[email protected]

7/25/2019 [email protected]

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/101007s11366-016-9398-ypdf 1/20

R E SE AR C H AR T IC L E

A Discourse Called China and the PRC’s Foreign

Policy and Diplomacy

Jesús Solé-Farràs1

# Journal of Chinese Political Science/Association of Chinese Political Studies 2016

Abstract On the basis of the premise that China, besides being a powerfulcivilization and state, is also a powerful discourse, this essay will set forth, as a preliminary analytical step, a plausible definition of the ‘Chinese mind’ bydescribing certain essential characteristics that have been forged in China’sclassical culture and thought. When placed in the more creative sphere of discourse construction, these essential characteristics become ideological compounds of the here theorized ‘discourse called China’, whose impact is weighedup as the focal analytical point in the discursive space of the PRC’s foreign

policy and diplomacy.

Keywords China as a Discourse . Chinese Philosophy. The Chinese Mind . PRC’sForeign Policy and Diplomacy

China is Also a Discourse — Constructed Under MultipurposeCooperation

There is clear evidence that China can be treated as a discourse. In this essay we willattempt to objectify such evidence in order to understand the importance and scope of this powerful discourse.

Countless scholars have investigated Chinese culture in great depth, and particularly the ancient philosophy that supports it while stripping this culturedown to the bare bones in order to identify its unique characteristics. Likewise,their work has, from the perspective of very different disciplines, often

J OF CHIN POLIT SCIDOI 10.1007/s11366-016-9398-y

* Jesús Solé-Farrà[email protected]

1 Faculty of Arts and Humanities, Open University of Catalonia, Barcelona, Spain

http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s11366-016-9398-y&domain=pdf

http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8172-4654



established a stable link between traditional Chinese thought and various formsof behavior that articulate the consecutive cultural, social and political realitiesof China.1 Needless to say that this view bestows on a plausible ‘Chinese mind’an inexhaustible, timeless capacity to influence. Research on this matter has

frequently relied on the systematic contradistinction of certain elements of anidealized Chinese culture to others of a perhaps even more idealized Westernculture. Trying to avoid this systematics, we have here set forth, by locatingour analysis in the sphere of discourse construction, an alternative methodolog-ical approach based on the theoretical framework we call ‘multipurpose coop-eration’. This approach is particularly fruitful when applied to Chinese culture,since it is quite evident that this culture has an idiosyncratic narrative dimen-sion — according to Toynbee, ‘China’s hold on Eastern Asia has not been just political; it has been cultural first and foremost ’ [5].

It is precisely this consolidated narrative dimension of Chinese culture that allows usto theorize verisimilarly a concept that results from the aforementioned methodologicalapproach, which hereafter we will refer to as the ‘discourse called China’ (DCC), and toaffirm that, beyond being a formidable economic and political power again, China isalso a discourse, a powerful discourse that it has surely never ceased to be. Since Chinais probably still more discursively vigorous as a civilization than as a state, the DCC is powerful enough to permeate any field and hence can be extensively theorized. Theconcept of DCC mainly embodies the presumption that certain elements deeply rootedin the Chinese cultural tradition constitute, as a structured whole, a persistent force that

is still able to shape most aspects of today’

s China. Even in the convulsive earlytwentieth century, Chinese intellectuals, both those who supported and loathed tradi-tional culture, professed the existence of a Chinese ‘essence’ that should be preserved,adjusted or eradicated, depending on each viewpoint.2 This idea, which has essentiallyremained constant, seems to be gaining momentum in the twenty-first century amonganalyses of China’s reality.

The theoretical framework in which we explain the construction and dynamics of adiscourse is, as mentioned above, that of multipurpose cooperation.3 According to thistheoretical framework, while ideological elements, other discourses and discursivespaces constitute the indispensable internal structure of any distinct discourse, thespecific cooperating factors constitute its external constructive forces. In brief, thistheory is based on the assumption that discourses are intellectual dynamic concretionsconstantly being refined, which, by virtue of the association of ideological elements bearing different degrees of affinity, occur within complex, heterogeneous and perme-able structures known as discursive spaces. Since the main relational factor of these primary components, which are ideological elements, of a discursive space is not coherence but affinity, discursive spaces provide discourses with inexhaustible

1

For an overview of these outstanding scholars in modern China and their disciplinary fields see: [1 –

4].2 For instance, analyzing the positions on traditional Chinese thought of the intellectuals of the May FourthMovement — which arose from the protests in Tian’anmen Square in 1919 — Jean François Billeter [6] definesfour groups: ‘iconoclasts’, ‘critics’, ‘comparativists’, and ‘ purists’. According to him, the political implicationsof their positions would still be reflected in contemporary China’s ideological debate.3 The ‘multipurpose cooperation’ theoretical framework is set out further in Jesús Solé-Farràs, New Confu-

cianism in Twenty-First Century China: The Construction of a Discourse (Abingdon, Oxon; New York:Routledge, 2014), 3 – 5, 220 – 230.

J. Solé-Farràs



resources. Thus, in its context, a particular discourse will take shape as a result of theaction of specific cooperating factors — philosophical schools, ideological currents,individual thought, social movements, government policies, etc. — incorporating certainideological elements in order to gain internal coherence. The life of a discourse will

depend, to a great extent, on the degree of internal coherence acquired in the process of construction. A discourse that lacks ideological coherence will collapse as soon as it begins to engage other discourses coherently formed in debate. Internal coherenceadded to a high degree of coherence with external reality is what makes a discoursesound and long-lived. Thus, the construction of a discourse is the formulation of alogical, sequential narrative caught between the intrinsic need for coherence of itsideological elements and the need to adapt to the changing circumstances of externalreality. All philosophical and ideological forms of thought strive mainly to make all theideological elements of their discourses fit coherently, through which they try both to

explain and to transform reality. Indeed, the construction of a discourse is an unending path to perfection united by coherence; a path that begins with maximum freedom,which is inherent to a relatively low degree of coherence, and then evolves progres-sively towards some degree of dogmatism.

Why the notion of ‘multipurpose’ in this theory? Let us posit a couple of notes about this. When analyzing a discourse, it is important not to commit the error of underestimating, let alone ignoring, those cooperating factors that, ostensibly obliviousto this discourse, unintentionally but at times decisively influence its construction. Inline with this feature, one of the most relevant conclusions obtained from the applica-

tion of our theory is that a discourse has no owners but contributors and representatives.In other words, it would be virtually impossible to identify a particular discoursealigned completely with exclusive objectives or serving a sole ideology, which wouldexplain why it is difficult to make reliable prognoses on the evolution of social and political events.

For the purposes of this essay, we will focus on a singular kind of discourse,or the ‘substratal discourse’, which can be defined as a discourse mostly madeup of those ideological elements identified as the substratum of a culture.Mainly due to their presence, studying discourses and their dynamics is anineluctable exercise when understanding the underlying living forces of aculture, especially in a society such as Chinas’s, where transitions are subject to a mass of accumulated cultural sediments. Of course, the DCC is a substrataldiscourse, which implies that its ideological elements are well-established asideological compounds bestowing a high degree of coherence on it. Theseelements mainly belong to traditional Chinese philosophy; a fact that does not allow more redefinitions than those generated by modern interpretations of classic works. In this case, however, what really matters is its impact on thediscourses with which it interacts in a particular discursive space.

Applying multipurpose cooperation theory — see the diagram below — the essentialcharacteristics of the Chinese mind, once transferred from the sphere of culture andthought to that of discourse construction, change from playing a descriptive role aselements of the Chinese philosophical heritage to playing the creative role that specificcooperating factors confer upon them as ideological compounds. This means that theChinese mind and the DCC share contents, which, depending on the specific sphere of study, must be seen as playing different roles targeting distinct purposes.

