05. Spot Risk Supplier

8/8/2019 05. Spot Risk Supplier

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HOW TO SPOT

Current economic realities make one

thing clear: todays business continuity

needs cannot be met by using yesterdays

risk-management approaches. Thats

especially true when it comes to your

suppliers, who should they falter have the

potential for derailing your operations.

Supply chain managers need new

mechanisms to spot at-risk suppliers

and proven processes for intervening to

reduce the impact of those suppliers

problems.

18 S u p p l y C h a i n M a n a g e m e n t R e v i e w J u l y / A u g u s t 2 0 0 9 www.scmr.com


2/8

Dear Customer: We are liquidating and areunable to fulfill our current orders on file for you...

With little advance warning, sup-plier communiqus like this arebecoming increasingly commonin an economic environmentthat saw 2008 bankruptcy fil-ings in the United States jumpby 54 percent from the prior

year. Even if your key suppliers are not filing for bank-ruptcy or ceasing operations, you may be still confrontedwith actions that disrupt the continuity of supplies orsignificantly affect your financesactions such as take-it-or-leave-it price increases, demands for faster paymentterms, delivery of less-than-ordered quantities, and lon-ger delivery lead times.

The impact is global and affects nearly every indus-try. Edscha, a German manufacturer of sun roofs, doorhinges and other car parts, filed for insolvency in earlyFebruary 2009. The production interruption forced akey customer, BMW, to make undisclosed incremental

payments to Edscha to support the suppliers continu-ing operations so the automaker could meet a plannedproduct launch.

Similar scenarios are playing out elsewhere. In theU.S., the challenges faced by automotive Tier One sup-plier Delphi have been front-page news. The Chapter11 bankruptcy filings of storied brands such as packag-ing producer Smurfit-Stone Container and industrialequipment and chemicals maker Milacron have added

to a growing list of distressed businesses that appearsin nearly every industrial sector, regardless of the size ofthose businesses.

Raising Your Risk Management GameThe impact of supplier vulnerability has made it doublycritical to safeguard supply continuity. That concern hasbrought two imperatives to the fore: The need for supplychain managers to spot financially at-risk suppliers andthe importance of intervening to stave off or plan around

those suppliers problems.Unfortunately, we have observed few supply manage-ment functions that are skilled at assessing the financial

viability of their suppliersparticularly the viability ofsmall private enterprises. We recently reviewed a requestfor proposal from a highly respected global manufacturerthat was 130 pages in length. The RFP required respon-dents to provide specifics about: local product content,diversity programs, management structure, and environ-mental responsibility. However, we could not see a singlequestion that addressed the suppliers financial viability.

If few supply-management functions are adept at

identifying financially distressed suppliers, even fewerare equipped to intervene when a supplier encountersfinancial distress. Mounting economic pressure hasundermined the viability of many companiescustom-ers and suppliers alike that took on debt during bettertimes and structured themselves for business levels thatnever materialized. So more suppliers are facing diffi-culties while too few of their customers have adequateprocesses for detecting suppliers problems early enoughto take preventative measures. Consequently, many pro-curement groups are discovering suppliers distress atadvanced stages of metastasis, when the costs of main-

and HELPan

By Foster Finley

Foster Finley is a managing director at AlixPartners LLP. He

can be reached at [email protected].

www.scmr.com S u p p l y C h a i n M a n a g e m e n t R e v i e w Jul y / Augus t 2 009 19

AT-RISK SUPPLIER

DILIGENCE CONTINUITY NUTURE BEHAVIOR ALIGNMENT


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At-Risk Suppliers

taining supply continuity are at a premium.The following example puts the dangers for customers

in sharp relief. Following more than 10 months in bank-ruptcy, automotive supplier DriveSol announced that it was

liquidating its U.S. operations at the end of 2008. The com-panys announcement to its customers acknowledged theirinability to re-source DriveSols products on short noticeand indicated that their requirements would be met with ashift to DriveSols continuing European operations.

