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Background

Duringitsdryseason,whichnormallylastsfromMarchtillOctober,theterritoryofRepublicofIndonesiaisregularlyhitbyforestandlandfiresofgreatproportions–mostlyaman-madephenomenontakingplaceontheislandsofKalimantanandSumatra–whichcauseheavy environmental, human and economic damage. After historically recorded peaks in1997and2015,in2019(July-October)theCountry’sbushlandandmostbio-diverseforestswere again consumed by huge fires, which directly harmed the human population withserious consequences in term of health, education, economy, transportation and socialcohesion.Besidethedestructionofthousandsofacresofvegetation,thethickanddangeroushazeproducedbythefiresprovokedthedisruptionofflightsandtheclosureofschools,andmadethousandsofcitizens-particularlytheyoungandtheelderly-sufferfromvariouslevelsofAcuteRespiratoryInfections(ARI)andotherillnesseslikestress,nausea,breathshortnessandcoughing.TheBorneoInstitute(BIT),too,wasaffectedbythehazethatblanketedthecityofPalangkaRaya:employeeshadtobedismissedforaweekinAugust,duringoneofthepeaksofthefires,whilethroughoutthecrisisallStaffworkedintheHeadOfficewearinganti-smokemasks.OurpartnerFairventuresWorldwide Indonesia, too,had to reduceworkinghoursby2hoursdaily.

Beforeandthroughoutthisnewcrisis,theauthorities,atbothcentralandlocallevel,werenoticeablefortheirapparentinabilitytodisseminateinformationabouttheimpendingdroughtsandtheElNiñophenomenonand,mostimportantly,wereperceivedasfailingtotakesystematicstepstotimelypreventanddealwiththeconsequencesoftheman-madefires,nottomentiontoidentifyandapprehendtoculprits,provingunabletoshowleadershipto the public opinion and to effectively coordinate competent agencies. Anticipatorymeasureshadevidentlynotbeentakentotryandpreventthenewlandandforestfires,whichinKalimantanhavenowcometobeconsidered,byanexhaustedandpowerlesspopulation,almostasanunavoidableseasonaldisaster.

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Uncheckedperpetrators

SeveralstudiesregardingthecausesofthefireshavebeencarriedoutinrecentyearsinIndonesiaandCentralKalimantanbyanumberofinstitutionsandNGOs,allhighlightingthe role played in the fires by business and criminal interests. Among others, reputedenvironmental organizations like WALHI and SOB focused on large palm-oil and pulpcorporationsoperatinginourProvince,whichweredeemedtobedecisivelycontributingtotheexpansionofthephenomenon.ABorneoInstituteinvestigation–carriedoutin2019inseveraldistrictsalsowiththetechnicalcollaborationofFairventuresWorldwide–haslargelyconfirmedthiswell-knownreality,buthasalsohighlightedtheinvolvementofotherparties,namely a wide range of small and large real estate developers, which created havocparticularlyintheprovincialcapitalPalangkaRayaandotherminorurbancentersandappearto have so far successfully eluded the scrutiny of lawenforcement agencies and the attention of themedia. In our2019research,wethereforefocusedontryingtoascertainthemodusoperandi(MO)oftheseparticularperpetratorsandwhytheyescaped the sanctionsof the Lawevery yearbeforeandsince the great emergencyof 2015, and the reasonwhy theyendedupplayinganevenmorerelevantroleinthefiresandthecrisisofthisyear.Social,PoliticalandLegalContext

At thepeakof thegreathazecrisisof2019,while thecitizensofPalangkaRayawerecrowdingthe12“OxygenPosts”hurriedly set up by the City Health Office, the CentralGovernmentof Indonesia– through itspowerfulCoordinatingMinister forPolicy, LawandSecurity,general (ret.)Wiranto–publicly accused the indigenous farmers of Kalimantan andotherprovincesofbeingthemainresponsiblefortheravagingland and forest fires that were causing the hazardous air

pollution. “Theyalwaysdo it in thedry season,before the rainsand thispractice should be eliminated”, Wiranto stated in Jakarta. In CentralKalimantan’stownsandruralareas,theallegationdroppedonthecivilianpopulationby theman consideredas thede factoCentralGovernment’sNumber Two, was met with disbelief and disappointment. During thecelebrationsoftheannualFarmers’Day(23-25September),theindigenouspeopleoftheManuhingRayasub-district,inGunungMas,openlycontestedWiranto’sstatement,sayingthatitwas“notbasedonfacts”.Gatheredinthe village of Luwuk Tukau, theDayak farmers of the semi-mountainousareastronglydeniedthattheyhadsettheirownfieldsandforestsonfire,andclaimedtobeactuallyamongstthemanyvictimsofthepoisonoushaze,which at that verymomentwas blanketing also the site of the farmers’

ceremoniesandwasclearlycomingfromthesouthernlowlands,astheBITStaff,whohadcometoManuhingRayafromPalangkaRayatoattendthe3-daylongevent,couldwitness.

