ISSN 0014-1690

The Ethical RecordVol. 97 No. 8 £1 October 1992

CONTENTS Page

Rhyme and Reason Peter Heales 3

Sartre: Existentialism & Humanism Part II Tom Rubens 11

Couple Counselling Rita Udall 15

Paglia's Sexual Personae Nicola King 18

View points 21

PROGRAMME OF EVENTS AT THE EtHICAL SOCIETY

The Library, Conway Hall Humanist Centre,

25 Red Lion Square, Holborn, SYCI

All welcome — admission free.

OCTOBER

Sunday, 11thI am ONWARD "BROADLY CHRISTIAN" SOLDIERS! JOHN WHITE, Secretary of the

British Humanist Association's Education Committee, reviews the present state of

the long campaign against compulsory religion in schools with particular reference

to the 1988 Education Act.

3 pm THE HERESIES OF MICHAEL FARADAY. Btu. HORSLEY investigates the

heresies, religious and scientific. held by one of the chief creators of the modern age.

His major achievements in the philosophy of science will be particularly stressed.

Sunday, 18thI I am MAKING THE MIND UP. GRAHAM RICHARDS, Chair of History and Philosophy

Section of the British Psychological Society maintains that changing our ideas about the

mind actually changes the mind - and this makes the history of psychology important.

3 pm THE MENACE OF I ILALTH 'FASCISM'. CHRIS TAME, Director of FOREST, and

proponent of libertarianism, gives a history and critique of medical paternalism and

statism form 'Social Darwinism' to the modern anti-smoking movement.

Sunday 25thII am WHAT IS FAITH? BARBARA SMOKER (SPES appointed lecturer) states: "according to the

school catechism, faith 'enables us to believe, without doubting, whatever God has

revealed'. Thus, it is a denial of reasoning doubt. Nothing in human psychology and

human history has proved more harmful".

3 pm TIW ROLE OF TIIE CHURCH IN THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR. AL Ric IARDSON •

explores "how and why the Catholic Church meddles in politics - using one or the worst

examples in modern times".

Programme continues on page 24

The views expressed in this journal are not necessarily those of the Society

Published by the South Place Ethical Society, Camay Hall, 25 Red Lion Square, Latakia WC1R 4RL

SOUTH PLACE ETHICAL SOCIETYThe Humanist Centre, Conway Hall

25 Red Lion Square, London WC1R 4RL. Telephone: 071-831 7723 Hall Lettings: 071-242 8032. Lobby: 071-405 4125

TrusteesLouise Booker, John Brown, Anthony Chapman, Peter Heales, Don Liversedge,

Ray Lovecy, Ian MacKillop, Barbara Smoker, Harry Stopes-Roe. Appointed Lecturers

Harold Blackham, T.F. Evans, Peter Heales, Richard Scorer, Barbara Smoker, Harry Stopes-Roe, Nicolas Walter.

OfficersHonorary Representative: Nicolas Walter. General Committee Chair: Diane Murray.Vice Chair: Louise Booker. Treasurer: David Williams. Editor, The Ethical Record'Norman Bacrac. Librarian: Edwina Palmer. Registrar: James Addison.Secretary of the Society: Nina Khare. Hall Manager: Steven Norley.

New MembersPeter Hart, David Hass, Patrick Lewin, T.E. Mills, Lorraine Morley, Dr. Otten-

Sooser, D.J. Pope, John Priest, D.J. Reid.

MONCURE CONWAY HONOURED BY HIS OLD COLLEGE

Dickinson College, Washington, D.C., from which Moncure Conway graduatedwith a B.A. in 1849 and M.A. in 1852, has just named a new hall of residence'Conway Hall', writes SPES member Walter E. Beach, who is a Trustee of theCollege. This is actually the second time the college has had a 'Conway Hall' - thefirst, established in 1904 and lasting until 1967, resulted from a gift to the collegeof $68,480 from philanthropist Andrew Carnegie "in recognition of his (Conway's)great services in the realm of letters, of reform, and of humanitarian effort".

An activist on behalf of antislavery, Conway's friends included Emerson,Thoreau, Whitman, Carlyle, Huxley and Browning. He was an influential Ministerof the then South Place Religious Society from 1864 to 1884 and later was the lastMinister of South Place Ethical Society (which it had by then become)from 1892 to1897. Thereafter the Society appointed lecturers instead of a Minister, continuingits evolution from religious to secular practice.

LONDON STUDENT SKEPTICS

meets fortnightly on Mondays at 7.30 pm TtRoom 2F, University of London UnionBuilding, Malet Street, WC1 (opposite Dillon's bookshop). Annual subscription £2allows entry to all events.

October 26: INTRODUCTORY MEETING followed by wine and cheese social.November 16: SCEPTICAL ABOUT FREUD. Frank Cioffi,November 30: THE TRUE HISTORY OF UFOs. Hilary Evans.

Membership of the Society includes subscription to The Ethical Record Non-membersmay subscribe to the journal for f 1 0/year.Contributions should be sent to the Editor, at Conway Hall.On Disc - Word Star, Word Perfect, MS Word. Include clearly legible print-out.Typewritten — A4 paper, double-spaced with wide margins, clear ribbon.

2 Ethical Record, September, 1992

RHYME AND REASON

Peter Heales

Surtunacr til a lecture given on Sunday, 14 June, 1992

Humanists like the language of reason. Clear expression exposes the truth and leads to

well considered solutions to problems. The English language is capable of just such

clarity; yet it is also rich in the imaginative, emotive and poetic. Few Humanists would

object to the enjoyment of such language. How does it relate to the ideal of clarity? Has it

a place in our activities other than enjoyment when the day's work is over?

Some examples may serve to make the questiou clearer. The first is taken from the

conclusion to Alexander Pope's Es-say on Man, a poem published in 1733.

When statesmen, heroes, kings, in dust repose.

Whose sons shall blush their fathers were thy foes,

Shall then this verse to future age pretend

Thou wen my guide, philospoher and friend?

That, urged by thee, 1 turn'd the tuneful art

From sounds to things, from fancy to the heart;

For Wit's false mirror held up Nature's light;

Show'd erring Pride, - WHATEVER IS, IS RIGHT!

That REASON, passion, answer one great aim;

That true SELF-LOVE and SOCIAL are the same:

That VIRTUE only makes our bliss below;

And all our knowledge is. - OURSELVES TO KNOW.

This work is in the style of its age, to which it may be difficult to respond. To

understand the 'poetic' qualities, it would be useful to compare it with a short piece of

prose of the same period, e.g., an extract from Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature (from

Book II, Of The Passions), published in 1740.

Thus we have established two truths without any obstacle or

difficulty, that it is from natural principles this variety of causes

excite pride and humility, and that it is not by a different principle

each different cause is adapted to its passion. We shall now proceed

to inquire how we may reduce these principles to a lesser number,

and find among the causes something common on which their

influences depends.

The two quotations share a quality of reasoned argument. Hume, without too much

violence to his philosophical position could have expressed the view taken by Pope in

much the same words. Yet Pope writes poetry whilst Hume does not. The difference lies in

the metre and rhyme, which stress particular words, and generate a sense of expectation as

certain points in the argument are reached. The effect is similar to that of a good orator

who adds persuasion to a sound argument by his manner of delivery.

The comparison also shows something more subtle. Word order, and the distortions of

syntax necessary to fit an argument to metre and rhyme can sometimes create phrases

more memorable than 'flat' prose. It has to be said that the process may also reduce

readability.

Ethical Record, October, 1992 3

My second example is a short poem by Philip Larkin. This poem is in the language ofour age, and presents no problem of comprehension.

Homage to a Government (1969)

Next year we are to bring the soldiers homeFor lack of money, and it is all right.Places they guarded, or kept orderly,Must guard themselves, or keep themselves orderly.We want money for ourselves at homeInstead of working. And this is all right.

It's hard to say who wanted it to happen,But now it's been decided nobody minds.The places are a long way off, not here,Which is all right, and from what we hearThe soldiers there only made trouble happen.Next year we shall be easier in our minds.

Next year we shall be living in a countryThat brought its soldiers home for lack of money.The statues will be standing in the sameTree muffled squares, and look nearly the same.Our children will not know it's a different country.All we can hope to leave them now is money.

This highly crafted poem has the readability of good plain prose. It does not containarguments such as Pope used, and therefore aQoids the necessity of forcing connectedreasoning into a metric pattern. The sentences fit comfortably into the verse form.

