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1
Sociology’s three big questions
THREE SMALL DUTCH QUESTIONS
and
Presentation at the
Danish Institute for Social Research
Copenhagen, Denmark
December 11-12, 2003
Wout Ultee
Interuniversity Center for Sociology (ICS) at Radboud University Nijmegen, Netherlands
2
THE FIRST SMALL DUTCH QUESTION
LEAVING CHURCH
3
IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 20TH CENTURY
DUTCH SOCIETY CONSISTED
NOT SO MUCH OF CLASSES LAYERED
FROM TOP TO BOTTOM
BUT OF RELIGIOUS PILLARS
RISING UP NEXT TO EACH OTHER
THOSE PILLARS SHAKE SINCE THE 1960S
WHY?
4
NEW QUESTIONS ON RATIONALIZATION
RATIONALIZATION
RISE OF SCIENCE
5
NEW QUESTIONS ON RATIONALIZATION
RATIONALIZATION
RISE OF SCIENCE
RISING GENERAL LEVEL OF
EDUCATION
6
NEW QUESTIONS ON RATIONALIZATION
RATIONALIZATION
RISE OF SCIENCE
RISING GENERAL LEVEL OF
EDUCATION
RELIGIONS WITH FEWER
MAGICAL MEANS OF
SALVATION
7
NEW QUESTIONS ON RATIONALIZATION
RATIONALIZATION
RISE OF SCIENCE
RISING GENERAL LEVEL OF
EDUCATION
RELIGIONS WITH FEWER
MAGICAL MEANS OF
SALVATION
LEAVING CHURCH
8
PERCENTAGES FROM THE DUTCH CENSUS AND FROM SURVEYS
1930
1947
1960
1971
1983
1990
1997
CATH LIBPROT ORTHOPROT REST NONE
34
36
38
39
36
33
32
37
34
31
25
19
17
15
8
9
9
9
8
8
7
5
4
4
3
5
5
6
14
17
19
24
32
38
39
9
PUZZLING FINDING:
HOW IS IT POSSIBLE THAT THE PERCENTAGE OF CATHOLICS IN THE NETHERLANDS ROSE A BIT
BETWEEN 1960 AND 1971,
WHEREAS ‘EVERYBODY’ KNOWS THAT PRIESTS AND LAITY LEFT THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THRONGS?
10
TIME-SERIES OF CROSS-SECTIONAL DATA ARE MISLEADING ABOUT INDIVIDUAL CHANGE
FOR CLOSED POPULATIONS, THEY ONLY TELL ABOUT NET CHANGES
THEY ARE PARTICULARY MISLEADING IF COHORT CHANGES ARE TAKING PLACE
IN THE NETHERLANDS THE CATHOLIC BIRTH RATE WAS MUCH HIGHER THAN
THAT OF OTHER DENOMINATIONS (INCLUDING NO DENOMINATION)
11
DUTCH POPULATION BY ABSOLUTE NUMBER 1960-1971, ABSOLUTE NUMBERS ( * 1000) ACCORDING TO CENSUS
AND ADMINISTRATIVE DATA
CENSUS 1960
BIRTHS 60-71 +
DEATHS 60-71 -
NET MIGRATION -
OTHER LOSSES -
CENSUS 1971
4,634
1,115
387
49
178
5,274
3,240
587
391
7
354
3,076
1,069
277
93
7
21
1,225
2,102
538
136
6
-569
3,079
CATH LIBPROT ORPROT NONE
12
NIJMEGEN-GROUP 1998 3M-MAC DATA SET
RANDOM SAMPLE SURVEY OF DUTCH POPULATION
DO YOU CONSIDER YOURSELF AS A MEMBER OF A CHURCH (if yes, which one)?
DID YOU EVER CONSIDER YOURSELF AS A MEMBER OF A CHURCH (if yes, which one)?
WHEN DID YOU STOP CONSIDERING YOURSELF AS A MEMBER OF A CHURCH?
