CHINA BANKING CORPORATION AND CBC PROPERTIES AND COMPUTER CENTER, INC.,petitioners, vs.THE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND (HDMF); HDMF PRESIDENT; AND THE HOME MUTUAL DEVELOPMENT FUND,respondents.D E C I S I O NGONZAGA-REYES,J.:This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on pure questions of law from the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 59 dated October 10, 1997 and from the Order of the same court dated December 19, 1997 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.Briefly, petitioners China Banking Corporation (CBC) and CBC Properties and Computer Center Inc. (CBC-PCCI) are both employers who were granted by the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) certificates of waiver dated July 7, 1995 and January 19, 1996 (covering respectively the periods of July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1996 for CBC andJanuary 1 to December 31, 1995 for CBC-PCCI) for the identical reason of Superior Retirement Plan pursuant to Section 19 ofP. D. 1752 otherwise known as the Home Development Mutual Fund Law of 1980 whereunder employers who have their own existing provident and/or employees-housing plans may register for annual certification for waiver or suspension from coverage or participation in the Home Development Mutual Fund created under said law.It appears that in June 1994, Republic Act No. 7742, amending P. D. 1752 was approved.[1]On September 1, 1995, respondent HDMF Board issued an Amendment to the Rules and Regulations ImplementingR.A. 7742(The Amendment) and pursuant to said Amendment, the said Board issued on October 23, 1995 HDMF Circular No. 124-B or the Revised Guidelines and Procedure for filing Application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage under P.D. 1752 (Guidelines). Under the Amendment and the Guidelines, acompany must have a provident/retirement and housing plan superior to that provided under the Pag-IBIG Fund to be entitled to exemption/waiver from fund coverage.CBC and CBC-PCCI applied for renewal of waiver of coverage from the fund for the year 1996, but the applications were disapproved for the identical reason that:Our evaluation of your companys application indicates that your retirement plan is not superior to Pag-IBIG Fund. Further, the amended Implementing Rules and & Regulations of R. A. 7742 provides that to qualify for waiver, a company must have retirement/provident and housing plans which are both superior to Pag-IBIG Funds.Petitioners thus filed a petition forcertiorariand prohibition before the Regional Trial Court of Makati seeking to annul and declare void the Amendment and the Guidelines for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction alleging thatin requiring the employer to have both a retirement/provident plan and an employee housing plan in order to be entitled to a certificate of waiver or suspension of coverage from the HDMF, the HDMF Board exceeded its rule-makingpower.Respondent Board filed a Motion to Dismiss and the courta quo, in its first challenged order dated October 10, 1997 granted the same.The Court dismissed the petition forcertiorarion the grounds (1) that the denial or grant of an application for waiver/coverage is within the power and authority of the HDMF Board, and the said Board did not exceed its jurisdiction or act with grave abuse of discretion in denying the applications; and (2) the petitioners have lost their right to appeal by failure to appeal within the periods providedin the Rules for appealing from the order of denial to the HDMF Board of Trustees, and thereafter, to the Court of Appeals. The Court stated thatcertiorariwill notlie as a substitutefor a lost remedy of appeal.Motion for reconsideration of the above-Order having been deniedin the Order of December 19, 1997, this petition for review was filed under Rule 45 alleging that:1. The courta quoerred in the appreciation of the issue, as it mistakenly noted that petitioner is contesting the authority of respondent to issue rules pursuant to its rule-makingpower;2.The courta quoerred in observing thatthe matter being assailed by the petitioners were the denial of their application for waiver (Annexes H and I), and therefore, appeal is the proper remedy.Essentially, petitioners contend that it does not question the power of respondent HDMF, as an administrative agency, to issue rules and regulations to implement P.D. 1752 and Section 5 of R.A. 7742; however, the subject Amendmentand Guidelinesissued by it should be set aside and declared null and void for being irrevocablyinconsistent with the enabling law,P.D. 1752, as amendedby R.A. 7742, which merely requiresas a pre-condition for exemptionfor coverage,the existence of either a superiorprovident (retirement) plan or a superior housing plan, and not the concurrence of both plans.Petitioners claim thatcertiorariis the proper remedy as what are being questionedare notthe orders denying petitioners application for renewal of waiver for coverage which were admittedly issued in the exercise of a quasi-judicial function,but rather the validity of the subject Amendment and Guidelines, which are a patent nullity;hence the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply.Intheir comment, respondents contend that there is no question of law involved.The interpretation of the phrase and/or is not purely a legal question and it issusceptible of administrative determination.In denying petitioners application for waiver of coverage under Republic Act No. 7742 the respondent Board was exercising its quasi-judicial function and its findings are generally accorded not only respect but even finality.Moreover, the Amendment and the Guidelines are consistent with the enablinglaw, which is a piece of social legislation intendedto provide both a savings generation and a house building program.We find merit in the petition.The coreissue posed in the court below and in this Courtis whether the respondents acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the Amendment to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 7742 and HDMF Circular No. 124-B on the Revised Guidelines and Procedure for Filing Application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage under P.D. 1752, as amended by R.A. 7742, insofar as said Amendment and Guidelines impose as a requirement for exemption from coverage orparticipation in theHome Development Mutual Fund the existence ofboth a superior housing plan and a provident plan.The procedural issue raised in the petition asto the propriety ofcertiorariin lieu of appeal has not been traversed by the respondents. Suffice it to note thatthe petitioners soughtto annul or declare null and void the questioned Amendmentand Guidelines and not merely the denial by the respondent Board of petitioners application for waiver or exemption from coverage of the fund.As noted by the courta quo,the petition below squarely raised in issue the validity of the Amendment to the Rules and Regulations and of HDMF Circular No. 124-B insofar as these require the existence of both provident/retirement and housing plans for the grant of waiver/suspension by the Board and prayed that the same be declared void for want of jurisdiction.We hold that it was an error for the courta quoto rule that the petitioners should have exhausted its remedy of appealfrom the orders denying their application for waiver/suspension to the Board of Trustees and thereafter to the Court of Appealspursuant to the Rules.Certiorariis an appropriate remedy to question the validity of the challenged issuances of the HDMF which are alleged to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.[2]Moreover,among the accepted exceptionsto the rule on exhaustion of administrativeremedies are:(1) where the question in disputeis purely a legal one; and (2) where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performedwithout jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction.[3]Moreover,whilecertiorarias a remedy may not be used as a substitute for an appeal, especially for a lost appeal, this rule should not be strictly enforced if the petition is genuinely meritorious.[4]It has been said that where the rigid application of the rules would frustrate substantial justice, orbar the vindicationof a legitimate grievance, the courts are justifiedin exempting a particular case from theoperation of the rules.