However, DriveSols notice also indicated that sup-ply continuity would require a substantial surcharge, pro-rated across the customer base, to be collected over onlythree months. It also stipulated 10-day payment terms onall orders. Customers were given just a few days in whichto accept these requirements. While most customers wereaware of DriveSols financial distress, many were caughtoff guard by the financial implications of its spot demands.Few were in a position to pass on the additional costs to

end customers; for some customers, the extra cost burdenraised the threat of having to shut down production lines.Most supplier risk management processes across

industries simply have not anticipated these kinds ofevents. As current economic realities disrupt more andmore global supply chains, it becomes increasingly evi-dent that todays needs cannot be met by using yester-days risk-management approaches.

Whats needed now is a fundamental shift in theprocesses and mechanisms for monitoring suppliers.Effective supply management functions must incorpo-rate structured, routine, data-supported ways to assess

their suppliers financial viabilityin addition to many ofthe traditional supply management activities. Today, bestpractice in supplier risk management (SRM) must blendassessment of the suppliers financial viability with otherrelevant metrics for a composite rating that can be weight-ed and adjusted to suit the business environment. Thismonitoring process might include: product quality ratings,on-time service performance, or a qualitative assessmentof a suppliers management team. Such a composite scorecontinually prioritizes the riskiest of the at-risk suppliers.

Inclusion of a suppliers financial viability can proveinvaluable far beyond the current downturn. It now must

be developed as a core competencyas a competitivedifferentiator with which to safeguard supply continuity.

Identifying the High Priority SuppliersA first step in practicing effective SRM is to highlightthe true priority suppliers. Fortunately, many supplymanagement functions already maintain some form ofprioritized supplier listings, and these may provide ahelpful starting point. These existing processes may be

based on metrics such as overall por-tion of procurement spend, histori-cal delivery performance, indirect vs.direct products, threat of labor inter-ruptions, or product quality varia-tions, for instance.

However, while these are all rel-evant considerations for highlightingpriority suppliers, they fail to address

the underlying question of overall dependence upon anygiven supplier. Even small and medium-sized enterpriseshave hundreds and sometimes thousands of suppliers.Moreover, the goods and services acquired from thosesuppliers will vary dramatically in terms of how essentialthey are to ongoing operations. When we discuss the topicof high-priority suppliers with supply chain leaders suchas chief procurement officers, we find four mindsets thatdistract them from properly pinpointing criticality:

1. A focus on price escalation or commodity volatility:Many companies are reliant on commodities such asoil, sheet steel, copper, and aluminum. And given themeteoric rise and subsequent fall of prices of those com-modities, its easy to understand why so many companiesspend so much time and attention on budget forecasts,market outlooks, hedging positions, and customer sur-charge management. But most often, the risk is borneproportionately across the customer base so it is lessoften linked to the potential failure of any one supplier.

2. Siloed organizational structure: Category specializa-tion can make global comparisons difficult because dif-

ferent groups of supply management specialists focus ondiscrete pockets of information. It is not uncommon forthe supply management function to be organized by, say,direct materials, indirect materials, capital expendituresand services with further subdivisions within each cate-gory. While informed purchasing professionals and buyersare equipped to describe their most strategic or difficult-to-replace supplier, making organization-wide compari-sons in search of critical suppliers is very difficult.

3. Adherence to the Pareto principle: There is a naturaltendency to interpret a suppliers criticality in terms ofrelative annual spend, or of units or weight of a product

As global supply chains become morecomplex and expansive, it becomesincreasingly evident that todays needs cannot

be met by using yesterdays risk-management

approaches.


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purchased. Financially, it makes sense to lavish attentionwhere the most money is spent. But in many companies,this is a poor proxy of true criticality because it fails totake into account either the business importance or the

relative difficulty of re-sourcing a supplier of a productthat accounts for a large spend. For example, a trans-portation-intensive shipper could rightly point to its reli-ance on a particular less-than-truckload (LTL) carrier asa proportion of its spend base. But it would be muchharder to declare that that carrier was critical because ofthe relative ease of finding alternate LTL carriers.

4. Focusing on the tallest nail: Every company hasone or more problem suppliers that consume dispropor-tionate amounts of managerial attention. Product qualityissues, lack of responsiveness, unreliable delivery, aggres-sive pricing, or just the most recent one-time issue allprovide rationales for meetings and resolution. Except inthe most unusual cases, customer and suppliers reachan accord over timeor they part company. But, time-consuming suppliers are not de facto critical suppliers.

