111-112.pdf

1 | R E M E D I A L L A W R E V I E W 1 : C R I M I N A L P R O C E D U R E

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO, QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

RULE 111 PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION

SOLIDUM vs. PEOPLE 718 SCRA 263

2014

Criminal Procedure; Prosecution of Offenses; Civil Liability; In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed instituted with the criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense charged.

Facts of the Case: Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 19922 with an imperforate anus. Two days after his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large intestine out through the abdominal wall, enabling him to excrete through a colostomy bag attached to the side of his body.

On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through operation. Dr. Leandro Resurreccion headed the surgical team, and was assisted by Dr. Joselito Luceo, Dr. Donatella Valea and Dr. Joseph Tibio. The anesthesiologists included Dr. Marichu Abella, Dr. Arnel Razon and petitioner Dr. Fernando Solidum (Dr. Solidum). During the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia, and went into a coma. His coma lasted for two weeks,9 but he regained consciousness only after a month. He could no longer see, hear or move.

Agitated by her sons helpless and unexpected condition, Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz) lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with the City Prosecutors Office of Manila against the attending physicians.

Upon a finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutors Office filed an information solely against Dr. Solidum, alleging:

That on or about May 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then an anesthesiologist at the Ospital ng Maynila, Malate, this City, and as such was tasked to administer the anesthesia on three-year old baby boy GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO, represented by his mother, MA. LUZ GERCAYO, the former having been born with an imperforate anus [no anal opening] and was to undergo an operation for anal opening [pull through operation], did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail and neglect to use the

care and diligence as the best of his judgment would dictate under said circumstance, by failing to monitor and regulate properly the levels of anesthesia administered to said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO and using 100% halothane and other anesthetic medications, causing as a consequence of his said carelessness and negligence, said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO suffered a cardiac arrest and consequently a defect called hypoxic encephalopathy meaning insufficient oxygen supply in the brain, thereby rendering said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO incapable of moving his body, seeing, speaking or hearing, to his damage and prejudice.

The case was initially filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, but was transferred to the RTC pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997), where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 01-190889.

On July 19, 2004, the RTC rendered its judgment finding Dr. Solidum guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. The decree of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, of expressly holding Ospital ng Maynila civilly liable jointly and severally with Dr. Solidum.

On January 20, 2010, the CA affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum, pertinently stating and ruling: The case appears to be a textbook example of res ipsa loquitur.

Dr. Solidum filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied his motion on May 7, 2010.

Upon appeal with the Supreme Court, the Court acquitted Dr. Solidum of the crime charged for failing of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Issue: Whether or not Ospital ng Maynila is civilly liable? Ruling: The Court ruled in the negative. Although the result now reached has resolved the issue of civil liability, we have to address the unusual decree of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, of expressly holding Ospital ng Maynila civilly liable jointly and severally with Dr. Solidum. The decree was flawed in logic and in law.

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In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed instituted with the criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense charged.48 It is puzzling, therefore, how the RTC and the CA could have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila jointly and severally liable with Dr. Solidum for the damages despite the obvious fact that Ospital ng Maynila, being an artificial entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower courts thereby acted capriciously and whimsically, which rendered their judgment against Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Not surprisingly, the flawed decree raises other material concerns that the RTC and the CA overlooked. We deem it important, then, to express the following observations for the instruction of the Bench and Bar.

For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence, its fundamental right to be heard was not respected from the outset. The R TC and the CA should have been alert to this fundamental defect. Verily, no person can be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party. Such a rule would enforce the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.

Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability would be properly enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the subsidiary liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions for subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital ng Maynila should first be complied with. Firstly, pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a corporation "engaged in any kind of industry." The term industry means any department or branch of art, occupation or business, especially one that employs labor and capital, and is engaged in industry.49 However, Ospital ng Maynila, being a public hospital, was not engaged in industry conducted for profit but purely in charitable and humanitarian work.50Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng Maynila was engaged in industry for profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an employee of Ospital ng Maynila acting in the discharge of his duties during the operation on Gerald. Yet, he definitely was not such employee but a consultant of the hospital. And, thirdly, assuming that civil liability was adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an employee (which did not happen here), the execution against him was unsatisfied due to his being insolvent.

CASTILLO vs. SALVADOR G.R. No. 191240

July 30, 2014 Facts of the Case: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which assails the Decision1 dated February 11, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30151 with respect only to the civil aspect of the case as respondent Phillip R. Salvador had been acquitted of the crime of estafa. Respondent Phillip Salvador and his brother Ramon Salvador were charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code in an Information2 which reads: That during the period from March 2001 up to May 2002, in the City of Las Pias, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to gain and by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the complainant CRISTINA B. CASTILLO, in the amount of US$100,000.00 in the following manner, to wit: Respondents convinced the complainant to invest into the remittance business in the name of accused PHILLIP R. SALVADOR in Hongkong, representing to her that they will personally take charge of the operations and marketing of the said business, assuring her with huge profits because of the popularity of accused PHILLIP R. SALVADOR, knowing very well that the said manifestations/representations and fraudulent manifestations were false and were intended only to exact money from the Complainant, and by reason of the said false representations made by both accused, the Complainant gave and entrusted to the accused the amount of US$100,000.00 as seed money to start the operations of the business and the said accused, once in the possession of the said amount of money, misappropriated, misapplied and/or converted the same to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the Complainant in the aforementioned amount of US$100,000.00. Issue: The trial court was correct in convicting the respondent so that even if the court of appeals decided to acquit him it should have at least retained the award of damages to the petitioner. Ruling: We find no merit in the petition. To begin with, in Manantan v. CA, we discussed the

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consequences of an acquittal on the civil liability of the accused as follows: Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the actor omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act oromission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delictois out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule III of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission." x xx. Since the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, respondent is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED.

LILY LIMvs.KOU CO PING a.k.a. CHARLIE CO G.R. No. 175256

FACTS: FR Cement Corporation (FRCC) issued several withdrawal authoritiesfor the account of cement dealers and traders, Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt. Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt, sold the withdrawal authorities covering 50,000 bags of cement to Co for the amount of P 3.15 million or P 63.00 per bag. Co sold these withdrawal authorities to Lim at the price of P 64.00 per bag or a total of P 3.2 million.

Using the withdrawal authorities, Lim withdrew the cement bags from FRCC on a staggered basis. She successfully withdrew 2,800 bags of cement, however, FRCC did not allow Lim to withdraw the remaining 37,200 bags covered by the withdrawal authorities due to a price increase. Lim objected and maintained that the withdrawal authorities she bought were not subject to price fluctuations. Lim sought legal recourse after her demands for Co to resolve the problem with the plant or for the return of her money had failed. Consequently, Information for Estafa through Misappropriation or Conversion was filed against Co before the RTC of Pasig City. The trial acquitted Co for the crime of estafa and also relieved Co of civil liability to Lim. Lim sought reconsideration, however, the trial court denied the motion. Thereafter, Lim filed a notice of appeal on the

civil aspect of the criminal case.

Lim again filed a complaint for specific performance and damages before the RTC of Manila. The complaint asserted two causes of action: breach of contract and abuse of rights. Co filed motions to dismiss the said civil caseand appeal in the civil aspect of the estafa case on the ground of lis pendens and forum shopping.

The CA favorably resolved Cos motion and dismissed Lims appeal from the civil aspect of the estafa case. Meanwhile, the Manila RTC denied Cos Motion to Dismiss and held that there was no forum shopping because the causes of action invoked in the two cases are different. It observed that the civil complaint before it is based on an obligation arising from contract and quasi-delict, whereas the civil liability involved in the appeal of the criminal case arose from a felony. The CA (17th) agreed with the Manila RTC that the elements of litis pendentia and forum shopping are not met in the two proceedings because they do not share the same cause of action.The CA deniedCos motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lim commit forum shopping in filing the civil case for specific performance and damages during the pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal case for estafa?