[5]We vote to give the petition due course. The assailed Amendment to the Rules and Regulations and the Revised Guidelines suffer froma legal infirmityand should be set aside.The law pertinent to the Home Development Mutual Fund, otherwise known as the Pag-IBIG Fund, should be revisited.The Human Development Mutual Funds were created by Presidential Decree No. 1530, promulgated on June 11, 1978. The said funds, one for government employees and another for private employees, wereto be established and maintained from contributions by the employees and counterpart contributions by their employers. P.D. No. 1752, enacted on December 13, 1980, amended P. D. 1530 to make the Home Development Mutual Fund a body corporate and to make its coverage mandatory upon all employers covered by the Social Security System and the Government Service Insurance System. Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 providesfor waiver or suspension from coverage or participation in the fund, thus:Section 19. Existing Provident/Housing Plans. - An employer and/or employee-group who, at the time this Decree becomes effective have their ownprovident and/or employee-housingplans, may register with the Fund, for any of the following purposes:(a) For annual certification of waiver or suspension from coverage or participation in the Fund, which shall be granted on the basis of verification that the waiver or suspension does not contravene any effective collective bargaining agreement and that the features of the plan or plans are superior to the Fund or continue to be so; or(b) For integration with the Fund, either fully or partially.Theestablishment of a separate provident and/or housingplan after the effectivity of this Decree shall not be a ground for waiver of coverage in the Fund; nor shall such coverage bar any employer and/or employee-group from establishing separate provident and/or housing plans.(underscoring ours)OnJune 17, 1994, Republic Act No. 7742, amendingcertainsections of P.D. 1752 was approved. Section 5 of the said statute provides that within sixty (60) days from the approval of the Act, the Board of Trustees of the Home Development Mutual Fund shall promulgate the rules and regulations necessary for the effective implementation of (this) Act.Pursuant to the above authoritythe Home Development Mutual Fund Board of Trustees promulgated The Implementing Rules and Regulationsof Republic Act 7742 amending Presidential Decree No. 1752,Executive Order Nos. 35 and 90, which was published on August 1, 1994. Rule VII thereof reads:RULE VIIWAIVER OR SUSPENSIONSECTION 1.Waiver orSuspension-Existing Provident or Retirement Plan.An employer and/or employee groupwho has an existing providentor retirementplanas of the effectivity of RepublicAct No. 7742, qualified under Republic Act No. 4917 and actuarially determined to be sound and reasonable by an independent actuary duly accreditedby the Insurance Commission,may apply withthe Fund for waiveror suspensionof coverage. Such waiver or suspension may be grantedby the Presidentof the Fund on the basis of verification that the waiver or suspension does not contraveneany effectivecollective bargaining or other existing agreement and that the features of the plan or plansare superior to the Fund andcontinue to be so.The certificate of waiver orsuspension of coverageissued herein shall onlybe for a period of one (1) yearbut the same may be renewed for another year upon the filing of a proper application within a period of sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the existing waiver or suspension.SECTION 2.Waiver or Suspension-ExistingHousingPlan.An employer and/or employeegroup who has an existing housing plan as of the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7742 may apply with the fund for waiveror suspension of coverage. Such waiveror suspension of coverage may be grantedby the President of the Fund on the basis of verificationthat the waiver or suspension of coveragedoes not contravene any effective collective bargainingor other existing agreement andthat the features of the plan or plans are superior to the Fund and continue to be so. The certificate of waiver or suspensionof coverage issued herein shall only be for a period of one (1) year but the same may be renewedfor another year upon the filing of a proper application within a period of sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the existing waiveror suspension.Subsequently, the HDMF Board adopted in its Special Board Meeting held onSeptember 1, 1995, Amendments to the Rules and Regulations ImplementingRepublic Act 7742. As amended, Rule VIIon Waiver or Suspension now reads:RULE VIIWAIVER OF SUSPENSIONSECTION 1.Waiver or Suspension Because of Existing Provident/Retirement and Housing Plan.Any employer with a plan providing both for aprovident/retirement and housing benefitsfor all his employees and existing as of December 14, 1980, the effectivity date of Presidential Decree No. 1752,may apply with the Fund for waiver or suspension of coverage . The provident/retirement aspect of the plan must be qualified under R.A. 4917 and actuariallydetermined to be sound and reasonable by an independent, actuary duly accredited by the Insurance Commission. Theprovident/retirement and housing benefitsas provided for under theplan must be superior to the provident/retirement and housing benefits offered by the Fund.Such waiver or suspension may be granted by the Fund on the basis of actual verification that the waiver or suspension does not contraveneany collective bargaining agreement, any other existing agreement or clearly spelled out management policy and that the featuresof the plan or plans are superior to the Fund and continue to be so.Provided further that the application must be endorsed by the labor union representing a majority of the employees or in the absence thereof by at least a majority vote of all the employees in the said establishment in a meeting specifically called for the purpose.Provided, furthermore thatsuch a meeting be held or be conducted under the supervision of an authorized representative from the Fund.The certificate of waiver or suspension of coverage issued herein shall only be for a period of one (1) year effective upon issuance thereof. No certificate of waiver issued by the President of the Fundshall have retroactive effect. Application for renewal must be filled within-sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the existing waiver or suspension and such application for renewal shall only be grantedbased on the same conditions and requirements under which the original application was approved. Pending the approval of the application for waiveror suspension of coverage or the application for renewal, the employer and his covered employees shall continue to be mandatorilycovered by the Fund as provided for under R.A. 7742.(underscoring ours)On October 23, 1995,HDMF Circular No. 124-B entitled Revised Guidelines and Procedure for Filing Applications for Waiver or Suspension ofFund Coverage under P.D. No. 1752, as amended by Republic Act No. 7742, was promulgated. The Circular pertinently provides:I.GROUNDS FOR WAIVER OR SUSPENSION OF FUND COVERAGEA. SUPERIOR PROVIDENT/RETIREMENT PLAN AND HOUSING PLANANY EMPLOYER WHO HAS A PROVIDENT, RETIREMENT, GRATUITY OR PENSION PLAN AND A HOUSING PLAN, EXISTING AS OF DECEMBER 14, 1980, THE EFFECTIVITY OF P.D. NO. 1752, may file an application for waiver or suspension from Fund coverage, provided, that - -1. The retirement/provident plan is qualified as such under Republic Act No. 4917 (An ActProviding That Retirement Benefits ofEmployees of Private Firms Shall Not Be Subject to Attachment, Levy, or Execution or Any Tax Whatsoever), as certified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;2. Theretirement/provident plan is actuarially determined to be financially sound and reasonable by an independent actuary duly accredited by the Insurance Commission;3. The retirement/provident plan is superior to the retirement /provident benefits offeredbytheFund in terms of:- vesting features-full and immediate crediting of employers contributionto the employees account, the TAV of which the employee carries with him in the event he transfers to another employer; or he becomes self-employed or unemployed;-employers contribution (* For provident plans)-must be equal to or higher than two percent (2%) of employees monthly compensation, defined in the HDMF Implementing Rules and Regulations as the employees basic monthly salary plus Cost of Living Allowance;-retirement age and years of service required to avail of plan benefits-85 or lower-10 years of service or less-amount of benefits extended to EEs (* For retirement plans)-at least fifty (50%) of monthly compensation, as defined in the HDMF IRR, for every yearof service.4. The housing plan must be superior to the PAG-IBIG HousingLoan Program in terms of:-residency requirement as employee of the company or member of the plan to avail of housing loan under the plan-six (6) months or less;-interest rates-equal to or lower than the prescribed rates under the PAG-IBIG Expanded Housing Loan Program (EHLP);- repayment period-25 years or more;-loanable amount-equal to or greater than the maximum loan amount under the PAG-IBIG Expanded Housing Loan Program; and-percentage of covered EEs benefitted by the Housing Plan-EEs who have availed of the Housing Planbenefits as of date of waiver application must be no less than five (5%) of the total.5. The application for waiver or suspension, based on actual verification of the Fund, does not contravene any effective collective bargaining or any other agreement existing between the employer and his employees.6. The application must be endorsed by the laborunion representing a majority of the employees, or, in the absence thereof, at least a majority vote of all company employees in a meeting specifically called for the purpose and conducted under the supervision of an authorized representative of the Fund.As above stated, when petitioners CBC and CBC-PCCI applied for the renewal of waiver of Fund coverage for the year 1996, the applications were disapproved on identical grounds namely,thattheretirement plan is not superior to Pag-IBIG Fund and that the amended Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 7742 provides that to qualify for waiver, a company musthave retirement/provident and housing plan which are both superior to Pag-IBIG Funds.Petitioner contends that respondent, in the exercise of its rule making powerhas overstepped the boundsand exceeded its limit,.The law provides as a condition for exemption from coverage, the existence ofeither a superiorprovident (retirement) plan, and/or a superior housing plan, and not the existence of both plans.On the other hand, respondents claim that the use of the wordsand/or in Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752, which words are diametrically opposed in meaning, can only be used interchangeably and not together, and the option of making it either both or any one belongs to the Board of Trustees of HDMF, whichhas the powerand authorityto issue rules and regulations for the effective implementation of the Pag-IBIG Fund Law, and the guidelines for the grant of waiver or suspension of coverage.There is no question that the HDMF Board has rule-making powers. Section 5 ofR.A. No. 7742states thatthe said Board shall promulgate the rules and regulations necessary for the effective implementation of said Act.Its rule- making poweris also provided in Section 13 of P.D. No. 1752 which statesinsofar as pertinentthat the Board is authorized tomake and change needfulrules and regulations to provide for, among others,a. the effective administration, custody, development, utilization and disposition of the Fund or parts thereof including payment of amounts credited to members or to their beneficiaries or estates;b. Extension ofFund coverage to other working groups andwaiveror suspension of coverage or its enforcement for reasons therein stated.xxxxxxxxxi. Other matters that, by express or implied provisions of this Act, shall require implementation by appropriate policies, rules and regulations.The controversy lies in the legal signification of the words and/or.In the instant case, the legal meaning of the words and/or should be taken in its ordinary signification, i.e., either and or; e.g. butter and/or eggs meansbutter and eggs or butter or eggs.[6]The term and/or means that effect shall be given to both the conjunctive and and the disjunctive or; orthat one word or the other may be taken accordingly as one or the other will best effectuate the purpose intended by the legislature as gathered fromthewholestatute.The term is used to avoida construction which by the use of the disjunctive or alone will exclude the combination of several of the alternatives or by the use of the conjunctive and will exclude the efficacy of any one of the alternatives standing alone.[7]It is accordingly ordinarily held that the intention of the legislature in using the term and/or is that the word and and the word or are to be used interchangeably.[8]It is seems to us clear from the language of the enabling law thatSection 19 of P.D. No. 1752, intended thatan employer with a provident planoran employee housing plan superior to that of the fund may obtain exemption from coverage. If the law had intended that the employee should have both a superior provident plananda housing plan in order to qualify for exemption, it would have used the words and instead of and/or.Notably, paragraph (a) of Section 19 requires for annual certification of waiver or suspension, that the features of theplan or plansare superior to the fund or continue to be so. The law obviously contemplatesthat the existence of either plan isconsideredas sufficient basis for the grant of an exemption; needless to state, the concurrence of both plans is more than sufficient. To require the existence of both plans would radically impose a more stringent conditionfor waiver which was not clearly envisioned by the basic law.By removing the disjunctive word or in the implementing rules the respondent Board has exceeded its authority.It is well settled that the rules and regulations which are the product of a deligated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the Administrative agency.[9]Department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute.[10]As aptly observed in People vs.Maceren[11]:Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particulardepartment must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina,supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress (Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao vs. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969 SCRA 350).The rule making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (University of Santo Tomas vs. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C. J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Villaflor, 69 Phil. 319; Wise & Co. vs. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del Mar vs. Phil. Veterans Administration, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349). While it may be conceded that the requirement of the concurrence of both plans to qualify for exemption would strengthen the Home Development Mutual Fund and make it more effective both as a savings generation and a house building program, the basic law should prevail as the embodiment of the legislative purpose, and the rules and regulations issued to implement said law cannot go beyond its terms and provisions.We accordingly find merit in petitioners contention that Section 1, Rule VII of the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 7742, and HDMF Circular No. 124-BandtheRevised Guidelines and Procedure for Filing Application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage under P.D. 1752, asamendedbyR.A. 7742, should be declared invalid insofar as they require that an employer must have both a superior retirement/provident plan and a superior employee housing planin order to be entitled to a certificate of waiver and suspension of coverage from the HDMF.WHEREFORE, the petition is given due course and the assailed Orders of the courta quodated October 10, 1997 and December 19, 1997 are hereby set aside. Section 1 of Rule VII of the Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 7742, and HDMF Circular No. 124-B prescribing the Revised Guidelines and Procedure for Filing Applications for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage under P.D. 1752, as amended by R.A. No. 7742, insofar as they require that an employer should have both a provident/retirement plan superior to the retirement/provident benefits offered by the Fund and a housing plan superior to the Pag-IBIG housing loan program in order to qualify for waiver or suspension of fund coverage, are hereby declared null and void.SO ORDERED.