Larkin generates a meaning beyond the literal interpretation of the sentences byrepeating and juxtaposing ideas and phraes, such as 'That is all right'.

He also evokes ideas by using images: 'statues' in 'tree muffled squares'. Much of thepoet's intention slips into our minds by routes not guarded by our reason. The crux of thepoem is a view which might give us pause to reflect. Do you agree with Larkin?

My third example, a short poem by Edith Sitwell, is cast in yet another mould.

In a room of the palaceBlack Mrs BehemothGave way to wrothAnd the wildest maliceCried Mrs Behemoth,'Come, court lady,Doomed like a moth,Through palace rooms shady!'The candle flameSeemed a yellow pompion

Sharp as a scorpion;Nobody came ...Only a bugbear Air unkind,That bud-furred papooseThe young spring wind,Blew out the candle.Where is it gone?'To flat CoromandelRolling on!

Here the sound of the words creates a persuasive effect. Sitwell's words make a kind ofsense; the poem provides a brief and intense experience. Afterwards, when we stand back

4 Ethical Record, October, 1992

from it, we may wonder what the point of it all was. Surely we have been in the realms ofpure fantasy. This is truly a use of language for pure enjoyment.

The examples I have given all rely on the interplay of various kinds of symbolism. Alllanguage is symbolic. Words are 'arbitrary' symbols; there need be no relation betweentheir sound or appearance and their meaning. Words develop in use, and all lexicographersknow that meanings in living languages can never be pinned down.

Some words do suggest their meanings through their sound (onomatopoeic words). Poetsuse patterns of sound to suggest emotive undercurrents. As an obvious example, warmvowel sounds mixed with clipped consonantrs; compare "Come home" with "Get Back".

I have mentioned already the 'oratorical' impact of rhythm. Rhythmic patterns canalso symbolize ideas, especially those associated with motion. For example:

'Break, break, breakOn thy cold grey stones, 0 sea'.(Tennyson)'Boot, saddle, to horse and away!Rescue my castle, before the hot dayBrightens to blue from its silver grey.Boot, saddle, to horse and away!'

(Browning)

Sound and rhythm are among the necessary properties of language which can be turnedto great effect in both poetry and prose. Perhaps the most potent form of symbolismavailable to any writer is that of imagery. Here the writer's skill is to suggest to the reader'smind images which carry powerful associations. A skilled writer can suggest iniages withgreat speed and economy. Her success in influencing depends upon drawing a pbtentimage from shared experience. The following examples are effective for many Englishpeople today. Larkin's image might misfire with anyone lacking experience of cities.

'Statues in tree muffled squares'(Larkin)

'We are such stuff as dreams are made on,And our little life is rounded with a sleep'.

(Shakespeare, The Tempest)

Images, like words themselves, can also ̀ stand for' ideas. The connection may or maynot be evident from the context. The Red Cross Knight in Spenser'sFaery Queen providesan example. The whole poem actually symbolizes the secret Rosicrucian doctrine, butreaders today cannot know that from a direct reading. In Wagner's Ring Cycle, thelegendary characters 'stand for' grand ideas. Shaw saw a critique of capitalism in theRing, whilst other commentators have seen it differently.

When a writer uses an image in a deliberate, or 'formal' Way, she will almost certainlybe responding to the associations it has for her. Much of its weight depends upon herreadership sharing those associations. Writing using imagery may well present symbolismat several different levels.

I have given a rough outline only of the range of symbolism which may be at work in a

Ethical Record. October, 1992 5

piece of writing ( or for that matter in a speech or a lecture). The author will probably haveworked out quite overtly any formalized symbolism he wishes to use. It is a skilled writerindeed who can control the more intimate levels of symbolism. Much of it may be presentwithout the explicit knowledge or control of thc author.

Whatever the type of symbolism, it has to be learned. Much or our symbolism isacquired as part of the fabric of the culture and society. without the need to directattention to it. Such symbolism seems so natural that we find it difficult to realize that it isacquired. Some symbols have a very wide currency but none is truly universal. Forexample, in Europe. we quite 'naturally' associated purple and black with death; in muchof the east it is 'natural' to associate white with death.

Symbolism is present in all forms of art and communication; in visual art; in dramaticart and in music. The various levels of sybolism conveyed by spoken and written languageare of special i ni port ance. It is in that medium that most of our overt reasoning takesplace. It is in language that laws and public policy are made, scientific results are given tothe public. and our lite stances are expressed. But in those activities we use only a part ofthe symbolism implicit in our language; often least lively form of symbolism.

Philosophical views on language

Philosophy, itself a language based discipline, has long tried to account for theexistence and acquisition of language. Although the history of European philosophycentres on a continuing debate between opposing philosophical positions, there has been,a remarkable unanimity on some key points. One has been about the acquisition oflanguage. The broadly accepted View has been that each individual learns language 'fromnothing by being taught by his or her parents.

Here is St Augustine's view of the matter:When my elders named some object, and accordingly moved towardssomething, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound theyuttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention was shown by theirbodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples: theexpression or the face, the play of the yes, the movement or other parts of thebody, and the tone of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking,having, rejecting or avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedlyused in their proper places in various sentences. I gradually learnt tounderstand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth toform these signs, I used them to express my own desires.

Augustine was a platonist and a theologian. He was a founding father of the Catholicchurch and also or that great tradition or rationalist philosophy which has come down tous through Descartes and Spinoza. This view of language has indeed been shared by mostthinkers on the subject from ancient times until this century. Bertrand Russell putsforward essentially the same point at the beginning of Ins An Inquiry into Meaning andTruth, Written in about 1940. Only since the turn of our century has the view been seriouslychallenged by such diverse thinkers as Naom Chomsky and Ludwig Wittgenstein:

Chomsky. for example, maintains that humans are necessarily pre-programmed tocommunicate. and that the process or learning serves merely to teach what specificsymbols to use for the purpose. According to this view, a child must have at least aninstinctive grasp of what it is to communicate before it can understand the significance of

Ethical Record October, 1992

the relevant parts of its parents behaviour. Why else, should a child understand that the

sound of say the word "dog" is to be learned as a word, whilst the sound of a cough Ls not?

Chomsk y intends nothing more mysterious about the process than the pre-programming

of a bird to tly or a baby to draw milk from its mother's breast.

Augustine described a process which, no doubt, we have all experienced, and can be

observed in any family with small children. It would be interesting to know whether

teaching by the Augustine method is actually important to the child's learning. I refer

only to the deliberate use of the particular method:children could not learn their language

without interaction of some kind with those who already are in command of it.

The traditional view concentrates upon words in conventional language. It may be

correct to take words as the 'paradigm case' of symbolism; but the working out of the

traditional view has gone beyond this. Augustine refers to 'natural language', suggesting

that all forms of symbolism other than spoken/written language must be set apart from

t his specifically human achievement.

The Empiricists

The emphasis has been further compounded by a growing need to understand science

and the nature of its propositions. Leibniz and Russell, among others, have attempted

'ideal' languages intended to exPress scientific fact and rational argtonent efficiently. For

them, clarity and precision are more important than richness of symbolism.

Empiricists have made the traditional view of language their own. It seemed the only

possible way forward, given the fundamental premiss of their philosophy. John Locke's

classic description is famous. All knowledge is gained by natural processes which stamp a

replica of the experienced world upon the 'tabula rasa' of the mind.

Mos( empiricists have accepted the 'label' theory of meaning as implied by Augustine;

i.e.. that a word gains its meaning by acting as a label attached to whatever it means. On

the face of it, that view seems to work well for nouns, although there are obvious initial

difficulties in the case of verbs, adverbs, prepositions. Given the internal and external

worlds that empiricism implies, words have to be labels for ideas; ideas conceived as

menial 'things' in individual minds. On that basis, words have private meaning, not a

meaning shared with others.

Solipsism

This is the origin of the idea of solipsism which has dogged the history of empiricism. It

is the view that we can only communicate with ourselves; that all we can know about

others is their appearances. We have no grounds for saying that other intelligent beings

like ourselves exist at all.

No one in their right mind actually believes in solipsism. The mere act of going about

our business indicates our 'common sense' acceptance of our interaction with others. Like

us, they experience the world and participate in its activities. We do not accept the concept

of private meanings; we do share our common language which refers not to private ideas

but to the world about us. No philosopher who seriously accepted solipsism could

possibly want to publish a book, thereby perpetuating the illusion others exist who can

read it:

Ethical Record, October, 1992 7

The solipsist conclusion need not (rouble us; it does not say anything mysterious about(he world in which we live. It merely indicates that there is something wrong with thetraditional empiricist account. The importance of empiricism, especially in anglo-saxonphilosophy, has prompted a succession of thinkers to try to save the principle from thedifficulties implicit in it.