Downsouth in theProvince’sCapital, in themeantime, thehazehadreachednewhigh and dangerous levels, officially certified by the monitoring outposts set up by the

Announcementofthetemporaryclosureofallschools,issuedbytheMayorofPalangkaRayaon12thofAugust2019

PalangkaRayachildrensharinganoxygencan(Photo:BIT)

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MinistryofEnvironmentandForestry (MLHK).Nevertheless,even though for twomonthsalreadymanycitizenshadbeenheavilyaffectedbyshortnessofbreathandothersymptoms,theProvincialGovernmenthadnotyetdeclaredtheStateofEmergency invokedbymanyenvironmentalorganizations,firefightersandhealthpractitioners.

During the haze crisis, in Palangka Raya and other minor urban centers (Sampit;Kotawaringin;Barito)airpollutionseriouslyimpactedthecitizens’healthanddisruptedmanyoutdoor activities. The number of respiratory illnesses cases reported by hospitals hadreached in September a total of 11,591 individuals all over CentralKalimantan, including 2,139 people suffering from ARI in the city ofPalangkaRayaalone. Thehazealsodisrupted theeducation systemandmany office activities. Based on data released by the National DisasterManagement Agency (BNPB), on the 15th of September 2019 in CentralKalimantantherewere954activehotspots(fires),atthattimethelargestnumber inallof Indonesia. Facinggrowingcomplaintsby thepublicandincreasingmediascrutiny,finallyonSeptember16ththeMayorofPalangkaRaya reactedwith a Decree (SK - No. 188.45 / 435 /2019) enacting theKarhutla(KebakaranHutandanLahan,orBurningForestandLand)StateofEmergencyresponse,howeverjustforthelimitedperiodbetweenthe16thand30thofSeptember.

This pattern of slow reaction was not unprecedented. Theauthorities’failuretotimelyactduringthe2015greathazeemergencyinCentral Kalimantan had, at the time, been the subject of many civic

protests, such as the public collection of coins to“pay theGovernment’s expenses” (more than 500peoplecontributed)organizedbyvariousgroupsasaformofsatiricalreproachagainstvariousnationalministriesandtheprovincialauthorities’claimthattheirlackofresponsehadbeencausedby“ascarcityofpublicfunds”.In2015inPalangkaRaya,thelandmarkSoekarnostatue,sittingatthecenter of the city’s main roundabout, was fitted by a group ofprotesterswith a giant anti-smoke facemask as a formof extremeprotestandfrustrationaboutthehaze.

The2015people’sprotests inKalimantanandotheraffectedprovinces ended in a lengthy legal battle culminated in a CitizenLawsuit(CLS)promotedbyanumberofcivicorganizations,whosuedthe President of the Republic (Joko Widodo), the Ministry ofEnvironmentandForestry,theMinistryofHealthandtheGovernorofCentralKalimantan,accusingthemofneglectingtheirdutytopreventandstopthefires,andtoprotectthepopulation’shealth.Onthe7thofSeptember 2017, the Central Kalimantan High Court accepted thepeople’slawsuitwithitsDecisionNo.36/PDT/2017/PT/PLK,andthelegal issue went up to the Indonesian Supreme Court. In 2019 theNation’s High Court finally confirmed the negligence of both the

centralandprovincialGovernmentswithitsDecisionNo.3555K/PDT/2019(negligence,inthiscase,waslikenedtoanactagainsttheLaw)andorderedtheauthoritiestoswiftlytakeremedialmeasuresandaddress thepeople’s requests forbetterplanningandprevention.Unfortunately, the Government de facto refused to comply with the Court’s ruling as it

In2019,anonymoushandsputanti-smokemasksonthemonumentinJalanA.Yani.Inthebackground,abillboardwiththeimageofCentralKalimantanGovernor,SugiantoSabran(Photo:BIT)

ThelandmarkstatueofSukarnoinPalangkaRaya,coveredwithananti-smokemaskin2015.“Yourhazekillsus".

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appealedagainsttheDecision,thusprolongingtheagonyofthepopulationandfailingagain,in2019,tobereadytopreventandrespondtoanewhazeemergency,whichthistimewastobecomemoredramaticduetoahistoricdecisiontakenbytheveryCentralGovernment,whichbroughtunforeseen(butentirelyforeseeable)consequencestoKalimantan.KalimantanasthesiteofaNewCapital Atthebeginningof2019,rumorsofapossible,imminentdecisionbythePresidentregardingthetransferoftheNation’sCapitalfromJakartatoanother,moregeographically-central,locationoftheArchipelago(withthreeKalimantanprovincesinpoleposition),startedcirculatingamongstpoliticalcircles,bigbusinessinterestsandmediaoperatives.Afteraseriesofleaksandinformalconfirmationsbyindividualministers,andfinallybythesamePresident,theconcretepossibilitythattheGovernmentwouldselectKalimantanignitedalobbyingraceby the islandprovinces’ respectiveGovernors, including thatofCentralKalimantan,and–mostimportantlyinouranalysis–starteda‘goldrush’amonglocalandnationallandownersand developers. These business people, often well connected with State agencies andindividualofficials,starteda fiercecompetitiontosellandbuy landforbuildingpurposes,luredbythealmostcertaintythat–ifoneofKalimantanProvinceswerechosen–thewholeisland would inevitably benefit from the transfer of the Nation’s Capital, in terms ofinfrastructuresandservicesasaconsequenceofthemovefrom Jawa to Kalimantan of an estimated 1,5million civilservantsplustheirfamiliesandbusinessoperativesandtheirstaff.

