1 DESAI LAW FIRM, P.C. Aashish Y. Desai, Esq. (SBN 187394)

2 Adrianne De Castro, Esq. (SBN 238930) 3200 Bristol St. , Suite 650

3 Costa Mesa, CA 92626 Telephone: (949) 614-5830

4 Facsimile: (949) 271-4190 aashish@desai -law .com

5 adrianne@desai-law.com

6 SANFORD HEISLER SHARP, LLP Danielle Fuschetti (Bar No. 294064)

7 dfuschetti@sanfordheisler .com 111 Sutter Street, Suite 975

8 San Francisco, CA 94104 Tel.: (415) 795-2020

9 Fax: (415) 495-2021

10 Attorneys for Plaintiff

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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF ORANGE

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MARY ANNE JOHNSON, on behalf of herself ) CASE NO.: and all other "aggrieved" employees, )

) Plaintiffs, )

) REPRESENTATIVE ACTION COMPLAINT

vs. ) )

SEASPINE HOLDINGS CORPORATION, a ) COMPLAINT FOR: Delaware Corporation, SEASPINE, INC., ) SEASPINE ORTHOPEDICS Corporation, ) SEASPINE SALES, LLC; and DOES 1-10, )

1. VIOLATION OF CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2699 ET SEQ;

inclusive. ) )

Defendants. )

2. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, CAL. CIVIL CODE§ 1060

) ) ) DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL ) )

COMPLAINT

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Plaintiff Maryanne Johnson, on behalf of herself and all other aggrieved employees

("Plaintiffs"), hereby file this Complaint against Defendants SeaSpine Holding Corporation, a

Delaware Corporation, and all its subsidiaries that acted as joint employers to the Plaintiff with

SeaSpine Holding Corporation, including SeaSpine, Inc., SeaSpine Orthopedics Corporation,

SeaSpine Sales, LLC, Theken Spine LLC, IsoTis Orthobiologics, Inc., and IsoTis, Inc. and DOES

1-10 (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Defendants" or "SeaSpine"). Plaintiff is informed

and believes, and on that basis, alleges as follows:

Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all aggrieved employees against

Defendants for their failure to provide equal pay to her and other women employed by SeaSpine.

As a result, Defendants have violated the California Fair Pay Act, Cal. Labor Code Sect. 1197.5

as described below and the Private Attorneys General Act ("P AGA"), Cal. Labor Code Sect.

2699, et seq.

INTRODUCTION

1. This lawsuit arises out of an ongoing wrongful scheme by Defendants to deny their

female employees equal pay compared to their male counterparts for performing substantially

similar work.

2. SeaSpine Holdings Corporation is a medical technology company headquartered in

Carlsbad, California that designs, develops, and markets surgical solutions for the treatment of

spinal disorders. It maintains an office in Irvine, California. SeaS pine was incorporated in 2015

as a spinoff from Integra LifeScience Corporation of Integra's orthobiologics and spinal fusion

hardware business. It is a publicly traded corporation and enjoys a robust revenue stream:

approximately $128.9 million in 2016.

3. SeaSpine employs approximately 300 persons in California. Despite the fact that

women account for approximately half of SeaSpine's workforce, the Company's executive

leadership is predominantly male. In fact, both the its 8-member Board of Directors and its 9-

member senior leadership, each, have only one female member. This exclusive leadership team

exemplifies and perpetuates SeaSpine's good old boys club, which is hostile to women.

4. This hostility towards women extends to the Company's compensation scheme.

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SeaSpine pays women less than it pays men for performing substantially similar work, when

viewed as a composite of skill, effort, and responsibility, and performed under similar working

conditions, in violation of the California Equal Pay Act, CaL Lab. Code§ 1197.5. This inequity

is not justified by any lawful reason.

5. SeaSpine's violation of the California Equal Pay Act is willful and intentional.

The Company has known or should have known that it pays women less than men for performing

substantially similar work; but the Company refuses to rectify this.