Russell and Ayer

Bertrand Russell and, later, A.J. Ayer made the attempt by recasting empiricistn into ananalytic rather than a biographical form. Ayer went further than Russell in ignoring questionsabout the acquisition of language altogether. The important thing was to accept language asestablished and to examine its structure. In spite of his ingenuity Ayer did not succeed inresolving the problems fully. His Language. Truth and Logic does battle heroically butunsuccessfully with the spectre of solipsism.

Ayer's approach to language grows out of Russell's Principia Mathematiea. Russell's logicmakes it possible to express empiricism in purely logicaVlinguistic terms without relying eitheron physiology or subjective psychology. Objective factual statements can all be reduced tostatements recording 'pure' observations.

The difficulty of Russell's view of language lies in its links with the world of real experience.This is not a matter of how we learn words; Russell was quite comfortable with thc Augustinianexplanation of that. The problem is how statements come to represent 'states of affairs' in theworld. There seems to be a parallel between the logical/linguistic system and the world to whichit allegedly refers. but Russell was not able to explain how a sentence actually portrayed a state of

More to the present point, Russell's view of language reinforces the classic opposition betweenthe scientific and the emotive. Language can express only what can be observed, what is 'pure'hict and could become evidence for a scientific theory. His analysis can accommodate theimprecise observation of everday life; observation that is scientific in general character but doesnot meet the highest standards. B ut the system has no place for the expressions of emotion, si peeemotion is not observable: not fact. This. limitation is partially obscured by the device ofdescribing signs of emotion. We can observe quite objectively the way a person looks whenangry. The system permits us to record the fact that a person is angry, envious or joyful. Thesystem cannot accommodate the expression of anger, envy or joy.

I' or this reason, poetry and all imaginative writing becomes, as Ayer portrays them,'entertaining nonsense'. Such writing is not discarded, because cultivated people enjoy it andthink it valuable. Ayer therefore admits that language does in fact express emotion, but herefuses to abandon the scientific model. His position is a little less austere than Russell's.Emotive language is an aberration of language. In its ideal form language should record purescientific fact with clarity. We should beware of the emotive element which ordinary usage graftson to the ideal stock. Emotive words can seduce us from the truth when we are considering realand important issues, but we should be grateful for them when we relax and enjoy the diversionsof poetry.

The motive for the Russell/Ayer approach to language is that it supports pure objectivity.This objective view of language is concerned with effectiveness in the sense in which effectivenesscan be tested and measured. Thus, subjectivity, which is always a murky area when thinkingscientifically, can be avoided or a( least ignored.

8 Ethical Record Octobt /992

The Russell/Ayer view is open to a number of objections. Firstly, Russell's 'ideal'

language is an abstraction. The concept imiy have some use in improving precision in

defined circumstances. but it could not exist as a real working language. Such a language

would not do what most people want it to do: namely to express what they are thinking.

Emotive language is much more effective as a means or Communication than 'cold'

scientific language. Emotive language engages our interest and relates what is being said

to our interests and objectives. The effectiveness of emotive language is known to all

professional writers and can be tested objectively.

By contrast, the subjective view of language concerns understanding and enjoyment.

They can be tested if they are defined in appropriate ways. But in the domains of artistic

appreciation and enjoyment of life. that seems to miss the point. It is a person's actual

experience that matters.

Pragmatism

We may contrast the Ayer/Russell view of language with that of. say, Pragmatism.

Pragmatists share a broadly empirical view of life, in that they deny any source of

knowledge or understanding which can lie outside physical or social experience. But the

balance of their interpretation is different; formal objectivity is a mirage. For pragmatists,

science is important, but it cannot bc understood as a formal and totally abstract array of

knowledge. It forms part of a continuous process of improvement; creating 'better

conditions, and contending with the setbacks which the environment frequently inflicts.

Science is neither unemotional nor disinterested. All science is conducted to achieve

objects and satisfy desires which we may have as individuals, groups or societies. Some

emotions are appropriate to the conduct of science; some are not. The emotions that drive

the explorer; the desire to Find out are entirely appropriate to science. Inappropriate

emotions would include defensiveness; the desire for comfort; and the urge to make a

quick buck. Such emotions are inappropriate not because science is somehow "sacred'; an

activity which must be treated in a special way. They simply lead to bad science; solutions

which fail.

This formal rejection of objectivity at once resolves the divided view of language we haVe been

examining. The emotive components of words are as valid as the factual, for they refer to the

context in which facts gain their' significance. Language quite properly expresses not only the .

substance but, alongside it, the author's impulse and interest in the substance. In language as in

life present fact and future desire are intimately interdependent.

Naturally we can be influenced, deceived, and led astray by the emotive elements in

language. But the dry clarity of the language advocated by Ayer and Russell can equally

be used to deceive by an author who is so minded. The deception is the more insidious

because the language purports to be objective, and therefore beyond dispute. The

pragmatists' answer is the only one that has real practical value. We must listen or read;

savour and enjoy the experience the author has put into words, but never drop our critical

guard.

Wittgenstein

The name of Wittgenstein cannot be omitted from a discussion of language. In the

context of the present discussion his views can be seen as a profound extension of

Pragmatism. His aim is to rescue us from our 'bewitchment with language'. All his later

Ethical Record, October, 1992 9

work revolves around the vision and discipline necessary to achieve that end. Like thepragmatists he continues to regard language as a whole, and does not anentPt to hone it'down as the empiricists do.

NVittgenstein quotes St Augustine on language at the beginning or Philamp/ilea/Invesligations. He then sets out by example and exploration to build an alternative view.He destroys Augustine's distinction between 'natural language' and 'verbal language'. Heexpands the concept of language to encompass all aspects of communication betweenpeople. Like the pragmatists. Wittgenstein maintains that meaning can never beseparated from activity or content.

Our 'bewitchment' with language arises because we attempt that separation. Inconcentrating on 'meaning' in isolation, we are in danger of following a will-o'-the-wispinto fairyland. We can lose ourselves worrying at abstractions which have no function inour afftirs. The critical discipline for Wittgenstein is to see every communication ascontributing to an activity, or as a move in a 'game' which is in progress here and now.'Language game' is equivalent to 'way of life'.

The Humanist attitude

I began by saying that Humanists like clear, rational language. That is entirelyappropriate, especially when considering matters too important to be obscurred bysentimentality and other inappropriate emotions. Rational language should not,however, be confused with the false ideal of inexpressive, emotionless or abstractlanguage.

The matter is vitally important for Humanists. The Humanist movement in Britaingrew Out of the empiricist tradition, and has inherited some of its difficulties withlanguage. The tradition as we know it grew up to defend a new emerging science from theopposition of established religion. As a weapon in that debate it has proved invaluable,and remains a resource whenever arguments about religion are important. There is,however, much more to Humanism than opposing religion.

Some of that armoury has been inherited from Christianity itself. Christianity hasfrequently bewitched its followers with language, creating many a will-o'-the-wisp toensnare the unwary. It is a religion in which devotion to an empty verbal tbrmula assumesfar greater importance than the sensible and achievable. Alongside this abstraction, anddespite a barrage of publicity to the contrary. Christianity is one of the least spiritual ofreligions the world has knoWn. I do not use the word spiritual in the sense of adherence toa dogma about an afterlife or an immortal 'soul'. I mean the acceptance of the t'ull rangeof experience, whether physical, emotional, intellectual or aesthetic that a rich lite canoffer. Potentially. Humanists understand spirituality better than Christians.

As Humanists, we aim to build a better life for mankind in the fullest sense. I am justsutriciently a Pragmatist and a Wittgensteinian to suggest that our preparations mustinclude a thorough command of our 'language games', not just our language in theordinary educational sense. How we express our thinking in our acting and interacting isvastly more important than our abstract reasoning. •

tO Ethical Record, Ociober, 1992

SARTRE: EXISTENTIALISM AND HUMANISM

Tom RubensA lecture given on. 28 June 1992

continued from the September 1992 Ethical Record.