MAXIMA REALTY MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,petitioner, vs.PARKWAY REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION represented by LUZ LOURDES FERNANDEZ and SEGOVIA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,respondents.D E C I S I O NYNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:This is a petition for review oncertiorariassailing the December 9, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41866[1]which affirmedin totothe June 2, 1998 Order of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 5697[2]dismissing petitioners appeal for having been filed out of time.The subject of the controversy is Unit #702 of Heart Tower Condominium, covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 12152 and located along Valero Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City. Said unit was originally sold by Segovia Development Corporation (Segovia) to Masahiko Morishita, who in turn sold and assigned all his rights thereto in favor of Parkway Real Estate Development Corporation (Parkway) on October 16, 1989.[3]Sometime in April 1990, Parkway and petitioner Maxima Realty Management and Development Corporation (Maxima) entered into an agreement to buy and sell, on installment basis, Unit #702 in consideration of the amount of 3 Million Pesos.[4]It was further agreed that failure to pay any of the installments on their due dates shall entitle Parkway to forfeit the amounts paid by way of liquidated damages.[5]Maxima defaulted in the payment of the installments due but was granted several grace periods until it has paid a total of P1,180,000.00, leaving a balance of P1,820,000.00.[6]Meanwhile on May 10, 1990, Parkway, with the consent of Segovia, executed a Deed of Assignment transferring all its rights in the condominium unit in favor of Maxima. This Deed was intended to enable Maxima to obtain title in its name and use the same as security for P1,820,000.00 loan with Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), which amount will be used by Maxima to pay its obligation to Parkway. On the other hand, Segovia and Maxima agreed to transfer title to the condominium unit directly in Maximas name subject to the condition that the latter shall pay Segovia the amount of P58,114.00, representing transfer fee, utility expenses, association dues and miscellaneous charges.[7]On June 5, 1990, RCBC informed Parkway of the approval of Maximas P1,820,000.00 loan subject to the submission of, among others, the Condominium Certificate of Title transferred in the name of Maxima and the Certificate of Completion and turn over of unit.[8]Maxima, however, failed to pay Segovia the amount of P58,114.00 for fees and charges. Thus, Segovia did not transfer the title of the condominium unit to Maxima. Since Parkway was not paid the balance of P1,820,000.00, it cancelled its agreement to buy and sell and Deed of Assignment in favor of Maxima.[9]On May 2, 1991, Maxima filed with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), a complaint[10]for specific performance to enforce the agreement to buy and sell Unit #702.On December 17, 1992, the HLURB Arbiter sustained the nullification of the Deed of Assignment and ordered Parkway to refund to Maxima the amount of P1,180,000.00. Segovia was further ordered to issue the condominium certificate of title over Unit #702 in favor of Parkway upon payment by the latter of the registration fees. The dispositive portion thereof, reads:Premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered 1.declaring the nullification of the Deed of Assignment between complainant Maxima and Parkway;2.ordering respondent Parkway to refund to complainant Maxima the amount of One Million One Hundred Eighty Thousand Pesos (P1,180,000.00);3.ordering respondent Segovia to issue the certificate of title in favor of Parkway upon payment by the latter of only the registration fees.No pronouncement as to costs.[11]Both Maxima and Parkway appealed to the Board of Commissioners of the HLURB (Board).[12]During the pendency of the appeal, Maxima offered to pay the balance of P1,820,000.00, which was accepted by Parkway. The Board then ordered Maxima to deliver said amount in the form of managers check to Parkway; and directed Segovia to transfer title over the property to Maxima.[13]The latter, however, failed to make good its offer, which compelled Parkway to file a Manifestation[14]that the appeal be resolved.[15]On March 14, 1994, the Board rendered judgment modifying the decision of the HLURB Arbiter by forfeiting in favor of Parkway 50% of the total amount paid by Maxima and ordering Segovia to pay Parkway the amount of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees. The decretal portion of the decision, states:WHEREFORE, the decision of the Office of Appeals Adjudication and Legal affairs (OAALA) dated December 17, 1992 is hereby affirmed with respect to the following:1)Declaring the nullification of the Deed of Assignment between complainant and Parkway;2)Ordering Respondent Segovia to immediately issue the certificate of title in favor of Parkway upon payment by the latter of only the registration expenses. This order for delivery of title in the name of Parkway is now final and immediately executory.and is modified as follows:3)Declaring the forfeiture of 50% of the total payments made by the complainant to Parkway by way of damages and penalty, and for Parkway to refund the remaining balance of the said payments to the complainant within thirty (30) days from finality of this decision with legal interest thereon thereafter, for each day said amount remain unpaid; and4)Ordering Segovia to pay Parkway the sum of P10,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees.IT IS SO ORDERED.[16]On May 10, 1994, Maxima appealed[17]to the Office of the President which dismissed the appeal for having been filed out of time.[18]Undaunted, Maxima filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On October 1, 1998, Segovia filed its Comment that as the original owner-developer of Unit #702, it had already consummated the sale and transferred title of said property to Parkway.[19]On December 9, 1998, the Court of Appeals affirmedin totothe Decision of the Office of the President.Hence, the instant petition on the sole issue of: Was petitioners appeal before the Office of the President filed within the reglementary period?InSGMC Realty Corporation v. Office of the President[20]it was settled that the period within which to appeal the decision of the Board of Commissioners of HLURB to the Office of the President is fifteen (15) days from receipt of the assailed decision, pursuant to Section 15[21]of Presidential Decree No. 957 (otherwise known as the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protection Decree) and Section 2[22]of Presidential Decree No. 1344.[23]The Court ruled that the thirty (30) day period to appeal to the Office of the President from decisions of the Board as provided in Section 27 of the 1994 HLURB Rules of Procedure,[24]is not applicable, because special laws providing for the remedy of appeal to the Office of the President, such as Presidential Decree No. 597 and Presidential Decree No. 1344, must prevail over the HLURB Rules of Procedure. Thus:[W]e find petitioners contention bereft of merit, because of its reliance on a literal reading of cited rules without correlating them to current laws as well as presidential decrees on the matter.Section 27 of the 1994 HLURB Rules of Procedure provides as follows:Section 27.Appeal to the Office of the President. Any party may, upon notice to the Board and the other party, appeal the decision of the Board of Commissioners or its division to the Office of the President within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof pursuant to and in accordance with Administrative Order No. 18, of the Office of the President dated February 12, 1987. Decision of the President shall be final subject only to review by the Supreme Court on certiorari or on questions of law.On the other hand, Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987, issued by public respondent reads:Section 1. Unless otherwise governed by special laws, an appeal to the Office of the President shall be taken within thirty (30) days from receipt by the aggrieved party of the decision/resolution/order complained of or appealed from.As pointed out by public respondent, the aforecited administrative order allows [the] aggrieved party to file its appeal with the Office of the President within thirty (30) days from receipt of the decision complained of. Nonetheless, such thirty-day period is subject to the qualification that there are no other statutory periods of appeal applicable. If there are special laws governing particular cases which provide for a shorter or longer reglementary period, the same shall prevail over the thirty-day period provided for in the administrative order. This is in line with the rule in statutory construction that an administrative rule or regulation, in order to be valid, must not contradict but conform to the provisions of the enabling law.We note that indeed there are special laws that mandate a shorter period of fifteen (15) days within which to appeal a case to public respondent. First, Section 15 of Presidential Decree No. 957 provides that the decisions of the National Housing Authority (NHA) shall become final and executory after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of receipt of the