In the Shadow of Pacifism: Foreign Policy Choicesof Germany and Japan in Afghanistan

Patrick Hein

Received: 4 October 2010 /Accepted: 17 January 2011 /Published online: 16 February 2011# Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Abstract This paper explores the policy choices of Germany and Japan forcontributing to international security and stability in Afghanistan. Both countrieshave been closely involved with Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks2001. It is argued that the policy choice of Japan with a low military element andhigh civilian element differs significantly from the German military centeredapproach. An analysis of the goals and motives behind the foreign policy choicesreveals that in Germany the military involvement has been justified withhumanitarian reasons, national self interests and the right to “unlimited” sovereignty.This logic has ultimately led to the acceptance of civilian casualties and participationinto offensive counterinsurgency operations. It is suggested that elite drivendiscourses have determined foreign policy strategy. In the case of Japan the paperclaims that the conservative LDP elite had been pushing for intensified militaryinvolvement which materialized in the dispatch of military vessels to the IndianOcean and ground forces to Iraq. Similar to Germany these moves towards gaininginternational reputation were rooted in domestic politics.

Keywords Japan . Germany . Afghan war . Collective defense . Pacifism .

Human security

Introduction

The international Afghanistan Conference in Kabul on July 20, 2010 was a keysignal that responsibility was to be handed over to the Afghan authorities. TheAfghan Government has translated the political commitments made at the London

East Asia (2011) 28:135–155DOI 10.1007/s12140-011-9140-5

P. Hein (*)Tokyo, Japane-mail: p_heinjp@yahoo.co.jp

Conference into concrete reform plans with deadlines. One key outcome of theKabul Conference was broad support for President Karzai’s goal that Afghansecurity forces assume responsibility for security throughout the country by 2014. Thetransition is to be carried out gradually in coordination between the Afghan Governmentand NATO. Following in the footsteps of President Obama, who decided to increase theUS troop contingent to 100,000men, both Germany and Japan stepped up their efforts tosupport the Afghan Government. On February 26, 2010 Germany’s participation inISAF was extended until February 28, 2011 by the Bundestag. It pledged to increasetroops on the ground to a maximum of 5,350 soldiers. On the other hand, Japan hascommitted in November 2009 to spend a total of 5 billion dollars over five years forstabilizing and reconstructing Afghanistan. While the readiness to assume a largerinternational security role has grown, Germany and Japan have exhibited differenttrajectories in dealing with Afghanistan. Germany has moved from military absence inthe 1990/91 GulfWar to the deployment of ground forces in Afghanistan in 2001. For itspart, the Japanese Government dispatched Self Defence Force (SDF) vessels to theIndian Ocean in support of coalition operations against international terrorism inAfghanistan in November 2001 and deployed military non-combat units to Iraq from2004 to 2006, but scaled down its physical military presence in the region to zero byJanuary 2010. Some observers have seen in this move a return to the past checkbookdiplomacy. As perceptions mask sometimes reality it may not surprise that US scholarsgave high scores to Germany for its strong US loyalty and questioned at the same timeJapan’s determination:

“Even countries with constitutional constraints similar to Japan’s,likewise bornof their unpleasant military histories, acted more boldly. Germany declared itsfull military support for the United States, and departing from the restraint thathad characterized all German uses of force beyond Europe since World War II,Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder staked the future of his government onlegislation that would permit Germany to join the allied war effort. Germansoldiers were among the first to die in Afghanistan, and Germany even offeredto assume leadership of the subsequent peacekeeping operation” (Heginbothamand Samuels, Foreign Affairs, [9], p. 116).

This paper argues that the German determination has somehow faded into harshrealities since then. The question why Germany is present in Afghanistan hasrepeatedly been raised and the answer given is to ensure freedom and security.General David Petraeus, commander in chief of the ISAF troops, has formulatedwhat is also Germany’s self-understanding of the war objectives:

“The core object, the reason we've all come here is to make sure thatAfghanistan is not becoming a sanctuary for terrorists and other extremistswho intend to attack European and other societies.”(Source: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,718285-2,00.html)

Despite the shared understanding of the common goal to establish and ensuresecurity, the paths chosen by Germany and Japan in choosing the means to achievethis goal could not be more different. Whereas Japan favors civilian nation-buildingmeasures relying on financial and economic assistance, Germany has givenpreference to the military element, even though it has been insisting that post-

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conflict nation-building, democratic state structures, human rights and the rule of lawshould deserve priority. It is the purpose of this paper to ascertain that for Germanyremote Afghanistan has presented an opportunity to assert national self-interests andget rid of the constraints of “limited sovereignty” (former Chancelor GerhardSchroeder). For Schroeder, Afghanistan has been instrumental in eliminating thehistorical restrictions put on Germany’s sovereignty:

“The Bundestag's decision put an end to the chapter of Germany's limitedsovereignty after World War II. It made us an equal partner in the internationalcommunity of nations, one that had obligations to meet, such as those that havearisen from the NATO alliance in the case of Afghanistan.”(Source: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,607205,00.html).

As a result of elite driven political choices the German strategy – whichexperienced a political legitimacy crisis with the resignation of German PresidentHorst Koehler in May 2010 as well as a moral legitimacy crisis with the deadlyKunduz airstrike against civilians in September 2009 - has come under increasedpublic criticism and scrutiny [24]. Consequently, the gap between the war supportivepolitical elites in parliament on one side and a sceptical public opinion on the otherside has widened. According to a poll released in June 2010, 58% of Germans and53% of Japanese want the US and NATO troops to be withdrawn from Afghanistan(See Appendix). German soldiers, who have returned from Afghanistan, feel“abandoned” by their political leadership and have accused politicians of pursuing“questionable objectives” in Afghanistan ([8], p.10).