THERE IS NO DUTCH CENSUS ANYMORE
WHAT IS MORE, LOSSES SHOULD BE PINNED DOWN ON AGE OP PERSONS WITH KNOWN YEAR OF BIRTH
13
HYPOTHESES WERE TESTED WITH PARAMETERS FROM
EVENT-HISTORY MODELS FOR 1998 3M-MAC DUTCH DATA
IT IS KNOWN FROM CROSS-SECTIONAL SURVEYS THAT
PEOPLE WITH MORE EDUCATION ARE LESS LIKELY
TO BE A CHURCH MEMBER
ARE THEY ALSO MORE LIKELY TO LEAVE CHURCH AND IF SO, WHY IS THIS SO?
14
IN SIMPLE MODELS PERSONS WITH MORE EDUCATION (AS A TIME-DEPENDENT COVARIATE)
ARE MORE LIKELY TO LEAVE CHURCH
LIBERAL PROTESTANTS ARE MORE LIKELY TO DO SO THAN CATHOLICS, AND ORTHODOX
PROTESTANTS ARE EVEN LESS LIKELY TO LEAVE CHURCH
15
GENERAL HYPOTHESIS
BEHAVIOUR DETERMINED BY MOTIVES AND OPPORTUNITIES
EDUCATION PROVIES A MOTIVE FOR LEAVING CHURCH
AUXILIARY ASSUMPTIONS
RELIGIOUS MARKETS OFFER OPPORTUNITIES FOR LEAVING
CHURCH
AND FAMILIES AND STATES LIMIT OPPORTUNITIES FOR DOING SO
16
SINCE STARK
THE RATIONAL CHOICE APPROACH
IS BIG IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION
THIS NAME IS A MISNOMER
IANNACONE NOW ADVERTISES WITH THE LABEL
MARKET THEORY OF RELIGION
17
THE LABEL MARKET THEORY OF RELIGION IS TOO BAD SINCE THE U.S. QUESTION IS ABOUT
FREE MARKET VERSUS STATE RELIGION
AND THAT WAY OF FRAMING THE QUESTION
MISPLACES THE EMPHASIS FOR THE NETHERLANDS
SINCE THE QUESTION THERE IS ABOUT
THE FAMILY PLUS THE STATE
VERSUS THE MARKET
IN THE NETHERLANDS, THE STATE FULLY FUNDS NOT ONLY ITS OWN SECULAR SCHOOLS, BUT ALSO
PROTESTANT AND CATHOLIC (AND WHATEVER) SCHOOLS
18
IF IN A PROVINCE THE PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION THAT DOES NOT BELONG TO A
CHURCH IS HIGHER,
CHANCES OF LEAVING CHURCH ARE HIGHER
IF IN A PROVINCE THE GENERAL LEVEL OF EDUCATION OF THE POPULATION IS HIGHER,
CHANCES OF LEAVING CHURCH ARE HIGHER
MARKET HYPOTHESES TESTED AND CORROBORATED;
FINDINGS
19
FAMILY HYPOTHESES TESTED AND CORROBORATED
CHIILDREN OF PARENTS WITH A HIGHER STANDARD OF LIVING, ARE LESS LIKELY TO LEAVE CHURCH
CHILDREN OF PARENTS WHO VOTED LEFT-WING, ARE MORE LIKELY TO LEAVE CHURCH
CHILDREN OF PARENTS WHO WENT TO CHURCH MORE FREQUENTLY ARE LESS LIKELY TO LEAVE CHURCH
20
MORE FAMILY HYPOTHESES TESTED; SURPRISING FINDING ABOUT CHILDREN FROM RELIGIOUSLY MIXED MARRIAGES
CHILDREN FROM RELIGIOUSLY MIXED MARRIAGES ARE LESS LIKELY TO LEAVE
CHURCH THAN CHILDREN FROM RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGAMOUS MARRIAGES
CHILDREN FROM MARRIAGES WITH ONE NON-RELIGIOUS PARENT, ARE MORE LIKELY TO
LEAVE CHURCH THAN CHILDREN FROM RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGAMOUS MARRIAGES
21
FAMILY PLUS STATE HYPOTHESIS TESTED AND PARTLY CORROBORATED;
FINDINGS:
PERSONS WHO ATTENDED A PROTESTANT SCHOOL ARE LESS LIKELY TO LEAVE
CHURCH THAN CHILDREN WHO WENT TO A PUBLIC SCHOOL; PERSONS WHO WENT TO A CATHOLIC SCHOOL ARE MORE LIKELY
TO DO SO
POSSIBLE EXPLANATION: LOCALLY PROTESTANT SCHOOLS FACED MORE COMPETITION FROM
SECULAR SCHOOLS THAN CATHOLIC SCHOOLS?
