(,1 2 1/,1( - unizg.hr · these quick-tempered discussions, the renowned German law professor Roland Hefendehl, for example, spoke of the 'Bruxelles' octopus', which would now begin

Citation: 16 Eur. J. Crime Crim. L. & Crim. Just. 89 2008

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M AR T IN US 0 fflMIJHOFF European Journal of Crime,

P U B L I S H E R S Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 16 (2008) 89-124 ,brill.WBeC

The European Fight against Fraud - The Community'sCompetence to Enact Criminal Laws and Its Power to

Approximate National Criminal Law by Directives

Thomas Seibert*

Graduate Lawyer

Nel tempo dell'inganno universale, dire la verit6 un atto rivoluzionario.

Carlo Alberto dalla Chiesa

i. Introduction

The European Commission's 2005 annual report concerning the Protection of

the Communities' financial interests estimates that the total financial impact of

irregularities reported in 2005 reached c 1.042 billion.' The overall damage is be-lieved to amount to at least io-2o % of the Community's budget.2 According to

* Dr. iur., LL. M. This article is based on the author's final thesis for the 2oo6/z007 LL. M. in

International Organizations, International Criminal Law and Crime Prevention, jointly organized

by the University ofTurin and the United Nations Interregional Crime & Justice Research Institute

(UNICRI) in Turin, Italy. The author thanks Prof. Dr. Jeffrey Pommerville for his kind support.

') Com (2oo6), 378final, p. 12f.

z) G. Dannecker, 'Strafrecht in der Europaischen Gemeinschaft', Juristenzeitung (1996), p. 875; I.

Fromm, 'Die Frage der Einfiihrung einer partiellen strafrechtlichen Anweisungskompetenz des Rates

der EG zum Schutz der Finanzinteressen der Europaischen Gemeinschaft unter besonderer Beriick-

sichtigung der Unberiihrtheitsklausel in Art. 28o Abs. 4 S. 2 EG Vertrag', Zeitschriftfiirlnternationale

Strafrechtsdogmatik (2007), p. z7; 0. Hedtmann, 'Unregelmaigkeiten und Betrug im europiischen

Agrarsektor', Europarecht (2002), p. 122; D. Spinellis, 'European legal interests and their protection by

the European criminal law', in: B. Schiinemann, A Programme for European Criminal Justice (K6ln,

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2008 DOI: 10. 1 163/092895608X272598

HeinOnline -- 16 Eur. J. Crime Crim. L. & Crim. Just. 89 2008

Seibert / European Journal of Crime,90 Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 16 (2008) 89-124

news reports, around 40 % of all requests for agricultural subsidies are imperfect;and in countries such as Cyprus (88.9 %) and Portugal (77.3 %) this number iseven exceeded.3 These vast figures illustrate the Communities' vital interest to fightfrauds4 affecting their budget.S Judicially, this can be achieved in different ways.

Since Member States have transferred sovereign rights to the Communities,making them a supranational organization, the Communities might be entitledto originally enact criminal laws on the European plane. As regards to the financialinterests, this may possibly be based on Article 280 (4) of the Treaty Establishingthe European Community.

Understanding criminal law as a 'core of state sovereignty',6 Member States,though, might have avoided conferring such rights in the field of criminal law uponthe Communities. Then, the Communities, however, may have the power to issuedirectives addressed to Member States, obliging them to criminalize frauds againstthe Communities' in their own national legislation. The Commission resorted tothis option in 20oi and 2002. It submitted a proposal for a directive concerningthe protection of the Community's financial interests to the European Parliament

Berlin, Miinchen 20o6), p. 480; J.A.E. Vervaele, Fraud against the Community (Deventer, Boston 1992)

p. VII; for an overview over the characteristic criminal conducts, B. Hecker, Europliisches Strafrecht(Berlin, Heidelberg, New York 2007) § 14 Rn. loff.; see also S. White, Protection of the FinancialInterests of the European Communities: The Fight against Fraud and Corruption (The Hague, London,Boston 1998).

3) <http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/o,1518,472872,oo.html>.

4) The term 'fraud' is not to be understood in a strict sense. It rather encompasses 'all conducts

[...], which adversely affect the Community's financial interests', H.-M. Wolffgang and S. Ullrich,'Schutz der finanziellen Interessen der Europaischen Gemeinschaften', Europarecht (1998), p. 627(quotation in German).

5) I. Fromm, loc. cit., p. 27; S. van den Wyngaert, 'The Protection of the Financial Interests of the EUin the Candidate States. Perspectives on the Future of Judicial Integration in Europe' - Final Report

-, in: P. Cullen, Enlarging the Fight against Fraud in the European Union: Penal andAdministrativeSanctions, Settlement, Whistleblowing and CorpusJuris in the Candidate Countries (Ko1n 2003), p. 304.Frauds might also negatively influence the competition, endangering the functioning of the internalmarket, cause ideational damages to the Community, B. Hecker, op. cit., § 14 Rn. 3; A. Miceli, 'Fondistrutturali e attiviti. La cooperazione tra 'UCLAF e le forze di polizia', in: G. Grasso, La lotta controlafrode agli interessifinanziari della comunith europea tra prevenzione e repressione (Milano 2000), p.31, and lead to an 'underground economy', U. Sieber, 'Bekiimpfung des EG-Betrugs und Perspektivender europaischen Amts- und Rechtshilfe', Zeitschrififiir Rechtspolitik (2ooo), p. 187.6) K. Ambos, Internationales Strafrecht (Miinchen 2oo6), § ii Rn. i Fn. i; E. Herlin-Karnell, 'Com-

mission v. Council: some Reflections on Criminal Law in the First Pillar', 13/1 European Public Law(2007), p. 83; M. Kaiafa-Gbandi, 'The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe and Challengesfor Criminal Law at the Commencement of 2ist Century', 13/4 European Journal of Crime, CriminalLaw and Criminal Justice (2oo5), p. 487.


Seibert / European Journal of Crime,Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 16 (2008) 89-124 91

and the Council.7 The view that the Community is entitled to do so has been - atleast with respect to environmental criminal law - recently upheld by the EuropeanCourt ofJustice. This judgement has sparked highly controversial debates. Duringthese quick-tempered discussions, the renowned German law professor RolandHefendehl, for example, spoke of the 'Bruxelles' octopus', which would now beginto 'ultimately incorporate criminal law'.9

Another completely different possibility for Member States to fight frauds is tonegotiate international treaties. Member States did, for example, take this optionin 1995 when they concluded the so-called Fraud Convention/PIF Conventionand added several Protocols to it.' ° In this case Member States do not act withinthe Communities but rather their actions are 'merely' part of the Police and Ju-dicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM) within the European Union.Therefore, these treaties only enter into force upon ratification by the contractingparties. In this context, the Community does not enjoy any means to enforcetheir implementation;" the European Court ofJustice has no competences either."Moreover, Member States may, during the implementation process, 'express reser-vations and exempt themselves from different regulations causing lacunas again inthe intended uniform protection. '13 Hence, conventions are somehow less effectiveand more time-consuming. This has already been seen by the fact that the 1995Convention was not ratified until 2002.24

7) Com (2ooi), 272final, 28.8.2001; Com (zooz), 557final 16.10.2002; thereto K. Ambos, op. cit.,§ ii Rn. 6; E. Bacigalupo, 'La tutela degli interessi finanziari della comunit : progressi e lacune', in:G. Grasso, op. cit., pp. zoff.8) ECJ, Judgement 13.9.2005 - C-176/03 (Commission/Council).

9) R. Hefendehl, 'Europiiischer Umweltschutz: Demokratiespitze ftir Europa oder Briisseler Putsch?',Zeitschriftiir Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik (2oo6) p. 167 (quotation in German).'o) E. Bacigalupo, 'The Criminal Law Strategies of the EU', in: B. Schiunemann, op. cit., pp. 3 37 f.;

M. Kaiafa-Gbandi, 'The Development towards Harmonization within Criminal Law in the EuropeanUnion - A Citizen's Perspective', 9/4 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and CriminalJustice(zooI), p. 245.

") P. Schwarzburg and K. Hamdorf, 'Brauchen wir ei EU-Finanz-Strafgesetzbuch?', NeueZeitschrififlir Strafrecht (2002), p. 618.12) A. Klip, 'European Integration and Harmonisation and Criminal Law', in: D. Curtin et al.,

European Integration and Law (Antwerpen, Oxford 20o6), p. 116.

'3) M. Kaiafa-Gbandi, loc. cit. (Fn. io), p. 246.

4) P. Schwarzburg and K. Hamdorf, loc. cit., p. 618.



Besides these actions, the Communities are also interested in creating institu-tional bodies.' 5 In 1988, the Commission established UCLAF as a task force 6 tocoordinate the fight against fraud.'7 After the Commission resigned in March 1999in the wake of corruption allegations, 8 it founded OLAF as UCLAF's successor.' 9

OLAF was established as an independent body, enjoying full independence as regardsits investigations. These investigations also encompass crimes committed withinthe Communities' own institutional bodies.2 0 The work of OLAF poses, however,several legal problems. For example, the European Central Bank 2 the EuropeanInvestment Bank2 2 and some European Parliament's representatives 23 called uponthe European Courts to limit OLAF's competences for internal investigations asfar as they themselves are concerned.

Already this brief overview exemplifies the different elements of the Europeanstrategy to counter frauds.2 4 This judicially interesting concept deems it - togetherwith the immense practical significance of the subject and the existing controversies- appropriate to examine the matter. This paper will carefully portray, criticallyanalyze and evaluate some of the aforementioned techniques.

Firstly, this requires a short overview of European Union's legal system, includ-ing the Communities, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and thealready mentioned PJCCM (2.). After pointing out the legal differences between

I5) E. von Bubnoff 'Institutionelle Kriminalitatsbekampfung in der EU', ZeitschriftirEurparecht-liche Studien (2002), pp. I88ff.,6) B. Hecker, op. cit., § 4 Rn. 28.

'7) B. Hecker, op. cit., § 4 Rn. 29; H. Satzger, Internationales undEuropiiisches Strafrecht (Baden-Baden2005), § 9 Rn. 27; as regards UCLAF, see E Coiling, 'La lutte contre la fraude et la corruption .l'interieur des institutions de lUnion europdene', in: B. Huber, Combating Corruption in the EuropeanUnion (K61n 2002), pp. I37ff.1s) K. Ambos, op. cit., § 13 Rn. i; H. Satzger, op. cit., § 9 Rn. 27.

'9) K. Ambos, op. cit., § 13 Rn. 2.2o) K. Ambos, op. cit., § 13 Rn. 2; B. Laffan, 'Financial Control: The Court of Auditors and OLAF',

in: J. Petersen et al., The Institutions of the European Union (Oxford, New York 2002), pp. 24 0ff.

I) ECJ, Judgement 10.7.2003 - C-11/OO (Commission/ECB).

2) ECJ, Judgement 10.7.2003 - C-15/OO (Commission/EIB).23) Court of First Instance, Judgement 26.2.2002 -T 17/00 (Rothley and Others/Parliament).

'4) A further element is the Commission's 20oi Greenpaper on criminal-law protection of thefinancial interests of the Community and the establishment of a European Prosecutor, Com(2ooi),715, December 2001, thereto A.R. Castaldo, 'Der strafrechtliche Schutz der Finanzinteressen der Eu-ropaischen Gemeinschaft dutch Schaffung einer europiiischen Staatsanwaltschaft und die italienischeRechtsordnung', Strafverteidiger (2003), pp. 122ff. See also the project elaborated by a group of lawprofessors, B. Schiinemann, 'Grundziige eines Alternativ-Entwurfs zur europiiischen Strafverfolgung',116 Zeitschrifiir die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (2004), pp. 3 7 6ff.



these fields, the paper will examine whether the Communities have the power toprotect their financial interests by enacting criminal laws on the European level(3.) or if- and, if yes, under which conditions - they may only issue directives toMember States (4.). Although an assessment of OLAF's work would be as inter-esting as an illustration of the so-called 'Corpus Juris Project', 5 these aspects arebeyond this paper's scope. 6

2. The European Union's Legal System

This chapter will briefly illustrate the fundamental basics of the European Union'slegal system and its historical development 27 as far as relevant for the subject at hand.

The notion of a 'Common Europe' can be traced back several centuries. In 1454,Enea Silvio Piccolomini, soon to be Pope Pius II, in his speech 'ConstantinopolitanaClades' stated 'nunc vero in Europa, id est in patria, in domo propria'.28 Neverthe-less, it was only in the zoth century that this idea assumed a definite legal form. 29

After the Second World War, the conviction prevailed that Europe should notsee any more bellicose conflicts, but rather reclaim its nations' similarities. TheProcess of European Unification embarked upon the economic field. 3° In 1951,the Treaty on the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was concludedand a homonymous supranational organization established, upon which MemberStates conferred some of their sovereign rights. 3' In 1957, this development was

25) The 'Corpus Juris' is a result of the collaboration of, inter alia, the Commission, the European

Parliament and several European scholars, see H. Otto, 'Das Corpus Juris der strafrechtlichenRegelungen zum Schutz der finanziellen Interessen der Europiischen Union', JuristischeAusbildung(2000), p. 99.

