07-Krkac,+Kristijan+-+Wittgenstein’s+Dubbit+III

8/7/2019 07-Krkac,+Kristijan+-+Wittgensteins+Dubbit+III

1/30


2/30

1. The dawning of the dubbit (LW I 147, 492)

Say that one is presented with a series of drawings from (a) to (f) asshown in the Figure 1. What kind of descriptions would one give regard-ing this series of drawings (Wittgenstein mentions this possibility, see PIp. 199, LW I 517)?

Drawing (a) in Figure 1 could be a scribble, similar to one a childoften makes while drawing something and at one moment starts to scrib-ble over it claiming that it performed a horrible mistake. Furthermore,for drawing (a) it could be said that it consists of unorganised lines (on

the other hand and in a childs mind they are completely organisedsince they cover the alleged mistake perfectly). Now, drawing (b) isless unorganised. There is some minimal, almost geometrical organisation

Figure 1: The dawning of the dubbit (duckrabbit head)

Kristijan Krkac122


3/30


4/30

Now, what one sees, if one sees anything at all, are not organisedlines (no more then a strange creature, or an odd drawing), if onesees anything at all, then it must be an aspect, since this is the precise

point regarding such multiaspectual drawings. It has been suggestedthat here the distinction between continuous and representative seeingasapplies in a way that when one perceives an odd drawing this should beunderstood as continuous seeing-as, while seeing-it as a rabbit or a duckshould be understood as representative seeingas (Voltolini 1993, 56772, grounded on PI p. 194). However, it will be suggested that there isno representation here, since there is nothing that can represent any-thing else. The drawing itself isnt something that represents aspects, since

the drawing itself is an aspect of the dubbit. Besides this particular dis-tinction, it seems that the dubbit is important at least for two reasons:

(1) It is important because seeing aspects is significant part of Wittgen-steins morphological method (PI 66) and grammatical goal in termsof perspicuous (re)presentation (PI 122). This point is nicely expli-cated by J. Good in the following passage. To use one of Wittgen-steins metaphors, the concept of seeing is like a delicious artichoke

with many leaves. When we construct a theory or a definition to cap-ture its essential nature, we divest the artichoke of its leaves, trying tofind the real artichoke hidden within. Nevertheless, the artichoke isits leaves. Wittgenstein offers us a technique for exploring the

whole artichoke, for getting to the heart without losing the whole.(Good 2006, 2)

(2) In addition, it is a significant because it reveals the notion of seeingespecially in phrase seeing aspects as something between perceptionand interpretation (this point is explicated by G. Baker 2004. For thedifference between interpretation and imagination regarding this par-

ticular case, and for an interpretation as action of interpreting seeBudd 1989, 901), and while being at half way it also differs fromseeing Mller-Lyer lines, Neckers cube, or double cross, for instance,as seeing with a significant influence of will. This means that one can[c]hange the imaginative focus of the aspect at will no matter howthe imaginative focus itself is constrained by the visually graspedproperties of the object one perceives. (Voltolini 1993, 567) It is ap-proximately half way between the case of double cross and any case ofpure interpretation (as shown in Figure 3).

(2.1) Regarding (1) and (2) it seems that Wittgenstein uses the dubbitas an example of his morphological method and grammatical inquiry, the

Kristijan Krkac124


5/30

goal of which is clarity, and as an quite obvious objection to the moderndifferentiation between perception and reasoning (thinking), between em-piricism and rationalism, or between perception and volition (which he

found perhaps in Jamess The Principles of Psychology or in The Varietiesof religious Experience, or in Russells works (for instance Russell [first pub-lished 1927] 1995, 48), or regarding the perception between behaviourismand Gestalt theory, or regarding the ontology between desert landscapesand overpopulated universes (Quine 1980, 4). If such objections are ac-cepted, then another issue is raised, namely is all our perception so tospeak aspectualised? In order to answer affirmatively to this and similarquestions, one needs to understand that there is no strict border betweenseeing, seeingas and imaginingas.

(2.2) On the other hand, Wittgensteins treatment of the issue, espe-cially some indications of his solution in terms of grammatical proposi-tions, show that it is connected to his conception of human consciousness

which is further connected to his conception of the human being. In ad-dition, it represents the first example of a morphological and grammaticalinquiry which goes beyond investigating morphology of expressions,namely the morphology of visual experience. Regarding the lastpoint, the grammatical inquiry stays the same, namely the one containing

hints of grammatical propositions, while the morphological one changes,and one could see some strengths and weaknesses of such method precise-ly in cases such as that of the dubbit. Some of these explications will beinvestigated in further sections in more detail.