22
HYPOTHESES ABOUT THE INTERPLAY OF OPPORTUNITIES AND MOTIVES
TESTED AND CORRBORATED
PERSONS WHO LEFT THEIR PARENTAL HOME AT AN EARLIER AGE AREMORE LIKELY TO LEAVE CHURCH
IF PERSONS LEFT HOME EARLIER AND THEIR PARENTS WENT TO CHURCH MORE OFTEN, THEN
THEIR CHANCES OF LEAVING CHURCH ARE HIGHER
IF PERSONS LEFT HOME EARLIER AND THEIR EDUCATION WAS HIGHER, THEN THEIR CHANCES OF
LEAVING CHURCHES ARE HIGHER
23
THE HYPOTHESES ABOUT THE INTERPLAY OF MOTIVES AND OPPORTUNITIES
ACCOUNTED FOR A LARGE PART OF THE SIMPLE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN
EDUCATION AND LEAVING CHURCH
24
THE SECOND SMALL DUTCH QUESTION
WORKING WIVES AND THEIR HUSBANDS
25
ARE PART OF THE INEQUALITY QUESTION AND PART OF THE COHESION QUESTION
CONNUBIUM
QUESTIONS ABOUT CONNUBIUM,
(WHO MARRIES WHOM, HOMOGAMY)
26
ARE PART OF THE INEQUALITY QUESTION AND PART OF THE COHESION QUESTION
INEQUALITY
CLOSURE
MOBILITY CONNUBIUM
QUESTIONS ABOUT CONNUBIUM,
(WHO MARRIES WHOM, HOMOGAMY)
27
ARE PART OF THE INEQUALITY QUESTION AND PART OF THE COHESION QUESTION
INEQUALITY
CLOSURE
MOBILITY CONNUBIUM
ISOLATION / TIES
COHESION
CONVIVIUM
QUESTIONS ABOUT CONNUBIUM,
(WHO MARRIES WHOM, HOMOGAMY)
28
BOURDIEU ADDRESSED THE QUESTION OF THE REPRODUCTION OF INEQUALITY, THE
TRANSMISSION OF ADVANTAGES FROM ONE GENERATION TO THE NEXT
AND BYPASSED THE QUESTION OF THE RECONSTITUTION OF INEQUALITY BY WAY OF
CONNUBIUM
BOURDIEU FORGOT
IT TAKES A MAN AND A WOMAN TO MAKE A CHILD
29
IT IS WELL-KNOWN THAT IN ALL COUNTRIES OF THE HIGHLY
INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD
COUPLES TEND TO CONSIST OF MEN AND WOMEN WITH THE SAME LEVEL OF EDUCATION
IT IS LESS WELL-KNOWN THAT THE LABOUR MARKET POSITION OF
SPOUSES (EMPLOYED, NONEMPLOYED) TENDS TO BE THE SAME TOO
30
THE VARIOUS QUESTIONS ON CUNNUBIUM
31
THE VARIOUS QUESTIONS ON CUNNUBIUM
CONNUBIUM
32
THE VARIOUS QUESTIONS ON CUNNUBIUM
CONNUBIUM
33
THE VARIOUS QUESTIONS ON CUNNUBIUM
CONNUBIUM
CROSS-CLASS MARRIAGES
34
THE VARIOUS QUESTIONS ON CUNNUBIUM
CONNUBIUM
CROSS-CLASS MARRIAGES
EDUCATIONAL HOMOGAMY
35
THE VARIOUS QUESTIONS ON CUNNUBIUM
CONNUBIUM
CROSS-CLASS MARRIAGES
EDUCATIONAL HOMOGAMY
(NON)EMPLOYMENT HOMOGAMY
36
AT FIRST SIGHT IT IS NOT PUZZLING THAT LABOUR MARKET POSITIONS OF HUSBANDS