Japan has chosen a non-military, soft path in Afghanistan for various reasons.Most importantly the peace constitution bans the deployment of military in out ofarea combat zones; second Japan is not accountable to a multilateral militarystructure such as NATO or the European Defence Agency. Under the bilateral US-Japan Security Treaty, the US is obliged to defend Japan if it is attacked, but Japan isnot required to defend the US [30,31]. Third, Japanese NGOs and the semi-governmental overseas cooperation agency ‘JICA’, though strongly interwoven withthe Foreign Ministry, act as independent, neutral, civilian relief and developmentactors in Afghanistan. Furthermore, a large portion of government assistance hasbeen channeled through international civilian institutions (UNHCR, ADB, WFP,UNDP). This has increased the credibility with the recipients. Forth, Japan has beenkept busy with more pressing domestic security issues struggling to assert itssovereignty over disputed territories and secure its own borders (unresolvedterritorial disputes with China, Taiwan, Korea, Russia; military threat by NorthKorea). Fifth, Japan has taken the lead under Sadako Ogata, former head of theUNHCR, to enhance an alternative, civilian people centered concept of “humansecurity” from a global perspective.

The first part of the paper sheds light on the domestic internal dynamics behindthe Afghan involvement since 2001 in both countries. The second section exploresthe theme of humanitarian intervention in the case of Germany and how this strategyhas not only failed to fully respond to the needs and expectations of the Afghans butalso raised the political and moral questioning of the legitimacy of militaryinvolvement by German citizens. The third section explores the non-military, humansecurity centered approach advocated by Japan’s Sadako Ogata, aiming at improving

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the livelihoods of local residents. The forth section looks at the German-Japanesepolice training projects intended to strengthen civilian capacity-building. The articleconcludes by submitting the premises and outcomes of both countries’ policychoices to a critical review.

Section 1

Japan: In Search of a Civilian, Pacifist Purpose for the Military

Public opinion in Japan has traditionally been rather hostile to one of the mainobligations of permanent membership in the Security Council, namely a militarycontribution to United Nations Peace-keeping Operations (PKO). Many, if not most,Japanese hold that Japan’s constitution (Article 9) prohibits such activities. FormerPrime Minister Kaifu was the first to lay the foundations for overseas Self-DefenceForces (SDF) missions. In September 1990 he presented a plan to send a UN peacecooperation team to Saudi Arabia and thereafter he tried to push the dispatch of fiveSDF airplanes for airlifts to Iraq through parliament, but without avail. He succeededin dispatching SDF minesweepers to the Persian Gulf without seeking or getting therequired approval from parliament. The most important step towards overseasdeployment was doubtlessly the dramatic passage of the United Nations PeaceCooperation Bill in 1992. The so-called “PKO Law” set five conditions for theJapanese SDF to participate in UN peacekeeping operations:

1. Agreement on the ceasefire shall have been reached among the parties to theconflicts.

2. The parties to the conflict, including the territorial states, shall have given their consentto deployment of the peacekeeping force and Japan’s participation in the force.

3. The peacekeeping force shall maintain strict impartiality, not favoring any partyin the conflict.

4. Should any of the above requirements cease to satisfy the Government of Japan,it may withdraw its contingent.

5. Use of weaponry shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the livesof personnel.

The bill became law on the evening of 15 June 1992 with a vote of 329 to 17in its favor with the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) boycotting it andthe Communist Party voting against it. Backed by the new law Japan becameenabled to send peacekeeping troops to Cambodia and Mozambique andparticipate in refugee relief efforts in Rwanda later on. The PKO Law wasrevised twice (in 1998 and 2001) in order to loosen the strict conditions underwhich SDF units operating abroad may use weapons. In 1993 when two Japanesenationals were killed in Cambodia while assisting the United Nations mission torebuild that country, Junichiro Koizumi, then minister of postal service andtelecommunications, stated that although the kind of contribution Japan shouldmake to the international community had been debated at length, nobody everimagined that blood would have to be shed in the process. He urged thegovernment to withdraw Japanese personnel from the peacekeeping operation on

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the grounds that Japan was a special case. A decade later, Koizumi was thedriving force behind a significant expansion in the scale and nature of Japan’sinternational contribution to the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ in and around bothAfghanistan and Iraq.

A Diet resolution from 1954 had prohibited the overseas dispatch of SDF forces.This taboo had been upheld with some exceptions until 2001. With the 9/11 attacksthe LDP saw a chance to overcome the limitations put on SDF operations abroad.The question if Japanese military should participate in missions abroad or not andunder what conditions was shifted from an UN perspective to the fight against terrorand thereafter to a collective defence perspective. As Ishizuka [13] has pointed out,Japan’s decision to dispatch the SDF to Iraq but not to Sudan was inconsistent withthe conditions set forth by the 1992 PKO law:

“The Five Principles were secured in Sudan, but the Japanese Governmentdeclined the request for the dispatch to the Sudan mission. However, Iraq wasstill in a chaotic situation, which means the Five Principles were not yetachieved.” ([13], p. 16).

The preference given to the military mission in Iraq over UN peacekeeping inSudan was a choice influenced by domestic considerations. Domestic considerationsinfluenced also the foreign policy choices with regard to the Indian Ocean refuelingmission of the SDF.

Japan’s Afghanistan Policy: From a Military Focus to Civilian Nation-building

Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's announced in January 2007 in a speech toNATO that Japan would enhance its activities in Afghanistan and mapped Japan’scontributions and commitments: support the Afghan National DevelopmentStrategy, in areas such as road and airport construction as well as agriculturaldevelopment; enhance assistance in the area of security, disbandment of IllegalArmed Groups, capacity building for the Afghan police forces; intensifycooperation with NATO's Provincial Reconstruction Teams' humanitarian activi-ties; fight against narcotics and terrorism by reinforcing the border controlcapabilities of the Afghan Government, in collaboration with Germany, the U.S.and the EU. Since 2007, Japan has provided financial support to basic humanneeds projects in various regions of Afghanistan. Japan has been eager under theconservative LDP to seek ways to allow for SDF forces to engage in collectivedefence activities similar to the NATO mechanism of mutual assistance in case ofan attack on a member State.

