02.Hund-Are Social Facts Real

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Are Social Facts Real?Author(s): John HundSource: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Jun., 1982), pp. 270-278Published by: Wiley on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political ScienceStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/589936 .

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John Hund

Are socialfactsreal?*AB STRACT

This Note is a clarificationand defense of the Durkheimian iewthat social facts are 'real,'that they can and often do 'constrain'individuals, hat they exist independentlyof and 'external o' in-dividuals,and that they cannot 'withoutremainder' e reduced opsychologicalfacts or to statements that individualsmay or willhabituallyor as a ruledo certain hings.This questionof the realityof social facts is related to the work of Hartand Searleand to thedebate aboutthe connectionbetween factualand moral udgments,and in this way the controversybetween the so-calledmethodo-logical holists and individualists s located within a largerphilos-ophicalframework.In a recent articleby the OxfordmoralphilosopherPhilippaR. Footthe authornotes that:

when arlthropologists r sociologists ook at contemporarymoralphilosophy they must be struckby a fact about it which is indeedremarkable: hat morality is not treated as essentially a socialphenomenon.Wherethey themselveswould think of moralsfirstof all in connectionwith . . . the regulationof behaviour n and bysociety, philosophers commonly take a different startingpoint.What the philosopherdoes is to ask himself what it is to make amoral judglnent, or to take up a moral attitude, and he tries togive the analysis in terms of elements such as feeling, action andthought,which are found in a single ndividual.

Sociologists,as this learnedphilosophernotes, do not usually ake theindividualas the startingpoint of analysis,but rather he group ofwhich the individuals a partconstitutes he fundamental nit of analy-sis, and the elements of analysisare social facts. But because of thestartingpoint taken by many philosophers he notion of 'social acts'hasbeen thought o be suspectby many.Nowhere s thissuspicionmoreThe British Journal of Sociology Volume 33 Number 2 June 1982g3RKP. 1982 0007 1315/82/3302-0268 $1.50

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Are socialfacts real?271apparenthan nthe controversy etween he so-calledmethodologicalindividualists nd holists. In the main, the individualists avebeen

philosophers ast in the traditionalempiricistmold. Theyhavebeeninclined,that is, to the view that what is 'real' s that whichcan beseenorsensed,andthatwhichis not observable r sensible s not real.Sincesocial actscannotbe observedbut individuals an, they reason,the latter are realand the formerare not, and all statementsaboutthe behaviourof groups,and all use of groupconceptsto describethe behaviour f individuals,an ultimatelybe reduced o statementsabout the feelings,beliefs and dispositionsof individuals,or whatelse is there?Most philosophershavebeen perfectlyreadyto acceptthe notion of 'brute' facts, but they have preferred o ignorethenotionof 'social,' societal,'or 'institutional'acts.One exception to this has been MauriceMandelbaumwho hasargued or the existenceand autonomyof societalfacts whichare,hemaintains,as ultimateaspsychologicalacts,'and 'cannotbe reducedwithout remainderto concepts which refer to the thoughts andactions of specific individuals.'2The view held by Mandelbaumsantithetical o the positionof Watkins,who writesthat 'theultimateconstituentsof the socialworld arepeople.'3

In this note I am not goingto rehashthe assortmentof side andancillary issues raised by the Mandelbaum-Watkinsontroversy.InsteadI am going to presenta defenseof methodologicalholismorthe view espousedby Mandelbaum,nd in anearlierperiodby Durk-heim,that socialfactsare 'real,' hatthey canandoftendo 'constrain'individuals, hat they exist independentlyof an 'externalto' indi-viduals, and that they cannot 'without remainder'be reducedtopsychological acts or statements hat individualsmayor will habitu-ally or as a rule do certainthings.A few of the arguments presentmay be modestlyoriginal, ut in the mainI am simplygoingto restateand to some extent modestlyrevisesome of the powerfulargumentsagainstmethodological ndividualismby that or any other name)whichhave been devisedby John R. Searleand H. L. A. Hart.Bothof these philosophershavedeparted romthe individualisticr brutefact startingpoint adopted by the others. Both have arguedthattraditionalempiricistmodes of explainingsocial behaviourcannotexplainnor accountfor the existenceof 'obligations.' incethe con-troversybetweenthe methodologicalndividualistsnd holistshassofar not been construedbroadlyenoughto includethe workof thesephilosophers, nd sincetheirviewsmayhelpto locatethis controversywithina larger hilosophical ontext,it maybeworthwhileo examinethemhere.One of the reasonsthat Searle'smuch-celebratederivationof an'ought' from an 'iS'4 has had and still has so many philosophersscratchingheir headsis that he was audaciousenoughto introducethe notion of 'institutional acts' into philosophicaldiscourseand to