These reasons (1, 2) constitute the vital point (described in Figure 3),as well as explication (2.12) that will be made in the present paper.Now, a lot of it was implied in (12.2). In the following section it

will be suggested that the dubbit is no issue of a theory of perception,rather that it is an issue of morphology (the third section) and an issue

of philosophical grammar (fourth section).

2. Aspects of the dubbit is it because the drawing is poor?

When one sees the dubbit for the first time, one could say something likeI dont see anything at all, or ask What is this?, or I see a pile oflines, or I see lines that seem to be organised in a particular yet to

me unknown way, or OK, now I can see a rabbit, but I see aduck as well, or How outlandish, I see a duck at one moment, and arabbit at the other! or, I see a one-eyed monster with both ears on

Wittgensteins Dubbit III 125


6/30

the left side of its head, or something similar. Now, how it is possiblethat one sees the duck and the rabbit? Maybe the drawing itself is some-how poor, or quite the contrary; perhaps it is perfectly aspectualised.Namely, small changes in the drawing can be made in order to minimizesome ambiguities. For instance, if one stretches it horizontally, one willsee the rabbit first and then perhaps the duck later on, and if one stretchesit vertically, one will see the duck first and perhaps the rabbit afterwards.

these versions of Figure 1 are shown in Figure 4.Therefore, even slight changes in the proportion of the drawing ob-viously influence our seeing of aspects. Regarding both changes it is easier

Figure 3: Seeing Dubbitaspects as halfperception and halfinterpretation with si-gnificant influence of will

Kristijan Krkac126


7/30

to recognize one of the two aspects, namely in the first one the rabbit as-pect, and in the second one the duck aspect, because in the first one thebeak is unnaturally long for a duck, and in the second one the ears are

unnaturally short for a rabbit. Leaving aside proportions of the drawing,some other changes can be made. In particular, the position of the eye isalso important since if the eye is moved more to the left or more to theright this would surely influence seeing one aspect before the other (asshown in Figure 5).

However, it is also possible that the aspect one notices will remain thesame, because the whole dubbit looks as it is positioned diagonally in re-lation to the observer. Perhaps there is another distinction, namely the

one between a pile of lines and a number of specifically organisedlines, but then what does an organisation mean? Does an organisa-tion mean that aspects are possible? Let us test the drawing by making

Figure 4: Some changes in proportions of the drawing of Dubbit



8/30

few minor changes in the organisation of lines in order to investigatethis particular possibility (as shown in Figure 6).

In the Figure 6, namely in its upper part, a small hollow on the leftside of it is emphasised and the eye is moved slightly to the left, while inthe lower part of it the eye is slightly moved to the right and the hollowon the left side is completely removed. In both illustrations shadows areremoved as well. If these changes are sufficient for one in order to seeonly a rabbit in the upper part, and a duck in the lower one, then weclarified what it means that lines are organised in certain ways in

order for one to see a rabbit and a duck.However, one could make the drawing even more distinct as shown

in Figure 7 in which the rabbits ears are a little bit lowered (lookingperhaps like a turkey, or an alien creature aspect besides the rabbit aspect)and it seems almost impossible to see a duck on the upper part of theFigure 7. Now, one can go back to the original drawing and removechanges one by one and stop at the one that seems to be sufficient fornoticing both aspects.

On the other hand, these distinctions are distinctions between so tosay real aspects, no matter how odd an aspectabsent drawing shouldsound. All of the descriptions of aspects belong to certain perspicuous

Figure 5: Some changes regarding the position of Dubbits eye

Kristijan Krkac128


9/30

presentation of the dubbit; they belong to the grammar of sight not tothe grammar of the dubbit. The dubbit itself has no grammar, only or-ganisation of lines. Therefore, the basic question is still unanswered:

What is the difference between perception of the dubbit and visual ex-perience of the duck aspect or rabbit aspect?

There are many such possibilities each one making the drawing moreor less ambiguous. However, the drawing is always the same; there are nochanges even in its proportions. Instead, what is changed is our seeing ofit, namely

(3) [t]hat experience is what I call perceiving an aspect (PI 398401).

As we already mentioned, Wittgenstein discusses seeing aspects in PI (PI398 401, II: xi) and in some other works. Now, one should not be mis-guided by the use of the word seeing in the expression seeingas, nomore then with the word odd in the expression an odd drawing, since

this could be a metaphorical use. Namely, many of our words for knowl-edge are oculocentric (the phenomenon itself is even sometimes referredto as oculocentrism). Those are for example:

Figure 6: Some minor changes in the organisation of (Dubbit) lines



10/30

definition, observation, phenomenon, introspection, contemplation,speculation, and many other phrases containing words like eye orsee which are obviously used metaphorically, like

I see it in my mind, I see what you mean, and similar.