The new Ministry of Defence (Defence Agency) launched in 2007, recognizes theright to collective self-defence but restricts it at the same time:

“(…) Japan has the right of collective self-defence under international law. Itis, however, not permissible to use the right, that is, to stop armed attack onanother country with armed strength, although Japan is not under direct attack,since it exceeds the limit of use of armed strength as permitted under Article 9of the Constitution.”(Source: http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_policy/dp01.html)

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In other words Japan has the right of collective self-defence but cannotexercise that right under the Constitution, an interpretation some lawmakers andeven some legal experts say appears possibly at odds. The prohibition of use ofarmed strength has not prevented Japan from participating in the war againstterror. In 2001 under then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi the duty to join theinternational fight against terrorism became a key argument in supporting the waron terror in Afghanistan. Under the ‘Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law’enacted in 2001, the SDF were authorized to provide non-combat andhumanitarian support to the US-led coalition in the Indian Ocean. Destroyersand combat support ships of the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF)were dispatched to the Indian Ocean from 2001 to 2008 to participate in OEF-MIOs (Operation Enduring Freedom-Maritime Interdiction Operation). Theirmission was to prevent the marine transportation of illegal weapons andammunition, and the drugs which fund terrorist activity. Since 2004, the JMSDFhad provided ships of foreign forces with fuel for their ships and ship-basedhelicopters, as well as fresh water. This was the third time Japanese militaryvessels had been dispatched overseas since World War II, following thedeployments of mine-sweeping units during the Korean War and the PersianGulf War. In the end, the anti-terrorism legislation that authorized the IndianOcean refueling operations did expire on November 1, 2007, and Japan’s navalvessels temporarily returned home. Due to a veto to a new bill authorizing themission by the opposition-controlled Upper Chamber of the Japanese Diet a newlaw was subsequently passed when the Lower Chamber overruled the veto, andthe mission was resumed in the beginning of 2008. The government drafted newlegislation that removed any reference to Afghanistan, and specifically barredrefueling for anything other than MIOs. Any and all connections between Japan’srefueling operations and Afghanistan were cut. The new law was voted with atwo third majority of the LDP against the opposition of the DPJ (DemocraticParty of Japan) submitting its own counter-proposal. It contained the DPJ's ideaof providing assistance to civilians in Afghanistan within the framework of UNactivities. The DPJ said it could consider participation by the SDF in a maritimeoperation aimed at cracking down on ships related to terrorism if the mission wasauthorized by the United Nations. At the time, Japanese officials acknowledgedgreat disappointment with the wording of the replacement legislation, as it markeda major step backward from the decade-long effort to bring about Japaneseacceptance of the right of collective self-defence [27]. In 2008 the US put renewedpressure on Japan to send troops on the ground to Afghanistan. Then PrimeMinister Yasuo Fukuda agreed to send a fact-finding team to investigate whether tosend troops to Afghanistan on a reconstruction mission but finally declined to doso because of expected fierce internal opposition to his plans.

After the termination of the Indian refuel mission, Japan has been reconsidering whatrole it should play in future peace-building operations in the region [28]. Since May2002, it has been playing the lead donor role in the Disarmament, Demobilization, andReintegration (‘DDR’) measures and the subsequent Disbandment of Illegal ArmedGroups (‘DIAG’) program as part of Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the wake of thedemise of the Taliban regime [10,12,14,22,30,31]. The disarmament expert KenjiIsezaki, a former special representative of the Japanese Government in Afghanistan,

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made crucial contributions to the initiation of DDR [12]. Without disarmament of thewarlords, the other four pillars, namely building a national army (responsibility of theUnited States), organizing the police (Germany), establishing a judicial system (Italy),and countering narcotics (U.K.) would have had no effect. It is an irony, that theprocess did not include destroying the weapons, but rather transferring them to the newNational Afghan Army. Japan has carefully avoided any military involvement orassistance in the security sector and, despite major financial contributions, “only asmall number of Japanese experts have worked for DDR and DIAG implementation”according to Miyahara, a former Kabul based diplomat ([22], p. 127). All of them werecivilians. From the beginning of the conflict there has been a strong consensus to keepthe SDF completely out of Afghanistan in line with Japan’s strict policy of not usingforce or endangering the lives of soldiers or civilians. Defence expert Yoshizaki hassuggested that the “SDF’s stance of not firing a shot and causing not a single casualty”in Irak may offer lessons for future non-military peace building efforts ([30,31], p.177).On the other hand, there are limitations to the benefits of military soft power as theSDF can only operate if other nations-such as the Dutch army in Irak-ensure the safetyof Japanese soldiers.

The newDPJ government has re-confirmed its non-military approach. It announced amassive aid package of 5 billion USD in November 2009 to enhance post-conflict statebuilding in Afghanistan. On July 20, 2010 Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada disclosedthe most comprehensive plan so far at the Kabul conference to stabilize the country andcontribute to nation-building focusing on three priority areas of security, reintegrationand development. First, top priority should be given to improving security and putting inplace the machinery of government. To this end, it is imperative to strengthenAfghanistan’s security forces, notably the police. Second, political initiatives arerequired if the security situation is to be improved. Specifically, it is vital for thestabilization of the country that efforts are made, under the lead of the AfghanGovernment and with assistance from the international community, to reintegratemoderate factions among the militants into the country’s political life. Third, it isessential to bring more stability to the daily lives of Afghans and build a solid economicfoundation, thus allowing improvements in infrastructure in the areas of agriculture andvillage life that ordinary Afghan citizens can see with their own eyes. In addition to theabove, the new strategy incorporates the basic principle that what is most effective is tohelp Afghans improve their capability to tackle problems on their own and that theinternational community should remain behind the scenes. Japan pledged to train theAfghan police force, financially support reconciliation initiatives with the insurgentssuch as the ‘Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program’ and the launching of the‘Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund’; and to launch development initiatives in variousfields including infrastructure development, agriculture and engineering. Furthermore,Japan pledged to continue its cooperation in the areas of education and health, goodgovernance, finance and anti-corruption actions.