decision. Second, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1344 states that decisions of the National Housing Authority shall become final and executory after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of its receipt. The latter decree provides that the decisions of NHA is appealable only to the Office of the President. Further, we note that the regulatory functions of NHA relating to housing and land development has been transferred to Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, now known as HLURB [by virtue of E.O. No. 684 (7 February 1981) and E.O. No. 90 (17 December 1986)]. Thus, said presidential issuances providing for a reglementary period of appeal of fifteen days apply in this case. Accordingly, the period of appeal of thirty (30) days set forth in Section 27 of HLURB 1994 Rules of Procedure no longer holds true for being in conflict with the provisions of aforesaid presidential decrees. For it is axiomatic that administrative rules derive their validity from the statute that they are intended to implement. Any rule which is not consistent with [the] statute itself is null and void.In this case, petitioner received a copy of the decision of HLURB on October 23, 1995. Considering that the reglementary period to appeal is fifteen days, petitioner has only until November 7, 1995, to file its appeal. Unfortunately, petitioner filed its appeal with public respondent only on November 20, 1995 or twenty-eight days from receipt of the appealed decision, which is obviously filed out of time.[25]In the case at bar, Maxima had until May 4, 1994, the fifteenth day from receipt of the decision of the Board on April 19, 1994,[26]to appeal to the Office of the President. The appeal which was filed on May 10, 1994 was clearly beyond the reglementary period.WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the December 9, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41866 which sustained the June 2, 1998 Order of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 5697 is AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 179431-32 June 22, 2010LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC),Petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,Respondents.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xG.R. No. 180443LUIS K. LOKIN, JR.,Petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, CINCHONA C. GONZALES and ARMI JANE R. BORJE,Respondents.D E C I S I O NBERSAMIN,J.:The principal question posed in these consolidated special civil actions for certiorari and mandamus is whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) can issue implementing rules and regulations (IRRs) that provide a ground for the substitution of a party-list nominee not written in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941,1otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, the law that the COMELEC thereby implements.Common AntecedentsThe Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly registered under the party-list system of representation that manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections. Together with its manifestation of intent to participate,2CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of five nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number of qualifying votes. The nominees, in the order that their names appeared in the certificate of nomination dated March 29, 2007,3were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang. The nominees certificates of acceptance were attached to the certificate of nomination filed by CIBAC. The list of nominees was later published in two newspapers of general circulation, The Philippine Star News4(sic) and The Philippine Daily Inquirer.5Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007,6whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees. The amended list of nominees of CIBAC thus included: (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales, and (3) Borje.Following the close of the polls, or on June 20, 2007, Villanueva sent a letter to COMELEC Chairperson Benjamin Abalos,7transmitting therewith the signed petitions of more than 81% of the CIBAC members, in order to confirm the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution of Borje. In their petitions, the members of CIBAC averred that Lokin and Tugna were not among the nominees presented and proclaimed by CIBAC in its proclamation rally held in May 2007; and that Galang had signified his desire to focus on his family life.On June 26, 2007, CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the COMELECen bancsitting as the National Board of Canvassers a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee.8The right of CIBAC to a second seat as well as the right of Lokin to be thus proclaimed were purportedly based on Party-List Canvass Report No. 26, which showed CIBAC to have garnered a grand total of 744,674 votes. Using all relevant formulas, the motion asserted that CIBAC was clearly entitled to a second seat and Lokin to a proclamation.The motion was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.Notwithstanding Villanuevas filing of the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees and the petitions of more than 81% of CIBAC members, the COMELEC failed to act on the matter, prompting Villanueva to file a petition to confirm the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC on June 28, 2007.9On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8219,10whereby it resolved to set the matter pertaining to the validity of the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution of Borje for proper disposition and hearing. The case was docketed as E.M. No. 07-054.In the meantime, the COMELECen banc,sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, issued National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9, 200711to partially proclaim the following parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List System as having won in the May 14, 2007 elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong, Bayan Muna, CIBAC, Gabriela Women's Party, Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives, Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms, Inc., Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party, Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party, Cooperative-Natco Network Party, Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns and Abono; and to defer the proclamation of the nominees of the parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes until final resolution of their respective cases.The COMELECen bancissued another resolution, NBC Resolution No. 07-72 dated July 18, 2007,12proclaiming Buhay Hayaan Yumabong as entitled to 2 additional seats and Bayan Muna, CIBAC, Gabriela Women's Party, and Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives to an additional seat each; and holding in abeyance the proclamation of the nominees of said parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes until the final resolution of their respective cases.With the formal declaration that CIBAC was entitled to an additional seat, Ricardo de los Santos, purportedly as secretary general of CIBAC, informed Roberto P. Nazareno, Secretary General of the House of Representatives, of the promulgation of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 and requested that Lokin be formally sworn in by Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. to enable him to assume office. Nazareno replied, however, that the request of Delos Santos could not be granted because COMELEC Law Director Alioden D. Dalaig had notified him of the pendency of E.M. 07-054.On September 14, 2007, the COMELECen bancresolved E.M. No. 07-05413thuswise:WHEREFORE, considering the above discussion, the Commission hereby approves the withdrawal of the nomination of Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Sherwin N. Tugna and Emil Galang as second, third and fourth nominees respectively and the substitution thereby with Atty. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as second nominee and Atty. Armi Jane R. Borje as third nominee for the party list CIBAC. The new order of CIBAC's nominees therefore shall be:1. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva2. