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Vol. 9, No. 1 � Canadian Military Journal 21

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Oliver Ryan Clow is a former soldier and is now a civilian employee

with the Department of National Defence. He holds an MA degree from

the Royal Military College of Canada, and has been published in the

RUSI Journal and the Royal Air Force Airpower Review.

by Ryan Clow

PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONS:THE NEED TOUNDERSTAND THEPSYCHOLOGICALPLANE OF WARFARE

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Sun Tzu

Introduction

Historically, there have been a number of militaryphilosophers and practitioners who spoke not only of a

physical plane of war but also of the political, economic, andpsychological (also known as moral) planes of war. WhereasSun Tzu outlined five fundamentals of war, including weatherand terrain, he also rated politics – or the wider context withinwhich war is fought – as the first fundamental. Further, heincluded in his maxims “...[that] to win a hundred victories inone hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue theenemy without fighting is the supreme excellence.”1 Providingmore contemporary currency to those notions, General VoNguyen Giap,2 a brilliant North Vietnamese battlefieldtactician and strategist, has been quoted as saying:

...for us, there is no such thing as a single strategy.Ours is always a synthesis – simultaneously diplomatic,military and political. Which is why, quite clearly, theTet Offensive had multiple objectives....And that wasour biggest victory: to change the ideas of the UnitedStates. The Tet Offensive had been directed primarilyat the people of South Vietnam, but ...it affected thepeople of the United States more. Until Tet theythought they could win the war, but now they knewthey could not. [President Lyndon] Johnson wasforced to decrease military activity and start todiscuss with us around the table of how to endthe war.3

While modern warriors have been adept at ‘hoistingaboard’ the principles of surprise and momentum asfundamental to the physical plane of war, there has arguablybeen little appreciation for the wider psychological plane.Yet, as can be ascertained in words of great warriors, thereis the implication that consideration of those other planesof war requires a great amount of attention, due to theirinherent complexity, real or perceived, and their impactupon the overall end-state.

The psychological plane transcends the levels of command:

Strategic: To affect the global informationenvironment – generally to achieve politicalobjectives.

Operational: To influence the Joint OperationsArea (JOA) as a means to achieve consistencybetween national and coalition objectives.

Tactical: To support specific Areas of Operation(AOs) to provide freedom of action to the tacticalcommander.4

22 Canadian Military Journal � Vol. 9, No. 1

For the tactical commander, effective PsychologicalOperations (Psy Ops) are his/her means to affect the psycho-logical plane of war. Effective Psy Ops may be achievedthrough an appreciation of three fundamental factors:

• An understanding of key principles of PsychologicalOperations.

• An understanding of target audiences.

• An understanding of how to measure effectiveness.

Background

Psy Ops, or the basic aspects of modern psychologicaloperations, have been known by many other names

or terms, including Psychological Warfare, PoliticalWarfare, “Hearts and Minds,” and even Propaganda.5

Scholars of the subject trace the roots of modern Psy Opsto the “Congregatio di Propaganda Fide,” a Roman Catholicinstitution founded as a way to spread the Catholic faithin response to the Protestant Reformation.6 In terms ofmilitary history, Psy Ops are an aspect of war that hasbeen much derided.

Psy Ops have become a fixture of the state at war,and did so largely during the last century.7 The birth ofmodern military Psy Ops occurred during the First

World War through the actions of a Canadian self-styledaristocrat, Lord Beaverbrook, and his British contemporary,Lord Northcliffe.8 During this war’s immediate wake,the term propaganda truly gained its pejorative senseas a post-war world unfolded, and successful Alliedpropaganda that had demonized the enemy was scrutinizedclosely.9 And yet, it has been argued, “...why shouldthere be such a stigma surrounding a process ofpersuasion designed to get people to stop fighting, andthus preserve their lives, rather than having their headsblown off?”10

The true heyday of modern Psy Ops undeniablyoccurred during the Second World War, when the adoptionof the concept of ‘Total War’ gave way to state-runpropaganda agencies, and they became important toolsin warfighting arsenals. Although the efforts of theThird Reich’s massive propaganda machine, as wellas those of the British (Ministry of Information andPolitical Warfare Executive) and their American (Officeof War Information) counterparts are well chronicledin many volumes of published work, it is less well-knownthat Canada made important contributions in nicheareas of Psy Ops through the initiatives of itsWartime Information Board.11 Then, in the aftermathof this second great global conflagration, Psy Opscontinued to evolve as a tool of war in the hands ofmany nations.