A Discourse Called China and the PRC’s Foreign Policy and Diplomacy



Unceasing change rules the universePhilosophizing through a non-anthropocentric humanism

An ever-perfecting ethics in the core of human natureSearching for all-embracing harmony

Synthetic reasoning by defusing antithetical viewsA pragmatic mind requiring a versatile epistemology

Government by virtue to avert chaos

SPHERE OF CULTURE AND THOUGHT

Chinese mind

cultural substratum

Essential characteristics playing a descriptive role

based on philosophical heritage

SPHERE OF DISCOURSE CONSTRUCTION

Discourse called China

substratal discourse

Ideological compounds playing a creative role

based on cooperating factors

multipurpose cooperation theory

DIAGRAM OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE DCC UNDER MULTIPURPOSE COOPERATION

Recapitulating the two fundamental purposes of this essay, the first of whichwas to expound a comprehensive methodological approach, based on themultipurpose cooperation theory of discourse construction, which results inthe notion of the DCC, a discourse that effectively conditions any discursive

space connected with the multidisciplinarily analyzed China of today. Thesecond purpose spells out how the DCC actually shapes a specific discursivespace. These two purposes have been satisfied by dividing the paper into two parts while positing it as a continuum. The first part is actually a preliminaryanalytical step setting forth a plausible definition of a cultural substratum — the‘Chinese mind’— that becomes a substratal discourse — the ‘discourse calledChina’. The second part is the focal analytical point weighing up the impact of the DCC on the specific discursive space of the PRC’s foreign policy anddiplomacy, both in its canonical version and within its current evolution.

Incidentally, perhaps it would be appropriate to note here that collaboration betweenthe humanities and social sciences — respectively represented in this essay by the‘Chinese mind’ and the ‘PRC’s foreign policy and diplomacy’ issues — is as stimulatingas it is fruitful, since when reducing unattended areas of knowledge, variables increasein number and conclusions become more comprehensive. One could even dare say that this is why Sinologists are so often attracted to social and political matters, as well as tothe opportunity to theorize on the basis of hybrid concepts, such as the DCC.

The Chinese Mind as a Source of the Discourse Called China

To describe the Chinese mind — the preliminary analytical step of our essay — we havestarted from the premise that it must be chiefly understood through Chinese philosophy,since the philosophy of a culture is a representation of how that culture attempts tounderstand itself [7]. Historically, a number of philosophical schools have profoundlyshaped the thought and life of the Chinese people. A. C. Graham, for instance,

J. Solé-Farràs



condensed their main contributions to what he called ‘the Chinese secret to defeat thedestiny by which all things come and go’ as follows: from Confucianism, an ethicrooted in the most enduring social bonds, kinship and custom; from Legalism, arational statecraft with the techniques for organizing an empire; from Yin-Yang, a

proto-science which places man in a cosmos modeled on community; from Taoism,reinforced by Buddhism, personal philosophies relating individuals directly to thecosmos, allowing room within the social order for the unassimilable who might disrupt community; and from Mozi, a rationality confined to the useful [8]. However, the earlyfading of many of these schools yielded prominence to Taoism and, specially, Confu-cianism, which has succeeded the best in preserving and consciously transmitting someof the key cultural elements more identifiably ‘Chinese’— New Confucianism would bethe most eloquent contemporary example of this.

We outline below an admissible, although perfectible and expandable, set of essen-

tial characteristics of the Chinese mind as follows:

1. Unceasing change rules the universe. This is probably the oldest view of all to havetaken root in the Chinese mind. The two fundamental ideas that the universe is adynamic system that changes constantly from simple to complex, and that the yin and

yang — the two, passive and active, universal principles generated by the Great Ultimate (taiji) — are the agents of change, preceded by centuries the compilation of the Yijing , the classic text where this theory is conveniently expounded and whoseorigin can be traced to the remote past when divination was the only form of

intellectual activity. The yin-yang theory provided the common background for thedivergent philosophical schools. It was also a key aspect of the two long indigenoussources that shaped the Chinese mind, i.e., Confucianism and Taoism, and conse-quently, it has largely conditioned the Chinese view of reality. These ideas have beensome of the major Chinese contributions to universal philosophical thought.

2. Philosophizing through a non-anthropocentric humanism. ‘The way of Heaven is far away, but the way of man is near ’, said the philosopher and statesman Zichan —

Zuozhuan (VI B.C.). To most Chinese thinkers, humanism is the only sound mode of philosophizing. Nonetheless, Chinese humanism is of a kind that while averring that ‘man is at once the maker and spectator of an order of events as he passes through that vast array of cosmic activities with an attempt to cope with the most high’ [9] alsorejects anthropocentrism as an impoverished idea of humanity, given that the ultimate purpose of the universe is not the human being and his needs. This feeling has alsocome to permeate a very large part of Chinese art and literature. Unquestionably, theChinese humanist school par excellence is Confucianism, whose main moral inspi-ration would be that ‘it is man who can make the Way great, not the Way that canmake man great ’ ( Analects, 15:29). This humanism, possibly more than anything else,has been the determining factor of the Chinese way of life, as for more than 2000 yearsit has been teaching diligence, independence of character, respect for the settled order,adherence to moral duty, and esteem for intellectual eminence [10]. Confucianismaimed at teaching each individual how to take his place in his own social group withthe least possible friction, and how to perform his allotted duties within that group insuch a way as to bring the greatest benefit to the group as a whole. Thus, the Chinesemind conceives the state as an enlargement of the family unit — in Chinese, the termfor ‘nation’, guojia, means ‘national family’.




3. An ever-perfecting ethics in the core of human nature. In line with this prevailinghumanism, the Chinese conception of human nature is founded purely on philo-sophical deliberation.4 Thus, in Confucianism, human nature ( xing ) is social incharacter, which, driven by ‘humanity’ (ren) as the basic moral virtue that makes

human beings authentically human, focuses on ethics to achieve harmony in socialrelations. To Confucius, ren simply meant human perfection, which begins with thedevelopment of the individual and culminates in a well-organized state in a peaceful world. Holding that human nature is good, ren also became a psycholog-ical need with Mencius. Political Confucianism — represented by the GongyangSchool — emphasized the importance of reforming institutions to overcome theshortcomings of human nature, which in spite of being good in origin becomesevil when subject to the influence of external conditions. Neo-Confucianism —

virtual dominant force in Chinese thought during the last millennium — added a

metaphysical dimension to ren: since original human nature is identical to that of the Great Ultimate, as it was a good infused into the human being by heaven, manmust strive to develop his nature to the fullest to create a cosmic moral order. Thus,human nature would be the source of ethics, and the moral self its essence. Taoismand Buddhism, as the usual dialectical counterpoises to Confucianism in shapingthe Chinese mind, posit that human nature is immersed in a mutable world that generates confusion and suffering, from which man can only escape by developingthe principles of harmony with the primary force of the universe (dao), or byovercoming, through spiritual development, affliction (dukkha), which is provoked

by desire, hatred and ignorance.4. Searching for all-embracing harmony. In the Chinese mind there is no real distinc-tion between the world of the supernatural, the world of nature, and the world of man; they are all bound up in one all-embracing unity — the concept of ‘unity of heaven and man’ is of capital importance. Coherently, such a mind is characterized by what has been called the ‘cultivated sense of comprehensive harmony’.5 Theanthropocosmic vision that the human being is in harmony with everything that surrounds him is basic to Chinese philosophy, especially in the Neo-Confucianist tradition, characterized by the search for the Great Harmony (taihe), which in-cludes harmony in nature, harmony between human beings and nature, socialharmony, and individual harmony. Confucianism prioritizes the harmony of theself because it believes that individual harmony is the starting point for attaining allother harmonies. Likewise, the dialectic of harmonization, which sees harmonyand conflict not as opposites but as the latter being integrated into the former, helpsus to understand the model that Confucianism still offers to cope with the problemsof contemporary human life — in fact, ‘harmony’ (he) has a culinary etymology asthe art of blending two or more foodstuffs so that they come together with mutual benefit and enhancement without losing their particular identities.6

4 Fang, Chinese View, p. 88.5 Ibid., p. ii.6 As is well known, in current Chinese politics, sound potentialities of the traditional concept of harmony have

been explored, which may not be unrelated to the classic idea of the restoration of an idyllic past of peace andharmony associated with the existence of a stable political power. The concept of ‘harmony’ as an overlappingfield in which the traditional Confucian values, adapted to the twenty-first century by New Confucianism, andthe CCP’s socialist values representing ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’ is dealt with in [11].

