TheCollisionofLanguageandMetaphysicsintheSearchforSelf-Identity:on“Aha�kāra”and“Asmitā”inSā�khya-Yoga

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ABSTRACT

Theauthorofthispaperdiscussesthreemajorpoints:(1)asigniicantfeatureoflinguisticanalysisintheclassicalIndianphilosophicaltradition;(2)theroleofthereligiouspractice(īśvara-pranidhāna)inthesearchfortrueself-identityinSā�khyaandYogaschools(darśa-na-s)withspecialreferencetotheirgnoseologicalpurposes;and(3)somepossiblereadingsof “aha�kāra” and “asmitā” displayed in the context of Sā�khya-Yoga phenomenologyandmetaphysics.Thecollisionoflanguageandmetaphysicsreferstotheriskofparalogismcausedbethecommonlinguisticproceduresmakingthesubjectdeineitsidentitywithinthesemanticorder(thatisverbalconventionsandgrammaticalrules)whichdonotrelecttheactualmetaphysicalsituationoftheself,thoughitdeterminesone’sself-understandingin the empirical sense. Whereas Sā�khya-Yoga aims at recognizing, reorganizing and, i-nally, going beyond these procedures regarded as the obstacles on the path towards self-knowledgeandliberationfrommetaphysicalignorance.

1.ISTheGRAMMATICAlAnAlYSISUSefUlonThePAThoflIBeRATIon?

eventhoughneitherSā�khyanorYogaisfamousfortheirspecialcon-cern with grammar (vyākara�a), or linguistic analysis, both classicaldarśanasshareageneralviewoftheIndiangrammariansthatlanguagehasbothphenomenalandmetaphysicaldimensions,whichcanbeun-coveredonlyifoneusesitinacorrectandinsightfulmannermasteredthanks to some i g n o r a n c e-c l e a r i n g a c t i v i t i e s. Yogasūtra(III.17),whichreferstothewaylanguageisgeneratedandunderstood,

A R G U M e n TVol.1 1/2011

pp.37–48

www.argument-journal.eu

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recommendsthatoneshouldconcentrateonadistinction(pravibhāga)betweenthreeelements:aword(śabda,orpada),themeaning(padārtha,or artha), and presented-idea (pratyaya, or sm�ti) in order to effaceignorance (avidyā).Theyoginmakesavirtueoutofanatural inclina-tion to fuse and confuse these three distinct components by using itasastarting-pointforanexerciseinconcentrationandmeditative-ab-sorption (samādhi).1 In this way, Patañjali argues, a yogin can haveknowledgeofthelanguageofall livingbeings.2ofcourse,thereisnoa single language that is used by all living beings. So, what Patañjalisuggests pointing to this rare vibhūti, or supernatural power, is thatayoginbecomesomniscient(sarvavid)thankstoovercomingalltheli-mits that every language imposes upon the perceiving being. Whencommentingonsutra(III.17)Vyāsastatesthatthebondbetweenthe-se three elements: śabda, artha and pratyaya, is merely a v e r b a lc o n v e n t i o n (sa�keta) consisting in wrong identiication of onewithanother.Therefore,theauthorofYogabhā�yarecommendsgram-maticalanalysis(vyākara�īya),sothatonecangraspthedifferencebe-tween these elements and thereby avoid mixing verbs (kriyā-vācaka)andnouns(kāraka-vācaka).

however,inthecontextofYS,anymentalactivityinvolvingnamingordenoting(vyapadeśa),andeveryrelectionbasedmerelyontheanaly-sisofwordsiscalledvikalpa,orconceptualization(YSI.9),whichisrec-ognizedas theaflicted, troublingluctuationofmind (kli��a citta-v�tti).Vikalpa,contrarytoavalidcognition(pramā�a),neverreachestherightinsight into reality, because it i m p l i e s i g n o r i n g t h e d i f f e r -e n c e between the words and their meaning, or intended-objects andpresented-ideas(YS,YBh,TVI.41).ThatiswhytheauthorofYSwarnsus against undue trust of language and conceptualization (savitarka).nevertheless,theriskofwrongusageofthewordsmayonlybeeliminat-ed through purifying the mind and freeing it from all gross and subtleobjects.Andhereagain,acarefulgrammaticalanalysisprovestobethebestmeansforinitialpuriication.