2'6) As regards the 'Corpus Juris', see E. Bacigalupo, loc. cit., in: B. Schiinemann, op. cit., pp. 335 f.;

P.J. Cullen, 'Introduction', in: P. Cullen, op. cit., pp. 5f.; M. Delmas-Marty and J.A.E. Vervaele, TheImplementation of the Corpus Juris in the Member States, Volume i (Antwerpen, Groningen, Oxford2ooo). With respect to OLAF, see 0. Odudu, 'Case Law: Case C-ii/oo, Commission of the EuropeanCommunities v. European Central Bank, Judgement of 1o July 2003, 41 Common Market Law Review(2004), pp. Io73ff.

27) As regards the historical development of European Criminal Law in particular, see W. Perron,

'Perspektiven der Europaischen Strafrechtsintegration', in: M. Hettinger et al., Festschrififiir WilfriedKuper zum 70. Geburtstag (Heidelberg 2007), pp. 4 3off.28) This speech was given one year after the Fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman Empire.

29) K. Ambos, op. cit., § 9 Rn. I; M. Herdegen, Europarecht (Minchen 20o6), § 4 Rn. i.

30) E. Hughes, 'European Integration: The Interaction between European and National Law',

Criminal Law Forum (2oo6), p. 361.

3') K. Hailbronner and G. Jochum, EuroparechtI (Stuttgart 2005), § I Rn. u; M. Herdegen, op. cit.,§ 4 Rn. i.



furthered by concluding the 'Treaties of Rome' on the formation of the EuropeanEconomic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community(EAEC). Along with the ECSC, these supranational organizations formed theEuropean Communities. 32

Up to the 199os, several other significant steps were taken, not least of whichwas a large increase in the number of Member States.33 The most trend-settingevolution occurred in 1992 when the then concluded Maastricht-Treaty led Europeinto a 'new dimension'.34 The contracting parties established the European Union(EU). The EU is founded on the three abovementioned European Communities;however, the EEC was renamed the European Community (EC).35 The EU issupplemented by the CFSP and the PJCCM.36 Hence, the EU is based on threepillars. 37

The Communities build the first pillar.38 They constitute, in the words of theEuropean Court ofJustice in I962, 'a new legal order of international law',39 beinga 'self-contained legal system'.40 They have the competence to originally createrights and duties for individuals. The law becomes 'communitised'. This 'acquiscommunautaire' 4' contains the Treaties on the ECSC, EC and EAEC (so-calledprimary Community Law) and those acts which the Communities' bodies have

32) M. Herdegen, op. cit., § 4 Rn. 5.

33) K. Ambos, op. cit., § 9 Rn. 3ff.; M. Herdegen, op. cit., § 4 Rn. 5ff.

4) M. Herdegen, op. cit., § 4 Rn. Io; E. Hughes, loc. cit., p. 361.

35) K. Ambos, op. cit., § 9 Rn. 5; M. Herdegen, op. cit., § 4 Rn. 15.

30 G. Conway, 'Breaches of EC Law and the International Responsibility of Member States', Eu-ropean Journal of International Law (zooz), p. 68o Fn. 3.

37) G. Conway, loc. cit., p. 68o Fn. 3 et passim; E Fink-Hooijer, 'The Common Foreign and Secu-rity Policy of the European Union', European Journal of International Law (1994), p. 174. This pillarstructure was intended to be abolished by a prospective Constitutional Treaty, M. Kaiafa-Gbandi, loc.cit. (Fn. 6), p. 490. However, after referenda failed in France and The Netherlands, the ratificationprocess was stopped. On 21 and 22 June 2007, the Brussels European Council decided to 'convenean Intergovernmental Conference' 'to draw up' a so-called 'Reform Treaty' amending the existingTreaties, see Brussels European Council 21/22 June 2007 Presidency Conclusions, para. IO. 'Theconstitutional concept, which consisted in repealing all existing Treaties and replacing them by asingle text called 'Constitition', is abandoned', see Draft IGC Mandate, para. i.

31) M. Herdegen, op. cit., § i Rn. iff.

39) ECJ, Judgement 5.2.1963 - C-26/62 (Van Gend en Loos/Administartie der Belastingen), sum-mary 3.40) ECJ, Judgement 15.7.1964 - 6/64 (Costa/Enel), summary 3; M. Herdegen, op. cit., § i Rn. iff.,

§ 5 Rn. f.

4) M. Herdegen, op. cit., § 7 Rn. 7, § 9 Rn. 3; R. Streinz, Europarecht (Heidelberg 200 5), § 3 Rn. 97.



enacted on the basis of the Treaties (so-called secondary Community Law).42

In contrast, the CFSP and the PJCCM form the EU's second (CFSP) andthird (PJCCM) pillar. They only concern intergovernmental cooperation. 43 Thiscooperation follows the general rules of International Law. If Member States actwithin the scope of these pillars, their acts do not directly have legal effect withrespect to individuals. 44

Although the Maastricht Treaty has been changed by the i99 7 Amsterdam Treatyand the 2ooo Nice Treaty, 45 the EU's structure with its three pillars still remainsas it has been portrayed.

These remarks have shown that the legal realization of the Process of EuropeanUnification commenced after World War II. It was aimed at avoiding any moreconflicts. This was to be achieved by legally tying them closely together, startingwith their economies. Focussing on economics and financial interests has, there-fore, always been understood as a means and further step to the higher, remotergoal of political integration.46

The historical notion of this 'spill-over-effect'4 7 has to be kept in mind whenreading the next chapters dealing with the potential powers of the Communitiesto protect their budget by criminalizing certain conducts. Considering the evolu-tion of the past decades, the founding fathers of the relevant treaties might havemeant this field to also lead the way with respect to the development of a commonEuropean Criminal Law.

3. The European Communities' Power to Enact Criminal Law Norms

The Communities are empowered to acts of legislation ('jurisdiction to prescribe')4s

if, and to the extent to which, they act within the authority delegated to them. 49

This principle of limited authorization/principle of attributed powers ('compitenced'attributation') is - with respect to the relevant European Community - laiddown in Articles 5 (I), 7 (i) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community

42) K. Ambos, op. ci., § 9 Rn. 5; M. Herdegen, op. cit., § i Rn. Iff., 5, § 5 Rn. iff.

43) K. Ambos, op. cit., § 9 Rn. 5; G. Conway, loc. cit., p. 68o Fn. 3; F. Fink-Hooijer, loc. cit., p. 174.

44) M. Herdegen, op. cit., § i Rn. ff., § 5 Rn. f.

45) M. Herdegen, op. cit., § 4 Rn. 2off.

4) M. Herdegen, op. cit., § 4 Rn. 1, 5; M. Zuleeg, 'Der Beitrag des Strafrechts zur europaischenIntegration', Juristenzeitung (1992), p. 769.

47) K. Ambos, op. cit., § 9 Rn. 3; M. Herdegen, op. cit., § i Rn. 14.48) K. Ambos, op. cit., § iI Rn. i Fn. I;J. Deutscher, DieKompetenzen derEuropischen Gemeinschaften

zur originaren Strafgesetzgebung (Frankfurt am Main 2ooo), p. 33-

49) M. Kaiafa-Gbandi, loc. cit. (Fn. 1o), p. 247.



(hereinafter: 'EC Treaty'). 5° More precisely, it signifies that every act of legislationrequires a power of authority either explicitly provided for in or derived from theinterpretation of the EC Treaty.5' Consequently, the Community may enact criminallaws if such a competence has been delegated to it explicitly in or by interpretationof the EC Treaty.52

The EC Treaty does not formally provide for the authority to generally enactcriminal laws. 53 It is, however, conceivable that when Member States conferred thepower to regulate certain subject-matters to the Community, they concomitantlydelegated the competence to regulate these domains also penologically.54 Legally,this could be justified by the doctrine of implied powers, maybe combined with theeffet-utile-principle.

Understanding criminal law as a 'core of state sovereignty', 55 such an approachmight, however, not be applicable with respect to this sensitive field of law. Rather,the competence could require an explicit provision in the EC Treaty, albeit not ageneral one, but at least one for the specific subject-matter in question. As regardsthe Community's financial interests, such a provision could be Article 280 (4)EC Treaty (3.2.). This, however, becomes only decisive if the Community doesnot already enjoy the authority in question without an explicit Treaty provision.Consequently, this issue has to be addressed first (3.1.).

3.1 Implied Powers and Effet-Utile-Principle

Some academics submit the Community's power to regulate certain subject-mattersalso includes the capacity to create criminal laws in respect thereof. It would not bemandatory that the EC Treaty explicitly contains a competence norm delegatingsuch an authority to the Community.56 It is further submitted that the competencein question does not in any event concern the core of criminal law. It would only

50) K. Ambos, op. cit., § ii Rn. i; B. Hecker, op. cit., § 4 Rn. 5 4 ff.; E. Herlin-Karnell, loc. cit., p. 79.

5') See K. Ambos, op. cit., § ii Rn. 4; R. Hefendehl, loc. cit., p. 163; H. Satzger, op. cit., § 7 Rn. 23.52) H. Satzger, Die Europiisierungdes Strafiechts (K61n, Berlin, Bonn, Miinchen 2001), p. 92.

53) P. Schwarzburg and K. Hamdorf, loc. cit., p. 618; E Zieschang, 'Chancen und Risiken der Eu-ropiisierung des Strafrechts', 113 Zeitschrififipr die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaf (2001), pp. 2 56f.

54) Compare K. Ambos, op. cit., § i Rn. 4.

55) K. Ambos, op. cit., § ii Rn. i Fn. i; E. Herlin-Karnell, loc. cit., p. 83; M. Kaiafa-Gbandi, loc. cit.(Fn. 6), p. 487.56) 1. Appel, 'Kompetenzen der Europaischen Gemeinschaft zur Oberwachung und sanktion-

srechtlichen Ausgestaltung des Lebensmittelrechts', in: G. Dannecker, Lebensmittelstrafrecht undVerwaltungssanktionen in derEuropischen Union (K61n 1994), pp. 17 6ff.; thereto K. Ambos, op. cit.,§ ii Rn. 4; C. Schr6der, Europizische Richtlinien unddeutsches Straftecht (Berlin, New York 2ooz), p.185.


Seibert/ European Journal of Crime,Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 16 (2008) 89-124 97

affect criminal law related to business and the law of supplementary penalties,consequently just certain special areas. 57 Dogmatically, this approach rests uponthe doctrine of implied powers and the effet-utile-principle.58

In principle, the doctrine of implied powers is acknowledged under CommunityLaw.59 Up to certain, strictly confined limitations, the Community may enjoy thepower to administer competences not having been explicitly assigned to it. Thispresupposes that the explicit delegation of related authorities logically requiresthe exercise of those competences so that they have to be considered implicitlyconferred upon the Community.6° To justify the Community's competence forenacting criminal laws, the application of this approach gets supplemented by theeffet-utile-principle,6' according to which Community Law has to be enforced inthe most effective way possible. 62 Both these basic principles allegedly establishthe Community's competence in question.

This is unimpressive. The aforementioned considerations do not change the factthat criminal law affects the 'core of State sovereignty', being a 'specific concept'thereof,63 and 'symbolises a national identity and culture'.6 4 Moreover, criminallaw and its application are the sharpest means of intervening into individuals' livesand actions.65 A delegation of authority in this sensitive field requires - maybeunlike other branches - an explicit Treaty provision.66 More important is, since thedetails of the doctrine of implied powers are generally, especially as regards theirlimitations, highly controversial, 67 the application of such a doctrine becomeseven more problematic.

57) M. B6se, Strafen und Sanktionen im Europiischen Gemeinschaftsrecht (K61n, Berlin, Bonn,Minchen 1996), p. 82; see K. Ambos, op. cit., § ii Rn. 4.58) See K. Ambos, op. cit., § ii Rn. 4.

59) ECJ, Judgement 27.9.88 - C-16 5/87 (Commission/Council), para. 8; J. Deutscher, op. cit., pp.2o6f.; M. Herdegen, op. cit., § 9 Rn. 57.60) j. Deutscher, op. cit., pp. 2o6f; M. Herdegen, op. cit., § 9 Rn. 57.

61) See K. Ambos, op. cit., § ii Rn. 4.