J. Solé-Farràs



5. Synthetic reasoning by defusing antithetical views. Closely related to the ideas of yin and yang , comprehensive harmony, and the dialectic of harmonization, thetendency to combine, seeking almost instinctively similarities, different and evenopposite elements in a synthetic whole, is a characteristic Chinese attitude. Thus,

absolute distinctions such as those indicated by the ‘either-or ’ point of view do not meet with the approval of the Chinese mind [12]. Accordingly, the Chinese can beat one and the same time both extremely idealistic and extremely realistic [13]. Asmentioned, contrasts are not antithetical, but synthesized into one whole. How thiscan be done is a problem that Chinese philosophy attempts to solve. Herein probably lies the spirit of this philosophy, which exists to enable human beingsto possess the nature of the Chinese sage, a nature traditionally described as ‘inner sageliness and outer kingliness’— the locus classicus of this expression is the last chapter of the Zhuangzi. Adopted as a Confucianist concept, it became the ideal

model of life; that is to say, individual ethics displayed to the external world associo-political ethics. In China, the most influential philosophers have been thosewho have attempted to synthesize both. Moreover, this synthetic view allows oneto actually consider Chinese philosophy as monistic, insofar as, despite the appar-ent dualism in the yin- yang theory or in the reason (li) and vital force (qi) tradition,these forces are just different aspects of the one reality synthesized in the Great Ultimate.7 Since values are seen as complementary rather than mutually exclusive,Chinese people apply different value systems to fit different situations — there is awell-known saying that every Chinese is a Confucian when everything is going

well, a Taoist when things are falling apart, and a Buddhist as he approaches death.6. A pragmatic mind requiring a versatile epistemology. Chinese thinkers haveseldom shown much concern for truths that serve no obviously useful purpose; scornful of knowledge for knowledge’s sake, they emphasizedthe practical over the speculative mind. An example from Confucianismof the subtle pragmatism rooted in the Chinese mind is the description inthe Record of Rites of two types of cultures: the utopian culture of theGreat Concord (datong ), and that of Minor Peace ( xiaokang ), as the second best. Meaningfully, all Confucius’s teachings about social order (li) areconcerned with this latter culture, which is seen as practical and attainablein the present world [14]. The versatile epistemology that pragmatismrequires also shows the Taoist mark on the Chinese mind — indeed, Taoismdoes not consider pragmatism as a lack of principles, but the only wayforward for harmony — since the union of reason and intuition gives ethicsand politics an emotional and social basis [15]. Taoism also furnishes theidea of ‘following two paths simultaneously’, i .e., a double patternconsisting of an external adaptation to events without this implying internalinfluence.8 Certainly, as Chinese philosophy has neither clearly demarcatedthe distinction between the individual and the universe nor paid muchattention to the division between the ego and the non-ego [16], epistemol-ogy has not formed an important part of this philosophy. However, Chinese

7 Chan, ‘Spirit of Oriental Philosophy’, p. 155.8 Álvarez, El Tao, p. 122. On the idea of ‘following two paths simultaneously’, see the fable ‘In the morningthree’ in Zhuangzi, 2:6.




thinkers do believe in the efficacy of reason, albeit at no time is thisaccepted as the exclusive path to truth; their pragmatic mind, by and large,trusts all means of knowledge.

7. Government by virtue to avert chaos. As a rule, Chinese philosophers have

regarded government by virtue as the most perfect form of government,followed by government by cultural refinement, and then by government bylaw, as the only good choice left.9 In the Confucianist system, politics andethics are fused into one, so that the ruler rules on the basis of moralityand the interests of the people — by doing so he holds Heaven’s Decree(tianming ). Heavenly disapproval, however, will be manifested by popular revolts that may culminate in the ruler ’s dethronement. The so-called ‘right of revolution’, originating before the first millennium B.C., is one of themost fundamental concepts underlying the Chinese theory of government —

geming (‘revolution

’) means verbatim ‘changing the Decree

’ [17]. I t isinteresting to note that New Confucianism interprets tianming as a seed

of democracy in traditional culture, since the people’s will is implicit in it.Likewise, two fundamental ideas have generated permanent concern in theChinese about how to keep the government virtuous and avert the specter of chaos: firstly, that the chaos of revolution and harmony are inseparable poles of the same changing reality; and secondly, since personal harmony isthe starting point of social harmony, the individual is ultimately responsiblefor achieving stability in society. Because it is perceived as being so likely,

panic in the face of chaos is so deeply rooted in and so dreaded by theChinese mind. Confucianist teachings mainly provided the ideological basisfor preventing social disorder, but the Taoist and Buddhist concept of governing with no active interference (wuwei) also reinforced the ideal of governing by virtue. These views have had an enormous influence on theintellectual history of China and, definitely, in shaping the Chinese mind.

Only for ease of analysis, the gist of these essential characteristics may beencapsulated in the concepts of ‘unceasing change’, ‘non-anthropocentric hu-manism’, ‘ever-perfecting ethics’, ‘all-embracing harmony’, ‘synthetic reason-ing’, ‘eclectic pragmatism’, and ‘virtuous stable government ’. On the basis of these, the Chinese mind could be summarized as a mind molded by thefollowing views: that unceasing change, driven by two universal dialectical principles, rules the universe; that a humanism rejecting anthropocentrism isthe sound mode for philosophizing and as the moral guide for living; that ethics, as the moral self fixed in human nature, perfects both individual andsociety; that an all-embracing harmony will only be reached through individualharmony; that a synthetic reasoning, incompatible with antithetical views, en-ables us to generate compatible but different value systems; that the search for truth must serve useful purposes, whereby all means of knowledge are trust-worthy; and that government by virtue is always the preferable choice, sinceruling on the basis of morality keeps the specter of chaos at bay.

9 Fang, Chinese View, p. 263.

J. Solé-Farràs



The DCC in the Canonical Discursive Space of the PRC’s Foreign Policyand Diplomacy

After having approached the essentially humanistic issue of our study, i.e., the Chinese

mind, taken as a source of the DCC, we can now deal with the issue pertaining to thesocial sciences, i.e., the PRC’s foreign policy and diplomacy taken as a discursivespace. To do so, the intellectual perimeter of this discursive space must be defined byidentifying the diverse discourses that take place within it, some of which will bediscussed below. The crux of the matter, however, is to see how, by the action of thedifferent CCP leaderships as main cooperating factors in the construction of thesediscourses, several essential characteristics of the Chinese mind, now acting in thesphere of discourse construction as ideological compounds of the DCC, redefine thePRC's foreign policy and diplomacy — actually, this is the focal analytical point of our

essay. The aim of the cooperating factors is, naturally, to foster their ideologicalinterests. Moreover, we must bear in mind the fact that, in this case, CCP leadershipsform part, culturally and psychologically, of the ‘Chinese mind’, whereby the func-tional shift of the essential characteristics in ideological compounds is very evident.