1 Cf.TheYoga-SūtraofPatañjali.ANewTranslationandCommentary,trans.G.feuerstein(1989:105–106).

2 Yogasūtra(III.17):śabdārthapratyayānāmitaretarādhyāsātsaṅkara�tatpravibhāgasa�ya-mātsarvabhūtarūtajñānam.

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2.WhATISACTUAllYTheGodThATSā�KhYAAndYoGAdooRdonoTBelIeVeIn?

now, before we master “the language of all living beings” and have anaccomplished mind of diminished luctuations (nirvicāra samāpatti, YSI.41), like a clear jewel assuming the colour of any near object, we cantry to get a closer look at the Sanskrit grammatical structure and meta-physical connotations of some important terms occurring in the oldestpreservedtextsofYogaandSā�khya.Theselectionofthetermsis,natu-rally,determinedbythethemeofthepanel.3WhilePatañjalaYoga,of-tencalled“Sā�khyawithGod”(seśvara),seemsappropriateforthisses-sion, referring to grammar and God in classical Sā�khya, codiied byĪśvarak���a in Sā�khyakārikā (c. 450 Ad), may seem odd because it iscommonlythoughttobeatheisticornon-theistic.Butshouldwesimplyfollow this popular slogan? In fact, what we can learn about God fromthe passages of Yuktidīpikā, as well as Gau�apāda’s and Mā�hara’s com-mentaries to SK is that īśvara is not a cause of the world.4 Sā�khya issvābhāvika,whichmeansthatitbelievestheworldarisesspontaneouslyfromitsowninherentnature;therefore,theprocessoftheso-calledcre-ationoftheworldneedsnoadditionaltranscendentalcauseandreason.nevertheless, Sā�khya philosophers do not openly and unequivocallydenyacategoryofGodassuchbutratherconinethemselves toreject-ing a strong metaphysical concept of God as Creator and Ruler of theworld. Yd even suggests that God acquires the instrument of under-standing(buddhi)andalsoadoptsamaterialbodytotakeoverthepow-er,whichbelongstothatbody.Godtakesabodilyform,forinstancethebodyofadivinewarrior, likeŚiva (Yd72.9–10),or thegreat seerbeingtheincorporation,orembodimentofGod.5

3 Anearlyversionofthispaperwaspresentedatthepanelon“GrammarandtheGods:When Metaphysics and language Rules Collide”, during the Annual Meeting of theAmericanAcademyofReligion(Chicago,nov2,2008).Thenitwasslightlydevelopedandre-edited thanks to some valuable comments and hints I owe to Arindam Chakrabarti(University of hawai’i, USA) and Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad (lancaster University, UK).Thoughtheircriticalremarksinspiredmegreatly,anyerrorsormistakesaremyown.

4 TheYuktidīpikā (68.20–74.15)considersthefollowingcausesoftheworld,whichallaresubsequentlyrejected:theatoms(paramā�u),theSelf(puru�a),God(Īśvara),work(kar-man), fate (daiva), time (kāla), chance (yad�cchā)andabsence (abhāva).God, like theSelf,isheredeinedasnon-active(akart�),buthisexistenceassuchisnotrejectedatthesametime.Cf.Yuktidīpikā(1998).

5 ThecommentaryarguesthatGodcantakeabodyofdignity (māhātmyaśarīrādipari-grahāt,Yd72.13)whichisĀpta‘authoritative’(Yd45.10–11)likeĪśvaramahar�is,thatisthegreatseerswhoare[incorporationsof]God,andwhoare“devoidofblemishessuchaspas-