In line with the Kabul proposal to promote internal reconciliation between theconflict parties, the Afghan scholar Yuji Uesugi has urged that:

“Japan should assist Afghanistan, first and foremost, in creating a politicalarena in which a negotiated settlement between the Karzai government and theinsurgency can be sought” [29].

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A New Policy Orientation under DPJ Rule?

The DPJ has pledged in its election manifest of 2009 “to play a role in peacebuildingin Afghanistan and elsewhere, examine the participation of Self-Defence Forces inpeacekeeping operations and civilians in activities contributing to internationalsociety” and “aim to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council”(Source: DPJ Manifest 2009). First it has refused the deployment of JapaneseGround Self-Defence Forces to Afghanistan as part of the NATO-led InternationalSecurity Assistance Force, as proposed in the Diet by then-DPJ leader Ichiro Ozawain October 2007. Second, it terminated the operation of SDF vessels in the IndianOcean. In January 2010, the defence minister ordered the Japanese navy to returnfrom the Indian Ocean, fulfilling a DPJ pledge to end the eight-year refuelingmission. Former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama had refused to renew the lawauthorizing the mission, ignoring requests from the US Government for continuationand emphasized that Japan should think of sending the SDF to UN led missionsinstead. What this means in concrete terms has remained unclear. The new DPJgovernment in power has not made it clear if and how it intends to make use of themilitary in future UN mandated peace operations. In a recent policy strategydocument the‘National Security Council’ has issued its thoughts on the future roleand responsibilities of the SDF:

“Traditionally, Japan has responded to these (security PH) challenges throughcontributions focused in non-military fields. However, experience in the fieldof international efforts, as in Afghanistan, shows that there are certain kinds ofactivities that only military forces can carry out, such as reconstructionassistance in dangerous areas, and the protection of civilians who work there. Itis indispensable for Japan to use its defence force more proactively in the fieldof international peace cooperation, so that Japan can assume responsibility formaintaining and constructing an international system” (Source: The Council onSecurity and Defence Capabilities, August 2009, p 38, accessed at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ampob).

In August 2010 the DPJ announced that it will create a new body within theCabinet secretariat of the Prime Minister’s Office to streamline and centralizeAfghanistan support activities. Japan is currently reconsidering how it caneffectively contribute to UN peacekeeping operations without jeopardizing the spiritof its peace constitution.

Germany: Elite Consensus as Driving Force

With the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, Germany has come undergrowing pressure from its allies to assume a greater international security role [4,5].After voting for the ISAF mission with a great majority in December 2001, theGerman Bundestag approved also German participation in ‘Operation EnduringFreedom’ in November 2002. Soon after the ousting of the Taliban regime, Germanytried to integrate NATO into post-conflict reconstruction. The Ministry of Defence,in particular, pushed for NATO support for the ISAF troops despite its formerreservations on the expansion of NATO operations [26]. In 2003, the NATO Council

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agreed to the German request that the Alliance should take over ISAF command.The UN mandate has authorized ISAF to take all necessary measures, including theuse of military force, in order to implement its mission. Although German troopshave mainly operated in the relatively quiet north of the country, the Bundeswehrhas suffered several casualties. As of December 2010, 45 German soldiers and 3policemen had died in Afghanistan. On top of this, there are additional Germancivilian casualties such as development aid workers.

Despite or because of the military restrictions all major parties except the “DieLinke” (Leftist) Party have generally supported Germany’s commitment toAfghanistan and avoided explicit calls for withdrawal of troops. In keeping withthis cross-party consensus, Germany’s decision to increase troops had theendorsement not just of the new governing coalition of Christian (CDU) and FreeDemocrats (FDP) but also the main opposition party, the SPD. The CDU is probablythe most direct supporter of these operations. SPD and the Greens do not oppose theengagement in principle but demand a closer focus on civilian support and clear exitstrategies for Afghanistan. The Greens have called for an end to Operation EnduringFreedom and called it “irresponsible” to conduct two missions -OEF and ISAF- inparallel [18]. While the junior liberal coalition partner the free democrats (FDP) hasa very critical stance on the German military involvement in Afghanistan as well, itstill supports the Bundeswehr’s engagement there.

Section 2

In Search of a “Just Cause” for Military Intervention

This section will seek an answer to the question why German public support for thewar in Afghanistan has declined over time and why the elites on the left and the righthave not followed suit, but continue to believe that the military deployment is a non-offensive, humanitarian mission benefiting the Afghan civilian population. Thedecision to send German troops to Afghanistan was taken by the coalitiongovernment led by the social democrat SPD and the Green Party under the clearassumption that Germany would not be participating in a war or engaged in coercivecombat operations and that ISAF was supposed to be a routine security“stabilization” mission after the military defeat of the Taliban. By contrast to directcombat operations, “stabilization operations” encompass various military missions,tasks, and activities conducted to maintain or reestablish a safe and secureenvironment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructurereconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Part of the problems the German soldiersface on the ground today can be explained by the fact that the Afghan mission wasright from the start not meant to be a traditional peacekeeping mission, whichrequires a political willingness of the conflict parties to settle a conflict peacefullyand consists in monitoring ceasefires, disarming local forces, election supervision,medical assistance, patrolling demilitarized zones, inspecting the transport ofweapons and collecting and disposing of abandoned weapons. Although the initialinvasion of Afghanistan was not mandated by a specific UN Security CouncilResolution, relying on the justification of self-defence, the Security Council moved

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quickly to authorise a military operation to stabilize the country [30,31]. SecurityCouncil Resolution (UNSCR) 1386 of December 2001 laid down the initial mandatefor a 5,000-strong International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to deploy to theregion in and immediately around Kabul, in order to provide security and to assist inthe reconstruction of the country under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It allows theCouncil to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or actof aggression" and to take military and nonmilitary action to "restore international peaceand security". While UN-mandated, the ISAF force was not deployed under leadershipof the UN. Until August 2003, when NATO assumed command, the ISAF operation wasconducted as an UN-mandated coalition of the willing.