Thecloserthedateofthefinalpresidentialdecision,thehigherthepricesoflandrose(literallyskyrocketed)inallKalimantan,doublingoreventreblingeveryweek,includingof course the price of “unused” forests, bush areas anddegradedpeatland,notyetcommerciallyexploitedandthusconsidered “up for grabs”, particularly in the vicinities ofprovincialroadsandurbancenters.Wheneventually(16thofAugust)PresidentJokoWidodoformallypickedtwodistrictsofEastKalimantanasthenewCapital’ssites,themachineoflandsellingandclearinghadlongbeensetinmotionandwasrunningatfullsteam,andkeptdoing so even after the formal announcement, with businessmen and politicians of the‘losing’provincesstillhopingtodirectlyandindirectlyprofitfromthefalloutofthehistorictransfer(asthebeginningoftheactualmoveisplannedonlyforYear2024,therealestatefrenzyinKalimantanislikelytocontinueformanyyearstocome).BITResearch-Timeframe,LocationsandMethodology

TheBorneoInstitute’sresearch,focusingonthe“Principalcausesofforestandlandfires”intheDistrictofPalangkaRaya,startedinearlyJuly2019andwasconcludedbyearlyOctober,andfocusedontheaimsandMOofrealestatedevelopersandprivatelandownersinvolvedinlandburning.Theinvestigationwascarriedoutbyutilizingthreemaintools:

PresidentJokowiexaminespossiblelocationsforthenewCapitalinKalimantan(Photo:JakartaGlobe)

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1) On-site(firehotspots)BITStaffvisitswithdirectobservationandevidence-seekingatthescenesofthefires.LocationswerealsoidentifiedbyusingtheGlobalForestFiresWatchapplication

2) In-depthinterviewswithwitnesses,localresidentsandfirefighters,whopossessedfirst-handinformationaboutfireincidentsandtheircircumstances.

3) Audio-visualrecordings

AlltheforestandlandfiresrecordedinCentralKalimantanbetweenthe1stofJulyandthe30thofSeptember2019.

PalangkaRayaisthefourthdistrictbynumberofhotspots(8689).Courtesy,mappingserviceofFairventuresWorldwide

ThemainlandfireslocationsvisitedbyBITwithintheboundariesofPalangkaRayaurbanarea

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ForestandLandFiresintheurbanDistrictofPalangkaRaya.

Duringthe3monthsofthecrisis,BIT’sinvestigativeTeamsfocusedmainlyon20mainlocationswithinthecity/districtboundaries,whichwerethetheatreofseverefires.Ourstaffvisitedandobservedthefire-affectedlocationsoftenfollowingthefirebrigadesor,insomecases, reaching theareasbefore–evenhoursbefore– the interventionof theProvince’sagencies.OurTeamsthenreturnedtothesamespotsinsubsequentvisits,afterafewdaysorweeks,forfollow-upsaimedatgatheringfurtherinformationandvisualdata.

After interviewing many witnesses, neighborsand fire fighters – often off the record to protect theidentity of our collaborators –we started forming theclearimageofapractice,whichwasnotnewbutwhichhad suddenly become acute, in this urban district, in2019:thesettingonfireofvastplotsofbushland,oftenpeat land, inthe immediatesurroundingsoftheurbancenter,aphenomenonclearlyanddirectlyconnectedtoaswiftincreaseinrealestateactivitiesortheexpansionof other business-related facility-building activities. Insum,landownersanddevelopers,luredbythemoveofIndonesia’s center of Power to Kalimantan and thepossibilityofgreaterprofitsthaninthepastyears,were

usingfireasa“cheapandquick”waytoeliminatethevegetationinordertoshowcasealreadysemi-cleansed landstopotentialbuyersand/ortofacilitatetheconstructionworktotheircontractors.

ByburningbushesandtreesallaroundPalangkaRaya(thusdecisivelycontributingtothe haze that blanketed for months the city, affecting its population of all ages), thesebusinesses intended to “save big money” (using heavymachineryorhumanlaborwouldcostthemmuchmore)andtime (another crucial element in a suddenly highlycompetitivebusinessenvironment).

In spite of the existing regulations, of well knowndangerstothecitizens’healthandoftheauthorities’blandinvitations to exercise restraint or stop the burning, thepractice-inandaroundPalangkaRaya-continuedbasicallyunimpededforthewholedryseason.