AND WIVES TEND TO BE THE SAME
EDUCATION MAKES FOR LESS UNEMPLOYMENT
AND IF SPOUSES HAVE THE SAME LEVEL OF EDUCATION, THEN (NON)EMPLOYMENT HOMOGAMY IS A
BY-PRODUCT OF EDUCATIONAL HOMOGAMY
37
HOWEVER, ANALYSIS OF DATA FROM CROSS-SECTIONAL STUDIES LIKE
NATIONAL LABOR FORCE SURVEYS
MAKES CLEAR THAT
(UN)EMPLOYMENT HOMOGAMY
PERSISTS AFTER CONTROLLING FOR
EDUCATIONAL HOMOGAMY
AND ALSO AFTER CONTROLLING FOR
THE LOCAL LABOUR MARKET UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
38
THAT IS, PROCESSES OF MUTUAL REINFORCEMENT ARE GOING ON
HYPOTHESES ON PARTNER-EFFECTS
HUSBAND-EFFECTS ARE STRONGER THAN WIFE-EFFECTS
PARTNER-EDUCATION MAKES FOR MORE EMPLOYMENT RE-ENTRY
AND FOR LESS EMPLOYMENT EXIT
PARTNER-INCOME MAKES FOR LESS EMPLOYMENT RE-ENTRY AND FOR
MORE EMPLOYMENT EXIT
39
HOW TO STUDY PARTNER EFFECTS? 1993 3M-MAC DUTCH DATA-SET
WITH EDUCATIONAL HISTORY, (NON)EMPLOYMENT HISTORY AND
INCOME HISTORY
NOTE THAT AN ASSOCIATION IN CROSS-SECTIONAL DATA BETWEEN EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT MAY RESULT
FROM LOW-EDUCATED PERSONS BEING FIRED MORE OFTEN OR FROM THEM BEING REFUSED A NEW JOB MORE OFTEN,
OR FROM BOTH
40
FINDINGS ON WIFE’S EMPLOYMENT EXIT WITH
HUSBAND’S EDUCATION AND INCOME AS
TIME- DEPENDENT COVARIATES IN A
MULTI-VARIATE EVENT-HISTORY ANALYSIS
AN EMPLOYED WIFE IS LESS LIKELY TO EXIT EMPLOYMENT
IF HER EDUCATION IS HIGHER
AND SHE IS MORE LIKELY TO DO SO
IF HER HUSBAND’S EDUCATION AND INCOME ARE HIGHER
41
FINDINGS ON HUSBAND’S EMPLOYMENT EXIT WITH WIFE’S EDUCATION AS A
TIME- DEPENDENT COVARIATE IN A
MULTI-VARIATE EVENT-HISTORY ANALYSIS
AN EMPLOYED HUSBAND IS MORE LIKELY TO EXIT EMPLOYMENT
IF HIS EDUCATION IS HIGHER
AND LESS LIKELY IF HIS WIFE’S EDUCATION IS HIGHER
42
FINDINGS ON WIFE’S EMPLOYMENT RE-ENTRY WITH HUSBAND’S EDUCATION AND INCOME
AS TIME - DEPENDENT COVARIATES IN A MULTI-VARIATE EVENT-HISTORY ANALYSIS
A NON-EMPLOYED WIFE IS MORE LIKELY TO RE-ENTER EMPLOYMENT
IF HER EDUCATION IS HIGHER
SHE IS MORE LIKELY TO RE-ENTER IF HER HUSBAND’S EDUCATION IS HIGHER
AND SHE IS LESS LIKELY TO RE-ENTER IF HER HUSBAND’S INCOME IS HIGHER
43
FINDINGS ON HUSBAND’S EMPLOYMENT RE-ENTRY WITH WIFE’S EDUCATION AS A TIME-DEPENDENT COVARIATE IN