As for the discourses making up the PRC’s foreign policy and diplomacy, several of these, which are deeply rooted, have forged the conception that contemporary ChineseIR theory is largely indebted to China’s traditional principled background. The dis-course of Chinese exceptionalism, which emphasizes pacifism and harmonious policiesas exceptional Chinese cultural leanings, nourishes this conception, as does the state

level of analysis that constructivism represents;

10

and specifically, the branch of theconstructivist discourse called ‘strategic culture’ [19], which claims that strategicchoices are in large measure determined by values with roots that strike deep into astate’s ideational history. In policy terms, the notion of strategic culture leaves open the possibility that strategic preferences and state interests are more amenable to purposivechange than structural realists might assume. Thus, unique historical experiences wouldexplain distinctive features of Chinese foreign policy, such as obsession with sover-eignty, desire for an international image of a principled actor, or the mixture of great and weak power attitudes.

In this discursive space, diplomatic discourse stands for the example par excellenceof a discourse constructed under the aegis of many strategies — prominently, culturalstrategy. Although diplomacy is a general concept that includes both discourses of traditional diplomacy — those engaging governments — and of public diplomacy or soft power — those engaging a country with citizens in other societies — is perhaps in thelatter that the impossible task of trying to fashion a discourse serving precisely definedgoals is more tenaciously undertaken. For instance, in ‘cultural diplomacy’, aspects of culture are displayed with the purpose of developing an understanding of the nation’sideals and values in an effort to build broad support for economic and political goals.An enlightening official document on US-China relations sums up the goals of US

10 The ‘state level’ of analysis considers that the state’s external behavior grows out of a complex interactionof internal factors, so that foreign policy cannot be understood without specific knowledge of each state’shistory, political system, culture, and leaders — constructivism is the term that most frequently summarizes this.Distinctively, the ‘system level’ of analysis presumes that foreign policy is a reaction to the state’s externalenvironment, so that the international system would largely determine the behavior of states regardless of their internal characteristics — usually, this describes the theories of realism, liberalism and Marxism. See [ 18].




public diplomacy as ‘to advance our interests, protect our security and continue to provide the moral basis for our leadership in the world’ [20]. Ethics is here emphasizedas basic, since it prevails through soft power. On the same subject, a US Senate report complains that the US is in a lop-sided contest, because ‘China has a vigorous public

diplomacy program, based on a portrayal of an ancient, benign China’ [21]. Thisstatement, aside from exuding a certain helplessness for having to compete against acountry with a much longer history, is right to refer to the virtuous government as anelement of Chinese soft power generating seductiveness through attractive values.

In China’s traditional principled background, indeed, we can find discourses fromwhich contemporary Chinese IR theory manages to generate arguments for its funda-mentals. The following are two examples.

1. A civilized country operates on moral principles. For centuries, the worldview that

the Middle Kingdom represented a cultural and political center surrounded by barbarians prevented the Chinese mind from developing a foreign policy per se.Actually, China did not have something akin to a Ministry of Foreign Affairs until1639 — expressively called Court of Colonial Affairs. Han emperors subscribed tothe doctrine of rule by virtue, bringing foreign rulers to participate in the Confuciannetwork of civility and etiquette.11Consequently, China’s dynastic record on foreignaffairs is fragmented circumscribed by issues such as ‘ border control, frontier trade, punitive expeditions, tribute embassies, imperial benevolence to foreign rulers, andthe like’ [23]. This worldview, however, gave rise to the discovery that cultural

prestige could be used diplomatically, which was certainly one of the sources of theidea that the successful ruler was one who attracted people by his virtue instead of subduing them by force. Thus, stemming from this major traditional idea of Chinesesuperiority, which did not accept the principle of legal equality among nations,derives the discourse that a civilized country was supposed to operate strictly onmoral principles. This view of China’s superiority, in spite of the use of an all-out revolutionary language, also flourished under Mao Zedong’s,12 and with it, the mark of a ‘virtuous stable government ’ as an ideological compound.

2. Internal disorder increases vulnerability to foreign attack. The aphorism ‘domesticdisorder and foreign calamities’,13 which paradigmatically combines the twin afflic-tions under which most dynasties collapsed, sums up the age-old discourse that linksto the idea of disorder and chaos, and to the perennial yearning for a ‘virtuous stablegovernment ’. Deng Xiaoping’s panic in the face of disorder most likely not onlystemmed from his own ordeal during the Cultural Revolution —‘there is great disorder under heaven and the situation is excellent ’, said Mao before realizing the situationwas out of control — but also from this deep-rooted Chinese sentiment. Likewise, it ishighly unlikely that he did not have this aphorism in mind nor the ‘unceasing change’idea when, just 5 days after the repression of Tian’anmen in 1989, he stated that ‘thisdisturbance would have occurred sooner or later ’, because ‘it was determined by boththe international environment and the domestic environment ’ [24].

11 In Analects 16:1 we read: ‘If remoter people are not submissive, all the influences of civil culture and virtueare to be cultivated to attract them to be so; and when they have been so attracted, they must be madecontented and tranquil’ [22] .12 Fairbank, "China's Foreign Policy", p. 460.13 Its locus classicus is the Book of Rites, ‘Miscellaneous records II’.

J. Solé-Farràs



What Deng Xiaoping thought, and how certain ideological compounds of the DCCcould have redefined his thinking, is a crucial issue, since, unquestionably, today’s political China, including its foreign policy and diplomacy, is most definitely the result of his obstinate work.14 Not for nothing Deng was described as ‘a needle wrapped in

cotton’ by Mao Zedong,15

or as ‘the reformer of elemental convictions’ who reflected atradition ‘of painstaking analysis and the distillation of the experiences of an ancient country with an instinct for distinguishing between the permanent and the tactical’, byHenry Kissinger [26]. Of all the tasks that Deng performed between 1978 and 92, whenhe was the paramount leader of the PRC and the paramount cooperating factor of thediscourses underpinning these tasks, the most important was probably the reworking of the Maoist discourse of the New China, providing it with both continuity and verisi-militude in order to establish it as an ideological brace for his reform and opening up policy. This made him credible as the legitimate ‘transmitter ’ of Maoism, positioning

himself more as an intermediate reference point than as the initiator of a new politicalage — it is impossible not to draw parallels with Confucius’s self-description as ‘atransmitter and not a maker, believing in and loving the ancients’ ( Analects, 7:1). Thisdiscursive strategy is revealed, when referring to his political legacy as a collectivework, when Deng says that ‘all I did was sum up those ideas in the form of principlesand policies’, which ‘must be continued’ [27]. It is probably his Chinese mind that made him say that ‘we shall stand firm as Mount Tai’ [28] to emphasize the firmness of his purposes.16

Deng’s canonical principles of foreign affairs can be summarized in several dis-

courses, which are mainly outlined below as locutions that bundle them into a logicalnarrative.3. Emancipating the mind and biding China’s time. Discursively speaking, the

PRC ruled by Deng Xiaoping originated in his 1978 speech ‘Emancipate themind, seek truth from facts and unite as one in looking to the future ’.17 With it,China ushered in a new era with a refined discourse that updated the Marxist doctrine of ‘seeking truth from facts’ and deactivated any revolutionary timing,and, accordingly, after reaffirming socialism as the primary stage of commu-nism, it laid down the idea that China was in the primary stage of socialism,which would take at least a century to complete. One could say that communismis now dealt with by the CCP with the same practical attitude that Confuciusdealt with datong — a utopia also used by Mao as a reference point of commu-nism — i.e., only with concern for the attainable xiaokang — the ‘moderately prosperous society in all respects’ that is expected to be achieved in the PRC by 2021. Deng, in accordance with this, a sort of general psychological reset,made a series of major adjustments to foreign policy by changing Mao’s viewthat ‘the low-flying swallows and the rising wind forebode a coming storm’—

14

The construction of the PRC’s foreign policy official discourses started, however, in 1949 with MaoZedong’s principles of ‘starting anew’, renouncing all the diplomatic relations that the Guomindang Govern-

ment had established, and of ‘leaning to one side’, that is, to socialism.15 Cited in [25].16 Insert footnote:Mont Tai is a powerful symbol, which played an important role in the development of Buddhism and Taoism.17 [29]. The name of the Qiushi Journal , which publicizes the official philosophy of the CCP, derives from thefour-character phrase ‘shi shi qiu shi 實事求是’ (‘seeking truth from facts’).




which alluded to the idea that war was unavoidable and impending. Alladjustments were subject to Deng’s strategic principles of ‘observing thingssoberly, holding our ground, dealing with matters calmly, hiding our capacitiesand biding our time, and getting things done and making achievements’.18 Aside

from a scent of traditional wisdom emanating from these principles, bold pragma-tism is evident therein, as is in the concept of ‘emancipating the mind’.