6') ECJ, Judgement 17.i.1980 - C-7 9 2/92 R (Camera Care/Commission), para. 18; M. Herdegen,

op. cit., § 9 Rn. 46.63) K. Ambos, op. cit., § it Rn. 4; G.J.M. Corstens, 'Criminal Law in the First Pillar?', iI/i European

Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice (2003), p. 131.64) W. Perron, loc. cit., in M. Hettinger et al., op. cit., p. 435.

65) R. Hefendehl, loc. cit., p. 16I.

66) K. Ambos, op. cit., § ii Rn. 4 f.; G. Dannecker, 'Die Bedeutung des Schutzes der finanziellen

Interessen der Europaischen Union ffir die Harmonisierung des Strafrechts in der EuropaischenUnion', I2I Schweizerische Zeitschriffir Strafrecht (2003), p. 280.67) M. Herdegen, op. cit., § 9 Rn. 58.



Furthermore, the assertion that only special areas of criminal law would beaffected is not convincing either.68 In the first place, these claimed distinctionsare difficult to draw;69 it is, for example, already under German law controversialwhat exactly the elements and the content of criminal law related to business are.70

But even if one could find criteria to persuasively demarcate these fields, the actsof legislation would continue to be acts of criminal law legislation.71 Why acts oflegislation in certain criminal law fields should not require an explicit delegationof authority when the general competence to enact criminal laws does, cannot beexplained convincingly.

For all these reasons, the doctrine of implied powers and the effet-utile-principledo not lead to the Community's authority to enact criminal laws.72 Such a com-petence requires an explicit delegation provided for by the EC Treaty.

3.2 Article 280 (4) EC Treaty

As has already been pointed out, the EC Treaty does not explicitly contain a pro-vision, generally delegating authority to enact criminal laws to the Community.However, the requirements illustrated do not necessarily have to be met withrespect to a delegation of authority which affects criminal law as a whole. Rather,the required preconditions can also be fulfilled if the EC Treaty provides for anexplicit provision with respect to a specific area of criminal law. As regards the matterof examination at hand, such a norm could be Article 280 (4) EC Treaty.73

By virtue of this provision, the Community, acting through the Council, 'shalladopt the necessary measures in the fields of the prevention of and fight againstfrauds affecting [its] financial interests.' Consequently, the Community's com-petence in question first requires that the term 'measures' encompasses 'acts oflegislation' in criminal law.

Since 'measures' and 'acts of legislation' are not identical, the term 'measures' hasto be interpreted. Methodologically, there are different approaches. Mainly, one candistinguish a grammatical, systematic, historic, and teleological interpretation .74

Order and content of these approaches are, already under domestic legal systems,

18) K. Ambos, op. cit., § Ii Rn. 4.69) K. Ambos, op. cit., § II Rn. 4.

70) J. Wessels and T. Hillenkamp, Strafrecht Besonderer Tell/2 (Heidelberg zoo6), Rn. 8a.

M K. Ambos, op. cit., § 11 Rn. 4.72) Compare M. Kaiafa-Gbandi, loc. cit. (Fn. 1o), p. 248.

73) In detail K. Ambos, OP. cit., § iI Rn. 6ff.; B. Hecker, op. cit., § 4 Rn. 83 ff., 9 7 ff.; I. Fromm, oc.Cit., pp. 29 ff.

74) See K. Hailbronner and G. Jochum, op. cit., § 4 Rn. 3o8ff.



subject to controversies. 75 Considering that there are also self-contained rules ofinterpretation with respect to International Law,7 6 one has to, at first, decide whichrules to apply when interpreting Community Law - a field of law both distinctfrom domestic and International Law.

The interpretation of Community Law follows its own rules.77 First of all, onehas to focus on the wording. Alongside with this grammatical/textual approach, theterms have to be interpreted systematically and teleologically, the latter particularlymeaning 'in light of the Treaties'. In contrast, the historic interpretation plays onlyan ancillary role.78 In general, taking into account the jurisprudence of the EuropeanCourt ofJustice, the interpretation of Community Law is also determined by theaforementioned effet-utile-principle and, hence, at least according to the Court,considered a means to further European Integration. 79

In application of these rules, the wording of the term 'measures is open toencompass 'acts of legislation'. 8° A systematic interpretation leads to the same re-sult.8' According to Article 28o (2) EC Treaty, 'Member States shall take the samemeasures to counter fraud affecting the financial interests of the Community asthey take to counter fraud affecting their own financial interests.' In this context,the term 'measures' also means 'acts of legislation': Member States shall undertheir national domestic law criminalize frauds detrimental to the Community asthey criminalize frauds detrimental to themselves. 82 Hence, one has to concludethat the term 'measures' as used in Article 28o EC Treaty, consequently also inparagraph 4, is a 'superordinate concept', encompassing also 'acts of legislation'. 83

It can, therefore, be recorded that paragraph 4, sentence i could indeed providefor the competence in question.

75) As regards Germany, see K. Larenz and C.-W. Canaris, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft(Berlin, Heidelberg, New York, Barcelona, Budapest, Hongkong, London, Mailand, Paris, Santa

Clara, Singapur, Tokio 1995), pp. 163 ff.

76) D. French, 'Treaty Interpretation and the Incorporation of Extraneous Legal Rules', Internationaland Comparative Law Quarterly (2oo6), pp. zSiff.

77) M. Herdegen, op. cit., § 9 Rn. 74.78) K. Hailbronner and G. Jochum, op. cit., § 4 Rn. 3"1; M. Herdegen, op. cit., § 9 Rn. 74.

79) M. Herdegen, op. cit., § 9 Rn. 74; compare also the groundbreaking decision ECJ, Judgement5.2.1963 - C-z6/62 (Van Gend en Loos/Administartie der Belastingen), summary 3.8o) K. Ambos, op. cit., § ii Rn. 7; H. Satzger, op. cit. (Fn. 52), p. 139; E Zieschang, loc. cit., p. 260.

8') E Zieschang, loc. cit., p. 26o.82) ECJ, Judgement 21.9.89 - C-68/88 (Commission/Hellenic Republic), para. 24.

83) K. Ambos, op. cit., § iI Rn. 7; J. Deutscher, op. cit., p. 344; I. Fromm, DerstrafrechtlicheSchutz

der Finanzinteressen derEG (Heidelberg 2004), pp. i22ff., 39f.; E Zieschang, loc. cit., p. z6o.



However, sentence 2 has to be taken into consideration too. This provisionreads as follows: 'These measures shall not concern the application of nationalcriminal law or the national administration of justice.' The interpretation of this'ambiguous clause' is disputed.84

First of all, one could argue that if the measures provided for in Sentence ishall not concern national criminal law or the national administration of justice,the Community does not have the competence to acts of legislation in the field ofcriminal law, since such actions would clearly concern national criminal law andthe national administration of justice. 5

On the other hand, one can highlight that the phrase does only mention theapplication of national criminal law or the national administration of justice. Itdoes not explicitly exclude the possibility that the Community's measures maynot concern the creation of criminal law.86 This interpretation would not affect theaforementioned provisional result. The Community would have the competenceto enact criminal laws.

The persuasiveness of these concepts 87 has to be assessed on the basis of theaforementioned methodology. Starting from the wording, one has to concedethat the phrase indeed only mentions the term 'application'. Eventually, this alonedoes not give the Community the competence in question. One has also to takeinto consideration that these measures provided for in the first sentence 'shall notconcern' the mentioned areas. If one stresses this part, one can also understand it'shall in no way concern' national criminal law and the administration of justice.88

Hence, the wording does not seem to be clearly in favour of the competence inquestion, nor does it rule out this possibility either.

Applying the systematic and teleological interpretation, the result does not seemto be clear either at first sight. Particularly with respect to a teleological approachcombined with the aforementioned principles applied by the European Court ofJustice, one might jump to the conclusion that the Community indeed is entitled toenact criminal laws. It could potentially be argued that the effet-utile-principle and

14) In detail K. Ambos, OP. cit., § ii Rn. 8; I. Fromm, loc. cit., pp. z8ff.85) See K. Ambos, op. cit., § ii Rn. o.

86) R.-J. Colomer, Opinion of Advocate General, C-176/03 (Commission/Council), para. 78.

87) See also the interpretations of, on the one hand, H.-M. Wolffgang and S. Ulrich, loc. cit., p. 644;E Zieschang, loc. cit., p. 261, and, on the other hand, K. Tiedemann, 'Einleitung: Re-Europaisierungdes Strafrechts versus Nationalismus der (deutschen) Strafrechtslehre', 145 Goltdammer's ArchivfiirStrafrecht (1998), pp. 1o7f.; K. Tiedemann, 'EG und EU als Rechtsquellen des Strafrechts', in: B.Schiunemann et al., Festschriffiir Claus Roxin zum 7o. Geburtstagam 5.Mai 2oo (Berlin, New York2001), pp. 1409f. Thereto K. Ambos, op. cit., § ii Rn. 8ff.88) K. Ambos, op. cit., § ii Rn. so; I. Fromm, loc. Cit., p. 29.



the nature of interpretation as a means for further integration lead to this result.This could be underpinned by the notion that, as has been illustrated previously,the founding fathers of a Treaty have historically always considered the field ofeconomics and finances a means to further integration.

This reasoning is not persuasive. The less significance of a historic interpreta-tion has already been emphasized.8 9 Much more important are systematic andteleological considerations. Systematically,90 one must not only consider Article280 EC Treaty but the whole framework of European Law.9' In this respect, it isinteresting to note that criminal law was, in principle, classified as belonging tothe third pillar. It should deliberately not fall under the scope of the first pillar.This seems to argue against the Community competence in question. 92

This, however, is less evident than one might have thought at first sight.93 WithArticle 280 EC Treaty, Member States have deliberately included the fight againstfrauds within the EC Treaty, although criminal law matters usually fall within thethird pillar. Thus, it is not apriori impossible that they also delegated the authorityto enact criminal laws with respect to this specific area. Consequently, the systematicinterpretation does not lead to a definite result.

Hence, the decisive question 94 is if teleological deliberations can convincinglyexplain that Member States have delegated the competence in question to theCommunity.9 5 This has to be answered in the negative. The mere reasoning withthe effet-utile-principle is insufficient. As the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the GermanSupreme Constitutional Court, held in its fundamental Maastricht-Decision,96 theapplication of the effet-utile-principle in context of extensively interpreting the

'9) According to Fromm, the historic interpretation shows the severe resentments Member States

had towards any kind of European criminal law, I. Fromm, op. cit., pp. 27 3ff.; I. Fromm, loc. cit.,pp. 3 2f.

90) With respect to the systematic interpretation, see I. Fromm, op. cit., pp. t4Iff.; I. Fromm, loc.

cit., pp. 3 2f.

90) K. Hailbronner and G. Jochum, op. cit., § 4 Rn. 313.92) K. Ambos, op. cit., § it Rn. io; S. Braum, Europiiische Strafgesetzlichkeit (Frankfurt am Main

2003), pp. 4 19 ff.; B. Hecker, op. cit., § 4 Rn. 99; dismissive I. Fromm, op. cit., pp. 17tff., 184.

93) See, also with respect to the following, I. Fromm, op. cit., pp. I7 tff.

94) K. Ambos, op. cit., § iI Rn. so.

95) With respect to the teleological interpretation, see I. Fromm, loc. cit., pp. 33 ff.; as regards the impact

of the Maastricht-Decision, compare T. Weigend, 'Spricht Europa mit zwei Zungen?', Strafverteidiger(2ooi), p. 67.

96) BVerfGE 89, I55 ff.; thereto K.J. Alter, Establishing the Supremacy ofEuropean Law (Oxford, NewYork 2001), pp. 29 f., IO5ff.



Community's competences is limited by the principle of conferred powers. 97 Itis irreconcilable with this concept and the legal structure of the Community as asupranational organization that one easily assumes competences by applying theeffet-utile-principle when such competences have not clearly been delegated.98

This trendsetting jurisprudence is even clearer when it comes to criminal law.99'Affecting the very core of State sovereignty', competences in this field can onlybe delegated in a 'non-ambiguous' and 'explicit' way.' An ambiguous provisionlike Article 280 (4) EC Treaty does not meet these requirements.'' Teleolocially,the second sentence has thus to be interpreted as ruling out the Community'scompetence in question.'0 2

For all these reasons, Article 28o (4) EC Treaty does not empower the Com-munity to acts of legislation in criminal law.1°3

3.3 Conclusion

The Community is not entitled to enact criminal laws on the European plane. 0 4

97) BVerfGE 89, 155 [210].

98) BVerfGE 89, i55 [i88, 210].

99) See for this line of reasoning also G. Dannecker, 'Das materielle Strafrecht im Spannungsfelddes Rechts der Europiischen Union (Teil i), Juristische Ausbildung (2oo6), p. 96.