Propaganda was a key Psychological Warfare instrument of both the Allied and the Axis powersduring the Second World War, as embodied in the following propaganda posters

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CWM19720121-015

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More recently, organized military Psy Ops unitshave continued to be a facet of modern war, fromVietnam, to Iraq (both during Operation Desert Stormand more recently), and in Afghanistan. Notably,Psy Ops have been as applicable to mass modern armiesas they have been to the guerrilla, the freedom fighter,and the terrorist. We currently see the use of Psy Opsas common to both sides of the ‘Long War,’12 with ourpresent foes, such as al Qaeda, making the psychologicalimpact of an attack a hallmark of their actions.13

Arguably, we in the West have appeared slower toappreciate the power of the psychological impact – whetherwhen used alone or to reinforce physical acts – thanhave our foes. As a result, while many modern armedforces include Psy Ops units in their Order of Battle,their actual effect upon the battlespace arguably hasnot been exploited to its full potential.

Psychological Operations

Psy Ops have been defined as planned psychologicalactivities designed to influence attitudes and

behaviour affecting the achievement of political andmilitary objectives.14 Arguably, part of the problemwith effectively integrating Psy Ops into modernmilitary tactics is the definition itself. As it stands, itsays everything and nothing, all at once. As aresult, Psy Ops can be anobtuse concept for the tacticalcommander, who may perceivetheir importance, but whohas not been fully trainedto leverage them for maximumeffect.

To help try to clarifyPsy Ops, it is suggestedthat a tactical commanderfocus upon two key aspectsof the definition, namely:Psychological Activities, the‘how’ of Psy Ops, andAttitudes and Behaviours,the ‘what’ of Psy Ops.

Psychological Activities. Successwas achieved in many previouswars through words, whetherthey were dropped from thesky (leaflets), plastered uponwalls (posters), or transmittedover the air (radio). As a result,when the term Psy Opsis used, these mediumscommonly spring to mind.The obvious consequence isthat this limited exposureto Psy Ops has created a rutin our line of thought whenit applies to modern Psy Ops.

In essence, we tend to apply circa 1914 or 1945thinking to modern Psychological Operations. Conversely,our adversaries, such as al Qaeda, have harnessedemerging technology as a medium for their plannedpsychological activities.

If we want to understand how al Qaeda hassurvived and adapted since the war in Afghanistan,how it has transformed itself...the most importantsingle factor to look at is its use of the Internet. TheInternet is a weapon of great power in twenty-first-century warfare...one recent example shows theeffectiveness of this weapon in the hands of one ofthe most recent al Qaeda affiliates, al-Zarqawi’sgroup in Iraq. For the whole of 2003, Abu Musabal-Zarqawi was known to the public only throughleaks from American and Jordanian intelligence.Then, in little more than a month...he rocketed toworldwide fame, infamy if you will, by a deliberatecombination of extreme violence and Internetpublicity.15

While the term planned psychological activities is usedfor the sake of brevity in policy and doctrine, the tacticalcommander, in order to remain relevant and effective, mustbe sophisticated, innovative, and evolutionary in his/herinterpretation of the term. Moreover, views must widen interms of what is considered a planned psychological activity.

The terrorist as a force multiplier in psychological operations – Hamas militants.

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Attitudes and Behaviours. Simply stated, Psy Opsattempt to influence the attitudes and behaviours ofselected target audiences. As such, all Psy Ops will haveat their core one of three common objectives:

• Weaken the will of the adversary by loweringmorale and reducing the efficiency of his force bycreating doubt, dissonance, and disaffection.

• Reinforce feelings of friendly target audiences.