What had Germany in mind when it decided to get involved in Afghanistan? Thedriving force to give a new international purpose to the German military was JoschkaFischer, the foreign minister from 1998 to 2005, who justified the deployment inAfghanistan with the need for humanitarian intervention [6,11]. The political and moralreasons invoked to go to Afghanistan were twofold: Foreign Minister Fischer (as wellas Chancellor Schroeder) were persuaded that the Taliban held the Afghan peoplehostage, had no legitimate support base and assumed they were terrorists who posed aserious threat to the rest of the world. In a speech in 2002 Fischer justified the dispatchof the German army with the duty to liberate Afghanistan:

“The readiness to free the Afghan people from the frightful yoke of the Taliban is ofcentral importance to the success of the international coalition against terrorism. It’sabout nothing less than the war of the civilized world against international terrorism,irrational fanaticism, and misanthropic criminality” (cited by [20], p.118).

It should be noted, that Fischer has remained a strong advocate of increasedmilitary involvement of Germany in Afghanistan and voiced his strong concernson any troop withdrawal plans. By contrast to Japan poised in its steadfastpacifist peace constitution, the Greens in Germany gave up part of their pacifistprinciples under Fischer out of duty and conviction to help Afghanistan. Anargumentative turn in policy analysis made it possible for Green pacifism toapprove the selective use of military force the sake of a just cause. For theGreens the use of force could only be strictly defensive in nature and restrictedwithin the context of civilian reconstruction. They continued to “opposing (only)aggressive force, invasions of another country and in particular military force toachieve selfish national interest goals” ([6], p. 342).

Unlike for Iraq, the general support for the Afghanistan mission was almostunanimous at the beginning. Nevertheless, the military parliamentary mandate thatwas formulated, reflected a cautious, reluctant and maybe even delusive nationalperspective. It appeared to serve the purpose of individual self-defence and self-protection of German soldiers based on foreign territory. Out of the five tasksmentioned in the mandate three were strictly defensive:

“Self-protection; if necessary, self-evacuation and relocation” (German:“Eigensicherung, im Bedarfsfall Eigenevakuierung sowie Rückverlegung”;Source: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 14/793 from 21. 12. 2001).

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The mandate stated clearly that Germany did not feel responsible for the securityof Afghans:

“The responsibility for public security and order lies with the Afghansthemselves” (German: Dabei liegt die Verantwortung für die öffentliche Sicherheitund Ordnung bei den Afghanen selbst; Source: Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache14/7930 vom 21. 12. 2001).

In 2010, the acting new conservative-liberal coalition government, subject to publiccriticism, shifted the focus from prior distant watching to offering “support to theGovernment of Afghanistan to maintain security especially for the protection of thepopulation” (German:Unterstützung der Regierung von Afghanistan bei der Aufrech-terhaltung der Sicherheit, auch und besonders zum Schutz der Bevölkerung; Source:Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 17/654 vom 09. 02. [7]) but announced in the samedocument that the responsibility for security would be handed over to Afghanauthorities by the beginning of 2011 and that the German gradual withdrawal of troopswould probably start by then.

As a result of a seemingly protracted logic the operational mandate of theBundeswehr, which was fixed in very restrictive terms on paper, did not match thereality on the battleground [24]. Even worse, the decision to move to the securenorthern part of Afghanistan and refrain from engaging in warfare caused a “split” inthe alliance as Kornelius puts it:

“The relocation of the German contingent to the north led to an irrevocablesplit in the multinational force. The fact was that the security situation inthe various parts of the country could not have been different. But insteadof acknowledging this fact and at least providing moral support for theNATO units stationed in the south, German policymakers began to pretendthat they knew better. They praised the exemplary nature of the Germanreconstruction concept in the north, and at the same time criticized thetactics of the troops operating in the south, in particular those of theAmericans” ([19], p. 28).

Kornelius has claimed that the military mandate was ill-defined from thebeginning. The paradox outcome of this situation has been that the soldiers havebeen unsecure of what they are supposed to accomplish. According to him, “thesoldiers are the real victims of a grand kind of self-deceit” ([19], p.5). One shouldnot forget to mention the civilian Afghan casualties. The misguided mandate andthe silence kept about civilian casualties are linked to the core problem thatsurrounds the German mission: a military strategy relying on premises andassumptions that contradict the reality on the battleground and the particular humansecurity needs of the Afghan population. Despite or because of the very restrictiveand defensive engagement rules, German soldiers have become increasinglyinvolved in direct combat operations involving not only Taliban but also civilians.As a matter of fact the German intervention has slipped into a mission includingcounter-insurgency operations. In an interview with the German weekly Spiegel

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dated September 19, 2010, ISAF Commander General David Petraeus has praisedGerman offensive combat tactics:

“The Germans have done wonderful work. Not long ago, a German battlegroup battalion conducted a very impressive counterinsurgency operation in aportion of Baghlan province. I think these are the first counterinsurgencyoperations conducted by any German element after World War II. And they dida very impressive job.”(Source: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,718285-2,00.html

Kreps has claimed that the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan has evolved froma war of necessity to a war of choice over time: “the current operation is a “war ofchoice,” which is to say that national interest is no longer directly at stake as it wasin the initial phases of the war” ([16], p. 25). If that was true one cannot but wonderwhy the German (and Japanese) elites continue to view Afghanistan as a hotbed ofinternational terrorism. In a major government declaration on Afghanistan from 2009Chancellor Merkel justified the mission to:

“protect the lives of people in Germany from the evil of internationalterrorism” (German:“Leib und Leben der Menschen hier in Deutschland vordem Übel des internationalen Terrorismus zu schützen” Source: http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Regierungserklaerung/2009/2009-09-08-regerkl-merkel-afghanistan.html).