These four mindsets are fundamental to good suppli-er management, and we do not intend to diminish theirimportance. But satisfying the demands of the here andnowof day-to-day supplier managementcan obscurethe more fundamental question of overall supplier criti-cality and risk management. The starting point is to iso-late the suppliers without which key production lines or

service capabilities would grind to a halt in very shortorder. The central question is this: If this supplier failedin the next few months, what would be the impact onmy business? More specific questions totest reliance include:

Are the supplies sole-sourced and arethere viable alternative sources?

Who owns the production tooling?Can tooling be relocated to other suppliers?

What is the current inventory posi-tion and how much more consumption canit support?

Is product engineering or redesignnecessary in order to relocate supply?

How lengthy are product qualifica-tion cycles? Must customers approve sup-plier changes?

What is the risk of interruption of rawmaterials to the supplier?

Do geographical distances or localregulations impact control?

Both quantitative and qualitative con-siderations go into these assessments. Wehave found that a practical and time-effi-

cient approach involves ranking suppliers in even quin-tiles from most strategic to least strategic (so as to avoidthe occasional tendency to discover that nearly all suppli-ers are highly strategic). This approach requires that if

there are, say, 100 suppliers, no more than 20 can be inany individual quintile ranking. The output from this ana-lytic step is used to stratify all suppliers along the dimen-sions of strategic importance to the business; the sameapproach is then applied along a continuum of difficultyto re-source the goods or services provided. Specifically,we seek to prioritize those suppliers that fall into theupper right quadrant, denoting high strategic importanceand high switching difficulty. (See Exhibit 1.)

After a supply management executive in the printingindustry conducted this analysis on his supply base, he wassurprised by the degree to which the truly critical suppli-ers differed from his previous perception of what criticalmeant. For example, this manufacturer had always regardedone chemicals supplier as critical since it had long been asole source producer of proprietary compounds. However,closer scrutiny of the suppliers performance, followed bycompetitive sampling, made it clear that there were via-ble alternatives and suppliers to meet production needs.Conversely, the process highlighted a few suppliers thathad previously been considered inconsequentialprompt-ing a much closer focus on their status and performance.

Assessing Financial DistressOnce you have identified your high-priority suppli-ers, the next step is to assess their financial viability.


StrategicImportance

Proprietary ProductDesign ResponsibilityCustomer Visibility

High

Low

Re-SourceSupplier

FixSupplier

Low HighDifficult to Re-SourceTimeDegree of CustomizedEquipment and ToolingPre-Production TestingRegulatory Approvals/CertificationsIntellectual Property Barriers

EXHIBIT 1

Pinpointing the Most Critical Suppliers


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At-Risk Suppliers

For many supply management functions, this can be adaunting task. Commonly available supplier financialreports typically fail to adequately reveal the suppliersoverall liquidity position, which is an all-important mea-

sure of any companys ongoing sustainability. Moreover,suppliers that are privately owned often reveal little or nofinancial information.

There are many valuable and comprehensive sourcesof financial data with which to assess suppliers financial

viability. However, we have seldom seen all the collect-ed data, across the multitude of suppliers, successfullytranslated into cogent indicators of financial distress.In one case, a customer kept a detailed and up-to-datekey suppliers folder. In addition to internal reports onsupplier performance, the folder contained the annualreports, 10-Ks, 10-Qs, sector coverage reports from sev-eral investment analysts, chronological transcripts fromthe earnings calls as well as reports purchased fromfinancial information bureaus. Most buyers could read-ily describe suppliers metrics such as recent stock priceperformance, executive compensation, the fiscal calen-dar, key competitors, and whether business was growingor declining. However, nobody with whom we spoke atthat company could quantify supplier liquidity beyondsubjective quotes from analysts reportsmuch less ranksuppliers by the extent of financial distress.

If needed information is publicly available, or if your

privately owned supplier is willing to share details, theAltman Z-Score can be applied as a general predictor offinancial distress. This reliable metric was introducedin 1968 by New York University Professor Edward I.Altman. The lower the score on a 0 to 5 scale, the greaterthe likelihood of distress. The Altman Z-Score equationcomprises five financial ratios: Working capital to totalassets; retained earnings to total assets; earnings beforeinterest and taxes to total assets; market value of equityto book value of total liabilities; and sales to total assets.

