing sector and needed strategies, but has lacked the room of manoeuvre or political will to follow up, take the decisions it should, including developing the needed rules and regulations, preparing laws and initiating housing programs to parliament and government (Walts 2000:9). Other people concur with this view, and claim that the MoH has not managed to fill its role, because the political leadership in the PA has not pushed or given priority to the human settlements issue (interview with high-ranked UNDP official and others).

4.9 On the other hand, in the (recent) past the MoH has been responsible for the implementation of several large housing projects in the OPT. Partly these initiatives were carried out by PHC (see below) and partly with the involvement of local entrepreneurs, and with donor support. However, while the objective was to help low-income families, the costs of the offered housing units were much to high for low and even middle-income Palestinians. Even higher-income households have chosen not to buy some of the apartments resulting from these efforts, leaving quite some dwelling units empty (Waltz 2000). Clearly, the MoH missed the target group and did not manage to design a housing development scheme with a social profile.

4.10 The Palestinian Housing Council (PHC) has continued to play a dominant role in the provision and delivery of housing services in the OPT since 1992. After 10 years of operations, this non-profit national entity has both proud achievements on her record as well as lessons derived from past mistakes. The PHC has provided soft loans and other credit programs for low

6 Despite the inadequate housing conditions documented in this report, and due to the present political and economic circumstances, the main concerns of most people seem to be other than housing. In a recent project allowing the poor to define their own needs, voice their concerns and identify how they think the PA and other institutions can assist them and improve their living conditions, human settlement issues are almost invisible. However, some mentioned the need to improve the provision of water and sanitation networks to cover all villages, and some of the poor also suggested that the authorities “assume the role of supporting public housing projects for people with limited income according to provisions that suit their conditions.” (UNDP 2002c:19).

18

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

and middle-income Palestinians engaged in new housing construction and improvements on old units. It targets families with a monthly income of 500-1,000 USD in the West Bank, while more income is required to be applicable for loans in Jerusalem (700-1,5000 USD). It was able to put up 1,178 apartments in the Gaza Strip (34,000 USD per dwelling unit), 408 house units in the West Bank (41,000 USD per unit), 231 houses in rural areas (average loan of 11,700 USD) and 2,000 house units in Jerusalem (16,500 USD per unit). Moreover, through the Welfare Association7 the PHC has provided 85 poor families with grants of on the average 2,800 USD for the rehabilitation of their houses (PHC 2002, interview with PHC staff). In the Gaza Strip, the PHC has built mainly apartment buildings (high-rise ‘towers’) that have been used to house the Palestinian police force and civil servants. This particular program has met some criticism regarding its inability to benefit the targeted poor segments of Palestinian society plus the inability to enforce repayments from the beneficiaries.

4.11 The PHC concedes that it has met some setbacks in its past operations. However, officials assert that they have learnt from the mistakes, and the PHC has embarked on a course of streamlining and providing close monitoring of its operations. The agency is also making efforts to ensure sustainability, by making sure that it collects due repayments that are in turn put into a revolving fund to finance new housing programs. Data from the Jerusalem Unit show a generally healthy situation up to the breakout of the 2nd intifada, after which many people have had difficulties in making repayments. To make matters worse, there are no dependable judicial or court system in the OPT that can be utilized to enforce the credit repayments. (Interview with senior PHC staff). International donors remain the major source of finance for the activities of the PHC. Together, they have pumped in 96.1 million USD in housing projects in the OPT (PHC 2002).

4.12 CHF International is an American NGO that aims at promoting welfare and democracy through the provision of affordable housing to low-income families, and is funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID). CHF runs a Home Improvement Loan Project in the OPT. It has dispersed 4,300 loans for this purpose from 1995-2002, with the average loan being 4,000 USD (maximum is 8,000 USD). CHF cooperates with local, commercial banks, which both have inserted capital in the project and are handling the lending activities. Criteria for getting a loan is the same as found in all schemes in the OPT, including with the commercial banks: the applicant should own the dwelling or house and land (public documents, contracts and deeds required); have a steady income over a certain amount (in the case of CHF 200-800 USD depending on the size of loan) and with a bank account in the bank handling the loan where the applicant’s salary goes; and have two guarantors with regular incomes and a bank account in the same bank as the applicant. CHF gives loans up to 10 times the salary, payback amount is max 1/3 of salary, and interest is 9%. CHF thinks it has targeted customers with as low an income as possible with reasonable security of repayment. It reports to have some 99% payback, and links this success to applying strict selection mechanisms and allowing no wasta/mediation (corruption), including controlling the banks (where wasta is the norm), and tight follow-up of beneficiaries. According to CHF, their loans have been very popular, but demand has dropped significantly since October 2000 (interview with CHF program director).

4.13 The Palestinian Mortgage Housing Company (PMHC) was set up in 1998 to facilitate the flow of private capital into the production of housing in Palestine by giving long-term housing loans at reasonable terms. Main funding comes from the World Bank. On top of that it benefits from some Palestinian funds and works with local, commercial banks. Chairman of the board is Deputy Minister of Housing in Gaza. The lending terms are generally the same as presented above for the CHF, but partly because the PMHC approach includes default loan insurance the

7 The Welfare Association was established in 1983 by a group of businessmen and intellectuals to provide humanitarian and development assistance to Palestinians, and is registered as a non-profit foundation in Geneva, Switzerland. It specializes in fund management and has a diverse project portfolio, being involved in small-scale renovation of houses in Jerusalem, but also health projects and legal aid, etc. (Welfare Association 2002). Interviews told us that the institution is being universally trusted in the OPT, receiving recognition and being commended for doing a good fund management job.

19

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

borrowers supposedly benefits from a relaxation of the guarantor and collateral requirements usually imposed by lenders. The PMHC has not suffered any losses since start-up. However, it admits low lending volume and difficulties in identifying potential borrowers under the current political and economic circumstances. Therefore, it has recently re-launched its activities in the Gaza Strip in the hope of attracting new customers (interviews with top PMHC representatives). The PMHC has been criticized for only serving the interest of high income-groups, since it is only they who can afford the interest rates of 7.5-8.5% (Shaheen and El-Masry 2002). The PMHC does not deal with its beneficiaries directly, but have instead chosen to let lending activities and servicing of loans be handled by private banks (interviews with top PMHC repre-sentatives).

4.14 Another institution of relevance to human settlements is the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR), which is basically an implementing agency, carrying out a wide range of infrastructure projects with international donor contributions, such as building roads, electricity grids, water and sewage networks, schools and other public buildings. It has moreover conducted a number of comprehensive studies in these areas, and been involved in the urban planning for some towns. It has a ‘free’ position, reporting directly to the Palestinian President and not to any line Ministry. Its current Managing Director contributed to the founding of the PHC (PECDAR 2002, interview with PECDAR’s director, other field interviews).

4.15 The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) has been doing strategic planning undertakings, for instance developed national and regional plans with broad guidelines on zoning and physical development, including housing. But, the use of these plans remains limited. Under normal conditions, the master planning activity should have been drawn up with the involvement of all concerned parties and stakeholders, some of who in this case do not even know the existence of such plans (interviews at MOPIC, other field interviews).

4.16 The Ministry of Local Government (MOLG) makes master plans, including defining built-up areas. In doing so, MOLG has tried to coordinate and cooperate with MOPIC. For master plans on East Jerusalem it cooperates with the Orient House, the Palestinian institution responsible for cultural and economic development projects there. Available master plans have also been crafted in dialogue with the municipalities. The plans should be the reference for all construction activities, but with the restriction put on land use by Israel (controlling Area C), and under the current situation, it is difficult to apply the plans fully, leading to cases where private homes have been erected in areas set aside for public use such as parks, or protected for historical and cultural heritage reasons. It has recently been decided that the MOLG shall decentralise, with the Ministry at the central level focusing on regional plans, while the Ministry at district levels shall cooperate with the municipalities on local plans (interviews at MOLG). This is perhaps a response to the general recognition that, except for towns and some larger villages, municipalities do not possess the human resources required to execute physical planning and zoning (interviews), but that they need to be deeper involved in planning and decision-making in order for the PA to improve on its distribution of development efforts, which have not been all that well coordinated, resulting in great variation in service provision between localities (UNDP 2002b). It has been noted that the PA “did not delegate authority or create mechanisms to enable local councils to fulfil their potential role in the development and administrative processes” (UNDP 2002b:65).

5 Challenges and constraints in housing development5.1 There is clearly a lack of coherent planning and coordination among public and semi-public institutions when it comes to human settlements efforts. While the weak performance of national institutions here at least to some extent can be explained by the present political and economic crisis, which has shifted the attention from medium and long-term planning efforts to emergency actions, this can be no justification for not trying harder to define a comprehensive national housing policy. Postponing progress in this field will only bring additional challenges and

20

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

problems for the future. Irretrievable damages to environment and cultural heritage may occur, while other mistakes of today may be corrected tomorrow only at high costs.

5.2 When it comes to credit for housing purposes, there are some institutions in place, but (a) the number of beneficiaries reached has been limited so far; and (b) the beneficiaries represent only a segment of society – the loans are not reaching those with the severest housing needs, namely the low-income families. ‘Low income’ here does not necessarily hint at the severely poor only, because many families even with what would be considered ‘normal’ or ‘average’ income are barred from taking up (substantial) housing loans, even when from the PMHC on preferential terms (interviews). We have made an example, where a household would like to borrow money to put up a moderate 150 m2 house on a plot of land it owns. Assuming an uncomplicated and inexpensive building permit process, a total of 45,000 USD would be needed to build the house. With 5,000 USD in savings and 5,000 in support from relatives, the household would have to borrow 35,000 USD. At an interest rate of 8.5% and with payment over 20 years, a monthly income of about 400 USD would be required just to cover the monthly instalments. When public employees earn 300-400 USD (and a few up to 500 USD) a month, one understands that it is difficult for many to qualify for loans of this magnitude, and that they opt for the traditional, incremental building strategy instead of the ‘all-in-one-time’ method.8

5.3 Banks and credit institutions appear rather risk adverse. In addition to the unstable political and poor economic situation producing a perception of unreasonable risk exposure (but which has also led to the paradoxical situation of increased formal saving because people with means do not dare to invest, including in housing), lack of laws regulating finance and housing markets, incomplete land titling, and shortage of funds with preferential terms that could secure lower interest rates and longer repayment time are explanations given for low lending (interview with representative of a large commercial bank). Here we would like to add that the banking system is new to the Palestinians in the OPT, as it was not until after the establishment of the PA that Arab and Palestinian banks emerged there. Although the well-educated and affluent parts of society have been exposed to banks for a long time, even they have for the most part used banks for saving purposes. Hence, for many, borrowing money from a formal institution is something unknown, and which it will take time to introduce to the population. Summarizing this paragraph, one can say that there are both supply and demand deficiencies explaining the low volume of housing loans in the OPT.

5.4 Although accessible funding is important to improve the current housing situation, we think that the backbone and the real crux of the matter hinges upon the key questions of land ownership and the lack of freedom to use it by a large portion of the people who live in the OPT. The lack of and restrictions on land use and space utilization for Palestinian housing development continues through a number of deliberate Israeli actions and inaction. These include among others:

8 In our case study material (Appendix 6) we have the following examples of monthly earnings from the West Bank and Gaza Strip: (a) male UN employee, 800 USD; (b) male shoe shop employee, 170 USD (before intifada construction work in Israel, 957 USD); (c) female head with mostly transfer income of about 200 USD (paradoxically, that is more than before the intifada due to the availability of a higher number of sources of assistance); (d) male police officer, 350 USD; (e) male with irregular construction work in Israel, 700 USD (first year of intifada, half of what it used to be, even less the second year); (f) male teacher in UNRWA school, 600 USD (and the household also have 130 USD from part time work of the wife); (g) male taxi driver, 1,300 USD (half of what it was before the intifada); (h) male carpenter with own business, 100 USD during the intifada’s first year (thereafter very little, while some months prior to the intifada would bring in up to 3,000 USD); (i) male employee at the President’s office, 450 USD; (j) male public teacher in basic school, 250 USD; and (k) 2 male employees in private or informal sector with 350 USD and 450 USD. From a recent (November and December) field work of Fafo in Gaza City and a West Bank village we have added these examples: (l) male police officer, 383 USD; (m) female salesperson in shop, 255 USD; (n) female teacher in secondary school, 276 USD; (o) male teacher in secondary school, 255 USD; and, finally, (p) male construction worker in Israel, 638 USD (a report on the effects of the present crisis on people’s lives and livelihoods to be published by Fafo in January 2003).

21

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

The expansion of Jewish settlements (colonies) plus related infrastructure, especially the by-pass roads, that consume land and space;

Closing-off of land for various purposes including military and security reasons;

Confiscation of Palestinian land;

Withholding and refusing to issue building and house improvement permits; and

Destruction of houses and buildings, as a collective or individual form of punishment, as an enforcement measure against ‘illegal’ constructions, and as a way of controlling the increase and expansion of the Arab population in East Jerusalem.

6 The way forward6.1 We believe that a comprehensive national housing strategy is urgently needed, in order to guide all domestic and international efforts being put into improvements on the Palestinian habitat. Notwithstanding the political constraints and other unknown future factors that will come into play, it is imperative that the PA and other stakeholders in the OPT be on the ready, with a concrete and coherent policy and commensurate implementation strategy. The top ministerial leadership has articulated that, “the Ministry should not be in the business of providing housing for the people, but rather act as an enabling agent and try to provide a friendly environment to the individual builder” (interview with deputy minister). The present position of the PA government of ‘staying out of the house building’ role receives universal support in the OPT.

6.2 Hence, the need by the donor community and other international organizations such as UN-HABITAT to provide assistance towards this basic need of a national housing policy formulation process based on a broad consensus on key elements. There seems to have been several policy-oriented initiatives in the past, so one does not start from scratch here. All national and local governmental as well as non-governmental institutions with an interest in human settlements should participate actively in the process. Naturally, the Ministry of Housing (and Public Works) must assume a leading role. The following checklist could be part of the elements and variables for consideration and inclusion in the policy formulation process:

Housing standards: Explore the concept ‘adequate housing’ in the OPT context in order to reach a realistic definition of its mirror, ‘inadequate’ or ‘substandard’ housing (including infrastructure services), to be used for a careful and comprehensive housing needs assessment;

Social housing policy: There is a documented shortage of residential dwellings; many existing dwellings are substandard by any definition; and poor housing is most abundant among the poorest Palestinians, who cannot afford loans. Thus, a housing policy should identify vulnerable groups and locations and arrive at a priority list for immediate and future action;

Land titling: Identify steps that can be taken to increase the speed of land titling efforts as well as public registration of apartments on ‘shared’ or leased land, so such property can be used as collaterals;

Agree on joint criteria to be applied in the development of regional and local master plans with the aim to design plans that strike a balance between considerations of land needs for private and public housing development, infrastructure, cultural heritage, natural resources and the environment, and other considerations;

While the crafting of national plans, building regulations and standards should be applicable to the entire OPT, they must be appropriate to regional diversity;

Review laws and regulations governing the operations of credit facilities, housing finance and related investment agencies in order to ensure that such institutions work

22

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

efficiently and functionally in the implementation of future public housing programmes as well as individual and collective private sector housing initiatives;

Institutional resources: Assess institutional capacities, systems and structures with the aim to improve the sharing of information, coordination and cooperation between ministries and other agencies, as well as between central, regional and local levels within each institution; and

Human resources: Identify strengths and weaknesses of the various institutions, and within each institution each department and individual, with the objective of designing capacity building programs ensuring improved performance at all levels.

6.3 International human settlements specialists, for example from UN-HABITAT, can contribute to achieving all of the above. In a setting where housing does not seem to receive its due recognition as a priority area from the PA leadership, sensitising the Palestinian government and the international community to the importance of housing not only to the welfare of the population but also to its significance as a key element in people’s living conditions and perception of such, and hence its possible repercussion on social unrest and political instability, is important. The current shortage of some 130,000 housing units and the failure of even middle-income households to afford housing loans should not be overlooked.

6.4 We think, however, that the achievements of experts on short missions and time-restricted assignments are of limited value in an area where the presence of international agencies, donor countries and NGOs is very strong. What is needed is rather a permanent presence of housing expertise, which, of course, can and should be supplemented with other experts according to needs and requirements. A permanent presence is essential to understanding the housing situation on the ground in-depth, including all aspects being dealt with in this report such as needs, the legal framework, human resources and institutional capacities, the policy formulation process and funding.

6.5 While the present situation is exceptional in the sense that violence is rampant and closure policies obstruct effectively any normal Palestinian activity, including access to work, education and health services, and policy-making and planning is complicated and strenuous, some preparation in the area of housing and human settlements can and should be carried out to prepare for a normal situation and a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

23

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

References and BibliographyAbu Arafa, Abdul-Rahman, Najat Amr, Rinad Zu’rub and Usama Al-Ja’fari 2002. Palestinian Draft National Plan of Action for Human Rights, Arab Thought Forum.

Abusway, Khader, Rose-Marie Barbeau and Muhamed el-Hasan 1997. Signed, Sealed, Delivered: Israeli Settlement and the Peace Process, East Jerusalem: Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre (JMCC).

Arab Studies Society 2002. Re-planning a Green Area in the Village of Umm Tuba-South East of Jerusalem, Maps and Surveys Department ARS, February.

ARIJ 2001. Localizing: Agenda 21 in Palestine, Bethlehem: ARIJ (The Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem) in cooperation with The Palestinian Ministry of Environmental Affairs.

B’Tselem 2000. ‘The Settlement Process: A Study in Illegality’, Palestine-Israel Journal, Vol. 7, No. 3 & 4:69-81.

Birzeit University 2002. Palestine Human Development Report, Development Studies Programme at Birzeit University in cooperation with UNDP and MOPIC, June.

Bocco, Riccardo et al 2001. Palestinian Public Perceptions on Their Living Conditions: The Role of International and Local Aid during the Second Intifada, December, Geneva: IUED – Graduate Institute of Development Studies, University of Geneva.

Chazan, Naomi 2000. ‘Towards a Settlement without Settlements’, Palestine-Israel Journal, Vol. 7, No. 3 & 4:46-51.

Dakak, Ibrahim 1994. Multi-Sector Review of east Jerusalem, Arab Studies Society, March.

Diwan, Ishac and Shaban, Radwan A. (eds.) 1998. Development Under Adversity: The Palestinian Economy in Transition, Summary, Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) and the World Bank.

Drury, David and Abu-Sharar, T.M. 1998. ‘Housing and infrastructure’, Chapter 3 in Hanssen-Bauer, Jon, Jon Pedersen and Åge A. Tiltnes (eds.): Jordanian Society: Living Conditions in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Fafo-report 253, Oslo: Fafo.

Dillinger, William 1994. Decentralization and Its Implications for Service Delivery, UNDP/ UNCHS/ World Bank, Washington DC.

Egset, Willy and Endresen, Lena C. 2001. Paying a Price: Coping with Closure in Jericho, Fafo-report 368, Oslo: Fafo. (Available on www.fafo.no)Farah, Randa 2000. A Report on the psychological effects of overcrowding in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, paper prepared for the Expert and Advisory Services Fund – International Development Research Centre (IDRC), April, http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/mepp/prrn/farah.html. Giacommelli, Giorgio 2001. Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, Including Palestine, Update to the mission report on Israel’s violations of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, Report submitted by the Special Rapporteur to the Commission on Human Rights at its 5th Session, 21 March.

Heiberg, Marianne and Ovensen, Geir (eds.) 1993. Palestinian Society in Gaza, West Bank and Arab Jerusalem: A Survey of Living Conditions, Fafo-report 151, Oslo: Fafo. (Available on www.fafo.no)Haaretz, 3 November 2002. ‘A land of roadblocks and barriers’, by Danny Rubinstein.

HIC 2002. House demolitions in ‘Isawiya neighborhood of occupied Jerusalem: 14 January 2002. Quantifying the losses to victims and civilization, Habitat International Coalition (HIC), Housing and Land Rights Network.

