Upload
others
View
2
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
1. What is Public Financial Management?
Marco Cangiano
Rome, February 6-8, 2017
Outline
1. IntroductionandDefinition(s)
2. ComplexityinthePFMsystems
3. Functionality
4. Preliminaryconclusions
Introduction
3
Interestincreasedinthelasttwodecades
• PFMreceiveditsmostrecentimpetusfromthe“NewPublicManagement”reformsinNewZealand,Australia,andtheUKinthe1980s.
• Reformswerelargelysuccessfulinthesecountries.Aimwastotransforminput-oriented,controlandcompliancefocusedbureaucraciesintoflexible,responsive,efficientservicedeliveryunitsfocusedonoutputsandoutcomes.
• ReformsweretranslatedinNorthernEurope,USandAdvancedAsiancountries.Somecountriesdidbetterthanothers.
• Frommid-nineties,emergingmarketanddevelopingcountriestriedtocopyadvancedcountryPFMreforms
• Surgeintechnicalassistance,oftensupportedbyinternationalfinancialinstitutions
4
KeyInnovations• Thenumberofcountrieswithsomesortoffiscalrulehasrisenfrom5
in1990to76in2012.• Thenumberofcountrieswithasortofmedium-termbudget
frameworkhasincreasedfrom20in1990toabout130in2008.• Therearenow25fiscalcouncilscomparedwith6in1990.• 41countriesarereportingtotheIMFatleastafinancialbalance
sheet,twiceasmanyasin2004.• Since2007,80%percentofOECDcountriesproduceperformance
information,andin2011about2/3haveaperformancebudgetingframework.
• Since1999,111countrieshaveundergonea“FiscalTransparencyROSC,”andbytheendof2011,126countrieshadundertakenaPFMdiagnosticassessment,suchasPEFA.
5
Commonproblems• Deficitbias
ü informationasymmetry/principal-agentrelationshipsü commonpoolresourceproblem(Weingast etal,1981)ü prisoners’dilemma(Hallerberg andvonHagen,1997)ü timeinconsistency(Kydland andPrescott,1977)ü Wagner’sLaw:demandforpublicgoodsrisesmorethan
proportionatelywithincomeü Baumol’s disease:lowerproductivitygrowthofthepublicsectorleads
toanincreasingshareofgovernmentintheeconomytokeeprelativeactivitylevelsinbothsectorsequal.
• Disappearinggovernment:updatedtaxonomy(Irwin,2012)ü Hiddenborrowing:loanproceeds,saleandlease-back,asymmetric
treatmentofpensionassetsandliabilitiesü Deferredspending:operationalvs.financiallease,PPPsü Disinvestment:Sellingofassets,butnoreflectionoffuture(+/-)flows,
securitizationü SpecialpurposevehiclesandoperationsordisappearinggovernmentüMorewhenwediscussfiscaltransparency…..