The Altman Z-Score can certainly help supply chainmanagers to quantify and rank suppliers

with more rigor than they may have donepreviously. However, it is only a generalpredictor that varies dramatically based onfactors such as asset intensity or industrystructure. Over the past decade, we haveused a proprietary Early Warning Model(EWM) tool. The EWM analyzes a num-ber of company-specific financial factorsand produces a likelihood of distress, ona scale of 0-100 percent, over a forward-looking, two-year period. The higher the

value, the higher the likelihood of distress.

Contextsuch as comparisons within peer or industrygroupsis vital to interpreting the condition and extentof distress. In Exhibit 2, the deterioration (red line) ofa process-industry company is apparent, leading to the

companys bankruptcy filing. At the same time, two otherproducers in the same industry (blue lines) are exhibitingclear indications of stress, while the remaining peers (greenlines) are all tracking below the 15 percent level. It is easyto spot the prospective suppliers that should be cause forconcern. Moreover, by periodically monitoring each com-panys absolute distress level, one-time increases in distress,and period-over-period deteriorating trends, it is possible toflag at-risk suppliers just as the first distress signs appear.

It is not unusual for suppliers to be surprised whentheir financial viability is first challenged. However afact-based conversation dispels emotions, facilitates aconstructive dialog, and can lead to early preventativeactions among receptive suppliers. For recalcitrant sup-pliers or suppliers on a deteriorating path, the advancewarning can provide supply chain managers with an early

jump on alternative plansthus avoiding the premiumsassociated with crisis responses at the last minute.

We have learned that many companies exhibit earlysigns of distress when there are months, if not years,of lead time before they hit crisis levels. It is possibleto monitor average distress levels of tracked companiesthat filed for bankruptcy protection, contrasted with the

number of months prior to filing, during each of threecalendar years: 2007, 2008, and 2009 (through April).(See Exhibit 3.) The data suggest that in the cases ofsuppliers that cross a 40 percent probability level of cri-sis, there is, even in the worst cases, more than a fullfinancial quarter in which to take corrective action.

While a 40 percent-plus rating is no guarantee of fail-ure, it implies that proactive intervention or contingencyplanning significantly improves customers chances ofuninterrupted supply or crisis response, much as earlydetection of a disease can help forestall its worst effects.

Process Industry Peer Group at Three Digit SIC Code

Oct

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

DistressLevel

EXHIBIT 2

Context is Vital to Assessing Distress

Nov

2007 2008 2009

Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar

Crisis Producer (Ch.11 Filed in 2009)

Distressed Producer

SIC Peer Firms


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In our experience, it is essential to open confidential dia-logs with high-priority suppliers whose probability of distressexceeds 40 percent. This gives supply chain managers anopportunity to assess the circumstances first-hand and judgewhether the suppliers distress level is a financial anomaly ora signal of mounting distress. Constructive intervention atthe earliest stage also means that there are the most degreesof freedom remaining to reverse the coursewhich is in thebest interests of both supplier and customer.

Intervening with At-Risk SuppliersHighlighting at-risk suppliers is only the first, and easiest,part of the SRM process. Once you have recognized that apriority supplier is financially at-risk, it is time to suspend

the business-as-usual approach until stability is restoredor until you no longer rely on the supplier. To be sure, manysupply management functions have instituted cost take-outprograms or other structured mechanisms to contain costs,and these are certainly appropriate ways to ensure competi-tiveness over the duration of a relationship.

However, during periods of financial sensitivity,aggressive supplier negotiations can inadvertently serveas the coup de grce for a supplier and heighten thelikelihood of supply disruption. Consider this recentexample from Chryslers experience. Prior to its ownbankruptcy filing, the car maker sought 50 percent price

reductions from some of its suppliers, including AradcoManagement, a Tier 1 supplier of stampings, modularassemblies and welded parts. With more than 90 per-cent of its business dedicated to Chrysler, Aradco couldnot withstand the additional loss of income inferredin Chryslers proposal. Failing to reach an agreement,Chrysler attempted to move all of its business away fromAradco. Even after obtaining a court injunction grant-ing legal rights to Chrysler for Aradcos parts and tool-ing, Chrysler was turned away by a union blockade atthe Aradco plant in Windsor, Ontario, severing flow toproduction lines.