• Gain the support of uncommitted or undecidedaudiences.16

While the end state of Psy Ops is to produce changesin attitudes and behaviours, the effort must be correctlyplaced within a wider context, sincethe changes are fundamental to thevery being of a person. As a result, inmost cases, the effects of Psy Ops arenot immediate, but, rather, are producedover time in an aggregated fashion.The results are seldom as definable asa ‘body count’ in a kinetic battle.

In developing a Psy Ops plan, atactical commander needs to be awareof the fundamental principles of PsyOps, so that both the advantages and disadvantagesare weighed and understood – including the breadth ofoptions available, but also the inherent limitationsof the capability. Without an adequate understanding ofthese principles – namely, the ‘how’ and ‘what’ – it isimpossible for a tactical commander to get the maximumreturn from this powerful tool.

Target Audiences

Opinion

The cornerstone of attitudinal and behavioural change,and the area wherein the greatest effort needs to beapplied in the planning of effective Psy Ops, rests inunderstanding opinion. Simply put, the factors thatinfluence how a person forms an opinion, and, therefore,how one will act in light of a given situation, need to beunderstood in order to shape attitudes and behaviour.Psy Ops planning requires a great amount of ingenuity,analysis, and time in order to achieve the desired effectupon a target audience.

Modern soldiers are trained practitioners of their craft,molded within the social norms of their society – somethingthat occurs almost to a fault. In this respect, it is notuncommon to interpret others through one’s ownexperiences, and to judge others based upon one’sown expectations of acceptable attitudes and behaviouralvalues. In many cases, this ethnocentrism inhibitsappropriate interpretation of a situation, due toinherent biases. This thought process needs to be

acknowledged and avoided, since others simply do notthink and act necessarily as do Westerners. Culture,codes, norms, language, and history – to name but afew factors – have created the world disparately.Therefore, the inhabitants of various regions have adaptedattitudes and behaviours, based upon surroundingsand collective experiences. Simply put: to understand“them,” “we” must learn to think like “them.”

The famous opinion theorist Walter Lippmanformulated a model of attitudinal and behaviouralchange in terms of how opinions – as the basis forattitudes and behaviours – are formed. In Lippmann’sview, the danger is a view that assumes a ‘commonwill’ exists. In other words, that a group of people whoshare the same social context will share the exact same

fundamental opinion as a basis forcollective action.17

Rather, he theorized that peopleformed opinions (pictures inside theirheads in Lippmann terms) that incorporatedstereotypes (a term Lippmann coined)and the like to make sense of the world.This allows one to order a situationin a way that would allow him/her toreact. He said, “...whatever we believeto be a true picture, we treat it as if it

were the environment itself.”18 We do so by actingupon “...the pictures inside the heads of ...humanbeings, the pictures of themselves, of others, of theirneeds, purposes, and relationships are their...opinions.Those pictures are acted upon by groups of people.”19

In short, whether people share the same social context,they may form the same or different attitudes andbehaviours as a result of their opinions, or theirinterpretations of a given situation.

The transformation of al Qaeda – the organization – intoal Qaeda – the ideology – provides evidence to supportLippmann’s theory. Al Qaeda’s objective has been torecreate a Muslim caliphate, a trans-national confederacy.In order to achieve this objective, Osama Bin Ladenhas inspired terrorists from various backgrounds – frommiddle class Americans and European Muslimsto poor Middle Eastern Muslim youth – to committerrorist acts the world over. While these individualscome from different backgrounds, have had differentlife experiences, and, consequently, would have beenexpected to have opinions that reflect the ‘common will’of their social context, this is obviously not the case. Rather,Bin Laden’s carefully crafted messages of Westernpersecution have created consonance in their attitudes andbehaviours by influencing their personal opinions, so thatthey stand in direct opposition to what could be expectedfrom their upbringing, if the notion of a ‘will’ truly existed.20

While this synopsis of opinion may seem irrelevantto a discussion concerning military Psy Ops, it is, infact, a central consideration. To affect a target audience

“...in most cases,the effects of Psy Opsare not immediate,but, rather, are

produced over timein an aggregated

fashion.”


want to kill you, or those that are undecided as towhether they want to help you. The wider audienceshould be dealt with through strategic communicationsand diplomacy, both of which are well beyond thepurview of the tactical level. This is not to say thatthe wider context does not concern the tacticalcommander. Rather, it means that the tactical commander,while appreciating and addressing the wider context,must not mistake the task at hand for his/her level,and the same can be said of operational and strategiccommanders. Consequently, their actions must bewell meshed with those of the operational andstrategic level through effective Information Operations,as opposed to Psy Ops, in order to have a consistent,coordinated, and direct effect upon the informationenvironment writ large.22

Characteristics

The characteristics of the target audience that shouldbe duly considered are conditions, receptivity, andvulnerability.