6. Despite the fact that Plaintiff and her male colleagues performed substantially

similar work, SeaS pine paid Plaintiff tens of thousands of dollars per year less than it paid her

male colleagues. The men whom SeaSpine paid more often lacked her qualifications, experience,

skills, and strong record of performance. Plaintiff raised the issue to SeaSpine' s male senior

leaders, including its CPO, John Bostjancic, and Senior Director of Human Resources, Dennis

Raposa, to no avail. In response, SD Raposa suggested that SeaSpine was not "the right place"

for Plaintiff, and reminded her that SeaSpine "is Keith Valentine's Company." SeaSpine's

response betrays its willful and intentional abdication of its basic obligation to comply with the

law.

7. Plaintiff files this suit to hold SeaS pine to its fundamental duty under the

California Equal Pay Act to pay its female employees equally to its male employees.

THE PARTIES

8. Plaintiff Maryanne Johnson was hired by SeaSpine in 2015 as a Human Resources

Generalist. She was later retitled, not promoted, to "Human Resources Partner." She joined

SeaSpine as a highly qualified and experienced Human Resources professional, having worked,

inter alia, for the City of Irvine. She holds a Bachelor's degree from University of California,

Los Angeles, has certifications as a senior human resources manager from HRCI and SHRM, and

possesses over 18 years of experience in human resources management.

9. Throughout her employment at SeaSpine, Plaintiff was an exemplary employee.

Throughout her employment, SD Raposa praised her quick adjustment to the Company and

acknowledged her critical role in key initiatives at the Company. Plaintiffs employment with

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1 SeaSpine ended on October 19, 2016.

2 10. Defendant SeaSpine Corporation is a corporation registered with the California

3 Secretary of State. Its principal place of business is in Irvine, California and it has another office

4 in Carlsbad.

5 JURISDICTION AND VENUE

6 11. Plaintiff was an employee of SeaSpine within the State of California and was

7 subject to the unlawful policies at some point during the liability period.

8 12. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter because SeaSpine is a corporation that

9 maintains its headquarters in California, and committed the unlawful acts alleged herein in

1 0 California.

11 13. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §§ 395 and

12 395.5 because one of Defendants' predominant place of business is in Irvine, California in

13 Orange County. Defendants' obligation to pay their female employees equally to their male

14 employees, and their liability for failing to do so, therefore arise in the County of Orange, among

15 others.

16 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

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A.

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SeaSpine's Male Senior Leadership Undervalues and Demeans Female Employees.

Compensation at SeaSpine is determined by a majority-male senior leadership that

20 places a low value on women and their contributions to the Company. Throughout Plaintiffs

21 time at SeaSpine, the Company's male senior leaders, including its then-head of Human

22 Resources, Dennis Raposa, routinely expressed sexist attitudes that belied a lower value for

23 women.

24 15. While servmg as the head of SeaSpine's Human Resources Department, SD

25 Raposa frequently made comments ranging from chauvinist to abusive. He often referred to

26 female employees as "gossipy" or "bitchy." He comm.ented on a woman' s breasts, proposing to

27 "do a brief walk around to take a look at the[ ... ]sisters." He accused an older woman of having a

28 facelift, and called her "Joan Rivers" while stretching his face with his hands. And, he called the

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1 only female member of senior leadership a "hag," said that she needed to wear more make-up,

2 and made fun of her attire.

3 16. These sexist attitudes were not isolated to SD Raposa. SeaSpine' s senior leaders

4 including SeaSpine's CFO, John Bostjancic, and SeaSpine's CEO, Keith Valentine expressed

5 their greater regard for men by favoring them in a variety of personnel decisions including but not

6 limited to hiring, titling, and other terms and conditions of employment.

7 17. SeaSpine's male-dominated senior leadership knew and should have known of SD

8 Raposa' s conduct, and took no steps to rein him in for over a year. Their apathy in the face of his

9 open hostility towards female employees ratified his behavior and sent a clear message regarding

10 the value SeaSpine' s male leaders place on women.

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B.

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This Old Boys' Club Presides Over a Company that Systematically Pays Women Less Than It Pays Men for Substantially Similar Work.

Plaintiff is informed and believes that SeaSpine pays and has paid its female

14 employees, including the Plaintiff, less than similarly-situated males performing substantially

15 similar work.

