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Political Stability in Thailand
Tamada, YoshifumiTamada, Yoshifumi
(Kyoto University, Asafas)
Table 1 Becoming less democratic Freedomhouse2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
PhilippinesPR 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 3CL 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3PR 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
②⑨Vietnam
PR 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7CL 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 5
LaosPR 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7CL 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6PR 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
⑨
⑩
⑦CambodiaPR 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6CL 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Thailand PR 2 2 2 2 3 7 6 5 5 5CL 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4
⑦
⑤Myanmar
PR 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7CL 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
MalaysiaPR 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4CL 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
⑪
④Singapore
PR 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6CL 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
BruneiPR 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6CL 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
⑥⑦
IndonesiaPR 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2CL 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3
East TimorPR 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3CL 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4
①③CL 3 3 3 3 3
2PR: political rights, CL: civil Liberties 1‐5: free (democratic), 6‐10: partly free, 11‐14: not free
1: best7: worst
less stable as wellless stable as well
Why has Thai politics become lessWhy has Thai politics become less democratic and less stable?
Wh d h it t blWhy and how was it more stable and democratic in the past?p
What are factors affecting stability and democracy?stability and democracy?
3
Discerning administration and regimeDiscerning administration and regimeadministration
stableFigure 1
regime
Thaksin administrationunstable regime
After 2006 coupSamak administration
hi i d i i i
In the 1990sChuan (I)(II) administration
h d
stable
Aphisit administrationYinglak administration
Banhan administrationChawalit administration
unstableTable 2
administration regime democracy
Before 2001 unstable stable democratic
Table 2
Before 2001 unstable stable democratic
2001‐2006 stable stable democratic
Aft 2006 t bl t bl tl d tiAfter 2006 unstable unstable partly democratic
4
causes of instability (unpredictability)causes of instability (unpredictability)
One deriving from parliamentary cabinet systemOne deriving from parliamentary cabinet system (representative democracy)
When PM and MPs are not on good termsWhen PM and MPs are not on good terms.Instability of this type is widely observed all over the world In Thailand it stood out in the 1990sworld. In Thailand, it stood out in the 1990s
Another deriving from friction between li d d TSD(Th i lparliamentary democracy and TSD(Thai‐style
democracy)Peculiar to Thailand needs explanationBecoming conspicuous and visible during Thaksin era
5
duarchy: two national leadersduarchy: two national leaders4 types of representative democracy4 types of representative democracy
(1) Presidential systemU.S.A., South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia
(2) Semi‐presidential system(2) Semi presidential system Russia, France
( ) l(3) Parliamentary system U.K., Japan, Singapore, Malaysia
(4) Semi‐parliamentary system Thailand
6
TSD(Thai‐Style Democracy)h
Figure 2a
Constitutional GovernmentMonarchy
Parliamentary Democracy
PoMP PM
Parliament Cabinet Post‐coup period
Po
ConMP PM
Realm of itthiphon
People
Realm of itthiphon(influence) instead of amnat (power or authority)authority)
7
TSD (ประชาธิปไตยแบบไทยๆ)TSD (ประชาธปไตยแบบไทยๆ)“Democracy with the king as head of state” (ประชาธิปไตยy g (
อันมีพระมหากษัตริยทรงเปนประมุข)
“shared sovereign power by the king and theshared sovereign power by the king and the people” (ราชประชาสมาศัย)
P li i l i h h ki h ldi h Political system with the king holding hegemony“royal democracy”(Thongchai 2011)
“the right to be consulted, to encourage and to warn” and more(Hewison and Kengkit 2010: 191)
it l d i l l b lritual and ceremonial role, symbol
network monarchy (McCargo 2004)
8
Formation of TSDFormation of TSDexpanding royal power and authority p g y p y
Hop: 1947 coup
Skip: coups in 1957 and 1958Skip: coups in 1957 and 1958
Jump: October 14 incident in 1973
toppling the military government intoppling the military government in collaboration with students and army chief
admired as ‘democratic’ kingadmired as democratic king9
royal power without institutionalization
( )
royal power without institutionalization
(1) The king can intervene in politics in case of need (Kasian 2010a)case of need (Kasian 2010a)
(2) power has not been institutionalized Royal power has hardly been stipulated in the constitution (Thongthong 2005, quoted by Kasian 2010b)
This power has neither the upper limit nor the bottom = flexible but fragilebotto e b e but ag e
& power cannot be inherited
10
Characteristics of TSDCharacteristics of TSDRoyal power and authority depending upony p y p g p(1) Loyalty of the people(2) barami (virtue and charm) of the king(2) barami (virtue and charm) of the king(3) Character of PM duarchyWeakness(1) barami: indispensable(1) barami: indispensable(2) power and authority: not inheritable (3) l i hi i h(3) zero‐sum relationship with PM
11
summarysummaryIn order for TSD to prevail,
A person on the throne should have baramiA person on the throne should have baramiPM should be obedient
blunmanageableDemocratization may be accompanied by a
h l d d lstronger PM with solid democratic legitimacyRoyal successor may not have barami
Options: how to cope with(1) Keeping the monarchy above politics truly(1) Keeping the monarchy above politics truly.(2) Searching an able and popular successor.(3) Getting rid of strong PMs one after another.