24

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

Houssari, Parastou 1997. Bulldozed into Cantons: Israel’s House Demolition Policy in the West Bank Since the Signing of the Oslo Agreements, September 1993 to November 1997 , Jerusalem: LAW (the Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment).

Issa, Shawqi and de Bruinje, Gert 1995, Existing water laws and regulations in Palestinian territory, Jerusalem: Land and Water Establishment.

ICBS 2002. Statistical Abstract of Israel 2002, No. 53, Jerusalem: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics.

JCSER 2000. Human Rights Violations In Occupied Arab Jerusalem, Annual report 2000, Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center For Social & Economic Rights.

JCSER 2001a. Social and Economic Rights Violations In East Jerusalem, Annual report 2001, Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center For Social & Economic Rights.

JCSER 2001b. Occupied Jerusalem, a new Soweto?, August, Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center For Social & Economic Rights.

JCSER 2002. ‘Close(d) to separation’: The impact of closure and direct effects of checkpoints on East Jerusalem’s institutions and residents, May, Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center For Social & Economic Rights.

Ju’beh, Nazmi 2001. ‘Jewish Settlements in the Old City of Jerusalem after 1967’, Palestine-Israel Journal, Vol. VIII, No. 1.

Khawaja, Marwan 2001. ‘Family and Household’, Chapter 2 in Pedersen, Jon, Sara Randall and Marwan Khawaja (eds.) 2001.

Khawaja, Marwan and Tiltnes, Åge A. 2002. On the Margins: Migration and living conditions of Palestinian camp refugees in Jordan, Fafo-report 357, Oslo: Fafo. (Available on www.fafo.no)

Kothari, Miloon 2002. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of Adequate Standard of Living: Report of Visit to the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 5-10 January 2002, 10 June, E/CN.4/2003/5/Add.1.

Land and Water Establishment 1995. House Demolition and The Control of Jerusalem: Case Study of Issawiya Village, Jerusalem.

Lebanon Ministry of Social Affairs/UNDP 1998. Mapping Living Conditions in Lebanon: Analysis of the Housing and Population Data Base, Beirut.

LAW 1998a. Campaign to Save the Homes of Palestine, compiled for the LAW conference ‘Fifty Years of Human Rights Violations’, 7 June, produced as a coalition effort by The Christian Peacemaker Teams, The Israeli Committee against House Demolitions, Land Defence General Committee – Palestine, and LAW (the Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment).

LAW 1998b. Save the Homes of Palestine, Brochure containing the story of ‘The house demolition of the Ghayan and Al-Qadi families’ and facts and figure about house demolitions in the West Bank, LAW (the Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment).

LAW 2000. An Overview of the Consequences of Israeli Occupation on the Environment in the West Bank and Gaza, January, Jerusalem: LAW (the Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment).

Magembe, Elias 1991. Towards Effective People Participation in Low-Income Housing Projects: Lessons from Tanzania, Medelin Colombia.

Marshy, Mona 1999. Social and psychological effects of overcrowding in Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza: Literature review and preliminary assessment of the problem, paper prepared for the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), August, http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/mepp/ prrn/marshy.html.

25

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

Matar, Ibrahim 2000. ‘Israeli Policy in Jerusalem: A Chronology of Dispossession’, Palestine-Israel Journal, Vol. 7, No. 3 & 4: 99-104.

MOPIC 2001. The 3rd and 4th Quarterly Monitoring Report of Donor’s Assistance of the Year 2001, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, December.

MOPIC 2002. National Priorities for Emergency and Urgent Damage Repair, June, Ramallah: Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation.

Oxfam 2002. Forgotten Villages: Struggles to survive under closure in the West Bank , Oxfam Briefing Paper No. 28, Oxfam International.

PASSIA 1998. Israel Settlement Policy in Jerusalem.

PASSIA 2001. Settlements and the Final Status Talks, Special Bulletin, March, Jerusalem: PASSIA (Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs).

PASSIA 2002. The Palestine Question in Maps, 1878-2002, Jerusalem: PASSIA (Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs).

PCBS 1999. Housing in The Palestinian Territory: Annual Report 1998, September, Ramallah: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS).

PCBS 2000a. Population, Housing and Establishment Census 1997 – Pocket Book, January, Ramallah: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS).

PCBS 2000b. Housing Report: Final Results for the Palestinian Territory, Statistical Reports Series, No. 061, January.

PCBS 2001. Housing Conditions Survey 2000: Main Results, September.

PCBS 2002a. Palestine in Figures, April, Ramallah: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS).

PCBS 2002b. Impact of the Israeli Measures on the Economic Conditions of Palestinian Households on the Eve of Israeli incursion (4th Round: January-February, 2002), Press Conference on the Survey Results, April.

Peace Now 2000. The West Bank and Gaza Strip Population Map November 2000, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv: Peace Now.

PECDAR 2001. Palestinian Water Strategic Planning Study, Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction.

PECDAR 2002. Activity Report 2001, Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction.

Pedersen, Jon 1997. West Bank and Gaza living conditions: Are refugees different? (The answer is: not very much), Fafo-paper 1997:22, Oslo: Fafo.

Pedersen, Jon 1998. The Palestinian Population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Current characteristics and future growth, Fafo: Unpublished paper.

Pedersen, Jon 2001a. ‘Introduction’, in Pedersen, Jon, Sara Randall and Marwan Khawaja (eds.) 2001.

Pedersen, Jon 2001b. ‘Mortality’, in Pedersen, Jon, Sara Randall and Marwan Khawaja (eds.) 2001.

Pedersen, Jon 2002. Population Forecasts of Palestinian Refugees 2000-2020, unpublished paper, October, Oslo: Fafo.

Pedersen, Jon et al. 2001. Paying a Price: Coping with Closure in Gaza City, Oslo: Fafo Report No. 371.

26

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

Pedersen, Jon and Hooper, Rick (eds.) 1998. Developing Palestinian Society. Socio-economic trends and their implications for development strategies, Fafo-report 242, Oslo: Fafo. (Available on www.fafo.no)

Pedersen, Jon, Sara Randall and Marwan Khawaja (eds.) 2001. Growing Fast: The Palestinian Population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Fafo-report 353, Oslo: Fafo. (Available on www.fafo.no)

Pedersen, Jon, Mona Christophersen, Lena C. Endresen and Paal Sletten 2001. Paying a Price: Coping with Closure in Two Palestinian Villages, Fafo-report 365, Oslo: Fafo. (Available on www.fafo.no)Pedersen, Jon, Mona Christophersen and Paal Sletten 2001. Paying a Price: Coping with Closure in Gaza City, Fafo-report 371, Oslo: Fafo. (Available on www.fafo.no)PHC 2002. The Palestinian Housing Council (PHC): 10 years of achievements (1992-2002).

Randall 2001. ‘Fertility’, in Pedersen, Jon, Sara Randall and Marwan Khawaja (eds.) 2001.

Salman, Nael 2000. Urban development challenges in the Middle East Arab countries: Concepts and spatial strategies with reference to land use and housing towards a sustainable city development: Bethlehem/Palestine, Stuttgart: Fakultät 1, Architektur und Stadtplanung, Städtebau-Institut, Universität Stuttgart.SCBS 2001. Statistical Abstract 2001, Syria’s Central Bureau of Statistics.

Shaban, Radwan A. 1997. Living standards in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, August, Jerusalem and Ramallah: Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS).

Shah, Samira 1997. The By-Pass Road Network in the West Bank: An Analysis of the Effects of the Network on the Palestinian Territories, Ramallah: al-Haq.

Shaheen, Khalil and El-Masry, Jamal 2002. The Draft National Plan for Human Rights – The Housing Sector, Submitted to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Second Draft, 25 June.

Shehadeh, Raja 1993. The Law of the Land: Settlement and Land Issues Under Israeli Military Occupation, PASSIA (Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs).

Shtayyeh, Mohammad 2000. Scenarios on Jewish Settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Al-Bireh: The Palestinian Cemter for Regional Studies (PCRS).

Shtayyeh, Mohammad 2002. ‘The Palestinian Economy Under Siege and Closure (Interview with Mohammad Shtayyeh)’, Palestine-Israel Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2:96-101.

Stokke, Liv Jorunn 2001a. ’Marriage patterns’, Chapter 3 in Pedersen, Jon, Sara Randall and Marwan Khawaja (eds.) 2001.

Stokke, Liv Jorunn 2001b. ’Housing Conditions’, Chapter 8 in Pedersen, Jon, Sara Randall and Marwan Khawaja (eds.) 2001.

Tufakji, Khalil 2000. ‘Settlements: A Geographic and Demographic Barrier to Peace’, Palestine-Israel Journal, Vol. 7, No. 3 & 4:52-58.

Ugland, Ole Fredrik 2001. ’Population structure’, Chapter 1 in Pedersen, Jon, Sara Randall and Marwan Khawaja (eds.) 2001.

United Nations 2002a. Humanitarian Plan of Action for the Occupied Palestinian Territory, UN’s Technical Assessment Mission, October.

United Nations 2002b. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Follow-up to the World Conference on Human Rights, 24 April, E/CN.4/2002/184.

27

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

UNDP 1999. 20 Years of Partnership: Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People , Jerusalem: UNDP/PAPP.

UNDP 2002a. Programme for the Assistance to the Palestinian People”, Assorted Publications and Thematic Papers on Poverty (“The Poor Speaks...”), Ramallah, October.

UNDP 2002b. Arab Human Development Report, New York: United Nations Development Programme, Regional Bureau for Arab States.

UNDP 2002c. The Poor Speak Out …, The Palestinian Participatory Poverty Assessment Project, Executive Summary of the forthcoming report, distributed at a recent seminar.

UNSCO 2002. The Impact of Closure and Other Mobility Restrictions on Palestinian Productive Activities, 1 January 2002 – 30 June 2002, October, Office of the United Nations Special Co-ordinator (UNSCO).

UNRWA 2002. Relief Services Instructions No. 1/2002: Special Hardship Assistance, February.

UNRWA 2002b. Jenin Camp Rehabilitation Project: Reconstruction & Development of Jenin Camp for Palestine Refugees, West Bank; Demolished Houses, Data Analysis & Study Options , ECSD-DU HQ(A), September.

UNRWA 2002c. Jenin Camp Rehabilitation Project: Reconstruction & Development of Jenin Camp for Palestine Refugees, West Bank, May.

Waltz, Victoria 2000. A Social Orientated Housing Programme and Policy for Palestine, Report for the Ministry of Housing Gaza/Ramallah, January.

Waltz, Victoria 1999. Housing Situation, Needs and Guidelines in Gaza, October.

Welfare Association 2002. Capability Statement 2002.

World Bank 2000. ‘Poverty in the West Bank and Gaza’, Palestine-Israel Journal, Vol. 7, No. 3 & 4:125-131.

World Bank 2001. Poverty in the West Bank and Gaza, 18 June, The World Bank, Middle East and North Africa Region.

World Bank 2002a. Fifteen Months – Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis: An Assessment, March.

World Bank 2002b. ‘West Bank and Gaza Strategic Outlook’, West Bank and Gaza Update, April, World Bank’s West Bank and Gaza Office.

World Bank 2002c. Long-Term Policy Options for the Palestinian Economy, July, Jerusalem: World Bank West Bank and Gaza Office.

World Bank 2002d. ‘The Palestinian Authority’s (PA) Reform Agenda’, West Bank and Gaza Update, August, World Bank’s West Bank and Gaza Office.

Yishay, Ariel Ben 2002. ‘Palestinian Economy, Society, and the Second Intifada’, Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 6, No. 3 (September): 42-52.

Ziara, Mohamed, Kamal Naser and Shadia Touqan 1997. Evaluation of Housing Affordability in Palestine, Ramallah: Birzeit University, Faculty of Engineering.

28

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

Appendix 1 Terms of Reference

UNITED NATIONS CENTRE FOR HUMAN SETTLEMENTS (Habitat)CENTRE DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LES ETABLISSEMENTS HUMAINS

CENTRO DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS PARA LOS ASENTAMIENTOS HUMANOS

Housing Situation/Needs Assessmentin the Occupied Palestinian Territories

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Country: The occupied Palestinian territories

Project Title: Towards a human settlements fund for the Palestinian people

Location: Gaza Strip and the West Bank including Jerusalem and possible travel to Nairobi and/or Beirut.

Consultants: Team leader (Human Settlements conditions); Team member (housing situation analyst); and local NGO/network of experts in the Occupied Territories

Duration: Team leader (6 work/weeks over a period of three months – 2 in the Occupied Territories/Israel, 3 days in Beirut and the rest in home base); Housing situation expert (4 work/weeks over a period of three months – 2 in the Occupied Territories/Israel and the rest in home base);Local NGO/network of experts in the Occupied Territories to be recruited by the team leader (8 work/weeks over a period of two months)

Expected Starting Date: September 2002

ProjectBackground: During the Eighteenth session of the Commission on Human

Settlements in February 2001 the Member States adopted resolution 18/12 "Illegal Israeli human settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories." In order to execute the operative paragraphs of the resolution, UN-Habitat created a flex team and action plan for the implementation of the resolution. Pursuant to this resolution and to produce the required outputs, UN-Habitat has outlined the following objectives:

29

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

Objective 1: To assess the current Palestinian housing situation and needs in the occupied territories and propose interventions;

Objective 2: To prepare a framework for the establishment, management, and sustainability of a Palestinian Human Settlements Fund; and,

Objective 3: To assist in organizing a meeting on the establishment of a Palestinian Human Settlements Fund in the occupied Palestinian territories.

Purpose: The consultants will work in conjunction with the UN-HABITAT Human Settlements Fund consultant to achieve the following:1 Conduct a study on the establishment of a human settlements fund

for the Palestinian people in the occupied territories. The study will analyze the housing situation of the people in the occupied territories, including the refugee camps, and conduct a current housing needs assessment.

2. Participate in organizing a meeting on the establishment and funding of a human settlements fund for the Palestinian people in the occupied territories and help present the report on the housing situation during this meeting.

Duties: The team [Team leader (Human Settlements conditions); Team member housing situation analysis; and local NGO/network of experts in the Occupied Territories], under the directorship of the team leader, will assess the housing situation and needs in the occupied territories and contribute towards achieving objectives two and three. To this end, the team will undertake the following duties, tasks and responsibilities:

1. Develop a detailed work plan for the study (responsibility of the team leader in consultation with the team members);

2. Review, update and complete the existing study on the housing situation in the occupied territories. Update data to reflect changes that have taken place since the previous report. Collect data, as practically possible, through documents, meetings and discussions with designated officials, and through observations, interviews with households, and local community groups and organisations, documents availed by UNDP Jerusalem, the Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories in Gaza, UNRWA, ESCWA, OHCHR, UNHCR, Palestinian Authority officials and agencies (including the Palestinian Statistical Agency), the Israeli Authorities, and other relevant UN agencies and special mechanisms.

2. Assess the current housing situation in general by focusing on:i) Planning and housing policies and strategies;ii) Planning and housing institutions and finance, particularly

funding agencies and mechanisms;iii) Rights and access to housing resources and development

elements such as land and building materials, and review of housing construction, rehabilitation and slum upgrading processes;

30

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

iv) Monitoring and management of housing programmes and projects; and,

v) Overall housing demand, supply and deficiency.

3. Assess the problems and constraints affecting the housing conditions in the occupied Palestinian territories including, but not necessarily limited to:

i) Israeli Settlements planning, development and expansion;ii) Internal and external constraints and actions as they affect the

development of Palestinian housing programmes;iii) Palestinian community infrastructure development and

management;iv) Environment aspects of Palestinian communitiesv) Issuance of construction permits for new housing units and

expansion of existing ones;vi) Issuance of housing rehabilitation and renovation permits; andvii) Any other actions deterring normal development of settlements

and housing, including the provision of services and utilities.

4. Recommend specific interventions suitable to address the identified housing problems and constraints

5. Propose an action plan to establish a housing strategy, including:i) Liasing with the Consultant developing the framework for the

fund;ii) Making recommendations towards a housing strategy for the

occupied Palestinian territories including: Making recommendations towards a housing-finance

strategy; Identifying the roles of the public and private sectors in

housing provision and finance; Addressing priority needs in institutional capacity building; Special attention to women and children’s situation, role

and effective participation; and Addressing human resources training needs.

6. Produce draft report and submit to UNHABITAT for comments

7. Incorporate comments and finalize the report

8. Undertake any other assignment related to this mission as requested by UNHABITAT, within the general outlines of these terms of reference.

9. Participate in an international meeting to help present the finding of the study.

10. Submit the expected outputs to UNHABITAT as indicated below in the outputs section.

31

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

11. Provide logistical support to the Housing Fund expert (Team Leader and Local staff)

Outputs: 1. The Team Leader, assisted by the team members, is expected to submit a final draft report, in English, on the housing situation and the needs assessment to UN-HABITAT by 1 November 2002. The Team Leader should submit the report(s) by e-mail as an attachment in MS-Word and an acknowledged receipt from our offices or, alternatively, two hard copies of the report accompanied by an electronic copy on high-density 3.5 inches hard diskette(s), programmed in IBM compatible, in MS-Word. the name of Consultants, project number, method used, and all relevant particulars should be clearly indicated for easy retrieval of information.

2. Upon receipt of comments from UNHABITAT, the Team Leader will incorporate such comments and submit the final report within 4 working days in accordance with the same specifications as outlined in 1 above.

Qualifications:

Team Leader: A university degree in Social/Political Sciences or Urban Planning (preferably with a post-graduate degree). Not less than 10 years of relevant practical experience with a focus on socio-economic surveying, preferably in the region. Extensive knowledge and understanding of the cultural, social, political and economic issues of the region are mandatory.

Housing Analyst: A university degree in Housing, Urban, Regional Planning or social sciences (preferably with a post-graduate degree), relevant practical experience of not less than 10 years in the field of housing and human settlements planning.

Local experts: To be selected by the Team Leader according to TORs to be drafted by him/her.

Languages: Fluency in speaking, reading and drafting in English is mandatory, Arabic an asset.

32

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

Appendix 2 Meeting ListInstitutions and persons met during missions to the Occupied Palestinian Territories, October and November 2002

Date Institution Individual & position16/10 UNRWA HQ, Amman Beth Kuttab

Director of Relief and Social Services Department17/10 Ministry of Housing and Public

Works, GazaMarwan AbdelhamidDeputy MinisterDr. Ziyad AlshagraSenior Advisor, Policy and technical AffairsTalal Nasrallah

17/10 Gaza Municipality Basil AlashiHead of External RelationsAlan Al-Shorafa Engineer, Project coordinator and follow up

17/10 Ministry of Planning, Gaza Dr. Magdi ElkhaldiDeputy Minister (Gaza Strip)Dr. Samih Al AdedDeputy Minister (Ramallah)Laila TarziHead of Scandinavian desk

17/10 CHF International Alaa SisalemProgram Director

18/10 Peace Now Moria ShlomotGeneral DirectorDror EtkesSettlement watchJanet AviadVolunteer

18/10 LAW Shawqi IssaGeneral Director

18/10 Arab Studies Society Khalil M. Tofakji G.I.S.