Criticism over, let's now turn to the positive things:Firstly, even after saying that Sartre is tooexclusive in regarding action as the only reality, it Must be conceded that action, deed,achievement represents themost importantreality. No-one can be adequately described just interms of his potential. Try, for example, to imagine an obituary or eulogy consisting only ofphrases such as "potential statesman" or "potential poet". Fundamental and final definitioncomes from performance and, in the absence of the latter, there is ultimately no point in referringonly to capacity.

At this point, I'd like to look again at the term "essence". You'll remember that, whendiscussing the sum total of human capacity, this word was dropped in favour of "nature", thelatter conveying the idea of origins and starting-points. "Essence" can now be re-introduced toconvey the idea of what one does with what one starts with: what one makes of one's potential.Hence, if by essence we take Sartre to mean what a person can be finally described as, then wehave to agree that existence, meaning action, does indeed come before essence.

I would argue that action gives to a person's life a quality or dimension which was not presentprior to action. It adds a new fact, a new existent, to the world. A person existsthroughthe actionin a way he did not previously. As an actor, he takes on a mode of being which he lacked whenonly a potential actor. This, it seems to me, is true whether the action is free or determined. Thestatus of action is unique and irreplaceable. Hence, as said earlier, self-fashioning is possible evenwithout the kind of freedom Sartre says exists.

For humanists, these considerations are pivotal. A realistic humanism has to be critical andevaluative, and should be so along Sartrian lines. There's no use saying, like Garcin inNo Exit,"I

died too soon. I did not have enough time to do my deeds". Ones's deeds are those one hasactually performed, and not some other kind. As another character in the play, Inez, tellsGarcin: "now your life's finished. It's time to make up the account. Youarenothingother thanyou life".

This viewpoint may seem austere, but Sartre himself has used that word to describe the moralteachings of existentialism, and he, employs the word "sternness" in Existentialism and

Humanism. Austerity is not something humanists should fight shy of. It is, for one thing, asafeguard against the sentimentalising, generalising type of humanism which Sartre (thoughwrongly attributing it to Comte) rightly insists is unviable. Man with a capital M is not to beexalted; mankind is nothing other than the separate individuals who comprise it, each of whommust be appraised in the light of a life-total of personal actions, since there is no other basis forjudgement. Also, as Sartre emphasises, austerity implies not only judgement but alsoencouragement: it "puts every man in possession of himself.., it is optimistic, a doctrine ofaction". Existentialism, while inflexible in its view that only action will be referred to in theevaluation process, is also a spur to action, a call to deeds, a stimulus to endeavour, self-exploration and adventure. It carries the excitement of placing the ball in our court, at any andevery stage of our lives; and even with the qualification that we can never act beyond ourcapacities, the existential perspective is profoundly invigorating because it rouses us to act to thelimit of those capacities — that is, to an extent we might otherwise not act.

Ethical Record October, 1992 11

Choice and universality

Let's now turn to Sartre's contention that, when we choose for 'ourselves, we should regardour choice as applicable to all. Interpreted in a sufficiently wide and flexible way, this principlecan, I think, be accepted by humanists. Its essential point is the inclusion of all in a general sphereof satisfaction. One person's actions in seeking a certain benefit should not deprive others of thesame benefit, and should involve the desire to share that benefit. This of course does not meansharing the specific objects or contexts from which the benefit is derived; a distinction must bedrawn between the general and the particular, between type of satisfaction and specific instanceof it. To take an example given by Sartre: if I choose to marry and restrict myself to one wile, I layclaim to the benefits of monoga niy and wish that all other men WOU Id be monogamous in orderto enjoy those benefits. At the same time, I do not wish to share my wile with any other man.Hence, my marrying one wife does not exclude other men from doing the same — indeed itenjoins them to do the same — but it does exclude them from marrying the same woman I havemarried.

Every social commitment and pursuit of satisfaction engaged in by the humanist should, itseems to me. have a general principle to validate it, one that links the individual to others ratherthan isolates him from them. In committing himself, to use Sartre's words, "on behalf of allmankind". he should, as Spinoza says, desire "for others the good he desires for himself-. (Notehere Sartre's concern, not the norm among white Europeans in 1945, for the interests of colonialpeoples — anticipating the efforts he was later to make on behalf of Third World countries).

Sartre's insistence on general principles relates to another very important feature of hisdoctrine: his emphasis on freedom. When he defines freedom as the ultimate value, I think wehave to take him to mean freedom in the external sense: freedom from the exterior, socialrestraints which prevent one from exercising one's internally free power of choice. This freedom,then, is a social condition, one that should be striven for. Internal freedom, on the other hand isnot an objective, a value, a something to be aimed at, because it is already, Sartre argues, a fact(though one that many people refuse to accept). Now while we may disgree that we possess thekind of interior liberty which Sartre claims we do, I think we have to accept the importance heplaces on external freedom. Whether our choices are free or subject to causality, they remain ourchoices, and therefore components of our identity as individuals; and, provided they are madewith mature awareness, they deserve a social outlet, a social space in which to express themselvesin act Mil and have an appomriate effect.

Me interdependence of freedoms

Also to be endorsed is Sartre's linkage of individual freedom with interdependence offreedoms. The liberty I desire for myself should also be that which I desire for others: respect formy own individuality should entail respect for that of otheN. My freedom should not exist at theexpense or anyone else's. Indeed, if it does, I cannot myself be free; because, as Sartre says myfree access to truth about myself depends on the free access to it of others, their minds being themedi um th rough which such truths arc transmitted or confirmed. Further, my access to truths ofall kinds depends on others' access to them discovery and clarification require an inter-action ofminds based on the liberty to agree or dissent. And, over and above the attainment of truth, myfreedom to be a social being, to enjoy open, voluntary and spontaneous relations with others,depends on their freedom to do likewise. This of course extends to love relationships, and Sartrewould agree with Spinoza when the latter writes:"all love which acknowledges any other causethan freedom of the mind passes easily into hatred". That 'passing into hatred', Sartre wouldsprings from resentment of the other's freedom to disagree, a resentment which ultimately theliberty of the person who harbours it.

12 Ethical Record, October, 1992

These points seem to me crucial ones in present-day Western society. Our society could

broadly be described as secular-liberal. The movement toward this position has involved the

decline of authoritarian social structures. This decline, itself a good thing, has placed

unprecedented emphasis on the sphere of the individual and of personal relationships. The

emphasis is an interesting and fruitful one. yet n has, unfortunately, led some people to a

one-sided view of freedom — one person enjoying freedom without sufficient regard for

another's — and among the consequences are many highly unstable personal relationships,

marital and otherwise. Sart re's stress on mutuality and symbiosis or freedoms can provide the

stabilising influence that is so (Men missing. Most humanists would agree that, in the absence of

a deity to whom to relate, our highest relationship-attainment must be a fully authentic and

empathetic connection with our fellow beings: a forever flexible. give-and -take, speak-and-listen

elninterbalancing of individualities. To that attainment Sartre's teaching points. echoing

William Morris's dictum that "Fellowship is life".

It should be added that Sartre is well aware of behaviour which rails far short of this

achievement. Flis philosophical treatise Being and Nothingness (1943) examines in extensive

detail the kind of behaviour which threatens or denies the liteedom or others. In fact, in this

hook, his conclusions about human relationships are grim ones. He contends that we shall never

achieve, in our rdations with others, mutual recognition of each other's freedom; that the

Ka ntia n principle of treating others as ends and not means is unrealisable; and that the essence of

relations between conscious beings is not togetherness and mutuality but conflict. This picture is

found also in much orSart re's creative writing, including the novel trilogy The Roads to Freedom

and. again. No Eva, where Garcin utters the famous line: "Hell is other people".

The growth of a more optimistic view of the possibilities of human inter-action by the time

Sartre gave his 1945 lecture has been attributed by some critics to the effect of his wartime

experience of comradeship in the French Resistance. Whatever the reason for the change in

outlook, there's no doubt that it was immense, and indicates Sartre's awareness of areas of

highly constructive experience not covered in Being and Nothingness and other writings.

Evistemialimn and Humanism's affirmation that mutuality or l'reedom is both desirable and

possible is also an affirmation of the possibility of realising Kant's principle of treating others as

ends and not as means. Indeed. Sartre's vision of mutuality is very like Kant's "kingdom of

ends-. For Sartre. die vision has political implications. With the increasing influence of socialism

and Marxism on his thinking in the 1940s and '50s, he came to feel that a vital factor in ensuring

the treat ment of people as ends rather than means was the establishment of an ecomnuically

classless society (ultimately a global (me). This may not be the solution every hurnanist would

offer to the ends-means prohlem, but some solution must be looked for, because the problem is

enormous, especially in the present period of dire economic pressure and instability. Those who

would subordinate the individual to market forces know nothing of the counterbalancing

empathy between individuals which is the Sartrian ideal.