This raises many questions.

Is Wittgensteins use also metaphorical like in the mentioned cases?

Namely, when one sees an aspect, is this a good example of perceiving,or a good example of interpreting? What is visual perception in this particular case of seeing aspect?

o Is seeingas looking at with an assignment an extraordinary atten-tion or a bizarre caution?

The main point concerning seeingas is that one sees as one interprets.

(4) So we interpret it, and see it as we interpret it. (PI p. 193, Z 212)

(4.1) [A]n interpretation becomes an expression of experience.

(RPP I 20 see also 99)

Figure 7: Some major changes in the organisation of (Dubbit) lines

Kristijan Krkac130


11/30


12/30

(7.2) and the other is seeing the aspects with minds eye, or interpret-ing what one perceives (of course, the point is precisely in connection

with proposition (4), namely, that one must interpret in order to see).

The particular difference between (7.1) and (7.2) can be described as a)what there is (lines on a paper) and b) how it appears or looks to us(visual experience of a duck, rabbit, and change of aspects). This pointgoes along with the distinction made by J. Good, namely the following:Correlated grammatically with the distinction between seeing and inter-pretation is a distinction between direct and indirect descriptions of whatis experienced. The expression of an interpretation is an indirect descrip-tion. (Good 2006, 26)

(7.3) 7.2, besides being consistent with (4), i. e. with PI p. 193, alsogoes along with Wittgensteins remark that the aspectchange we in factdescribe as the change in perception, almost as the object itself changes infront our very eyes (PI p. 195).Nevertheless, how is this possible if the drawing remains the same? Per-haps something changes regarding our visual experience, or with our in-terpretation of the drawing? On the other hand, perhaps it is just a spe-cial kind of drawing. The last point should not be of our pivotal interestsince the question is not empirical or technical (for instance how todraw such a multiaspectual drawing), no matter if this is of some impor-tance regarding art theory (interpreting Eschers or Arcimboldos worksfor instance) or visual literacy education.

3. Morphologies of the dubbit

Proposition (7.3) as a correct interpretation of (7.2) and being consistent

with (3) and (4) implies that there is one drawing, (at least) two aspectsand that these aspects are different; but how do we know this, especiallythe last one? Of course, one could say, this point can be illustrated withtwo drawings of the dubbit and with pointing to the differences betweenthem, but how to point to the differences if both drawings are the same?Namely, there will be no differences between the drawings.

However, if they were different and made by two people who claim tosee only one aspect, say that Smith claims to see only the duck aspect,

while Jones claims to see only the rabbit aspect, then if there are differ-ences in their drawings of the dubbit, the differences should be at-tributed to the ability to draw what one sees (a similar proposal was

Kristijan Krkac132


13/30

made by Fogelin 1987, 202). However, we would then have two differ-ent drawings of the dubbit, one more ducklike, and the other onemore rabbitlike. Now, say that Smith and Jones are skilled cartoonists,

and consequently draw exactly the same drawing, namely the dubbit,and claim to see only one aspect, this proves nothing. Perhaps some-thing is wrong with their eyes, or brain, or imagination; perhapsthey are aspectblind?o Regarding cartoonist, it should be noted that Wittgenstein bor-

rowed the dubbit from Jastrow 1900. However, Jastrow publishedthe drawing a year later as well (1899), and borrowed it fromHarpers Weekly magazine (1892, 1114). Finally, Harpers Week-ly reprinted the drawing from the German magazine FliegendeBltter of the same year (1892, 312). Wittgenstein was obviouslyacquainted with the magazine, and particularly with the cartoonist

Adolf Oberlnder (PPO 97). However, I did not succeed in findingthe name of the author of the original drawing (the reprint of thepage from the magazine is accessible on the Internet).

The point is that the drawing itself can be seen in two ways not thatthere are two drawings in one. Does this mean that there are no differ-ences between these two aspects? Surely, there is some kind of difference

and even a kind of change, while one sees one aspect after another, but onthe other hand, it is not the change in perception, and consequently itcannot be shown by two different drawings, rather the change goes onin our seeing, since the eye filters, but the mind interprets. In other

words, we do not want to introduce neither a minds eye, nor a privatelanguage.