4. A permanent country of the Third World with international obligations. Dengmarked out two key points of Chinese foreign policy: firstly, China would always belong to the Third World; secondly, it would never seek hegemony. Neither point would have to change when China became a more developed country in the future.However, what would change once the national economy expanded is that Chinawould come to bear more ‘international proletarian obligations’. Thus, moderni-zation became the essential condition for solving both China’s domestic and

external problems, and the cornerstone for achieving international status, sincethe role China plays in international affairs would depend on the extent of itseconomic growth. Once center stage in international affairs as a standing member of the UN Security Council, Deng made historical tradition a guarantor of com- pliance with China’s international obligations, since ‘acting in good faith is aChinese tradition, not something invented by our generation’, as ‘it is an essentialquality of our magnificent old country’ [31]. The DCC emerges in these discourseswhen, through synthetic reasoning, an eminently ethical stance regarding foreign policy is harmonized with the pragmatic view that international obligations are

dependent on economic development. Here, neo-authoritarianism can be identifiedas a cooperating factor, insofar as it postulates the fact that the modernization of aneconomy must precede the modernization of its political system, and that bothmust be led by an authoritarian, supposedly virtuous, government.

5. Five principles for building a new international order . The discourse of the FivePrinciples of Peaceful Coexistence — i.e., respect for sovereignty and territorialintegrity; non-aggression; non-interference others’ internal affairs; equality andmutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence — is one of the pillars of China's foreign policy. Indeed, Chinese diplomatic relations and economic and cultural ties with allcountries have been established on this basis since 1954, when prime ministersZhou Enlai and Jawaharlal Nehru met to sign a China-India bilateral agreement.These principles are also central in the ‘new international political and economicorder ’ that Beijing proposed to replace Cold War bipolarity. For China [32], thisnew order would have to be based on the Five Principles for three reasons: theycontain the basic norms that give full expression to the nature of a new type of international relations —’unceasing change’; they are more comprehensive thanother laws, which are international or regional in nature —‘all-embracing harmo-ny’; and they would do away with unjust and unreasonable factors in the oldinternational relations, and repudiate hegemony and power politics —’ever- perfecting ethics’. Furthermore, it is not difficult to see an updated version of theFive Principles in Hu Jintao’s ‘harmonious world’ discourse.

6. Chinese characteristics in an independent foreign policy. The ‘Socialism withChinese characteristics’ discourse, which became an official formulation in 1982,

18 Cited in [30].

J. Solé-Farràs



has managed to transfer the fundamental elements of Chinese Marxism to a post-Maoist ideology with the undisguised aim of seeking some legitimacy in tradition.Thus, urged on by the CCP’s general ideological line, China has also explored aforeign policy discourse ‘with Chinese characteristics’. The very nature of this

discourse, steeped in exceptionalism and constructivism, means that understandingthe sources of Chinese behavior has become a central issue in internationalrelations. Also in 1982, Beijing reasserted the principle of an independent foreign policy, which also marked a long-term shift to a conciliatory approach towardforeign powers. Although this drive is correctly seen as eminently pragmatic, it also reflects a political culture that has long prized moral consensus and benevolent government, as well as its traditional concept of sovereignty and its goal of restoring past status. All this was well understood by Henry Kissinger, who, whenactually talking about the reconsideration of a new world order, remarked that ‘equality of status, a fierce insistence on not bowing to foreign prescription, is for Chinese leaders not a tactic but a moral imperative’.19 Once considerable economic

growth was achieved, China began, as Deng anticipated, to play a more important role in international affairs — it is already the sixth largest funder of UN peace-keeping. While China has elided ‘ proletarian’ from its ‘international obligations’,its view of an independent foreign policy designed and implemented by a virtuousstable government remains intact.

7. Following the peaceful road that a peaceful culture had cleared. Although promot-ed by Deng since 1978, the idea of ‘ peaceful development road’ was spelled out in

a 2005 State Council white paper [33], and was integrated immediately intoChina’s foreign strategy as a key discourse. The white paper states that ‘opening,tolerance and all-embracing are important features of Chinese civilization’, and that ‘the spirit of the Chinese people has always featured their longing for peace and the pursuit of harmony’. To illustrate this spirit and the idea of sovereignty, the Mingexplorer Zheng He is invoked: despite reaching more than thirty countries, he ‘didnot occupy an inch of any other's land’, thus preserving ‘the diversity of civiliza-tions and development patterns’. Undoubtedly, linking the spread of the imperialtributary system to the preservation of other countries’ sovereignty is a fair exampleof creativity in the construction of contemporary foreign affairs discourses. The paper puts the finger on a sore spot when it regretfully asserts that, in recent years,the peaceful character of this road is being questioned. Certainly, some hold that, in2008, perhaps misinterpreting the global financial crisis and predicting an immi-nent collapse of US power, Beijing abandoned the peaceful rise policy. But not thesame discourse, as only 6 years later a new white paper was issued on the matter [34]. In this update, China's peaceful development is said to carry forward ‘theChinese historical and cultural tradition’. Thus, ‘under the influence of the cultureof harmony, peace-loving has been deeply ingrained in the Chinese character ’.Deng was already aware of the importance of trying to erase any shadow of doubt as to the peaceful intentions of a powerful China. Accordingly, he summed up, inthe ideas of opposing hegemonism and safeguarding world peace, China’s entireforeign policy and conferred permanent Third World status on China. These wereideological choices designed to ethically underpin China’s immense and

19 Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 831.




foreseeable power in the near future. Deng also wanted to make clear that such policies should not be altered ‘once the country's current leaders are gone’ [35]. Nevertheless, the shadows looming over this discourse became more sombre andChina has had to resort again to its peaceful culture and history as a reassuring

factor, on the basis that ‘the culture of a country determines its values, and itshistory points the way to its future’ [36].

8. The ‘One Country, Two Systems’ principle serving both foreign policy and nation-alism. This principle is one of the jewels of Deng Xiaoping’s discursive creativity. Hequite precisely described it as a ‘creative masterpiece’ of ‘historic and internationalsignificance’ [37]. Note, however, that the ‘Two Systems’ clause is unequivocallysubordinated to and derived from the ‘One Country’ clause.20 Such a hierarchy couldexplain Deng’s occasional staunch defense of nationalism, even placing it abovesocialism: ‘We don’t demand that they [referring especially to the Taiwanese] be in

favor of China’s socialist system; we only ask them to love the motherland

’ [38].Deng even comes to refer to China as ‘sacred territory’ ( shensheng lingtu), and the

desire for reunification as taking hold in ‘the hearts of all descendants of the YellowEmperor ’ [39]. As an extension of the debate in contemporary Chinese IR theory between realism — system level of analysis — and constructivism — state level of anal-ysis — two discourses have dominated the discursive space of Chinese nationalismsince the 1980s: ‘state nationalism’ and ‘cultural nationalism’. The former is the pragmatic post-Maoist instrument by which official patriotic sentiment is expressed,the starting point being the reaction to prospective foreign threats — nationalism

conjuring away ‘

domestic disorder and foreign calamities’

. The latter stipulates that it is the unique culture related to the nation that constitutes the basis of identity,making Confucianism the main cultural system for the identitary consciousness of theChinese nation — it is significant to note how Confucianism has been shifting from itstraditional function as the core of Chinese civilization to a new modern function as thecore of the cultural identity of the Chinese nation. At any rate, the ‘One Country, TwoSystems’ principle easily evokes the tributary system, and the Chinese sense of sovereignty associated with it, as an idea imprinted on the Chinese mind — hereshown through various ideological compounds of the DCC, especially, the ‘syntheticreasoning’ that defuses antithetical views.