12
Figure 3 Elected MPs in the cabinet d li t 1944 2011and parliament, 1944‐2011
90 0%
100.0%
Parliament
80.0%
90.0%
Cabinet
60.0%
70.0%
40.0%
50.0%
20.0%
30.0%
0.0%
10.0%
Aug
‐44
Aug
‐45
Sep‐45
Jan‐45
Jan‐46
Mar‐46
Jun‐46
Aug
‐46
May‐47
Nov‐47
Feb‐48
Apr‐48
Jun‐49
Nov‐51
Dec‐51
Mar‐52
Feb‐57
Sep‐57
Jan‐58
Feb‐59
Dec‐63
Mar‐69
Dec‐72
Oct‐73
Mar‐75
Apr‐76
Oct‐76
May‐79
Mar‐80
Dec‐81
Apr‐83
Aug
‐86
Aug
‐88
Mar‐ 91
Apr‐92
Jun‐92
Sep‐92
Jul‐9
5Dec‐96
Nov‐97
Feb‐01
Mar‐05
Oct‐06
Feb‐08
Dec‐08
Aug
‐11
13
Before 2001
14
Unstable administration and stable regime
Instability:Weak PM
Short‐lived administrationShort‐lived administration
Stability:yLittle necessity of changing the regime predictability: elections bringing little changeschanges
15
Unstable administrationUnstable administration
MP d tiMP and parties Weak political parties: small membership, no organization, no manifesto, financial dependency
self‐help MPs uncontrollable and rebelliousp
Coalition government and PMNon‐confidence motion every year parliament dissolution in a few years defeat every time
PM with weak leadership: compromise > command
no collision with TSD stable regimeno collision with TSD stable regime16
Stable regimegConservative parties general elections every f i hfew years with
# no concern about the left forces
# little concern about election results election makes little difference election makes little difference
# the effects of refreshing the regime legitimacydefeat of the largest party = change of the governmentdefeat of the largest party = change of the government
shock absorbing mechanisms insulating governments/political parties from the voters
vote brokers , no election pledge (manifesto),vote brokers , no election pledge (manifesto),
money meaning a lot 17
Political Reform and the 1997 Constitution
Mi t ki th d i i t ti i t bilit f liti lMistaking the administrative instability for political instability,
Electoral reform in order toElectoral reform in order to # stabilize the administration# boost the numerical minority (urban middle class))# weaken MPs (and the numerical majority )
Expected! democratic regime comfortable for Expected! democratic regime comfortable for the middle class and TSDUnexpected product! Thaksin administrationUnexpected product! Thaksin administration
18
Figure 4 Larger parties in electionsg g p
1957‐II
1957‐II
1976
1975
1969
1986
1983
1979
1st
2nd
1992‐II
1992‐I
19883rd
4th
2001
1996
1995
1992 II
2007
2005
2001
0 50 100
2011
19
Th k iThaksin eraboth were stableboth were stable
20
Strong leadershipg p• Power: Big victory in elections electoral reform & money& money– controlling the parliament: MPs and factions within TRT and the oppositionTRT, and the opposition
– harnessing the bureaucracy– surpassing financial contributors (capitalists)surpassing financial contributors (capitalists)
• Popularity: Fascinating the electorate with l li ipopular policies
MPs elected owing to TRT and Thaksin(1) TRT ticket is critical
(2) Very popular ex. Thaksin on campaign poster
b d obedient MPs 21
Figure 5 PM like a president
presidency president‐like PM PM 1997 constitution
首相president PM#Single constituency larger party#Proportional representation system
election pledge election pledge
Only party list MPs can be ministers
parliament
parliament
Only party list MPs can be ministers
Party list system functions as direct l i felection of PM
Custom to be followed
people people people
PM able to boast double legitimacy, one from the parliament
22the other from the people
Collision with TSDCollision with TSDLittle problem within the parliamentary democracy
# Unprecedentedly stable administration Completed 4 years term of MPs for the first time in Thai history
# Regime was stable as well The constitution and rule of game (electoral politics)
ld b t i dwould be retained. Unable to deny this regime without denying
democracy.democracy.