The German Foreign Ministry has repeatedly claimed that threats to the nationalsecurity of Germany justify the continuation of the military intervention: “There aretwo central issues here – our own security and Afghanistan’s future. The threatscenarios are not a figment of our imagination as shown by the attacks in Londonand Madrid and by the German Sauerland group (a terrorist network composed ofGermans trained by the Taliban in Afghanistan, PH).

(Source: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/AfghanistanZentralasien/Mission-Statement-AFG.html

One might add here, that one of the side effects of the war has been the growingreadiness of radical, militant German citizens fighting on the side of the Taliban.

Back to Gunboat Diplomacy? The Resignation of German President Horst Koehler

The public discontent with the war in Afghanistan took a new turn when the GermanPresident himself tried to justify foreign military interventions with national interestand the right to national self-defence. On 31 May 2010, Koehler announced hisresignation as President of Germany after he had been publicly criticized forstatements given in an interview. The president had become the target of intensecriticism following remarks he made during a surprise visit to soldiers of the Germanarmy in Afghanistan on May 22. In an interview with a German radio reporter whoaccompanied him on the trip, he seemed to justify his country's military missionsabroad with the need to protect economic interests:

"In my estimation, though, we—including [German] society as a whole—arecoming to the general understanding that, given this [strong] focus and

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corresponding dependency on exports, a country of our size needs to be awarethat where called for or in an emergency, military deployment, too, is necessaryif we are to protect our interests such as ensuring free trade routes orpreventing regional instabilities which are also certain to negatively impact ourability to safeguard trade, jobs and income. All of this should be discussed andI think the path we are on is not so bad."(Source: http://www.dradio.de/aktuell/1191138/)

It sounded as though Koehler was justifying wars for the sake of nationaleconomic interests in the context of the Afghan mission which is highlycontroversial in Germany. He subsequently stated that his comments referred topiracy off the coast of Somalia. By justifying military overseas intervention with theprotection of national interests the President touched upon the question ofsafeguarding national sovereignty including the use of military force, regardless ofexisting international UN frameworks for conflict prevention or peaceful conflictsettlement. Instead of referring to international instruments that have beenestablished to solve conflicts and prevent unilateral military action the Presidentreinforced the idea that German military sovereignty serves the national interest andcannot be restricted by international agreements and collective security and peacearrangements.

Targeting Civilians? The Kunduz Airstrike

A fatal airstrike in 2009 has shaken the self-understanding of Germany’s presence inAfghanistan in the eyes of public opinion. For the first time during an overseasdeployment of German forces after the Second World War a large number ofcivilians had been killed by an airstrike under German commandment. The NATOrules of engagement only allow for sending F-15 jets if German groups areendangered. However in this case the information turned out to be false. After aconversation with the pilots in which various requests by them regarding theimminent danger of the people on the ground as well as the possibility of warningstook place, the German commander decided to attack the civilians with the goal ofhitting a large number of local Taliban leaders. After several allied tank truckshijacked by Taliban got stuck in a river sandbank, the commander gave the order todrop two bombs on a crowd, who had gathered around the trucks. In this airstrike upto 140 people were killed, among them not only members of the Taliban but alsomany civilians. The German Ministry of Defence officially recognized 102 victimsas result of the air strike of 4 September 2009, among them 91 persons killed. Mostof the dead were men and boys, who went to the riverbank to get fuel from thetankers or who went there just out of curiosity. Kornelius has argued that force underthe German mandate may only be used if there exists an imminent danger andcivilian lives will not be put at risk:

“True, the use of force is permitted, but only “as a last resort,”only in cases of“imminent danger,” and only if collateral damage can be excluded” ([19], p. 30).

In criminal law self-defence may be invoked in the face of an imminent threat ofdeath or grave bodily harm. In general, the threat must be immediate and the

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response must not be pushed beyond what is reasonably required to repel that threat.In Kunduz both preconditions for the use of force were reportedly not given. TwoGerman journalists based in Kabul published a detailed account of what happenedon 4th September 2009 [21]. According to their findings “the internal NATOinvestigation report found that there was no evidence to support the assumption thatthere had been an imminent attack by Taliban insurgents on the German PRT”([21],p.25; German: Der spätere Untersuchungsbericht hält fest, dass es keine sicherenErkenntnisse gegeben habe, »die auf einen geplanten Angriff der Taliban«auf dasdeutsche PRT hingewiesen hätten, kurzum: Es habe»keine akute Bedrohung«gegeben). It was later revealed that the Taliban had decided to distribute the tank fuelto local people as they did not manage to move the tanks out of the muddy sandbank. Most Taliban commanders had left the scene already when the bombs weredropped and only a few remained to supervise the distribution of fuel to civilians. Howcould it be that civilians became the innocent target of an airstrike? According to the twojournalists, the German commander failed to follow the strict field operation manualguidelines issued by the US commandment to make sure no civilians becomeunintended targets of NATO airstrikes. The new rules, issued in July 2009, had beenenforced to prevent troops from shooting at the Taliban, if there is a risk of civiliancasualties [30]. The tactical directive highlights that this is the case even if it means toallow the enemy to escape. Furthermore the German commander decided on his ownto launch the airstrike without consulting with his immediate superiors or the USairforce operations centre in Kuwait according to Mettelsiefen and Reuter. In theaftermath of the fatal airstrike the government denied the facts. Initially theBundeswehr did not investigate the results of the air strike, and for months acted asif there had been no civilian casualties. Germany's then Defence Minister Franz JosefJung, who had repeatedly denied civilians had been killed in the attack, resigned inNovember 2009 amid allegations of a cover-up. Meanwhile, the German parliamenthas established an ongoing parliamentary commission to investigate the militaryairstrike. So far the victims have not been compensated by the German state. Criminalcharges were not filed. Whenever a civilian abroad of any nationality is killed in asituation involving a German soldier, the public prosecutor starts an investigation intothe incident. In this case the prosecution and army commandment decided not to bringcriminal or disciplinary charges against the German commander who ordered theairstrike. The two US air force pilots who dropped the bombs were reportedlypunished for violating the internal rules of engagement. It might be an irony thatGermany, who has blamed the US for its failed military strategy, violated US rules ofengagement meant to protect civilians (former Chancellor Schroeder for exampleblamed the Bush administration in a recent essay for its failed Afghanistan strategy,see http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,607205,00.html).