The DCC Within the Current Evolution of the PRC’s Foreign Policyand Diplomacy

Since the PRC’s foreign policy and diplomacy as defined by Deng Xiaoping isofficially in force at present, the aforementioned discourses still circumscribe thisdiscursive space. Nevertheless, new and rephrased discourses are clearly modulatingsome of its canonical principles, with President Xi Jinping constituting the keycooperating factor in making these modulations, even strengthening the creative role played by the DCC. As has been rightly observed [40], Xi’s penchant for articulating

20 By the so-called 1992 Consensus, governments of the PRC and the ROC agreed that China’s sovereigntywas indivisible, which lent legitimacy to the One-China policy that makes simultaneous diplomatic relationswith both countries incompatible.

J. Solé-Farràs



his policy in theoretical terms allows him to link well-established concepts in the CCP’sforeign policy canon to his own formulations, which seem, by and large, to be movingChina away from Deng’s longstanding injunction that the country keep a low profileinternationally, by suggesting it adopt a much more forward-leaning approach whereby

China would seek to shape the contours of the ‘ period of strategic opportunity’ throughits growing power.

Let us explore, also by using locutions bundled into a logical narrative, some of thesenew and rephrased discourses constructed to underpin the shift in China’s foreign affairs.

9. Diplomacy rooted in Chinese civilization harnesses strategic culture. We have men-tioned above that the Chinese worldview that a civilized country must operate onmoral principles gave rise early on to discovery that cultural prestige could be useddiplomatically. It seems that an early awareness of the potential of this reasoning led to

an extensive strategic use of culture all through the history of China. And in the post-Maoist era, Jiang Zemin noted ‘the strategic significance of cultural development ’, because culture ‘is interactive with economic and political activities’ [41]. Hu Jintaoalso defended enhancing culture ‘as part of the soft power of our country’, sinceChinese culture has been ‘an unfailing driving force for the Chinese nation’ [42]. Thediscourse of the current PRC government on the question seems even more evident,as it explicitly states that China's diplomacy originates in Chinese civilization, thusappealing to diplomacy in order to promote Chinese culture. In this vein, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi asserts that China has been searching for a uniquely

Chinese approach to settling hotspot issues, paying great attention ‘

to drawingwisdom and inspiration from China's traditional culture’.21 As if he were drawingup a list of ideological compounds of the DCC — note the evident equivalences withour own — Wang mentions the following ideals that have been developed by Chinesecivilization [43]: ‘the human-oriented concept of loving all creatures’, ‘the political philosophy of valuing virtue and balance’, ‘the peaceful approach of love, non-offense and good-neighborliness’, ‘the idea of peace being of paramount importance’and ‘harmony without uniformity’22 as well as the personal conduct of ‘treating othersin a way that you would like to be treated’23 and ‘helping others succeed if you want tosucceed yourself ’. To support the deep-rootedness of such lofty ideals in the Chinesemind, Confucius is made to say that ‘the virtue of the sage will last long and the causeof the sage will thrive’.24 As a result of such civilizational influence — following the

21 Wang Yi, Press conference at the 3rd Session of the 12th National People's Congress, 8 March 2015, http:// www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1243662.shtml.22 The idea of ‘harmony without uniformity’ (和而不同), which is here used to underpin the key contemporaryChinese views of respect for sovereignty and non-interference in a ‘new international order ’, is taken from

Analects 13:23. It is another example of the creative use of the Chinese philosophical heritage in the sphere of discourse construction, since the classical text referred to the exemplary behavior of the junzi as opposed to

that of xiaoren: ‘The gentleman is harmonious but not conformist, the little man is conformist but not harmonious’— translated by [44].23 The universal principle of ‘reciprocity’ is formulated in Analects 15:23 in the Chinese culture, in which this

principle is shared by Confucianism, Taoism and Mohism.24 The locus classicus of this sentence is ‘The Great Treatise I’, in the Book of Changes. Indeed, Confucius isnot identified there as the author of these words —‘to be able to continue long shows the virtue of the wise andable man; to be able to become great is the heritage he will acquire’, in J. Legge’s translation — which wouldonly show the purpose of giving the highest moral authority to the quotation.


http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1243662.shtml






official narrative — independence and peace would have always been the two definingfeatures of Chinese diplomacy and the cornerstones of its foreign policy since thefounding of the PRC.

10. All-out implementation stage to cope with new international circumstances.

To what extent the current CCP’s leadership is correcting Deng’s foreignaffairs principles may be seen from the ongoing rephrasing or constructionof certain discourses. The two key concepts on which these discourses are based are as simple as ‘new circumstances’ and ‘all-out implementation’.Thus, while maintaining discursive continuity ‘under new circumstances’,President Xi Jinping’s diplomatic strategies, policies and principles ‘must progress from the roll-out stage to the all-out implementation stage’ [45].Amidst the usual long-winded official rhetoric, this statement from theState Councilor Yang Jiechi probably summarizes the general strategic

drive of the CCP’s fifth generation leadership. These ‘new circumstances

’

also would warn China to be prepared for ‘worst-case scenarios in diplo-matic work ’; yet, ‘no country should entertain the fantasy that China willallow its sovereignty, security and development interests to be infringed’,Yang warns. Foreign Minister Wang also emphasizes this new juncture pointing out that a ‘new starting point, new thinking and new practice’ arethe concepts that encapsulate the main features of China's current diplo-macy [46]. Indeed, although no factual change is clearly described, theword ‘new’ is ascribed attributively to all policies —‘elevated to a new

stage’

, ‘

entered a new era’

, ‘

building a new model’

, ‘

broken new ground’

,etc. Obviously, ‘all-out implementation’ refers to much more proactive andassertive behavior than that prescribed in Deng Xiaoping’s ‘observingthings soberly’. Thus, China's international standing would be further enhanced and its strategic influence strengthened by diplomacy conductedwith a ‘ broader vision’. An example of such a broader vision would bethe approach of ‘upholding principles and pursuing interests’, which ‘hasincreased the moral appeal of China's diplomacy’, as well as displaying‘characteristics of diverse thinking’, according to Wang. Actually, beyondthis creative reference to ‘moral appeal’, China’s diplomacy is constructingdiscourses shored up by ideological compounds, such as ‘unceasingchange’ and ‘eclectic pragmatism’, in order to convey the idea of facingnew circumstances from an all-out implementation stage.