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272 John Hunduse the existenceof these to explainhow evaluative onclusions ouldbe derived from factual or descriptivepremises.Even though it hasprovokeda spate of reply and rejoinder nd rebuttals o rejoinders oreplies and so on, Searle'sderivationof an 'ought' from an 'is' issimpleenough.He argues his way: from the fact thatJones promisedto pay Smith five dollarsno one would disagree hat he,Jones, oughtto pay Smith five dollars,all thingsbeing equal. Some have attackedthe ceterasparibus rider, others have denounced he deduction as afraud,and still othershave simply deniedthat Jones ought to do any-thing at all, if he is not so inclined.WhatSearlesays about his deduc-tion it is that it is possibleonly becauseof the institutionof promising.If the institution did not exist, then Jones' utterance 'I herebypromise . . ' would haveno effect uponJones'moral ituationor uponwhat he ought to do. But underlying he institution of promising,according o Searle,are certain 'constitutiverules' to the effect thatutterancesof the kind 'I herebypromise . . etc.' count as promising,and 'promisingnvolves he undertaking f an obligation.'SSearle gives as a formulafor constitutiverules 'X counts as Y incontext C,' where X is a brute descriptionof certainthings in theworld, and where Y is an institutionalstate of affairs.Withoutcon-stitutive rules the description they played football' or 'Jonesmade apromise' cannot be given, according to Searle. It is possible thattwenty-two men might line up and go through the same physicalmovementsas are gone throughby two tfbams t a football game,butif there were no rules of football, that is, no antecedentlyexistinggame of football, there is no sense according o Searle n which theirbehaviourcould be describedas playing football. Constitutive ulesgive sense to the activitiesof individuals.They createand define newforms of behaviour ccording o Searle.

What are constitutive rules? More to the point in the context ofthe present discussion,what are rules, how are they possible, andwhat does it mean to say that they 'exist'?Thoughmany empiricist-mindedphilosophers avegrown iredof asking uchquestionsbecausethey see no point in it, satisfactoryanswersto them may help toresolve the controversybetween those who believe that social factsare real, and those who deny their existence. Indeed,the questionofthe existence and reality of social facts is identicalwith the questionof the existence and realityof socialrules,for what are socialrules fnot social facts?Social rules have two dimensionsas it were, which are explicatedby Hart n termsof whathe calls heir 'internal' nd sexternal' spects.A social rule s definedby Hartashavingan 'internal spect' n additionto an 'external aspect' which it shareswith a mere social habit andwhich consists in simple, regularbehaviourwhich an observer ouldrecord. This internalaspect of rules is according o Hart sometimesmisrepresented s 'a mere matter of psychological eelings,'but such