HELD:

No. A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender -ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability may be based on "an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony," as provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as for breach of contract or for tort). It may also be based on an act or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal action by specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code ("in cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries").

The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions that constitute the criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action. For this reason, the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the criminal offense.If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the criminal action. The civil

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liability based on delict is extinguished when the court hearing the criminal action declares that "the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist."

On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are separate from the criminal action and may be pursued independently, as provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code.

Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the offended party may pursue the two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the rules on forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata.As explained in Cancio, Jr. v. Isip:

One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes of action. In the instant case, it must be stressed that the action filed by petitioner is an independent civil action, which remains separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Not being deemed instituted in the criminal action based on culpa criminal, a ruling on the culpability of the offender will have no bearing on said independent civil action based on an entirely different cause of action, i.e., culpa contractual.

In the same vein, the filing of the collection case after the dismissal of the estafa cases against the offender did not amount to forum-shopping. The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. Although the cases filed by [the offended party] arose from the same act or omission of [the offender], they are, however, based on different causes of action. The criminal cases for estafa are based on culpa criminal while the civil action for collection is anchored on culpa contractual. Moreover, there can be no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law expressly allows the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal action.

Since civil liabilities arising from felonies and those arising from other sources of obligations are authorized

by law to proceed independently of each other, the resolution of the present issue hinges on whether the two cases herein involve different kinds of civil obligations such that they can proceed independently of each other. The answer is in the affirmative.

The first action is clearly a civil action ex delicto, it having been instituted together with the criminal action. On the other hand, the second action, judging by the allegations contained in the complaint,is a civil action arising from a contractual obligation and for tortious conduct (abuse of rights).

Thus, Civil Case No. 05-112396 involves only the obligations arising from contract and from tort, whereas the appeal in the estafa case involves only the civil obligations of Co arising from the offense charged. They present different causes of action, which under the law, are considered "separate, distinct, and independent" from each other. Both cases can proceed to their final adjudication, subject to the prohibition on double recovery under Article 2177 of the Civil Code.

AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO,

petitioners, vs. MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent.

G.R. No. 145391. August 26, 2002.*

All the other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer deemed instituted, and may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code. Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case. Facts: Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Laroya and the other owned by petitioner Capitulo and driven by petitioner Casupanan , figured in an accident. As a result, two cases were filed with the MCTC of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property. On the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict. When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion and dismissed the civil case. On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal case.

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The MCTC denied the MR. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the RTC assailing the MCTCs Order of dismissal. RTC dismisses the petition for lack of merit. MR denied by RTC. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case? Held: Yes. Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based on the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have different causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There is nothing in the law or rules that state only the private complainant in a criminal case may invoke these articles. Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure expressly requires the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit: SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.(a) x x x. No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied) Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil action. Conclusion of SC: Section 1 of Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action. Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delictwithout violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover

damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused may be litigated in a separate civil action. This is only fair for two reasons: First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed. Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law. Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper.

People vs. Romero

306 SCRA 90 Effect of Death on Civil Action

Facts: Complainant Ernesto A. Ruiz was a radio commentator of Radio DXRB, Butuan City. He came to know the business of Surigao San Andres Industrial Development Corporation (SAIDECOR), when he interviewed accused Martin Romero and Ernesto Rodriguez regarding the corporations investment operations in Butuan City and Agusandel Norte. Romero was the president and general manager of SAIDECOR, while Rodriguez was the operations manager. Complainant Ernesto A. Ruiz went to SAIDECOR office in Butuan City to make an investment, accompanied by his friend Jimmy Acebu, and SAIDECOR collection agent Daphne Parrocho. After handing over the amount (P150,000.00) to Ernesto Rodriguez, complainant received a postdated Butuan City Rural Bank check instead of the usual redeemable coupon. When the check was presented to the bank for payment, it was dishonored for insufficiency of funds, as evidenced by the check return slip issued by the bank. Both accused could not be located and demand for payment was made only sometime in November 1989 during the preliminary investigation of this case. Accused responded that they had no money. Martin Romero and Ernesto Rodriguez was charged for violation of Batas PambansaBilang 22, arising from the