Choice and Anguish

I'd now like to say something about Sartre's view of the anguish involved in moral choice. As

we've seen, he regards anguish as inescapable because the values on which it is based have no a

priori validity, and because of the universal implications of. the choices one makes. His sense of

anguish stems partly litom Isis libertarian belief in our internal freedom to choose. [(la even

without sharing this belief, we can appreciate the point he is making. Whether we choose freely

or not, we are answerable for the consequences or our choices, ones which can nd no

supra-human vindication. These considerations are, to say the least, sufficient to give us pause.

Sartre, in describing the experience of. anguish as vividly as any modern writer, has done an

Ethical Record, October, 1992 13

immense service to humanism by exhaustively mapping the problems involved in [floral choiceand showing how complacency in this mauer is impossible.

In combatting complacency and the attitude that anguish can be avoided because there existready-made values to be adopted without question. Sartre attacks not only the religious believerbut also, in (he secular field, (he polidcal idea logue: see the character of Brunet, the doctrine-dependent Communist in The Roads to Freedom. Fle also castigates what he calls "the spirit ofseriousness".a pompous earnestness, displayed by the middle classes, whom. he says, assume theyhave a natural right to their occupations and life-style — indeed a natural right to exist —and aretoo quick to accept the values their social position entails. Now whether or not the middle classesare tainted by the "spirit of seriousness", or, if they are, whether or not they are the only group soaffected, Sartre's overall point about false moral certainty remains.valid. In rejecting this falsityand in exploring anguish. Sartre widens our sympathy for and understanding of the complexity ofindividual situations. This is surely one of humanism's principle projects.

Conclusion

In drawing toward a conclusion, I would add that I think Sartre's reply to the three criticisms ofhis doctrine specified in Existentialism and Humanism are sound. To recapitulate briefly: thecriticisms are:- a) that the absence of a priori values makes moral choice unimportant b) thatexistentialists are not in a position to judge others c) that the existentialist's values are not seriousbecause he chooses them himself: My summary of his replies shows, I think, that he demolishesthese objections.

Further, I think his definition of a general human situation is valid, though it needs to besupplemented by what I have suggested about the existence of a human nature in addition to asituation.

Finally, I'd like to return to the point made earlier about the compatibility of determinism andself<reation. Sartre, in an essay written at the time of France's liberation from Nazi occupation,refers poignantly to his experience in the Resistance:

Everyone of us who knew the truth about the Resistance asked himself anxiously, If theytorture me, shall I be able to keep silent?' Thus the basic question of freedom was set beforeus; and we were brought to the point of the deepest knowledge a man can have of himself.The secret of a man is not his Oedipus complex or his inferiority complex; it is the limit ofhis own freedom; his capacity for standing up to torture and death.

For Sartre, the withstanding of torture stems from an unconditioned freedom to do so (eventhough, it should be noted, he equates the limits of freedom with capacity, which suggasts thatfreedom is not unconditioned). For the determinist, on the other hand, the withstanding of tortureis unequivocally dependent on pre-existing capacity. However, despite these differences, thedeterminist, like Sartre, accords unique status to the action of having withstood torture. Apotential withstander is not the same as an actual one, and can no more be described as the latterthan can someone who lacked the potential, The actual withstander has fashioned himself assuch; he has crossed the diatance from capability to deed, and added a new fact to the world; hehas created for himself an essence from his existence.

While we may not all find ourselves in the extremely dramatic kind of situation which Sanredescribes, we should be continually aware of the creative character of our existence in ourresponses to whatever circumstances we encounter. As h u ma nists, we should follow Sartre inplacing maximum emphasis on that creativity, because it draws our picture on the one life-canvaswhere such depiction is possible. •

14 Ethical Record. September. 1992

COUPLE COUNSELLING - AN ADLERIAN VIEW

Rita Udall

Lecture given to SPES on 14 June 1992

'If I were asked what love and marriage mean, 1 should give the following definition, incomplete

as it may be: Love with its fulfillment. marriage, is the most intimate devotion towards a partner

of the other sex, expressed in physical attraction, comradeship and the desire to have children. It

can easily be shown that love and marriage are one side of cooperation in general, not a

cooperation for the weltlire of two persons only, but a cooperation also for the welfare of

mankind'.

This is a quote from Alfred Adler, the Viennese psychiatrist who was born in 1870, founded

the school of Individual Psychology and died in 1937. He was, at one time, an important

member of Freud's discussion circle but resigned because of theoretical differences. Among the

things Adler objected to was, 'accepting the doctrine of sexual impulses in the neurotic or normal

individual as the basic factor in psychic life. They are never causes but a means of personal

striving'.

Peter Heales wrote in a past issue of 'The Ethical Record': 'The growth in world population,

the development of technology and the rate at which the earth's resources are being exhausted have

forced us to re-locus our lives. Our social and cultural climate has become more diverse than at

any time in recorded history. It is not just that there is more uncertainty, many different cultures.

Some mature and others in their infancy are meeting and competing. The task of seeing the best

possible human life has become more complex than ever'.

Then and NowWhat are some of the changes that make sexual partnership more complex than in Adler's time'?

Then, marriage for most people was a lifetime commitment for better or for worse. The roles of

husband and wife, mother and father, were clearly defined. Now, we have a different situation,

with women's struggle for equality, the notion of the 'new man' (does he exist?), in many cases

both husband and wife working full time outside the home. There are, thanks to the media, high

expectations of what marriage 'should be' both in romantic and material fulfilment. Because of

such things as safe contraception, artificial insemination and fertility drugs, couples have

complicated decisions to make about if and when to start a family. Also new is the acceptance by

society of couples living together before marriage, living together without marriage, intercultural

marriages, increased mobility as people move away from their friends and family of origin and

perhaps, most important of all, the changes in attitudes that have taken place so rapidly as we

progress from an autocratic to a democratic society. Equal rights for all, including women and

children, ethnic minorities, elderly and disabled people, gays and lesbians, mean that the

problem often lies in how we accept the responsibilities that go with these equal rights and how

we can make ourselves accountable for our own behaviour and its consequences.

Relate, formerly the Marriage Guidance Council, sees over 50,000 cases a year. Most are

married. some are in live-in relationships, the majority heterosexual but gay and lesbian couples

are counselled as well. When we realise that Relate is only one of many organisations dealing

with sexual and flintily problems we have some idea of the help that is sought by couples wanting

to live in a better atmosphere of cooperation and harmony.

Of course individuals may seek counselling help for other reasons. They may be needing to

make decisions about further education or training. Perhaps there are problems at work or

Ethical Record, October 1992 15

impending redundancy, worries about finances, loneliness, depression, anxiety, bereavement,loss of meaning in one's life can all be reasons fbr seeking counselling help.

What is Counselling?There are many definitions of counselling: 'A way of helping people to resolve personaldifficulties' 'The task of counselling is to give the client an opportunity to explore, discover andclarify ways of living more resourcefully and towards greater well being'. 'Adlerian counselling isan educative process based on the theory that the client is self reliant, self sufficient andresponsible. By discovering his/her own private logic and goals the client can be encouraged tocorrect mistaken notions and move in more useful directions'.

Individual PsychologyWhen we talk about Individual Psychology, the word 'individual' is used in the sense of'indivisible' because Adler saw the individual as a unity who is self determining and creative,socially embedded and goal directed as well as subjective. We give meaning to life 'We are notdetermined by our experiences but are self determined by the meaning we give to them assoon as we find and understand the meaning a person ascribes to life we have the key to thewhole personality'.

Adler defined Life Style as 'one's style of acting, thinking, perceiving, the wholeness of hisindividuality'. Our life style is formed before the age of eight by which time we have formed firmideas about what the world is like, and what we must do in order to survive, belong andcontribute. Many of these ideas are mistaken notions based on how we saw our position in thefamily, how we viewed our parents' relationship, what the atmosphere in the home was like, ourfamily's involvement with the outside world and so forth. Adler's use of early recollections inunderstanding a person's private logic is one of his most important contributions. 'There are no'chance memories'. Out of the incalculable number of impressions which meet an individual, hechooses to remember only those which he feels, however darkly, to have bearing on his situation.Thus his memories represent his 'Story of My Life', a story he repeats to himself to warn him or•comfort him, to keep him concentrated on his goal, to prepare him, by means of pastexperiences, to meet the future with an already tested style of action'.