Whenaskedwhytheculpritswerenotdiscouragedbythepotentialriskofbeingcaughtandarrested,almostallofourintervieweescitedthesamesetofreasons:a)thefireswere“easilyandquickly”setoff“byfreelancers”whohadbeenpaid“byemissariesofsomeone”andwho,evenifcaught,couldnotand“wouldnot”linktheburningtoaspecificbusinessmanorcompany;b)thepossibilityofbeingcaughtintheactwas“minimal”,asmanyoftheburningstartedatnightorearlyinthemorningandrequiredonlythe“timeoflightingamatchandthrowingitonapileofdryleavestosetthewhole fieldon fire”; c) the recordof legal sanctions imposedupondirectperpetratorsorconcernedcompaniesfrom2015onwardsinKalimantan(andcountrywide)waslow,almostbordering“impunity”,asmostof the (already relatively few)cases reportedby thePolice

Bannerpublicizinganewhousingcomplextobebuiltonlandclearedbyfire(Photo:BIT)

Publicityforanewhousingcomplex,erectedonalargeburnedplotoflandbytherealestatedeveloper(Photo:BIT)

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endeduplostinthefoggywatersofthecourtsandhavenotresultedasoftodayinsignificantjailsentencesorseverepecuniaryfines.

Anotherrecurrent fact,citedbyall the interviewees,wasthat inmostcases ithadbeentheneighbors(concernedabouttheirhomesandfamilies’safety)whohadrequestedthe intervention of the fire brigades,eitherbyphoneorhurriedlycallingonthefewknownlocalemergencycenters:“It’snevertheownerofthelandtheonewhocries for help and tries to quicklyextinguish the flames before theybecomeahugefire”,statedallwitnesses,inferring that theowners (inmost casesreal estate companies, other businessesorrichprivatelandlords)seemed-tosaytheleast-tonothaveadirectinterestinpreventing the fires from creating thehaze and destroying the vegetationcoveringtheirproperties.Whenaskediftheyknewwhattheownersintendedtodowiththeland,ourinterlocutorssimplypointedatthebrand-newlargebannerserectedparticularlybytherealestatedevelopersimmediatelyafterthefires,inthemiddleofthecharredfields,topublicize the soon-to-be-built new luxury “perumahan” (housing complexes) or “rumahsubsidi”(State-subsidizedhomes,forlessaffluentcustomers).Thereasonsofthefiresandtheaimofthelandownersseemedtoallofourpowerlessintervieweesas“anopensecret”,as itwasthefeelingofacompletesurrenderof theauthorities inchargeofenforcingtheexistinglaws.

Thisfeelings,ofpowerlessnessandimpunityfortheperpetratorswasconfirmedbyanepisodethatoccurredtoaBITStaffduringoneofourTeam’svisittosomeburnedfieldsin the Palangka Raya area of Keren Bankirai. While taking photographs of a large site

completelyrazedbytheflamesoneofourresearcherswasapproachedby a land mediator. The man introduced himself as a civil servantworking for aProvincial Service (Education) andwho,with “friends”,wasactivealsointhelandbusiness,asasidejob.Theman(wehavehisname,phonenumber,vehicleplateandpicture,andwehaverecordedthewholeconversation) toldourStaffmemberthat, if the latterwasinterested, he could help him with buying land “all over CentralKalimantan”andsecuring“quickly”allthenecessarypermits.Headdedthat he had already “many plots” available, to be used for housingcomplexes or plantations. Our Staff played the game, confirming hisinterest,butexpressedconcernaboutthe legalityoftheprocessandaskedwhether themanandhis friendscouldhelphimalsowith the“cleansing”oftheland.Themediatorgavehimthefollowinganswer:“Ifyouowntheland,wecanhelpyoureachan‘agreement’withtheRT[RukunTetangga,thesmallestlocaladministrativedivisioninIndonesia]orthesub-district[Kecamatan]orwiththeCitydepartments,beforewe

burntheland,sothatyouwillbefreefromtheburdenoftheLaw”.Pressedonwhetherthis‘agreements’wouldbelegal,thelandmediatorstatedtoourStaff:“Youneedtogetallonboard,sothatinfutureyouwillnotbeblackmailed.”

Peatsoilstillburningafterthemainfirewasextinguished(Photo:BIT)

AfirefightingteamfromtheprovincialDISHUT(ForestryService),franticallysearchingforwaterinanalmostdryditch(Photo:BIT)

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BIT researcherswere also directwitnesses of themassive difficulties faced by thefirefighterswhotriedformonthstoextinguishthefires,particularlyduetothedangerous,trickynatureofthepeatlandwhichsurroundsPalangkaRaya(theflamesputdownonthesurfacekeepburningunderneathfordays,andcomeoutagaininasuddenandsometimesdevastatingmanner).Manyofthetrulyselflessandcourageousfirefightersweinterviewedhighlightedconfusionandalackofcoordinationbetweendifferentgovernmentalagenciesand lamentedexhaustingworkinghours and inadequate technicalmeans (vehicles;watertanks; water pumps; safety gears, among others), although stressing that the greatestchallengeforthemhadcomefromthelack,orscarceavailability,ofproperwatersources.