16 19. These pay disparities are created and caused by common policies imposed by, and

17 common practices established and followed by, SeaSpine's male-dominated senior leadership.

18 These include centralized control over the Company's compensation policies, practices and

19 procedures, and other policies, practices, and procedures that impact compensation, such as

20 titling, hiring, and promotion within a male-dominated senior leadership that undervalues women

21 and their contributions; centralization of decision-making on compensation and factors affecting

22 compensation within this same biased, male-dominated cadre; the use of wide ranges of salary

23 and incentive-based compensation; common evaluation policies such as subjective performance

24 measures made by predominantly male management; the fragmentation of substantially similar

25 jobs into multiple titles; and other common policies, practices, and procedures.

26 20. For example, SeaSpine' s male leadership maintains executive authority over

27 compensation decisions for employees. Upon information and belief, SeaSpine's senior

28 leadership periodically attend calibration meetings behind closed doors where they make

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1 decisions with respect to the compensation of all SeaSpine employees.

2 21. To mask their unequal pay for women, Defendants created multiple job titles -

3 over 200 for only 300 employees - hoping to justify their illegal practices by claiming these

4 individuals perform different tasks, which they do not. These titular differences do not

5 correspond to differences in responsibilities. Even if some employees perform certain unique

6 tasks, these are minor differences that do not substantially change the nature of the work. Upon

7 information and belief, members SeaSpine's male-dominated senior leadershipare responsible for

8 this system and its administration.

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c.

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SeaSpine Paid Plaintiff Less Than Men Performing Substantially Similar Work.

Plaintiff Johnson is the perfect example. SeaSpine paid several less-qualified,

12 underperforming men tens of thousands of dollars more than it paid Plaintiff for performing

13 substantially similar work. Upon inf01mation and belief, SeaSpine also paid these men

14 substantially more than the average market compensation for their respective titles. Plaintiff

15 complained of this disparate treatment repeatedly throughout her employment. Her complaints,

16 however, fell on deaf ears.

17 23. From the start, she was underpaid compared to her male counterparts particularly

18 given her responsibilities and contributions to company, a fact that SeaS pine attempted to cover

19 up using job titles. For example, John Doe One, a male "Talent Acquisition Manager," earned

20 approximately $40,000 more in base salary and a $7,000 more in bonus than Plaintiff and

21 similarly situated HR employees performing substantially similar and equal work.

22 24. Plaintiff and John Doe One performed substantially similar functions in the HR

23 department. When John Doe One proved incapable of performing one of the major duties

24 assigned to him, SD Raposa reassigned the task to Plaintiff, who completed it successfully.

25 Following the successful completion of this high-level task, SD Raposa made Plaintiff

26 responsible for strategic recruiting at the Company, an undertaking previously assigned to John '

27 Doe One. John Doe One's employment lasted approximately one year, and ended in or about

28 April 2016.

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25. On or about January 2, 2016, Plaintiff made a verbal complaint to SD Raposa that

John Doe One's salary was higher than her salary. Plaintiff followed up with an email that

showed a local job posting for a position similar to John Doe One's. The posting listed a salary

significantly lower than John Doe One' s and similar to Plaintiff's salary. Rather than address this

discriminatory disparity, SD Raposa threatened to delete Plaintiffs email.

26. In or about April 2016, Plaintiff had a meeting with SD Raposa in which she

raised concerns regarding gender discrimination against women. Plaintiff gave him specific

examples of how male and female employees were treated differently with regard to pay,

including her own discriminatory pay as an example. Plaintiff believes she was the oldest and

most technically qualified of the professional staff in the human resources department, and yet

she received the lowest pay. Upon information and belief, nothing was done with her complaint

and instead, the pay discrimination continued.

27. Soon after John Doe One's employment ended, SeaSpine hired John Doe Two, in

May 2016. His title was Talent Acquisition Business Partner. John Doe Two had less experience

and was less qualified than the Plaintiff. Prior to John Doe Two's starting work, SD Raposa

assured Plaintiff and another HR employee that John Doe Two would be hired into a lower level

Business Partner title and would be paid similarly to them. Instead, SeaSpine assigned John Doe

Two a newly-coined job title "Talent Acquisition Business Partner," a role equivalent to

Plaintiffs in seniority. Despite John Doe Two's clear lack of experience and skill compared to

Plaintiff, his salary and bonus totaled approximately $30,000 more than Plaintiff's.