18/10 ARIJApplied Research Institute -Jerusalem

Nader Sh. HrimatDr. Nael SalmanMajed Abu Kubi

18/10 Individual capacity Dr. Khader ShqeiratFormer General Director, LAWHead of Marwan Barghouti Committee

18/10 Individual capacity Abed Al Raoof ArnaoutJournalist, Al-Ayam newspaper, Associated Press

19/10 TIPH – Temporary International Presence in Hebron

Bendik Sørvig Community relations officerOle MadslienProject managerIb KnutsenSenior press and information officerGry BallestadResearch officer

33

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

20/1016/11

Welfare Association Dr. Rafiq HusseiniDep. Director GeneralDirector of Operations

20/1016/11

PECDAR - Palestinian Economic Council for Development & Reconstruction

Dr. Mohammed ShtayyahManaging Director

20/10 PHC Palestinian Housing Council

Adnan Husseini Director/ Chairman of the Board(Director of Islamic Waqf, Jerusalem)Nabil Al-ArefGeneral Manager of North GovernorateNashaat TahboubChairman of Technical Committee,Board member

20/10 Norwegian Office to the PA (Palestinian Authority)

Jens MjaugedalCounsellorCoordination of donors, admin/ political reform

21/10 PCBS - Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics

Luay A. ShabnehDeputy Assistant of President For Technical AffairsOla Farah AwadDirector, Projects Coordination Department

21/10 MOPIC – Ministry of Planning & International Cooperation

Nabil ShaatMinisterBasil JabirChef de CabinetDr. Khalil NijemDirector GeneralStrategic PlanningAmb. Dr. Ahmed SobohAssistant Deputy MinisterSamia BaniekDirector general,UN Department and International Organizations

22/10 Ministry of Housing and Public Works, Gaza

Dr. Ziyad AlshagraSenior Advisor, Policy and Technical AffairsAhmad ShahwanEngineer

22/10 UNSCO, Gaza Ismail LubbadResearcher, Regional Economic Affairs Unit

22/10 UNRWA, GazaRelief Operations Office

Nasser ElKhalidMustafa HalubiAgi Abu Shammalah

23/10 Palestine Housing Council Mohamed HalaykaManager, Jerusalem Dept.

23/10 UNDPUnited Nations Programmes of Assistance to the Palestinian People

Walid HasaChief, Engineering Unit

23/10 UNDP, Jerusalem Sufian MushashaCo-ordinatorParticipatory Poverty Assessment Project

24/10 UNRWA, Jerusalem Mahmoud A. AbdulhadiChief Field,Relief and Social Services

24/10 Jerusalem Center for Social and Economic Rights

Ziad HammouryDirector

24/10 Individual capacity Ibrahim Sha’banLecturer in law, Al-Quds UniversityBoard member, PHC

34

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

29/10 HIC - Habitat International Coalition, Housing and Land Rights Network

Joseph SchechlaMiddle East/North Africa Regional Coordinator

8/11 University of Oslo, Institute for Human Rights

Turid S. PolfusResearch Fellow

13/11 ECON, Centre for Economic Analysis, Oslo

Per Schreiner Senior Economist

17/11 UNDP, Jerusalem Timothy S. RothermelSpecial RepresentativeProgram of Assistance to the Palestinian People

18/11 SIDA - Swedish International Development Authority, Jerusalem

Johan BrismanCounsellor for Development and Cooperation

18/11 European Commission Technical Assistance Office, West Bank and Gaza

Philippe JacquesHead of section, Infrastructure, water, energy, environment, agriculture, and UNRWA

18/11 UNDP, Jerusalem Lana J. Abu-HijlehAssistant Resident RepresentativeHead of Environment & Infrastructure Unit, Program of Assistance to the Palestinian People

19/11 World Bank Ibrahim Khalil Zaki DajaniEnvironmental Engineer Projects Officer

19/11 MOLG - Ministry of Local Government, Nablus

Tawfiq Al Bedairi EngineerBosayna Abu Esheh Planning engineerOhood EnainEngineer

19/11 Arab Bank Mazen Nazem Abu HamdanPalestine Area and Branches ManagerBoard member of PMHC

19/11 PMHC - Palestine Mortgage & Housing Company

Mohamed Osama AmmouriGeneral Manager and C.E.O.

35

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

Appendix 3 The population in the Occupied Palestinian Territories

IntroductionKnowledge of the population size and its distribution as well as an understanding of family formation dynamics is important for any housing assessment. Amongst others we need to know the number of people living in the area under study and how the population is distributed across geographic regions and between urban and rural areas, cities and villages. Furthermore, we need to know something about the family size, and variations across geographic districts and socio-economic groups (including Palestinian refugee status), if any. In addition, information about key demographic factors such as fertility and mortality, and their likely developments, is important for making population projections and thus enable the estimation of current and future housing needs.

Population: its geographic distribution, size and growth Population distribution

The Palestinian population under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority (PA) can be found in two physically de-linked areas: the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with about 64% of the population in the West Bank and the remaining 36% in Gaza. The refugee part of the OPT population is considerable at more than 41% (PCBS 20001:Table 9).9 At the time of the 1997 Population Census 53% of the population lived in urban areas, 31% in a rural areas, and 16% of the population lived in refugee camps (PCBS 2000a:Table 3). The vast majority of refugee camp dwellers are refugees.

The most accurate population figures for the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) resulted from the 1997 Census, which found a population of about 2,896,000. That compares to a population of 1,035,300 that Israel found in a census after her occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967. The average growth rate of 3.4% between the censuses may appear small given the high fertility levels and relatively low mortality levels in the same period, but is explained by a large out-flux of people during that period (Pedersen 2001a).

MigrationInternational (out-) migration, was as high as 2% annually in the West Bank in the late 70s and early 80s, but later stopped, partly due to the expulsion of Palestinians from the Gulf States following the 1991 Gulf war (Ugland 2001). In the years following the establishment of the PNA a considerable number of PLO officials and their families returned to the OPT, resulting in the in-migration of as many as 275,000 persons, according to one source (interview with high-ranked PA official). Despite the lack of statistical evidence, it is likely that the net migration in the latter part of the 1990s was about zero. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that up to 100,000 Palestinians may have left the West Bank for Jordan and Western countries since the beginning of the so-called Al-Aqsa (2nd) Intifada in September 2000. Many of these out-migrants have been young, well-educated persons employed by the private sector, but also PA employees have resigned from their positions and left the OPT (interview with high-ranked PA official). 10 Despite this out-migration over the pat two years, we shall assume no significant effect on the population

9 Refugees (the vast majority of whom are registered with UNRWA) constitute 26.5% of the total West Bank population, while their relative share of the Gaza population is much higher at 65% (1997 Census results, PCBS: http://www.pcbs.org/inside/ f_pophos.htm). The refugees residing in the West Bank and Gaza moreover make up about 40% of all Palestinian refugees living in the OPT, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria altogether (Pedersen 2002).10 See also Bocco et al (2001:35-38) who present signs that Palestinians have left the OPT, although without giving any estimates as to their numbers. A World Bank report (2002a:38) makes reference to poll data suggesting that “2 percent of respondents said that family members had gone abroad for extended periods”. The reports goes on citing anecdotal information suggesting that “many of those leaving are highly-skilled and internationally mobile, exactly those that Palestinian society can least afford to lose.”

36

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

structure of the OPT. This is both because we cannot verify the numbers that have left, and we do not know whether this mobility is temporary or permanent. If the migration is mainly a temporary measure taken to avoid hardship and reduce risks on health and life, then it shall have no long-term effect on the demography of the OPT.

FertilityThe TFR is considerably higher in Gaza than in the West Bank, at 7.78 versus 5.84 percent. While the fertility in the West Bank has experienced a steady decline, the fertility in Gaza saw a rise in the 80s and early 90s (Randall 2001). Yet there are signs, although inconclusive, that fertility started to fall again in Gaza during the second half of the 90s. For instance, both the 1997 Census and a Health Survey carried out in 1999 report lower TFRs than those just mentioned; the latter study a TFR of 6.8 (Pedersen 2002).

Compared to other Arab and neighbouring countries, fertility is relatively high in the OPT. The 1995 Demographic Survey finds a Total Fertility Rate (TFR)11 of 6.46 for the OPT overall. This compares to 2.29 for Lebanon, 4.00 for Syria and 4.69 for Jordan (UNDP 2002b:143). According to Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, the TFR for Israel was 2.89 in 2001 (ICBS 2002:Table 3.12).

MortalityAnalysis of the PCBS Demographic Survey data suggests that the overall picture of mortality conditions in the OPT is optimistic, the general level of mortality being slightly better than that of the Eastern European countries. Comparative figures for male and female life expectancy for countries in the Middle East leaves the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the middle of the range. However, the downward trend in infant and child mortality appears to have been arrested in the 80s and have been fairly stable since (Pedersen 20001b).

Population forecastsThere have been several attempts to make population projections for the OPT. The Regional Plan for the West Bank Governorates (MOPIC 1998) is one such attempt. Here, the authors create three different scenarios for population developments to the year 2020. Whereas the two first scenarios assume no migration and an annual “natural” growth rate of 2.6-2.7 or 2.7-2.8 percent till the year 2010 respectively, the third scenario also assumes 780,000 immigrants to settle in the West Bank within 10 years from 2005 and implies an annual population growth rate of 3.9%.

The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) in its population forecasts assumes immigration in the years up to 2010, but limits the number of people returning to the OPT to 500,000.12 A gradually falling fertility rate is also a key assumption in the projection. Calculating population growth based on Table 1 would render a 4.45% average annual growth rate for the years 1997-2010.

11 Technically, the TFR is a period index which summarizes the total number of children a woman of reproductive age would have, had she experienced throughout her lifetime the age specific fertility rates of the period in question.12 About PCBS population projections, including its basic assumption, see http://www.pcbs.org/english/populati/proj_mai.htm.

37

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

Table 1 PCBS Population projections 1997-2025

Source: http://www.pcbs.org/english/populati/dem97_8.htm; the figures for the years 2000-2005 are also found in PCBS 2000a: Table 3.

The assumption of a net in-migration is based on a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which in today’s situation seems unlikely in the near future. Besides, in our opinion, introducing migration into the projections involve so much guesswork that it is not worthwhile. It is better to model the population as it develops (or we think it may develop) without migration. Then, if migration should occur in conjunction with a final status agreement, one would consider that part of the population as a separate issue, and correct the population figures accordingly.

A Norwegian demographer working with Palestinian population statistics for the past decade, amongst others as an advisor to the PCBS, has recently published two articles, and earlier analysed the demographic developments of the OPT in an unpublished working paper, that may serve as a guide to the “natural” (assuming zero net migration) population growth of the Palestinian population up to the year 2010. In one article and the previous working paper he indicates that the Palestinian population in the OPT will reach between 4.2 and 4.4 million, the two estimates being different depending on the fertility rate chosen (Pedersen 1998; 2001a). This equals an average annual growth rate between 3.0% and 3.3%.

Next, in an article making population projections for Palestinian refugees in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the OPT for the years 2002-2020, he estimates that there will be 1,688,000 refugees in 2010 compared to 1,357,000 refugees in 2002 (Pedersen 2002). This implies a yearly average population growth rate of just about 2.8% in this eight-year period. The average growth rate for the West Bank is about 2.2% and for Gaza about 3.2%. Refugees in the OPT are generally not significantly different from non-refugees when it comes to most living standards and demographic indicators, including fertility. If anything their fertility is lower than that of the non-refugee population (Pedersen 1997, 2002).

To conclude the discussions above, we believe it is reasonable to assume a zero net migration rate in our population forecasts, and to use a 3% average annual (“natural”) population growth. This figure is slightly higher than the projections for Palestinian refugees (41% of the population) cited above, taking into account the somewhat higher fertility rate of the non-refugee population (59% of the population). Also, the 3% growth rate is higher than the natural growth rate suggested by MOPIC in 1998, which is logical taken into consideration that MOPIC’s estimate is for the West Bank only, which has a lower TFR than the Gaza Strip, at 5.6 versus 6.9 according to one estimate (PCBS 2000a:Table 12).

Our population estimate takes as a basis the 1997 Population Census. However, readers of Palestinian statistics may have noted the different population data available from the Census.

38

Year West Bank Gaza StripPalestinian Territory

1997 1,787,562 995,522 2,783,084

1999 1,932,637 1,087,067 3,019,704

2001 2,102,360 1,196,591 3,298,951

2003 2,304,825 1,329,670 3,634,495

2005 2,514,480 1,472,333 3,986,813

2007 2,730,750 1,624,844 4,355,594

2009 2,953,433 1,786,850 4,740,283

2011 3,167,583 1,949,311 5,116,894

2013 3,341,343 2,093,523 5,434,866

2015 3,517,154 2,241,206 5,758,360

2017 3,694,140 2,391,130 6,085,270

2019 3,872,403 2,542,193 6,414,596

2021 4,051,714 2,693,304 6,745,018

2023 4,230,610 2,843,450 7,074,060

2025 4,408,941 2,992,856 7,401,797

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

Even the PCBS itself has published contrasting population figures (see, for example, PCBS 2000a; http://www.pcbs.org/ english/populati/dem97_8.htm). The explanation is the following: The Census of 8-9 December 1997 found a population of approximately 2.6 million people. Next, a post-Census survey established an undercount of 2.4%. When the undercount and a population of about 210,000 in annexed Jerusalem were added, a total of about 2.9 million emerged. Then, sometimes a reverse-projection from the Census date in December to mid-year 1997 is also done, which brings the population figure down with about 50,000.

In our population estimates we follow Pedersen (1998), who takes all steps just described, assumes zero net migration, assumes stable mortality and moderate fertility decline. The population projections presented in Table 2 assumes that the average annual population growth is 2.6% for the West Bank, 3.75% for the Gaza Strip, and 3% for the Occupied Palestinian Territories overal

Table 2 Population projections for 1997-2010 (assuming zero migration)

Households and familiesIn this section we shall borrow heavily from what Marwan Khawaja (2001) has written about this topic, based on analysis of data from the 1995 Demographic Survey in the OPT, and we shall add to that statistics from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS).

Definitions of ‘household’ tend to be very much similar among the world’s statistical agencies. The PCBS uses a typical definition of a household: “One person or group of two or more persons, with or without family relationship, who live in the same dwelling unit and share meals and make joint provisions for food and other living essentials” (http://www.pcbs.org/english/househol/exp_conc.htm).

Household headshipAs with all statistics compiled by the PCBS, a subjective, self-reported definition of “headship” is used here. In other words, the household head is the person designated as such by the respondent or other household members during an interview. Hence, headship reflects the patriarchal cultural norms prevailing among Palestinian households. The Arabic term for household head, rub al usra (lord of the family), is widely used and usually refers to the (adult) person who takes final decisions on behalf of the household in most economic and social affairs. Headship status rates are age and sex dependent, and linked to life-cycle events, particularly entry into, or exit from, marriage. From the age of 35 more than 90% of men are classified as household heads. Unlike that of men, the proportion of women heading their own household increases consistently with age, reaching its highest level at the 65+ age group. Female headship is largely a life cycle phenomenon, indicating absent husbands due to death or divorce. And, while about 80% of

39

Year West Bank Gaza StripPalestinian Territory

1997 1,822,021 1,010,158 2,832,179

1998 1,869,394 1,048,039 2,917,1441999 1,917,998 1,087,340 3,004,6592000 1,967,866 1,128,116 3,094,7982001 2,019,030 1,170,420 3,187,6422002 2,071,525 1,214,311 3,283,2722003 2,125,385 1,259,847 3,381,7702004 2,180,645 1,307,092 3,483,2232005 2,237,341 1,356,108 3,587,7202006 2,295,512 1,406,962 3,695,3512007 2,355,196 1,459,723 3,806,2122008 2,416,431 1,514,462 3,920,3982009 2,479,258 1,571,255 4,038,0102010 2,543,719 1,630,177 4,159,150

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

married men head their own household, only about 1% of married women do. Altogether 9% of households in the West Bank and 7% of households in Gaza are female headed.

Household size and compositionOverall, Palestinian households are large, according to the Demographic Survey averaging almost 7 persons per households. The 1997 Census found the average household size to consist of 6.4 persons. Households are larger in Gaza Strip (DS: 7.8 persons; Census: 6.9 persons) than the West Bank (DS: 6.6 persons; Census: 6.1). Refugee camps have larger households than villages and towns, but there is generally little variation in household size within the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. The above figures can be compared to Jordan, where average household size is reported at 6.3 for the refugee camps, and between 6.0 and 6.2 for the population overall (Khawaja and Tiltnes 2002: 24). Israel has considerably smaller households, reported to be 3.47 for 2000, but with substantial differentiation by religion: 3.12 for Jews and 4.68 for “other religions” (ICBS 2002:Table 5.1).

An extended family household can be defined as one that includes a nuclear family and other relatives of the household head. Households that include unrelated persons are not counted as extended families, and are very rare (1-2%). In both the West Bank and Gaza Strip about one fourth of households are extended with the majority (70%) having nuclear structures. Here, “married couples with children” make up 6 in 7 households, while “married couple only” and “one parent with children” makes up the rest. Single-parent households are quite rare, perhaps due to relatively low levels of marital dissolution and the tendency to return to the parental home after divorce or widowhood. Extended households are more common in Gaza than in the West Bank, and more common in refugee camps than in towns and villages. The grand majority of extended households include children.

As everywhere, household formation in the OPT is an age-dependent process. Moreover, the establishment of a new household is primarily linked to marriage, as living with parents has been the traditional norm for the never married. This is especially the case for women, where establishing an independent household is generally seen as inappropriate. Marriage age has only seen a slight increase over the last 40 years (which is one reason behind the relatively slow fertility decline) (Stokke 2001a). Median and mean age at first marriage for the OPT taken as a whole is 23 and 24 for men and 18 and 19 for women respectively, with men tending to marry a bit earlier in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank (PCBS 2000a:Table 10 and Table 11).

Information about the number of families or generations living together as members of one household can be useful for understanding the potential for housing demand. Two-family households are relatively common in the OPT, amounting to about 13% of the total, but one-family households are the predominant form accounting for almost 80% of all households. There is variation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip regions. For example, the West Bank has a larger proportion (81%) of one-family households than Gaza (73%), and the proportion of household having three or more families in the West Bank is less than half of the corresponding one in the Gaza Strip (at 3% versus 8%). Similarly, the Gaza Strip has more households (25%) with three or four generations than the West Bank (17%). The refugee camps are also more crowded according to the above measures than non-camp areas.

What might come as a surprise to some, villages have a larger proportion of one-family households than the camps and towns, which Khawaja – himself from the city of Ramallah on the West Bank – ascribes to better housing supply in the countryside, and not that of different preferences across the urban-rural divide.

Household projectionThe need for housing and related needs for infrastructure depends to a large extent on the number of households rather than directly on the number of people. This is because it is the household that often is the unit of consumption of public goods. The number of households in the future depends both on the total population size and how people in different age groups form households. This is difficult to project, because household formation is related to many socio-economic factors such as kinship, marriage age, income, education opportunities, structure of the

40

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

labour market and types of industry in an area, etc. as well as characteristics of the housing market such as the supply of dwellings and their cost. If the supply of affordable housing increases more than the population grows the average household size may be affected and decrease.

The forecasts of Households in the OPT has been made in a very straightforward way. We have assumed that the average annual household growth rate for the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the OPT overall is identical to the population growth rate used in Table 2. This implies that we foresee no change in the average household structure and keep this variable and other household formation factors constant. Therefore, under the assumption of stable household sizes in the West Bank and Gaza regions, the number of new households each year will equal the population increase divided by household size for that year. We have applied the household size as it was found in the 1997 Census (West Bank: 6.1; Gaza Strip: 6.9; OPT: 6.4). The projected number of households and the number of new households during the period 1997-2010 are displayed in Table 3. The population increase will result in 136,000 more households in the OPT in 2010 compared to eight years before.

Table 3 Household projections for 1997-2010 based on population forecast in Table 2 and household sizes according to the 1997 Census

41

YearTotal households

New housholds

Total households

New housholds

Total households

New housholds

1997 298,692 146,400 442,528

1998 306,458 7,766 151,890 5,490 455,804 13,2761999 314,426 7,968 157,586 5,696 469,478 13,6742000 322,601 8,175 163,495 5,909 483,562 14,0842001 330,989 8,388 169,626 6,131 498,069 14,5072002 339,594 8,606 175,987 6,361 513,011 14,9422003 348,424 8,829 182,587 6,600 528,402 15,3902004 357,483 9,059 189,434 6,847 544,254 15,8522005 366,777 9,295 196,537 7,104 560,581 16,3282006 376,313 9,536 203,907 7,370 577,399 16,8172007 386,098 9,784 211,554 7,647 594,721 17,3222008 396,136 10,039 219,487 7,933 612,562 17,8422009 406,436 10,300 227,718 8,231 630,939 18,3772010 417,003 10,567 236,257 8,539 649,867 18,928

West Bank Gaza Strip Palestinian Territory

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

Appendix 4 The Housing situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories

IntroductionIn the following we shall describe the housing situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Major topics are type of dwelling, tenure, housing density, infrastructure and housing costs. We shall also mention the issue of Israeli settlements and land seizure, Israel’s house demolition policy, as well as the impact of bypass roads and Israeli closure policies on housing. We shall finally identify current and future housing needs.