6
Expendituredrift
7
05101520253035404550PercentofGDP
ExpendituretoGDP,OECDaverage1970-2012
32
42.5
-9.0-8.0-7.0-6.0-5.0-4.0-3.0-2.0-1.00.01.0
PercentofGDP
BalancetoGDP,OECDaverage1960-2012
020406080100120
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
PercentofGDP
DebttoGDP,OECDaverage1970-2012
HowtoaddressthemDeficitbiasü information
fragmentationü commonpoolü prisoners’dilemmaü timeinconsistency
DisappearinggovernmentüHiddenborrowingüDeferredspendingüDisinvestmentüSpecialpurposevehiclesandoperations
üTop-down,TSA,GFSüFiscalresponsibility/rulesü IndependentagenciesüMTBFs/long-termforecasts/DSA
üEntity/transactioncoverage
üAccountingandreportingü Independentoversight
8
Fiscalrules
9
Numberofcountrieswithfiscalrules Nationalfiscalrulesbytypeofeconomy
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
All rules
National rules
Supranational rules
0
10
20
30
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Advanced Economies
Emerging Market Economies
Medium-termbudgeting
10
Growthofmedium-termframeworksworldwide1990-2008
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Num
bero
fcou
ntrie
s
Medium-termfiscalframework Medium-termbudgetframework
Commitmentcontrols
11
AverageannualoverspendinGreece2005-2009(% oftotalspending)
2.2
15.1
3.2
9.7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
FiscalPlanning BudgetPreparation BudgetExecution TotalOverspend
Long-termprojections
12
-5 0 5 10 15 20 25
KORFIN
CHESWEDNKESTDEUAUTISR
CZEISL
SVNSVKAUSCANNLDBELITA
FRANZLPRTGBRGRCESPIRL
USAJPN
Required adjustment between 2011 and 2020
Increase in age-related spending, 2011–30
Riskassessment
13
FiscalRiskDisclosurein2012
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Alternativemacro-fiscalscenario
Qualitativefiscalriskstatement
Quantifiedfiscalriskstatement
Other
AdvancedEconomies EmergingMarketEconomies
Accrualaccounting
14
CountriesPreparingAccrualBasedFinancialStatementsforCentralGovernment1980-2012
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2012
AdvancedEconomies EmergingMarketEconomies
Independentfiscalagencies
15
CountrieswithIndependentFiscalCouncils1960-2012
0
5
10
15
20
25
1960 1980 1995 2005 2012
Advanced Economies Emerging Market Economies
Performancebudgeting
16
PerformanceOrientedBudgeting1990and2012
StrengthofPerformanceOrientedBudgetinginAdvanceCountries
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
FINLAND
AUSTRA
LIA
KORE
ANETHE
RLAN
DSNORW
AYPO
LAND
USA
CANAD
A UKSW
EDEN
TURK
EYSLOVA
KRE
P.JAPA
NNEW
ZEA
LAND
AUSTRIA
DENMAR
KIRELAN
DMEXICO
GREECE
LUXEMBO
URG
FRAN
CEITALY
ICELAN
DSW
ITZERLAN
DPO
RTUG
ALGE
RMAN
YHU
NGA
RYSPAIN
BELG
IUM
CEZCHRE
P.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1990 2012
Advanced Emerging
Internalfinancialcontrol
1. Devolutionoffinancialmanagementresponsibilities
2. Limitstowhatcanbedetectedbycentralizedcontrolorgans
3. EmphasisintheEuropeanUnion
17
Treasurysingleaccount
• Centralizationofcashbalances• Lowersborrowingcostandreducestheneedforcashrationing
• Enhancedpotentialwithelectronictransfers• Majorityofcountrieshave—orareintheprocessofintroducingTSAs.
• Coverageisgraduallybeingexpanded.
18
Growthoftechnicalassistance
• Between1990and2005thenumberofWBprojectswithasignificantPublicSectorReformcomponentquadrupled.
• OECDdatashowthatdonorfundingforPFMreformrosefromUS$85millionin1995toUS$931millionin2007
• IMFPFMTAalmosttripledfrom2006to2014
19
ButImprovementshavebeenmixed
20
1.5%
-9.8%
5.4% 5.1%
-1.9%
25.5%
2.9%
-15.0%
-10.0%
-5.0%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
LatinAmericaandCaribbean
(LCR)
SouthAsia(SAR) EastAsiaandPacific(EAP)
Africa(AFR) MiddleEast andNorthernAfrica
(MNA)
EuropeamdCentralAsia
(ECA)
Total
%Increase/D
ecrease
GrowthChangeintheAverageCPIARatingforPFMfortheperiod2001-2011
Definition(s):WhatisPFM?
21
Startwithabudget
• Abudgetisaquintessentialpoliticalprocesswherebyscarceresourcesareallocatedtomeetsociallydesirableobjectives—ameanstoanend:
– Asetofprocessesandproceduresthatrelatetheexpenditureoffundstotheaccomplishmentofplannedobjectives(Schick).