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issuance of the same check. Both of the accused pleaded not guilty but nevertheless, the RTC convicted each of them of estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Presidential Decree No. 1689, for widescale swindling, and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to jointly and severally pay Ernesto A. Ruiz the amount of one hundred fifty thousand pesos . Accused filed their notice of appeal which was granted by the RTC. However, during the pendency of the appeal, Ernesto Rodriguez died. Issue: Whether or not the Criminal and Civil Liability ex delicto of Ernesto Rodriguez were extinguished. Held: During the pendency of the appeal, on November 12, 1997, accused Ernesto Rodriguez died. As a consequence of his death before final judgment, his criminal and civil liability ex delicto, were extinguished. The Court notes that one of the accused-appellants, Ernesto Rodriguez, died pending appeal. Pursuant to the doctrine established in People vs. Bayotas, the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability ex delicto. The criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.

MAGESTRADO vs. PEOPLE

GR No. 148072 July 10, 2007

Prejudicial Question Facts: Private respondent Librojo filed a criminal complaint against petitioner, for allegedly committing perjury in executing an affidavit of loss to support his request for issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of the TCT Magestrado, with The OCP of Quezon City, who through its ACP filed an information for perjury against petitioner with the MeTC of Quezon City. Petitioner filed a motion for suspension of proceedings based on a prejudicial question. He alleged that a case for recovery of a sum of money and a case for Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of Title and Damages pending before the RTC of QC must be resolved first before Criminal Case for perjury may proceed since the issues in the said civil cases are similar or intimately related to the issues raised in the criminal action. The same was denied by the MeTC. The motion for recon suffered the same fate. A petition for certiorari (Rule 65) with preliminary injunction was thereafter filed by Petitioner with the RTC, which was denied. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule

65. The CA denied the petition and the subsequent motion for reconsideration on the ground that petitioners remedy should have been an appeal from the dismissal by RTC. Hence, petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. Issue: Whether or not it is proper to suspend the case of perjury on the ground that a prejudicial question exist? Held: No. the recovery of a sum of money and a case for Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of Title and Damages are not prejudicial questions to a case of perjury.

A perusal of the allegations in the complaints show that the civil cases pending before the RTC, are principally for the determination of whether a loan was obtained by petitioner from private respondent and whether petitioner executed a real estate mortgage involving the property. On the other hand, Perjury involves the determination of whether petitioner committed perjury in executing an affidavit of loss to support his request for issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of the TCT.

Thus, the civil cases and the criminal case can

proceed independently of each other. Regardless of the outcome of the two civil cases, it will not establish the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal case for perjury. The purchase by petitioner of the land or his execution of a real estate mortgage will have no bearing whatsoever on whether petitioner knowingly and fraudulently executed a false affidavit of loss of the TCT.

In coming up with the decision the SC took into consideration Sections 6 and 7, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, which read:

Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of

prejudicial question. A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.

Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.

The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The rationale behind the principle of

suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.

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A prejudicial question is defined as that which

arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.

For a prejudicial question in a civil case to

suspend criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

Thus, for a civil action to be

considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.

If the resolution of the issue in the civil action

will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case, therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.

However, the court in which an action is

pending may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and upon proper application for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to abide by the outcome of another case pending in another court, especially where the parties and the issues are the same, for there is power inherent in every court to control the disposition of cases on its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights of parties to the second action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are settled, the second action should be stayed.