Dwelling types and house ownershipNormally, oriental households, as those in the OPT, would rather live in independent, separate houses (villa or the smaller, traditional dar) than to share the house with other households. But, apartments have become more common over the past decade, and figure quite prominent in available statistics. As is seen in Table 1, almost 50% live in a multi-dwelling housing structure. Not surprisingly, apartments are twice as common in towns and city centres as in villages and farm areas. These findings are similar to the situation in Jordan, although a lower share of the population lives in apartments and a greater share lives in separate houses in the OPT compared to its neighbour to the east. In Jordan 1% resides in villas, 42% reside in traditional dars and 55% of the households are apartment dwellers (Drury and Abu-Sharar 1998).

Table 1 Proportion of households by type of housing unit, type of locality and region (1997 Census)

Property ownership has been regarded as important among Palestinians. Real estate has been seen as a good sector for investment, and property has given many families a sense of economic security in a political situation characterized by instability. More than 80% report owning their dwelling, which compared to Jordan’s 63% is high (Drury and Abu-Sharar 1998).13 However, this figure masks regional differences, as is evident from Table 2: A higher proportion of households own their dwelling in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, and households in the latter region more often rent their place of living, especially in towns and other urban areas. For OPT overall, the ownership status of the camps is as for the countryside, that is ownership is the dominant type of tenure with 9 out of 10 reporting they own their dwelling.14 This is despite the fact that legally

13 According to the Census 29% of the rented dwellings are houses or villas, while the rest (71%) are apartments (Calculations based on PCBS: http://www.pcbs.org/inside/f_pophos.htm). 14 The Census figures for ownership status in the OPT overall is slightly different from the survey results presented in the Table, and is as follows: Owned: 78.1%, rented: 9.7%, without payment: 11.6%, others/not stated: 0.6% (Calculations based on PCBS: http://www.pcbs.org/inside/f_pophos.htm). .

42

Villa House Apartment Other Not stated TotalType of localityUrban 1.0 41.0 56.9 1.0 0.1 100

Rural 0.7 67.3 28.2 3.7 0.1 100

Camp 0.3 63.0 36.1 0.5 0.1 100

RegionWest Bank 0.9 52.2 44.5 2.3 0.1 100

Gaza Strip 0.6 51.6 46.5 1.2 0.1 100

All OPT 0.8 52.0 45.2 1.9 0.1 100

Source: PCBS 2000b: Table 44 and Table 56

Type of housing unitType of Locality and Region

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

speaking, few actually own their houses in the refugee camps as the land is rented or granted by the Palestinian Authority.15 There is no variation in tenure between Palestinian refugees and non-refugees (PCBS 2000b: Table 65).16

Table 2 Proportion of households by tenure of housing unit, type of locality and region  

A special note on the housing situation of the refugee camps is perhaps in place here. The type of housing initially set up for refugee households in the camps (erected after the 1948 Arab-Israeli war) to replace tents were “shelters”, or small single detached dwellings. Those who moved into the camps subsequent to this have mostly built their own shelters or purchased them. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) does not own the original camp housing, but refugees are free to use the housing as long as UNRWA is given use of the land upon which it is built. UNRWA’s main role in shelter maintenance is the reconstruction of shelters damaged during natural or manmade disasters, or the rehabilitation and maintenance of shelters of families that are registered as so-called special hardship cases, and hence eligible for poverty support. Since the initial setting up of shelters, the stock of refugee housing in the camps has changed considerably – a necessity given that the population has increased but the camp borders have not. Where they have had the means and permissions, camp refugees have replaced, modified, extended and built additional shelters and houses.

15 There has been an informal process of camp refugees buying the land “their” house is built on from the original owner (often influential families or large Bedouin families) in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Stokke 2001b). It is, however, not known the extent to which this has taken place. Furthermore, camp dwellings are traded on the market. We have, for example, interviewed a family in Camp No. 1 in the outskirts of Nablus that purchased a tiny house in poor conditions for 12,000 USD (see, Appendix 6, case no. 8).16 A Palestinian refugee is one who was forced to leave his or her home in what today is Israel during or in the aftermath of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. Sons and grandsons, and their immediate family (wife, children), also fall in this category. PCBS statistics include both those who are registered as refugees with UNRWA (the vast majority, 96.5% of all household heads) and those refugees that are not (3.5% of household heads) (calculations based on PCBS 2000b:Table 56).

43

Rented OwnedWithout Payment For Work

West BankUrban 17.9 74.8 7.2 0.1 100

Rural 3.6 91.7 4.7 _ 100

Camps 2.4 83.4 14.2 _ 100

Total 11.1 82.1 6.7 0.1 100Gaza StripUrban 4.0 92.5 3.3 0.2 100

Rural _ 96.2 3.8 _ 100

Camps 1.7 93.6 4.7 _ 100

Total 3.1 93.1 3.7 0.1 100Palestinian TerritoryUrban 12.9 81.2 5.8 0.1 100

Rural 3.3 92.0 4.7 _ 100

Camps 1.9 90.4 7.7 _ 100

Total 8.5 85.6 5.8 0.1 100

Tenure of Housing Unit

Total

Type of Locality and

Region

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

Dwelling size and densitySize

How big are Palestinian housing units? As can be seen in Table 3, estimates vary across surveys, which is normal. Although the data represent a time span of 5 years, we should not look for development trends in them, because they may represent slightly different methodologies, and there is little reason to expect dramatic and significant change on an aggregate level in such a brief period. But, it seems safe to conclude from these data that some 24-30% of Palestinian households live in housing units with 1-2 rooms only, while 40-50% of the households have dwellings of 4 or more rooms, a result which is comparable to that found in Jordan (Drury and Abu-Shara 1998).

Table 3 Proportion of households in OPT by number of rooms in housing unit 1995-2000

Table 4 displays the households by the number of rooms in the dwelling, region and type of locality. Basically there is no difference between the West Bank and Gaza here, but there is variation according to type of locality, with urban (non-camp) households residing in the largest dwellings (average of 3.5 rooms), followed by rural (non-camp) households (3.3 rooms), and the camp dwellers living in the smallest housing units (average of 3.1 rooms).

Table 4 Proportion of households in the OPT by number of rooms in housing unit, type of locality and region (2000)

44

1995 (1) 1996 (2) 1997 (3) 1998 (4) 1999 (5) 2000 (6)

1 7.1 8.1 9.6 6.0 7.2 5.7

2 20.9 19.1 21.6 16.6 21.0 18.2

3 29.4 26.4 28.8 25.3 31.4 29.6

4 24.5 24.9 23.7 26.0 27.6 29.8

5+ 18.1 21.5 16.0 26.1 12.7 16.7

Not Stated _ _ 0.3 _ 0.1 _

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Number of Rooms

Year

(4) The Palestinian Expenditure and Consumption Survey, 1998.

(5) Labour Force Survey, October - December 1999 Round.

(6) Labour Force Survey, October - December 2000 Round

Source:

(1) The Demographic Survey in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 1995.

(2) The Palestinian Expenditure and Consumption Survey, 1996.

(3) Population, Housing and Establishment Census, 1997.

Average Number of Rooms in the

1 2 3 4 5+ Total  Hosing UnitWest BankUrban 3.8 17.1 30.6 30.8 17.7 100 3.5

Rural 6.8 18.9 30.8 28.1 15.4 100 3.4

Camps 6.0 25.0 36.7 23.7 8.6 100 3.1

Total 5.1 18.4 31.1 29.2 16.2 100 3.4Gaza StripUrban 5.5 14.4 26.0 34.0 20.1 100 3.5

Rural 8.7 25.6 25.3 23.3 17.1 100 3.2

Camps 9.4 23.0 27.6 26.3 13.7 100 3.2Total 6.9 17.8 26.5 30.9 17.9 100 3.4OPTUrban 4.4 16.1 28.9 32.0 18.6 100 3.5

Rural 6.9 19.3 30.4 27.8 15.6 100 3.3

Camps 8.3 23.6 30.5 25.5 12.1 100 3.1

Total 5.7 18.2 29.6 29.8 16.7 100 3.4

Type of Locality and

RegionNumber of Rooms

  

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

The distribution of households on number of rooms in the OPT is amazingly similar to the distribution identified for Jordan by the Jordanian Census of 1994. There, the distribution was as follows: 1 room: 5.7%, 2 rooms: 20.4%, 3 rooms: 29.5%, 4 rooms: 24.8%, and 5 rooms and more: 19.0% (0.9% unspecified number of rooms) (calculation based on table found at the Web-site of Jordan’s Department of Statistics: http://www.dos.gov.jo/owa-user/owa/pb_show_t2_10). Furthermore, the average number off rooms available per dwelling unit in the OPT is very close to that reported for Syria at 3.25 (SCBS 2001:Table 14/6).

Table 5 is almost identical to Table 4, but shows the number of bedrooms (rooms used for sleeping) instead of the number of total rooms. The picture is rather similar to the one in the previous table, with urban households better off and where, on the average, we have the same situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The only noticeably difference is that the camps come out somewhat better, relatively speaking, when we consider availability of bedrooms.

Table 5 Proportion of households in the OPT by number of bedrooms in housing unit, type of locality and region (2000)

As Table 6 shows, urban households are also best off when it comes to living space, here defined as the floor area of the housing unit, again followed by rural areas and with the camps’ household having the least spacious dwellings. The average area of the housing unit for these three locations is as follows: Urban: 123 m2;; rural: 109 m2; and camp: 103 m2. The second main conclusion to be drawn from the Table is that households in Gaza on the average have more space than households in the West Bank.

Table 6 Proportion of households in the OPT by area of housing unit, type of

45

1 2 3 4+ Not StatedWest BankUrban 20.6 48.9 25.8 4.5 0.2 100 2.2

Rural 27.2 46.8 21.5 4.2 0.3 100 2.0

Camps 33.2 46.7 17.9 2.2 _ 100 1.9

Total 24.1 48.0 23.5 4.2 0.2 100 2.1Gaza StripUrban 16.4 37.9 37.0 8.3 0.4 100 2.4

Rural 22.5 50.2 23.1 4.2 _ 100 2.1

Camps 21.8 39.7 30.8 6.8 0.9 100 2.2

Total 18.4 39.2 34.3 7.6 0.5 100 2.3Palestinian TerritoryUrban 19.0 45.0 29.8 5.9 0.3 100 2.2

Rural 26.9 47.0 21.7 4.2 0.2 100 2.0

Camps 25.4 42.0 26.6 5.4 0.6 100 2.1

Total 22.3 45.1 27.0 5.3 0.3 100 2.2

Type of Localityand

Region

Number of Bedrooms

Total

Average Number of Bedrooms in the

Housing Unit

Less than 80 80-119 120-159 160-199 200+ Not stated

West BankUrban 22.3 30.0 27.5 10.4 8.2 1.6 116.0

Rural 25.3 33.4 27.5 5.9 7.3 0.6 108.8

Camps 35.2 33.6 20.2 4.5 2.1 4.4 93.3

Total 24.4 31.6 27.0 8.2 7.4 1.4 111.5Gaza StripUrban 9.0 20.2 34.5 15.2 11.4 9.7 137.1

Rural 21.1 28.5 25.6 12.4 8.1 4.3 114.2

Camps 22.1 31.5 23.7 8.4 4.6 9.7 107.9

Total 13.8 24.3 30.6 12.9 9.0 9.4 126.6Palestinian TerritoryUrban 17.5 26.5 30.0 12.2 9.3 4.5 123.2

Rural 25.0 33.2 27.3 6.3 7.3 0.9 109.1

Camps 26.3 32.2 22.6 7.1 3.8 8.0 103.1

Total 21.0 29.3 28.1 9.7 7.9 4.0 116.1

Type of Localityand

Region Area of Housing Unit (m2)

Average Area of Housing Unit (m2)

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

locality and region 

Since Gaza households overall have the same number of rooms at their disposal as West Bank households, we may conclude that dwellings there in fact are more spacious.17

While Table 6 presents data for the current, average situation, Table 7 gives us the size of the residential dwellings that have been constructed the latest years. We can observe a clear trend towards building more spacious housing units.

Table 7 Licensed housing units in the OPT by number and area (m2) 1996 - 2000

However, density and crowding may also be analysed according to other measures. For instance, while households in the Gaza Strip on the average have more space inside their dwellings, the plots of land on which their houses are erected tend to be significantly smaller, as shown in Table 8.

Table 8 Proportion of households in OPT by area of land on which building is constructed, type of locality and region

17 The typical house or apartment in neighbouring Jordan is about the same size as in the OPT. According to 1994 Census estimates, the median size of dwelling unit is about 100 m2 (referred in Drury and Abu-Sharar 1998). Although a slightly different measure than the arithmetic mean or average, and less affected by “outliers” (extremely high and/or low values) the median here indicates that the living area in the two areas is fairly similar.

46

Less than 150 299-150 499-300 999-500 1000+ Not stated

West BankUrban 17.0 20.6 11.4 22.9 20.2 7.9 100

Rural 17.3 20.0 13.1 24.7 21.1 3.8 100

Camps 57.4 25.8 2.6 4.1 3.6 6.5 100

Total 19.9 20.7 11.5 22.3 19.4 6.2 100

Gaza StripUrban 20.1 47.6 11.9 4.8 1.7 13.9 100

Rural 33.7 46.4 12.0 2.0 ÜÜ 5.9 100

Camps 52.7 31.5 3.8 0.9 0.1 11.0 100

Total 31.2 42.4 9.4 3.4 1.1 12.5 100Palestinian TerritoryUrban 18.1 30.3 11.6 16.4 13.5 10.1 100

Rural 18.3 21.7 13.1 23.3 19.7 3.9 100

Camps 54.2 29.7 3.4 1.9 1.2 9.6 100

Total 23.6 27.7 10.8 16.2 13.5 8.2 100

Type of Locality and

Region

Area of Land (m2)

Total

No. Area (m2)Average Area

(m2)1996 13,733 1,819,100 132.461997 15,775 2,126,570 134.811998 15,504 2,151,524 138.771999 17,278 2,494,212 144.362000 13,438 2,029,333 151.01Total 75,728 10,620,739 140.25

Note: The data does not include the camps and those parts of Jerusalem which were annexed by Israel in 1967.

Number and Area of Licensed Housing Units

Year

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

For example, while about 4 in 10 West Bank households live in housing units built on plots less than 300 m2, more than 7 In 10 Gaza households live on plots of that size. At the other end of the scale, between nine and ten times as many West Bank households as Gaza households live on plots larger than 500 m2. Furthermore, Table 8 confirms the compactness of the refugee camps, where more than half the households are residing in housing units built on plots smaller than 150 m2.

DensityThus far we have only considered the content of the dwelling as measured by the number of rooms and bedrooms, as well as described the size of dwellings in the OPT, and the size of the plots of land on which people live. However, any useful description of dwelling density and crowding in addition has to look into the relationship between household size and living space. So, we need to establish some facts about household sizes and composition in the OPT. This is done in more detail in a separate appendix. Here we shall only present key data, with a focus on variation between regions and locations:

Size: The average household size for the OPT is 6.4 according to the 1997 Population Census. The corresponding figure is 6.9 for the Gaza Strip and 6.1 for the West Bank. Refugee camps have larger households than villages and towns.

Household types: Analysis of the 1995 Demographic Survey shows that the West Bank has a larger proportion (81%) of one-family households than Gaza (73%), and that the proportion of household having three or more families in the West Bank is less than half of the corresponding one in the Gaza Strip (at 3% versus 8%). Similarly, the Gaza Strip has more households (25%) with three or four generations than the West Bank (17%). Refugee camps are more crowded according to these measures than non-camp areas.

A related measure is the number of households sharing the housing unit. As shown in Table 9, multiple-household dwellings are rare in the West Bank (2.9%), but more common in Gaza (16.2%). The phenomenon also seems to occur quite often in the refugee camps, but the relatively high occurence of a dwelling being shared between two or more households in camps is confined to camps in Gaza only.

Table 9 Proportion of households in OPT by number of households in the housing unit, type of locality and region

47

1 2 3+

West BankUrban 97.1 2.7 0.2 100

Rural 97.2 2.3 0.5 100

Camps 96.6 3.2 0.2 100

Total 97.1 2.6 0.3 100Gaza StripUrban 82.7 9.8 7.5 100

Rural 89.3 7.3 3.4 100

Camps 85.2 10.2 4.6 100

Total 83.8 9.8 6.4 100Palestinian TerritoryUrban 91.9 5.3 2.8 100

Rural 96.7 2.6 0.7 100

Camps 88.9 7.9 3.2 100

Total 92.9 4.9 2.2 100

Type of Locality and

Region

Number of Households

Total

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

Perhaps the most widely used measure of density is that of the average number of person per room. Table 10 displays housing density according to this definition, and as it has been recorded by 6 different surveys, in as many years. While one should treat such results with caution (due to e.g. possible methodological differences and the unknown margins of error for the estimates), it does appear that the Palestinian population, on the average, experienced an improvement of its housing standards, at least according to this particular indicator, from 1995-2000. In 2000 households in the OPT had at its disposal on average one room per 1.91 persons. In the Jordanian population as a whole there is an average of 2 persons per room (Drury and Abu-Sharar 1998). The same is reported for Syria (SCBS 2001: Table 14/6).

Table 10 Proportion of households in OPT by housing density (persons per room) 1995 – 2000

Table 11 displays density by region and location. Gaza is clearly more crowded than the West Bank, at 2.1 persons per room against 1.8 persons per room. Urban areas appear less crowded than rural areas, which in turn are somewhat better off than refugee camps. 18 Yet the overall picture here is one of similarity across regions and location rather than dissimilarity. The refugee non-refugee differential is also insignificant (PCBS 2000b:Table 15).

Table 11 Proportion of households in OPT by housing density (persons per room), type of locality and region - 2000

18 1997 Census results confirm this pattern (PCBS 2000b:Table 14).

48

Less than 1 1.00 -1.99 2.00 - 2.99 3+ TotalWest BankUrban 13.3 43.0 26.5 17.2 100 1.7

Rural 8.0 39.3 31.9 20.8 100 1.9

Camps 5.8 40.1 34.8 19.3 100 2.0

Total 10.6 41.4 29.2 18.8 100 1.8Gaza StripUrban 7.3 35.9 34.1 22.7 100 2.0

Rural 6.5 35.5 34.0 24.0 100 2.1

Camps 5.9 32.6 33.9 27.6 100 2.1

Total 6.8 34.8 34.1 24.3 100 2.1Palestinian TerritoryUrban 11.1 40.5 29.2 19.2 100 1.8

Rural 7.9 39.0 32.1 21.0 100 1.9

Camps 5.8 35.1 34.2 24.9 100 2.1

Total 9.4 39.2 30.8 20.6 100 1.9

Type of Locality and

Region

Housing Density (persons per room) Average Housing Density

1995 (1) 1996 (2) 1997 (3) 1998 (4) 1999 (5) 2000 (6)

Less than 1 9.0 9.5 10.1 9.5 8.0 9.4

1.00 - 1.99 33.1 35.6 35.5 36.5 37.7 39.2

2.00 - 2.99 30.0 30.1 29.1 31.2 30.8 30.8

3.00+ 27.9 24.8 25.3 22.8 23.5 20.6

Total 100 100 100 100 100 100

Average Housing Density 2.33 2.45 2.00 1.88 1.98 1.91

Housing Density (persons per room)

Year

(4) The Palestinian Expenditure and Consumption Survey, 1998.