To resolve the question of supply conti-nuity, we have to triage at-risk suppliers intotwo groups based on how badly a suppliersfinancial picture has deteriorated. Broadly,

we categorize them into distressed andcrisis, with each category implying differ-ent levels of intervention. Lets get into moredetail on each:

Dealing with a Distressed Supplier.In such cases, the fundamental objective isto improve the suppliers cash flow in orderto reduce or reverse its distress level. A goodexample is the recent case of an interven-

tion at a privately held freight provider. This company wasexhibiting early signs of financial distress; its customerswere worried about its viability. At the same time, its ownerwas worrying about how to secure a major cash infusion totide the company through the economic downturn.

The initial meeting between the suppliers executiveteam and AlixPartners centered on a detailed review ofthe companys financials. It was agreed that the com-pany would give priority to immediate and steep costreductions, which included a freeze on new hires andon planned salary increases, and the appointment of thechief financial officer (CFO) as the cash czar to controlall discretionary expenditures. The initiative also involveda company-wide program to dramatically improve earn-

ings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization(EBITDA) per transaction, by: Executing one-time employee severance pay-outs

for selected employment contract-based executiveswhose employment contracts had been thought to be toocostly to terminate.

Implementing a 26 percent staffing reduction to bringoperational capacity in line with the business outlook.

Shutting down services provided by all non-employ-ee contractors whose total costs came at a premiumcompared to those of full-time employees.

Eliminating and not replacing non-recurring costs,

including ongoing litigation expenses. Replacing a health insurance plan that was due for

renewal at a higher cost with another providers morecompetitive plan that better suited the needs of the newbusiness structure.

Immediately cutting travel and expense costs for allbut essential business purposes.

Reducing communications costs.Exhibit 4 shows the relative impact of these key

actions over time. After just four weeks, the changeslisted above led to a $15 per transaction positive swingin EBITDA, reaching full run rate after 60 days. The


24

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

DistressLevel

EXHIBIT 3

Spotting the Warning Signs of Distress

23 22 21

* Publically traded firms with sales >$250 million (>$500 for retail firms) and assets>$100 million

20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Months before Chapter 11 Filing

Average Level of Distress Before Chapter 11 Filing*

2009 Filings (as of 4/16/09)

2008 Filings

2007 Filings


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At-Risk Suppliers

suppliers CFO noted that had it not been for the inter-vention, the suppliers liquidity crisis would have neces-sitated a bankruptcy filing or massive equity infusion bythe end of the year.

This case provides a clear example where advanced

interventionwell before the onset of a cash crunchallowed orderly and sustaining improvements with nodisruption to service. What is also notable is the contrastbetween a plan designed to improve cash flow vs. a typ-ical supplier-development action plan resulting from acustomers visits. In our experience, supply managementfunctions are rarely equipped to engage constructivelywith suppliers to address issues such as SG&A reductionor health insurance negotiations. Rather, they tend to beoriented toward product quality, service levels and costcontainment. Certainly all of those factors are critical,but during periods of acute financial sensitivity, they are

insufficient to meaningfullyimprove supplier liquidity.Exhibit 5 shows a contin-uum of supplier financial

distress along the dimen-sions of timeframe, focus,actions, and skill sets.

Coping with aSupplier in Crisis.Typically, a crisis supplierhas already run out of cashor is about to run out, whichcuts short the debate overthe need for intervention.Supplies can be at great risk:It is quite possible that payrollcannot be met or the suppli-ers suppliers have not beenpaid. The supplier may beabout to default on its obliga-tions, resulting in an involun-tary bankruptcy filing. Once acompany has filed for restruc-turing, it operates under theprotection of the court andin the interests of its debtors.The objective of restructur-

ing is to restore the businessto ongoing financial viability.Implications for customerscan include: renegotiatingcontracts and the associatedterms; selling, liquidating orshuttering business units to

raise cash or stanch financial underperformance; encumber-ing assets, including parts, tooling and equipment; and evenreclaiming cash or assets exchanged during a defined timeperiod prior to the filing.

When a crisis does occur with a priority supplier, it

is usually too late to re-source the goods. If supply con-tinuity is in jeopardy, there are several undesirable butprospective steps that a customer may undertake to fillimmediate needs. Suppliers cash flow can be temporar-ily improved by paying your suppliers supplier directlyfor the raw materials or inputs for your products. If tool-ing is controlled under a bailment agreement, it may bepossible to relocate it to a different supplier. There areeven circumstances in which resources from your orga-nization may run the endangered suppliers productionequipment in order to obtain output. Of course, none ofthese kinds of moves should be more than temporary.