– Attemptstoallocatefinancialresourcesthroughpoliticalprocessestoservedifferenthumanpurposes(Wildavski).
• Thisrelativelysimpledefinitionhidesacomplexityandmultidimensionalitythatneedtobedisentangledtounderstanditsvariousphases,components,keyfunctions,andactors.
MoveontoPublicFinancialManagement
• PFMgoesbeyondtraditionalbudget:formulation,preparationtoexecutionandcontrolandvalidation
• Includesafocusonmanagingpublicresources:– directlythroughthebudget;or– indirectlythroughlowerlevelsofgovernments,state-owned
enterprises,quasi-fiscalactivities,andprivatesectorpartnerships.
• Itisthusan“umbrella”definition:– anintegratedframeworkcoveringasetofsystems– aimedatproducinginformation,processes,andrules– thatsupportfiscalpolicymakingandprovideinstrumentsforits
implementation.23
WhatisPFM?• IMF,2013:“PFM….isconcernedwithhowgovernmentsmanage…..
allaspectsofresourcemobilizationandexpendituremanagement.....withaprogressiveextensiontothemedium- tolong-termimplicationsandrisksforpublicfinancesoftoday’spolicydecisions.”
• Morerecently,Andrewsetal,definePFMas“thewaygovernmentsmanagepublicresources(bothrevenueandexpenditure)andtheimmediateandmedium-to-long-termimpactofsuchresourcesontheeconomyorsociety.”
• Assuch,“PFMhastodowithbothprocesses(howgovernmentsmanage)andresults(short,medium,andlongtermimplicationsoffinancialflows).”
24
ObjectivesofPFM• Threebasicobjectives:
– Aggregatefiscaldiscipline– througheffectivecontrolofthebudgettotalsatallstagesintheresourcesmanagementcycle[Spendinginafiscallysustainablemanner]
– StrategicAllocation– abilitytoallocateresourcestostrategicprioritiesandonthebasisofprogrameffectiveness,andtoshiftresourcesfromoldtonewprioritiesandfromlesstomoreproductiveactivities,inaccordancewithpolicyobjectives[Spendingontherightsetofactivities]
– OperationalEfficiency– abilitytoachievecost-efficiencyinservicedelivery[GettingmoreoutofeachtaxdollarsorVFM]
• Theobjectivesarecomplementaryandinterdependent.• Beyondthethreebasicobjectives,asoundPFMsystemshouldtakeinto
considerationthewidersocietalvaluesandneeds.– Accountability,transparency,predictability,andparticipationtogetherformthe
pillarsofgoodgovernance.
25
Asimplifiedview
Complexities
27
• Threemaininstruments–information,processesandrules—toaffectbehaviorofpoliticiansandcivilservice(i.e.,keyactors)andachievedesiredoutcomes.
• Thethreeinstrumentsformalogicalsequence:
Ø Informationistheessentialfirststep—betterinformationwillproducebetteroutcomes.
Ø Processesprovideincentivesforpolicymakerstomakeprudent,effectivedecisions.
Ø Rulesprescribeactionsbypolicymakersandpublicservants.
• Buteachinstrumenthasitslimitations:
– Information,whileessential,canbecostly,anendbyitself,andstirconflict.– Processestendtobedominatedbyroutineandbureaucraticinertiathatwork
againstinnovations.– Rulescanbeproceduraland/orrestrictive.
28
ConceptualFramework
Roleofinformation
• Governmentoftendonotknowtheirtruefinancialpositionorthefutureimplicationsoftoday’sdecisionortheriskstheymaybefacing.
• Toaffectbehaviors,governmentsmustchangetheinformationavailabletoparticipantsandhowitisprocessed.
• Butinformationmeansclarity,reliability,frequency,timeliness,andrelevanceofpublicfiscalreportingonpast,current,andfuturefiscaldevelopments—moreonthiswhenwediscussfiscaltransparency.