However, repulsion of TSD toward the strong PMWhy does TSD dislike Thaksin?
23
Network monarchy deemedNetwork monarchy deemed Thaksin as threat against TSD
Thaksin was very popular and able A t bl A Acceptable ex.Anan
Thaksin was not obedientUnacceptable
+ Thaksin was going to control the militaryUnacceptable
The military and the court should be under the control of network monarchy
24
Exorcizing Thaksin: The 2006 coupExorcizing Thaksin: The 2006 coupusual way was useless
democratic way: the opposition to defeat TRT in general elections
legal way: judicial power to convict Thaksin
special way: military coupspecial way: military coupBlaming Thaksin harshly to justify every measures to expel him‐‐corrupt, anti‐monarchist, dictatorial,….
“good coup” (Thitinan2011)
Unable to comprehend democratic origins of Thaksin
25rooting out Thaksin = denying democracy challenging the people
[noted later]
Figure 6 unreversible democratizationg
General elections since 1979
PM should be elected MP since 1992PM should be elected MP since 1992
1997 constitution: electoral reform
Decentralization since 1995
Thaksin administration in 2001Thaksin administration in 200126
Post coup eraPost‐coup eraBoth are unstableBoth are unstable
27
Unable to predictUnable to predict# When the administration will be toppled# When the administration will be toppled
# Whether there will be elections
# When general elections will be held
# Whether election results will be acceptedaccepted
# Whether the present constitution will be prevised
28
Figure 7 gu ea case of unpredictability
mainly because ‘invisible yhand’ continues to intervene in politics as they like
‘special order’, ‘special power’, ‘informal power’
Weekly Nation13 May 2011 29
Figure 8 a case of unpredictabilityElection or coup?
Daily News, Sep 20, 2011
(1) Prophecy of a famous monk: Aphisitwill be PM again(2) How?(2) How?(3) Election or coup?
Daily News, Dec 9, 2008
A road to PM of Aphisit(1) military( ) y(2) PAD(3) Rebel MPs 30
Pitfall 1: using the monarchy as aPitfall 1: using the monarchy as a political weapon (justification)
PAD: forcing the people to choose between the monarchy and Thaksinmonarchy and Thaksin
The people: loving both without contradictionLove and respect for the monarch / Love for ThaksinLove and respect for the monarch / Love for Thaksin
PAD: the monarchy > the people, as source of l iti / f th i tlegitimacy / owner of the sovereignty
The people: electoral politics is indispensable d f l ( l k h )definitely (unlike the 1991 coup)
cf strong eapon as necessar no other eapon as strongercf. strong weapon was necessary, no other weapon was stronger than this one
31
Pitfall 2: War on electoral politicsIn order to deprive Thaksin of power,
Condemning people for electing ThaksinCondemning people for electing ThaksinPoor, ignorant, easy to be deceived,
willing to sell votes
Denying democratic legitimacyDenying democratic legitimacyIntent to postpone elections, reject election results and justify coupresults, and justify coup
Resulting in repulsion and awakening
32
Wrath of the electorateWrath of the electoratePeople never give up electoral politicsp g p p
even if they can forsake Thaksin
electoral politics indispensable due to recent democratizationrecent democratization
“from subjects to citizens” (Aphichat 2011)