(5) Labour Force Survey, October - December 1999 Round.

(6) Labour Force Survey, October - December 2000 Round.

Source:

(1) The Demographic Survey in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 1995.

(2) The Palestinian Expenditure and Consumption Survey, 1996.

(3) Population, Housing and Establishment Census, 1997.

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

While the percentage distribution of households by housing density in the OPT is rather similar to the one found in Jordan (Drury and Abu-Sharar 1998), it is very distinct from the situation in Israel. Here, 54% of Jewish households have less than one person per room, and 21% of households of “other religions” have the same. Only 0.5% of Jewish households have 3 persons or more per room, and this is the case for only 5.7% of the “other religion” households (ICBS 2002: Table 5.22).

Above we stated that Gaza dwellings on the average are a little larger area-wise than West Bank dwellings, but we also just found that the housing density is higher in Gaza. A “combination” of the two approaches by which we (or, rather, the PCBS) estimate the dwelling area available for each household member demonstrates that there is no significant difference between the two regions of the OPT (Table 12). On the average, each Palestinian citizen has 18 m 2 at his or her disposal at home. The Table shows that urban households have more space than other households. Camp refugees fare the worst.19 For the sake of comparison, the average floor area available to each individual in the OPT is somewhat larger than that at the disposal of each Syrian citizen (14 m2) (SCBS 2001: Table 14/6).

19 However, there appears to be quite some variation also within camps. For example, while the 391 demolished housing units in Jenin refugee camp following the incursion of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) into the camp in April 2002 on the average measure 99.5 m2, due to a relatively small household size in the affected households (4.2 persons per household), the area available to each person is above the national average, at 23.7 m2. On the average each demolished building had 1.8 floors (UNRWA 2002b).

49

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

Table 12 Proportion of households in OPT by person share of housing unit, type of locality and region  

The above analysis of housing density is for the most part based on the latest statistics from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (2000), most of it available on the Web. Based on information from various reports (Stokke 1998b, Waltz 2000), personal impressions from visits to various parts of the West Bank and Gaza over the years and interviews with well-informed persons in the OPT in October and November, we had expected the situation to be a good deal worse in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. Much to our surprise the data do not allow us to make that conclusion. Indeed, people of Gaza do live under more cramped conditions, with an average of 2.1 persons per room versus 1.8 persons per room in the West Bank, but with equal share of the dwelling area, on the average. However, the disparity between the two regions is smaller than expected and seems to be more related to external space than to the area available to each person inside the dwelling. Now, this feature of people’s overall housing conditions should not be overlooked, as having sufficient outside living area is important for the welfare of the households: for example, that extra space can be used, and traditionally is important for adults’ social life and as a children’s playground, and can be used to grow fruit and vegetables and as an area for various income-generating activities. The refugee camps are particularly cramped, with little or no extra space adjacent to the outer walls of the house and oftentimes only pathways between the houses instead of wider roads with room for cars.20 Because a higher proportion of the population in Gaza lives in camps, Palestinians in Gaza on the average are more adversely affected by these dense conditions, including the lack of public space, than Palestinians in the West Bank.

Amenities and sanitationIn addition to a housing unit’s size, the availability of basic services such as electricity, water and sanitation is important to a household’s welfare. Here, therefore, we shall describe the housing conditions in the OPT with regard to other factors than space.

Table 13 shows the proportion of households according to whether they are connected to a public electricity, water or sewerage network, whether they rely on private solutions or lack the services completely. There are few households overall lacking piped water, having no disposal system for

20 See, UNRWA (2000c) for a description of how camps typically have grown from the time of the tents to the situation of today.

50

Less than 10 14.99-10.00 19.99-15.00 24.99-20.00 29.99-25.00 3.00+

West BankUrban 14.0 19.6 16.6 16.2 8.7 24.9 100 19.2

Rural 13.9 26.8 19.7 15.6 7.0 17.0 100 16.7

Camps 15.8 28.2 20.7 15.5 5.5 14.3 100 15.2

Total 14.1 23.1 18.1 15.9 7.8 21.0 100 17.9Gaza StripUrban 9.2 21.3 20.8 17.1 9.4 22.2 100 18.9

Rural 12.4 22.0 23.8 17.1 5.1 19.6 100 17.3

Camps 16.7 25.4 23.2 12.7 5.6 16.4 100 15.9

Total 11.8 22.6 21.7 15.7 8.0 20.2 100 17.9

Palestinian TerritoryUrban 12.4 20.1 18.1 16.5 8.9 24.0 100 19.1

Rural 13.8 26.5 19.9 15.7 6.9 17.2 100 16.8

Camps 16.4 26.3 22.4 13.6 5.6 15.7 100 15.7

Total 13.3 23.0 19.2 15.9 7.8 20.8 100 17.9

Type of Locality and

Region

Person Share of Area of Housing Unit (m2)

Total

Average Person Share ofArea of

Housing Unit (m2)

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

sewage and not having electricity. But there are regional differences, whereby a higher proportion of households in Gaza rely on private solutions (water systems, cesspits) than in the West Bank. Moreover, there are also urban-rural variations with towns having better access to public services than villages. As regards electricity, rural Gaza stands out as having a particularly poor provision of electricity as compared to other localities. The refugee camps of both regions on the average fare better than other areas.

51

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

Table 13 Proportion of households in the OPT by connection to public networks (water, electricity and sewage), by type of locality and region

The vast majority of dwellings have a separate kitchen, bathroom and toilet, and there is no significant difference between the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Table 14). However, rural areas consistently fare worse than urban areas and camps. And, since a lower proportion of households in the villages have piped water, the standard of kitchens, bathrooms and toilets is lower here.

52

Public Network

Private System

No Piped Water

Public Network

Private Generator No Electricity

Puplic Sewage Cesspit

No Sewage System

West BankUrban 94.4 4.9 0.7 99.8 0.1 0.1 53.8 45.6 0.6

Rural 75.8 21.1 3.1 97.2 2.1 0.7 8.8 89.9 1.3

Camps 98.5 1.1 0.4 99.9 _ 0.1 78.3 21.5 0.2

Total 87.2 11.1 1.7 98.8 0.9 0.3 37.5 61.6 0.9Gaza StripUrban 98.3 1.5 0.2 99.0 0.1 0.9 50.1 49.9 0.0

Rural 35.3 63.1 1.6 80.9 _ 19.1 _ 98.5 1.5

Camps 99.0 0.8 0.2 99.8 _ 0.2 70.9 28.8 0.3

Total 95.0 4.7 0.3 98.2 0.1 1.7 53.8 46.0 0.2Palestinian TerritoryUrban 95.8 3.7 0.5 99.5 0.1 0.4 52.5 47.1 0.4

Rural 73.3 23.7 3.0 96.2 2.0 1.8 8.2 90.5 1.3

Camps 98.9 0.9 0.2 99.8 _ 0.2 73.3 26.4 0.3

Total 89.8 9.0 1.2 98.6 0.6 0.8 42.8 56.6 0.6

Type of Locality and

Region

Connection to Public NetworksWater Electricity Sewage

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

Table 14 Proportion of households in the OPT by availability of kitchen, bathroom and toilet by type of locality and region

The picture given here is rather good and rates favourably when compared to Jordan (see, Dury Abu-Shara 1998, Khawaja and Tiltnes 2002). We should, however, add that we have not discussed the quality of services here. For example, to what extent do people experience electricity cuts? Does the sewerage system function well? Is the delivery of water regular and of sufficient quantities; and is the quality of water satisfactory? Anecdotal evidence suggests that the picture painted above, and with the support of the PCBS statistics, is too rosy. For instance, the high and increasing salinity of the ground water in Gaza is a cause of concern. Also, in Gaza Municipality approximately 70% of the housing units are connected to the sewage network, but the network suffers from many defects and is badly in need for overhaul and repair (interview, Gaza Municipality staff). But, we shall not delve with this matter, for the lack of background material and time.

However, we shall show how housing conditions vary by what the PCBS call “level of living”, which is a variable defined by the proportion of consumption on food out of total consumption. PCBS usually divides all households into three groups: the “better-off”: food consumption to total consumption less than 30%; the “middle category”: food consumption to total consumption between 30-44%; and the “worse-off”: food consumption to total consumption between 35-100%. Table 15 shows how the poorest households systematically are worse off on the various housing conditions variables included. But, the difference is perhaps less than could be expected.21

21 Note that the figures in this table is not consistent with figures presented elsewhere in this Appendix, due to a different source of data (survey). For example, average density is higher and more in line with results from the 1996 Expenditure and Consumption survey than the 2000 Labour Force survey (see, Table 9), which the data in Table 10 is based on. The main point here is not the exact figures, though, but to show how housing conditions quite naturally vary by the economic resources available to the household. The average household size is over 7 according to this table, while the 1997 Census results show that the average household size to be 6.4.

53

With Piped Water

Without Piped Water No Kitchen

With Piped Water

Without Piped Water NoBathroom

With Piped Water

Without Piped Water NoToilet

West BankUrban 95.4 3.6 1.0 94.9 3.0 2.1 95.0 4.8 0.2

Rural 89.1 8.9 2.0 88.8 7.8 3.4 88.9 10.5 0.6

Camps 95.7 3.2 1.1 97.5 1.7 0.8 97.3 2.7 _

Total 92.9 5.7 1.4 92.6 4.8 2.6 92.7 6.9 0.4Gaza StripUrban 95.7 3.3 1.0 95.8 2.9 1.3 97.6 1.7 0.7

Rural 74.2 21.6 4.2 77.6 17.4 5.0 77.5 21.7 0.8

Camps 92.4 5.3 2.3 92.9 4.6 2.5 96.9 2.4 0.7

Total 93.5 4.9 1.6 93.9 4.2 1.9 96.2 3.1 0.7Palestinian Territory

Urban 95.5 3.5 1.0 95.3 2.9 1.8 95.9 3.7 0.4

Rural 88.2 9.7 2.1 88.1 8.4 3.5 88.2 11.2 0.6

Camps 93.5 4.6 1.9 94.4 3.6 2.0 97.1 2.5 0.4

Total 93.1 5.5 1.4 93.1 4.6 2.3 93.8 5.7 0.5

Type of Locality

Availability of Kitchen, Bathroom and ToiletKitchen Bathroom Toilet

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

Table 15 Proportion of households by level of living and selected housing variables

Israel’s occupation policiesIsrael’s occupation policies in the OPT since 1967 have effectively hindered the establishment of new built-up areas for human settlement (and industry) on land outside the town borders as they were in 1967. Thus, expansion of towns has been curtailed leading to increased land demand in the centres, causing land prices to escalate. Apart from making land acquisition harder for all but particularly for low-income households and thus obstructing their prospects for improved housing standards, the ensuing effect has been high density of building structures on small plots of land (Salman 2000, field interviews). The result is rapid urbanisation; perhaps more rapid than the case would have been under a regime allowing cities to expand and new built-up areas to be created. Below we shed light on some central features of Israel’s policies in the OPT with a bearing on the housing situation of the indigenous, Palestinian population.

Settlements and bypass roadsThe West Bank and Gaza Strip has been occupied and controlled by Israel since 1967. Following the occupation, Israel started to erect Israeli settlements, or colonies as many Palestinians prefer to label them, in the OPT. In 1977 there were 20 settlements and 3,876 settlers (Tufakji 2000). In 1983, there were according to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics 23,700 settlers in the OPT, twelve years later the Israeli population has risen to 132,900, and in 2001 a total of 205,600 Israelis had their residence in the West Bank and Gaza (ICBS 2002: Table 2.7). That number may or may not be higher at the time of writing of this report. Undoubtedly, new Israeli housing structures have been put up, expanding current settlements, but due to the ongoing Al-Aqsa Intifada many settlers have abandoned their homes out of security considerations. Some settlements may have been deserted by up to 40-60% of its residents (interviews with Peace

54

Sewage Disposal

Public Sewer 6.92 43.85 37.48 31.57

Septic tank or cesspool 7.11 56.15 62.52 68.43

Type of Tenure

Rented 5.22 10.84 8.66 9.45

Owned or other 7.24 89.16 91.34 90.55

Type of Dwelling

Villa 8.21 0.95 0.23 -

House/ other 7.17 54.76 60.7 69.63

Apartment 6.81 44.28 39.07 30.37Number of rooms

1 4.21 3.4 4.96 9.14

2 5.48 8.58 15.91 22.85

3 6.37 28.16 24.88 23.78

4 7.25 28.96 26.85 22.95

5+ 9.14 30.91 27.4 21.29Average number of rooms 7.06 4.03 3.83 3.42

Density of household

Less than 1 2.82 18.93 8.58 7.48

1-1.99 5.99 47.41 40.16 30.74

2-2.99 8.29 26.21 31.26 30.63

3+ 9.32 7.44 20 31.15Average household density 7.06 2.22 2.62 2.85

Source: Received electronically on request from the PCBS, 28 October 2002.

Level of livingAverage household

sizeBetter-off Middle

categoryWorse-off

Variables

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

Now). There are today 128 Israeli settlements in the OPT, with 121 in the West Bank and 7 in the Gaza Strip (PASSIA 2002:95).

There are many legal aspects to the settlement policies of Israel in the West Bank and Gaza. We shall refrain from legal discussions in this report, but would nevertheless like to mention two key aspects, as B’Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, sums them up:

Israeli settlement in the occupied territories violates two principles of international humanitarian law: the prohibition on the transfer of civilians from the occupying power to the territory occupied, and the prohibition on creating in the occupied territory permanent change that does not benefit the local population (B’Tselem 2000:73).

On a further note, the UN Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living has stated that, “the implantation of settlements and settlers [in the OPT] is […] a violation of the basic principles of international humanitarian law and also has been recognised as a violation of human rights norms, particularly economic, social and cultural rights.” (Kothari 2002:10).

The motives underlying the establishment of settlements have varied over time. The earliest settlements in the Jordan Valley were created for security reasons; some were set up for historical reasons; others erected to meet the growing demand for cheap housing; and some settlements have been put up for nationalistic and/or messianic reasons. But, whatever the underlying rationale for putting up a settlement they have been placed in areas that would separate Palestinian population clusters, denying the possibility of Palestinian territorial integrity, in the West Bank as in the Gaza Strip. The many bypass roads that have grown up the past decade have reinforced this effect. While constructed to serve as safe passageways between settlements and major cities and communication hubs in Israel as well as between the larger settlements, these bypass roads have impeded Palestinian mobility and truncated the West Bank. (N. Chazan 2000, M. Shtayyeh 2000, interviews with Peace Now).

Building permitsThe Gaza-Jericho (Oslo I) Agreement (Cairo, 1994) and Interim (Oslo II) Agreement (Taba, 1995) divided the Occupied Palestinian lands in different zones, giving the Israelis and Palestinians varying degrees of jurisdiction. The Gaza Jericho Agreement defined the Gaza Strip and the West Bank town of Jericho as Palestinian Autonomous Areas, but Israel retained the responsibility for security in certain areas of the Gaza Strip (so-called ‘yellow areas’). The Interim Agreement divided the West Bank into 3 zones of control: “In six West Bank cities (in addition to Jericho) the PA gained civil and internal security control (Area A); in 420 villages the PA was made responsible for civil affairs, while Israel retained security control (Area B); in the remaining territory (Area C) Israel retained its exclusive control. […] In all, Area A amounted to just under 2% of the West Bank, Area B 26% and Area C made up the remaining 72%.” (PASSIA 2002:74-77).

For towns and villages in Area A (3% of the West Bank, under the jurisdiction of the PA), building permits are given by the Palestinian municipalities, and are usually given, provided that the applicant has title to the land. This, however, is not always the case, because land titling in the West Bank and Gaza is far from complete.22 According to the World Bank, “the PA could have addressed land title issues more diligently in area A, but disputes over ministries’ mandates held up progress on this issue” (2002c: 61-62). In Area B (27% of the West Bank, under joint Israeli-Palestinian control) it is more difficult to get building permits, and in the Israeli-controlled Area C, it is as a rule not given to Palestinians. But, Israeli settlements get permissions to expand and receive rights to land for agricultural use and for security reasons (LAW 1998, interviews with experts at Peace Now). For Palestinians, it is almost impossible to obtain the necessary building permits in East Jerusalem (JCSER 2001a).

22 Most buildings in Gaza are now titled. In the West Bank, land titling is only partly implemented in Area A and B and totally lacking in Area C (interview with senior staff at MOHPW).

55

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

Building licenses are generally expensive, and may cost at least 6-10,000 USD and up to 25,000 USD in Jerusalem (JCSER 2001b, interviews at PHC). Applications for building permits from the Israeli Civil Administration in Area C may take 3-4 years and cost up to 2,500 USD (LAW 1998).

House demolitions“House and property demolition has emerged as a consistent pattern [in the OPT]” (Giacomelli 2001). In October 2001, during its invasion of areas under the control of the PA, Israel renewed its activity of demolishing houses as punishment, a policy it had ceased in 1997. Such demolitions are carried out to punish suspected Palestinian perpetrators of attacks in Israel or against Israeli settlements, and leave the suspects’ family members homeless. In the period 1987-1997 Israel completely demolished 449 houses as punishment, partially demolished 62 houses, completely sealed at least 296 houses and partially sealed 118 houses. In the period October 2001 to 2 December 2002, Israel completely demolished 96 houses, partially demolished 1 and sealed one house, as reprimands (http://www.btselem.org). Since 1987 the Israeli authorities have administratively demolished at least 2,450 Palestinian houses in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and hundreds of other building structures. These are demolitions justified by the lack of building permits (http://www.btselem.org).

While Israel points out that house destruction serves the security needs of Israeli settlers and settlements, a UN document reporting on Israel’s Human Rights violations in the OPT states that “this practice violates the Fourth Geneva Convention’s prohibitions against collective punishment (art. 33) and illegal acts of destruction (art. 53), as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (art. 25)” (Giacomelli 2001:3).

In April-May 2002, a donor-led damage assessment exercise estimated the number of damaged and destroyed private dwellings in the OPT since the start of the 2nd intifada, for any reason, at 40,000. Of this, 2,800 housing units were totally destroyed as a result of IDF activity and the rest had sustained moderate and serious damages. Since that time the number of damaged dwellings and houses put in ruins has continued to increase due to heavy military campaigns and the reoccupation of major towns and urban areas (United Nations 2002a).

We have received a Table from the PCBS, and produced jointly by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) and the PCBS and based on unpublished data from the Ministry of Housing and Public Works, which concurs pretty well with the UN assessment, although covering a slightly longer time period of two years (Table 16).

56

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

Table 16 Number of damaged buildings in the OPT from 28/9/2000 to 20/8/2002 by Governorate/ district, building type and estimated value of damage

57

Governorate/ district Total No. of damaged security buildings

No. of damaged public buildings

No. of partly damaged buildings

Palestinian Territory 39517 411 118 36349

West Bank 31081 74 117 28979

Jenin 3863 6 1 3011

Tulkarm 2141 4 22 2095

Qalqiliya 638 10 11 600

Salfit 423 1 1 415

Nablus 5502 14 26 4588

Ramallah/ AlBireh 4576 15 49 4500

Jericho 30 9 0 20

Bethlehem 7733 4 7 7650

Hebron 6175 11 0 6100

Gaza Strip 8436 337 1 7370

North Gaza 981 0 0 865

Gaza 1314 337 0 924

Deir Al- Balah 625 0 0 478

Khan Yunis 2686 0 0 2553

Rafah 2830 0 1 2550

5.2 133

12.1 279

29.0 53

5.3 147

55.9 728

4.3 116

18.6 72

15.2 64

17.1 12

1.7 1

4.6 6

27.6 874

6.2 20

6.0 17

204.5 1911

46.0 845

Estimated value (million USD)

No. of completely damaged buildings

260.4 2639

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

Cost of housingAlthough the information is not abundant, to shed light on the costs related to housing we shall present the information we have managed to gather on costs of building new dwellings, expenditure on housing (nominal and relative to total expenses), and costs of rent.