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on the other hand, Patañjala darśana has been commonly recog-nized as “Sā�khya with God”6 due to the fact that the author ofYogasūtra (c. 300 Ad) refers to īśvara or īśvara-pra�idhāna in elevenaphorisms(YSI.23–29; II.1–2,32,45). Intheirstpāda,wherethedy-namicsofyogicpractice (abhyāsa) iselucidated,meditationon īśvaraseemstobeameanstosamādhi,thoughnotthehighestsamādhiena-blingdistinguisheddiscernment(viveka-khyāti).Whereasinthesecondpāda,bothinthecontextofthethree-stepkriyā-yogaandasoneoftheiveniyama-sincludedinthepracticeofa��aṅga-yoga,itisjustameansfor puriication of the sattva-buddhi7 and effacement of the impact ofkarmāśaya. Besides, īśvara-pra�idhāna is mentioned in the third chap-terofYSwherethemethodsofinducingthesupernaturalpowers(sid-dhi-s)arediscussed.Generallyspeaking,Patañjaliconsidersīśvaratobethe Self distinguished by the empirical consciousness (citta) in thecourse of discriminative discernment (viveka-khyāti), and an i d e a lm o d e l o f t h e e m p i r i c a l s e e r present permanently in our-selves in the form of inward consciousness (citi), but accessible onlythrough meditative effort and one-pointed, intentional samādhi(ekāgra). Such a concept of the ideal preceptor, or the perfect innerguru, lets us suppose that īśvara, in the context of yogic pedagogy, isa counterpart of jīvan-mukta whose doctrine was not developed byPatañjaliotherwise.AsG.J.larsonrightlysuggests,īśvaraforclassicalYoga is c o u n t l e s s i m p e r s o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s that canonly manifest or reveal itself in the presence of perfectly pure sattva(prak���a-citta-sattva);therefore,“worship”or“prayer”inthePatañjala

sion, whose opinions are free from doubt, who see things that cannot be reached by thesenses”.foradetailanalysisoftheideaofGodinthecommentariestoSā�khyakārikācf.Johannes BRonKhoRST (1983: 149–164). Bronkhorst gives three readings of the termīśvaramahar�ī�ām(152–153):(1)ifwereaditasadvandvacompound,itmeans‘toGodandthegreat seers’; (2)whenreadasakarmadhāraya compound, itmeans ‘to thegreat seers,who are [incorporations of] God’; and (3) ‘to the seers, who are Gods’ (this last optionBronkhorstrightlyconsidersinapplicable).

6 Patañjali’sphilosophyhasbeencalled“Sā�khyawithGod”atleastsinceSāya�amā-dhava’sSarvadarśanasa�grahaandtheSarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha (14thcentury)orevensinceŚaṅkara(8thcentury).however,f.edGeRTon(1924:38)arguesthatYoga,originally,didnotrefertoPatañjali’sphilosophy,becauseitisnota“system”ofbelieforofmetaphysics,anditwasalwaysjustaway,amethod,ofgettingsomething,andnotoneoftheSā�khyaschools. Moreover, as Bronkhorst (1981: 309–320) tries to convince us, Yoga in an earlydate referred rather to nyāya and/or Vaiśe�ika instead of Patañjali’s views presented inYogasūtra, therefore, theexpression ‘seśvara sā�khya’mayhavereferredto thePāñcarātrasystem.

7 Thesetwounderstandingsofīśvara-pra�idhānaarealsoclearlydistinguishedbyT.S.RUKMAnI(1999:738).

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Yoga ought to be understood as a profound meditation and longing(bhakti-viśe�a) for the e t e r n a l e x c e l l e n c e (śāśvatikautkar�a)ofp e r f e c t e m b o d i m e n t (prak���a-sattva).8

Thus, the difference in attitude to God between Sā�khya and Yogadoes not prove to be so big as one might initially think, since the sys-tems share basic metaphysical assumptions and skepticism towards theideaofanAlmightyGodCreatorbeingthehighestentity.Andmoreim-portantly,theybothacceptasimilarconceptionof t h e e m b o d i e dS e l f, which can manifest itself as a distinguished and perfect subjectperceivedas īśvara.Therefore,whenweconsidertheideaofGodinthecontextofthesetwoschools,wemustmaketheanalysisof“subject”and“self-identiication”ourstartingpoint.Whiledoingsowemustrefertosemantic,cognitive,andontologicalperspectivesonsubjectivity.

3.ABoUTGRAMMARof“AhA�KāRA”And“ASMITā”

Therearenumeroustermsnamingdifferentaspectsofsubjectivityrecog-nized by Patañjali and Īśvarak���a, such as dra���, sāk�in, citta, buddhi,manas,anta�karā�a,puru�a,svāmin,bhokt�,ātmanetc.,buthereIamgo-ingtodiscussonlytwoofthem,namelyaha�kāraandasmitā.Theyareworth analyzing even more carefully than others in the present paperdue to a crucial role they play in the cosmological, psychological and,aboveall,soteriologicalcontextofSā�khya-Yogatradition.