Conditions. Generally, conditions are those influencesexerted upon a target audience over which the targetaudience has no control. Issues such as poverty,climate, or location constitute examples. Not only isit important to identify the condition, but, morespecifically, to define how the condition actually affectsthe attitudes and behaviours of the target audience.

A carefully orchestrated line ofpersuasion can be articulated in orderto inspire action by identifying acondition of a particular targetaudience, and then setting about toaffect – whether to alleviate, to improve,or simply to exploit – the conditionin a way that the target audiencecannot do.

During the 1940s, the Communistmovement in Vietnam sought toleverage the condition of widespreadpoverty as a catalyst for actionamong the rural population in anattempt to expand the appeal of the

Communist ideology. General Giap explained the lineof persuasion:

Before we had leaders who talked aboutindependence, but they did not give rice fieldsto the farmers so they could not motivate them.It was my belief that socialism would motivatethe farmers and the workers.23

It was in this manner that Giap organized commonpeople into effective soldiers that brought about theend of colonial rule in Vietnam. Yet, withoutdiscrediting Giap’s military prowess, it has been arguedthat precise identification and the subsequent exploitationof the condition was the catalyst for success.24

in a desired manner, Psy Ops practitioners must understandthe complex nature of the target audiences, and mustcommit time and significant resources to defining thedevelopment of opinions within the target audience.In this respect, just as tanks, machine guns, and artilleryare necessary in the conduct of war, so also areanthropologists, linguists, and historians.

Delineation

Another key aspect of modern Psy Ops is that targetaudiences need to be carefully delineated. Oftenthis aspect is seemingly overlooked, since, in manycases, there is only rudimentary, if any, delineationof target audiences in military Psy Ops at all. At theoutset of the Psy Ops planning process, it is importantto delineate target audiences in relation to theobjectives and/or the desired effects of the mission.The exercise is analogous to how a tactical commanderanalyzes a piece of terrain in order to devise ascheme of manoeuvre for an attacking force.

In accordance with CF Doctrine,21 there are fourcategories for target audiences:

Ultimate: the real, intended, or final target ofthe message.

Intermediate: may or may not be part of theultimate target audience [but are likely to haveinfluence over the ultimate audience].

Apparent: audiences that appearto be the target of a message.However, they may not be thereal, intended, or final target ofthe message.

Unintended: audiences that theplanner did not intend to reach,but those who received the messagedirected at another audience.

The delineation of target audiencesis a necessity for many practicalreasons, notably for maximizing resources.However, it is most important to satisfy an importantprinciple of war – the selection and maintenance ofthe aim. In this respect, it is now common – due tothe influence of mass media, scrutinizing publics,demanding governments and technological advances,such as the Internet – for tactical commanders tospend a great amount of time and effort explaining actionson the battlefield to the wider international community.While the geopolitical reality begets this public affairsexercise, it must be addressed without sacrificing theeffectiveness of Psy Ops in a theatre.

Ultimately, the question for the tactical commanderis whether the people whose attitudes and behavioursthat need to be addressed the most are those that

“At the outset of thePsy Ops planning

process, it is importantto delineate targetaudiences in relationto the objectivesand/or the desiredeffects of themission.”


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Receptivity. To understand how a person best receivesinformation is crucial. Psy Ops must be planned and conductedwith great attention paid to a variety of influences on thesituation at hand, which, in turn, affect attitudes andbehaviour, ranging from culture to language to history. Assuch, while an appeal may appear as a simple message on aleaflet, the message must be crafted in a way that may gobeyond a simple suggestion for it to be followed. It must havean inherent appreciation for how the reader thinks, and forhow he or she will react, based upon the influences exerted.