• Notallinformationisessential,someisuseful,somelessso,butinanyeventitiscostly,mayleadtooveraload oranendbyitselfratherthanameanstoanend,andmaygenerateconflict.
• Limitedcapacitytoprocessinformation.
29
Keyactors• Strategicbudgeting(formulation),preparation,approval
– Centralfiscalinstitutions(CFAs)– Planningministriesandagencies– Centralbanks/independentagencies– Ministryoffinance/treasury– Spendingministries/units(SUs)– Parliament/congress
• Resourcemgt.(execution),internalcontrol,andreporting– Ministryoffinance/treasury– Cash/debtmanagementagencies/units– Spendingministries– CFAs/SUs(internalcontrol/audit)– Accountingoffices/unitswithinCFAs(accountingandreporting)
• Externalauditandaccountability– SupremeAuditInstitutions(external/independentaudit)– Parliament/Congress/Publicatlarge
Multiple,complex,conflictingobjectives• ThinkofMusgrave’straditionalfiscalpolicyobjectives:
– maintainingasustainablefiscalposition– aneffectiveallocationofresources(redistribution)– efficient(valueformoney)deliveryofgoodsandservices
• Butthesearecomplex,maybeconflicting,objectives• Butthereareotherdimensions:
– reliabilityofresourcesallocatedtogivenobjectives– accountabilityforuseofpublicmoneys– transparencyontruefinancialpositionvis-à-visthepublic
• Anddifferentactorsemphasizedifferentobjectives• Thusaddingtothecomplexity
Morecomplexthanitseems
• Thinkofhowmanymovingparts:– Anumberofphases,oneleadingintotheotherandeachwithitsownoutputs/deadlines/routines
– Asetofactors,agencies,institutions– Anumberprocessesandprocedures
• Andthecomplexinfluenceofpoliticalsystems,history,culture,traditionssothat…– Canhardlyfindtwobudgetsystemsthatlookalike– Eachcountrymustdeviseasystemthatworksforit
AnIntegratedPublicFinancialManagementAct
33
a. Fiscalprinciples/rulesb. Contentandpresentationoffiscalstrategyc. Medium-termbudgetframeworkd. Fiscalriskmanagement
a. Budgetdocumentationb. Proceduresforbudgetpreparation&approvalc. Unitofappropriation,reallocation,&carryoverrulesd. Inyearreporting,contingencyreserve,supplementary&excessvote
a. Banking&cashmanagementarrangementsb. Collection,deposit,&retentionofrevenuesc. Authoritytocommit&spendpublicfundsd. Issuanceofloans,guarantees&saleofassets
a. Coverage&standardsforaccountingb. Timetableforpreparationandsubmissionofaccountsc. Externalaudit,internalaudit&follow-upd. Sanctions
MainSections KeyProvisions
a. MinisterofFinance,LineMinistersb. TreasurySecretary,AccountantGeneral&AccountingOfficersc. Parliament,Committees,andFiscalCouncilsd. AuditorGeneral
II.Macro-FiscalPolicy
III.Budgeting
IV.TreasuryManagement
V.Accounting&Audit
I.Roles&Responsibilities
VI.Oversighta. Localgovernmentsb. State-ownedenterprisesc. Extra-budgetaryfundsd. Otherbodies
Functionality
34
Budgetsystemscomesinvariousshapesandforms
Whatdofunctionalsystemsdo?• Commonyardstick?
– PFMsystemprovidespredictabilityandcapabilitytodeliveronagreedplans,toachievestatedobjectives
• Focusonfunctionality,butimperfectview– prudentfiscaldecisions– crediblebudgets– reliableandefficientresourceflows– institutionalizedaccountability
• Butexpectdifferencesinfocus,reflecting– politicalregime,governmentstructure,administrationtype,economic
context,etc.