28. Plaintiff again complained to SD Raposa, this time with another female human

resources employee who also earned less than this new hire. They complained about being paid

less than John Doe Two and requested salary increases to equalize their pay with his. Again,

nothing was done about these complaints.

29. John Doe Two' s employment ended in or about August 2016. Again, Plaintiff and

other female HR staff were left to pick up the slack. Plaintiff, another female HR employee, and

a newly-hired female employee with the title "Talent Acquisition Coordinator" absorbed his

duties. Despite their superior performance on each of these tasks, Plaintiff and her female

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1 colleagues continued to receive less compensation than John Doe One and John Doe Two

2 received during their tenure at the Company.

3 30. In or about September 2016, SD Raposa told Plaintiff that the only way to bring

4 her pay in line with that of the men who were performing substantially the same work would be

5 for her to obtain a promotion. In response, Plaintiff asked SD Raposa to promote her. SD Raposa

6 refused on the grounds that the promotion would be a "sham," implying that a "promotion" in this

7 instance amounted to a mere change in title and pay without a change in responsibility. This

8 would, indeed, have been the case, as Plaintiff had been successfully performing the same tasks

9 as higher-paid men since the start of her employment.

10 31. In or around October 2016, SeaSpine hired John Doe Three, a personal friend of

11 SD Raposa. SD Raposa discouraged the female Talent Acquisition Coordinator who absorbed

12 much of John Doe Two's work from applying for the position, even though she was already

13 performing many of his tasks well. John Doe Three and Plaintiff performed substantially similar

14 functions, despite John Doe Three's inferior qualifications. Specifically, John Doe Three had no

15 large corporate, recruiting experience. Despite Plaintiffs superior experience and their

16 substantially similar work, SeaSpine gave John Doe Three the title of "Talent Acquisition

17 Business Partner," and paid him significantly more than Plaintiff and the female Talent

18 Acquisition Coordinator who had been performing the same work before John Doe Three's hire.

19 32. In fal12016, Plaintiff wrote an email to CFO Bostjancic to inform him that she was

20 making 12% of market pay, while John Doe Three was being paid at 60% of market value.

21 Plaintiff informed CFO Bostjancic that she was more qualified than John Doe Three and

22 requested an in-person meeting. CFO Bostjancic wrote her back to schedule a meeting that he

23 called a "comp discussion." Plaintiff wrote him back to correct him by stating it was a meeting to

24 discuss pay equity at SeaSpine.

25 33. When Plaintiff eventually met with CFO Bostjancic after several follow-up emails,

26 she informed him about her concerns regarding pay inequities and gender discrimination. He

27 then contacted another female HR Business Partner, telling Plaintiff that they should all schedule

28 another meeting so they could discuss these concerns together. There was no follow-up meeting

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D. Pay Inequity Is Rampant Throughout the Company.

34. Such pay disparities permeate SeaSpine. During Plaintiffs employment, she was

aware of countless other women, across many departments, who earned less than male

counterparts, with no valid justification.

35. Upon information and belief, SeaSpine's pay disparity results in inequity in

employment benefits. For example, males predominately occupy Director and higher positions at

SeaSpine. As a result, men receive more unlimited paid time off, additional life insurance, higher

bonuses and more stock options than female employees. Men in these higher positions also

receive life insurance that is three times their annual salary, as opposed to two times the annual

salary for lower level employees.

36. Based upon Plaintiffs experiences and those of her female colleagues, SeaSpine

has paid female employees, including Plaintiff, less than similarly situated male employees, as a

result of its common policies and practices in determining raises, salaries, and incentive

compensation; the practice of setting wide ranges for salary and incentive compensation based on

job and job title; common performance and evaluation policies (including but not limited the use

of subjective performance measures by predominantly male management); centralized decision­

making by predominantly male senior leaders; job-titling scheme, and other common policies,

practices and procedures.