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales3. Armi Jane R. BorjeSO ORDERED.The COMELECen bancexplained that the actions of Villanueva in his capacity as the president of CIBAC were presumed to be within the scope of his authority as such; that the president was charged by Section 1 of Article IV of the CIBAC By-Laws to oversee and direct the corporate activities, which included the act of submitting the party's manifestation of intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections as well as its certificate of nominees; that from all indications, Villanueva as the president of CIBAC had always been provided the leeway to act as the party's representative and that his actions had always been considered as valid; that the act of withdrawal, although done without any written Board approval, was accomplished with the Boards acquiescence or at least understanding; and that the intent of the party should be given paramount consideration in the selection of the nominees.As a result, the COMELECen bancproclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of CIBAC.14Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of officeas a Party-List Representative of CIBAC on September 17, 2007.15Precs of the Consolidated CasesIn G.R. No. 179431 and G.R. No. 179432, Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC.In G.R. No. 180443, Lokin assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 promulgated on January 12, 2007;16and the resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E.M. No. 07-054 (approving CIBACs withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang as CIBACs second, third and fourth nominees, respectively, and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales and Borje in their stead, based on the right of CIBAC to change its nominees under Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804).17He alleges that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941.18the law that the COMELEC seeks to thereby implement.In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that a petition for certiorari is an inappropriate recourse in law due to the proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales as Representative and her assumption of that office; that Lokins proper recourse was an electoral protest filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); and that, therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction over the matter being raised by Lokin.For its part, CIBAC posits that Lokin is guilty of forum shopping for filing a petition for mandamus and a petition for certiorari, considering that both petitions ultimately seek to have him proclaimed as the second nominee of CIBAC.IssuesThe issues are the following:(a) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy;(b) Whether or not Lokin is guilty of forum shopping;(c) Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the Party-List System Act; and(d) Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC and allowing the amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC without any basis in fact or law and after the close of the polls, and in ruling on matters that were intra-corporate in nature.RulingThe petitions are granted.AThe Court has jurisdiction over the caseThe COMELEC posits that once the proclamation of the winning party-list organization has been done and its nominee has assumed office, any question relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the candidates to the House of Representatives falls under the jurisdiction of the HRET pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, Lokin should raise the question he poses herein either in an election protest or in a special civil action forquo warrantoin the HRET,not in a special civil action for certiorari in this Court.We do not agree.Anelection protestproposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. It can only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for in the preceding elections.A special civil action forquo warrantorefers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of ineligibility of the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible person from the office, but not to install the petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest where the parties strive for supremacy because the petitioner will not be seated even if the respondent may be unseated.The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action forquo warranto,for it concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second nominee of CIBAC. Although an election protest may properly be available to one party-list organization seeking to unseat another party-list organization to determine which between the defeated and the winning party-list organizations actually obtained the majority of the legal votes, Lokins case is not one in which a nominee of a particular party-list organization thereby wants to unseat another nominee of the same party-list organization. Neither does an action forquo warrantolie, considering that the case does not involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of the Philippines, or some other cause of disqualification for her.Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the review of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales. The constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokins petitions for certiorari and for mandamus against the COMELEC.BPetitioner is not guilty of forum shoppingForum shopping consists of the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. Thus, forum shopping may arise: (a) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision (other than by appeal orcertiorari) in another; or (b) if, after having filed a petition in the Supreme Court, a party files another petition in the Court of Appeals, because he thereby deliberately splits appeals "in the hope that even as one case in which a particular remedy is sought is dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy) would still be open"; or (c) where a party attempts to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction from a court after failing to obtain the writ from another court.19What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused to the courts and the litigants by a party who accesses different courts and administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issue.20The filing of identical petitions in different courts is prohibited, because such act constitutes forum shopping, a malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and as abusing their processes. Forum shopping is an improper conduct that degrades the administration of justice.21Nonetheless, the mere filing of several cases based on the same incident does not necessarily constitute forum shopping. The test is whether the several actions filed involve the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances.22The actions must also raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues.23Elsewise stated, forum shopping exists where the elements oflitis pendentiaare present, or where a final judgment in one case will amount tores judicatain the other.24Lokin has filed the petition for mandamus to compel the COMELEC to proclaim him as the second nominee of CIBAC upon the issuance of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 (announcing CIBACs entitlement to an additional seat in the House of Representatives), and to strike down the provision in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 and NBC Resolution No. 07-72 holding in abeyance "all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases." He has insisted that the COMELEC had the ministerial duty to proclaim him due to his being CIBACs second nominee; and that the COMELEC had no authority to exercise discretion and to suspend or defer the proclamation of winning party-list organizations with pending disputes.On the other hand, Lokin has resorted to the petition for certiorari to assail the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC (approving the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales as the second nominee and Borje as the third nominee); and to challenge the validity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804, the COMELECs basis for allowing CIBACs withdrawal of Lokins nomination.Applying the test for forum shopping, the consecutive filing of the action for certiorari and the action for mandamus did not violate the rule against forum shopping even if the actions involved the same parties, because they were based on different causes of action and the reliefs they sought were different.CInvalidity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804The legislative power of the Government is vested exclusively in the Legislature in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. As a general rule, the Legislature cannot surrender or abdicate its legislative power, for doing so will be unconstitutional. Although the power to make laws cannot be delegated by the Legislature to any other authority, a power that is not legislative in character may be delegated.25Under