01 Francisco v GSIS

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  • 8/3/2019 01 Francisco v GSIS

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    TRINIDAD J. FRANCISCO, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICEINSURANCE SYSTEM,

    (Reyes J./ 1963)

    Facts:

    (from a previous digest)On Oct. 10, 1956, Trinidad Francisco, in consideration of aloan extended to it, mortgaged to GSIS a parcel of landknown as VIC-MARI compound. On Jan. 6, 1959 themortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed. GSIS acquiredownership of the land

    Vicente Francisco, Trinidads father, sent a letter dated Feb.20, 1959 to GSIS proposing a redemption of the property.

    He later received a telegram from the GeneralManager Andal saying that GSIS approvedredemption. After the redemption had already concludedand all of the arrearages have been paid.

    On Jan. 1960, Trinidad, thinking that she had alreadyredeemed the property suddenly received letters from theGSIS the General Manager Andal asking for the proposal forthe payment of her indebtedness. Franciscos fatherprotested claiming that he had already redeemed theproperty as per the letter he sent GSIS.

    Nevertheless, GSIS continued to demand foreclosure. Theyclaimed that the telegram assenting to the proposal letter ofFranciscos father should be disregarded as it failed toexpress the contents of the board resolution due to the errorof its minor employees in couching the correct wording ofthe telegram. The board resolution approving the lettercontained the condition that Franciscos father should alsopay the expenses in the foreclosure of the mortgage. Theremittances already made by him were not sufficient tocover this.

    Trindad thus instituted the present suit.

    The trial court ruled in favor of Trinidad. It found that theletter dated Feb. 20, 1959 had been unqualifiedly accepted

    and was binding and the plaintiff need not pay the extracharges being demanded.

    ISSUE: WON the offer by Vicente Francisco was accepted bythe corporation?

    RULING:

    YES, a person who knows that the officer or agent of thecorporation habitually transacts certain kinds of business forsuch corporation under circumstances which necessarilyshow knowledge on the part of those charged with the

    conduct of the corporate business assumes, as he has theright to assume, that such agent or officer is acting withinthe scope of his authority. If a private corporationintentionally or negligently clothes its officers or agents withapparent power to perform acts for it, the corporation will beestopped to deny that such apparent authority is real, as toinnocent third persons dealing in good faith with suchofficers or agents.

    In this case, the telegram was within Andals apparentauthority. Assuming that it was sent by the Board Secretaryin his name but without his knowledge, third persons are not

    duty bound to disbelieve the acts of a corporations officers,especially when it appears regular on its face.

    Furthermore, the Civil Code provides for ratification, whereina party with knowledge of the reason which renders thecontract voidable and such reason having ceased, theperson who has a right to invoke it executes an act whichnecessarily implies an intention to waive his right.In this case, GSIS ratified its acceptance of VicenteFranciscos offer when it failed to refute it in the letter sent

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    by Trinidad Francisco to Mr. Andal which quoted verbatimthe telegram of acceptance. This was in itself notice to thecorporation of the terms of the allegedly unauthorizedtelegram.

    Since a corporation cannot see, or know, anything exceptthrough its officers, knowledge of facts acquired orpossessed by an officer or agent of a corporation in thecourse of his employment, and in relation to matters withinthe scope of his authority, is notice to the corporation,whether he communicates such knowledge or not.

    GSIS pocketed the amount and kept silent about thetelegram. This silence, taken together with theunconditional acceptance of three other subsequentremittances from plaintiff, constitutes in itself a bindingratification of the original agreement

    FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed decision is

    hereby affirmed.