Theissueofwaterpointsforemergencieshadbeenahighlycontentioustopicin2015andstillwasin2019,ashighlightedtoourTeamsbyseveralcitizens,includingthefirefighters.ThelackofanappropriateplantocreatewaterpointsforemergenciesintheareaofPalangkaRayabecameapparent toeverybodyduring this 2019emergency andmighthavebeenadirect consequence of the BRG (Badan Restorasi Gambut or Agency for the PeatlandRestoration)’sdecisiontonot includetheprovincialcapital’surbandistrict intheirplantointerveneinCentralKalimantanafterthebigfiresof2015.

In2019,ourStaffdirectlyobservedhowthefirefightersofseveralcityandprovincialagenciesstruggledtogetaccesstowater,whentheirrelativelysmalltruck-mountedtanksgotempty.Insomecasestheworkershadtousewaterfromtherareexistingchannelsseparatinglargefields.Duringthedryseasonthesechannelswerealittlemorethanditchesfullofravinesandgarbageanddugalongtimebefore(andpoorlymaintained,ifatall)andthefirefightershadtopulloffthevegetation,ordiginsearchofwater,with theirbarehands.Mostoften, the firebrigadeshad toask theneighborsfortheirpermittoaccessthelatter’sprivate“sumur”(well)or “bor” (borehole)oreven“kolam ikan” (fish tanks) to secure thewaternecessarytotryandextinguishthefires.

Duringourlastroundoffieldvisits(inmidOctober,whenthefire/hazeemergencywasbasically finished),wenoticed that a fewnewwater channels had been excavated by some authorities and,most interestingly,we encountered some boreholes freshly dug incompletely charred plots of land. Some of these new boreholes(simpleplasticpipescomingoutofasmallsquarecementplatform)-liketheonewefoundin Bukit Tunggal - bore a redmetal placard, citing the acronymofprovincial agencies in charge of dealingwith peat land restoration(TRGD–TSAK),theOPCLGTacronym(OperasiPembasahanCepatLahanGambutTerbakar)andtheyearofconstruction(2019).Allofthemhadclearlybeenrealizedafterthefiresthathadravagedthelandtheysatwithin.Allwerenotfencedandwereunguarded.Inatleastonecasewehadthestrongimpressionthatwewerefacingoneofthemuchcomplainedaboutcasesof“sumurborpalsu”(fakeboreholes),decriedbybothcitizensandfirefightersduringthepeakoftheemergency.

Aspreviouslysaid,wevisitedmanyfirehotspotsinPalangkaRaya,doublecheckingseveraldaysorweekslatersomeofthem.Downhere,wereportonlyafewofourfindingsindetail,togiveourreaderssomeexamples.

OurTeamsvisitedseveraltimesoneofthemostfire-affectedarearightwithintheboundariesofPalangkaRaya,notfarfromthecity'scenter:asitethatwassoclosetotheurbansettlement that the firespromptedpossibly the fastest responseby theemergency

Anewsumur/borinBukitTunggal,dugafterthefires(Photo:BIT)

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services (that unfortunately were not able to prevent the complete destruction of thevegetation).Wearespeakingoftwolargeplotsoflandfacingtheroundaboutthatleadstotheairport,namelythelandbehindabigHondaDealerandanotheradjoinedsitedestinedtohostanew,giantShoppingMall.BothplotswerecompletelyrazedbyflamesthatcausedsuchaseverehazardtothehouseholdslivingintheimmediatevicinitiesthattheArmyitselffelttheneedtointervene.ThelandbehindtheHondadealerreportedlybelongstothesamebusiness,which–accordingtomanyneighbors-planstoexpanditspremisesbybuildingadepot, and it is still in plain view of the passing cars. The other burned area, nearby, iscompletelyconcealedtothepublicviewbyafreshlyerectedmetalhighfence,whichhidesadesolateburnedplot.ThegatetothisdevelopmentlocationbearsalargesignrecentlyplacedbythePoliceprohibitinganyonefromenteringthesite,whichisnow“underinvestigation”.

The surroundings of the “Tjilik Riwut” Airport’s new Terminal, inaugurated byPresident Jokowi in April 2019, were another infamous example of man-made fires inPalangkaRaya.Aroundtheairportarea(Panarung/Pahandut),thevegetationcannolonger

bedescribedasforest(treeswithadiameterof20cm.andabove),anditisdominatedbyshrubsandsmalllogsof5cm.indiameter)andcoveredbyalang-alanggrass.Atthetimeofourfirstvisits,thearea (4,46 km. from the city center) was blanketed by a thickyellowishsmoke,andseveralhotspotswerestillactive,promptingtemporary closures of the airport or flight delays. During our last visitinOctober,thehazehadgonebutthelandscapestillborethesigns of the huge fires that on several occasions in the previousmonths had ravaged the land surrounding the airstrip. In somesectionsoftheburnedland–markedwithconcretepostsbearingthe inscription “Batas Lahan Bandara” (Boundary of the Airport’sLand)–wephotographedsomenewPoliceLineyellowstripesand

otherPoliceplacards,declaringthelandofflimits.Oneplacardinparticular,signedbytheChief of Police, Pahandut area, launched an odd appeal: “Please, the land owner shouldimmediately contact the public security agency in Pahandut or the Criminal InvestigationPolice’s Investigator (081349143456) within 1 X 7 days. Palangka Raya October 2019”.Neighborslivinginthearea,statedtoBITthatthefires,whichalmosttorchedtheirhomes,hadcome“fromthesideoftheairport”.