Section 3

Human Security as a Third Way in Afghanistan?

The Global Commission on Human Security issued in 2003 a report which arguedthat human security was a public good that, in the aftermath of conflict situations,

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should be provided by states and communities instead of military interventions bythe international community. The Commission on Human Security, co-chaired bySadako Ogata, former head of UNHCR, and Noble Prize laureate Amartya Sen hadbeen created by Japan in 2001 as an attempt to examine new responsibilities with afocus on communities and states in the process of development. In its final report,‘Human Security Now’, the Commission defined human security as the necessity toprotect vital freedoms by building on people’s strengths and aspirations and byprotecting them from hostile incursions and disruptions. According to this newapproach the end of military intervention marks the beginning of human security andcivilian nation-building. Sadako Ogata has taken a lead role in pushing for a non-intrusive human security agenda based on her experience with refugees. Accordingto her, a successful human security approach that goes beyond mere state securityimplies both a state centered top down and a people centered bottom up mechanism:

“Protection refers to the norms, processes, and institutions required to shield peoplefrom critical and pervasive threats. It implies a “top-down” approach, such asestablishing the rule of law, institutional accountability and transparency, anddemocratic governance structures. States have the primary responsibility toimplement such a protective infrastructure.Meanwhile, the concept of empowermentemphasizes people as actors and participants in defining and implementing their vitalfreedoms. This implies a “bottom-up” approach” ([25], p 10).

To the traditional narrative of military security she opposes human security interms of democratic state structures complemented by people’s stable livelihoods.Ogata, a former special envoy to Afghanistan under the Koizumi administrationfrom 2001 to 2003, has been involved before that as former head of UNHCR withAfghan affairs. She showed convinced that Afghanistan would fulfill the conditionsfor enhancement of human security projects. She mentioned in 2004 that,

“the UN and the international community are working to support the Afghanauthorities to set up political institutions, rules of law, basic education, andhealth and other services that protect the citizens. This approach, arguably, isthe first step towards achieving human security. (…) One area that needs to bestrengthened further in Afghanistan is the bottom-up approach to empower thecommunities ([25], p. 13). This is namely where Ogata has made positivecontributions by incorporating the new vision of human security in the dailywork of her own workplace, the JICA cooperation agency and governmentaldevelopment aid programs (ODA). In this regard, it is noteworthy that someJapanese NGOs-such as the organization ‘Peshawar-Kai’, which has beensuccessfully assisting the local Afghan population with medical humanitarianaid and grassroots public works projects including digging wells and buildingwater channels- have demonstrated that it is possible to pursue a humansecurity based approach without involving the military [23]. The importance ofbuilding up the basic infrastructure and caring for basic human needs first hasbeen recognized as critical for civilian nation-building [15].

It is Ogata’s merit that Japan took additional initiatives to enhance human securityin Afghanistan within and outside the framework of the UN. She has always kept a

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critical distance to national governments -including her own- and has repeatedlyquestioned the need for military interventions. In 2002 she warned in a speech that:

“terrorism in a globalizing world cannot be counteracted by military power orgovernment control.”(Source: http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/activities/outreach/ogata_ogden.html)

In 2009 she expressed her deep concerns about the ongoing difficulties inAfghanistan in diplomatically wrapped terms: “There is a lot of international supportbut also—maybe intervention is the right word—which complicate the process.”

(Source: http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/president/speeches/2009/091107.html)

Section 4

Civilian Police Force? Training of Afghan Police by Germany and Japan

The establishment of the rule of law is considered to be one of the key tasks andpreconditions for civilian reconstruction and human security in Afghanistan. InMarch 2010 the Afghan Government presented its first ever ‘National PoliceStrategy’ valid from 2010 to 2015 [1]. The program, which will probably includesending thousands of officers abroad for training, is designed to rebuild andrestructure a force of more than 90,000 Afghans. Despite the various foreign policetraining projects initiated since 2002, civilian police capacity building in Afghanistanhas been hampered by the general militarization of security and the privatization ofsecurity in the hands of -legally acting- local militia and foreign private securityproviders. It is an irony that the police which is supposed to be essentially a civilian forceacts de facto as a complement to military units. The report recognizes, that ongoinginsecurity has “caused the police to train and prepare their patrols in a similar manner tothe military” ([1], p.6). The report recognizes that the police is very “militaristic” and“can intimidate” the people instead of serving it (p.8). There are many other issuesraised in the report, which add to the problems such as a very high illiteracy ratioamong policemen from “between 70% to 85%” (Source: [7], p.44) ineffective training,low pays, high turnover through desertion, tolerance of legal private militia (‘AfghanPublic Protection Force’) besides regular police units, drug abuse, or corruption. TheAfghan police is the key to creating a secure and lawful society but, in its presentcondition, also the main obstacle towards achieving that goal. The report states, that iswill be therefore “crucial to increase the public’s confidence and public perception ofthe police” ([1], p.12).

German Police Training in Afghanistan

Germany is the most active European country in the field of police capacity-buildingin Afghanistan. This support began in 2002 as a bilateral project with the GermanPolice Project Team and since 2007 has been complemented by the EU PoliceMission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan). The German Police Project Team(GPPT) took on the task of advising the Afghan National Police (ANP) on its reformefforts, training Afghan police officers and coordinating the contributions of

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international partners. More than 30,000 policemen have been trained by Germanysince 2002 according to data from the German Government [7]. Germany has builtpolice training facilities and financed police salaries through an international trustfund. As of mid 2010, around 200 German police officers have been working on theground as part of this bilateral police project. This number is scheduled to increase to260 in 2010. In addition, 45 military police officers from Germany’s armed forcesare also involved in the training. By 2014, 134,000 Afghan policemen are scheduledto be in active service. At the moment, there are just around 100,000 registeredpolicemen. It is estimated that out of the 100,000 only 70,000 are able to actuallyperform their job. It goes beyond the scope of this article to discuss the Germanconcept and strategy for police training in detail but suffice is to say that the GermanGovernment seems overall satisfied with the work and progress done since 2002 (see[2,3,7]) although no independent evaluation has been completed so far.