A MULTI-VARIATE EVENT-HISTORY ANALYSIS
A NON-EMPLOYED HUSBAND IS MORE LIKELY TO RE-ENTER EMPLOYMENT
IF HIS EDUCATION IS HIGHER
AND HIS CHANCES OF RE-ENTRY DO NOT DEPEND UPON THE EDUCATION OF HIS WIFE
44
THE THIRD SMALL DUTCH QUESTION
COMPULSORY SCHOOLING AND
EDUCATIONAL MOBILITY
45
DID THE EXTENSION OF STATE DID THE EXTENSION OF STATE
COMPULSORY SCHOOLING COMPULSORY SCHOOLING
RESULT IN LESS DOWNWARD RESULT IN LESS DOWNWARD
EDUCATIONAL MOBILITY?EDUCATIONAL MOBILITY?
CHANGES IN THE NETHERLANDS DURING THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY
46
ONCE MORE THE PROBLEM OF INEQUALITY
INEQUALITY
CLOSURE
MOBILITY
47
ONCE MORE THE PROBLEM OF INEQUALITY
INEQUALITY
CLOSURE
MOBILITY
FATHER-SON CLASS MOBILITY
48
ONCE MORE THE PROBLEM OF INEQUALITY
INEQUALITY
CLOSURE
MOBILITY
FATHER-SON CLASS MOBILITY
FATHER-SON AND FATHER-
DAUGHTER EDUCATIONAL
MOBILITY
49
Previous Research on the Previous Research on the Netherlands: Netherlands:
Educational mobility increased according to:loglinear models with educational distributions fitted with trend constraints on uniform association and diagonal densities
50
Present research: dataPresent research: data
Stacked data file from 31 surveys21,899 men/20,903 women; age over 25Fifteen 5-year birth cohorts (1900-1974)Father’s education 4 categories (low – high)Daughter’s/Son’s education 4 categories
(low – high)
51
Four hypotheses from the field of stratification
One from each generation of stratification studies
Present research: Present research: hypotheseshypotheses
52
Zero-generationZero-generation non-hypothesis non-hypothesis
There is a linear downward trend in uniform association and diagonal density
53
First-generation First-generation hypothesishypothesis
A rising standard of living makes for lower uniform association and lower diagonal density
54
Second-generation Second-generation hypothesishypothesis
Raising the age at which compulsory schooling ends makes for lower uniform
association and diagonal density
55
Third-generation Third-generation hypothesishypothesis
Raising the age at which compulsory schooling ends does not alter the
density in the diagonal cell for the highest level of education
56
How to derive macro hypotheses from micro hypotheses?