The drawing is organised in such a particular way that one can seeonly the lines, but also the aspects. The organisation of lines is an essen-

tial part of the drawing. On the other hand, it seems like in the first case (previously 7.1) one is just looking at the drawing

and observing lines only, and in the second case (previously 7.2) one is also seeing them as a duck

and as a rabbit.

Does this mean that the duck and the rabbit are already in the drawing?But if they are, where are they? But, dont you see is the only possiblecomment regarding this question and we are at the beginning again.

(8) The point and the problem is that seeingas does not belong to theperception, and this is so because seeingas is like visual perceptionand at the same time it is not (PI p. 197).



14/30

We have here at least two distinctions (following Wittgenstein7.017.02):

(9) A state of affairs in which one sees the drawing, which should bedescribed as a particular organisation of black lines on a whitepiece of paper,

(10) Then we have another situation in which one sees the drawing asan aspect, say that of a duck (this is the first distinction),

(11) One also has a situation in which one sees not just one aspect, say aduck aspect, but also a rabbit aspect (this is the second distinction),and the change from one to the another.

These two distinctions (namely 910 and 1011) should not be con-

fused for reasons that will be explicated further on. Wittgenstein makes a note about a rabbit, which suddenly runs in

front of us. We see it and exclaim, Rabbit!. He introduced the differ-ence between perception (seeing the drawing of the dubbit) and visualexperience (seeing the drawing of the dubbit as). Let us compare thesetwo cases. If the distinction is correct, we have one perception and one

visual experience.o In the first situation, one sees a rabbit suddenly running in front of

him/her and exclaims Rabbit!.o In the second situation, one looks at the drawing of the dubbit onthe paper, sees nothing at first, but moments later one exclaim I seea rabbit!.

In both cases, there is a particular visual perception. In the first case aliving, running rabbit, and in the second case thedrawing of the dub-bit. In addition, in both cases there is visual experience and exclama-tion as a reaction to what one sees. There is no relevant difference be-tween these two phenomena, since they can not be distinguished, apart

from the fact that in the second case one could have exclaimedDuck!, however in the first case one could also have exclaimed Bea-

ver! The supposed difference is in an interpretation, namely in thesecond case one could say that it was a case of mistaken identificationof the animal, while in the first one, one could say that it was a case ofseeing one of two aspects first.

Regarding the mentioned option, the question is: How can one, withoutnoticing it consciously, secretly slide from perception to interpretation,

since we see as we interpret (4, PI p. 193)?

Kristijan Krkac134


15/30

(12) This is so because immediate seeing of an aspect appears to be halfvisual perception and half thinking. Thinking here means over-view or presentation of what one sees (PI p. 198), since present-

ing all of the aspects surely must be a part of an overview of thedubbit.

(13) Wittgensteins solution seems to be unacceptable, since he claimsthat there is a significant difference between perception of a drawingand visual experience (half-thinking so to speak, although seeing anaspect isnt something like seeing+ thinking, or a mixture of these,PI p. 211; it is not cognitive at all, but the matter of will PI p. 213).He also claims that the perception is described and that experi-ence is presented; that, in a case of quick recognition of aspects,the decisive role is connected with habit and upbringing (hereone should allow some kind of relevance of visual literacy); andfinally that there is no special justification in the languagegameof representing visual experiences.

His solution seems to be unacceptable since he claims that there is a dif-ference between (9) and (1011). It seems that one cannot see an aspect

without noticing the drawing, therefore there cannot be (10, 11) without(9), as it were that (9) is phenomenologically prior to (10, 11), or the

condition of (10, 11). On the other hand, an aspect must be, so to speak,epistemologically prior to the drawing itself, since the particular organ-isation of lines is also an aspect of the drawing as well as the duck aspect,or the rabbit aspect. To give an example.

If one sees this *, one could say that he or she sees a small black circle,or a black dot, or a hole on a white piece of paper. Now, there is nospecial reason to regard a small black circle as the precise descriptionof what one sees. The small black round circle as a superior descrip-

tion would then have two aspects, namely, a dot aspect and a hole as-pect.

Therefore, we have one more distinction regarding the dubbit:The first distinction:

(14) Seeing nothing (white piece of paper with nothing on it), and(15) Seeing something (white piece of paper with some lines on it)

The second distinction:

(15) Seeing something (white piece of paper with some lines on it), and(16) Seeing something as a duck (some lines as a duck, LW I 165 72)

The third distinction:



16/30

(16) Seeing something as a duck (some lines as a duck), and(17) Seeing something as a rabbit (some lines as a rabbit)

The first distinction (1415) is the issue of perception (see Fllesdal2005:12742); the second (1516) and the third one (1617) are is-sues of an aspect seeing, and in some more complicated cases alsothe issues of so to speak aspect talent, opposite of which could be as-pect blindness. However, levels of these phenomena are topics under theheading visual literacy. In order to clarify the first distinction, namelyseeing something seeing nothing (i.e. 1415) one should compare twosituations as shown in figure 8 where concerning a) one could react withan utterance such as I see something, while concerning b) with an ut-

terance such asI dont see anything or I see nothing.