Atirstglance,bothtermsseemtobeequivalent,astheycomefromthe grammatical category of the irst-person singular pronoun, and theverb “to be” conjugated as “(I) am”. In his commentary to YS (III.47)whenexplainingthenatureofiveaflictions(kleśa-s),Vyāsaclearlyiden-tiiesbothterms.9Theissueofwrongself-understandingandadelusivesubjectivitybasedontheconceptof“I”(aha�kāra),and“mine”(mama-kāra),oregotism(abhimāna)andI-am-ness(asmitā),hasbeenquitecom-monintheIndianthought.ItirstcameupintheolderUpani�ads10andtheniscarefullydiscussedinBuddhism11andinnyāya.ButatleastsincePañaśikha Sā�khya distinguishes “I-sense” (aha�kāra) as a separate in-

8 The phrase “eternal excellence” was suggested by G. J. lARSon in his paper TheEccentric God of Yoga: A New Approach to ‘Worship’ and ‘Prayer’ presented at 4th dharmaAssociationofnorthAmericaConference(WashingtondC,nov.17–19,2006).

9 Īśvarak���ausesthistermthreetimesaham(SK61,64,66)andaha�kāra(SK22,24,25).

10 Cf.M.STeIneR(1927:109–114).11 Cf.R.o.fRAnKe(1913:44).

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strument,whichfunctionsasactivityorkriyāoftheempiricalconscious-nessratherthanitsstaticcosmologicalprinciple.Whereasasmitā,moreoftenusedintheYogaschool,hasaratherstaticconnotation.Thisdis-tinctionisalsoconirmedbythegrammaticalstructureofbothtwo-wordcompounds.Inthecaseofaha�kāra,irst-personpronounisfollowedbyasufixformedofaverbalroot,andassuchitcancovertwomajorcate-goriesofmeaning:thatoftheverbalactionitself,12andthatofapartici-pantofaction,oragent.13Inthecaseofasmitā,averbconjugatedinirstperson singular is followed by a sufix tā (feminine), which is, togetherwithtva(neuter),averycommonendingtoformabstractnounsmean-ing“beingsuch,thequalityofbeingsoandso”.14

3.1.A h a � k ā r a

In aha�kāra composed of aham “I”, and kāra, the latter component isnot unequivocal and has several different meanings, especially when itoccurs in conjunctions. What is more, kāra can be derived either from√k�‘todo,make,perform,accomplish,cause,prepare,work,employ,use,utter,pronounce’,orfrom√k�‘topourout,scatter,throw,cast,disperse’,andalso‘tohurt,injure’,or‘tokill’.Ifweincludealltheseconnotationsrecorded in Monier-Williams’ Sanskrit-English Dictionary, the term kāraenvelops the following meanings: a) ‘making, doing, working, makingasound,utterance’;b)‘amaker,doer’;c)‘anact,action,effort,exertion,determination,religiousausterity’;d)‘amaster,lord’;andalsoe)‘killing,slaughter’;f)‘bringingdown,humiliation’.

now, taking into account the philosophical usage of this term inSā�khya-Yoga tradition, I suggest that we distinguish between threemainreadingsofaha�kāra,whichmaybecalled:(1)c o s m o l o g i c a l,(2)p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l, and (3) s o t e r i o l o g i c a l.Allof them

12 likeinphutkāra ‘pufing,blowing’.13 forinstanceinvārttikakāra‘composerofvārttikas’,or‘commentator’.AsG.A.TUBB

notices,theformulasofanalysisinordinarylanguageusedbythecommentatorstoexplaink�t formationsfollowverycloselythetreatmentoftheseformationsinPā�ini’sgrammar.Cf.G.A.TUBBande.R.BooSe(2007:50).

14 PāṄInI, A��ādhyāyī (5.1.119), cit. after TUBB and BooSe (2007: 177). It is worthmentioningthatbothsufixestāandtvaareidenticalinmeaning,sowecannotdistinguishbetween these abstract nouns; for instance both śuklatā and śuklatva mean ‘being white,whiteness’, both aśvatā and aśvatva mean ‘being a horse, horseness’. however, when itcomestothephilosophicaltechnicalterms,theremaybesomesubtledifferenceinmean-ing, i.e.aha�tābeingpure“I”,undifferentiatedconsciousness(KashmirShaivism),aha�-tva—being“I”(ego),individuality,mine-ness(Rāmāya�a3.5.31).

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areacceptedtobecomplementaryratherthancompetitiveorexceptive,thoughtheycapturetheego-makerfromquitedifferentperspectives.

