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1
Asymmetric information and corporate
financial structure
Chap 8, Mishkin
Combine with class handouts
2
Corporate financial structures across developed nations reveal some common features:
1. The methods of financing in order of importance are
implying is more important than and form the most important type of
2. Only a few large corporations have
3. are a common feature in . These contracts also place substantial
4. Financial systems are heavily
This chapter and the accompanying handout “Market for lemons” try to show how these features are a product of asymmetric information problems and transactions costs in corporate financing.
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Financial intermediaries have evolved to
1. reduce
2. reduce
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Asymmetric information problems are of
• Adverse selection
• Moral hazard
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Equilibrium price and trade under adverse selection
A dealer sells two types of used cars – (i) good quality or “peaches/plums” (sweet) and (ii) bad quality or “lemons” (sour). Buyer doesn’t know which car is which.
Buyer value for “peaches” = $3000
Buyer value for “lemons” = $1500
Cost of “peaches” to seller = $2500
Cost of “lemons” to seller = $1000
Number of buyers = 40
Number of “peaches” = 15
Number of “lemons” = 15
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Equilibrium under full information
buyer can observe the quality of the car.
Market for peaches Market for lemons
p p
Equilibrium in market for peaches = ( _____, ____ )Equilibrium in market for lemons = ( _____ , ____ )Total gains from trade = _________________________________
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Equilibrium under hidden information
Buyer doesn’t know the quality of the car and has “pessimistic” beliefs.
price
quantity
Equilibrium in the market for used cars = ( ____, ___)Only ____ quality cars are traded. ____ quality cars are driven out of the market because _____________.
Total gains from trade =
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Equilibrium under hidden information (contd.)
What other belief structures are possible for buyers to have? ____________
price
quantity
Is it possible to have an equilibrium with thealternative belief structure?Hint: In equilibrium thebelief structure must be sustainable.
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“Lemons” (adverse selection) problem in stock and bonds markets
When a lender cannot distinguish between “good” stocks (bonds) and “bad” stocks (bonds), she/he
As a result
Ways to reduce
1. private production and sale of information by specialized firms
example: S & P, Moody’s,
this arrangement creates its own problem:
2. Govt. regulation to increase information
example:
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3. financial intermediation
4. collateral and “net worth”
net worth of a firm = performs a similar function as a collateral;
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Moral hazard problem in stock and bonds markets
When a lender cannot control the actions of a borrower
Ways to reduce moral hazard problems:1. Monitoring
2. Financial intermediation
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3. Designing an appropriate contract
Debt vs. equity
Collaterals
Restrictive covenants
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“Conflicts of interest” - a special type of problem in financial markets
Financial intermediaries essentially
Conflict of interest =
Example 1: investment banks research and underwrite firms
Example 2: auditing and consulting in accounting firms
Sarbanes-Oaxley