The power to stay proceedings is incidental to

the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the cases on its dockets, considering its time and effort, those of counsel and the litigants. But if proceedings must be stayed, it must be done in order to

avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments, confusion between litigants and courts. It bears stressing that whether or not the trial court would suspend the proceedings in the criminal case before it is submitted to its sound discretion.

As stated, the determination of whether the

proceedings may be suspended on the basis of a prejudicial question rests on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the civil cases are so related with the issues raised in the criminal case such that the resolution of the issues in the civil cases would also determine the judgment in the criminal case.

PIMENTEL vs. PIMENTEL and People of the Philippines G.R. No. 172060.

September 13, 2010. Second Division CARPIO, J.

Prejudicial Question

FACTS: On 25 October 2004, Private respondent Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap filed a criminal action for frustrated parricide against Petitioner Joselito R. Pimentel before the RTC Quezon City. On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the RTC of Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. Hence, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of civil case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City. The RTC Quezon City held that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The CA dismissed the petition ruling. ISSUE: WON the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner. RULING: No. Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question in Criminal Case for Parricide. Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal

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action may proceed. The first requirement is that there must be a prior civil action instituted. The second requirement is that the issue in the civil action is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In this case, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action. Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action. While the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioners will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent. Petitioner was amiss in his reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals that the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x. First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the SC ruled in Tenebro that there is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. In fact, the SC declared in that case that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned.

CITY PROSECUTOR ARMANDO P. ABANADO vs. JUDGE ABRAHAM A. BAYONA, Presiding Judge,

Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 7, Bacolod City

A.M. No. MTJ-12-1804 677 SCRA 595 July 30, 2012

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION FACTS: In 2009, complainant Armando P. Abanado (City Prosecutor) filed an Information before the MTC, Bacolod City, which was eventually raffled to Branch 7 thereof presided by respondent Judge Abraham A. Bayona. Bayona required Abando to submit the following: 1. Copy of the Memorandum of Preliminary Investigation;2. Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor on Record, Prosecutor Dennis S. Jarders Resolution;3. Memorandum of the transfer of case assignment from designated Investigating Prosecutor to the City Prosecutor; and 4. Exhibit to the Court, the copies of all documents submitted by the complainant and the respondents therein for comparison, authentication and completeness of the photocopies attached to the information. The City Prosecutor was able to submit numbers 1, 2, 4 and with respect to item 3 thereof, complainant, in a letter explained that there was no memorandum of transfer of the case from the investigating prosecutor, Assistant City Prosecutor Dennis S. Jarder, to him. Bayona stated that the Jarder Resolution (dismissing the complaint) was part and parcel of the official records of the case and, for this reason, must form part of the records of the preliminary investigation. The Office of the City Prosecutor again sent a letterexplaining the impossibility of submitting the Jarder Resolution to the court. The respondent required complainant to explain within five days from the receipt thereof why he should not be cited for contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Complainant received the aforementioned order and requested for a ten-day extension to comply with it. Respondent denied the request of a ten-day extension and set the hearing for the contempt charges. He likewise ordered the Clerk of Court to issue a subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum to ACP Jarder directing him to testify on the existence of his resolution dismissing the case entitled People of the Philippines v. Cresencio Palo, Sr. and to Office of the City Prosecutors Records Officer Myrna Vaegas to bring the entire record of the preliminary investigation of the Palo case. Aggrieved, complainant immediately filed a motion for inhibition against respondent. Complainant likewise filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a TRO to restrain respondent from proceeding with the hearing of the contempt proceedings. Complainants prayer for a TRO and petition for certiorari was granted by Presiding Judge

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Pepito B. Gellada of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Bacolod City,holding that:

When a city or provincial prosecutor reverses the investigating assisting city or provincial prosecutor, the resolution finding probable cause replaces the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor recommending the dismissal of the case. The result would be that the resolution of dismissal no longer forms an integral part of the records of the case. It is no longer required that the complaint or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and be examined by the judge. The rationale behind this practice is that the rules do not intend to unduly burden trial judges by requiring them to go over the complete records of the cases all the time for the purpose of determining probable cause for the sole purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest against the accused. "What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcripts of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. x x x.