Some conclusions a child may have reached could be:

No one cares about my feelings so I must bear my pain alone.I am unappreciated.People should look after me.I have to do what is expected of me.Other people's ideas are better than mine.

Clients are unaware of how these childish conclusions from early recollections haveinfluenced their behaviour in life. Understanding their own and their partner's mistaken notionscan make them understand the dynamics of the relationship.

Counselling the coupleIt is necessary to establish a relationship of trust so that both parties feel that they are beinglistened to; to pinpoint the issues that are being brought by each partner and discover how eachpartner feels about what is going on in the relationship; to investigate the individual life stylesand find out what preconceived notions each has brought to the relationship about how things'should' be. In many cases couples realise very quickly that the main difficulty has been lack ofcommunication. Neither knows what the other wants or needs or what effect their behaviour ishaving on their partner. The final stage is considering options that can be encouraging to both

16 Ethical Record, October, 1992

and will facilitate change: stressing the need for mutual trust; suggesting ways of disclosingfeelings and thoughts; encouraging the clients to stop blaming one another and aim towardsequality, cooperation and contribution. Adlerians usually give assignments to be done betweensessions. These might be related to the wider social scene. Children, in-laws, work, leisure time,community attachments are all part of the couple relationship.

The counsellor's task is not to keep a marriage together but to find out if both partners arecommitted to make the effort to see if it can be improved and then for all three to work togetherto make it happen.

For details of lectures, workshops, annual residential weekend counsellor training and otheractivities contact

The Administrator, The Adlerian Society, 55 Mayhill Road, London SE7 716 Tel: 081-858 7299 •

RICHARD DAWKINS TO GIVE VOLTAIRE LECTURE AT CONWAY HALL ENTITLED:

"RELIGION AS A VIRUS OF THE MIND"

The British Humanist Association announces that the 1992 Voltaire Lecture is to be given byRICHARD DAWKINS, author of The Selfish Gene and The Blind Watchmaker. He will applythe concept of the natural selection of metnes (unit idea; analogue of gene) with particularreference to the survival of religions. Doors open 6.30 pm and the lecture (free) starts at 7 pm onFriday, 6th November. Be early!

A HUMANIST HERITAGESPES EVENING CLASS

A series of 8 evening classes held by Leslie Serase.Tuesdays 6.30 - 8.30 pm Library Admission LI Inc. Refreshments

ALL WELCOME

It is said that humanism is new. It is said that atheists are irresponsible, anarchic and dangerous. It issaid that humanism derives its ethical standards from Christianity. In themselves these charges arecontradictory. An examination of some ancient atheisms willalso show them to be false.

These highly personal lectures ranging from India to China and back to Greece and Rome will invitehumanists to be proud of their heritage - a heritage with a pedigree as ancient as any. They will showthat the humanist way of life has often been liberating, life-affirming and joyful and has always beenbuilt upon a sensible ethical foundation.

6 & 13 Oct. 1992 Some Indian and Chinese atheisms with particular reference to Buddhismand Confucianism

20 Oct. to 10 Nov. 1992 The foundations of Western Humanism from Homer to Epicums17 & 24 Nov. 1992 Somc Roman humanists

Ethical Record, October, 1992 17

BOOK REVIEW

Sexual Personae: An and Decadence front Nefeniti to Emily Dickinson by Camille Paglia. (Penguin, 1991)

Reviewed by Nicola King

Paglia's huge and superficially impressive book is symptomatic of the recourse to irrationalismmade by those who believe that politics and theory have failed: she is a, fashionable exponent ofthe ideas of gurus such as Jung and Nietzsche who have their defenders even on the pages of theEthical Record. Sexual Personae is deliberately polemical and provocative; its method, she isproud to confess. is 'a form of sensationalism' (xiii), but not half as original as she would have usthink, or, presumably, like to believe herself She would like her readers to see her as a kind ofAthena or Minerva (one of the 'sexual personae' from which she traces the whole of Westernculture) springing hilly-formed from the head of her father Zeus, without ancestry or parentage inliterary, cultural or feminist theory.

The position she outlines in her first chapter, 'Sex and Violence, or Nature and Art' is anunargued and usually only loosely acknowledged amalgam of Hobbes, the anthropologistsJames Fraser and Jane Harrison, Nietzsche, the biological-essentialist parts of Freud, Jung,Sartre and de Sade. She could have summed up her argument with this quotation from Nietzsche,also quoted by Jung: 'art owes its continuous evolution to the Apollonian-Dionysiac duality, evenas the propagation of the species depends on the duality of the sexes': for Paglia, in fact, thedevelopment of the whole of Western culture depends upon absolute sexual difference, cultureitself being, by and large, the product of the male imagination in its attempts to transcend nature,the Great Mother. Art is Apollonian form imposed on Dionysian flux or liquidity.

Her 'Zeus' would be her teacher Harold Bloom, one of the very few literary critics who getsmore than a passing mention (the other is Milton Kessler, who is responsible for the bizarrereading of Blake's "Infant Joy" on pages 272-4; he is best known for his book The Anxiety ofInfluence, a condition Paglia may well be suffering from herself given her reluctance to credit anyother female critics or thinkers with any ideas at all — women, in any case, don't need to achieve,only to 'be' (another unoriginal and unacknowledged 'idea'), and any who do, such as EmilyBronte or Emily Dickinson, are 'women of masculine will who tend towards sadism' (657). Andas it is the task of masculinity to separate itself from and deny the mother, so Paglia refuses toacknowledge the fact that many of her ideas have their antecedents within the feminism she affectsto despise. (She has apparently been so rude about most feminist writers — Gloria Steinem, forexample, is 'the Stalin of our time' — that she is now accompanied on stage by two huge muscledminders)1. She never defines feminism, but seems to be using it to mean only the liberal-socialistvariety which sees all sexual difference and inequality as the result of social conditioning. She failsto acknowledge the range of positions within fcminism, some of which are very close to her own:de Beauvoir's accounts of a women's experience of her own body3, Susan Griffin's analysis ofwomen's identification with nature', Marilyn French's 'feminine' and 'masculine' principles inShakespeare'; the attempts of French feminists such as Luce Irigary and Julia Kristeva to theorisefecriturefeminine6, the product of the woman's unique experience of her own body and sexuality.Nor would one guess from Paglia's book that there is an on-going debate within feminism aboutpornography, eroticism and sadomasochism: she is only right that 'sex is a far darker power than'sonic kinds of feminism' have 'admitted'3.

Paglia's essentialism exposes the dangers of those feminisms which emphasize 'difference' whenthey are appropriated by reactionaries. For her, biology is destiny to an extent that would belaughable were it not so dangerous, and probably attractive to those for whom real politics is toomuCh trouble. 'Man's cultural achievements', she tells us, 'follow directly from his singular

18 Ethical Record, October,. 1992

anatomy ... in sex as in life they are driven beyond ... The male projection of erection and

ejaculation is the paradigm for all cultural projection and conceptualisation ... male urination is ...

an arc of transcendance' (19-20). Woman, on the other hand, is 'literally the occult, which means

"the hidden"...' (23): women tend to be more realistic and less obsessional because of their

toleration for ambiguity, which they learn from their ability to learn about their own bodies.

Women accept limited knowledge as their natural condition ...'(22). Women have a more

accurate sense of reality: they are physically and spiritually more complete. Culture, I said, waf

invented by men, because it is by culture that they made themselves whole'(653). Paglia offers very

limited evidence for the equation female=nature: she is certainly right that primitive myth and

Western art have represented nature as female, but that is hardly the same thing, and she is hardly

the first to notice it.