Embedding the four hypotheses Embedding the four hypotheses in general sociologyin general sociology
57
First-generation First-generation hypothesis derivedhypothesis derived
going to school depends upon financial resources
people differ in financial resources
financial resources have increased and they have become more equally distributed in the course of time
58
Second-generation Second-generation hypothesis derivedhypothesis derived
apart from individual actors there is an all powerful corporate actor: the state
and the state has raised the age of compulsory schooling
Coleman about corporate actors
59
Third-generation Third-generation hypothesis derivedhypothesis derived
Highly educated parents deploy strategies compensating for state policies raising the age at
which compulsory schooling endsBourdieu about compensatory strategies
Elias about a spiraling process as a competitive outcome
60
12
34
stre
ngth
of
asso
ciat
ion
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970birth cohort
cohort specific association linear trend
GDP per Capita Age Compulsory Schooling
intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974
Model includes one general diagonal effect for each cohortHomogeneous equal scalings for education
Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory SchoolingGraph 1 Changes in Cohort Specific Association-Men
61
0.2
.4.6
.81
stre
ngth
of
asso
ciat
ion
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970birth cohort
cohort specific association linear trend
GDP per Capita Age Compulsory Schooling
intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974
Model includes one uniform associat ion effect for each cohortHomogeneous equal scalings for education
Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory SchoolingGraph 2 Changes in Cohort Specific Diagonal Effects-Men
62
0.2
.4.6
.81
stre
ngth
of
asso
ciat
ion
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970birth cohort
cohort specific association linear trend
GDP per Capita Age Compulsory Schooling
intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974
Model includes one uniform associat ion effect for each cohortHomogeneous equal scalings for education
Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory SchoolingGraph 3 Changes in Cohort Specific Diagonals 1 2 3-Men
63
0.2
.4.6
.81
stre
ngth
of
asso
ciat
ion
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970birth cohort
cohort specific association linear trend
GDP per Capita Age Compulsory Schooling
intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974
Model includes one uniform associat ion effect for each cohortHomogeneous equal scalings for education
Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory SchoolingGraph 4 Changes in Cohort Specific Diagonal 4-Men
64
12
34
stre
ngth
of
asso
ciat
ion
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970birth cohort
cohort specific association linear trend
GDP per Capita Age Compulsory Schooling
intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974
Model includes one general diagonal effect for each cohortHomogeneous equal scalings for education
Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory SchoolingGraph 5 Changes in Cohort Specific Association-Women
65
0.2
.4.6
.81
stre
ngth
of
asso
ciat
ion
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970birth cohort
cohort specific association linear trend
GDP per Capita Age Compulsory Schooling
intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974
Model includes one uniform associat ion effect for each cohortHomogeneous equal scalings for education
Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory SchoolingGraph 6 Changes in Cohort Specific Diagonal Effects-Women
66
0.2
.4.6
.81
stre
ngth
of
asso
ciat
ion
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970birth cohort
cohort specific association linear trend
GDP per Capita Age Compulsory Schooling
intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974
Model includes one uniform associat ion effect for each cohortHomogeneous equal scalings for education
Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory SchoolingGraph 7 Changes in Cohort Specific Diagonals 1 2 3-Women
67
0.2
.4.6
.81
stre
ngth
of
asso
ciat
ion
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970birth cohort
cohort specific association linear trend
GDP per Capita Age Compulsory Schooling
intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974
Model includes one uniform associat ion effect for each cohortHomogeneous equal scalings for education
Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory SchoolingGraph 8 Changes in Cohort Specific Diagonal 4-Women
68
How do macro variables influence uniform association and diagonal densities?
Uniform association and diagonal densities derived from odds ratios
Odds ratios made up from an odds for moving up and an odds for moving down
Testing the third-generation Testing the third-generation hypothesis more severelyhypothesis more severely
69
Hypotheses about oddsHypotheses about odds
Raising the age at which compulsory schooling ends, increases the odds for moving up.
But what does it do to the odds for moving down?Few states ever sought to increase the odds for
moving down.
70
02
46
810
stre
ngth
of o
dds
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970birth cohort
Men in the Netherlands 1900-1974
dots proportional to sample size
intergenerational educational mobilityObserved Odds: Upward Move from Level 1 to Level 4
upward trend
71
0.2
.4.6
.81
stre
ngth
of o
dds
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970birth cohort
Men in the Netherlands 1900-1974
dots proportional to sample size
intergenerational educational mobilityObserved Odds: Downward Move from Level 4 to Level 1
no trend or a downward trend
72
TO BE CONTINUED
THE LONG-RUN AIM OF THE EXERCISE IS TO DETERMINE
WHETHER THE NOTION THAT THERE EXIST CULTURAL
RESOURCES (NEXT TO FINANCIAL RESOURCES) IS
SUPERFLUOUS
73
A BONUS COMPARATIVE QUESTION
DOES EMPLOYMENT OF MIGRANTS DEPEND UPON
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, COUNTRY OF DESTINATION
AND SETTING (THE INTERPLAY OF COUNTRY OF
ORIGIN AND COUNTRY OF DESTINATION)?