100) K. Ambos, op. cit., § ii Rn. io; G. Dannecker, 'Der zeitliche Geltungsbereich von Strafgesetzenund der Vorrang des Gemeinschaftsrechts', Zeitschriftfir Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik (2oo6),p. 313; H. Satzger, op. cit. (Fn. 52), p. 141; dismissive I. Fromm, loc. cit., p. 28.o') Concerning the ambiguity, see also I. Fromm, loc. cit., pp. 29 f.

'o) K. Ambos, op. cit., § iI Rn. IO.

'03) K. Ambos, op. cit., § ii Rn. io; J. Deutscher, op. cit., pp. 3 4 4 f.; B. Hecker, op. cit., § 4 Rn. 9 9 ff.;

B. Hecker, 'Europiisches Strafrecht als Antwort auf transnationale Kriminalitit', JuristischeArbeits-bliitter (2002), p. 727; M. Kaiafa-Gbandi, loc. cit. (Fn. io), pp. 257 f.; dismissive 0. Hedtmann, oc.cit., pp. I33 f.; F. Zieschang, loc. cit., pp. 259 ff.o4) ECJ, Judgement 13.9.2005 - C-17 6/03 (Commission/Council), para. 47; ECJ, Judgement i9.i.i999

- C 348/96 (Calfa), para. i7; ECJ, Judgement 16.6.1998 - C-226/97 (Lemmens), para. i9; BGHSt41, 127 [131f.]; BGHSt 25, 19off.; K. Ambos, op. cit., § i Rn. iff.; B. Hecker, op. cit., § 4 Rn. 9 9 ff.;R. Hefendehl, 'European Criminal Law: how far and no further?', in: B. Schiinemann, op. cit., p.450.



4- The Communities' Power to Approximate National Criminal Law byDirectives

Even though the Community does not currently ° 5 enjoy the authority to enactcriminal laws, Community Law already at present plays a significant role forMember States' domestic criminal laws. ° 6 With respect to the subject at handand the available limited scale of the examination, the following illustration willbe confined to one specific form of this interaction: 07 the issuance of directivesaimed at harmonizing domestic criminal law norms., °8

For that purpose, the main general characteristics of directives have to be brieflyillustrated (4.2.). Subsequently, it is to portray what problems follow from thereofwith respect to criminal law (4.3.). First, the need for approximation of criminallaws shall be addressed (4 .109

4. The Need for Approximation

For the time being, the Community does not enjoy the competence to enact crimi-nal laws. Concomitantly, it has a 'vital interest' to protect its financial interests." 0

Therefore, the Community depends on the criminal law legislation and its enforce-ment by Member States."' Despite this fact, Member States have shown a kind of'laxity ... for an effective penal protection of its [the Community's] goods.' 112

io5) For the changes which were intended by the European Constitution, M. Kaiafa-Gbandi, loc. cit.

(Fn. 6), pp. 4 9 off.; J. Vogel, 'The future of European integration in the area of criminal justice', in:B. Schilinemann, op. cit., pp. 37 3 ff.[o0) K. Ambos, op. cit., § ii Rn. 14; B. Hecker, loc. cit., pp. 72.4, 729; A. Klip, loc. cit., in D.M. Curtin

et al., op. cit., p. to9.107) See for an extensive overview K. Ambos, op. cit., § I Rn. 14 ff.; G. Dannecker, loc. cit. (Fn. 2),

pp. 87 1ff.; B. Hecker, loc. cit., pp. 7z 4 ff.; J. Eisele, 'Europaisches Strafrecht - Systematik des Rechts-giiterschutzes durch die Mitgliedstaaten', JuristischeArbeitsblitter (2000), pp. 9 9 1ff.; H. Satzger, op.cit. (Fn. 52), pp. 187ff., 4 7 5ff.,o) Thereto K. Ambos, op. cit., § ii Rn. 14, 3off.; J. Eisele, 'Einflussnahme auf nationales Strafrecht

durch Richtlininengebung der Europaischen Gemeinschaft', Juristenzeitung (zooi), pp. I157ff.; B.Hecker, op. cit., § 8 Rn. iff.; H. Satzger, op. cit. (Fn. 52), pp. 4ooff.; for other ways of approximation,W Schomburg, 'Are we on the Road to a European Law-Enforcement Area? International Coopera-tion in Criminal Matters. What Place for Justice?', 8/i European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law andCriminalJustice (2000), p. 57.[09) Thereto A. Klip, loc. cit., in D.M. Curtin et al., op. cit., pp. I3 9 ff.

nio) I. Fromm, loc. cit., p. 27; B. Hecker, op. cit., § 14 Rn. 3.

.. G. Dannecker, loc. cit. (Fn. 66), p. 289; G. Grasso, 'Droit penal special: Infractions de fraude,blanchiment et association de malfaiteurs', in : P Cullen, op. cit., p. ii.[[2) M. Kaiafa-Gbandi, loc. cit. (Fn. IO), p. 244.



A model example can be found in Greece in the I98os. In 1986, a company calledITCO allegedly exported two consignments of maize from Greece to Belgium. Infact, the consignments comprised maize imported from Yugoslavia. Since Yugo-slavia was not a Member State to the Community, agricultural levy would havehad to be paid to the Community. The reasons for this not having happened weremainly due to the fact that Greek authorities had deliberately and falsely declaredthe consignments as comprising Greek maize."13

This state of facts led to a European Court ofJustice's judgement and developed theassimilation principle."4 The Court held in this 'landmark decision"' 5 in applicationof the principle of solidarityx6 that 'the Treaty requires the Member States to takeall measures necessary to guarantee the application and effectiveness of Commu-nity law."' 7 'For that purpose, [...] they must ensure [...] that infringements ofCommunity law are penalized under conditions [...] which are analogous to thoseapplicable to infringements of national laws of similar nature and importance andwhich, in any event, make the penalty effective, proportionate and dissuasive."' 8

'Moreover, the national authorities must proceed [...] with the same diligence asthat which they bring to bear in implementing corresponding national laws. ' 9

However, the Court leaves a certain degree of discretion to Member States onhow they fulfil these requirements.' Since Member States have made use of thisdiscretion, many different criminal laws can be found within the EU.'2 ' For exam-ple, whereas fraud under German law can also be committed by omission, 2' the

13) See ECJ, Judgement 21.9.89 - C-68/88 (Commission/Hellenic Republic), para. 2; thereto B.Hecker, op. cit., § 7 Rn. 27 ff.; H. Hugger, StrafrechtlicheAnweisungen der Europiiischen Gemeinschaft(Baden-Baden 2ooo), pp. 3 of.

"4) E. Bacigalupo, loc. cit., in B. Schinemann, op. cit., p. 334; P.J. Cullen, 'Introduction', in: P. Cul-

len, op. cit., p. 5 Fn. i.

115) A. Klip, loc. cit., in D.M. Curtin et al., op. cit., p. I13 Fn. 24.

") J. Eisele, loc. cit. (Fn. io8), p. 1158; B. Hecker, op. cit., § 7 Rn. 27 ff.

H7) ECJ, Judgement 21.9.89 - C-68/88 (Commission/Hellenic Republic), para. 23; ECJ, Judgement

10.7.1990 - C-326/88 (Hansen), para. 17.

08) ECJ, Judgement 21.9.89 - C-68188 (Commission/Hellenic Republic), para. 24; ECJ, Judgement

10.7.1990 - C-3 26/88 (Hansen), para. I7.

"9) ECJ, Judgement 21.9.89 - C-68/88 (Commission/Hellenic Republic), para. 25.

'20) ECJ, Judgement 21.9.89 - C-68/88 (Com mission/Hellenic Republic), para. 24; ECJ, Judgement

10.7.1990 - C-326/88 (Hansen), para. U7; B. Hecker, loc. cit., pp. 7 25 f-') E. Bacigalupo, loc. cit., in: B. Schiunemann, op. cit., p. 334; G. Grasso, loc. cit., in: P Cullen, op.

cit., pp. liff.; B. Hecker, op. cit., § 14 Rn. 22.

"2) Thereto T. Seibert, Die Garantenpflichten beim Betrug (Hamburg 2007); compare G. Dannecker,

'Strafrechtlicher Schutz der Finanzinteressen der Europaischen Gemeinschaft gegen Thuschung', io8Zeitschrififiir die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschafi (1996), pp. 588ff.



French system does not provide for such a criminal responsibility.2 3 According to

Grasso, the same is true, at least up to 2003, for the criminal laws of Bulgaria andRomania. 24 Furthermore, whereas Spain criminalizes only wilful conducts causing a

certain minimum damage, such a minimum loss is not required under Italian law.125

Already this brief overview126 illustrates the 'fragmentation' of criminal laws.127

All these differences lead to loopholesz 8 and aggravate the fight against frauds. 2 9

This is even more evident as the crimes in question are predominantly committedby highly intelligent culprits. 30 Usually, they belong to organized crime,' 3' havingenormous assets at their disposal. 32 Furthermore, the perpetrators often operatetrans-nationally, in many cases resorting to straw men and fictitious companiesas well as the latest technical equipment. 33 In addition, European integration has

opened national borders, making it easier to move from one country to anotherwithout any border controls. 34

Therefore, approximation of criminal laws is considered one inevitable means toeffectively protect the Community's financial interests within the destined 'area

of freedom, security and justice', Article 29 (I) of the Treaty on European Union(hereinafter: 'EU Treaty). 35 Since the Community is not empowered to enact

123) G. Dannecker, loc. cit. (Fn. 122), p. 588; B. Hecker, op. cit., § 14 Rn. 20; examples taken from B.

Hecker, op. cit., § I4 Rn. 20.

124) G. Grasso, loc. cit., in: P Cullen, op. cit., pp. I2f.; C. van den Wyngaert, loc. cit., in: P. Cullen,

op. cit., p. 305.125) E. Bacigalupo, loc. cit., in: G. Grasso, op. cit., p. I5; B. Hecker, op. cit., § 14 Rn. 2o.

nz6) See for further references G. Dannecker, loc. cit. (Fn. i22), pp. 586ff.; B. Hecker, op. cit., § 14

Rn. 21.

127) E. Bacigalupo, loc. cit., in: B. Schiinemann, op. cit., p. 334; G. Dannecker, loc. cit. (Fn. 122), pp.

584, 586; B. Hecker, op. cit., § 14 Rn. 22.

128) G. Grasso, loc. cit., in: P. Cullen, op. cit., pp. 12f.; V. Stiebig, 'Strafrechtsetzungskompetenz der

Europlischen Gemeinschaft und Europiisches Strafrecht: Skylla und Charybdis einer europiischen

Odyssee?', Europarecht (2oo5), p. 492.1Z9) J. Deutscher, op. cit., pp. 57 ff.

130) G. Dannecker, loc. cit. (Fn. 2), p. 876; B. Hecker, op. cit., § I4 Rn. 14.

131) G. Dannecker, loc. cit. (Fn. 66), p. 285; B. Hecker, op. cit., § 14 Rn. 14; 0. Hedtmann, loc. cit.,

p. 131.132) U. Sieber, loc. cit., p. 187.

133) B. Hecker, op. cit., § 14 Rn. 14.

'34) G. Dannecker, loc. cit. (Fn. 99), p. 95; B. Hecker, loc. cit., p. 724; H. Satzger, 'Gefahren ffir eine

effektive Verteidigung im geplanten europaischen Verfahrensrecht', Strafverteidiger (2003), p. 138; EZieschang, loc. cit., pp. 262f.135) G. Dannecker, loc. cit. (Fn. 99), p. 95.



criminal laws, it might only be competent to oblige Member States to harmonizetheir systems. This could be achieved by issuing directives (4.2.).136

4.2 The General Characteristics of Directives

Directives are part of the secondary Community Law. 37 They are addressed to andbinding upon each Member States, as to the result to be achieved. The choice ofform and method how to implement the directives are left to the national authori-ties (Article 249 (3) EC Treaty).

Therefore, directives are the 'classic instrument' to harmonize national laws. 138

Their big advantage is due to the discretion to Member States.139 This makes themespecially attractive in sensitive fields in which Member States might consider itan interference with their sovereign rights if legal actions are being taken on theCommunity field.

As regards the competence, only those Community institutions may issuedirectives upon which such powers have been conferred by the EC Treaty, Article7 (1) EC Treaty. Particularly, this means that the issuance of directives may onlyconcern such areas that fall within the scope of the Community (principle oflimitedauthorization/'compdtence d'attributation').

4.3 Approximating National Criminal Laws by Directives

Approximating criminal laws by issuing directives requires particularly that theEC Treaty provides for such an authority. With respect to the subject at hand,the EC Treaty must provide for a competence to issue directives as regards thefight against frauds (4.3.1.). If such an authority exists, it has to be examined towhich degree the Community is entitled to define Member States' obligations toimplementation (4.3.2.).