EXHIBIT 4

Rescuing a Distressed Supplier

Projected 2008 EBITDA 0.04

Annualized Impact of HealthCare Insurance increase

Projected 2008 EBITDA Adjusted forOctober 1 Health Benefits Cost Increase

Headcount Reduction

-2 0 2 4 6

$ EBITDA per Transaction

8 10 12 14

Benefits Sourcing

Communications CostReduction Program

Professional Services/Cosulting Reduction

Travel and EntertainmentReduction

Other Cost Reductions

Non-Recurring Lawsuit

Cost Reduction Costs

Future EBITDA atSame Level of Sales

8.04

0.97

0.59

2.19

0.68

0.23

1.00

1.04

13.81

-0.97

-0.92

Before Intervention

After Intervention


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In one recent case, a mid-sized apparel suppliercould not cope with its crushing debt load. After noti-fying senior lenders that it was unable to meet its debtrepayment schedule, the company moved to focus ongenerating cash, restructuring its manufacturing foot-print and supply chain and restructuring its debt.

Specifically, the apparel supplier implemented a 13-

week cash flow forecasting model to quickly manageand forecast profitability, established a disciplined cross-functional approach to accelerate collection of overdueaccounts receivables from customers, and dramaticallyreduced working capital tied up in slow or over-stockedinventory. The industrial restructuring focused on threekey drivers: (1) reducing the suppliers manufacturingfootprint by consolidating the number of production sites;(2) shifting to a more effective and efficient distribu-tion network to reduce costs and simplify the paths forproduct flow; and (3) increasing scrutiny on discretionaryspending such as travel and expenses. The actions taken

to preserve cash delivered significant accounts receivablebenefits, solid inventory benefits, and a 10 percent reduc-tion in manufacturing and discretionary spendinginaddition to a new business plan aligning the objectives ofthe owners with those of the management team.

Some supply management organizations have thecompetencies needed to help distressed suppliers. Butmost lack the skills necessary to turn around a supplier incrisis. So should they develop internal turnaround com-petencies? In our experience, the incidence of crisis sup-pliers is not high enough to merit doing so. Instead, theirtime and energies are better directed toward advanced

detection and prevention offinancial distressor towardre-sourcing at-risk goodsand services while theres

still time to do so.The skill sets, competen-

cies and approaches best suitedfor these situations are definedas those of a turnaround pro-fessional. The recognition ofthe role of turnaround pro-fessional is relatively recent.Organizations dedicated tothis discipline include theTurnaround ManagementAssociation (www.turnaround.org ) and the Association ofInsolvency & RestructuringAdvisors (www.airacira.org).Both organizations offer rel-

evant training and certification programs. Enterprising sup-ply management professionals can dramatically expandtheir conversancy and familiarity with the field of crisismanagement and turnaround work through these and otherprograms. While they do so, there is still no substitute forharnessing experienced turnaround capabilities if they areforced to deal with a supplier in crisiswhich of course is

what truly effective supplier risk management can help themavoid in the future.

The Financial Viability FactorIn todays world, where continuity of supply is so criti-cal, supply-management professionals must be able toembed financial viability in the overall function of sup-plier risk management. Specifically, they have to havethe data and the analytical methods to be able to high-light the most critical companies in their supply bases.They need to be able to critically monitor and engageany critical suppliers that are showing signs of distress.

And they must act to mitigate supply risk by decisivelyre-sourcing the relevant goods or services or by interven-ing to support the distressed suppliers.

The skills required for this kind of monitoring and sup-plier intervention are new for most supply managementfunctions and their professionals. But now they must viewthese accumulated skills as a long-term competency.

Supplier failures will remain a fact of life, but supplydisruptions need not be. We all look forward to a timewhen we can decrease the weight given to financial via-bility as a factor in deciding what to source from whichsuppliers. But for now, we dont have that luxury.


EXHIBIT 5

Supplier Distress Continuum

Supplier

Status

Crisis

Supplier

Financially Distressed

Supplier

Business-as-Usual

Supplier

Timeframe Immediate

Documents

05. Spot Risk Supplier