74
DATA FOR 18 HIGHLY INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES IN THE 1990s
AUSTRALIA AUSTRIA BELGIUM CANADA DENMARK FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY GREECE
IRELAND ITALY LUXEMBOURG NETHERLANDS PORTUGAL SPAIN SWEDEN UNITED KINGDOM UNITED STATES
75
DATA ARE FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION LABOUR FORCE SURVEY
PLUS THE PUBLIC USE SAMPLE OF THE CENSUS IN AUSTRALIA,
CANADA AND THE USA
AND SPECIFIC IMMIGRANT SURVEYS IN BELGIUM, GERMANY,
ITALY, NETHERLANDS AND UK
76
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
AGE DURATION OF STAY
LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY
77
THE DISTINGUISHED ORIGINS
CHINA, ITALY, PHILIPPINES, POLAND, TURKEY AND 182 OTHERS
NAMES RECODED INTO MEASURES
FOR POLITICAL SUPPRESSION, AND PREDOMINANCE OF
CHRISTIANITY
78
THE NAMES OF THE DESTINTIONS WERE RECODED INTO
THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF A POINT SYSTEM FOR MIGRANTS
AND THE PARTICIPATION OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTIES IN
GOVERNMENT
79
SETTING VARIABLES WERE
GINI ORIGIN / GINI DESTINATION GDP ORIGIN / GDP DESTINATION
GEOGRAPHIC DISTANCE RELATIVE GROUP SIZE
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF GROUP
80
CONTROL VARIABLES
LABOUR FORCE ACTIVITY OF NATIVES
NATURE OF SURVEY (MIGRANTS OVERSAMPLED)
81
TO BE EXPLAINED ARE
INSIDE – OUTSIDE LABOUR FORCE AND EMPLOYMENT – UNEMPLOYMENT
BOTH FOR MALES AND FEMALES
APPLIED WERE MULTI-LEVEL
MODELS
82
RESULTS AFTER THE CONTROLS
THERE ARE THE EXPECTED
INDIVIDUAL EFFECTS OF AGE, DURATION
OF STAY, EDUCATION, LANGUAGE
PROFICIENCY
83
SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN COUNTRY OF DESTINATION MAKES FOR MORE
ACTIVITY AND EMPLOYMENT,
POLITICAL SUPPRESSION IN COUNTRY OF ORIGIN FOR LESS AND
CHRISTINITY THERE FOR MORE ACTIVITY AND EMPLOYMENT
84
SIGNIFICANT NEGATIVE SETTING EFFECTS WERE FOUND FOR
GDP ORIGIN / GDP DESTIONATION AND GEOGRAPHICAL DISTANCE
85
MERGING NATIONAL FILES INTO A SUPER-FILE
HELPS ANSWERING QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ECONOMIC POSITION OF
MIGRANTS
86
this presensation liberally quoted from studies I undertook in the course of the years with several Dutch scholars:
WIL ARTS
WIM BERNASCO
JOS DESSENS
JAAP DRONKERS
HENK FLAP
HARRY GANZEBOOM
NAN-DIRK DE GRAAF
PAUL DE GRAAF
JOHN HENDRICKX
WIM JANSEN
JAN LAMMERS
RUUD LUIJKX
ARIANA NEED
WILMA SMEENK
JEROEN SMITS
FRANK VAN TUBERGEN
WILLFRED UUNK
MAARTEN WOLBERS
87
EXACT REFERENCES CAN BE FOUND ON MY WEB SITE, WHERE MY PRESENTATIONS HAVE BEEN POSTED TOO
http://www.socsci.kun.nl/maw/sociologie/ultee
Email: [email protected]