With regard to training goals, the needs assessment analysis of the GermanGovernment contrasts somehow with the ‘National Police Strategy’ report of theAfghan Government. The German Government estimates that the Afghan policeis in need of a “modular training in the military sense” ([7], p. 35) by Germanarmy instructors by keeping in mind that the “fight against insurgents is theresponsibility of the Afghan army” ([7], p. 50). The Afghan Government on theother side, estimates that the ‘Afghan national civil order police’ (ANCOP(G) orGendarmerie) must be enabled to “conduct counterinsurgency operations incooperation with the Afghan national army” ([1], p.15). However, as Germany isnot at all involved in the training for the Afghan Gendarmerie units, the question ifthe German police training strategy is at odds with the military, counter-insurgencyoriented training strategy pursued by the Afghan authorities must be raised. Is amilitarized police engaged in paramilitary operations able to fulfill civilian tasksbased on the rule of law?

Japan’s Contribution to Afghan Police Training

Japan has been the second biggest donor (319 Mio USD as of mid 2010) after theUS (6.2 Billion USD) for reconstructing the police force (Source: [7], p 5). Over thepast nine years, Japan’s police contribution has been limited to financial assistanceand the building of infrastructure. It has recently decided to go a step further andtrain Afghan police in Turkey. The project will be carried out in cooperation with theTurkish Government, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and others, usingpolice training facilities in Turkey. It is aimed at both improving security inAfghanistan and indirectly supporting the US Government, which is bearing a hugefinancial burden. The government and the ruling DPJ have been looking for ways tocontinue supporting Western operations in Afghanistan without dispatching SDFpersonnel. Japanese police are expected to teach their Afghan counterparts how to docrime lab work, fight drug trafficking and set up a Japanese style “police box”(koban) system, among other things. The police training project will be the core ofJapan's security assistance for Afghanistan. The government, which is alreadypaying part of salaries of about 80,000 Afghan police officers, decided on the policetraining project in an Islamic third country after concluding it would be problematicto dispatch Japanese police officers to Afghanistan.

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A preliminary assessment of German and Japanese police training goals andactivities substantiates the argument that civilian police capacity building is a sharedpolicy goal of both Germany and Japan. However there is a risk that the Afghanpolice strategy might endanger the civilian goals of the German police trainingprogram by putting too much emphasis on military training aspects andcounterinsurgency tasks.

Summary Conclusion

The article elaborated on the policy choices of Germany and Japan inAfghanistan and found that the Japanese civilian centered approach appearsmore adapted to the human security needs of the Afghan people, compared to theGerman military centered approach build upon the premise of militarystabilization and securitization. Motives and reasons behind the foreign policychoices have been largely influenced by domestic assumptions and considerationsin the case of Germany [17]. The comparison revealed that German pacifism hadfaded because there was a large political consensus among the political elite in theGerman legislative branch to intervene militarily in Afghanistan. The Greensinvoked the duty to humanitarian intervention because they wrongly assumed thatthe Taliban had no local support base and were Al-Kaida terrorists; the Social-Democrats declared themselves champions of “unlimited” national sovereignty andthe conservative Christian Democrats vowed to protect the lives and safety ofGerman citizens. The explicit military loyalty to NATO expressed in terms of“Buendnisfaehigkeit” (will to ally) only reinforced these national self-interests. Thedefensive mandate given to soldiers did not match the reality on the battleground.Hence, the military mandate remained contradictory. The military inconsistencyand “self-deceit” [19] resulted in the tragic and unnecessary loss of lives and theentanglement of German soldiers in offensive counter-insurgency operations.German police training has seemed at odds with the police militarization strategypursued by the Afghan Government.

In Japan foreign policy considerations in Afghanistan were greatly influenced bydomestic factors in the early 1990s when the LDP allowed the SDF to participate inoverseas operations by invoking the duty to fight terrorism (Indian refuel mission,reconstruction mission to Iraq, increased cooperation with NATO) and again in 2008when it reconsidered a US request for sending troops to Afghanistan. Pacifistattitudes had gradually regained strength after the controversial SDF dispatch to Iraq.Collective defence obligations similar to NATO’s mutual assistance clause wererejected as a viable political and military option. The 2007 DPJ decision to opposethe refueling mission in the Indian Ocean and subsequent election victory was thetrigger for a policy change. By January 2010 the Japanese military presence in theregion had been terminated. The findings for Japan suggested, that there has been anoverwhelming consensus among the political elite not to engage in dangerousmilitary operations, to stick to the five very restrictive PKO law principles and topursue a civilian nation-building strategy focused on disarmament activities, civilianpolice training, infrastructure development projects and humanitarian relief. TheJapanese initiatives to achieve human security centered goals in Afghanistan offer analternative, non-military perspective towards conflict resolution and peace-building.

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The Japanese choice not to get entangled militarily in Afghanistan has beencongruent with its civilian pacifist attitudes. The German deliberate choice to usemilitary force on humanitarian grounds has not produced the expected results interms of public security, civilian reconstruction and rule of law. The electorate andeven the soldiers on the ground seem to doubt that civilian nation-building can beachieved with “questionable” military means.

Appendix

Opinion poll on war in Afghanistan Japan and Germany released on June 17, 2010Source: http://pewglobal.org/2010/06/17/obama-more-popular-abroad-than-at-home/2/#chapter-1-views-of-the-u-s-and-american-foreign-policy

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