Construction costsWith reference to housing projects in the Gaza Strip, a report by a consultant to the Ministry of Housing estimated the average housing building costs per square meter to be between 200-300 USD (Waltz 2000:8).

Roughly, material costs are 70% and labour costs are 30% of total construction costs. But, labour costs vary quite a bit, currently from 10-12 USD per day in Gaza to 15 USD per day in the mid West Bank region (Jerusalem and Ramallah). A World Bank representative gave us price examples for the construction of two schools. They cost from 180-250 USD per square meter (the most expensive one in the mid-region), excluding the external infrastructure (connection to water and sewage network, electricity grid) (interview, World Bank staff).

The Palestinian Housing Council (PHC) in 1994 constructed what they describe as low-cost housing units at the price of 300 USD per square meter (interview with top PHC staff representatives). Rebuilding of demolished houses in Rafah in southern Gaza Strip will cost approximately 25,000 USD per housing unit (interview, staff at MOHPW). Reconstruction of refugee camp homes destroyed by the IDF is also estimates to cost on the average 25,000 USD per housing unit (UN 2002:47).

The Palestinian Housing Council has administered and supported various programs to construct new dwellings, finish uncompleted ones and upgrade housing units of poor quality. For example, 408 apartments were constructed in the West Bank at the average cost of 41,000 USD per unit. In Gaza, 1,178 apartments were built at the cost of 34,000 per apartment (PHC 2002).

Our own interviews have revealed the following examples of costs (see, case studies in Appendix 6):

In the Nuseirat area, close to the Nuseirat refugee camp, in Gaza a Palestinian family built a 250 m2 house on a 450 m2 plot, paying 30,000 USD for the land and 15,000 in construction costs. The house totals 170 m2 living area and 80 m2 of storage rooms.

A house of 50 m2 in Gaza City was expanded with a second floor (40-50 m2) and the ground floor improved to a cost 5,000 USD.

A household renting a flat is saving money to buy one, and estimates that a 150 m 2 flat in a good location in Gaza City would cost about 300,000 USD.

An 80 m2 house in very poor shape was purchased for 12,000 USD in a refugee camp in Nablus. The owner renovated the house for 8,000 USD.

A family in Doha, a town outside Bethlehem, is in the process of building a 180 m 2 high-standard house (small villa). The land is worth approximately 40,000 USD. The house has so far cost 40,000 USD, and the owner claims to have saved some 15,000 USD by carrying out much of the work himself.

In Dheisheh refugee camp, Bethlehem, a family built 185 m2, for which it has to date paid 32,600 USD. However, the remaining work will take the total cost of the house up to almost 48,000 USD.

A family bought an apartment of 135 m2 at a good location in the city Nablus on the West Bank for 40,000 USD. It is being improved for 11,500 USD. The owners have saved money on labour costs by conducting a considerable amount of the building work themselves.

To conclude, it would appear that building dwellings in the OPT cost anything from 100 USD to 300 USD per square meter depending on the material chosen, the general quality of the dwelling and its geographic location (leaving aside the cost of extravagant interiors).

58

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

The Al-Aqsa (2nd) Intifada and increased building costsThe West Bank is a land of roadblocks. There are more than 300 of them. Some 120 manned.23 The roads are crowded with signposts to the settlements, and Palestinians are banned from most roads. “The directives of the military command is to freeze all traffic on West Bank roads, including taxis, buses, private vehicles and others according to security needs,” wrote outgoing defense minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer on Oct. 3 in answer to a question by Meretz MK Zahava Galon. To prevent Palestinian traffic, most West Bank towns and villages have been surrounded by hundreds of roadblocks and are under permanent siege and closure. (The Israeli newspaper Haaretz, 3 November 2002).

Israel has applied closures, roadblocks and curfews to a varying degree after the Oslo Accords and the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority. In certain periods, the use of these measure have been “lenient”, but at times their use have been very strict24 and hindered movement of people and goods in and out of towns and villages of the West Bank and contributed to cutting much of the general communication in the OPT, adding to what have been described as a cantonization of the area, converting it into a “Swiss cheese”. Israel’s de facto colonization of the OPT through the expansion of her settlements and the construction of so-called by-pass roads connecting the various settlements have had the same effect.

Since the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Initifada, the 2nd Palestinian ‘uprising’, in September of 2000, the Israeli policies in the OPT – applied to protect her citizens against acts of terror from Palestinians residing in the Occupied West Bank and Gaza – have become much tougher, including a firmer use of the measures mentioned above inhibiting the movement of people and goods. This have affected the housing sector in several ways, such as: (i) Politicians, planners and municipality employees cannot go to work, attend meetings and thus develop housing policies, carry out their duties, such as drawing maps and making area master plans for their communities, manage applications for building permits, etc.; (ii) Many people’s livelihoods are taken away from them, reducing or ruining completely their affordability to housing, because all efforts are now centred around meeting basic needs, such as securing food on the table; and (iii) Prices on building materials have risen sharply.25

While (i) and (ii) are discussed elsewhere in the report, we shall devote some more space to and add information about the third consequence of the intifada here.

According to the World Bank, transport prices increased 15% between September 2000 and December 2001 in consequence of movement restrictions (World Bank 2002a). Comparing the average of 2001 and the average for the first 10 months of 2002, The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics estimates that transportation cost increased by 16% for the OPT overall, with the biggest change in the West Bank, the region heaviest affected by the Israeli closure policies. The average transport cost per truckload of goods nearly doubled from its pre-Intifada level to June 2001. The PCBS furthermore estimates that the increased transportation costs have driven housing expenses up by 7.5% from 2001-2002 (up just about 11% in the West Bank, 3.5-4% in Gaza and Jerusalem), as the costs of construction materials have surged (PCBS 2002: http://www.pcbs.org/english/cpi/major_02.htm, World Bank 2002a, 2002c: 101-105). According to the World Bank (2002b) housing costs have increased 12% during the Intifada.

23 A recent report states that, “[a]ccording to Palestinian sources, there were 97 armed blockades in the West Bank and 32 in the Gaza Strip during the last quarter of 2001.” (JCSER 2002:1). 24 According to the Web site of the Palestinian Red Crescent Society, between 18 June and midnight 30 November 2002, the 7 major towns of the West Bank had more time with curfew than they had without (http://www.palestinercs.org/Presentation%20 PowerPoint%20Curfew%20Tracking%20July%202002_files/frame.htm). 25 The various economic and humanitarian aspects of Israel’s closure policy are documented and discussed in Bocco et al. 2001, Egset and Endresen 2001, Pedersen et al. 2001, Pedersen, Christophersen and Sletten 2001, Oxfam 2002, Shtayyeh 2002, UNSCO 2002, World Bank 2002a.

59

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

In addition to the cost of construction material, the World Bank has identified two other causes of increased housing costs: “First”, it is argued, “the heavy military presence at the outskirts of many Palestinian urban areas may have induced households to relocate closer to the center of towns or villages, putting upward pressure on housing prices there. Second, the significant drop in construction activity26, of which was a significant part in residential housing, has slowed down the expansion of the housing stock and the supply of housing opportunities.” The World Bank goes on to say that, “The increase in housing costs probably reflects less the actual destruction of residential dwellings, which, although it has occurred during the Intifada, only amounts to a tiny fraction of the total stock of residential dwellings.” (World Bank 2002b:15).

Average expenditure on housingUnfortunately, the expenditure data we have from the PCBS on housing are becoming a bit out-dated. But they show that for January-December 1998, the average expenditure on housing for a 7-person household was almost 40 Jordanian Dinar (JD), which equals about 56 USD.27 It varied between the two regions, with 43 JD (60.5 USD) in the West Bank and 32 JD (45 USD) in the Gaza Strip. Expenditure on housing as a percentage of total expenditure equalled 7,5% in the West Bank, 6.7% in the Gaza Strip and 7.3% in the OPT overall (http://www.pcbs.org/english/househol/ exp_conc.htm).28

Monthly rent in rented dwellingsWe have not found much information about the cost of renting a residence. In fact the only solid data we have is that which is presented in Table 17. In line with expectations, the data (from the PCBS: http://www.pcbs.org/english/house/house_01/hou00_23.htm) indicate that the monthly rent is lower in the Gaza Strip, at 100 USD versus 123 USD in the West Bank with the average monthly rent for the OPT overall being 120 USD. A second source of information is a consultancy report, where the authors based on a national household survey estimate that “those who do not own their own houses where they live, […] spend up to 20% of their income on rent” (Ziara, Naser and Touqan 1997).29

Table 17 Proportion of households living in rented housing units in the OPT by monthly rent and region

Damaged and demolished houses“House and property demolition has emerged as a consistent pattern [in the OPT]” (Giacomelli 2001). Although such demolitions may not have had a great affect on the general housing costs or

26 In one report the World Bank refers to a construction materials manufacturer that only operates at 65% of production capacity (World Bank 2002b).27 1 USD = 0.71 JD.28 Expenditure data do not include the estimated rent value of dwelling. 29 However, we refrain from using this report much, because the methodology is not clearly stated (but 4,500 questionnaires were administered), it is hard to interpret some of the tables, there are inconsistencies, and arguments in the text are not always supported by data.

60

West Bank Gaza StripPalestinian

TerritotyLess than 50 41.1 25.6 39.350 - 99 19.4 59.1 24.0100 - 149 18.6 12.9 17.9150 + 20.9 2.4 18.8Number of Households (n) 325 60 385Average Monthly Rent (JD) 87.4 71.6 85.6Average Monthly Rent (USD) 123.1 100.8 120.6

Monthly Rent Jordanain Dinar

(JD)

Region

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

expenditure, there is no doubt that the many partly or completely destructed dwellings resulting from actions of the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) have brought much suffering upon the Palestinian population and incurred heavy material and economic losses on a population whose material conditions have deteriorated steadily the past two years, and where a majority at present may be living below the poverty line (Bocco et al 2001, World Bank 2002a, PCBS 2002b).

There are many statistical ‘initiatives’, but no attempt to coordinate the damage assessment (interview, Gaza Municipality). To date a joint, harmonized methodology to monitor and quantify losses caused by Israeli house demolitions and land seizure is lacking, although an initiative is under way to improve the situation. This initiative is born out of the fact that the various government and non-government assessments of this sort in the OPT vary considerably. In one example, four NGOs came up with very different figures for the same time period (9, 21, 54 and 72 demolished houses, respectively) (interview with representative of HIC). Nevertheless, we shall present some of the available data to indicate the magnitude of the problem.

In October 2001, during its invasion of areas under the control of the PA, Israel renewed its activity of demolishing houses as punishment, a policy it had ceased in 1997. Such demolitions are carried out to punish suspected Palestinian perpetrators of attacks in Israel or against Israeli settlements, and leave the suspects’ family members homeless. In the period 1987-1997 Israel completely demolished 449 houses as punishment, partially demolished 62 houses, completely sealed at least 296 houses and partially sealed 118 houses. In the period October 2001 to 2 December 2002, Israel completely demolished 96 houses, partially demolished 1 and sealed one house, as reprimands. (http://www.btselem.org).

Since 1987 the Israeli authorities have administratively demolished at least 2,450 Palestinian houses in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and hundreds of other building structures. These are demolitions justified by the lack of building permits.30 According to B’Tselem, The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, which has collected the data just given, it is not possible to determine precisely the scope of Israel’s destruction in the Gaza Strip, because in some of the areas where demolitions have taken place, principally near the settlements, entry is prohibited and thorough investigation thus impossible. On the other hand, UNRWA has reported that the IDF has demolished 655 houses in the refugee camps of the Gaza Strip since the eruption of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. The International Committee of the Red Cross has published figures supporting the UNRWA estimates. This has been contested, however, by the Israeli Defense Minister, who admits having destroyed only half as many structures, including farm buildings and walls. (http://www.btselem.org).

UNRWA has estimated that in the Jenin refugee camp alone 800 dwellings have been destroyed and many more damaged, leaving 4-5,000 people homeless. According to UNRWA, during the first three months of 2002, the IDF demolished more than 200 refugee shelters and damaged more than 2,000 others in the OPT (referred in United Nations 2002b). Also, in April-May 2002, a donor-led damage assessment exercise estimated the number of damaged and destroyed private dwellings in the OPT at 40,000. Of this, 2,800 housing units were totally destroyed as a result of IDF activity and the rest had sustained moderate and serious damages. Since that time the number of damaged dwellings and houses put in ruins have continued to increase due to heavy military campaigns and the reoccupation of major towns and urban areas. (United Nations 2002a).

So, what are the costs of these demolitions? The World Bank (2002a:21) has estimated physical damage to private buildings between 28 September 2000 and 31 December 2001 to be about 47.5

30 There are more demolitions orders handed out than carried out. For example, in 1997 Civil Administration data shows that there were 701 homes built without permits in Area C (West Bank). In the same year the Civil Administration gave 615 demolition orders and carried out 233 demolitions (LAW 1998). According to one estimate 282 houses were demolished for administrative reasons in East Jerusalem between 1987 and October 2002 (JCSER 2000). Although not having figures for exactly the same years, the data of B’Tselem seem to concur with this (http://www.btselem.org). For details on administrative demolitions in East Jerusalem, see Land and Water Establishment 1995, HIC 2002.

61

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

million USD, adding up to 16% of total damage in that period.31 The Palestinian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) has defined that there is a need of 48 million USD to reconstruct and repair private homes in the West Bank (except Jericho and Jerusalem) damaged between the start of the 2nd Intifada and May 2002 (MOPIC 2002).32 The UN ‘Humanitarian Plan of Action for the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ suggests that it will cost some 30 million USD to cater for 50% of the housing needs resulting from IDF activities during the two years of Intifada (United Nations 2002a).33 The Plan envisages UNRWA and the Ministry of Housing and Public Works to take the lead in providing emergency shelter repairs and reconstruction, especially for the most vulnerable families. On the other hand, MOPIC and the PCBS has put the value of damages to all buildings during the first two years of the intifada at 260 million USD (see, Table 16).

Current and future needs for housing“There is still need to define the housing demand for a full picture of the housing situation.” (Draft National Plan of Human Rights – the Hosing Sector, prepared by Shaheen and El-Masry 2002:47). Beneath we attempt to fill in some of the gaps in this regard.

Population growth and housing needsThe yearly need for housing can be captured by the number of new households forming each year, assuming of course that the overall household structures (nuclear, extended, etc.) are maintained as today. The number of households in the future depends both on the total population size and how people in different age groups form households. This is difficult to project, because household formation is related to many socio-economic factors such as kinship, marriage age, income, education opportunities, structure of the labour market, etc. in addition to characteristics of the housing market such as the supply of dwellings and their cost. If, for example, the supply of affordable housing increases more than the population grows the average household size may decrease.

Our forecasts of households in the OPT has been made in a very straightforward way. We have assumed that the average annual household growth rate for the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the OPT overall is identical to the population growth rate (see, Table 2 in Population Appendix). This implies that we foresee no change in the average household structure and keep this variable and other household formation factors constant. Therefore, under the assumption of stable household sizes in the West Bank and Gaza regions, the number of new households each year will equal the population increase divided by household size for that year. We have applied the household size as it was found in the 1997 Population Census carried out by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (West Bank: 6.1; Gaza Strip: 6.9; OPT: 6.4). The projected number of households and the number of new households during the period 1997-2010 are displayed in Table 18 (identical to Table 3 in Population Appendix).

31 Infrastructure suffered 13% of the damage, public buildings 13%, and agriculture 58% of all damage.32 The 48 million USD are broken down thus: 13 million USD, repair of partially damaged houses; 1 million USD, rent for temporary housing; 34 million USD, reconstruction of totally destroyed houses.33 Two-thirds of the amount is for reconstruction of destroyed dwellings; a bit less than a third is for repairs; and just over 1 million USD is for relocation fees and cash subsidies for household effects.

62

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

Table 18 New households 1997-2010 based on an average annual population and household growth of 2.6% for the West Bank, 3.75% for the Gaza Strip and 3% for the OPT overall, and household sizes as found by the 1997 Census

Current housing stockAccording to the 1997 Census figures the Palestinian population lived in about 401,000 residential dwellings with 6,000 housing units being used for work only, 24,000 being closed and 35,000 vacant (Table 19). Compared to a total number of 442,000 households at the same time, this may seem low, but is partly explained by the fact that some households share the same housing unit (3% in the West Bank, 16% in the Gaza Strip) and partly due to the fact that the population figure is adjusted for Palestinian residents in annexed Jerusalem while the housing unit figure is not.

Table 19 Housing units by utilization and region (1997 Census)

An interesting feature of Table 19 is the 5% closed and 7.5% vacant dwellings. According to the CBS, ‘closed’ refers to a situation whereby the fieldworker ascertains that there are people residing in the dwelling, but that they are not at home. This could perhaps, and we are guessing here for the lack of clear explanations from the PCBS, be the case if the household is staying with relatives and friends, or traveling including staying outside of the OPT for a shorter or longer time. ‘Vacant’, according to the PCBS, refers to habitable housing units, which usually are empty because they are for rent or for sale. However, due to existing rental laws, a good share of these dwellings may be ‘out of circulation’ for an extensive period of time. The risk is, from an owner or landlord’s perspective, that he, or she, may not be able to get the house or apartment back if and when he should need or want it, because he cannot, with reference to the law and use of the

63

Number % Number % Number %Residential 262629 83.6 135015 88.6 397644 85.2

Residential & Work 2975 0.9 656 0.4 3631 0.8

Work 4808 1.5 1425 0.9 6233 1.3

Closed 16441 5.2 7547 5.0 23988 5.1

Vacant 27377 8.7 7778 5.1 35155 7.5

Total 314230 100.0 152421 100.0 466651 100.0

* West Bank: Does not include those parts of Jerusalem which were annexed by Israel in 1967.

Source, PCBS 2002: http://www.pcbs.org/inside/f_pophos.htm

Utilization West Bank* Gaza Strip Palestinian Territories

YearTotal households

New housholds

Total households

New housholds

Total households

New housholds

1997 298,692 146,400 442,528

1998 306,458 7,766 151,890 5,490 455,804 13,2761999 314,426 7,968 157,586 5,696 469,478 13,6742000 322,601 8,175 163,495 5,909 483,562 14,0842001 330,989 8,388 169,626 6,131 498,069 14,5072002 339,594 8,606 175,987 6,361 513,011 14,9422003 348,424 8,829 182,587 6,600 528,402 15,3902004 357,483 9,059 189,434 6,847 544,254 15,8522005 366,777 9,295 196,537 7,104 560,581 16,3282006 376,313 9,536 203,907 7,370 577,399 16,8172007 386,098 9,784 211,554 7,647 594,721 17,3222008 396,136 10,039 219,487 7,933 612,562 17,8422009 406,436 10,300 227,718 8,231 630,939 18,3772010 417,003 10,567 236,257 8,539 649,867 18,928

West Bank Gaza Strip Palestinian Territory

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

legal system evict the tenant should he (or she) wish to stay.34 It should be noted, though, that vacant housing units are no particularity of the OPT but rather normal in the region. For example has 11% empty residential dwellings been reported for Jordan (Drury and Abu-Sharar 1998). Nevertheless, a law that enabled more owners to put their empty units out on the market would make housing more accessible to people, with the increased supply even contributing to lower prices. Below we shall assume that the relative share of vacant and closed housing units has been stable since 1997 and will remain so in the foreseeable future.