E. Plaintiff Repeatedly Raised Concerns About Pay Inequity.

3 7. Plaintiff repeatedly complained about pay discrimination. A brief summary of her

complaints, excluding those addressed above, is below:

38. Plaintiff brought up the pay disparity between men and women among the human

resources personnel upwards of four times with SD Raposa. In meetings and email exchanges

with SD Raposa, Plaintiff consistently suggested that, rather than hiring new employees, the

Company should use the money to equalize her and other women' s pay with that of their male

counterparts. SD Raposa admitted to Plaintiff that he knew there was inequity at the Company

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1 but it would be resolved over time. Upon information and belief, there was no resolution of the

2 pay disparity throughout the time she worked for the Company.

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39. Based on these facts, SeaSpine has systematically paid its female employees less

than similarly situated males. These discriminatory patterns and practices occur throughout

SeaSpine. Defendants' overall corporate culture, male dominated and centralized leadership, and

the uniform policies, procedures, and practices inevitably result in systemic pay discrimination to

the disadvantage of female employees. Such pay discrimination is manifested in multiple ways,

including, without limitation, by: (a) paying Plaintiff and other female employees less than

similarly-situated male employees; (b) failing to advance Plaintiff and other female employees at

the same rate as male employees performing equal or substantially similar work; and (c) other

adverse employment actions.

STATUTORY HISTORY

40. The California Fair Pay Act, enacted on January 1, 2016, amended California

Labor Code 1197.5 to make it one of the strongest equal pay laws in the nation. This law was

amended to allow individuals like the Plaintiff to fight against the very working conditions at

SeaS pine. Specifically, the law was meant to take aim at the persistent gender wage gap. On

average, women are paid 80 cents for every dollar men performing the same work are paid. 1

According to National Partnership for Women and Families, California women employed full

time are still losing a combined total of more than $39 million annually due to the wage gap,

which translated to hundred of thousands of dollars in lost income over individual women' s

lifetime.2

41. The Fair Pay Act of 2015 now creates stronger protections for women by requiring

employers to pay women and men equally for "substantially similar" work performed under

1 American Association of University Women, The Simple Truth About the Gender Pay Gap: Spring 2017 Edition, AAUW, 4 (2017), http://www.aauw.org/aauw _check/pdf_ download/show _pdf.php?file=The-Simple-Truth

2 National Partnership for Women and Families, Fact Sheet: California Women and Wage Gap, Sept. 2015 at http://www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/workplace-fairness/fair-pay/4-2017-ca-wage-gap.pdf.

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1 similar working conditions, even if their titles are different or they work in different offices,

2 unless pay differences are based on systems of seniority, productivity, or merit, or can be

3 explained entirely by a non-sex related factor that is job-related to the position in question and

4 consistent with business necessity. The "substantially similar" requirement is designed to ensure

5 that employers look beyond job titles to focus on what employees are actually doing when

6 making pay decisions.

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STATUTORY DAMAGES OWED To PLAINTIFF AND L WDA UNDER P AGA

42. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all "aggrieved employees"

under PAGA for one-year before the PAGA notice letter was issued. As a result of SeaSpine's

misconduct, Plaintiff seeks penalties and attorney's fees and costs under the Private Attorneys

General Act.

43. Based on the above, Plaintiff and other aggrieved employees are owed at least the

following by Defendants:

a. Failure to Provide Equal Pay: California Labor Code §§ 1197.5 requires

that employers pay women and men equally for "substantially similar" work performed under

similar working conditions, even if their titles are different or they work in different offices.