Wealsovisitedtheurbansectionsofsomeofthemainroadsandstreetsconnectingthe Capital City with the rest of the Province, namely Jalan G.Obos, Jl. MahirMahar, Jl.Bangaris, Jl. Kecipir, and found thatmany fields surrounding thesevital lines of communication were being or had recently beenaffected,withfiresstillragingorsmokestillcomingoutofthe(mostlypeat)land.Manyofthefireshadtakenplaceincloseproximityoftheroads(easyaccesstoroadsincreasesexponentiallythevalueoftheland for real estate purposes) and had directly threatened humansettlements,shopsandpublicbuildings.Electricandtelephonepoleshad also been surrounded by flames and some lines had beendamaged.

Someparticularworrisomehotspotsturnedouttobenotfarfrom the Central Business District (CBD) area of Palangka Raya,aroundJl.A.Yani,Jl.KinibaluandYosSudarso.Theareahoststhecoreof the city, and Province, economic activity with modern and

Thevastplotofburnedlandwithintheairportboundarylimitpost(Photo:BIT)

Policeplacardaskingthelandownertocontacttheinvestigators(Photo:BIT)

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traditionalmarkets, government institutions and private offices.We also visited the areaclose to the PalangkaRayaUniversity complex (Jl. Yos Sudarso), and theOuter Ring areabeyondJl.G.ObosXXV.Evidencethatlandbushfireswasstilloccurringinseverallocationsinandaroundthecitywasconfirmedbythefranticflight,stillinlateSeptember,ofoneoldRussian-madehelicopterutilizedtospreadriverwateronthefires(someresidentialbuildingshitbythewaterwerepartiallydamaged).

ManyelementsgatheredbytheBorneoInstituteTeams,throughdirectsightingandtens of interviews with eyewitnesses, strongly indicated that in almost all of the abovementionedlocationsinthewestern,northernandinnercityareasthebushhadbeenburnedforhousingdevelopmentpurposes.Thesefindingswerevisuallyexemplified,again,bytheadverts that some real estate developers had erected right on the sites of the fires,immediatelyaftertheburning.

OneexemplarycasewasrecordedbyourTeamsnear Jl.MahirMahar (JalanTransKalimantan-Banjarmasin),andinvolvedtheBYGcompany,whosebanner(publicizingthesaleofplotsoflandforanewprospectedluxuryhousingcomplex,dividedinto‘kavlings’orsub-plots)wefoundstandinguntouchedbytheflames(andthereforemostprobablyplacedin

theplotof land‘after’thefire) ina largefieldcompletelyburnedandcharred. According to several witnesses and the owner of awarung(tavern)TigaDara,standinginthevicinityoftheburnedarea,thefireintheBYGlocationhadbeengoingonforaweekandhadonlybeenputoff on September 20. The length of the extinguishing process hadreportedlybeenduetothelimitedavailabilityofthewaterthatcouldbefound by the fire brigades (called, again, by the neighbors) and theoutdatedandbasicequipmentusedbytheirteams,aswellastherefusalbyownersofneighboringlandstoavailtheirprivatewells.InthevicinityoftheBYGestate,wealsofoundanotherlargeplotoflandcompletelyburned and belonging to a DLM housing company, whose publicitybanneralsostoodfirmanduntouched,andthereforemostlikelyerectedafterthefire.

TheseandmanyotherfindingsformthebasisfortheBITTeams’opinion that business interests and operatives objectively received a

substantial benefit from, if not played a direct involvement in, the sudden and basicallyunchallenged burning of their properties. The concerned businesses and real estatecompaniesappearedeithernegligentorashavingintentionallylefttheirlands(mostlydriedup peat soil) to be engulfed in flames, also neglecting to create water points for fireemergencies and avoiding to man-guard their properties and to timely call up the firebrigades.

Awaterchannelonpeatland,dugaftertheemergency(Photo:BIT)

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TheGovernment’sIntervention

In themidstof the2019crisis,withthenationalmediaalreadyreportingdramaticstories from the field, and footage of raging fires appearing on all major internationalnewscasts,severalneighboringgovernmentsbegantoofficiallycomplaintoIndonesiaaboutthehazefalloutwhichwasbythendirectlyaffectingtheirrespectivecountriesandpeoples.Pushedbythemagnitudeofthecomplaints,afterinitiallydenying responsibility, the Indonesian Governmenteventually decided to address the issue. President JokoWidodo(Jokowi)himselfvisitedRiau(Sumatra)–butnotKalimantan – to inspect the land fires that were takingplaceonthatisland,andstatedthathehadinstructedtheChiefsofPolice(POLRI)andoftheArmedForces(TNI)to“demoteandreplace”anylocalcommanderwhohadfailedin their task of countering the emergency andapprehending the culprits (as of October, this has nothappened,yet,andactuallytheChiefofNationalPolicehasbeenpromotedtothepositionof Minister of Interior on 23rd of October). Joko Widodo lamented that based on theConstitutionandtheLawonAutonomies,hedidnothavethepoweroffiringnegligentandinefficientGovernorsandMayors.ThePresidentpubliclyexpressedregretfortheforestandlandfiresandremindedthelocalgovernmentsthattheyshouldplayakeyroleinpreventingthehazefromhappening.