Housing deficit in 2002 caused by low building activity Judged by data available from the PCBS and presented in Table 20, the construction of new residential dwellings kept up with demand, as defined by the need for dwellings by new households in Table 17, in the years 1998-2000, with on the average 15,400 new dwellings per year. For the year 1998, 11,101 units were licensed in the West Bank and 1,688 in the Gaza Strip (PCBS 1999), while for the year 2000 the figures were 11,556 and 1,882 for the two regions, respectively (PCBS Web site). However, compared to the years immediate before, the situation changed dramatically in 2001 with only about 7,500 housing units being licensed. This should be seen as a direct conesquence of the situation with IDF incursions, closures and curfews, and the reduced construction activity that has followed. There is little reason to believe that the number of new, licensed dwelling units has increased in 2002. Hence, there is an unmet housing need of at least 15,000 units for the newly established households resulting from the low building activity the past two years. Furthermore, although we lack exact statistics here, interviews and own observations have informed us that a considerable share of the recently constructed residential dwellings are empty. Therefore, and assuming about 8% of the housing units licensed 1998-2002 to be vacant, the unmet need increases to some 20,000 dwellings.

Table 20 Number of licensed housing units in the OPT 1996 - 2001

34 The Jordanian “Renter and Owner Law (No. 62) for the year 1953” is still applied in the OPT. According to paragraph 4-1, the courts as a rule cannot issue a decision to force any tenant out of a rented house (property) even if the contract date has expired. Such a decision can only be taken given the following conditions: (i) If the tenant has not paid the rent, within 30 days from receiving an order from the owner or from the court; (ii) If the tenant has damaged the house or allowed others to damage the house; (iii) If the tenant has used the house (property) for illegal purposes; (iv) If the tenant has rented the property or part of it to others, or left the property empty for more than 6 months; (v) If the owner needs the property to live in it, and the tenant has found another, comparable house at a similar price in the same area, and the court has found it acceptable; (vi) If the owner wants to carry out substantial changes such as re-building the house, and has informed the tenant in a written statement 6 months in advance; and (vii) If the tenant built his own dwelling that could be used by him. (The above is our own translation from Arabic).

64

New Housing Units

Existing Housing Units Total

1996 12,082 1,651 13,733 1997 13,050 2,725 15,775 1998 12,789 2,715 15,504 1999 14,071 3,207 17,278 2000 10,708 2,730 13,438 2001 5,824 1,822 7,646

Total 68,524 14,850 83,374 Note: The data does not include the Camps and those

parts of the Jerusalem which were annexed by Israel in 1967.

"New units" refers to licensed and newly constructed dwellings.

"Existing units" refers to licensed dwellings built before the year if licensing.

Number of Licensed Housing Units

Year

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

The Palestinian Population Census was implemented towards the end of 1997. If we assume a building activity in 2002 about the same as the previous year, the housing stock in 2002 would be about 462,000 residential dwellings (Table 21). If we compare this figure with the estimated number of households for the same year, 513,000 (see, Table 18), we realize that there is a shortage of 51,000 dwelling units. Put in a different way, 51,000 households share their living quarters with at least one more household. We shall return to the issue of such multi-household dwellings, and dwellers, below.

Table 21 Estimated housing stock 2002 based on number of housing units in 1997 Census and licensed housing units in the following years (‘vacant’ and ‘closed’ dwellings excluded)

Housing deficit in 2002 caused by inadequate housingIn earlier sections we have pictured some aspects of the housing conditions in the OPT. One important question in any assessment of housing needs is obviously that of housing adequacy: What are the needs for housing improvements? Is a part of the housing stock of so poor a quality that it is beyond repair, leaving the construction of new units the only option? To what extent are people residing together out of necessity and not choice, that is, to what extent is overcrowding a problem that can be solved by building new housing units only? Below, we will discuss these issues briefly.

An OPT housing assessment report for the Ministry of Housing has taken the following as its point of departure when reviewing housing needs (Waltz 2000):

i. Each average family household (6-7 persons) needs minimum 3 rooms;35

ii. A kitchen;

iii. A bathroom (or shower); and

iv. A toilet inside the dwelling.

v. No room should host more than 3 persons; and

vi. Multi-household dwellings (what Waltz calls ‘composite families’) should disappear.

We shall present statistics according to these assumptions and in doing so repeat some of the key Census and survey results already presented in this Appendix. However, we will first make a brief comment on each of the items: Item (i) is by Waltz taken to mean, that all dwelling units consisting of 1 or 2 rooms are considered inadequate and a sign of ‘housing poverty’. This assumption is dubious, because one can easily think of persons who may want or choose to reside together on limited space (two rooms) for shorter or longer time, and in doing so conforming to traditional norms (e.g. two newly-weds, old couple without children, close friends of the same sex, brothers or sisters). Although we do not think this is an appropriate measure of inadequate housing, we will present data on it below. Items (ii)-(iv) are unambiguous and easy to quantify.

35 Waltz is of the opinion that each family ought to have 4 rooms. But, she says, a 3-room dwelling is acceptable under the current circumstances because the present social, cultural and economic circumstances do not allow households to have a separate living room in addition to 3 bedrooms (for parents, boys, girls).

65

Estimated housing stock 2002

1997 Census - Base 401,275

New dwellings 1998 15,504

New dwellings 1999 17,278

New dwellings 2000 13,438

New dwellings 2001 7,646

New dwellings 2002 (estimate) 7,500Total no. of dwellings 2002 462,641

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

That a separate kitchen, bathroom and toilet are basic requirements of a decent, modern residential dwelling is indisputable. These three items also capture the availability of tapped water and a sewage system, whether through private solutions or connection to public networks. Item (v) implies that any shelter with a higher density than 2.99 persons per room is considered inadequate. This is frequently used as a cut-off point and measure of housing density in the region, including in the OPT, and we have no objections against using it. We also concur with Waltz that ‘multi-household dwelling’ (vi) is a good measure of poor housing. It indicates a form of living arrangement where two or more households camp together out of necessity rather than choice. Here we should remind the reader of the definition of a household: one or more persons who reside in the same dwelling and share meals and pool other resources together. A multi-household dwelling is accordingly a dwelling where at least two groups of persons share living space, but they do not as a rule eat together, nor do they pool economic and others resources together and act as one, sole entity. As a consequence, multi-household dwelling is a direct measure of housing shortage.

Table 22 displays the housing situation per date (2002), paying due attention to a range of assumptions about the population and its growth since the 1997 Census, including a stable household and headship structure and a steady household formation process. If we accept that ‘multi-household dwelling’ is a solid indicator of housing shortage, then the OPT is currently short of no less than 51,000 housing units, for this reason alone. This figure is the discrepancy between the estimated number of households and the number of available dwellings, that is dwellings in actual use, in 2002, and has already been presented above. It can also be deduced from Table 22, which tells us that 36,000 housing units are multi-household units, and Table 9, which indicated that in almost one-third of the multi-household dwellings there are 3 or more households camping together. Table 21 furthermore shows that about 105,000 households are overcrowded (having 3 or more persons per room). It also indicates that there are 7,000 households without a kitchen, almost 12,000 households lacking a separate bathroom, and 2,500 households in need of an inside toilet.

Table 22 Proportion and number of 2002 households by certain housing indicators and region

There is an open question as to what degree these housing conditions liabilities accumulate, that is to what extent the households listed on the various indicators in Table 22 are the same households, or to what extent households have only one or a limited number of housing conditions problems each and we as a result have a longer list of affected households. Since we do not have access to the (raw) data and can carry out more in-depth analysis, but rather depend on available statistics, we are confined to speculation. We would like to make two comments: First, it is likely that a substantial proportion of the 51,000 multi-household dwellings also are overcrowded (density of 3 or more). (We prefer to leave the ‘less than 2 rooms’ indicator out of the discussion since we do not think it is a very good indicator. But, when that is said, there is probably a huge overlap between this indicator and ‘3 or more persons per room’.) Second, the poorest housing conditions are found among the poorest segments of the population. Hence, we must assume that a missing kitchen, bathroom and/or toilet frequently are found in the same households, and that these attributes tend to go together with crowded conditions.

66

Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage Number1-2 rooms 23.5 79,805 24.7 43,469 23.9 122,610

Lack kitchen 1.4 4,754 1.6 2,816 1.4 7,182

Lack bathroom 2.6 8,829 1.9 3,344 2.3 11,799

Lack toilet 0.4 1,358 0.7 1,232 0.5 2,565

3 or more persons per room 18.8 63,844 24.3 42,765 20.6 105,680

Multi-household dwelling 2.9 9,848 16.2 28,510 7.1 36,424

Proportion and number of householdsWest Bank (339,594) Gaza (175,987) OPT (513,011)Housing indicator

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

We also have to deal with a second question, that is how much of the housing problem defined by inadequate housing standards can be solved through housing renovation and extension, and how many new dwellings ought to be built?

For 51,000 multi-household dwellers there is no way out but to acquire a separate housing unit, which means that as many new apartments or houses have to be built. If 30,000 of the multi-household shelters were also crowded, their housing density problem would be solved with the creation of the 51,000 new housing units (105,000 minus 30,000). There are some 75,000 cramped dwellings (equivalent to 75,000 households) left. If we assume that only 4,000 shelters of those lacking kitchen, bathroom or toilet are not overcrowded, we will have a total number of 79,000 inadequate dwellings, plus the 51,000 as defined by the multi-household dwellers, which gives us a grand total of 130,000 inadequate or lacking units. While a considerable lower figure than that of other studies, 130,000 missing or inadequate housing units is a sizeable number and equals 28% of the total housing stock of the OPT in 2002 (excluding ‘vacant’ and ‘closed’ units).

In many cases, the only solution to a housing problem is a new dwelling. We have already mentioned the case of the multiple household residential units. But there are other circumstances too, where construction something new is the only way forward, for example if the present place of living is beyond repair, or if horizontal and vertical extension is impossible (which is the case for many refugee camp shelters and, for example, in the old city of Nablus). If one-forth of the inadequate housing units other than the multiple-household dwellings is of this category, it suggests that a total of 71,000 new shelters have to be built to alleviate the substandard housing conditions of 2002, while another 59,000 units need renovation and/or extension.

Housing deficit in 2002 due to damaged and demolished housesOur housing needs estimates so far have been based on the situation in 1997, and have not taken into account the direct effect of the Israeli occupation and military activities since then on the housing situation. We have already presented data on damaged and demolished houses during the Al-Aqsa Intifada. We just like to repeat here that some 40,000 private and refugee homes were reported damaged and destroyed during the first 18 months of the Intifada. Of these, 2,800 had been completely demolished by the IDF, while the rest had suffered damages of varying degree of severity (United Nations 2002a:46).

Although house demolitions and damages are devastating to the individual families affected, we will suppose no special impact from such Israeli offenses during the Intifada on the housing needs assessment. The explanation is that house demolitions, whether carried out for administrative or punitive reasons, as documented above, have been going on for many years and already are part of the overall housing picture in the OPT. While the Israeli aggression has been more intense and as a result its damaging effect on the shelter sector greater the past two years than in the years preceding the Al-Aqsa Intifada, we believe humanitarian assistance to and emergency repair and construction projects carried out by the UNDP, UNRWA, the PA and others will fill most of the housing needs and gaps in the housing provision created by the Israeli policy.

Conclusion: Needs in 2002 and 2010With the 1997 Census as base year, the population growth will have created about 207,000 new households with a need for as many dwellings by the year 2010 (deduced from Table 18). This is lower than other much-cited estimates. For one, it is low compared to the 1998 estimate made by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC 1998), which suggested that 280,000 new housing units were needed in the 1997-2010 period. However, while MOPIC assumed net in-migration in this period, our estimates are based on natural population growth and keeping net migration at zero. Our estimate is also lower than the figure given by Waltz in her report titled “A Social Oriented Housing Programme and Policy for Palestine” to the Ministry of Housing (2000). She found that there was a need for 318,000 new residential dwellings due to population growth to the year 2010, assuming a higher growth rate than we have.36

36 However, for both MOPIC and Waltz, it is unclear how, exactly, they have reached their figures, although both claim to base their calculations on the 1997 Census and they reveal some of their assumptions.

67

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

While the construction (licensing) of residential dwellings kept up with population growth in the years 1997-2000, the 2nd Intifada has deprived the population in the Occupied Palestinian Territories of 20,000 dwellings to date. There is in addition an accumulated shortage of 71,000 shelters from earlier years. Moreover, 59,000 housing units are inadequate in the sense that they either lack one or more infrastructure amenities or are too crowded, and thus need upgrading.

Between 2002 and 2010, 136,000 new households will have been established indicating that an average of 17,000 new dwellings shall have to be put up every year to house them.

If the current stalemate in the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians last, the closure policies of the Israelis continue, and the Palestinian construction sector as a consequence does not pick up and improve its performance in the production of private housing, the situation will deteriorate. For each year the output stays at the 2001 level, from 8-10,000 new households will be denied their right to separate housing. The effect will be a higher proportion of extended households and multi-household dwellers, and increased residential density. Moreover, if the current, difficult situation in the OPT should persist and if the international donor community should not manage to close the housing gaps generated by Israeli closure policies and IDF actions, our assumptions above in the subsection about damaged and destroyed dwellings shall not hold, and as a consequence the housing problem will rise even further.

68

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

Appendix 5 Obtaining a house in the Occupied Palestinian Territories

Fafo’s Jerusalem Office has made a list of four ways of building, buying or owning a house in the West Bank and Gaza Strip:

1. Step by step, without completing the building process

This approach could for instance mean adding a room adjacent to another room. It is quite common to see part of the house incomplete. This happens due to lack of money, credit and loans; because of difficulties in getting building permits (mainly in C areas); and to avoid the feeling of insecurity that would arise from spending all savings in an environment where loosing job and income is rather commonplace. It is better “to keep some cash for the black day” (Palestinian saying).

2. Completing the first floor; then expand vertically

This is a traditional way of doing it. The family builds a house consisting of one floor only. Then, as the family grows, and especially when a male member of the family marries, it starts building the second floor. The construction process sometimes takes a few months, but it is not unusual that the expansion period takes several years. Lack of means (cash and credit) is a reason for this gradual expansion strategy. Through this process all family members, including the extended family, can contribute and help each other. It is very common in refugee camps, villages and clearly visible in the Gaza Strip.

3. To buy or build a fully complete house

This method is mainly used in towns and cities, but also in a few villages. The owners of such houses generally belong to the upper-middle and upper classes. The richer segments have income from own business or profits from land. The middle class families have one or more family member with a permanent job with the Palestinian Authority, in private business or and international NGO, which in addition to having a decent income would make (some of) them eligible for loans.

4. To buy an apartment

This approach to owning a dwelling is relatively new in the Palestinian Territories, but has become increasingly popular during the past 10 years. Some big building contractors complete the skeleton of a building, and then divide it into apartments and sell them on credit. The buyer pays a large sum at the beginning and then pays the rest in monthly down payments to the contractor over several years. The exact contract between contractor and buyer can vary considerably, even within the same building complex. The size of down payments also differs a lot from case to case. Fafo’s staff knows of instalments ranging from 300 USD to 1,000 USD. The buyer will complete the apartment, including all inside construction and finishing. A second way of buying an apartment, but to date not very common, is to purchase it through a leasing company with fairly long-term payments, to be paid to the company until the total costs of the apartment is covered. Only when the last instalment is paid, does the buyer receive the papers and legally speaking owns the apartment. This method has been applied in large building units, and is seen more frequently in the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem than in the West Bank.

69

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

Appendix 6 Case studies from the West Bank and Gaza Strip This Appendix aims at shedding light on the living conditions of Palestinian families in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), with a particular stress on issues pertaining to housing, including the standard of dwelling, the costs of rent and construction, and the funding of repair, improvement and new building. Our 11 cases have been selected to show the diversity of situations and arrangements, and do not represent in any way the “average” or typical state of affairs.

Eight case study interviews have been conducted in November of 2002 by Fafo’s offices in Jerusalem (4 studies) and Gaza (4 studies), while 3 cases (No. 5, 6 and 7) are based on information from the archives of CHF International in Gaza City, a USAID funded NGO providing loans for house renovation through local banks. We would like to thank CHF for allowing us access to their files. Cases have been anonymized by changing the names of families and individuals.

Case no. 1Nusseirat refugee camp, 12 km to the south west of Gaza City

Household compositionName Age Sex Relation to household head Income statusRaied 27 Male Head Has IncomeRuba 24 Female Wife NoThaeir 5 Male Son NoMnar 4 Female Daughter NoSuaad 3 Female Daughter NoHusan 1 (Twin) Male Son NoMohamed 1 (Twin) Male Son No

None of the household members suffer from chronic illness.

Household incomeThe household relies totally on the income of the head of the household, Raied, who is working for the UN with a monthly income of 800 USD. The household’s income has been stable for a long time (before and during the 2nd intifada). The household receives no other income or any transfers from any other source, and does not get food or material support (such as intifada assistance from UNRWA, the trade unions).

Housing situationBefore the intifada

The household lived in a shared house with the family of the head for 6 years in Nusseirat camp. The extended family of the head consists of about 30 members (father, mother, 5 married sons). During that time the (now) 7-member household had one room.

During the intifada

In august 2002, the household moved to its current residence, a new house built near the old one in the Nusseirat area (12 km from Gaza).

The new house contains 3 rooms, kitchen and bathroom in addition to 4 storerooms (making up 250 m2, including the storerooms). The new house is, however, not completed, as it still needs some work on the outside and some finishing inside, like paint. The four storerooms, covering 80 m2of the house, are not in use.

The head plans to either rent them out, or to open a business there. The rooms are easily converted into living area.

70

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

Living and housing standardsDuring the intifada many families in Gaza experienced severe deterioration of living conditions, due to the closures that led to unemployment when people lost their jobs in Israel.

The living standard of this household is quite good and above average. Despite the intifada it has experience no change in living conditions, because the head of household has stable and good income (800 USD).

However, the housing conditions of the household have undergone major changes, as they moved from one room to a new house with 3 rooms and separate kitchen and bathroom.

The household has easy access to schools, markets, hospitals and other institutions.

Due to the intifada (the closures), the household has experienced some problems in obtaining building materials, especially cement, which is causing a delay in finishing the house (about 6 months).

The household needsLike most Palestinian families, the household needs about 450 USD per month to cover its running living expenses (food, clothes, electricity, phone, etc.). The rest of the household head’s salary covers other needs, including completing the building of the house. Raied saves almost half his salary to complete the building of the new house.

Next on the household’s priority list is to expand their house vertically, that is to add a new floor to the house to have one room for each son/daughter. It is estimated that this process will take about 7-9 years. Raied would like to continue the building process beyond that point, and to add more floors with separate apartments for his sons.

Building costsThe total cost of building the house is estimated to 45,000 USD (including the 450 m2 land):

30,000 USD cost of the land

15,000 USD cost of the building

Sources of funds 30,000 USD savings for 7 years

5,000 USD gold sale (wife’s gold and gold savings)

10,000 USD borrowed from relatives and friends

The household pays no interest on the loans, and the payback time is 2-4 years.

71

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

Case no. 2Al Daraj area, Gaza city

Household compositionName Age Sex Relation to household head Income statusNahed 36 Male Head Has incomeJehad 32 Female Wife NoGhada 15 Female Daughter NoReiad 12 Male Son NoAlia 11 Female Daughter NoMohamed 10 Male Son NoShimag 4 Female Daughter NoKhaleel 2 Male Son No

None of the household members suffer from chronic illness.

Household incomeThe economy of the household depends on unstable daily income of the household head, Nahed, who is working in Gaza in a shoe shop owned by a relative of his. The income of the head is about 170 USD a month (6-7 USD a day).

Furthermore, the household receives some intifada aid, but not on a regular basis (106 USD twice since the start of the intifada; 10 times some food at the value of approximately 26 USD each time).

Before the intifada Nahed used to work in Israel as a construction worker with a monthly pay of about 960 USD. After the outbreak of the intifada, however, he lost his job, which has made covering the family’s expenses very challenging.

Housing situationBefore the Intifada

The household used to live in a small old house consisting of 50 m2, including two rooms, kitchen and bathroom, and they lived in this house for 16 years. Such a house is, according to the head, small for a family of 8 members.

Current situation

In 2001, the household improved the situation with building a second floor with additional two rooms, and they renewed the two old rooms and the kitchen.