Defendants did not pay its female employees equal to its male employees for substantially similar

work. To address violations for which no penalty had been established, section 2699(f) creates a

private right of action for aggrieved employees to recover civil penalties for violations of the

Labor Code. Labor Code Section 21 O(a) provides for civil penalties for violations of Labor Code

Section 1197.5 . For any initial violation, the penalty is one hundred dollars ($100) for each

25 percent of the amount unlawfully withheld."

b. Failure to Pay Timely Wages: All wages earned by Plaintiffs were and are

"due and payable twice during each calendar month, on days designated in advance by the

employer as the regular paydays." For "[l]abor performed between the 1st and 15th days,

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1 inclusive, of any calendar month" payment is due no later than the 26th day of the month. !d. For

2 "labor performed between the 16th and the last day, inclusive, of any calendar month" payment is

3 due no later than the 1Oth day of the following month. !d. Notwithstanding this, the "salaries of

4 executive, administrative, and professional employees may be paid at least "once a month on or

5 before the 26th day of the month during which the labor was performed, [provided ... ] the entire

6 month's salaries [ ... ] are paid at that time." Cal. Lab. Code § 204. The "salaries of executive,

7 administrative, and professional employees [ . .. ]earned for labor performed in excess of 40 hours

8 in a calendar week are due and payable on or before the 26th day of the calendar month

9 immediately following the month in which such labor was performed." Cal. Lab. Code § 204.2.

10 By failing to pay female employees properly, SeaS pine deprived Plaintiffs of timely payment of

11 all wages earned, due, and owing at these regularly scheduled intervals throughout their

12 employment, in violation of Labor Code §§204 and 204.2. Plaintiff seeks civil penalties under

13 Labor Code Section 210, which sets forth the civil penalties for violations of these sections.

14 c. Failure to Pay All Wages Due Upon Termif!ation of Employment: Pursuant

15 to California Labor Code §§201, 202, and 203, SeaSpine is required to pay all earned and unpaid

16 wages to an employee who is discharged or quits. California Labor Code §201 mandates that if an

17 employer discharges an employee, the employee's wages accrued and unpaid at the time of

18 discharge are due and payable immediately. California Labor Code §202 mandates that if an

19 employee quits, the employee's wages accrued and unpaid at the time of quitting are due and

20 payable no later than 72 hours after the employee quits his or her employment, unless the

21 employee provided at least 72 hours of notice of his or her intention to quit, in which case the

22 wages are due immediately at the time of quitting. By intentionally and deliberately paying

23 Plaintiffs and other female employees lower wages than wages paid to their male counterparts for

24 performing substantially equal or similar work, SeaSpine has willfully failed and continues to fail

25 to pay all accrued wages due to Plaintiff and other women at SeaS pine who have been discharged

26 or who have quit. Labor Code Section 2699 provides penalty in the amount of $100 for each

27 aggrieved employee per pay period for the initial violation, and $200 for each aggrieved

28 employee per pay period for each subsequent violation. Plaintiffs seek these penalties for the

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1 violations ofthese sections.

2 44. This action does not necessarily have to be maintained as a class action under

3 California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 because it is a representative, state-enforcement PAGA

4 action. Nevertheless, there is a well-defmed community of interest:

5 a. Numerosity: The potential members of the Class as defmed are so

6 numerous thatjoinder of all the members ofthe Class is impracticable. While the precise number

7 of aggrieved employees has not been determined at this time, Plaintiff is informed are informed

8 and believes that SeaSpine's current workforce in California is approximately 50% female.

9 b. Commonality: There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff

10 and the aggrieved employees that predominate over any questions affecting only individual

11 members of the Class. These common questions of law and fact include without limitation:

12 1. Whether SeaSpine violated Labor Code§§ 1197.5, 204, 204.2, and

13 201-203 by failing to pay its female employees the same as its male employees performing

14 substantially similar work;

15 11. What were the policies, practices, programs, procedures, protocols,

16 and plans of SeaSpine regarding compensation for its employees; and

17 111. What the policies and practices were for promotions for its

18 employees; and

19 lV. Whether SeaSpine violated Labor Code§§ 2699, et seq. by failing

20 to pay its female employees the same as its male employees performing substantially similar

21 work;

22 c. Typicality: Plaintiffs claims are typical of the claims of the other

23 aggrieved employees. Plaintiff and all the other aggrieved employees sustained injuries and

24 damages arising out of and caused by SeaSpine' s common course of conduct in violation of law

25 as alleged herein. Specifically, SeaSpine has failed to compensate Plaintiff and all other

26 aggrieved employees on par with its male employees for substantially similar work.