4.3.1 Authority to Issue DirectivesThe question of a Community's competence has a significant practical impact,and contains legal and political explosives. In order to understand the sometimesquite emotionally-led debate, the legal and practical dimensions will be brieflyportrayed first (4.3.1.1.). Then, the different legal approaches that make allowance

136) G. Dannecker, loc. cit. (Fn. 66), p. 300.

137) K. Ambos, op. cit., § ii Rn. 30; M. Herdegen, op. cit., § 9 Rn. 3 3 ff.

138) J. Deutscher, op. cit., p. 368; M. Herdegen, op. cit., § 9 Rn. 36; H. Satzger, op. cit. (Fn. 17), § 7

Rn. 22, § 8 Rn. 31.

139) M. Herdegen, op. cit., § 9 Rn. 36.



for the general authority of the Community to issue directives affecting criminalmatters will be illustrated (4.3.1.2.) and assessed (4.3.1.3.).

4.3.1.1 Legal and Practical Dimension of the Problem' 40

The relevant Treaties deliberately allocated 'criminal matters' on the third pillar.Thus, the authority of approximating criminal laws might compellingly and ex-clusively be part of the third pillar, too. If this was true, it would solely be up toMember States to decide upon taking the relevant steps for a harmonization. Actingon the third pillar, Member States would have significant power to independentlyapprove or disapprove any further developments.'41 This stems from the fact thatMember States can, as they have repeatedly done since the 1997 Amsterdam Treatywhich provided for it, 42 resort to the adoption of framework decisions, Article 34

(2) lit. b EU Treaty. These decisions have to be taken unanimously, Article 34 (2)EU Treaty, and without any significant involvement of the European Parliament)43

Every single Member State enjoys a 'veto power" by which it can easily determinethe pace of the approximation.

This situation changes dramatically, if the competence would fall within in thefirst pillar.'45 If this was true, the Community would be in charge of the approxima-tion process. It could issue directives obliging Member States to harmonize theircriminal systems. Unlike the aforementioned procedure, Member States would havea weakened position.4 6 Although the directive has, ultimately, to be adopted by theCouncil, constituted of Member States' representatives, both the Commission andthe European Parliament enter the decision-making process. 147 Moreover, the final

140) See for the following interpretation of the problem R. Hefendehl, loc. cit., p. 162.

W)0 G.J.M. Corstens, loc. cit., p. 135; R. Hefendehl, loc. cit., p. 16z; T. Pohl, 'Verfassungsvertrag durchRichterspruch', Zeitschrift fir Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik (2oo6), p. 215.142) See for an overview, G.J.M. Corstens, loc. cit., p. 134; M. Kaiafa-Gbandi, loc. cit. (Fn. io), pp.

24 3ff.

'43) H. Radtke, 'Europaischer Staatsanwalt: Ein Modell der Strafverfolgung in Europa mit Zukunft?',151 Goltdammer'sArchivfirStrafrecht (2004), p. 14; R. Streinz, 'Schleichende oder offene Europais-ierung des Strafrechts?', in: G. Dannecker et al., Festschrififr Harro Otto zum 7o. Geburtstag am i.April2007 (Miinchen 2007), p. 1030.

'44) R. Hefendehl, loc. cit., p. 162; B.W Wegener and T. Greenawalt, '(Umwelt-)Strafrecht in eu-ropaischer Kompetenz!', Zeitschriftfir Umweltrecht (2005), p. 586; B. Weifser, 'Die Wirkung vonEU-Rahmenbeschliissen aufdas mitgliedstaatliche Recht', Zeitschriffiir Internationale Strafrechtsdog-matik (20o6), p. 567.

'45) B.W. Wegener and T. Greenawalt, oc. cit., p. 586.146) M. Kaifa-Gbandi, 'Recent Developments in Criminal Law in the EU and Rule-of-Law Deficits',

in: B. Schiinemann, op. cit., p. 320.

47) R. Hefendehl, loc. cit., p. 166; see also G.J.M. Corstens, loc. cit., p. 135. According to the officialpress release IP/o5/II36, 13 September 2003, of Commission President Jos6 Manuel Barroso, the ECJ's


Seibert / European Journal of Crime,

108 Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 16 (2008) 89-124

decision within the Council does not have to be adopted unanimously. A majoritydecision suffices. Hence, a Member State could be obliged to implement, as an actof secondary Community Law, changes concerning its national criminal law, eventhough it did not vote in favour of such an approximation.4 8 Should MemberStates refuse the implementation, the Commission, 'monitoring and enforcing' theTreaty,149 may then bring the matter before the European Court ofJustice (Article226 (2) EC Treaty). 5° T-herewith, the general feature of current criminal law inEurope that 'the ultimate direction [of the further development] will no longerbe decided' in Member States 'alone, but will be determined in Europe as well"'

becomes fiercely intensified.The problem affects the relationship between the first and third pillar and the

allocation of competences within the EU. The juridical starting point for its solu-tion can be found in the EU Treaty itself. By virtue of its Article 29 (I), MemberStates are competent to develop common action in the fields of cooperation incriminal matters. Hence, this subject-matter falls, in principle, within the scopeof the third pillar and not under the authority of the first pillar. However, Article29 () EU Treaty does contain a caveat 'Without prejudice to the powers of theEuropean Community'. Consequently, the decisive question is whether the com-petence of approximating criminal laws as a special component of criminal mattersfalls within the 'powers of the Community'.152 If this is the case, the Communityis the competent authority. Then, framework decisions in this field are, due to alack of competence, void.' 53

judgement thereby 'strengthens democracy [...] in the European Union' since 'whatever criminalsanctions are involved in Community law, they cannot be decided without full democratic control

by the European Parliament'. The comment can be found by R. Hefendehl, loc. cit., pp. 166f., in theGerman translation. Thereto J. Vogel, loc. cit., in: B. Schiunemann, op. cit., p. 375, and M. Heger,'Anmerkung zu EuGH, Urteil v. 13.9.2005 - Rs. C-176/o3 Kommission./.Rat',Juristenzeitung (2oo6),p. 313.

14) R. Hefendehl, loc. cit., p. 167; M. Heger, loc. cit., p. 313; M. Kaifa-Gbandi, loc. cit., in: B. Schiine-mann, op. cit., p. 323.

49) K.J. Alter, op. cit., p. 7.'5°) G.J.M. Corstens, loc. cit., p. 139; M. Kaifa-Gbandi, loc. cit., in: B. Schiinemann, op. cit., p.

323.

'5') C. Krehl, 'Reforms of the German Criminal Code - Stock-taking and Perspectives - also froma Constitutional Point of View', German LawJournal (2003), p. 431. In the original quotation, Krehlonly refers to Germany. His findings are, however, also true for every other Member State.152) See also J. Eisele, loc. cit. (Fn. Io8), pp. I158f.; T Pohl, loc. cit., pp. 216ff.

153) Compare G.J.M. Corstens, loc. cit., pp. i3 9 ff.


Seibert / European Journal of Crime,Criminal Law and CriminalJustice 16 (2008) 89-124 109

4-3.I.2 Illustration of the Different ApproachesWith regards to the Community's authority, different approaches are made allow-ance for in general I54

Sometimes, it is submitted that the Community can a priori not have such acompetence. Considering its general lack of authority in criminal matters, onewould have to compulsorily draw the conclusion that the Community also lacks thecompetence to issue directives affecting criminal laws.55 Usually though, such an apriori denegation is rejected. The reasoning is not regarded as 'logically obligatory'.5 6

Emanating from this basis, differences of opinion, however, arise.The question has been debated for years in the scholastic world. The spectrum,

which can be found in respect thereof, ranges from deriving a competence fromthe principle ofsolidarity contained in Article Io EC Treaty, 57 from certain, broadlyworded delegations ofauthority in specific substantives,58 up to resorting to the verygeneric competence norm ofArticle3o8EC Treaty.159 In between, other points of viewapply the aforementioned doctrine of implied powers,,6 ° the effet-utile-principle 6,

or draw upon Articles 94ff EC Treaty.162

This debate got ignited anew,' 63 when, on 13 September 2005, the EuropeanCourt of Justice spoke out for the first time on the issue.' 64 According to its

'54) For an overview K. Ambos, op. cit., § it Rn. 3of.; M. B6se, 'Die Zustandigkeit der EuropiischenGemeinschaft fur das Strafrecht. Zugleich Besprechung von EuGH, Urteil vom 13.9.2005', 153 Golt-dammer'sArchivfiir Strafrecht (20o6), pp. 212ff.; H. Sazger, op. cit. (Fn. 52), pp. 4o 3ff.

I55) M. Kaiafa-Gbandi, loc. cit. (Fn. so), p. 249; B.W. Wegener and T. Greenawalt, loc. cit., p. 586.'56) G. Dannecker, 'Strafrecht der Europiischen Gemeinschaft', in: A. Eser et al, Strafrechtsentwicklung

in Europa 4.3 (Freiburg im Breisgau 1995), p. 2023; I. Fromm, loc. cit., p. 27; R. Hefendehl, loc. cit.,p. 163.

157) H. Satzger, op. cit. (Fn. 17), § 8 Rn. 32.158) B. Hecker, op. cit., § 8 Rn. 4 off.; H. Satger, op. cit. (Fn. 17), § 8 Rn. 33.

159) K. Ambos, op. cit., § iI Rn. 31; J. Eisele, loc. cit. (Fn. io8), p. 116o; H. Satzger, op. cit. (Fn. 52),pp. 4 3 7 ff.,6o) S. Griblinghoff, Die Verpflichtung des deutschen Strafgesetzgebers zum Schutz der Interessen der

Europiiischen Gemeinschaften (Heidelberg 1996), pp. 9 4 ff.,6,) M. B6se, op. cit., p. 81; dismissive H. Hugger, op. cit., pp. 58f.

,62) j. Eisele, loc. cit. (Fn. Io8), p. ii6o; B. Hecker, op. cit., § 8 Rn. 4 9 ff.

,63) M. B6se, loc. cit., p. 211.

i64) ECJ, Judgement 13.9.2005 - C-17 6/o 3 (Commission/Council); see for the prehistory of thejudgement M. Bose, loc. cit., pp. 2iiff.; R. Hefendehl, loc. cit., pp. 16if.; R. Streinz, loc. cit., in: G.Dannecker et al., op. cit., pp. 1o39f.



'startling', 65 'groundbreaking' 66 strongly debated 67 and sometimes harshly criti-cized judgement,' 68 the Court entitled the Community, at least with respect toenvironmental criminal law, to take 'measures which relate to the criminal law ofMember States which it considers necessary in order to ensure that the rules whichit lays down on environmental protection are fully effective." 69 The Court's reason-ing has been interpreted not to be limited to environmental criminal matters. 170

Even though it does not explicitly state which of the methodological approachesit refers to, the judgement has been interpreted as relying upon a 'vague allianceof the delegation of specific substantive competences and the doctrine of impliedpowers, carried out to an extreme.' 171

4.3.3.3 Assessment

It is beyond this examination's scope and purpose to discuss the persuasivenessof all these different approaches in depth.' 72 Nevertheless, some remarks shall bemade.

(a) The Community's competence in question is not impossible a priori. Theauthority to originally enact criminal laws and the competence to issue directivesaffecting criminal matters are distinct. Hence, both questions do not necessarily

,65) R. Hefendehl, loc. cit., in: B. Schiinemann, op. cit., p. 451; T Pohl, loc. cit., p. 213.

66) A. Klip, loc. cit., in: D.M. Curtin et al., op. cit., p. 138 Fn. 105; W. Perron, loc. cit., in: M. Het-

tinger, op. cit., p. 429 (quotation in German).,67) M. B6se, loc. cit., pp. 21ff.; S. Braum, 'Europaische Strafgesetzgebung: Demokratische Strafge-

setzlichkeit oder administrative Opportunitt?', Zeitschrifiir Wirtschafs- undSteuerstrafrecht (2oo6),pp. i2lff.; D. Diehm, 'Die 'safe-harbor'-Verordnung und das Urteil des EuGH zum Rahmenbeschlussiiber den Schutz der Umwelt durch das Strafrecht', Zeitschrfifir Wirtschafis- und Steuerstrafrecht(zoo6), pp. 368ff.; I. Fromm, loc. cit., pp. 26ff.; R. Hefendehl, loc. cit., pp. 1iff.; M. Heger, loc. cit.,pp. 3 ioff.; E. Herlin-Karnell, loc. cit., pp. 69 ff.; M. Kaifa-Gbandi, loc. cit., in: B. Schiunemann, op.cit., pp. 3 20ff.; T. Pohl, loc. cit., pp. 213 ff.; R. Streinz, loc. cit., in: G. Dannecker, op. cit., pp. io 39 ff.;B.W. Wegener and T. Greenawalt, loc. cit., pp. 58 5ff.,68) R. Hefendehl, loc. cit., pp. i6 4 ff.; A. Klip, loc. cit., in: B. Schiunemann, op. cit., p. 138; B.