• Andconsiderhowharditistoassessthesethings– Commonassessmentframeworksfocusmoreonprocess
Butafocusonformoverfunctioncanbemisleading
KeyCharacteristicsofamodernPFMsystem
• Goodqualityinformation.Publicavailabilityofclear,reliable,frequent,timely,andrelevantinformationonpast,current,andfuturefiscaldevelopmentsisacondicio sinequanon toassessgovernments’capacitytomeettheirstatedobjectivesandgoalsinanefficientandeffectivemanner.
• Understandthetrueunderlyingfiscalposition.withoutgoodinformationthecapacitytoanalyzethetrueunderlyingfiscalpolicyanditsdynamicsbecomesachallenge.Informationisthusessentialtoanalyzethestatusquo.
• A top-downperspective.Onlythiscanensurethatthemacroeconomicconstraintsaredulyrespectedsothatstabilizationandlong-termsustainabilityarere-establishedwhereneededandmaintained.
• Mediumtolong-termview.Capacitytoassesstheimpactonthemedium-tolongtermoftoday’spolicydecisionsonthepopulationsatlarge,includingtheirdistributionalandenvironmentalaspects.
• Financialcomplianceremainsthecoreofanygoodbudgetingsystemsothatpoliciescanbeexecutedasplanned.
• Accountabilitymustbeexercisedatalllevelsviatheconstitutionallyprotectedindependenceofauditandstatisticalinstitutions,avibrantdialoguewithinthesociety,andpublicparticipationinthebudgetprocess.
38
Government,publicinterest,governance,accountability
• Togettheconversationgoing,whatisagovernment?– Isitallinprovidingpublicgoods?Butwhatarethese?Isitallrelative?
• Howdowedefinepublicinterest?– Acontextualtermthatrequiresmorespecificdefinitionthattheonestypicallyfoundin
nationalconstitutionalmandatesorreligiousprescriptions.– Inotherwords,thequestforanobjectivedefinitionofpublicinteresthasprovensomewhat
illusory,asitrequires,forinstance,anexplicitvaluejudgmentonincomeredistributionwithinagivensocietyaswellasontherole,function,andsizeofgovernment.
• Whatisgovernance?– Normativevs.positiveapproach– Thearrangementswherebyintendedoutcomesforstakeholdersaredefinedandachieved.– Government’sabilitytomakeandenforcerules,andtodeliverservices(Fukuyama(2013).
• Howcangovernmentsbeaccountable?– Information– Independentevaluation– Increasingpublicparticipation 39
OnComparingInstitutions
40
• Lack workable definition(s) of governance/publicmanagement; existing ones are loaded with normative judgments that define what governments should do rather than how they should perform.
• Normative definitions tend to dominate so-called best practices, thus generating perverse effects in designing reforms, including isomorphic mimicry, prevalence of de jure over de factoreforms leading to implementation gaps.
• Hence, rating and ranking remain highly judgmental exercises, very clear among most of those who rate and rank, but typically overlooked by users and the media.
Preliminaryconclusions
• PFMsystemshavemanyprocessareas,actors,interactinginconstantways
• Thisleadstocomplexity– Movingparts– Manyembeddedinfluences(history,etc.)– Multiple(potentiallyconflicting)objectives
• Butwehaveanagendathat:– emphasizescompliancewithformoverfunctionality– andsetsmanyreformsupforfailure
Selectedreferences
Andrewes,Matt,etal.,2014,“ThisisPFM”,availableathttp://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/cid/publications/faculty-working-papers/this-is-pfm
Introductorychapterfrom PublicFinancialManagementanditsEmergingArchitecture,”editedbyCangiano,Marco,TeresaCurristine,andMichelLazare,IMF,2013(Washington:InternationalMonetaryFund).
Schick,Allen,2013,“ReflectionsonTwoDecadesofPublicFinancialManagementReforms,Chapter1inPublicFinancialManagementanditsEmergingArchitecture,editedbyCangiano,Marco,TeresaCurristine,andMichelLazare,IMF,2013(Washington:InternationalMonetaryFund).
43