11. Economic diplomacy to ensure wholesale success. Chinese diplomacy, the onethat is aware of the strategic significance of culture and which is now conductedunder a vision of ‘all-out implementation’, is still subordinated to DengXiaoping’s paramount principle that everything must serve the purpose of eco-nomic development. It is therefore no wonder that key discourses constructed bythe current CCP leadership attach to economic diplomacy, the more distinctive of which are those that uphold Xi Jinping’s three economic star initiatives: the NewSilk Road Economic Belt, the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road — aka the Belt and Road Initiative — in order to woo, respectively, the Central Asian and thesoutheast Asian and South-Asian countries, and, thirdly, the Asian InfrastructureInvestment Bank, which is an infrastructure lender rivaling similar West-driveninstitutions in the region. Discursively, these diplomatic efforts to expand China’s

J. Solé-Farràs



regional and global influence have also been steeped in tradition. Thus, accordingto the official narrative, they embody ‘the spirit of the ancient Silk Road’25 — a‘spirit ’ that certainly must be associated with the circulation of both goods andculture as a significant factor in the development of Chinese civilization and, most

particularly, its syncretism. Although Chinese economic diplomacy has beendeployed especially in underdeveloped and developing countries — several of which have already embraced the ‘look East ’ policy — its scope, however, isglobal. On the occasion of the 40th anniversary of EU-China diplomatic relations,for instance, Chinese FM Wang Yi appealed to the commitment of ‘developing potential synergies between EU policies and China's Silk Road Economic Belt initiative’ [47]. The FM also took the opportunity to creatively quote Confucius,who said that ‘at forty, I had no more doubts’. Meaningfully, this sentence is part of the Master ’s own account of his gradual progress and attainments;26 the new

stage in which any doubt has already disappeared. Shortly before, in a meeting to promote ‘a new model for South-South cooperation’,27 Wang had also invokedthe maxim, from the Doctrine of the Mean — one of the Four Books of Confucian philosophy, which has etched on the Chinese mind the concept that all humanactivities and thoughts must adhere to moderation — that claims that ‘ preparednessensures success and unpreparedness spells failure’ ( Liji, 20:16). Irrespective of whether or not such ‘all-out ’ diplomatic planning is to be understood as the beginning of the end of China’s ‘hide and bide’ foreign policy, it seems clear that the DCC is creatively shaping recent discourses of the PRC’s economic

diplomacy —

with ‘

eclectic pragmatism’

here as well.12. A global Chinese dream. Finally, here is the discourse that will be, in alllikelihood, the figurehead discourse of Xi Jinping’s mandate: ‘the Chinese dreamof the great rejuvenation’. This is a discourse that wants to be inclusive — of Chinese people, regardless of ideology — evocative — of a renewal historicallyyearned for — assertive — reflecting this CCP’s increasingly marked tendency —

and also elusive — for after all, it is expressed as a dream. Its inclusiveness couldalso provide a basic narrative framework for satisfying the CCP’s need to bringdivergent factions into line [48], but it is nationalism that is the main stuff of thisdream. Meaningfully, Xi made his first speech on the Chinese dream whenvisiting the exhibition ‘The Road of Rejuvenation’ in 2012 at the NationalMuseum of China, in which the so-called ‘Century of national humiliation’featured prominently. Actually, since Sun Yat-sen, almost all Chinese leadershave used the terms ‘national humiliation’ and the ‘great rejuvenation’ to mobi-lize the people, and they have probably been maintained both because the traumaof past losses binds a nation closer together, and because the CCP found in them anew source of legitimacy [49]. As a logical complement to its internal national-istic character, the Chinese dream manifests an assertive profile in the

25 Wang, Press conference.26 The complete Confucius’s account goes like this: ‘At fifteen, I had my mind bent on learning. At thirty, Istood firm. At forty, I had no doubts. At fifty, I knew the decrees of Heaven. At sixty, my ear was an obedient organ for the reception of truth. At seventy, I could follow what my heart desired, without transgressing what was right ’ (Analects, 2:4).27 Wang Yi, 1st Meeting of the China-CELAC Forum, Beijing, 13 January 2015, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/2461_663310/t1229672.shtml.


http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/2461_663310/t1229672.shtml






international scene. Therefore, this is a discourse constructed to be able tomodulate diverse arguments to fit into and influence various discursive spaces;including, of course, the discourses of the PRC’s foreign policy and diplomacy aswell. As Yang Jiechi points out,28 the Chinese dream is a purposeful tool to boost

China’s influence on international affairs, which ‘demonstrates a high level of integration and synergy between China’s domestic and foreign policies’. Theglobal dimension has given to the Chinese dream, however, by President Xi, whocoined the term ‘world dream’, saying that the Chinese dream was a collectivedream that ‘shares close links with the dreams of other peoples around the world’.This discourse is also presented as an enhancement of China’s commitment to‘the path of peaceful development ’, which will necessarily be a hot topic on theFM’s agenda considering that, according to a recently issued white paper onmilitary strategy [50], ‘China's armed forces take their dream of making the

military strong as part of the Chinese dream’. Carefully analyzed, this discoursecontains essential contemporary aims and yearnings that have been forged

throughout the history of China. The features of the Chinese dream quite matchwith the ideological compounds of the DCC, so that we can affirm that, actually,the Chinese dream is the dream of the Chinese mind.

Final Remarks

Although it is not possible in a short essay such as this to analyze in full the shapinginfluence of the ‘discourse called China’ on the construction of discourses that consti-tute the discursive space of the PRC’s foreign policy and diplomacy, we have put forward a general methodology to return further to the matter.

A remarkable point of this methodology is that it emphasizes the creative role played by the ideological compounds of the DCC. After analyzing a number of key discourses,it seems reasonable to conclude that there is a tendency in the CCP leadership, in itscapacity as a cooperating factor, to add creativity to the construction and redefinition of discourses related to foreign affairs. At the end of the day, creativity can be considered alogical discursive outlet for a new general situation in which the CCP must face boththe theory that economic development leads to political transformation, and the fact that the margin for further reforms without jeopardizing the political system is reallynarrowing. Understandably, the Chinese mind of the CCP leadership is paying attentionto concepts such as Chinese exceptionalism in order to conjure away such threats, andis also developing a parallel set of discourses nourished by traditional Chinese culture,in order to bridge the huge gap between the official Marxist discourse and reality — Xi’s‘Chinese dream’, as did Hu’s ‘harmonious society’ before it, constitutes a paradigmaticexample of it.

In any event, the fact that Confucius has become a paramount part of Chinese soft power proves that the DCC is an indispensable piece for completing the puzzle that isthe PRC’s current foreign policy and diplomacy; thus, once the full picture is before usit can be better understood, irrespective of constructivist, even realist, liberal andMarxist perspectives.

28 Yang, Innovations.

J. Solé-Farràs



References

1. Brière, S.J., O. 1956. Fifty Years of Chinese Philosophy: 1898 – 1950. London: George Allen & Unwin.2. Meissner, W. 1999. New Intellectual Currents in the People’s Republic of China. In China in Transition:

Issues and Policies, ed. D.C.B. Teather and H.S. Yee. Houndmills: Macmillan Press.3. Lin, Min, and Maria Galikowski. 1999. The Search for Modernity: Chinese Intellectuals and Cultural

Discourse in the Post-Mao Era. New York: St. Martin’s Press.4. Wang, Hui. 2005. The New Criticism. In One China, Many Paths, ed. Chaohua Wang. London: Verso.5. Toynbee, A. (ed.). 1973. Half the World: The History and Culture of China and Japan, 9. New York: Holt,

Rinehart and Winston.6. Billeter, J.F. 2006. Contre François Jullien, 20 – 23. Paris: Éditions Allia.7. Allinson, Robert E. 1991. An overview of the Chinese Mind. In Understanding the Chinese Mind: The

Philosophical Roots, ed. idem, 1. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.8. Graham, A.C. 1989. Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China, 6. La Salle: Open

Court.9. Fang, T.H. 1956. The Chinese View of Life, 9. Hong Kong: The Union Press.

10. Wang, Gung-Hsing. 1946. The Chinese Mind , 191. New York: John Day.11. Solé-Farràs, J. 2008. Harmony in Contemporary New Confucianism and in Socialism with Chinese

Characteristics. China Media Research 4(4): 14 – 24.12. Chan, W.-T. 1946. The Spirit of Oriental Philosophy. In Philosophy: East and West , ed. C.A. Moore, 164.

