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Maritime Force Protection Operations Analysis Methodology Development

Analysis Techniques for Defeating Threats to Naval Assets

International Maritime Protection Symposium

12-14 December 2005

Presented by Dr Darren J. Sutton

Navy Scientific Adviser

Defence Science and Technology Organisation – Australia

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Presentation Outline

Maritime Force Protection Scope the Problem

• Multiple views• Risk Analysis• Attribute Analysis• Threat Analysis• Functional Decomposition

Quantify The Problem• Modelling• Solution Options Evaluation• Requirements Determination• Examples

• Solution Options - Weapons Performance • Requirement for defence against suicide light aircraft

Conclusion

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TTCP MAR AG-5

• Small Boat Swarm Attack

• Suicide Attack on Berthed or Anchored ShipSurface Craft

Truck Bomb

• Swimmer or SDV Attack on Berthed or Anchored Ship• Attack by Asymmetric Air Threats on Berthed or Anchored Ship

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IntroductionMaritime Force Protection

{closely related to security of commercial ships, ports and harbour installations}

• Maritime Force Protection

To conserve the fighting potential of the force by countering the wider threat to all its elements from adversary, natural and human hazards, and fratricide.

• Harbour Protection To protect critical waterfront and floating assets by providing area security (defence) of

the harbour or port.

• In-Harbour Force ProtectionTo secure ships and naval assets while anchored or alongside in a port or harbour by

offboard or onboard means.

• Ship-Based Force ProtectionTo protect naval vessels berthed, anchored or underway, close-to-shore, at home or

away with onboard means.

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RISK ANALYSISComparative Risk

0.000001

0.00001

0.0001

0.001

0.01

0.1

1

0.1 1 10 100 1000 10000 100000

Consequence of Failure [f (Lives lost, Cost in $M)]

An

nu

al P

rob

ab

iliy

of

Sig

nif

ica

nt

Da

ma

ge

or

De

str

uc

tio

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[R

ISK

]

Commercial Aviation

Unacceptable RegionMerchant

Shipping

Acceptable Region

Marginal Region

Drilling Rigs

Space Travel?

Dams

[after Bhattracharya et al][after Bhattracharya et al]

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• Effects based approach• Seek publicity as effects-multiplier

(political damage)• Flexibility and Improvising ability• Opportunistic (initiative seizing /

offensive) • Cellular Local or Tactical Organisation

(Network or Hierarchy Command Structure)• Dispersed operations• Low cost relative to Military Force• Civilian - Non-compliant with UN, Laws of

Armed Conflict, national or local legislation

• Hardening (deterrence/survivability)• Intelligence /surveillance/reconnaissance• Preparedness (alertness/response

capability)• Flexibility (defences need to be as

flexible and adaptable as the threat!)• Flatter Command and Control (more

autonomous smaller forces)• Affordability (Realistic cost)• Freer legal operational environment

(maintain minimal collateral damage and avoid fratricide)

Anti-terrorist Requirements Terrorist Attributes

Attribute Analysis View

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Threat Analysis View Maritime Terrorist Threats

Threats may be characterised by • mission or intent

• harassment or attention-seeking non-lethal attacks• lethal weapon attacks• suicidal explosive attacks

• effector delivery method• Surface, sub-surface, air; Manned, unmanned

• physical features of the threat platform • form, material, dimensions• speed, agility• stability • signatures.

• cross platform features • manning strategy (recruitment, training, practicing, command and control) • interoperability and tactical skill

• strategy • radical unpredictability• opportunistic• employ quantity versus quality of forces

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Force Protection Functional Chain

Detect DefeatDeterClassify Mitigate

Next Map Functions to Capability Components and then Enablers Next Map Functions to Capability Components and then Enablers

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Detect

Intelligence

CBRN sensor packages* (air, sea, undersea)

EO/IR/acoustic*Sniper/Mortar Detection*Swimmer Detection (passive acoustic and non-acoustic)*

*Potential Technology

- Find Terrorists before they strike- Recognize terrorist targeting- Hold defensive posture

Sensors

Data fusion*Pattern/Anomaly recognition*Early warningInformation dissemination*Intelligent agents/Data Mining*

Detect potential threats approaching or entering protected areas or in areas of interest to the warfighter such as straits, anchorages, ports,

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Classify

Classification (provoke intent)

Remote Explosive Detection*Standoff imaging*Firearm Detection*Biometrics*Sensor Integration

*Potential Technology

Determine:•Friend / Enemy / Neutral?•Mission?•Authorized / Unauthorized?•Armed or Unarmed?•With What?

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Deter

Show of forcePerimeter Security

Area denial (water, USW, air, shore)Quick passage for “authorized good guys”Barriers – Physical and Virtual*, ChemicalUnambiguous warning devices/systemVehicle and vessel stoppers* (at range)Vehicle and personnel matching systems*Integration/Automation of surveillance systems*

Light/AudioPsychological Effects*DeceptionObscurants*Automated active response*UCAV, UCGV, UUCV

*Potential Technology

- Deny access to protected areas- Facilitate access for authorized persons and platforms- Improve capabilities while also reducing manpower

- Hide weaknesses- Show strength - Improve response time of both personnel and “actions”

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Deny Defeat

Non-Lethal

Directed Energy Weapons*Stand-off vehicle/ vessel disablement*Anti-Swimmer disablement*Automated active response*UCAV, UCGV, UUCV

Lethal

Remote explosive detonation*Automated counter fire weapon*

*Potential Technology

Interdict or influence potential threats when ROE or uncertainty precludes lethal force