This presidential statement finally tickled the Governor of Central Kalimantan,SugiantoSabran,whomadeseveralpublicstatementscallingforhelpandlaunchedasortofcontestamongtheProvince’scitizenstofindtheonewhowouldgethimanideaonhowtostop the fires, by promising a financial reward (2 billions Indonesian Rupiahs, ca. Euro120,000),andalso invitedthepopulationandthecivil servants topray for theendof thedroughtandthecomingofrain,inorderto“resolve”theproblem.PreparednessandCoordinationissues

The consequences of the historical political decision taken by the Government to

movetheCountry’sCapitaltoKalimantan,particularlythelandbusinessraceitignitedinourProvince, impacted Central Kalimantan throughout thewholedryseasonof2019,andcouldbestillfeltatthetimeofwritingthisreport(mid-October)asthepoliticaldecisionhaddefactocontributedtoasharpincreaseinlandburningforthepurposeofbuildingspeculation.Ontopofthis,landandforestfiresin2019becameevenmoreproblematicduetotheabovementionedfailuretotakepreemptivemeasuresandthewell-knownshortcomingsoftheGovernment,bothat central and provincial level, which seemed to not havelearnt anymajor lessons from the 2015 crisis. Themostseriousoftheseshortcomingswasanallapparentlackof

capacitytocoordinatethevariouspublicagenciesformallyinchargeofmitigatingmeasures,whichshouldhavebeenbettertaskedandinvolvedinthepreventionandcounteringofthe

PresidentJokoWidodovisitingaburnedlandareainRiau.(Photo:ANTARA/Setpres/Cahyo)

TheGovernorofCentralKalimantan,SugiantoSabran

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fires and their consequences, before or at least from the very beginning of the newemergency,andthelackofwaterpointstofightthefires.

Basedontheinformationobtainedfromcivilservantsinterviewedonthefires’scenesduringourinvestigation,in2019clearsignsofthislackofcoordinationemergedinCentralKalimantanparticularlyasregardstheinteractionsbetweentheMinistryofHealth(MOH),theDepartmentofEnvironmentandForestry(DLH),thePeatRestorationAgency(BRG),theEnvironmentServiceoftheProvinceandtheprovincialDisasterManagementAgency(BPBD).

To try and clarify the reasonsof this apparent governance failure,BIT interviewedSipetHermanto,experiencedcivilservantandformerHeadoftheForestryServiceinCentralKalimantan–theagencytraditionallyinchargeofcombatingforestandlandfires-whogaveus a quite discouraging picture of the many, unresolved hiccups of the administrativemachine.

“TheLawrequiresthataminimumoffiveKabupaten[provincedistricts]beaffectedbythefiresinordertodeclaretheStateofEmergencyandhandlethefireswiththenecessaryextraordinarymeansand resources”, statedMr.Sipet. “In this2019crisis, theemergencydeclarationcamesignificantlylate,buttheconfusedresponseoftheProvincesufferedalsofromthestructuraldifficultyofharmonizingtheplethoraofagencies,budgetsandregulationsthathampertheanticipation and control of forest and land fires in CentralKalimantan”.Incaseofalargeemergency,thereareinfactseveralentities, which should be involved, also depending on the fires’location (urban, semi-urban or forest), and these are mainly theSOPD (Provincial Organizational Apparatus Units), theEnvironmentalAgency,theBNPB(ProvincialDisasterManagementAgency),andfinallytheForestService.Anumberofother,smallercityservicesarealsoinvolved,incasethefirestakeplacewithintheboundariesofanurbancenterlikePalangkaRaya.Allthisproducesoverlapping and confusion. “There has been an attempt tocoordinate our respective forces and interventions”, added Mr.Sipet,“bycreatingaTimTerpadu(IntegratedTeam),butstilleachcomponent has to follow its own financial procedures, or risksincurring in penalties and bigger problems”. Meager individualbudgets and the possibility of violating long-established internalbureaucratic procedures and financial rules seem some of thereasons for the various agencies’ leading officials’ apparentreluctance to coordinatewith other entities swiftly andmore effectively. “We can accessextraordinaryfundsdisbursedbytheNationalDisasterManagementAgencyonlyifthereisadecreeissuedbytheGovernor,preciselystatinghowmuchandhowtospendthemoney.Withoutthat,it’simpossibletotimelyrespondtoanyemergencyinacoordinatedmanner.Allofthisisjustridiculousandmakesitimpossibletoeffectivelyaddressacrisis”,concludedMr.Sipet.