certain circumstances, the Legislature can delegate to executive officers and administrative boards the authority to adopt and promulgate IRRs. To render such delegation lawful, the Legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles that are to control in given cases. The Legislature should set a definite or primary standard to guide those empowered to execute the law. For as long as the policy is laid down and a proper standard is established by statute, there can be no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power when the Legislature leaves to selected instrumentalities the duty of making subordinate rules within the prescribed limits, although there is conferred upon the executive officer or administrative board a large measure of discretion. There is a distinction between the delegation of power to make a law and the conferment of an authority or a discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, for the power to make laws necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be.26The authority to make IRRs in order to carry out an express legislative purpose, or to effect the operation and enforcement of a law is not a power exclusively legislative in character, but is rather administrative in nature. The rules and regulations adopted and promulgated must not, however, subvert or be contrary to existing statutes. The function of promulgating IRRs may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of a law. The power of administrative agencies is confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulation cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation. Indeed, administrative or executive acts shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.27To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following requisites to be valid:281. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature;2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature;3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and4. It must be reasonable.The COMELEC is constitutionally mandated to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, a plebiscite, an initiative, a referendum, and a recall.29In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the COMELEC is also charged to promulgate IRRs implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other laws that the COMELEC enforces and administers.30The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 pursuant to its powers under the Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, and the Party-List System Act.31Hence, the COMELEC met the first requisite.The COMELEC also met the third requisite. There is no question that Resolution No. 7804 underwent the procedural necessities of publication and dissemination in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the resolution itself.Whether Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was valid or not is thus to be tested on the basis of whether the second and fourth requisites were met. It is in this respect that the challenge of Lokin against Section 13 succeeds.As earlier said, the delegated authority must be properly exercised. This simply means that the resulting IRRs must not beultra viresas to be issued beyond the limits of the authority conferred. It is basic that an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress,32for administrative IRRs are solely intended to carry out, not to supplant or to modify, the law. The administrative agency issuing the IRRs may not enlarge, alter, or restrict the provisions of the law it administers and enforces, and cannot engraft additional non-contradictory requirements not contemplated by the Legislature.33Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:Section 8.Nomination of Party-List Representatives.-Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later that forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election.No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned.The provision is daylight clear. The Legislature thereby deprived the party-list organization of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list is submitted to the COMELEC, except when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated. The provision must be read literally because its language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning. Such meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Legislature has intended to convey. Even where the courts should be convinced that the Legislature really intended some other meaning, and even where the literal interpretation should defeat the very purposes of the enactment, the explicit declaration of the Legislature is still the law, from which the courts must not depart.34When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application.35Accordingly, an administrative agency tasked to implement a statute may not construe it by expanding its meaning where its provisions are clear and unambiguous.36The legislative intent to deprive the party-list organization of the right to change the nominees or to alter the order of the nominees was also expressed during the deliberations of the Congress, viz:MR. LAGMAN:And again on Section 5, on the nomination of party list representatives, I do not see any provision here which prohibits or for that matter allows the nominating party to change the nominees or to alter the order of prioritization of names of nominees. Is the implication correct that at any time after submission the names could still be changed or the listing altered?MR. ABUEG: Mr. Speaker, that is a good issue brought out by the distinguished Gentleman from Albay and perhaps a perfecting amendment may be introduced therein. The sponsoring committee will gladly consider the same.MR. LAGMAN:In other words, what I would like to see is that after the list is submitted to the COMELEC officially, no more changes should be made in the names or in the order of listing.MR. ABUEG: Mr. Speaker, there may be a situation wherein the name of a particular nominee has been submitted to the Commission on Elections but before election day the nominee changed his political party affiliation. The nominee is therefore no longer qualified to be included in the party list and the political party has a perfect right to change the name of that nominee who changed his political party affiliation.MR. LAGMAN: Yes of course.In that particular case, the change can be effected but will be the exception rather than the rule.Another exception most probably is the nominee dies, then there has to be a change but any change for that matter should always be at the last part of the list so that the prioritization made by the party will not be adversely affected.37The usage of "No" in Section 8 "No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, or becomes incapacitated, in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list" renders Section 8 a negative law, and is indicative of the legislative intent to make the statute mandatory. Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory, for there is but one way to obey the command "thou shall not," and that is to completely refrain from doing the forbidden act,38subject to certain exceptions stated in the law itself, like in this case.Section 8 does not unduly deprive the party-list organization of its right to choose its nominees, but merely divests it of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order in the list of its nominees names after submission of the list to the COMELEC.The prohibition is not arbitrary or capricious; neither is it without reason on the part of lawmakers. The COMELEC can rightly presume from the submission of the list that the list reflects the true will of the party-list organization. The COMELEC will not concern itself with whether or not the list contains the real intended nominees of the party-list organization, but will only determine whether the nominees pass all the requirements prescribed by the law and whether or not the nominees possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Thereafter, the names of the nominees will be published in newspapers of general circulation. Although the people vote for the party-list organization itself in a party-list system of election, not for the individual nominees, they still have the right to know who the nominees of any particular party-list organization are. The publication of the list of the party-list nominees in newspapers of general circulation serves that right of the people, enabling the voters to make intelligent and informed choices. In contrast, allowing the party-list organization to change its nominees through withdrawal of their nominations, or to alter the order