So having noted that the equation was 'universal in prehistory'(7), and 'the resemblance of her

rounded breasts, belly and hips to earth's contours'(8), all Paglia can then assert is that

'mythology's identification of woman with nature is correcr(12) ... 'I think this identification not

myth but realityL9); herproor is yet more description of nature as female, and vice versa, which

only restates in slightly different terms that which she is purporting to prove or explain. So,

although she says during her discussion of Blake *whenever gender is symbolized, we must ask

why'(295), she fails to do this herself at the very beginning of her argument. Similarly, although

she is right to challenge the cosy, Green, 'balanced' view of nature, she fails to see that all

definitions of or generalisations about 'nature' are at least partly culturally determined: we choose

examples from the natural world — meerkats living communally or stags fighting over females

and territory — to suit the purposes of our argument. There is a similar weakness or gap in her use

of figures from Greek mythology as archetypes of human experience and cultural expression: she

never stops to ask why it might be in the interests of a particular culture (or ruling group within it)

to develop, encourage or privilege symbols or practices, but simply takes for granted the universal

(or at least 'Western') truths expressed by the mythological figures of Apollo, Dionysus and

others. Again, what ought to be analysis is only description: there is no acknowledgement of the

possibility of different or conflicting readings of these myths — they express universal truths and

Paglia has direct access to them.

Paglia calls her kind of analysis 'archetypal': she also subscribes to the pendulum model of

historical and cultural change — as in 'the liberal Sixties, identifying sex and nature with love and

peace, produced the Sadean countereaction of Seventies catastrophismi269) —which obviates

the necessity for any real social or political analysis. So: 'overstress of any faculty causes a rebound

to the other extreme. The Apollonian Enlightenment produced the countereaction of

irrationalism and daemonism which is Romanticism'(230), elsewhere referred to as 'that historical

wave of the archetypaf(138). Decadence is 'a counter-reaction within Romanticism, correcting its

tilt towards Dionysus1231). It is Decadence which produces the 'sexual personae' of Paglia's title:

the androgyne, the transvestite (*Romanticism is a sex-crossing mode which adds femaleness to

maleness1657)); the vampire. She traces the development of Decadence (expanding its definition

to include writers as unexpected as Henry James, in whom she finds a 'fantastically perverse

imagination'(607) ... 'the obscure late style is itaelf a sexual projection'(620)) from Coleridge's

poem 'Chistabel' in which an innocent girl is seduced by the vampire Geraldine: here 'the sexually

ambivalent artist projects himself into the passive girl, corrupted by a dominatrix'(610).

Her readings of literature are often biographically, as well as biologically, reductive; hence

'Wordsworth was a father/lover who absorbed Coleridge's self-punishing super-ego1320);

'Bridegroom. Wedding-Guest, and Mariner (in 'The Rime of the Ancient Mariner') 'arc all

aspects of Coleridge'(323); 'Heatheliff is Emily BrontrY(439); she tells us that Flaubert said that

"Madame Bovary, c' est moi"(443), forgetting that he also said "Madame Bovary n'a rien de moi";

we are also told that 'in their private lives, Leonardo and Michaelangelo were evidently

Ethical Record October, 1992 19

interested only in male beauty. Of course, they had no private lives apart from art andintellect'(159),— which may well be true, but we are given no evidence. Paglia will have no truckwith post-structuralist theories about the 'death of the author' (theories with which, needless tosay, she never attempts to engage): she 'can never know too much about that person and thathistory'(34) behind the book. But biography can never fully 'explain' a text, as Paglia makes onlytoo clear by interpreting the writers she chooses according to her own theory of sexual differenceand Apollonian/Dionysian conflict. In spite of this, she does produce interesting and occasionallyilluminating readings: of the 'ritualised sexual perception'(192) in Spenser's 'Faerie Queene'; onthe ambiguities of Blake, who, by 'trying to liberate sex from society ... keeps running back intothe cul-de-sac of female sexuality'(277); and the sadomasochism and 'displaced eroticism inEmily Dickinson, although she is surely wrong in saying that her 'appetite for murder andmayhem' has been 'unrecognized'(637). But here her interpretations sometimes become absurdlyoverhteral: commenting on a poem in which Dickinson uses the image of a phallic worm, Pagliasays: 'Dickinson had an elder brother. Austin, whose adultery has recently come to light. Isuspect, however, that the penile model, common in rural Amherst, may have been a stallion...'(645). In her analysis of Dickinson, as elsewhere, biological essentialism becomes also nationalor racial: she approves of writers and cultural practices when they are most 'Italian', and beingItalian herself, she thinks of course, that she is especially well-qualified to understand them. Thus,'the analogues to Dickinson's sexual personae are usually Italian'(667); the can understand thereal tone of Dickinson's comparison of herself to a wren because her (Paglia's) Italiangrandmother once described herself as an owl: 'Italians and Jews tend to be alert to self-dramatizing gambits where force masquerades in personae of infirmity'(660).

Paglia is at her most dangerous in her use of the word `fascism', which she de-politicizes byusing it to refer to any situation in which power is involved: so, 'nature's fascism is greater thanthat of any society'(13), a statement which either ascribes a moral and political consciousness to'nature' or implies that fascists are only following 'natural' impulses. She thus naturalizes apolitical concept and makes it seem an inevitable part of the human condition. So 'we cannotescape our life in these fascist bodies'(235), because 'when political and religious authorityweakens, hierarchy reasserts itself, in sex, as the archaizing phenomenon of sadomasochism'(234),— so perhaps we'd better bring back real fascism ...? The concept of hierarchy is also naturalizedand simplified: 'man is biologically a hierarchical animal. When one hierarchy is removed,another automatically springs up to take its place (231). Paglia sees sadomasochism everywherebut only 'explains' it as 'a symptom of a cultural thirst for hierarchy'(243), and, pathologically,quoting someone called Richard Tristman as if he were an expert, without comment orqualification: 'All sexual relations involve relations of dominance. The desire for equality inwomen is probably an attenuated expression of the desire to dominate'(248). So now we knowbut only 'probably'. Fascism is also aestheticized: 'idolatry is fascism of the eye'(I 39): Apollonianobjectification is fascist but sublime'(105) — so that's all right then; 'Apollo is obsessiveness,voyeurism, idolatry, fascism'(96). Here she wants to have it both ways: nature, the realm ofDionysus, is 'fascist', but so is the Apollonian attempt to transcend it via culture and art. Termsused so loosely are best not used at all, particularly when they refer to specific, and horrific,political realities.

In her description of the mythical Athene and her birth from the head of Zeus, Paglia writesthat she is 'born of aggression.She must fight her way out. The hammer blow is her power too,like a fig pounding a table'(8 I). This is an apt description of Paglia's style of argument: shortpunchy sentences reiterate her points, numbing us into submission. The fist is her constantinsistance, 'I said', 'I say', 'my theory again', 'I believe'. A point made early in the book (with noargument or evidence to prove it) will be repeated later, prefaced by 'I said' — if I've said it twice itmust be true.

20 Ethical Record October, 1992

This punchy sensationalist mode sits uneasily with the pompous voice with which she expresses

the moralism of ideas such as the weakening of 'political and religious authority'. So 'pursuit of

pleasure belongs on the party circuit, not in the centers of power. Today, too one might like

playfulness and spontaneity in a friend, lover, or, star, but one wants a different character in people

with professional or political authority'(133). The male homosexual is one of the great forgers of

absolutist western identity. But of course nature has won, as she always does, by making disease

the price of promiscuous sex'(15): so AIDS is 'nature's punishment', and 'the promiscuous

woman is self-contaminated and incapable of clear ideas. She has ruptured the ritual integrity of

her body'(27). 'Happy are those periods' announces Paglia, 'when marriage and religion are

strong. System and order shelter us against sex and nature. Unfortunately, we live in a time when

the chaos of sex has broken into the open'(25): one wonders how long it will be before she is

recruited into Bush's campaign (or our own Tory one) for family values. Elsewhere she tells us

that she is "an advocate Of aestheticism and Decadence'(512), but also that 'Decadence is the

juxtaposition of primitivism with sophistication, a circling back of history on itselP(137). In her

denial of historical and political realities, her bizarre yet vague defence of astrology — 'the

movements of the constellations are a clock by which earthly changes can be measured'(222),

—her subsciption to 'what Jung calls synchronicity'(222), her 'long study of the chthonian'(239),

and her absolutist biological determinism, Paglia is Decadence in person.

References:

I. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth if Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals trans. Francis Golffing:

Doubleday Anchor, New York 1956, p.I9. Quoted by C.V. Jung, Collected Works Vol.6, Chapter 3,

para.225.

'The Guardian', 20/8/1992,

Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Ser. Penguin 1972: First Published 1949,

Susan Griffin, Women and Nature: The Roaring Inside Iler Women's Press, 1984; Pornography and

Silence: Women's Press 1981.

Marilyn French, Shakespeare's Division of Experience: Abacus, 1982.