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Are social facts real? 273feelings,he argues, are neithernecessarynorsufficientfor the exist-ence of bindingrules.'6 hat is necessary n Hart'sviewis that thereshouldexist a 'critical eflectiveattitudeto certainpatternsof behav-iour which are taken as a common standard.'7Rules according oHart necessarily nvolve reference o somethingwhichis 'outside'ofthe individual,and this 'something's a certain patternof behaviour'whichis 'takenas' a commonor a 'shared tandard.'Now, in his article in defense of methodologicalholism ErnestGellner had made the point that individualsthink n holistic (or'institutional')concepts. \hat this amounts to, in Gellner'sview, isthat the individualsare capable of isolatingand reacting o certain'patterns' n their environment.The pattern abstracted,however,isaccording o Gellner'not merely abstracted,'but is 'reallythere.'8This is the samepositiontaken as Hart's,andraisesthe issue of the'exteriority'of social facts.It will be rememberedhat there are hreecrucialelements in Hart'sanalysisof rules: there is (1) a 'criticalreflectiveattitude' towardcertain (2) 'patternsof behaviour,'whichare taken as a (3) sharedor 'commonstandard.'Thesecommonorsharedstandards an also be thoughtof as 'sharedmeanings,' rwhatDurkheimwas prepared o call 'collectiverepresentations.' ollectiverepresentations, ccording o Durkheim,presupposed he existenceof certain 'sensible ndices'or 'visible patterns,'and the extent towhich such indices or patterns (the 'external'aspect of rules) are'sensible'or 'visible'varies n animals rom those, like dogs and apes,that havelittle ability to recognizethem to those, likehumans,whopossessthe cognitive capacityof accomplishingwhatAristotlecalled'graspingwhat isuniversaln the particular.Whats involved n patternrecognitionthen is the duality of concretenessand abstractness. heextent to which abstractstandards such as rules) are 'public' s thesame as the extent to which they are 'shared'or 'group'properties.9Viewed strictly from the external or 'physical'point of view,spokenlanguage s no morethan brutephonetic utterances; coin ora dollarbill is no more thana piece of metalor a pieceof cloth paperwith grey and green ink on it. Wehave 'holistic'concepts whichweuse to describe these social facts (and artifacts), and if we try toreduce these to individualistic oncepts whichhave as their referentsmere brute phoneticutterances in the case of a language)or piecesof metal or paper (in the case of money), what is lost is an entiredimensionof the social life that is being described.If humanbeingslike lower animalswere able to thinkonly in termsof individualisticconcepts referring o physical objects in the world, they wouldbeunableto recognizemuch less buildtheir lives aroundandparticipatein institutionalor social forms of behaviour.WhatWeber eferred oas 'social action' would not be possible.A rudimentary ystem ofkinship would not even be possible, for without constitutive rulescreatingand definingthe roles of 'husband' nd'wife' the institution



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274 John Hundof marriagewould not exist. Withoutholisticconceptsand he 'things'they createanddefinehumans ouldperhaps run n packs,'but grouplife as we know it could not exist. Constitutive ulesmakegroup ifeand society possible. They create the very possibility of formingsocial relationships, bligationsand social structures,and until theirimportance s graspedwe shall be unable to understand he wholedistinctive tyle of human hought, peechandactionwhich s involvedin the existenceof rulesandwhich constitutes he normative tructureof society.Why, then, do so many still cling to the idea that social conceptssuch as 'husband,' wife,' 'marriage,'state,' 'debt,' 'money,' 'uncle'and so on, can be reducedwithout remainder r loss of meaning oconcepts which refer only to brute facts? One possible answer sgiven by Searle in his book SpeechActs.10 After drawinghis distinc-tion between bruteand nstitutional actshe describes certainpictureof what constitutes the world, and consequently what constitutesknowledgeabout the world. It is a pictureof the world as consistingof brute facts. Part of what is meant by this is that there are certain'paradigms' f knowledgeand that these paradigms re taken to formthe model of all knowledge.Theseparadigms aryenormously.Theyrange from 'this stone is next to that stone,' to 'I have a pain.' Butthey share common features,according o Searle,and one of them isthat the concepts which make up the knowledge refer to physicalobjects. The model for systematic knowledge of this kind is thenaturalsciences, and the basisfor all knowledgeof this kind is gener-ally supposed to be simple empiricalobservations ecordingsenseexperience.It is obvious however that large areas of apparently act-statinglanguagedo not consist of concepts which are a part of this picture.Searlegives the followingas examplesof this: 'SmithmarriedJones,''the Dodgersbeat the Giants,'and 'Greenwas convictedof larceny.'Now, what is at issue (at bottom) in the controversybetween themethodological ndividualists nd holists, according o Gellner, s the'ontological' status of the entities referredto by holistic conceptssuch as those appearingn the examplescited above.While he notionof 'ontological status' is never as clear as it could be, one thing isclear and this is that the things referred o by holistic conceptsexistin and by virtue of rules. These rules consist of a criticalreflectiveattitude toward certain patterns of behaviourwhich are taken as acommon standard, t will be remembered,and these 'patternsofbehaviour'are 'out there,' which is to say that they are external toand exist independently f the individualswho take them as commonstandards hared by the group.They aregroup properties, in otherwords, and they cannot without remainder e reduced o properties,or conceptsused to describe he properties,of individuals.When we look at a work of impressionistic rt, for example, we