Rapidly and accurately neutralize threats at rangeMinimize collateral effects

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Mitigate

Reduce damage and casualties during threat strikeRecover rapidly to full operations / capability

Hardening/Blast MitigationRecovery Systems - rapid decontamination* - rapid temporary perimeters* - self forming networks*

Active armor / countermeasures*

*Potential Technology

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Quantify the Problem

• Variables• Constraints• Inclusions• Exclusions• Measures of Performance • Derive mathematical relationship between Variables

• Temporal• Spacial• Spectral

• Develop Model • Exploratory (parametric)• Deterministic

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Heirarchy of Mathematical Models

Tactical

Operational

Platform

Sub-system/ technical

System

Scenarios

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Probabilityof success

Ranges(detect, open fire,

intercept)

WeaponProbabilityof Hit & Kill

Time Delays

Threat NumberSpeed, Separation

Engagement Scheduling

Firing rate, Burst, Magazine

Size

Platform-Level Modelling

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Weapon Performance Study

• Aim – to compare general classes of gun based weapons against surface threats• Options

• 30mm stabilised• 25 mm stabilised • 20mm Close in Weapon System• 50 cal (stabilised or unstabilised)• 7.26 mm gun• 5.56mm

• Deconstruction• Single Gun vs single target• Platform vs multiple targets• Swarm Annihilation

• Tools • Gun Operational Analysis Model (GOAT), • Ship weapons scheduling model, • Target kill rate model.

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Weapon Study

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Firing Range (m)

Kill

s P

er M

aga

zine

30 mm stab

25mm stab

CIWS (20mm)

50 cal stab (12.7mm)

LMG (5.56mm)

GPMG (7.62mm)

Mini-Gun (7.62mm)

0.0

0.5

1.0

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Classif ication Range (m)

Mea

n K

ills

30 mm stab25mm stabCIWS (20mm)50 cal stab (12.7mm)LMG (5.56mm)GPMG (7.62mm)Mini-Gun (7.62mm)

Keep Out Range = 350 m

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Mean Kills

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Ship physical,targeting data

Threat data

1 on 1effectiveness

System issues.e.g. how many, timing,

no fire zones.

System modelOverall

effectiveness.

1 on 1effectiveness

Gun data

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Terrorist Aircraft Attack Keep-Out-Range Requirement Study

• Scenario: Vessel attacked by low slow aircraft • Problem: Survive the Attack

• Engage the target• Avoid debris damage

Questions:• What is Close-in Weapons System effectiveness ? • What distance must the aircraft be defeated so

heavy debris does not hit the ship ?• What are the effects of wind on collateral damage ?

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Example: Given Aircraft speed of 300 m/s at altitude of 200 ft.

Results:• Debris spread is between 300-1000 m• High R-value falls between 300 and 600 m, depending on the initial angle of the aircraft• A keep-out-range of 600 m would be chosen to avoid being hit by the most damaging material• A keep-out-range of up to 1000 m would be chosen to avoid being hit by all material down to an

R-value of 2.

Debris Pattern

Flight Direction

Wind Direction

HeavyLow drag

LightHigh drag

Flight DirectionFlight Direction

Wind Direction

Wind Direction

HeavyLow drag

LightHigh drag

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Suicide Aircraft AttackIn Port or at Anchor

• Weapon Solution Options • Guns, Missiles

• Variables• Effective Range• Lethality• Magazine capacity

• Measure of Performance• Probability of hit• Conditional Probability of kill / hit• Salvo probability of kill

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Conclusion Summarising Methodology

Define Top level Requirements

Propose S&T development

Functions required

Propose non-tech changeStrategic/Legal/Operational/Tactical

Maritime Operational Analysis Studies

Contribution

Determine Capability Gaps

Assess S&T Component of Solution Set

Identify Potential Solutions – compare options

Map function required to capability

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Finally

Continuing Research Operations Analysis Methodology Development • Analysis Techniques for Maritime Force Protection• Applications to the Royal Australian Navy capability analysis for development and

acquisition of ship and harbour force protection improvements.

Eileen Moran

eileen.moran@dsto.defence.gov.au

Defence Science and Technology Organisation

Maritime Operations Division

Wharf 17, Pirrama Road

Pyrmont NSW 2009

Australia.

Eileen Moran

eileen.moran@dsto.defence.gov.au

Defence Science and Technology Organisation

Maritime Operations Division

Wharf 17, Pirrama Road

Pyrmont NSW 2009

Australia.

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SPARES

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Functions - Deter, Deny, DefeatGraded Responses

• Avoidance/deterrence• Persistent Situational Awareness• Interrogations (IFF)• Warnings (illuminators, acoustic, pyrotechnics)• Non-lethal effectors (floodlights, water hose, flash-bang,

acoustic blast)• Lethal Weapons (guns, missiles, torpedos )• Mitigation - Survivability, Recovery

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Non - lethal Options

• Acoustic (LRAD)• Electrical (Stun Gun)• Mechanical/Kinetic (Water cannon, nets)• Electromagnetic (Active Denial system)• Optical (Laser dazzle, spotlights)• Bio/Chemical (Foam, Smoke)

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Measures of Performance for the Defender

• Prob uncovering plans to attack• Prob detection outside restricted zone• Prob determining hostile intent outside restricted zone• Prob warning-off/dissuading outside a keep-out-zone• Prob destroying/disabling by keep-out-zone• Or• Prob halting attack at outer layer boundary• Prob halting attack at inner layer boundary