Figure 8: Seeing something and seeing nothing

Kristijan Krkac136


17/30

In both cases, a) and b), the words something and nothing areused figuratively, not literally. Namely, in a) one is using somethingin a way that if one is asked to explicate what one sees in more detail,

one would probably say something regarding an unorganised pile ofmostly straight lines, etc. By giving such an answer one is in fact sayingI am seeing something, but it doesnt resemble anything I know or Icannot recognise what I am seeing. Now, in b), by saying I see nothingone is not claiming that he/she is blind, rather that one cannot recognise

what one sees. Namely, as being simply white, say, piece of paper itcould be almost anything white, and by that one claims that he/shedoes not recognise anything else besides the colour. Therefore, seeing

without recognising would be similar to pure perception, while seeingwith recognition would be perception+ thinking (here thinking meansseeingas which includes a use of some concepts, as well as interpreta-tive activity).

(18) Wittgensteins point here is not just that we interpret in the sameway as we actually perceive the dubbit, rather that we see the dubbitas we interpret it. Wittgenstein seems to make two hypotheses,one that says that there is a change of aspect, and secondly thatthere is a change of interpretation.

(18.1) The first hypothesis leads to the somewhat odd consequencethat aspects are in ones mind (but there is no private language, at least inthis case, and the aspects can be described simplyas duck or rabbit), orthat aspects are in the very organisation of lines (but senses do not expe-rience, we do, and we experience aspects).

(18.2) The second hypothesis leads to the consequence that aspectsare just languagegames of specific interpretations (but then the qualifi-cation of visual experience is dropped out), or that aspects are not just

languagegames but something more (which leads back to the issue ofprivate language, or to the issue of grammar and of forms of life).

(18.3) At f irst sight, it seems that Wittgenstein chooses the secondhypothesis, and that he struggles with the possibility to save the stand-point from the problems of private language on one hand, and fromthe problems with attributing mystical powers to the drawing, or tothe senses on the other hand (PI, Z, Denneson 2002).However, investigating the second possibility (18.2) and (18.3) leads one

directly to the issue of the grammar of sight, because a number of distinc-tions regarding the dubbit enable certain morphological investigations which leads to an explication of the grammar. Say that, unorganised



18/30

lines are = a, the dubbit = b, the duck aspect = c, the rabbit aspect = d,the monster = e, and SA= seeingas. Now, there are many possibilities,namely the following.

MORPHOLOGICAL RELATIONS

(18.4) Seeing unorganised linesas the dubbit.

SaAb AN IDENTIFICATION

(18.5) Seeing the dubbitas a duck.

SbAc NOTICING OF ANASPECT

(18.6) Seeing a duckas a rabbit.

ScAd A CHANGE OF ANASPECT

(18.7) Seeing the dubbitas a monster.

SbAe AN IMAGINATION

SaAb is the issue of perception of an odd drawing, a drawing which re-sembles something, but one is not sure what it is. In order for a to re-semble to something one needs concepts of duck and rabbit, oth-erwise it would not resemble at all. This could be compared to seeing a3D picture which has only two aspects, namely a strange pattern and

an organised picture representing something particular. Now, SbAc isthe dawning of an aspect, say the duck aspect. We could imagine oneexclaiming Oh, now I see, it is the duck!. However, ScAd is the mostimportant possibility, namely, a change of aspects. Again, one could ex-claim What is this, I see a duck now!. Now, what is the difference be-tween (18.5) and (18.6)? The difference is similar to the one between in-complete and complete identification, say of flightless birds, namelypenguins, or of flying animals which are not birds, namely bats, and inthat light (18.6) could be regarded by one noticing a change of aspects

as a genuine discovery accompanied with surprise and admiration. AsWittgenstein points out, (18.6) could be regarded as a new discovery be-cause it is not a result of separate noticings of aspects. One could noticeone aspect separately from another; more to that, (18.6) means to no-tice the change of one aspect into another aspect, and learning to controlthis change (therefore it is an issue of will). Consequently, (18.5) is notnoticing an aspect at all, it is simply identification of an organisationof lines as a duck for instance. In such a situation something unidentified

should not be regarded as an aspect. So far it was explicated that seeing is needed (regarding 18.4),

Kristijan Krkac138


19/30


20/30

This is so because what is important in the interpretation is habitand upbringing (PI p. 201) but also that the substratum of this ex-

perience is mastering a technique (PI p. 208). Aspect talent and as-pect blindness are not issues of visual perception but of visual liter-

Figure 9: A kitchen table with a vase and two tulips

Figure 10: The dubbit as a monster

Kristijan Krkac140


21/30

acy, visual arts (McFee 1999), culture, perhaps also of social psy-chology, consumer behaviour, epistemology of eyewitness testimo-ny, etc. to point out only a few applications.