Schiinemann, 'A Programme for European Criminal Justice', in: B. Schuinemann, op. cit., p. 313; B.Schiinemann, 'The Foundations of Trans-national Criminal Proceedings', in: B. Schuinemann, op.cit., p. 347.[69) ECJ, Judgement 13.9.2005 - C-176/o3 (Commission/Council), para. 48; see for deliberations

concerning 'effectiveness' E. Herlin-Karnell, loc. cit., pp. 7 4 ff.[70) R. Hefendehl, loc. cit., pp. 16iff.; M. Heger, loc. cit., pp. 312f.; E. Herlin-Karnell, loc. cit., p. 73;

M. Kaifa-Gbandi, loc. cit., in: B. Schiunemann, op. cit., p. 323; A. Klip, loc. cit., in: D.M. Curtin etal., op. cit., p. 119.

'I') R. Hefendehl, loc. cit., p. I65 (quotation in German); similar T. Pohl, loC. Cit., p. 216.[72) Thereto K. Ambos, op. cit., § ii Rn. 3 0f; B. Hecker, op. cit., § 8 Rn. 3 5ff.; R. Hefendehl, loc. cit.,

pp. 163f.; H. Satzger, op. cit. (Fn. 5z), pp. 4ooff.



have to be answered in the same way. 7 3 One should rather make allowance for thecompetence in question, provided that it can be referred to a sound basis.

It is rather doubtful this can be convincingly achieved by resorting to ArticleIO EC Treaty, by the application of other general generic competence norms orthe doctrine of implied powers.

Article io EC Treaty and its principle of solidarity only oblige Member Statesto protect the Community's interests within their criminal systems. Establishingan obligation for Member States does not automatically grant competences to theCommunity to call Member States to criminalize a certain conduct by issuingdirectives. 74 Rather, this requires a special competence d'attributation itself. 175

Consequently, Article io EC Treaty is not a sufficient basis.}76

Besides these considerations, this approach constitutes, as well as the applica-tion of other general and generic competence norms, a fungous line of reasoning.Particularly in respect of Community competences concerning criminal laws, theauthority should be based on a clear and convincing fundament. I77 If applyingoverall, in its content and limitations not clearly defined principles meets theserequirements despite its rather non precise argumentation, is disputable. Since thecommunitisation of criminal matters also affects a sensitive branch of law,178 strictrequirements for any Community competence have to be claimed. It is beyondthis paper's scope to terminally decide if resorting to Articles 9 4 ff., 3o8 EC Treatymeets the necessary threshold. What casts doubts on such a line of reasoning is,however, that in both cases Article 251 EC Treaty does not apply, preventing theEuropean Parliament from an appropriate involvement in the decision-makingprocess. This might disregard, at least as far as directives harmonizing criminallawsare concerned, the fundamental principle of democracy. 7 9

Eventually, the doctrine of implied powers is not a sufficient basis either. Asfar as this theory is concerned, one already has to recall its weaknesses which havebeen pointed out previously. Moreover, its requirements are not met. The explicit

173) G. Dannecker, 'Die Enrwicklung des Strafrechts unter dern Einflufl des Gemeinschaftsrechts',JuristischeAusbildung (i998), p. 8i; H. Hugger, op. cit., p. 6o.

,74) H. Hugger, op. cit., pp. 54 f

,75) H. Hugger, op. cit., pp. 54 f176) J. Eisele, loc. cit. (Fn. IO8), p. 1158; R. Hefendehl, loc. cit., p. 163; H. Hugger, op. cit., pp. 54 ff.;

H. Satzger, op. cit. (Fn. 17), § 8 Rn. 36.

'77) H. Satnger, 'Auf dern Weg zu einern Europiischen Strafrecht', Zeitschrifiir Rechtspolitik (2001),P. 554-

,78) B. Schiinemann, 'Ein Gespenst geht urn in Europa - Brusseler 'Strafrechtspflege' intra muros',149 Goltdammer's Archivfiir Strafrecht (2004), p. 505.

'79) J. Deutscher, op. cit., p. 37 of.



delegation of related authorities does not logically require the issuance of directivesaimed at approximating criminal laws.I 8o

(b) Consequently, the competence in question may, at least with respect to theCommunity's financial interest, cogently be justified only by a specific substantivecompetence. For this field, Article 28o (4) EC Treaty might in this context meet thenecessary requirements.

Its wording encompasses criminal law measures.' 8' Systematically, paragraph 4

has to be interpreted together with paragraphs i, 2 and 3. It is submitted that thoseprovisions 'declaratorily mirror' the aforementioned European Court of Justice'sGreek corn scandal ruling; it was this decision that led to the incorporation of theseprinciples into the EC Treaty via Article 280 EC Treaty.lS2 Consequently, Article280 (4) Sentence i EC Treaty should also be interpreted 'in light of' the principlesdeveloped by the Court in this judgement. Since the Court obliged Member Statesto protect the Community's financial interests also by their criminal laws, theterms 'effective and equivalent protection in the Member States' (Article 280 (4)Sentence i EC Treaty) is also interpreted to encompass a protection by 'criminallaws'.'83 If Article 280 (4) EC Treaty empowers the Community to 'adopt measures[...] with a view to [...] protection by criminal laws in the Member States', thisprovision seems to be a competence norm for issuing directives approximatingcriminal laws in this field.

This is underpinned by the characteristics of directives. Since they leave certaindiscretion to Member States, they are distinct from acts of legislation as discussedabove. As far as directives are concerned, it is not the Community which enacts acriminal law norm; it is the singular Member State,s 4 even though the MemberState enacts the provision to fulfil its obligation under Community Law.

Therefore, the delegation of authority in this respect is, as opposed to the com-petence to originally enact criminal laws, rather more reconcilable with Article 280(4) EC Treaty. 8 5 Issuing the directives in question does not concern the applicationof national criminal law or the national administration of justice as much as the

,8o) H. Hugger, op. cit., pp. 56ff.

181) B. Hecker, op. cit., § 8 Rn. 6o.

"lz) PJ. Cullen, loc. cit., in: P Cullen, op. cit., p. 5; G. Dannecker, loc. cit. (Fn. 66), p. 287; J. Eisele,

loc. cit. (Fn. io8), p. 1158; B. Hecker, op. cit., § 4 Rn. ioo, § 7 Rn. 33, 8 Rn. 6o; H. Satzger, op. cit.(Fn. 5z), p. 434.183) B. Hecker, op. cit., § 7 Rn. 33, § 8 Rn. 6o.

184) J. Deutscher, op. cit., p. 369; H. Satzger, loc. cit. (Fn. 177), pp. 55 If.; see also COM (2001) 272final,Explanatory Memorandum, p. 6f.

'81) ECJ, Judgement 13.9.2005 - C-17 6/03 (Commission/Council), para. 52; J. Eisele, loc. cit. (Fn.108), p. 116o; I. Fromm, loc. cit., pp. 28ff.; B. Hecker, op. cit., § 8 Rn. 60.



original enactment of criminal laws.' 86 In this sense, Article 28o (4) Sentence 2 ECTreaty can be 'interpreted narrowly'.,8 7

This does not contravene the EU's general three-pillar-structure and is not hin-dered by other systematic deliberations. Indeed, 'criminal matters' are, in general,allocated on the third pillar. Moreover, the EU Treaty provides in its 'passerelle

provision ' 88 of Article 42 a special and demanding procedure for transferring ac-tions referred to in the PJCCM onto the first pillar.' 89

However, these aspects do not persuasively exclude a Community's competencefor approximating criminal laws concerning its financial interests.'9°

Article 28o (4) EC Treaty should be compared with Article 152 (5) EC Treaty.Article 152 (5) EC Treaty deals with public health and reads in its relevant partsas follows: 'Community action in the field of public health shall fully respect theresponsibilities of the Member States [...]. In particular, measures [...] shall notaffect national provisions [...].'

At first, it is noteworthy that Article 152 (5) Sentence i EC Treaty explicitly andstrongly calls forfrhly respecting the responsibilities of Member States. Article 28o(4) EC Treaty lacks such a strong and non ambiguous statement. Its content seemsto be less strict. Systematically, one, therefore, has to conclude that whereas Article152 (5) EC Treaty clearly rules out a Community's competence, Article 28o (4) ECTreaty deliberately does not. Moreover, Article i52 (5) EC Treaty illustrates thatthe EC Treaty itself knows unambiguous provisions, undoubtedly preventing thereader to assume any Community competences in the wake of interpretation. SinceArticle 280 (4) EC Treaty does not make such a strong statement, it, e contrario,gives more power to the Community than Article 152 EC Treaty does.

This is not contravened by the different wordings of the second sentences ofthe provisions. It is to concede that Article 152 (5) Sentence 2 EC Treaty speaks of'shall not affect', whereas Article 28o (4) Sentence 2 EC Treaty only reads 'shall notconcern'. Theoretically, one could argue that both terms have different meanings,the term 'not concern' prohibiting more actions. This could follow from assuming

86) B. Hecker, op. cit., § 8 Rn. 6o.

187) COM (2001) 27 2fina1, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 6; thereto G.J.M. Corstens, loc. cit., pp.

t4 iff., where the quotation of the aforementioned Memorandum can be found; M. Heger, loc. cit.,p. 312.

"8s) G.J.M. Corstens, loc. cit., p. 135.

,89) G.J.M. Corstens, loc. cit., p. 136; M. Kaifa-Gbandi, loc. cit., in: B. Schiinemann, op. cit., p.

322.

190) J. Eisele, loc. cit. (Fn. Io8), pp. u15 8f. The argumentation is confined to Article 28o EC Treaty

and the fight against fraud. It might be possible that the Community enjoys more powers in thisfield than it does in others.



a hierarchical structure between 'affecting' and 'concerning', according to whichan 'affection' already occurs at an earlier stage.

Ultimately, this does not change the aforementioned line of reasoning. It is notevident apriori that both terms have a distinct content. This can be underpinnedby the fact that the German version uses the same phrases in both provisions anddoes not assume any essential differences.

However, the French, Italian and Spanish versions also use different terms. Alllanguages are, however, equally significant, none of them enjoying any primacy. It israther significant which wording expresses the provision's telos in the best way.'9'

One should assume that both terms mean the same. There is no logicallycompulsory difference in their contents. If also one of the binding languages, andeven one which is usually very precise, particularly when it comes to legal terms,confirms this assumption, this is another major indication. In addition, this seemsto at best express the provisions' ratio. Since Sentence i of Article 152 (5) EC Treatystrongly calls for fully respecting the responsibilities of Member States, Article 280(4) EC Treaty does not. Thus, Article 152 (5) EC Treaty wants to clearly repeat thecompetences of Member States in this field, whereas this does not seem to be therational of Article 280 (4) EC Treaty. These provisions' evident telos, being derivedfrom their wording, can not simply be contravened by using, if at all slightly dif-ferent, terms. If the EC Treaty would have really assumed a difference and withthe consequences portrayed above, the Treaty would have made it much clearerand more evident.

Consequently, the abovementioned conclusion remains valid. Comparingboth provisions, it is revealed that Article 28o (4) EC Treaty can be interpretedbroadly.

This has now to be seen in the interplay with some of the already aforementionedaspects. The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, which established Article 280 (4) EC Treaty,wanted to further promote the integration process. 92 The whole provision has tobe understood in the light of the aforementioned European Court ofjustice's cornscandal decision. 93 Moreover, one must not forget the 'cutting edge character' ofthe fight against fraud for the field of criminal law, I94 'more and more becomingthe motor of a European criminal law'' 95 Furthermore, the Community does notonly have a vital interest to protect its financial interests, but Member States have

'9') K. Hailbronner and G. Jochum, op. cit., § 4 Rn. 309; R. Streinz, op. cit., § 4 Rn. 27 4 f.192) F. Zieschang, loc. cit., p. 259. See, however, also T. Pohl, loc. cit., pp. 218f.

193) G. Dannecker, loc. cit. (Fn. 122), p. 585; B. Hecker, loc. cit., p. 727.

194) G. Dannecker, loc. cit. (Fn. 66), pp. 282f.

159) U. Sieber, loc. cit., p. 186 (quotation in German).


Seibert I European Journal of Crime,Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 16 (2008) 89-124 115

been aware of this fact. 196 Such an effective protection has necessarily to includeactions also concerning criminal matters.1 97

In addition, the necessary requirements with respect to the principle of de-mocracy are in any case met by this approach. Article 280 (4) EC Treaty explicitlyrefers to Article 25i EC Treaty, triggering the sufficient9 8 involvement of the Eu-ropean Parliament as a directly democratically legitimated body, by elections, inthe decision-making process.