BITResearchTeamYanediJagauDestanoAnugrahnuYokiYohandiDesieAndreastuti

Army,PoliceandProvincialServices'staffconveneonthesceneofalargefireinTumbangNusa(Photo:BIT)

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RodiYosaPrasetyaGiovanniPortaFairventuresWorldwideIwanSetyawanJojonSuriaNata

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BITRecommendations

OurResearchwasaimedfromitsinceptionattwoobjectives:toexposethereasonsbehindthePalangkaRayahazeemergencyin2019and,mostimportantly,toidentifypossiblewaysofpreventingasimilarcrisisfromtakingplaceagainin2020andthefollowingyears.

We are therefore presenting here some recommendations to the concernedAuthorities,forthemtotakeswiftandthoroughactionandcomplywiththeirdutiesinamoreeffectiveandcreativeway.

These calls for action represent also practical guidelines for Palangka Raya andKalimantan’sNGOsandcivicgroupsinfulfillingtheircrucialroleaswatchdogs,tolobbyandmonitortheresponsibleagencies,fromnowtillthenextdryseason,andmakesurethatthePeople’swillandhopesarenotbetrayedagain.

1. WeurgetheGovernment,representativebodiesatvariouslevels(DPR;DPRD),allexecutivebranchesofcentralMinistriesandprovincialservices,theGovernorofCentralKalimantan,theMayorsofPalangkaRayaandalltheProvince’surbancenters,aswellasalltheRegents(DistrictHeads)toformulate,approveandimplementacoherentsetoflegalregulationsandto revise the existing ones, regarding all aspects of land and forest fire prevention andmanagement.Theregulationstobeissuedorrevisedshould:

-Strengthenlawenforcementinterventionsagainstthoseresponsible(primaryandsecondary)forun-authorizedlandclearingbyfire.Culpritsmustbeswiftlyidentifiedandtakentocourt.Courtsshouldexaminethelandfirecasesasamatterofpriorityduetothehazardcausedtothewholepopulation.Monetarysanctionsshouldbebroughtupto5timesthevalueoftheburnt land, in order to discourage the burning. Follow up to court sanctions must bestrengthened,makingsurethatbusinessesandcompanies,sentencedtopayforthefirestheycaused,actuallymeettheirlegalobligations.

-Ensureamorerigorouscontrolandprotectionofforestsand landmanagement, includingsevere penalties for those found to be benefiting from land fires on own lands,with theprohibitiontoselllandinurbanareaswithinaperiodof10to20yearsfromanunauthorizedclearingbyfire.

-Prohibitlandusechangeafteranyun-authorizedclearingbyfire.Burntlandmustberestoredtoitsoriginalfunctionandspatialdestination,asofbeforethefire.

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- Prohibit the issuance of HGUs for new plantations and also the annulment of RealEstate/buildingpermitstothosecommercialentitiesfoundresponsibleofclearingbyfire.

-ProhibittheissuingofBuildingPermits(IMB)fortheburnedlands,asaformofdeterrencetotheownerswhointentionallyusefireasameansofclearing,aswellastothoseownerswhodelayedorshowednegligenceinputtingoutthefires.

-Introducetheobligationtodig,maintainorrestoreviable(sufficientandaccessible)sourcesofwater,inallplotsoflandsownedbyregisteredcompaniesordevelopers,andobligationtomakethesewatersourcesavailabletothefirebrigadesincaseoffire.

2. The Central and Regional Governmentsmust improve coordination (also internal) at alllevels,whichshouldbeaimedatanticipatingandmanagingforestandlandfiredisasters,bydesigningcoherentandmanageableforestfirepreventionprocedures, facilitiesandwaterinfrastructuressuchaswellsandcanals.Theremustbemuchbettercoordinationdirectedfrom the center and the provinces, which should simplify the bureaucratic process fordeterminingandcallingaStateofEmergencyintheearlystagesofdisasters.3.Educationcampaignsarepivotalforcommunityawareness.Citizensshouldbeinformedandinstructedtousewaysalternativetofireforlandclearing.Techniquesforfertilizingplantssuch as composting should be encouraged as they are more environment-friendly andconducivetoprogressivelyreducingoravoidinglandburning.4.Competentauthoritiesshouldagreeonjointplansandsimplermanagingandcoordinatingstructures,whoseeffectivenessshouldbesubjecttoperiodic,seriousevaluationandrevision,ifnecessary,inordertostrengthenbothpreventionandresponsetofires.5.AnadditionalallocationofdisasterresponsefundsbothintheAPBN/APBDintheeffortto prevent future land and forest fire disasters is necessary. Funds should be allocatedaccordingtowellsetandagreedpriorities,suchaspreparingboreholesinandaroundfire-proneareasaswellasstrengtheningthetechnicalcapacityofthefirebrigades(includingthepurchaseofmoremodernequipment;morehelicopters,etc.),andmaintainingtheirtoolstooptimalstatusinordertoensuretheyarealwaysreadyforuse.TheBorneoInstitutePalangkaRaya,October2019