H i j t b t t t t f d f th fi t tiHaving just begun to get taste of democracy for the first time
The electorate got angry if deprived of democracy
33
D i di blDemocracy indispensableDemocratizationDemocratization political leaders should be elected (cf. appointment)
Decentralization + Thaksin administration leaders of national and local governments should show election pledges and carry out them (‘contract’)
Economic and social changes + development ofEconomic and social changes development of telecommunication technology increasing interest in policies increasing interest in policies
34
unending power struggle destabilizing politics
The monarchy is sacred and inviolable
i i ibl invincible as weapon
Shouldn’t be defeated, but can’t win against electoral politics
Unending struggle to keep politics unstable Unending struggle to keep politics unstable and to awake the people politically
U d i i th h i th d Undermining the monarchy in the end
The monarchy should not be enemy of
35
y ythe people and democracy
SOLUTIONSOLUTIONRelationship among
parliamentary system, constitutional t d TSD h ld bgovernment and TSD should be readjustedreadjusted
(0) Regime should be stabilized prior to administrationadministration.(1) Parliamentary democracy should prevail. MPs
should be elected and inspected by the people.should be elected and inspected by the people. (2) Constitutionalism should prevail. The constitution
itself should be widely accepted one.y p(3) TSD should fade out to protect the monarchy.
36
TSD(Thai‐Style Democracy)Constitutional GovernmentFigure 9 (Figure 2b)
Constitutional Government
Monarchy
Parliamentary Democracy
MP PM
Parliament Cabinet
MP PM
People
37
Selected referencesAphichat Sathitniramai(อภิชาต สถตินิรามัย). 2011. “จากไพรฟาสูความเปนพลเมือง(From Subjects to Citizenship) ”, Prachathai, 13 May 2011. Hewison, Kevin and Kengkit Kitirianglarp. 2010 “ ‘Thai‐Style Democracy’ ”, Søren Ivarsson and g g p y yLotte Isager (eds), Saying the Unsayable (NIAS, 2010), pp. 179‐202.McCargo, D. 2005. ‘‘Network Monarchy and Legitimacy Crises in Thailand,’’ Pacific Review, 18(4): 499‐519.Nithi Iosiwong(นิธ ิเอียวศรีวงศ). 2011. “ขบวนการคนเสื้อแดงกับสังคม-การเมืองไทย (1)(2)”, Matichon (Online), Sep g( ) ( ) , ( ), p19 and 26 2011.Kasian Techaphira(เกษียร เตชะพรีะ), 2010a. “ระบอบประชาธิปไตยแบบหลัง 14 ตุลาคม”, Matichon (Online), Oct 15, 2010.‐‐‐‐. 2010b. “ลักษณะของประชาธิปไตยแบบหลัง 14 ตลาฯ : พระราชอํานาจ”, Matichon (Online), Oct 22, 2010.ุ , ( ), ,Phit Phongsawat(พิชญ พงษสวสัดิ์). 2007. การเมืองของไพร (กทม, Openbooks)Sirote Khlamphaibun(ศิโรตม คลามไพบูลย). 2011. ) ประชาธิปไตยกเ็รื่องของ”เรา” (กทม, สํานกัพิมพศยาม).
Tamada, Yoshifumi. 2008. Myths and Realities: The Democratization of Thai Politics (Kyoto UP)UP).‐‐‐‐. 2008. "ประชาธิปไตย การทําใหเปนประชาธิปไตย และการออกจากประชาธิปไตยของประเทศไทย ", ฟาเดียวกนั 6(4): 98‐139.‐‐‐‐. 2009. “Democracy and Populism in Thailand”, Mizuno and Pasuk (eds), Populism in Asia (Singapore: NUS Press), pp.94‐111. Thitinan Pongsudhirak. 2011. “Few voiced opposition to the 'good coup'”, Bangkok Post, 19 Sept 2011.Thongchai Winichakul. 2008. “Toppling Democracy”, Journal of Contemporary Asia 38(1): 11‐37.‐‐‐‐. 2011. “เสวนาชุด 5 ปรัฐประหาร (1) ธงชัย วนิิจจะกูล: สังคมไทยกับภาวะการหลอกตัวเอง”, Prachathai, 27 Sept 2011.
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