US Psy Ops practioners learned this lesson duringthe Second World War, when attempts to persuade Japaneseservicemen to surrender were obfuscated by language.By changing the language on leaflets from “I Surrender,”to “I cease resistance,” the US was able to produce abetter result. They did so by nuancing the appeal of the actin order to capitalize upon the concept of “saving face.”25

In all cases, the underlying consideration must be selectingthe method that best suits the target audience, not thepractitioner’s tastes.

Vulnerability. Depending upon the aim and target audienceof Psy Ops, vulnerabilities should be exploited. If, as anexample, the target is a rogue leader who has a propensity

towards vice, or his actions contradictcultural and social norms, these realitiesshould be incorporated as themes ormessages in order to elicit a desiredresponse from another target audience.

During counterinsurgency operations inMalaya conducted from 1948 to 1960, theBritish exploited just such vulnerabilitiesamongst the insurgent leadership:

Unofficial [sexual] liaison betweenmale and female comrades in the jungle wasseverely frowned upon by the Communisthierarchy. Nevertheless many senior comradestook ...females to the jungle couches....Countless examples of these liaisons werereported...and it became obvious that such‘unfair’ advantages were strongly resentedby the ‘other ranks’ who enjoyed no suchbenefits. Naturally the inequality of lifebetween the leaders and the led...was fullyexploited....”26

Understanding the target audience isfundamental to effective Psy Ops. Withoutan appreciation of how opinions are formedand how they affect attitudes and behaviour,without the clear delineation of targetaudiences to maintain the aim, and withoutdefining the characteristics of the targetaudience, Psy Ops are not only expectedto be ineffective, but they are arguablyimpossible. Without this well-roundedunderstanding, the tactical commanderwill be unable to develop the correct

posture, presence and profile for the Area of Operations.Miscalculation in this respect is likely to lead to mixedmessaging and/or unintended effects, both of which havecascading consequences for which the tactical commandermay be unequipped to deal.

Measures of Effectiveness

Afinal comment on effective Psy Ops concerns Measuresof Effectiveness (MOEs). Quite simply, determining if

Psy Ops are having an effect, and, indeed, the desired effect,is crucial. As part of the discussion with respect to attitudesand behaviours, it was stated that Psy Ops effects weregenerally obtained in an aggregated format over longperiods of time. Therefore, rigorous and iterative MOEs arecritical in demonstrating ongoing effectiveness to the militarychain of command.

A common mistake of MOEs is that quantifyingour effort does not measure effectiveness, but, rather, itmeasures performance. In the past, it was common to expressa Psy Ops MOE in terms of numbers, such as how manyleaflets were air-dropped, or how many newspaperswere distributed. While this could demonstrate to skepticsthat the Psy Ops element was, in fact, doing something, it

General Vo Nguyen Giap.

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more likely produced a detrimentaleffect in that it could show no result for agiven effort. Therefore, it is imperativeto derive indicators – either direct orindirect – in order to tangibly expressthat Psy Ops ‘Action X’ has a correlationto ‘Result Y.’

As an example, if the objective was toincrease support for a particular faction,opinions of who is seen as a crediblesource for information – either the ‘goodguys’ or the ‘bad guys’ – could be measured as an indicatorof an increase or decrease of support for the desired faction.Due to a variety of factors, ranging from the inherentbias/limitations of measurement techniques to thepermissiveness of the environment to the nature of opinionas discussed herein, both subjective and objectivesmeasures should be undertaken concurrently.

Measures of effectiveness can be broken intotwo primary types:

Quantitative Measures. Techniques such asquestionnaires and surveys are excellent tools forcanvassing large groups. However, the validity

of the results depends upon the qualityof the respondents, and it can sufferfrom factors such as illiteracy, theadministrator’s manner, and analyticalflaws. While there are inherent biases,quantitative measures are a valuable sourceof input when care is taken to rigorouslycraft those measures.

Qualitative Measures. Techniquessuch as focus groups are invaluableto complement quantitative measures.