27 d. Adequacy Of Representation: Plaintiff is an aggrieved employee and will

28 fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the other aggrieved employees.

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Plaintiffs Counsel who represents the Plaintiff is competent and experienced in litigating large

wage-and-hour class actions and representative PAGA actions.

e. Superiority Of Class Action: A class action is superior to other available

means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Individual joinder of all the

aggrieved employees is not practicable, and questions of law and fact common to the aggrieved

employees predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the aggrieved

employees. Each aggrieved employee has been damaged and is entitled to recovery by reason of

SeaSpine's illegal policies and practices. Even if every individual Class Member could afford

individual litigation, the court system could not. It would be unduly burdensome to the court in

which the individual litigation of the numerous cases would proceed. Individualized litigation

would magnify the delay and expense to all parties and to the court system resulting from

multiple trials of the same complex factual issues. In addition, if each individual aggrieved

employee was required to file an individual lawsuit, the large corporate Defendants would

necessarily gain an unconscionable advantage because Defendants would be able to exploit and

overwhelm the limited resources of each individual aggrieved employee with Defendants' vastly

superior fmancial and legal resources. By contrast, the conduct of this action as a Representative

action presents few management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and of the

court system, and protects the rights of each aggrieved employee. Plaintiff anticipates no

difficulty in the management of this action as a Representative action since the unlawful conduct

at issue is the same with respect to all the aggrieved employees.

45. The prosecution of separate actions by individual aggrieved employees may create

a risk of adjudications with respect to them that would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the

interests of other aggrieved employees not parties to such adjudication or that would substantially

impair or impede the ability of such non-party aggrieved employees to protect their interests.

46. The prosecution of individual actions by Class Members could establish

inconsistent standards of conduct for SeaSpine. SeaSpine has acted, or refused to act, in respects

generally applicable to the Class as a whole, thereby making appropriate fmal and injunctive

relief or corresponding declaratory relief with regard to members of the class as a whole, as

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requested herein. Likewise, SeaSpine's conduct as described above is unlawful, continuing, and

capable of repetition and will continue unless restrained and enjoined by the Court.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Violation of the Private Attorney General Act

(Cal. Labor Code§§ 2699, et seq.)

4 7. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation set forth in all of the

foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

48. The Private Attorney General Act ("PAGA"), Cal. Labor Code § 2699, et seq.,

allows an aggrieved employee to bring suit against an employer for violations of most Labor

Code provisions. These Labor Code violations the failure to provide equal pay to its female

employees. _Defendants discriminated by subjecting them to discriminatory pay, raises, and/or

bonuses, discriminatory denials of promotions and other advancement opportunities that would

result in higher compensation, and other forms of discrimination in violation of the California

Fair Pay Act.

49. Defendants caused, attempted to cause, contributed to, or caused the continuation

of, the wage rate discrimination based on sex in violation of the California Equal Pay Act.

Moreover, Defendants willfully violated the California Equal Pay Act by intentionally,

knowingly, and deliberately paying women less than men.

50. SeaSpine's deprived Plaintiffs oftimely payment of their wages earned and owing

at regularly scheduled intervals throughout their employment in violation of California Labor

Code Sections 204 and 204.2.

51. SeaSpine violated California Labor Code Section 201-203 by willfully failing to

pay all accrued wages due to Plaintiff and other women at SeaS pine who have been discharged or

who have quit.

52. Defendants' acts constitute continuing and ongoing unlawful activity prohibited by

the California Labor Code and therefore, these acts constitute violations of the P A GA.

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53. As a result of Defendants' conduct and/or Defendants' willful, knowing and

intentionaL discrimination, Plaintiff and the other aggrieved employees have suffered and will

continue to suffer harm, including but not limited to, lost earnings, lost benefits, and other

financial loss, as well as non-economic damages.

54. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to all Legal and equitable remedies, including

liquidated damages. Plaintiff and the other aggrieved employees are also entitled to civil

penalties pursuant to California Labor Code §§ 1197.5 and 2699(f). Specifically, under the

PAGA, Plaintiff and the other aggrieved employees seek default penalty in the amounts stated

above pursuant to Labor Code Sections 21.0 and 2699. California Labor Code § 2699(g) further

provides that any employee who prevails in an action for civil penalties is entitled to an award of

reasonable attorney's fees and costs. Plaintiff Johnson hereby seek to recover attorneys' fees and

costs under this one-way fee and cost shifting statute.

55. Plaintiffs have provided notice of these violations pursuant to Cal. Labor Code

§ 2699.3 and have specifically asked the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency if

it intends to investigate the alleged violations. More than 60 days have passed since Plaintiff

provided notice to the L WDA and she did not receive any notification that the L WDA intends to

investigate the alleged violations. Therefore, Plaintiffs is entitled to prosecute their Private

Attorney General Act ("PAGA") claims under Cal. Labor Code§ 2699, et seq.

56. The proper measure of damages and penalties under the PAGA is all aggrieved

employees, whether a party of this action or not. Further, this claim needs no certification to

proceed with class-wide recovery. Arias v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.4th 969,970-75 (2009).

57. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and all aggrieved employees respectfully request that the

Court award judgment and relief in their favor as described herein.

Ill

Ill

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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

Declaratory Judgment

(Cal. Civil Code § 1060, et seq.)

54. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation set forth in all of the

foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

55. An actual controversy has arisen between the parties relating the legal rights and

duties of the parties as set forth above. Plaintiff desires a declaration of rights and other relief

available pursuant to the California Declaratory Judgment Act., C. C.P. § 1060 et seq.

56. A declaratory judgment is necessary because Plaintiff contends that Defendants

have committed and continues to commit the violations set forth above, and, it is highly likely

that Defendants will deny that they have done so and/or will continue to commit such acts.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests the following relief:

1. That the Court find that SeaSpine has violated California Labor Code§§ 1197.5 by

f~iling to afford Plaintiff and other female employees equal pay for substantially similar work

performed by male employees;

2. That the Court find that SeaSpine has violated the Private Attorney General Act,

Cal. Labor Code § 2699, et seq. for all aggrieved employees by failing to afford Plaintiff and

other aggrieved employees equal pay;

3. That the Court find that SeaSpine's violations as described have been willful;

4. That the Court impose penalties against SeaSpine on behalf of all aggrieved

employees according to the Private Attorney General Act;

5. For all wages due pursuant to California Labor Code §1197.5(h) in an amount to

be ascertained at trial;

6. For liquidated damages pursuant to California Labor Code§ 1197.5(h);

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1 7. For prejudgment interest on unpaid wages at a rate of 10% per annum pursuant to

2 California Labor Code §1197.5(h) and California Civil Code §§3287-3288, and/or any other

3 applicable provision providing for prejudgment interest;

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For declaratory relief;

For preliminary and permanent injunctive relief enjoining Defendants from

6 violating California Labor Code § 1197.5 by paying its female employees lower wage rates than

7 those paid to their male counterparts for substantially similar work, and from engaging in

8 unlawful business practices complained ofherein;

9 10. That Plaintiffs be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Labor

10 Code §§1197.5(h), 2699(g)(1), Civil Procedure Code §1021.5, and/or other applicable law

11 providing for attorney's fees and costs; and

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11. For such further relief that the Court may deem just and proper.

Dated: October 13, 2017 DESAI LAW FIRM, P .C.

By: {If_· Aashish Y. esai Adrianne De Castro Attorneys for Plaintiff

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SANFORD HEISLER SHARP, LLP Danielle Fuschetti (SBN 294064) 111 Sutter Street, Suite 975 San Francisco, CA 94104 Tel.: (415) 795-2020 Fax: (415) 495-2021

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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, Plaintiffs demand trial by jury on all issues so triable.

4 Dated: October 13, 2017

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By:DESAILAWF~~·

Aashish Y. Desai Attorneys for Plaintiff

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SANFORD HEISLER SHARP, LLP Danielle Fuschetti (SBN 294064) 111 Sutter Street, Suite 975 San Francisco, CA 94104 Tel.: (415) 795-2020 Fax: (415) 495-2021

Attorneys for Plaintiff