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275re social facts real?find that if we standtoo near t we cannotmake out its object. Thenas we stand back at just the right distance, a 'pattern'comes intoview. We undergoa similarcognitiveexperienceas we are socializedinto a group, or as we learna language.Patternsbecome visibleto usas we become members of the group or speech community.As webecome familiarwith the ways of the group members,we begin torecognizecertainpatternsof behaviourwhich are taken by the groupas shared or common standards f behaviour. t could of course besupposed hat in the case of a work of impressionistic rt the patternis being 'imposed'on the canvasby the mind of the individual iewer-that it is not 'really there.' But if a pattern is an intelligible con-figurationof elements t must also to some extent exist 'out there' orin the world. This is the kind of claim, I take it, that is beingmadefor the ontological status or the reality of social facts. True, t takescertain raining, kill and capacity(sometimescalled 'competence'bylearning heoristsor linguists) o be able to recognize he patternsofbehaviourwhich constitute human speech and action. But the claimseems to be that these patternsreally are there to be discovered,orlearned,and that they are group (which is to say 'social')propertieswhich cannot be reduced to nor explained in terms of physical orpsychologicalpropertiesof individuals.This, at any rate, was Durk-heim's claim.He argued hroughouthisRules of Sociological Methodthat social facts could not be reduced o psychological acts, that theformeraresuigeneris and exist on a different level'from psychologi-cal facts. Empiricist-mindedhilosophersmay have trouble acceptingthese premises,but just as Watkinshas pointed out that 'Weberwasno Platonist,' et us here note that Durkheimwas.A second index of the ontologicalstatusof the entities referred oby holistic concepts that was noted by Durkheimwas 'constraint.'He felt that social facts could 'constrain' ndividuals.This is notnecessarily o say that social actscan 'cause' ndividuals o do certainthings, though it certainly includes the claim that they can 'givecause' or providereasonsfor actions. While t may not be true thatsocial facts can have an effect on behavior n the same way that abilliardball struck squarelycan have an effect upon anotherbilliardball, it still does make sense to say that social facts can constrainusand that indeed they do. Groupmembership onstitutesan enormousstructureof rights and duties which exerts a constant and indeed a'crushing' nfluence upon individuals,and any attempt to argue,asWatkinsdoes, that 'an individual's ersonality s a systemof unobserv-able dispositionswhich, together with his factual beliefs, determineobservable behaviour'll leaves an entire dimension of social lifeunanalyzed and unexplained. Indeed, often the explanation of anindividual'sbehaviordemands he introductionof conceptsreferringto societal status. An individual'sbehaviormay sometimesbe mademore intelligibleby viewing t as a speciesof 'role'behavior. t would



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276 Johnundbeifficultto reducemanyof the conceptsusedto characterizeole-relationshipsnd role-behavioro psychologicalconceptshavingtodo ith feelings,motivesandbeliefs.Thereason hisis so is thattheincumbentsf suchrolesare the bearersof rightsand dutieswhichdefineheseroles.Theyare'constrained' y suchroles.Structuresof rights and obligationsexist in the same way thatrulesxist, and these'constrain'ndividualswho aresubject o them.Thiss illustratedmostclearlyby examining henotionof socialobli-gation.hus,the statementthatanindividual asanobligation,e.g.,to ay Smithfivedollars, o stop at a redlight,to report ormilitaryduty r to carefor one's offspring,remains rueeven if he believes(reasonablyr unreasonably)hathe willneverbe foundout andhasnothingo fear from disobedience.This indicatesthe general rrel-evancef an individual's eliefs,fearsandmotivesto the questionofwhethere has an obligation.An individualhas an obligation f hiscasealls undera rule,andrules,as groupproperties,cannotbe re-ducedwithoutremainder)o thedispositions rbeliefsof individuals.TheuristJohn Austin, seeing the generalirrelevanceofaperson'sbeliefs,earsandmotivesto the questionof whetherhe hadanobli-gation, efined henotionof obligationnot intermsof thesesubjectivefacts,but in termsof the likelihood hatcertainofficialsorother ndi-vidualswould behavein certainways. And Hayekhas argued hat'theres no otherway towardanunderstandingf socialphenomenabutthroughan understandingf individualactionsdirectedtowardandguidedby theirexpectedbehaviour.'l2But these individualisticmodesof analysisobscurethe fact that whererulesexist, deviationsfromthem are not merely grounds or a predictionthat hostilere-actionswill follow, but are also a 'reason'and a 'justification'orsuchactions.Fromthe internalpoint of viewof group-membersulesareused as guidesto sociallife and as the basisof claims,demands,admissions,criticismand punishment.Suchrulesgivethem reasonsforbehavingn one wayrather hananother.So, if we insiston analyzing ocialbehaviour,ncluding anguage,from an 'individualistic' erspective n termsof motives, feelings,beliefs and habits,what is left out of the analysis s the social or'symbolic'dimensionof shared,groupactivity.Thus,whenthenotedOxfordphilosopherGilbertRylewrotethe Conceptof Mind n 1949his individualisticmodeof analysis ompletely eft out of the picturethe group or sharedpropertiesof humansocialandcommunicativebehavior.Thisexplainswhy thereappearsno referencen thatworkat all to the writingsof G. H.MeadwhoseinfluentialMind,SelfandSociety had appearedn 1934. Ryle andMeadbeganfromdifferent'startingpoints.'Andthetwoworksareasdifferent romone anotheras behavioristicpsychologyis fromsociology.The startingpoint foranalysisfoundin the work of Hart s muchcloserto thatof MeadorDurkheim hanit is to thatof Humeor Ryle.l3 BothHartandSearle