While a poll may provide a statistical indicationthat a certain opinion exists, a focus group canprovide the opportunity to delve into why trendsexist. Focus groups are also excellent tools sincethey are generally less resource-intensive; usinga representative sampling means that validconclusions can be drawn from a much smallergroup. However, qualitative measures are notwithout their own biases that can include languagebarriers, personality conflicts, and the trepidationof the respondents – whereby they answer asthey feel the administrator wishes them todo, particularly if the administrator is wearinga uniform and carrying a gun. Simple solutionsexist to limit the shortcomings, such as usinglocal employees, interpreters, and controlledsettings – such as being kept away from the pryingeyes of peers.

While an understanding of some of the principlesof Psy Ops and the target audience is fundamentalto effective Psy Ops – since they are cornerstonesof the craft – MOEs are fundamental to successfulPsy Ops when done properly through an effectivepairing of quantitative and qualitative methods.MOEs are the linchpins needed to bring it alltogether.

Conclusion

War is a complicated phenomenon. While thephysical act is seen by most to be the most

accurate representation of war, when taken in thebroadest sense war also includes other political,economic, and psychological planes. Psy Opsare one means that the tactical commander canemploy in order to understand and affect the otherplanes of war. And this article represents a casestudy of but one of those other planes of war: thepsychological plane.

Psy Ops have longstanding roots in militaryoperations. However, the effectiveness of Psy Opshas been inconsistent. Arguably, in contemporary terms,the disparate success has been the result of a lackof understanding of this capability by tacticalcommanders. By casting a wider net in terms ofan appreciation both for the psychological aspectsof the fight and the understanding of a few fundamentalOsama Bin Laden has been a source of inspiration to numerous terrorists.

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“...rigorous anditerative MOEsare critical indemonstrating

ongoing effectivenessto the military

chain of command.”


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1. General Tao Hanzhang, Sun Tzu’s Art of War:The Modern Chinese Interpretation (New York:Sterling Publishing, 1987), pp.13-15.

2. Giap was a political activist turned soldier, whospent much of his adult life in combat, during boththe French Indochina War and the Vietnam War.Giap rose from being a tactical commander to thesenior command of the North VietnameseArmy. Histenure of command included many decisive battles,such as Bien Den Phu, Khe Sanh, Dak To, IaDrang and the Tet Offensive. For a completeaccount of Giap’s career, see Peter MacDonald,Giap: The Victor in Vietnam (New York: W.W.Norton & Company, 1993).

3. Ibid., p. 268.4. CF Psychological Operations Doctrine articulates

three categories of Psy Ops: Strategic Psy Ops(SPO), Crisis-Response Psy Ops (CRPO), andCombat Psy Ops (CPO). These categories generallyconform to the levels of command, yet what isperceived to be the relevant aspects of each categoryhave been used herein to illustrate the main effortat each level of command.

5. In this context, the terms are viewed as synonymous.Propaganda is seen, as are the other terms, as a‘value neutral’ term without the pejorative contextof lies and trickery. It is seen in the truest sense ofthe word, i.e., in propagating an idea.

6. Dr. Philip Taylor, Munitions of the Mind,3rd Edition (Manchester, UK: ManchesterUniversity Press, 2003), pp. 2-8

7. Dr. Philip Taylor, in K.R.M. Short, (ed.) Film andRadio propaganda in World War II (Knoxville,TE: University of Tennessee Press, 1983), p. 20.

8. “...the nation that finished the conflict with reputedlythe most successful propaganda was Great Britain.This was despite the fact that in 1914 Britainpossessed nothing that could even remotely bedescribed as an official propaganda department. Thisimpressive exercise...culminated in the establishmentof a full Ministry of Information under LordBeaverbrook, and a separate Enemy PropagandaDepartment at Crewe House under LordNorthcliffe.” Ibid., p. 21.

17. Based on comments by G.K Chesterton, cited inWalter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York:The Free Press, 1965 [Originally published in1922]), p. 14.

18. Ibid., p. 4.19. Ibid., p. 18.20. For well-researched and well-rounded discussion

on the development of Bin Laden’s and al Qaeda’sphilosophy, see Peter Bergen, The Osama BinLaden I Know (New York: The Free Press, 2006),and Greenberg.