Princeton: Princeton University Press.13. Fung, Yu-lan. 1962. The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy, 3. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.14. Lin, Yutang. 1943. The Wisdom of Confucius, 155. New York: Random House.15. Álvarez, J.R. 1996. El Tao y el arte del gobierno, 101, 174. Buenos Aires: Almagesto.16. Fung, Yu-lan. 1952. A History of Chinese Philosophy: The Period of the Philosophers, vol. 1, 2nd ed, 3.

Princeton: Princeton University Press.17. Bodde, D. 1942. Dominant ideas in the formation of Chinese culture. Journal of the American Oriental

Society 62(4): 299.18. Roy, D. 1998. China’ s Foreign Relations, 227 – 228. London: Macmillan Press.19. Johnston, A.I. 1995. Thinking about Strategic Culture. International Security 19(4): 35, 63.20. USIA. 1999. The United States Information Agency: A Commemoration, p. 77. http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/

usia/abtusia/commins.pdf .21. US Senate. 2011. Another U.S. deficit: China and America: Public diplomacy in the Age of Internet.

Senate Prints, p. v. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-112SPRT64768/html/CPRT-112SPRT64768.htm.

22. Legge, J. (ed.). 1965. The Four Books: The Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, Confucian

Analects, and the Works of Mencius, 363. Taipei: Culture Book.23. Fairbank, J.K. 1969. China’s Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective. Foreign Affairs 47(3): 449.24. Deng, Xiaoping. 1989. Address to officers at the rank of general and above in command of the troops

enforcing martial law in Beijing. In SWX 3, http://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/03/18/address-to-officers-at-the-rank-of-general-and-above-in-command-of-the-troops-enforcing-martial-law-in-beijing/ .

25. Schell, O., and D. Shambaugh (eds.). 1999. The China Reader: The Reform Era, 531. New York: VintageBooks.

26. Kissinger, Henry. 1994. Diplomacy, 727. New York: Simon & Schuster.27. Deng, Xiaoping. 1988. We review the past to open up a new path to the future. In SWDX 3, http://

dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/03/18/we-review-the-past-to-open-up-a-new-path-to-the-future.28. Deng, Xiaoping. 1990. The international situation and economic problems. In SWDX 3, http://

dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/03/18/the-international-situation-and-economic-problems/ .29. Deng, Xiaoping. 1978. Emancipate the mind, seek truth from facts and unite as one in looking to the

future. In SWDX 2, http://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/02/25/emancipate-the-mind-seek-

truth-from-facts-and-unite-as-one-in-looking-to-the-future/ .30. Liu, Huaqiu. Strive for a Peaceful International Environment. In China Reader , eds. Schell andShambaugh. pp. 460 – 61.

31. Deng, Xiaoping. 1984. Maintain prosperity and stability in Hong Kong. In SWDX 3, http:// dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/03/08/maintain-prosperity-and-stability-in-hong-kong/ .

32. FMPRC. Build a new international order on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.

Paper of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_ 665543/3604_665547/t18016.shtml.


http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/usia/abtusia/commins.pdf


http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-112SPRT64768/html/CPRT-112SPRT64768.htm


http://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/03/18/address-to-officers-at-the-rank-of-general-and-above-in-command-of-the-troops-enforcing-martial-law-in-beijing/


http://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/03/18/we-review-the-past-to-open-up-a-new-path-to-the-future


http://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/03/18/the-international-situation-and-economic-problems/


http://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/02/25/emancipate-the-mind-seek-truth-from-facts-and-unite-as-one-in-looking-to-the-future/


http://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/03/08/maintain-prosperity-and-stability-in-hong-kong/



http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18016.shtml




















33. SCPRC. 2005. China’ s peaceful development road . State Council white paper, http://www.china.org.cn/ english/2005/Dec/152669.htm.

34. SCPRC. 2011. China’ s peaceful development . State Council white paper. http://www.china.org.cn/ government/whitepaper/node_7126562.htm.

35. Deng, Xiaoping. 1982. China’s foreign policy. In SWDX 2, http://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/

2013/02/25/chinas-foreign-policy/ .36. Wang, Yi. 2013. China at a new starting point . 68th Session of the UN General Assembly, New York,http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/2461_663310/t1082330.shtml.

37. SCPRC. 2014. The Practice of the ‘ One Country, Two Systems’ Policy in the Hong Kong Special

Administrative Region. State Council’s white paper, http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/ node_7207387.htm.

38. Deng, Xiaoping. 1984. One country, two systems. In SWDX 3, http://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/ 2013/03/08/one-country-two-systems/ .

39. Deng, Xiaoping. 1987. Fundamental issues in present-day China, 63. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.40. Johnson, C.K. 2014. Xi Jinping Unveils his Foreign Policy Vision: Peace Through Strength. Freeman

Report 15, http://csis.org/publication/thoughts-chairman-xi-jinping-unveils-his-foreign-policy-vision.41. Jiang, Zemin. 2002. Build a well-off society in an all-round way and create a new situation in building

socialism with Chinese characteristics, 16th National Congress of the CCP, http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66739/4496615.html.

42. Hu, Jintao. 2007. Hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics and strive for new

victories in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects, 17th National Congress of the CCP.http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/24/content_6938749.htm.

43. Wang, Yi. 2013. Exploring the path of major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, SecondWorld Peace Forum, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/2461_663310/ t1053908.shtml.

44. Bruce Brooks, E., and A. Taeko Brooks. 1998. The Original Analects: Sayings of Confucius and His

Successors, 103. New York: Columbia University Press.45. Yang, Jiechi. 2014. Innovations in China’ s diplomatic theory and practice under new circumstances, 16/8/

2013. Qiushi Journal 6(1). http://english.qstheory.cn/magazine/201401/201401/t20140121_315115.htm.46. Wang, Yi. 2013. Embark on a new journey of China’ s diplomacy. Symposium ‘ New starting point, newthinking and new practice 2013: China and the world’, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/ w jbz_663308/2461_663310/t1109943.shtml.

47. Wang, Yi, and Federica Mogherini. 2015. EU and China strategic partners for long run. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/2461_663310/t1262769.shtml.

48. Mahoney, J.G. 2014. Interpreting the Chinese Dream: An Exercise of Political Hermeneutics. Journal of

Chinese Political Science 19: 17.49. Wang, Zheng. 2014. The Chinese Dream: Concept and Context. Journal of Chinese Political Science 19:

3 – 5.50. MNDPRC. 2015. China’s Military Strategy. State Council white paper, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/TopNews/

2015-05/26/content_4586737.htm.

Jesús Solé-Farràs Independent researcher in classical and contemporary Chinese thought and, positioned between the humanities and the social sciences, in the influence of cultural substratum on social and politicaldiscourses in today’s China. Author of New Confucianism in Twenty-First Century China: The Constructionof a Discourse (Routledge, 2014). PhD in Translation and Inter-cultural Studies, Master of Research intoContemporary East Asia, and Bachelor of Psychology from the Autonomous University of Barcelona, andBachelor of East Asia Studies from the Open University of Catalonia (Barcelona). Currently is an AssociateProfessor in East Asia Studies at the Open University of Catalonia.

J. Solé-Farràs

http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Dec/152669.htm


http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7126562.htm


http://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/02/25/chinas-foreign-policy/





http://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/03/08/one-country-two-systems/


http://csis.org/publication/thoughts-chairman-xi-jinping-unveils-his-foreign-policy-vision

http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66739/4496615.html


http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/24/content_6938749.htm



http://english.qstheory.cn/magazine/201401/201401/t20140121_315115.htm






http://eng.mod.gov.cn/TopNews/2015-05/26/content_4586737.htm








http://english.qstheory.cn/magazine/201401/201401/t20140121_315115.htm



http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/24/content_6938749.htm



http://csis.org/publication/thoughts-chairman-xi-jinping-unveils-his-foreign-policy-vision












Documents

[email protected]