Intheirstsuggestedreadingaha�kārameans‘cry’(aham!).Theutter-ing“I”ishereregardedasakeystageoftheworldcreation.Itplaysasimi-lar role to an original being from Vedic cosmogony who, when about tocreatetheworld,criesout“heream I”. Inthismeaning,aha�kāra isnotapsychologicalcategory,butacosmicandevolutionaryprinciple,or tatt-vaderivedfrombuddhi,andinturnproducingtheivesense-capacities,theive action-capacities, inner sense (manas), and the ive subtle elements(tanmātras).Thiscosmogony-orientedunderstandingischaracteristicoftheearlypre-classicalandtheisticphaseofSā�khyaschooldevelopmentwhenaha�kāra waseven identiiedwithPrajāpati, themythicalfatherofcrea-tionwhoproducestheworldassacriicialfoodforhimselfbyknowledge,austerityandself-formulation.ByplacingtheI-makingprincipleinthese-quence of the creation stages, early Sā�khya acknowledges the ancientspeculations on c r e a t i o n-b y-n a m i n g or f o r m a t i o n-b y-f o r-m u l a t i o n,whichconsidernameandform(nāma-rūpa)tobeinsepara-ble.Thisearlymeaningofaha�kāraispositive:theoriginalbeingnaminghimself‘I’isoriginallyincompleteandneedstobecompletedincreation.15Interestingly, in the Indian grammarian tradition of Pā�ini no sharp dis-tinctionisdrawnbetweentheverbs“knowing”and“doing”.ThisissonotbecausetheIndiangrammarianssimplyignorethisdistinction,butbecausethey are aware of a deeper truth that the two are not dichotomous.16 Asf. Staal aptly noticed while analyzing the ritual function of mantra, lan-guageisnotsomethingwithwhichyou n a m e something,butitissome-thing with which you d o something.17 however, in the later stages ofSā�khyatraditionthisperspectiveundergoesaradicalchange. InSKandYS“thedoer”and“theknower”,ortheagentofdoingandthesubjectofknowledgeareclearlydistinguished.Whiletheactivityofanykindcharac-terizesthenature(prak�ti)andall itssattva-rajas-tamasmanifestations,thepower of knowing, or consciousness (cit) comes only from the Self (pu-ru�a).

Thesecondmeaningofaha�kāra,whichIcallp h e n o m e n o l o g i -c a l,orepistemic,is‘I-making’,or‘individuality-making’,butalso‘indi-

15 Cf.ASanskrit-EnglishDictionary(1993:124,253,274,301).16 SeeB�hadāra�yaka,ŚvetāśvataraUpani�ads,andMok�adharma.B�h.(I.4,17):“Inthe

beginning,this(world)wasjusttheself,oneonly.hedesired,‘wouldthatIhadwife,thenImayhaveoffspring.WouldthatIhadhadawealth,thenIwouldperformrites’.”

17 This is true inmanyothercasesofverbs too. It is said, forexample, that theword“toexist”or“tobe”(as)istobeusedinthesenseof‘tobecome’(bhuvi),and“tobecome”(bhū)inthesenseof‘tobe’(asbhuvibhūsattāyām).Cf.KamalalarMIShRA1981:10–11.

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vidual’smaking’inthesense‘makingbytheindividual’.onecouldalsorenderitas“I-sense”.Thisreadingofaha�kāraindicatesthesigniicanceof the phenomenal consciousness in the process of perception. here,aha�kāra instead of “creating” is rather responsible for “relecting” or“projecting” theempirical selfonnature,prak�ti,andconsequently im-posingontheworldtheindividualpointofview.Moreprecisely,allthementalandphysicalobjects,includingtheagentoftheempiricalpercep-tion, i.e. the mind-and-senses complex, are themselves manifestations,orprojectionsoftheego-principle.Thus,aha�kāraisuniqueinmarkingthe common meeting point for the knower and the known, or knowa-ble,alike.Itstandsfortheintentionalityofmindandplaysacrucialrolein the process of perception. In the statement “I know that I am theknower of objects”, the self implied by the irst “I” is the pure seer(puru�a) which is the relector of the buddhi or the empirical ego. Thisnon-objectiiedultimateselfenablestheembodiedegotooperateasthepresent subject.Whereas the second“I” implies the subjectof thephe-nomenalexperience(bhoga)beingtheillusoryself.Butwho,afterall, isthecogniserofthecontactbetweentheseerandtheseen?Itis“I”(aham)whoamitscogniser,becauseIthinkIamthebodyetc.,aswellasthatIamtheknower.Butaha�kāra isalso theproductof thatunion.There-fore,howcanIknowthatunion?Infact,IcomeintobeingorIcometoknowtheunionafterthecontact(sa�yoga)takesplace.duringeachactofknowing,theknowerandtheknownappearunited;afterthatbyanal-ysisweknowthat t h e r e a r e s e p a r a t e e n t i t i e s thereinastheknowerandtheknowable.Inotherwords,whilecapturingthesetwoinoneconceptionweundergotheillusionandignorance.Wethink“Icanknowmyself”becausethefacultyofself-awareness,orlightofconscious-ness is relected in thesattvicaha�kāra.That iswhyalthough“I-sense”is the result of the contact and its instrument, I understand that I amboththeseerandtheseen.