21. Canada. Department of National Defence.Psychological Operations. B-GJ-005-313/FP-00.Annex C, p. 58.

22. To amplify this point, there must be a clearunderstanding of Psychological Operationsversus Information Operations. PsychologicalOperations, in most cases, is a tacticallyfocused exercise. Information Operations is thecoordinating function for core capabilitiessuch as Psy Ops, but also includes Deception,Operations Security, and related capabilities,such as Public Affairs – all of which comprisethe ‘psychological plane of war.’ InformationOperations are the mechanism for influencingthe wider information environment; linkingmessages from the strategic to the tactical andbetween the military and wider governmentalcommunications apparatus.

23. MacDonald, p. 25.24. A Giap biographer wrote, “...[that] no general,

however brilliant or fortunate, wins battles byhimself. It is the nature of the population fromwhich soldiers are enlisted, and the fervour oftheir motivation, that determines the success....”Ibid., p. 36.

25. Available on-line at: <http://www.psywarrior.com/ICeaseJap.html>. Accessed 16 August 2006.

26. Archie Derry, Emergency in Malaya: ThePsychological Dimension (London: NationalDefence College, 1982), Chapter 5, p. 4.

27. Winston Churchill, in Dominique Enright, (ed.),The Wicked Wit of Winston Churchill(London: Michael O’Mara Books, 2001), p. 149.

9. “...at the end of WWI, the British government hadregarded propaganda as politically dangerous,financially unjustifiable and morally unacceptablein peacetime....associated with subversion of thefreedom of thought ...[propaganda] was a ‘goodword gone wrong ....” Ibid., pp. 24-25. In addition,Edward Bernays wrote “...[that] once the thrill ofvictory [World War One] had faded...the sordiddetails of the propaganda drive against the “Hun”began to circulate....Throughout the press,“propaganda” was now commonly condemned; and,for the most part, not the same as some dark alienforce, unloosed upon our culture by the Prussiansand/or Reds, but – far worse – by propagandists ofour own.” Edward Bernays, Propaganda (NewYork: IG Publishing, 2005), p. 28.

10. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind, p. 8.11. For a well-rounded account of Wartime Information

Board, see Gary Evans, John Grierson, and theNational Film Board, The Politics of WartimePropaganda (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,1984). For a comprehensive summary of theWartime Information Board’s psychological warfareoperations abroad, see Oliver Ryan Clow, “OttawaCalling: Canadian PsychologicalWarfare, 1939-45,”in Royal United Services Institute Journal,Vol. 151, No. 2, April 2006, pp. 76-81.

12. The term ‘Long War’ is an emerging nomenclaturefor the ‘Global War on Terror.’

13. “They [terrorists] learned that a single attack byinfluencing public opinion and morale can alterthe behavior of great nations.” Excerpts of testimonygiven by Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Secretary ofDefense, in Stephen Strasser, (ed.), The 9/11Investigations (Washington: United StatesDepartment of Public Affairs, 2004), p. 126.

14. Canada. Department of National Defence.Psychological Operations. B-GJ-005-313/FP-001, p.7.

15. Paul Eedle, in Karen Greenberg, (ed.), Al-QaedaNow. Understanding Today’s Terrorists (NewYork:Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 124.

16. Canada. Department of National Defence.Psychological Operations. B-GJ-005-313/FP-001, p. 8.

NOTES

factors of Psy Ops, it is possible for the tacticalcommander to have a greater effect upon the modernbattlefield.

In defence of our soldiers who risk their livesevery day doing what they believe is right andgood, “...it is always easier to discover and proclaimgeneral principles than it is to apply them.”27 Yet,our adversaries continually demonstrate that a needexists to develop this understanding of the psychologicalplane of war. By adapting their tactics, techniques,and procedures – whereby the overall impact of

their physical actions is supported and amplifiedby force multiplying factors, such as psychologicaloperations – our adversaries have clearly demonstratedthat they can sustain themselves in terms of a‘Long War.’ The question is: Can we?

The author would like to thank Colonel J.P.de B. Taillon, for his time, advice and support in thepreparation of this paper.

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