To repeat all of the distinctions (with the distinction between a pile oflines (scribble) and organised lines included as shown in table 1).Table 1 shows that only a perception of the dubbit, a duck aspect

and a rabbit aspect are significant for the seeing-as issue. In the table6.1 circularity is not suggested, but it could be, since in one way or an-other basic circularity (namely, interpreted as seen, and seen as interpret-ed) repeats itself (the curved dashed arrow on the right side of table 6.1could be represented as a circular one). Regarding this issue of circularity,

which is introduced due to the somewhat unclear function of interpre-

tation, a solution could be suggested. Namely, one could try to interpretewith some less interpretative actions then interpretation; for instance

Table 1: All of the distinctions regarding the dubbit



22/30

noticing (as Wittgenstein does). The dubbit is perceived, but the duckand the rabbit aspects are noticed or recognised. On the other hand,what is noticing if not perceiving with special care or concern. Therefore,

circularity remains. It could be possible to find the way in explicatingWittgensteins solution positively no matter if such an attempt is somewhat risky. However, let us start with the negative or critical elementsof his standpoint.

(20.1) In opposition to behaviourism and some empiricist explana-tions, Wittgenstein seems to suggest, that what we perceive are not justlines but organised lines (therefore the alleged distinction between a pileof lines and organised lines is of no relevance, see previously 6.2.1.).

(20.2) On the other hand, against Gestalt theory, he claims that whatwe perceive are not visual objects (mental entities, RPP I 1035), or atleast that there is no need to postulate such entities. Wittgenstein goesinstantly against empiricist thesis of the myth of the given accordingto which there are pure stimuli (pure perception) which will be interpret-ed later on, RPP I 101 2, Z 223 5.

(20.3) If there is no change, neither in the drawing (pure stimulus+ interpretation) ! (against behaviourism), nor in the organisation(visual objects) ! (against Gestalt psychology), but there is a change

like the one in seeing and in thinking ! (Wittgensteins solution),then the question still remains is this thinking (interpreting) or seeing?The notion of seeing seems to be natural; no matter if the actual use ofthe word is metaphorical. However, the idea of thinking seems to bequite strange regarding this particular case.

(20.4) The argument for (20.3) seeing is by no means perception.On the other hand seeingas is a little bit like a thinking or willingness;and this is so, because seeing for example a double cross or a Neckerscube, does not involve only the seeing of the phenomenon, namely going

along the borders of the white or black cross in order for one to see thecross, but also some concepts are needed, such as the white backgroundor the picture in front (see the Figure 3 at the beginning of the chapter).

(20.5) In other words, if one needs concepts to see the aspects, thenthe process is not purely perceptual but also conceptual as well and if oneneeds to use certain concepts appropriately in order to see the aspect,then it can be called interpretation. Finally if one needs aspect talentand training in order to see all of aspects, then it includes a considerable

level of visual literacy, creativity and imagination.Now, these seem to be reasons for his standpoint. Here we can repeat itmore clearly. Wittgensteins final position seems to be the following.

Kristijan Krkac142


23/30

(21) Seeingas can be located between seeing (pure perception) andthinking (pure interpretation), but it is in some cases (like in thecase of the dubbit) closer to the interpretation. This explication is

quite close to Bakers interpretation, which says that it is half per-ceptionhalf imagination, Baker 2004, 282. It can be formulatedas monoaspectual seeing and as multiaspectual seeing.

(21.1) Wittgensteins reason for (21) can be explicated as well. Thereis no sharp borderline between perception and interpretation. This is sobecause of two further reasons.

(21.1.1.) Seeingas is similar to an interpretation (imagination,thinking, willingness) because optical and visual pictures stay the same,

because seeing an aspect is a matter of will (it is possible to strive tosee an aspect and to succeed) and finally because by noticing aspectsone does not notice simply the organisation of the drawing, but also in-ternal relations, perhaps even some hints of its pattern (its grammar, thisis similar to Goods position mentioned at the beginning).