Sec, for example, Marks, Elaine and de Courtrivon, Isabelle, cds. New French Peminisms: Art

Anthology: University of Massachusetts Press, 1980.

VIEWPOINTS

Man's motivation questioned

Cyril Smith expected the 20th century to end in socialism (Sept. ER, p20), but if Marx was

right it should have been the 19th century that realised that aim.

It's true that Kautsky boiled down Marx to a large extent but, as when Cobden boiled

down (Adam) Smith, he did not err greatly in doing so. Cyril Smith offers us a greater

distortion than did Kautsky with his idea that Marx was not mainly an economist but an

ethical thinker. Marx did uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat, though not as Lenin

later held it, as Martov rightly protested at the time.

Marx himself was one of the eulogists of market forces, holding that they would create

the situation that would let the masses see we had an alternative. But they never did.

For Marx, communism was basically an economic aim. Flume influenced him far more

than did Hegel. Hegel's chief influence was getting him to read up on economics, for Hegel

too held himself up as a critic of Smith and co.

David McDonagh, — Birmingham.

EtAical Record, October. 1992 - 21

Freethinkers Challenged

I raise the question of the alleged decline in religion in this country. Judged by the decline inchurch attendance this is undoubtely the case.

I would like, however, to raise the question of the practice of prayer. The practices instilled inchildhood are not easily eradicated and often persist into adult life. This applies particularly, Ithink, to the practice of prayer, which was instilled to satisfy the needs of the young and cancontinue to be a formative influence in later life.

It would be interesting to find out how many of the so-called freethinkers resort to the practiceof prayer. It may be that we are far less irreligious than is commonly supposed.

I should like to hear the views of your members.

John C. Hutchinson, — Chiswick.

A timely message for John Patten N1.P.

As long as the sacerdotal order shall have the privilege of infecting youth, of habituating theirminds to tremble before unmeaning words, of alarming nations with the most terrific systems, solong will fanaticism be master of the human mind, imposture will at its pleasure cast the apple ofdiscord among the members of the state.

Baron D'Holbach, — Paris.

New Federal Crime Bills Passed

Both the Senate and the House have recently passed comprehensive legislation that willdramatically change the complexion of the way that the police and courts will deal with thosethey perceive as "criminals". Penalties for all offenses involving firearms and drugs will bedrastically increased; appeals will be made much more difficult to obtain; and Search andSeizure regulations will be greatly relaxed, so as to cause grave threat to Fourth Amendmentrights. Approximately fifty offenses are re-defined as being punishable by death.

I see this new crime legislation as a sharp escalation of the repression that our government,

Federal and State, has been building in our society over the last dozen years, but I do not see it asa completely drastic departure from a process that has been steadily taking place during theseyears. It is alarming, but not a cause for panic. The new crime legislation moves us along the roadto a police state more rapidly, but it does not complete the prqcess. It is important to know whatrepression is being legislated, and to educate others so that the tide of cruelty and mercilessnesscan be turned around before it is too late.

Bob Darby, — Atlanta, Georgia.

Could desire be a misleading concept?

I am indebted to Paddy Smith for his pleasant and thoughtful letter (ER Sept) in response to myarticle. He describes how he personally comes to terms with the idea that a human being is both(subjectively) a conscious agent, and (objectively) a programmed mechanism. He acknowledgesthat there are powerful reasons for accepting both these views, but regards them simply asmutually complementary. He rejects my suggestion that they are incompatible.

22 Ethical Record, October, 1992

My own view, as suggested in my article, is that our actions are produced by an automatic

pattern-seeking and interpreting program (of massive proportions) running in our brain. All our

lives we are engaged in an unending process of interpreting our experience, which means that we

unconsciously seek repeated patterns, and from these construct a predictive model of how things

are, most especially of how we ourselves are. We are quite unaware of the workings of this huge

program, because it runs automatically and non-consciously.

Thus what we have always been used to seeing as desires and acts of will are really

interpretations of ourselves and our own actions which have been computed unconsciously, and

then come into our conscious minds. Our sense of 'freedom' in our actions is really our

ignorance of how our non-conscious program works, indeed of its very existence.

I believe that a we become clearer about this, our way of picturing ourselves will change

radically: we will even be able to drop the misleading concepts of desire and free will altogether,

and our practical everyday notions about what kinds Of human activities make most sense, and

so are most worth pursuing, will be directly affected.

Stephen Houseman, — Cromer.

The Language of Revolution

Two difficulties arise from the use of language on display in Mark Galeotti's RefOrm or

Revolution (Sept ER): first, to say that The French Revolution introduced the very concept of

"revolution" into the political lexicon' overlooks, on the one hand, the concepts, new to our own

country at the time, assisting in the events of 1688,6and on the other the concepts, certainly

revolutionary, again at the time, embodied in the novae In traceable in Brutus's articulate

resistance to everything Julius Caesar was trying to stand for. If it is a conceptual lexicon that is

under consideration, one could argue that the concept in question had already been in its pages

for many centuries!

Secondly, to insist that 'the long-term cultural revolution genuine change reqthres' overlooks

entirely the historic cultural revolution initiated by Mao Tse-tung which, whatever it was, was no

long-term' matter.

Patrick Fetherston, — London El.

soum PLACE SUNDAY CONCERTS

South Place Ethical Society's famed series of chamber music concerts, performed by musicians

of high calibre, is now into its 102nd year. All concerts start at 6.30 pm, and tickets are only O.

For detailed and future programmes contact the SPIES Secretary at Conway Hall or David

Morris, 153 Nether Street. London, NI2 8ES, tel: 081-455 9958.

October 4: Lindsay String Quartet.

October II: Ruth Waterman (violin), Peter Pettinger (piano).

October 18: Duke String Quartet.

October 25: Luciano lorio (viola), Alexander Wells (piano).

November 1: Musicians of the Royal Exchange.

November 8: Chagall Trio.

November 15: Bernard Gregor-Smith (cello), Yolande Wrigley (piano).

Ethical Record, Oewher, 199273

NOVEMBERSunday, 1stI I am ONE WORLD, ONE CULTURE. HAROLD BLACEHAM, (SPES appointed lecturer) says a

culture is essentially local. A global culture could only be an encoded experience of thehuman race. What that code should contain will be the subject of this lecture.

3 pm DECIMAL TIME - THE NEXT GIANT LEAP FOR MANKIND? MIKE PINDER.

President of The Decimal Time Society on "how a free-thinking innovator sees theWorld of the Future"

Sunday, 8thI I am THE LIMITLESS POWER OF SCIENCE. PETER ATKINS. science author and physical

chemist, explores the power of science to account for evermhing there is in the world.

3 pm QUEST FOR JUSTICE. ANTHONY GREY discourses on the theme of his recentlypublished book 'Towards homosexual emancipation'.

Wednesday, 11th7.15 pm THE UNNATURAL NATURE OF SCIENCE. LEWIS WOLPERT, FRS, Professor of

Biology at UCL, argues the thesis of his latest book that science W counter-intuitive butprovides the best way of understanding the world. He takes issue with 'culturalrelativists'. Response by David Papineau, Professor of the Philosophy of Science. (Held

in association with The Society for Process Thought). Admission free to SPES members -£4 to others. A good reason to join SPES now for £10 p.a. !

Sunday, 15th11am THE NEW GENETICS AND THE FUTURE OF SOCIETY. SAHOTRA SARKAR, of the

Centre for Philosophy and History of Science at Boston University discusses the ethicalissues raised by genetics.

3 pm PROGRAMME OF MUSIC AND POETRY arranged by EDA COLLINS.

SOUTH PLACE ETHICAL SOCIETYRegistered Charity No. 251396

Founded in 1793, the Society ii a progessive movement whose aim is the study and dissemination of ethicalprinciples based on humanism, and the cultivation of a rational and humane way of life.

We finite to membership all those who reject supernatural creeds and find themselves in sympathy with ourviews.

At Conway Hall there are opportunities for participation in many kinds of cultural activiths, includingdiscussions, lectures, concerts and socials.

A comprehensive reference and lending library is available, and all members receive the Society's journal, TheEthical Record ten times a year.

The Sunday Evening Chamber Music Concerts founded in 1887 have achieved international renownMemorial and Funeral Services are available to members.Minimum subscriptions are: Members £10 p.a.; Life Members £210 (Life Membership is available only to

members of at least one year's standing). It is of help to the Society's officers if members pay their subscriptionsby Bankers Order, and it is of further financial benefit to the Society if Deeds of Covenant are entered into.

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