Moreover, Article 280 (4) EC Treaty substantially covers the protection of theCommunity's financial interests. This relativizes the concern, considering the peculiarnature of criminal law as a 'symbol of national identity and culture';'99 MemberStates should be prevented from too strongly interfering by the Community.Since it is the Community's goods which are concerned, there seems to be no, atleast not a relatively big, room for refusing criminal law legislations out of reasonsmotivated by national identity and culture."° '

The combination of all these aspects and the understanding of their interplayjustify the interpretation of Article 28o (4) Sentence 2 EC Treaty, as a sufficientbasis for the approximation of laws in this respect.2 1' Thus, Article 29 (i) EU Treaty'scaveat, to be read together with Article 47 EU Treaty, becomes applicable. Hence,this component of 'criminal matters' is not allocated on the third, but on the firstpillar.2

2

(c) Since therewith a competence norm has been found, it can be left undecidedif, with respect to other areas of law, this approach is generally convincing and ifthe other approaches might also be able to empower the Community in this mat-ter. However, since the issue has, particularly in the wake of the European CourtofJustice's decision, been debated so quick-temperedly, some further annotationsseem to be appropriate.

'9' H. Satzger, op. cit. (Fn. 52), p. 434.

197) Compare in this context T. Weigend, loc. cit., p. 66.,98) In this direction also K. Ambos, op. cit., § ii Rn. 4; 0. Hedtmann, loc. cit., p. 133.

'99) A. Klip, loc. cit., in: D.M. Curtin et al., op. cit., p. ii9.

0) B. Hecker, loc. cit., p. 730.20) J. Deutscher, op. cit., p. 345; J. Eisele, loc. cit. (Fn. io8), p. 116o; B. Hecker, op. cit., § 4 Rn. Ioo,

§ 8 Rn. 6o; B. Hecker, loc. cit., p. 727; K. Tiedemann, loc. cit., in: B. Schiinemann et al., op. cit., p.14o8; dismissive G.J.M. Corstens, loc. cit., p. 143; H. Satzger, op. cit. (Fn. 52), p. 437; P. Schwarzburgand K. Hamdorf, loc. cit., p. 620.202) COM (2oo1) 27Zfinal, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 6f.



The judgement's weakest point is its lack of detailed argumentation.0 3 The Courtshould have entered into a debate at great length.2 °4 It would have had to deal withall existing pros and cons. This should have included the controversy if granting theCommunity the authority in question, is reconcilable with the principle of nullapoena sine legeparlamentaria° 5 This has been doubted, since the Community hasoften been criticized as lacking a sufficient democratic structure.206 Moreover, itwould have been necessary, from a dogmatic point of view, to clearly emphasizewhich methodical approach the Court wants to adopt.2° 7

This criticism is even more important because the subject at hand is a criminal lawmatter 2° 8 and concerns 'a question of extraordinary importance for the future of EUcriminal law'.209 This branch of law is not only 'highly sensitive '210 but also an areawhich has not been the primary field of the 'communisation process' yet."' Since theCourt's ruling has now - on the jurisprudence level- paved the way for an intensifiedCommunity intervention, the Court should have been aware of the historic oppor-tunity2 12 it had to gain support for the further Europeanization of criminal law,213

203) E. Herlin-Karnell, loc. cit., pp. 73, 8of.; M. Kaifa-Gbandi, loc. cit., in: B. Schiinemann, op. cit.,

p. 321.204) E. Herlin-Karnell, loc. cit., p. 73.

205) 1. Fromm, loc. cit., p. 37; see as regards this principle also K. Ambos, op. cit., § ii Rn. 4; M. Bbse,

loc. cit., pp. 216ff.206) 1. Fromm, op. cit,, pp. 22 7 ff., 24 3ff.; M. Kaiafa-Gbandi, loc. cit. (Fn. 6), p. 488; W Schomburg,

loc. cit., p. 51; see for this general debate E. Herlin-Karnell, loc. cit., pp. 7 f.; J.H.H. Weiler, 'The

Essential (and would-be Essential) Jurisprudence of the European Court ofJustice: Lights and Shad-ows too', in: I. Pernice et al., The Future of the European Judicial System in a Comparative Perspective(Baden-Baden 2oo6), pp. I23ff. According to this paper, the necessary requirement with respect tothe principle of democracy, has already been, met by the involvement of the European Parliamentin the decision-making process (Articles 28o (4), 251 EC Treaty).207) See K. Hailbronner and G. Jochum, op. cit., § 4 Rn. 318.

,o8) In the same direction E. Herlin-Karnell, loc. cit., pp. 7 3f.

209) M. Kaifa-Gbandi, loc. cit., in: B. Schiinemann, op. cit., p. 321.

2,) E. Herlin-Karnell, loc. cit., p. 7o; M. Kaiafa-Gbandi, loc. cit. (Fn. 6), p. 492.

1") E. Herlin-Karnell, loc. cit., p. 70; W. Perron, loc. cit., in: M. Hettinger et al., op. cit., p. 430; W

Schomburg, loc. cit., p. 51.2"2) D. Brennan, 'The Future of the European Court ofJustice - A British Perspective', in: I. Pernice

et al., op. cit., pp. 7 9 ff.; M. Kaiafa-Gbandi, loc. cit. (Fn. 1o), pp. 239ff.; T. Pohl, loc. cit., p. 221; B.WWegener and T Greenawalt, loc. cit., p. 588.213) Bock wants to allude to a 'Re-Europeanization of criminal law', since a first Europeanization

had already taken place during the 'ius commune'. He calls for a 'rediscovery' of these historic rootswhen discussing today's further process, see D. Bock, 'Die erste Europaisierung der Strafrechtswis-

senschaft: Das gemeine Strafrecht auf r6mischrechtlicher Grundlage', Zeitschrifi/iir InternationaleStrafrechtsdogmatik (2006), pp. 7ff., 16.



which the Court obviously intended to promote. 1 4

The Europeanization of criminal law has been called the 'logical consequenceof a general Europeanization of all spheres of life' 215 and the 'irrefutable necessity'considering a 'Europe without borders'.21 6 'In short, legal Europe is attempting tocatch up with criminal Europe.'2 17 Nevertheless, this development is sometimescritically eyed. The existing concerns and apprehensions2 18 could have been tem-pered by the Court by also more clearly defining the limitations of the Communitycompetence. Its mere reference that the Community (!) has to consider the measures'necessary in order to ensure that the rules [...] are fully effective' does not meetthe required threshold.219

The Court also missed the opportunity to elaborate on its own role in the inte-gration process. 2 Its judgement will certainly not contribute to diminishing theconcerns it is exposed to. The Court's role and self-conception of being the 'mo-tor' of the integration process might be, in principle, correct. However, this doesnot prevent the Court from entering into in-depth debates and carefully givingreasons for its decisions. In the long run, the Court will not fulfil its role and gainacceptance in the European population 2 if it confines itself to simply deliveringjudgements that condescend opposing views. Rather, the process of integrationwill only succeed if it is based on trust and confidence. 222

Moreover, one should be careful to concentrate on plainlyjuridically approachingand assessing the process of Europeanization of criminal law. Judicial reasoningis, at least theoretically and ideally, not political reasoning. Which powers the

214) A. Klip, loc. cit., in D.M. Curtin et al., op. cit., pp. 138f.; see also K.J. Alter, op. cit., p. 20.

215) C. Krehl, loc. cit., p. 429.

2,6) F. Zieschang, loc. cit., pp. 262f. (quotation in German).

217) B. Laffan, loc. cit., in: J. Petersen et al., op. Cit., p. 248.

z,8) See R. Hefendehl, loc. cit., in: B. Schiinemann, op. cit., pp. 45off.; R. Hefendehl, loc. cit., pp.

16iff.; M. Kaiafa-Gbandi, loc. cit. (Fn. 6), pp. 4 8 3ff.; M. Kaifa-Gbandi, loc. cit., in: B. Schilnemann,op. cit., pp. 3 17 ff.; B. Schiinemann, loc. cit., in: B. Schiunemann, op. cit., pp. 313ff., 34 4 ff.; B. Schilne-mann, 'Die parlamentarische Gesetzgebung als Lakai von Briissel? Zum Entwurfeines EuropaischenHaftbefehlsgesetzes', Strafverteidiger (2003), pp. 53sff.; compare also the aspects mentioned by C.Krehl, loc. cit., p. 429; see E Zieschang, loc. cit., pp. z62ff., who also emphasizes the challenges andadvantages of the Europeanization of criminal law; for a 'total re-orientation' of the harmonizationprocess M. Kaiafa-Gbandi, loc. cit. (Fn. 1o), pp. z62f.219) E. Herlin-Karnell, loc. cit., p. 8o.

2 ) See E. Herlin-Karnell, loc. cit., p. 73; compare also D. Brennan, loc. cit., in: I. Pernice et al., op.

cit., p. 8o; K.St C. Bradley, 'The European Court of Justice', in: J. Petersen et al., op. cit., pp. 1z8ff.;J.H.H. Weiler, loc. cit., in: I. Pernice et al., op. cit., pp. 122ff.

221) Compare H. Satzger, loc. cit. (Fn. 177 ) , p. 554.

22) D. Brennan, loc. cit., in: I. Pernice et al., op. cit., p. 79; E. Herlin-Karnell, loc. cit., p. 83.


Seibert / European Journal of Crime,118 Criminal Law and CriminalJustice 16 (2008) 89-124

Community should have, is not up to the jurist to decide. He has to define whichauthorities the Community currently enjoys. Hence, all the arguments being basedon politically motivated deliberations, in favour or not in favour of a further Eu-ropeanization, are methodologically invalid right from the outset.

Apart from these grave reservations, it seems, as has been already stated, per-suasive to at least consider the Community competent to issue directives affectingcriminal laws in the wake of its efforts to protect its financial interests.22 3 Conse-quently, Member States lack, pursuant to Article 29 (1) EU Treaty, the authorityto adopt framework decisions dealing with this matter.22 4

4.3.2 Degree of the Authority to Issue DirectivesTherewith, however, it has only been shown that such a competence, in principle,exists. Now it must be determined to which extent the Community may definewhat Member States have to implement. This issue is controvertible.5

According to some academics, the Community enjoys a broad degree. Thisincludes the definition of specific elements of a criminal offence22 6 as well as speci-fications concerning the character and the extent of the criminal punishment whichshould be provided for.22 7 Even under such clear definitions, the singular MemberState would remain the one to ultimately enact the criminal law norms.2 8

This point of view is not all-too-true. If one already takes into account the char-acteristics of directives, leaving the choice of form and methods for the requiredimplementation to Member States (Article 249 (3) EC Treaty) and hence leavingthem certain discretions, those directives should allow for a margin of decision forMember States.22 9 Nevertheless, under general European Law it is seen legitimate

123) Besides the question of the degree of the Community's authority (see 4.3.2.), the Community's

competence is, as general, limited by the principle of subsidiary (Article z (z) EU Treaty, Article 5 (2)EC Treaty) and the principle ofproportionality (Article 5 (3) EC Treaty), see J. Eisele, loc. cit. (Fn.io8), p. 1161; B. Hecker, op. cit., § 8 Rn. 63 ff.224) j. Eisele, loc. cit. (Fn. io8), pp. I58f.; see also I. Fromm, loc. cit., p. 28; compare for controversies

concerning the scope of Articles 29, 47 EU Treaty S. Braum, loc. cit., pp. iziff.; T. Pohl, loc. cit., pp.216ff.

225) See K. Ambos, op. cit., § ii Rn. 32; J. Deutscher, op. cit., pp. 36Iff.; J. Eisele, loc. cit. (Fn. io8),

pp. 116iff.; B. Hecker, op. cit., § 8 Rn. 7off.; H. Hugger, op. cit., pp. 7 7 ff; H. Satzger, op. cit. (Fn.52), pp. 449 ff.226) J. Deutscher, op. cit., p. 371.

227) M. B6se, op. cit., pp. 4 14 f.; H. Hugger, op. cit., pp. 7 7 ff.; M. Zuleeg, loc. cit., p. 767.

22) M. Zuleeg, loc. cit., p. 767.

229) K. Ambos, op. cit., § ii Rn. 32; H. Satzger, op. cit. (Fn. 17), § 8 Rn. 37.



if directives include extremely detailed provisions to be implemented.230

This can, however, not be true as far as directives harmonizing criminal lawsare concerned.2 31 In this context, it has to be kept in mind that the Communitydoes not have the competence to originally enact criminal laws. This fundamentalprinciple would not be regarded adequately, if the Community could in every singledetail oblige Member States to implement the directive.2 32 Such an implementa-tion, lacking any kind of discretion for Member States, would ultimately be an'evasion' of the missing authority for originally enacting criminal laws.2 33 Even ifthe criminal law provisions would in this case be established by Member States, itcould not be considered a 'free' and 'independent' act. Member States would actunder a 'European vis compulsiva'.234

Hence, the Community's extent of defining the directives' content is limited. Itmay only issue directives which leave a degree of discretion to Member States. 35

At first, this concerns the statutory definition ofa crime. The directive may includegeneral aspects, i.e. describing the 'main features'236 or the 'overall concept' 237 of thefacts constituting an offence in a general sense.23 8 It must, however, not containany definite elements of a criminal offence. 39

In addition, the Community is entitled to address the legal consequences.2 4' In

particular, the directive may explicitly call for a general criminal punishment,241

providing such statements of requirement do not inadequately confine Member

230) G. Dannecker, loc. cit. (Fn. 99), p. 98; J. Eisele, loc. cit. (Fn. 107), p. 994; H. Satzger, op. cit. (Fn.