Inthethirds o t e r i o l o g i c a l reading,aha�kāraisthew r o n g “I”,oregotism,whichrequiresbringingdownone’sdelusive selfandmaster-ingitthroughspiritualdeterminationand,inally,“killing”or“resolving”itback untounmanifestandunindividualized formofnature (pradhāna).here, the emphasis is placed on the illusory aspect of the “I”-maker. Theemergenceofaha�kāra stands for thebifurcationof subjectivity into theempirical“I”andthetranscendentaltrueself.Andthissplittingupistherootcauseofignorance(avidyā)andallmundanesuffering(du�kha).Wrongself-identiication, namely the identiication of the ego with the true self(puru�a),leadstoamistakenself-understandinganddisablestherealizationof the trueknowledgeandfreedomfrommisery.Toachieve theultimate

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soteriological goal, Sā�khya advocates dissolving aha�kāra through dis-criminativecognition(viveka-khyāti)ofprak�ti—boththemanifestandun-manifest — and puru�a. one may gain access to the state of liberation(mok�a)onlythroughthe“implosion”ofone’sego,whichasaresultoftheanalysis of tattvas arising in the form of discrimination (nāsmi na me nā-ham—SK64),whichmeansthatIamnotwhatIthoughtmyselftobeun-derthedelusioninthestateofbondage;Iamneithermybodynorthecon-tentsofmyconsciousnessandnorevenegoitself.Inthisway,oneattainstheknowledgeofthedistinctionbetweentheunchangeableandultimatetrueselfandthemutablephenomenalself,functioningonlyasap r o v i -s o n a l a n d t r a n s i t i o n a l s u b j e c t.Thus,thewrong“I”,ontheonehand,makesindividualityassuchpossible—bothobjectiveandsub-jective—andintroducestheelementofsubjectivityandself-relectionintotheunconsciousmaterialworldbut,ontheotherhand,itenablesthetran-scendentalconsciousnessofpuru�a toevoke thepersonaldimensionand,inconsequence,toreleasethesubjectfromthefalseself-identitywiththeI-sense.

3.2.A s m i t ā

now,letusconsiderasmitā,comingfromirst-personconjugationoftheverbtobefollowedbytheabstractnounendingtā.Thistermismoretyp-icalofYogathanSā�khyasystem,quitetheoppositetoaha�kārabeingmoreoftenusedintheSā�khyatexts.WhileinSKitdoesnothaveasin-gle occurrence, Patañjali refers toasmitā several times. firstly, when hetalks about an advanced stage of meditation (sa�prajñāta-samādhi, YSI.17, I.41, III.47). At this stage one is aware only of himself (ekātmika),whichmeansthattheonlyobject(vi�aya)ofperceptionisthesubjectofknowing himself, the present “I”, or the grasper (grahīt�). Secondly, Pa-tañjaliusesthistermwhenexplainingthedoctrineofignorance(avidyā)tonameoneofitsmanifestations(kleśa—YSII.3,6).Andthirdly,asmitāisreferredtointhecontextoftheemergenceoftheempiricalconscious-ness(YSIV.4).So,eventhoughtheetymologyofthistermdoesnotseemasproblematicasaha�kāra,andtheliteralmeaningisclear:“I-am-ness”,or“beingI,thequalityofbeingI”,heretoothreedifferentreadingsmaybedistinguished.

one pointed ego-consciousness, which may be also called pure I, orI-hood.This stateof consciousness is achievedwhen the self-identiica-tion excludes everything considered to be mine, like “my body”, “myfeelings”,“mysensations”etc.,apartfromegoitself;then“I”appearsdis-

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tinguishedfromitsattributes,andanyexternalobjectsassociatedwith,referredto,orintendedbyego.This“I”expressedasasmitāisidentiiedwithpuresattvicbuddhidevoidofalldisturbingluctuations.