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Are social facts real? 277deviaterom heempiricist-indivldualisticaradigmf knowledgendanalysiset downby Hume ndby classicalmpiricistpistemology.Wecansee thenthatmethodologicalndividualismsan outgrowthof British mpiricism.heconversemethodologicaloctrine s thatsocialor groupphenomenare ntentional ndteleological,ndoneof the salientthemes of modern ociology s that descriptionfdistinctivelyocialphenomenamust nvolveunderstandinghe situ-ation as it is apprehendedy the agentwhose behaviours to beexplained nd understood.t mustthereforemakereferenceo theconceptualrameworkf the agent,andwhileholistic oncepts sedby an observermight be eliminableif all wecaredaboutwere hekindsof explanations roducedby behavioristicsychologists rnatural ciencedemographers)t is clear hatwhenusedby partici-pantsor groupmembershey arenot. Theseholisticconcepts ndthe 'things'heyrefer o are real ntheirconsequences,'hich s yetanotherway of saying hat they canand oftendo 'constrain'nclivi-duals, hat theyexist independentlyf and 'externalo' individuals,and hatthey cannotwithout emainder'e reducedopsychologicalfactsor statementshat ndividuals ayor willhabituallyr as a ruledo certain hings.

John HundDepartmentof SociologyUniversity f CaliforniaSan DiegoNOTES

*I would like to thank ProfessorA. G. N. Flew for some helpful com-mentson an earlierversion of this note.1. 'Approval and disapproval,' inP. M. S. Hacker andJ. Raz (eds),Law,Morality and Society, Oxford Univer-sity Press,19 77, p. 229.2. sSocietal Facts,' British Journalof Sociology, 1955, 6. All citationsareto the anthologized version of thearticle, reprinted in Patric Gardiner(ed.), Theories of History, OxfordUniversityPress,1959, p. 479.3. J. W. N. Watkins, 'Ideal typesand historical explanation,' BritishJournal for the Philosophy of Science,1952. This citation is to the antholo-gized version reprinted in PatrickGardiner (ed.), Theories of History,Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 505.

4. 'How to derivean ought fromanis,' PhilosophicalReview, 1964,73, pp.43-58. Reprintedin Philippa R. Foot(ed.), Theories of Ethics, OxfordUniversityPress, 1969.5. J. R. Searle, Speech Acts, Cam-bridge University Press, 1969, pp.33 -4.6. Concept of Law,Oxford Univer-sity Press,1961, p.56.7. Ibid.8. 'Explanations in History,' Pro-ceed ng of the Aristo elian Society,1956. All citations are to the antho-logized version of the article, retitled'Holism and Individualism n Historyand Sociology ' andreprinted n PatrickGardiner (ed.), Theories of History,Oxford UniversityPress,1959, p.498.9. Is this a Platonicdoctrine?Plato



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278John und

argued hat we sparticipate'in theuniversalshat constitute the heavenof orms.Whenwe, as group

members,sparticipate'n the group are we notalsoparticipating n abstractstandards'shared'by the group? Aren't thesestandards ropertiesof the group?WasPlatoadvancing sociologicaldoctrine?10. Op. cit.11. This citation is to the versionofWatkins's article reprinted in AlanRyan (ed.), The Philosophy of Social

Explanstion,Oxford UniversityPress,1973,p. 104.12. F. A. Hayek, IndividualismandEconomicOrder,University

of LondonPress, 949, p. 6.13. Oddly enough, references toboth Hume and Ryle appear n Hart'sbook, yet there are no referencesthatI could locate to either Mead orDurkheim.

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02.Hund-Are Social Facts Real