(21.1.2.) On the other hand, seeingas is also similar to seeing, be-cause it is not possible to be mistaken regarding noticing an aspect. To seean aspect is a state, and there is no simpler expression of experience ofseeingas then expressions such as I see this as a rabbit now in a

case when one sees a drawing of the dubbit. Namely, seeing an odddrawing is not simply an expression of an experience of seeing thisodd drawing as a rabbit. However, aspects are not given, one needs train-ing in order to notice them, especially more complicated ones like thedubbit.Here the main thesis which says that the dubbit is a good example ofmorphological inquiry and philosophical grammar can be explicated.Namely, if one is trained to see aspects, then what we have are experiential

propositions, hinge proposition, and grammatical propositions such asthe following:

GRAMMATICAL PROPOSITIONS

(22) A grammar of sight is possible. (Good 2006)(23) Seeing is a state, while seeingas (interpreting) is an action. (RPP

I 1, LW I 89)(24) Seeingas is half perception and half interpretation. (Baker 2004)(25) Everything observed is at least one-aspectual.



24/30

(26) The aspect-seeing (and aspect-change) is subject to the will : this byitself relates it to the thinking (RPP II 5445, PI p. 212), perhapseven a perceiving-thinking-willing-imagining issue.

HINGE PROPOSITIONS

(27) The dubbit has many aspects.(28) Aspects can change from one into another.(29) The dubbit has many aspects, namely, the following (a) A pile of

lines (or lines organised in certain manner), (b) a duck, (c) a rab-bit, (d) a one-eyed monster with both ears on the left side of its

head. (an extension of proposition 23)

EXPERIENTIAL PROPOSITIONS

(30) is the dubbit. (an experience of identification)(31) I see the dubbit as a rabbit now. (an experience of aspect-dawn-

ing)(32) A rabbit changed into a duck. (an experience of aspect-change)

Now, the descriptions of aspects (ad) in (29) are not different regardingclarity. Namely, the description (a) is not more clear then, say the de-scription (d). However, (a) can be regarded as clearer then (d) for partic-ular purpose. All of them are on the same level, but surely (a) is a moreperceptual description while (d) is a description that is more imagina-tive (or creative). Descriptions (b) and (c) are in this context aspectualdescriptions. Finally, one could find herself in situations where she seesnothing, especially after imagining strange aspects like the oneeyed

monster, and afterwards starting from scratch (seeing only unorganisedlines on paper). Furthermore, a grammar of the dubbit would have tobe presented. Here, I am only suggesting one possible way of such a pre-sentation (as shown in table 2).

Therefore, the final table would have to include at least some prop-ositions regarding the grammar of sight (as shown in table 3).

Kristijan Krkac144


25/30

Table 2: The grammar of the dubbit

Table 3: All distinctions regarding the dubbit accompanied with a few propositions



26/30

5. Some objections instead of conclusion

Wittgenstein often hesitates while stating and accepting the abovemen-

tioned solution (2121.1.2.) Once again, one could ask what is think-ing in this case? Is thinking not something like reasoning, while in thiscase it seems to be more like intuitive knowledge? Wittgenstein explicitlyclaims that a report such as Now I see this as a duck is a spontaneousresponse to what is seen. He also implicitly claims that the organisationof a drawing of the dubbit, or organisation of our seeing, is not changed(against behaviourism and Gestalt psychology), rather our attitude ischanged (Glock 1997, 39), our way of reacting, and if one reacts correctlyand quickly it also means that one has some kind of ability for aspect-seeing, talent and training. Thinking, on the other hand, simply meansthat particular concepts are needed in order to see an aspect, in order todescribe what one sees (RPP I 1029, 36). However, the keynote that hemakes regarding seeingas is that it is integral to complete perception,not just concerning few exceptions to the standard perception like thedubbit, the double cross and similar. These are examples of a particulargrammar of sight which shows that our perception is mostly half in-terpreting half seeing. Of course, some visible things do not have

the second aspect (they are mono-aspectual), but at the end, it is theissue of our willingness, imagination, and training, since perhaps an or-dinary table with a vase and two tulips do not have the second aspect,but a bicycle can be seenas a bulls head and the rest of it. Claimingthat all of visual perception is in fact aspect seeing leads to the some-

what strange possibility, namely that many observed phenomena are asit were at least-one-aspect phenomena or perhaps not (LW I 172). Inaddition, it changes our understanding of perception in front of oureyes. Finally, a little bit of two aspectart instead of a substantial con-

clusion, or needed criticism (as shown in Figure 7).