Living and housing standardsThe household is living under very difficult circumstances, due to the low and unstable income. The household’s living standard was very good before the intifada compared to the situation today. “Having 8 family members gives me more responsibly, and it is a challenge to ensure the most needed food, education, transport, etc.”, the head of Nahed said.

Adding two rooms and renovating the old ones, makes the housing conditions better than before, but the household needs an additional two rooms, according to the household head.

The household needsBefore the 2nd intifada the household spent most of the income on basic needs, such as food, clothing, education, electricity, which, according to the head, this cost about 640 USD a month.

But today, due to the low income (170 USD a month), the household cannot spend like before. For instance, it has stopped paying electricity bills, is prevented from buying new clothes, and cannot pay for school transportation any longer.

The household’s first priority is to improve the living conditions, something that is impossible without a good and stable income.

72

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

For the longer term, the second priority of the household is to purchase a piece of land to build a new and larger house, or to buy a big flat.

Cost of improving the houseThe total cost of improving the house was about 5,000 USD.

Source of funds 3,000 USD in savings (from work in Israel before the intifada)

2,000 USD in Provident Fund37 (working in Israel)

Case no. 3Khan Younis refugee camp, 30 km south of Gaza City

Household compositionName Age Sex Relation to household head Income statusSameera 46 Female Head Has incomeTagreed 19 Female Daughter NoAmal 17 Female Daughter NoIbtisam 15 Female Daughter NoSameh 14 Male Son NoAli 11 Male Son No

None of the household members suffer from chronic illness.

Household incomeThis household is among the poorest families in Gaza. Its income depends mainly on the assistance received from UNRWA and some other sources of support, such as Zakat from wealthy people.

During the 2nd intifada there are different sources of help reaching the people of the Gaza Strip. This particular household receives support from several of them, as some food coming from political fractions such as Fatah and Hamas and some other institutions and NGO's. But, such help does not arrive at regular intervals, except for the support from UNRWA. In addition to assistance of various kinds, the household has income from the needlework of Sameera, the household head. However, this work does not give regular income.

Average monthly income during the intifada

Source of income Amount in USD Type of incomeIncome form UNRWA 64 FoodIncome from ZAKAT 43 CashVarious types of intifada poverty support

53 Food

Income from needlework 32 CashTotal 202

37 All workers registered at the Labour office in Israel can receive two types of remunerations when leaving their jobs: (i) Pay or compensation from the Labour office in Israel (Provident Fund), or (ii) Pay or compensation from the employer (Severance Pay).

73

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

Average monthly income before the intifada

Source of income Amount in USD Type of incomeIncome form UNRWA 64 FoodIncome from ZAKAT 106 CashIncome from needlework 85 CashTotal 255

Housing situationThe household has a small house with two rooms, kitchen and bathroom. The house, which was inherited from the father of Sameera, the household head (her husband died 10 years ago), is very old and the roof is covered with asbestos. The house needs maintenance, and the family could do with more rooms. The size of the house is about 120 m2, and the only way to improve the housing situation is by getting some help or by finding work for the children, according to Sameera.

The household has not been able to afford any maintenance on the house since the death of the head’s husband. Money has been spent on food and education for the five children.

Living and housing standardsThe household’s living conditions are very poor. The family has no stable income to rely on, and the head faces difficulties in securing the basic needs of the family, especially since no one else in the family has any income. The oldest daughter is studying at the university, and the other children attend school. Education is a high priority, because they think university education will help the children getting jobs later. The household wants dearly to improve the housing conditions, but cannot do anything about it under the current difficult circumstances.

The household head says they can improve the house when the children finish their education and get jobs, but that will take at least another 7 years.

The household has good access to schools, markets, health institutions, etc. and receives free health care from UNRWA.

Case no. 4Gaza City (Tal El Hawa Area)

Household compositionName Age Sex Relation to household head Income statusHasan 35 Male Head Has incomeNajah 31 Female Wife Has incomeShreen 11 Female Daughter NoNoor 10 Female Daughter NoTahseen 7 Male Son NoHamed 3 Male Son No

None of the household members suffer from chronic illness.

Household incomeThe household depends on the income of the household head, Hasan, and his wife Najah. Hasan works as a police officer with the Palestinian Authority (PA) for about 350 USD per month, while Najah works as a teacher in a public school with a monthly salary of about 300 USD. The income has been stable for many years (i.e. the same before and during the 2nd intifada).

Housing situationThe household has lived in a rented house since 1996, and before that time it stayed in a shared house with the family of the household head. Current rent is 150 USD a month.

74

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

Living and housing standardsThe household is planning to improve their housing standard by buying a flat. The household’s current living conditions are quite good, and they manage to save 200 USD each month.

A flat of 150 m2 in a good location in Gaza costs about 35,000 USD. The household is trying to get a loan from a local bank. They have saved 18,000 USD, but need another 20,000 USD to purchase the flat.

Housing finance (plans)Source USDSavings 18,000 HasGold savings 5,000 HasBank loan 9,000 Attempts to get two loans (one for the head, one for the wife)Loans from friends /relatives 3,000Total 35,000

The priority for the household is to get the two loans as soon as possible and to borrow the rest of the money from friends. This can be done in 3 to 5 months. The repayment period for a bank loan is 45 months, and the interest rate is 9 % per annum.

Case no. 5 (from the files of CHF)Gaza City (Shejaia area)

Household compositionAbu Ahmad familyFamily size 7Age of household head 32 yearsAge range All 5 children under 18; a housewifeSalary range 450 USD a monthMonthly loan payment 140 USD

Household incomeIyad Abu Ahmad is 32 years old. He works at the President's office in Gaza, making 450 USD monthly, is married and has five children between the ages of two and nine.

Living and housing standardUntil April 2002, Iyad’s family lived in a 60 m2 rented concrete house with two rooms, a bathroom, and a metal cover for a ceiling. The house had no kitchen, no windows from which to let in sunlight, no finished floor, and a substandard bathroom. Iyad and his wife knew that their five children were growing up in unsanitary and unhealthy living conditions and they wanted to provide them with something better.

Each day, Iyad would go to look at the new house he had begun to build four years ago, a house he did not have the means to complete. His only dream was to finish it and to move his family away from their concrete misery.

In January 2002 Iyad applied for a 4,500 USD loan from CHF-International to improve his house. He got the loan through CHF and with this money he was able to finish the house. He installed a fully functional kitchen and two bathrooms, tiled the floors, painted the walls, and finished the carpentry and window glazing in the living room and three bedrooms.

On April 1, 2002, the Abu Hasan family finally moved into their new 150 m2 house, leaving behind them the dismal, dark concrete blockhouse they had once rented.

75

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

“Through the loan from CHF”, Iyad says, “I was able to realize my family's dream of living in a clean residence, and above all, a house of our own. This would not have been possible if it were not for the loan from CHF.”

Case no. 6 (from the files of CHF)Gaza City (Sheekh Radwan area)

Household composition

Household incomeMunir, the head of household, is 33 years old and works in a public school as a teacher for small children in Gaza City. His monthly salary is 250 USD. He has four children and all of them are younger than 12 years of age. His wife is a housekeeper without income.

Living and housing standard The family used to live in a 120 m2 unfinished house, which was build one year ago (2001). The house had no windows, no doors, no kitchen, no bathroom and no fence.

Munir applied for a CHF loan to finish his house, to ensure healthy living conditions for his family. The family received a loan of 2,500 USD, and started to improve the house immediately by installing doors, windows, kitchen, and sanitary facilities.

“Without the loan from the CHF, which was the only institution that agreed to grant us a loan because of my limited salary, we would never have been able to finish our house”, says the household head.

76

Bakir familyFamily size 6Age of household head 33 yearsAge range All 4 children under 12; a housewifeSalary range 250 USD a monthMonthly loan payment 75 USD

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

Case no. 7 (from the files of CHF)Gaza City (Amer project area)

Household composition

Living and housing conditionsSeventeen persons in this household used to live under very unhealthy conditions, with asbestos ceiling and no sanitary facilities.

Two of the brothers in the household applied for two CHF loans to build a better and bigger house where the whole family could live together. Their monthly salaries were 350 USD and 450 USD respectively. They got the two loans, and with that they managed to build a bigger house with a bathroom and kitchen.

The other two brothers would also like to apply for CHF loans to expand the house vertically to accommodate the growing family.

Case no. 8Al Ein refugee camp (Camp no. 1), Nablus

Household CompositionName Age Sex Education Relation to head

of householdIncome status

Hammed 36 Male Tawjihi*, part time student at Open University

Head Has income

Rawend 28 Female 11th grade Wife NoFedaa 11 Male 5th grade Daughter NoFadi 10 Male 4th grade Son NoAbeer 7 Female 2nd grade Daughter NoRabeaa 4 Male Son No* Tawjihi is the public exam after Secondary school, and the grades here decide which subject you can choose at College or University.

Household incomeBefore the intifada

Ayman, the household head, used to work in the construction sector in Israel and earned, on the average, 1,600 USD per month. Nasira, his wife, did some knitting work and sold her products to a dealer in Nablus earning some 160 USD monhtly.

During the intifada

During the first year of the intifada Ayman used to sneak into Israel, but not on a daily basis. The income decreased to about 700 USD a month. Later, he worked very little in Israel, and in the last five months he has not worked there at all. Neither has he worked much in the Nablus area.

One month ago Ayman had a car accident, and the medicines he takes weaken him to some extent. During the last five months, the family has earned just about 80 USD per month while

El Helew familyFamily size 17Age range Most of them under 18 yearsIncome status 4 brothers has incomeSalary range (2 brothers) 350 USD and 450 USDMonthly loan payment 110 USD and 140 USD

77

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

expenses have risen due to the accident. They have received some food support from UNRWA and the local Public Committee on a regular basis.

Housing conditionsDirectly after the couple married, in 1990, they lived in a room together with the Ayman’s parents. Living conditions in this house were difficult, and occasionally they were in conflict with the parents. In 1999 they bought a house, which they described as the ‘cave’, and they started to renew and rebuild it. The house had one bedroom, a very simple kitchen, and a very poor bathroom. They bought the 80 m2 house for 12,000 USD in the most crowded neighbourhood of Al Ein Camp.

Just a few months before the outbreak of the 2nd intifada, they started the renovations and construction activities, which had cost them about 8,000 USD by the time the house became adequate for living. They spent an additional 4,000 USD to furnish it.

The household has carried out a considerable amount of the building work, such as bringing the building material from the main road to the house, which is surrounded by pathways and very narrow streets. Furthermore, Ayman made the building blocks himself, and put together most of the water system.

Not long ago the building process was about to be completed. The household had been working to fix the outside walls before winter. The Israeli army (the IDF) then demolished their neighbour’s house (the home of a suicide attacker), an activity that also did a lot of damage to the renovated house of Ayman’s family. Only the kitchen, sitting room, and bathroom remained undamaged, while three bedrooms and a saloon were left unusable.

The family was suddenly without a habitable dwelling and in a very bad situation.

Engineers from UNRWA then assessed the damages and told Ayman that the house can be repaired. And, UNRWA decided to support the rebuilding with the amount of 2,000 USD.

The governor of Nablus asked the family to rent a house and said that the governor’s office will pay the rent. The family currently rent a house, but Ayman and Nasira are convinced that the governor’s office will cover the rent.

Case no. 9Doha, a town outside Bethlehem where all citizens are refugees

Household CompositionName Age Sex Education Relation to

household headIncome status

Nasser 38 Male BA in Education Head Has incomeNadia 33 Female BA in Education Wife NoNour 12 Female Daughter NoNadim 9 Male Son NoArwa 8 Female Daughter NoJamila 2 months Female Daughter No

Household incomeNasser, the household head, teaches at an UNRWA school, and his monthly income is 600 USD. Last year his wife was working part time on a monthly basis making some 130 USD per month. In 2002 she has been without income.

Nasser sometimes has additional work as a special teacher, and his extra income last year amounted to about 400 USD. Before this current intifada, he used to work in construction during the summer holidays, earning approximately 800 –1,100 USD each year.

78

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

Housing conditionsNasser’s father bought the land on which the family’s house is built about 20 years ago for approximately 3,000 USD. The cost of the land today is 40,000 USD.

They started to build the house in 1987, and up until today it is still incomplete. However, most of the house is finished, except for the entrance. The 180 m2 house resembles a small villa, including two floors, three bedrooms, kitchen, two toilets, and a saloon that will be completed in the future. The walls are made of stone and cement.

The first part of the house was completed in 1992, while the second construction phase started in 2000. One more year is needed to complete it.

Nasser carries out a lot of the non-professional construction work himself, thus keeping the cost of the house as low as possible. Moreover, the family has received help from Nadia’s brother who is an electrician and did a lot of work pay. So far, the household has paid about 40,000 USD and claims to have saved 15,000 USD through own self-help efforts and family labour assistance.

For religious reasons, Nasser rejects the idea of taking a bank loan. However, in 2001 he borrowed first 300 USD and later 400 USD from his sister. This year he has borrowed 400 USD from a colleague at school. He has not repaid the money yet.

Current living and housing conditionsThis family defines itself as belonging to the lower middle-class. Nasser and Nadia believe their living standards are good compared to many other Palestinians. Since Nasser works in the vicinity of his home, he is not directly affected by roadblocks to go to work. However, when curfew is imposed on Bethlehem, it is not easy to obtain food, and when available, it is very expensive. On the other hand, Nasser does not loose his monthly salary, and during periods of curfew he works on the house and on improving the small garden the family owns.

What can the household do (under the current circumstances) to improve its living standards and housing conditions? Since winter is near, Nasser said that he has to fix the outside walls of the house, and he is trying to borrow some money from friends or relatives. He urgently needs 300-400 USD to prevent the house from being affected by water leakage.

However, he is hesitant to spending borrowed money on the house, because he is in need for money to cover the school fees for his children (the school, which is private, has been sending the children home recently because the family has not paid any fees since the school year started in September).

The ultimate housing goal There are two remaining priorities: (i) to complete the interior of the house (sitting room and the entrance), and (ii) to complete the external entrance.

The family expects that all work will be completed after about two more years.

79

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

Case no. 10Dheisheh refugee camp, Bethlehem

Household CompositionName Age Sex Education Relation to

household headIncome status

Samir 42 Male Tawjihi Head Has incomeRuba 39 Female 9th grade Wife NoIyad 18 Male Tawjihi Son NoIlham 16 Female 10th grade Daughter NoIhab 14 Male 8th grade Son NoMohamad 12 Male 6th grade Son NoMuataz 6 Male 1st grade Son No

Household incomeSamir, the household head, drives his own taxi. He pays 2,127 USD yearly for rental of the plate of the car. His average income before the outbreak of the 2nd intifada was 1,300 USD, while it is only half that much today (650 USD). Due to decreased income, the children have been from the private schools to UNRWA schools, which are free of charge for all Palestinian refugees.

The household’s income is generated from the taxi only. Samir bought the car in 1994 and took the needed licenses to drive it. Prior to that, he used to work in the construction sector in Israel. In the beginning he owned the car together with another person, but later, in 1996, he borrowed 2,000 USD from the Palestinian Ex-prisoners Rehabilitation Program and bought the car for himself. The loan was without interest rate, but he paid an administration fee of 80 USD. He paid back 100 USD on a monthly basis.

Housing conditionsNowadays, the family lives in the first floor of a house constructed in 1986. The family spent one year building it. They never calculated how much the house has cost them. The space is 85 m 2, and includes two bedrooms, a saloon, a toilet, and a kitchen.

In 1999 they enlarged the house with a second floor, partly on a new adjacent piece of land. The new floor measures 185 m2 and contains three bedrooms, one sitting room, a kitchen, a saloon, two bathrooms and a veranda. Such a big enlargement was possible because the house they had was in a hill, and the new floor was partly on top of the old ceiling, while the additional 100 m2were built into the highest land.

The extension is still incomplete, lacking internal doors and windows, and a kitchen has to be built. The family hopes the house will be finished so they can move in after two years time, because the current dwelling (the first/ground floor) is too small for the big family. Besides, it is not very healthy, humid and dark as it is.

Costs of the extensionSo far the family has paid about 36,000 USD in building costs. Remaining costs are estimated at 17,500 USD. The family did not have to buy the adjacent land. It had no savings before the extension process was started, and believes in the ‘step-by-step’ construction procedure. During periods of curfew Samir has received building help from some neighbours. “This way we try to fill our time and we succeed in saving money”, he says.

Samir and Ruba are not in a hurry since they manage reasonably well in the old house.

Samir and Ruba never tried to get a bank-loan. They have, however, saved in a jamiya twice. The first time 10 people each paid 120 USD monthly, and the second time 12 people contributed 150 USD per month. The jamiya is quite a popular saving method, and gives you an opportunity to receive a large sum of money in short time. It is mainly an arrangement between friends, relatives, or work colleges, and everyone agrees on a monthly saving sum. If each one in a jamiya of 5 persons saves 100 USD per month, one participant can get 500 USD the first month, the

80

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

second one receives the same amount the next month, and so forth, until everyone has got the same amount. There is no written contract, but there is an understanding between the participants. All of them have to agree about who is going to take the money first, second etc.

In addition to savings through the informal savings clubs/ jamiyas, Samir has used outstanding checks to pay for such items as the cement, the metal and the blocks, but when the intifada started he faced some difficulties in paying and covering some of the checks in the bank.

The ultimate housing goalSamir says that they would like to complete the house, but buying food and covering the children’s education expenses are more important.

Case no. 11Nablus city

Household compositionName Age Sex Education Relation to

household headIncome status

Mujahed 41 Male Electronics (2 yrs) Head Has incomeNahil 41 Female 10th grade Wife NoFadi 15 Male Son NoFakhreya 14 Female Daughter NoMohamad 12 Male Son NoFiras 8 Male Son No

Household incomeBefore the intifada

Mujahed has his own carpenter shop. Before the year 1998 he was working as a carpenter in Israel, earning 45 USD a day. In 1998 he started his own business, after getting some credit from his brother. By the end of 1999 he had managed to pay back his brother, improve his business and increase his income. Some months he earned more than 3,000 USD.

During the intifada

His workshop is located near one of the check-points (Der Sharaf Road). In the beginning of the intifada his income dropped down to about 100 USD monthly. Due to the difficulties in entering Israel, he started to sell some of his products locally, although at very low prices since the design fitted the Israeli market better than the Palestinian market. During the past year or so he has not received any new orders.

The family is a refugee family. Earlier they never used the UNRWA clinic when in need of medical help. These days however, they do, an indication of their dire straits.

Last month the family received 170 USD in support from UNRWA. Furthermore, it currently is given food aid from the local public committee, as well as from the Red Cross (value of 90 USD per month).

Housing conditionsAfter Mujahed got married in 1985, he and his wife started to live in one room at his parents’ house. His family now consists of 6 persons, the youngest child being 8 years of age. Some of the children sleep in the grandmother’s room, while others sleep in the sitting room.

In 2000 they bought an unfinished flat of 135 m2 at a good location for 40,000 USD. They paid 7,000 USD as a first down payment, and started a process of paying the rest by instalments of 300 USD a month. So far, the family has paid 13,000 USD.

81

HSP/GC/19/INF/7

The apartment still lacks some internal construction before it is ready. The family has spent about 10,000 USD on the internal completion of the house, and believes that it has saved a lot on labour while hiring professionals at reasonable costs. To save additionally, Mujahed did all the woodwork.

To cut cost even further, Mujahid and Nahil decided to reduce the standard of the interior of the house and avoid choosing the best quality, as they had planed before the intifada. This saves them more than 40% compared to the original plans.

The family needs 1,500 USD to finish the house and make it habitable for the family. But, getting hold of that amount (taking up an additional loan, and serving it) on top of the 300 USD monthly down payment, is very unrealistic at this point in time. Mujahid has seriously considered selling the apartment, but this will not help much since the housing demand, and therefore also the prices are incredibly low at the moment.

-----

82