52), p. 451.231) C. Schrader, op. cit., p. 185; see also G. Dannecker, loc. cit. (Fn. 99), p. 98.

232) K. Ambos, op. cit., i iI Rn. 32; J. Deutscher, Op. cit., p. 370; H. Satzger, op. cit. (Fn. 17), § 8 Rn.

37.233) K. Ambos, op. cit., § ii Rn. 3z; J. Eisele, loc. cit. (Fn. io8), p. 1161; H. Satzger, op. cit. (Fn. 52),

p. 456.234) S. Gr6blinghoff, op. cit., p. 135 (quotation in German).

235) K. Ambos, op. cit., § in Rn. 32; B. Hecker, op. cit., § 8 Rn. 7 off.

236) S. Gr6blinghoff, op. cit., p. 136.

237) B. Hecker, op. cit., § 8 Rn. 70, 72; H. Satzger, op. cit. (Fn. 52), p. 462.

238) S. Gr6blinghoff, op. cit., p. 136; C. Schrader, op. cit., p. 188.

239) B. Hecker, op. cit., § 8 Rn. 7o; B. Hecker, loc. cit., p. 726. See for further requirements B. Hecker,

op. cit., § 8 Rn. 70.

'40) J. Eisele, loc. cit. (Fn. IO8), pp. 1162f.; dismissive C. Schr6der, op. cit., p. 188.

'4') J. Eisele, loc. cit. (Fn. lo8), pp. 1162ff.; dismissive H. Satzger, op. cit. (Fn. 52), pp. 4 5 5ff.; C.

Schrader, op. cit., p. 188.


Seibert / European Journal of Crime,120 Criminal Law and Criminal justice 16 (2008) 89-124

States' discretion. This is wise since the statutory definition of a crime and its legalconsequences are connected. 24 2

Whether this authority includes defining the precise form and the minimumand maximum range of the criminal punishment, is doubtful. 24 3 These questionshave to be answered in the negative. 2 "

At first, the directive must not provide for the specific form of the criminalpunishment.2 45 Considering the different criminal law systems within MemberStates, respectively following well-established traditions and national peculiarities,some Member States are not aware of certain forms of punishment that are com-mon to other European systems.246 Whereas, for example, Germany does de legelata not provide for a criminal responsibility ofjuristic persons,2 47 such a criminalliability can be found in Denmark, France, the United Kingdom and others24 8

If a directive could explicitly provide for such a specific form of criminal punish-ment, some Member States would be forced to introduce completely new meansof punishment or change existing ones. This is disproportionate. Pursuant to theprinciple ofproportionality (Article 5 (3) EC Treaty), the Community has to respectthe respective criminal law culture of Member States' legal systems, 249 giving themthe opportunity to implement the directive by 'respecting [their] own domesticcriminal laws' coherence'. 250 This includes choosing from equally effective measuresto reach a legitimate goal only those on the Community level which give way tothe broadest room possible for Member States' discretion and respect MemberStates' sovereignty as far as possible.2 5I Whereas it does not violate the principleof proportionality, if the directive generally calls for a criminal law punishment,defining the specific form thereof does. Not calling for criminal punishment wouldnot be as equally effective. Reaching the goal of effectively combating crime by

242) As J. Eisele put it, both elements have to be 'properly harmonized with each other', J. Eisele, loc.

cit. (Fn. io8), p. 1162 (quotation in German), referring to BVerfGE 90, 145 [173].243) Thereto J. Eisele, loc. cit. (Fn. io8), pp. 1162f; H. Satzger, op. cit. (Fn. 52), pp. 4 55ff.

244) H. Satzger, op. cit. (Fn. 52), pp. 4 5 5ff.; dismissive J. Eisele, loc. cit. (Fn. io8), pp. 1162f.

245) H. Satzger, op. cit. (Fn. 52), pp. 4 55f

246) H. Satzger, op. cit. (Fn. 52), p. 456.

247) G. Dannecker, loc. cit. (Fn. 122), p. 592; A. Schonke and H. Schroder, ed., Strafgesetzbuch

(Miinchen 2006), Vorbem % 25ff. Rn. i19.148) G. Dannecker, loc. cit. (Fn. 122), p. 592; A: Sch6nke and H. Schr6der, op. cit., Vorbem § 25ff.Rn. 122.

249) H. Satzger, op. cit. (Fn. 52), pp. 4 57 f250) B. Hecker, op. cit., § 8 Rn. 7o; see also J. Eisele, loc. cit. (Fn. 107), p. 994; H. Satzger, op. cit. (Fn.

52), p. 455.25) H. Satzger, op. cit. (Fn. 52), p. 456.



harmonizing domestic criminal laws does, however, not require simultaneouslydefining the specific form by which the conduct has to be punished. 5

For the same considerations, directives must not precisely define the range ofcriminalpunishment.53 If directives would also oblige Member States to criminalize,for example, a specific fraud affecting the Community by a term of imprisonment'from a minimum of five years' or 'a maximum often years', Member States' rightto discretion would be too strongly curtailed.2 5 4 This also constitutes a violationof the aforementioned principles.55 Member States' criminal law systems have torespect their own individual balance of ranges of punishment as regards their othernational criminal laws. If, for example,256 one Member State decided to protectits own financial interests by relatively soft criminal punishments like 'pecuniarypenalty or imprisonment up to two years', it would be opposed to severe legalproblems if a directive would oblige it to protect the Community's interests by aterm of imprisonment with a minimum of five years. In order to keep the overallbalance within its own system, the Member State would be forced to change itsown general concept. 57 This cannot be asked, since it would mean an unjustifiedde facto delimitation of Member States' discretion.

Eventually, this is underpinned by Article 28o EC Treaty itself. Incorporatingthe European Court of Justice's principles developed in the corn scandal ruling,Member States are obliged to take criminal law measures. Pursuant to Article 28o(2) EC Treaty, this obligation is somehow confined to the 'same measures they taketo counter fraud affecting their own financial interests.' Hence, if a Member Statehas decided to protect its own financial interests in a relatively soft way, this has tobe respected. By referring to the same standard as regards its own interest, Article280 (2) EC Treaty illustrates that the obligations of Member States have to be inaccordance with their own criminal law systems. This normative principle wouldbe weakened and evaded if a directive based on Article 280 (4) EC Treaty coulddetermine the range of punishment and in the wake potentially force MemberStates to change their domestic systems.

Ultimately, the legality of the Community's action, i.e. the question if theCommunity bodies acted within their authority, has to be examined for each

252) H. Satzger, op. cit. (Fn. 52), p. 458.

253) H. Satzger, op. cit. (Fn. 52), pp. 4 6off.; dismissive J. Eisele, loc. cit. (Fn. io8), pp. 1162f.

254) H. Satzger op. cit. (Fn. 52), pp. 4 6off.

155) B. Hecker, op. cit., § 8 Rn. 70.256) See G. Dannecker, loc. cit. (Fn. 2), p. 877; J. Eisele, loc. cit. (Fn. Io8), p. 1163; H. Satzger, op. cit.

(Fn. 52), pp. 4 5 5f2 57) J. Eisele, loc. cit. (Fn. io8), p. 1163.



directive individually.258 If the existing proposals, concerning the protection ofthe Community's financial interests, meet these requirements, 59 is beyond thispaper's scope. This has to be left undecided here.

5. Conclusion and Prospects

Ihe European concept of fighting frauds consists of numerous means. Two ele-ments of this strategy have been examined.

T-he paper has shown that the Community does not enjoy the competence tooriginally enact criminal law norms. Such an authority has not generally beenprovided. It does not exist for the specific area of protecting the Communities'financial interests either. Article 28o EC Treaty is not a sufficient basis.

On the other hand, the Community is entitled to issue directives harmonizingcriminal laws, at least as regards its financial interests. The required competencenorm is Article 28o EC Treaty.

However, the Community's authority is limited. Considering criminal law'speculiarities and the aforementioned lack of a Community's competence tooriginally enact criminal laws, the directive must leave sufficient discretion toMember States.

The directive may concern the statutory definition of a crime and the legalconsequences as far as they respect the guidelines which have been elaborated on.In particular, the Community might call Member States to provide for a criminalpunishment of a certain conduct. Then again the directive must not define thespecific form or determine the range of the criminal punishment.

In its 13 September 2005 ruling, the European Court ofJustice assumed a Com-munity competence to issue directives approximating criminal laws. As regardsthe fight against fraud, this is in accordance with this paper's reasoning. Thejudgement though is characterized by an extreme weak line of argumentationand methodologically poor. The Court was evidently driven by the motivation toadvance European integration. Nevertheless, it missed a historic opportunity. Asregards the Europeanization of criminal law, its decision could turn out a Pyrrhicvictory. Even though it paved, on the jurisprudence level, the way for advancingEuropeanization, critics of this process and of the Court will be felt assured intheir reservations.' 6° The functioning of the Europeanization process will only turn

'58) K. Ambos, op. cit., § iI Rn. 32; J. Eisele, loc. cit. (Fn. 1o8), p. 1163.

'59) G. Dannecker, loc. cit. (Fn. 66), p. 300.

260) Compare also B.W Wegener and T. Greenawalt, loc. cit., p. 588.



out a success, if it is accepted by its addressees, i.e. the European civilians.26' Trustand confidence are prerequisites therefore. Thus, the Court should reconsider itsself-perception and reassure itself about its significant role, in particular when itis called to decide upon criminal matters.

Nevertheless, the Europeanization of criminal law will most likely proceed pro-spectively in either case. In the aftermath of the expansion since the Communities'establishment, the advanced integration within Member States, the abolishmentof border controls and, despite obverse actions in the wake of fighting terrorism,the maximization of EU citizen's freedoms, criminals also have made use of theseadvantages.'26 Ultimately, these aspects will promote - if not rather force - furtherEuropeanization. In today's globalized and technically highly developed world,263national democracies will not be able to effectively protect their interests andcitizens, if they merely act alone on the domestic plane.264

Where and when this process will end, is not yet predictable. Persistence onimplementing the Europeanization of criminal law, one would have to envisageinstitutional criminal law bodies, e.g. a European Prosecutor as well as a Euro-pean Criminal Court.26 5 To have a European criminal law in its pure form, theseorgans would have to apply original European criminal laws, both substantiallyand procedurally. This presupposes that the Community will at some time in thefuture be competent to originally enact criminal law norms.

Presumably, the fight against fraud will play a leading role in this development.266

This area already features the most advanced achievements.267 Moreover, Euro-pean law's history has shown that the integration has always embarked upon theeconomic field. As far as the communitisation of criminal law is concerned, thiswill most likely not be different.

Time will tell if such notions will ever be implemented and assume, in wholeor in part, a definite legal form. The development of the past decades has to bekept in mind. Shortly after the Second World War, nobody would have imaginedthe level of European integration that exists today. Similarly, the creation of a

z6,) Compare also V. Stiebig, loc. cit., p. 492.

262) See V. Stiebig, loc. cit., pp. 469, 4 7 7 ff.

263) Compare U. Sieber, 'Grenzen des Strafrechts', II9 Zeitschriffiir diegesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft

(2007), pp. 3ff.264) See W. Perron, loc. cit., in: M. Hettinger et al., op. cit., pp. 4 3 8f.

265) Compare A. Klip, 'Europiisierung des Strafrechts - eine fixe Idee?', Neue Zeitschrififiir Strafrecht

(2ooo), p. 630.266) G. Dannecker, loc. cit. (Fn. 66), p. 3o8.

267) G. Dannecker, loc. cit. (Fn. 66), pp. 282f.



permanent International Criminal Court was often considered unthinkable. Itwould be surprising if the nations of Europe, with all their common grounds andhistory, fomented by future generations268 of young Europeans who have neverlived in a Europe without the EU, could in the end, not arrive at a comparableachievement.

z68) Compare M. Zuleeg, loc. cit., p. 769.


Documents

(,1 2 1/,1( - unizg.hr · these quick-tempered discussions, the renowned German law professor Roland Hefendehl, for example, spoke of the 'Bruxelles' octopus', which would now begin