Acknowledgements and a note

I would like to thank Boran Bercic, Josip Lukin, Davor Pecnjak, andNenad Smokrovic for their criticism and suggestions regarding some fun-damental points of my viewpoint. This paper is in fact a continuation of

my treatment of the dubbit topic, namely the title is Wittgensteins dub-bit III since I published Krkac K. 2005 Wittgensteinov patkozec,(Wittgensteins dubbit) in: Filozofska istrazivanja (98, 2/2005), 2005,

Kristijan Krkac146


27/30

647 663, and Krkac K. 2007 Wittgensteinov patkozec II, predavanje opatkozecu (Wittgensteins Dubbit II, Lecture on Dubbit, the secondpart), in: Godisnjak za filozofiju, 2007, 6795. However, this part issubstantively rewritten and shortened in terms that only in the first sec-tion there are some similarities with previous papers (I, and II), while sec-

tions two to five are completely new except for a few sentences of lessersignificance for newly developed thesis.

Figure 11: Marcel Duchamp, Fountain (1917)



28/30

Bibliography

Wittgensteins works

Wittgenstein, Ludwig: Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology I, Oxford1982. [= LW I]

: Philosophical Grammar, Oxford 1974. [= PG]: Philosophical Investigations, Oxford 1953, revised edn 2001. [= PI]: Philosophical Occasions 1912 1951, eds. James Klagge and Alfred Nord-

mann, Indianapolis 1993. [= PO]: Public and Private Occasions, eds. James Klagge and Alfred Nordmann, Lan-

ham 2003. [= PPO]: Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, I, II, 1980, Oxford. [= RPP I, II]

: Zettel, Oxford 1967, 2nd

edn. 1981. [=

Z]

Commentaries and analysis

Baker, Gordon: Wittgensteins Method, Neglected Aspects, Oxford 2004.Budd, Malcolm: Wittgenstein on seeing aspects, Mind, 96 (1987).Budd, Malcolm: Wittgensteins Philosophy of Psychology, London 1991.Denneson, Travis J.: Wittgenstein on Seeing http://www.infidels.org/library/

modern/travis_denneson/seeing.html (2002).Fogelin, Robert J.: Wittgenstein, London 1987.

Genova, Judith: Wittgenstein: A Way of Seeing, London 1995.Glock, Hans-Johann: A Wittgenstein Dictionary, Oxford 1997.Good, Justin: Wittgenstein and the Theory of Perception, Continuum Studies in

British Philosophy 2006.Hacker, Peter M. S.: Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind, vol. 3 of Analytical

Commentary on PI, Oxford 1990.Hacker, Peter M. S.: The relevance of Wittgensteins philosophy of psychology to

the psychological sciences, forthcoming in Proceedings of the Leipzig Confer-ence on Wittgenstein and Science 2007, http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk /scr/hacker/RecentPapers.html (2007).

Hanfling, Oswald: Wittgenstein and the problem of consciousness, in: Wittgen-stein and the Human Form of Life, London 2002, 104128.McGinn, Marie: Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations, London

1997.Schulte, Joachim: Experience and Expression: Wittgensteins Philosophy of Psy-

chology, London 1993.Voltolini Alberto: Two Types of (Witgensteinian) Seeing-As, in: Roberto Casati,

Graham White (eds.): Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Papers of the 16th

International Wittgenstein Symposium, ALWS, Kirchberg am Wechsel 1993.

Kristijan Krkac148


29/30

Other used sources

Quine, Willard V. O.: From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, Massachusetts1980.

BaronCohen, Simon: Mindblindness, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1995.Brugger, P. & Brugger, S.: The Easter Bunny in October: Is it disguised as a

duck?, in: Perceptual & Motor Skills, 76, 577578 (1993).Crane Tim: The Problem of Perception, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

http://plato.stanford.edu /entries/perception-problem/ (2005).Dondis, Donis A.: A Primer of Visual Literacy, MIT Press 1990.Gregory, Richard L.: Eye and Brain: The Psychology of Seeing, Oxford 1990.Gregory, Richard L.: An Introduction to Seeing, http://www.grand-illusion-

s.com/gregory1.htm (2005).James, William: The Varieties of Religious Experience, London 1985.

Jastrow, Joseph: Fact and fable in psychology, New York 1900.Russell, Bertrand: An Outline of Philosophy, London 1995.Siegel, Susanna: The Contents of Perception, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philos-

ophy, http://plato.stanford.edu /entries/perception-contents (2005).



30/30

Documents

07-Krkac,+Kristijan+-+Wittgenstein’s+Dubbit+III