of the nominations after the submission of the list of nominees circumvents the voters demand for transparency. The lawmakers exclusion of such arbitrary withdrawal has eliminated the possibility of such circumvention.DExceptions in Section 8 of R.A. 7941 are exclusiveSection 8 of R.A. No. 7941 enumerates only three instances in which the party-list organization can substitute another person in place of the nominee whose name has been submitted to the COMELEC, namely: (a) when the nominee dies; (b) when the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (c) when the nominee becomes incapacitated.The enumeration is exclusive, for, necessarily, the general rule applies to all cases not falling under any of the three exceptions.When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the general rule, the exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed. The exceptions extend only as far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exceptions. Where the general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, none but the enacting authority can curtail the former. Not even the courts may add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an express exception excludes all others, although it is always proper in determining the applicability of the rule to inquire whether, in a particular case, it accords with reason and justice.391avvphi1The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something from the scope of the general words of a statute, which is otherwise within the scope and meaning of such general words. Consequently, the existence of an exception in a statute clarifies the intent that the statute shall apply to all cases not excepted. Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict construction; hence, any doubt will be resolved in favor of the general provision and against the exception. Indeed, the liberal construction of a statute will seem to require in many circumstances that the exception, by which the operation of the statute is limited or abridged, should receive a restricted construction.ESection 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expandedthe exceptions under Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 states:Section 13. Substitution of nominees. A party-list nominee may be substituted only when he dies, or his nomination is withdrawn by the party, or he becomes incapacitated to continue as such, or he withdraws his acceptance to a nomination.In any of these cases, the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list of nominees.No substitution shall be allowed by reason of withdrawal after the polls.Unlike Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, the foregoing regulation provides four instances, the fourth being when the "nomination is withdrawn by the party."Lokin insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in expanding to four the three statutory grounds for substituting a nominee.We agree with Lokin.The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the Government in the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,40has neither the authority nor the license to expand, extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to implement thereby. The IRRs the COMELEC issues for that purpose should always accord with the law to be implemented, and should not override, supplant, or modify the law. It is basic that the IRRs should remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out.41Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government under legislative authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying the laws general provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be expanded by such IRRs, because an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.42The COMELEC explains that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 has added nothing to Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941,43because it has merely reworded and rephrased the statutory provisions phraseology.The explanation does not persuade.To reword means to alter the wording of or to restate in other words; torephraseis to phrase anew or in a new form.44Both terms signify that the meaning of the original word or phrase is not altered.However, the COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text of Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, because it established an entirely new ground not found in the text of the provision. The new ground granted to the party-list organization the unilateral right to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC, which Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 did not allow to be done. Neither was the grant of the unilateral right contemplated by the drafters of the law, who precisely denied the right to withdraw the nomination (as the quoted record of the deliberations of the House of Representatives has indicated). The grant thus conflicted with the statutory intent to save the nominee from falling under the whim of the party-list organization once his name has been submitted to the COMELEC, and to spare the electorate from the capriciousness of the party-list organizations.We further note that the new ground would not secure the object of R.A. No. 7941 of developing and guaranteeing a full, free and open party-list electoral system. The success of the system could only be ensured by avoiding any arbitrariness on the part of the party-list organizations, by seeing to the transparency of the system, and by guaranteeing that the electorate would be afforded the chance of making intelligent and informed choices of their party-list representatives.The insertion of the new ground was invalid. An axiom in administrative law postulates that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of their IRRs, but must ensure that their IRRs are reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If the IRRs are shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they were authorized to be issued, they must be held to be invalid and should be struck down.45FEffect of partial nullity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804An IRR adopted pursuant to the law is itself law.46In case of conflict between the law and the IRR, the law prevails. There can be no question that an IRR or any of its parts not adopted pursuant to the law is no law at all and has neither the force nor the effect of law.47The invalid rule, regulation, or part thereof cannot be a valid source of any right, obligation, or power.Considering that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 to the extent that it allows the party-list organization to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC was invalid, CIBACs withdrawal of its nomination of Lokin and the others and its substitution of them with new nominees were also invalid and ineffectual. It is clear enough that any substitution of Lokin and the others could only be for any of the grounds expressly stated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941. Resultantly, the COMELECs approval of CIBACs petition of withdrawal of the nominations and its recognition of CIBACs substitution, both through its assailed September 14, 2007 resolution, should be struck down for lack of legal basis. Thereby, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction, having relied on the invalidly issued Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 to support its action.WHEREFORE,we grant the petitions for certiorari and mandamus.We declare Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid and of no effect to the extent that it authorizes a party-list organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has submitted the nomination to the Commission on Elections.Accordingly, we annul and set aside:(a) The resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E. M. No. 07-054 approving Citizens Battle Against Corruptions withdrawal of the nominations of Luis K. Lokin, Jr., Sherwin N. Tugna, and Emil Galang as its second, third, and fourth nominees, respectively, and ordering their substitution by Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as second nominee and Armi Jane R. Borje as third nominee; and(b) The proclamation by the Commission on Elections of Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as a Party-List Representative representing Citizens Battle Against Corruption in the House of Representatives.We order the Commission on Elections to forthwith proclaim petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr. as a Party-List Representative representing Citizens Battle Against Corruption in the House of Representatives.We make no pronouncements on costs of suit.SO ORDERED.