The second reading of asmitā may be e g o t i s m, closely connectedwith ignorance and a dualist perspective towards self-knowledge. I-am-nessisunderstoodhereaspredominanceofanego-centricattitudeman-ifested in all our desires, aversions and habituations (rāga + dve�a +abhiniveśa).ofcourse,thisunderstandingofasmitādoesnothaveasaf-irmativeasigniicanceasithasintheirstreading.Asynonymoustermto this reading of asmitā is abhimāna, or self-conceit, which could betechnicallydeinedasanundueextension(abhi-)of theI-notiontoen-titiesforeigntoit.SK(24),inturn,identiiesabhimānawithaha�kāraasitsfunction.Theself-conceit,similartothesenseofownership,involvessomeambiguity. Itbrings forthacommonfeelingofpride,whichmaybeof twobasic types.Pride intheirstmeaning is respect, regard,hon-our,considerationofoneselfandothers;thiskindofpridegivesstrength,power and can lead to victory over all obstacles (kleśa-s) and ignorance(avidyā) if one manages to withdraw the destructive aspects of pride,whichareegotism,arroganceandselishness.Withoutpride intheirstmeaning,withoutrespecttowardsoneselfanddeeptrustinone’spowerand potential, no progress in self-knowledge would ever be possible.Thus, thepositiveaspectofpridecoming fromabhimāna is anecessaryprerequisiteoftheauto-soteriologicalperspective,socommoninIndianthought.

In the third reading asmitā reveals itself as aviśe�a, or asmitā-mātrathatisthesubtlest,non-speciicorimperceptibledimensionofprak�ti.Atirstglance,itmayseemthatthisreadinggetsasmitāprettyclosetothecosmologicalprincipleofaha�kāraastattva.however,thecontextofus-age of the term in YS is deinitely epistemic and not ontological. herethe individual empirical minds (nirmā�a citta-s) take their beginning.Sincethereispluralityordiversity(bheda)oftheindividualmentalpro-cesses (prav�tti;YS IV.4–5), theexistenceofonepriorandpure intellect(eka-citta)beingtheinitiatorofothersisaccepted.

ConClUSIon

Sā�khyaandYogabelievethatallverbalconventionswearesoattachedto, includingthewaysweaddressourselves,aremanifestationsof igno-rance. And the language rules are precondition of every conceptualiza-tion of our experience unless buddhi becomes purely sattvic and free of

TheCollisionofLanguageandMetaphysicsintheSearchforSelf-Identity 47

allkleśa-s.Therefore,thegrammaticalrules imposesomelimitationsonthe self-knowledge as well. The main collision between language andmetaphysics of Sā�khya-Yoga, or rather its mystical phenomenology,occurswhen thegrammatical toolsused toexpress the senseof subjec-tivity prove to be misleading for the seeker of the true self-identity.Counter intuitively, the language forms (i.e. usage of irst person pro-nounandtheverbam)seemtomaskandpetrifyourwrongself-knowl-edge, which is to be eradicated thanks to discriminative discernment(viveka-khyāti).

ThetwotermsdiscussedabovearenotusedintheSanskrittextscon-sequently. In some places they seem equivalent, while in others theymay be clearly distinguished or even contrasted in a sense. Putting itmostsynthetically,therearetwoaspectsofI-sense,ortwostagesofself-consciousnessnamely:(1)thesenseofp u r e s u b j e c t i v i t y,orself-consciousness(ahamasmior‘Iam’)withouttheconsciousnessoftheob-ject; this is the awareness of m y m e r e e x i s t e n c e and the senseofIwithoutdifferentiationofmyselffromothers;(2)thesenseofinten-tionality, or the awareness of I as distinct from not-I; this is the con-sciousnessoftheobject(ahamidamor ‘I [am]this’),whichisrelatedtoordependentontheconsciousnessofthe“thou”ortheobject.Thus,theexpressions of ‘I’ may serve in Sā�khya and Yoga both as the sense ofintentionality and the sense of subjectivity, which stand for the lowerandhigheraspectsofself-consciousness.

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