Complainant executed the present administrative complaint before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA. Complainant alleged therein that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the law or procedure, gross misconduct, and violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 12 dated June 30, 1987. He essentially asserted that respondent unduly burdened himself by obsessing over the production of the records of the preliminary investigation, especially the Jarder Resolution. Respondent, in his Comment with Counter-Complaint for Disbarment of Prosecutor Abanado, essentially reiterated the importance of the Jarder Resolution in deciding whether to issue a warrant of arrest. The OCA noted the Gellada Order which held that the resolution of the city or provincial prosecutor finding probable cause replaces the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor. In such case, the resolution recommending the dismissal is superseded, and no longer forms an integral part of the records of the case and it need not be annexed to the information filed in court. Thus, the OCA held that complainant cannot be held guilty of contempt. ISSUE: Whether or not the Jarder Resolution is relevant for the proper conduct of preliminary investigation in the abovementioned case.

HELD: No. The conduct of a preliminary investigation is primarily an executive function.Thus, the courts must consider the rules of procedure of the Department of Justice in conducting preliminary investigations whenever the actions of a public prosecutor is put in question. An examination of the 2008 Revised Manual for Prosecutors of the Department of Justice-National Prosecution Service31 (DOJ-NPS Manual), therefore, is necessary. The pertinent provisions of the DOJ-NPS Manual are as follows:

J. PREPARATION OF THE RESOLUTION

x xxx 3. Documents to be Attached to the Information An information that is filed in court shall, as far as practicable, be accompanied by a copy of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor, the complainants affidavit, the sworn statements of the prosecutions witnesses, the respondents counter-affidavit and the sworn statements of his witnesses and such other evidence as may have been taken into account in arriving at a determination of the existence of probable cause. L. ACTION OF THE CHIEF STATE/REGIONAL STATE/PROVINCIAL OR CITY PROSECUTOR ON THE RECOMMENDATORY RESOLUTION The Chief State/Regional State/Provincial or City Prosecutor concerned shall act on all resolutions within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, extendible for another thirty (30) days in cases involving complex issues and/or heavy workload of the head of office, by either: x xxx 3. Reversing the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor, in which case, the Chief State/Regional State/Provincial or City Prosecutor: a. may file the corresponding Information in

court (except the Regional State Prosecutor); or

b. direct any other state prosecutor or assistant prosecutor, as the case may be, to do so.

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In both instances, there is no more need for the head of office concerned to conduct another preliminary investigation.

We find that there is nothing in the DOJ-NPS Manual requiring the removal of a resolution by an investigating prosecutor recommending the dismissal of a criminal complaint after it was reversed by the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor. Nonetheless, we also note that attaching such a resolution to an information filed in court is optional under the aforementioned manual. The DOJ-NPS Manual states that the resolution of the investigating prosecutor should be attached to the information only "as far as practicable."Thus, such attachment is not mandatory or required under the rules. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent erred in insisting on the production of the Jarder Resolution when all other pertinent documents regarding the preliminary investigation have been submitted to his court, and in going so far as to motuproprio initiating a proceeding for contempt against complainant.

RULE 112 PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

FENEQUITO vs VERGARA 677 Scra 113

Preliminary Investigation Facts: Vergara filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents against petitioners Fenequito et al. before the City Prosecutor. Finding probable cause, the City Prosecutor filed an Information for falsification of public documents against petitioners with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila. Petitioners Fenequito et al filed a Motion to Dismiss the Case Based on Absence of Probable Cause. The MeTC issued an Order dismissing the case on the ground of lack of probable cause. Aggrieved, Vergara, with the express conformity of the public prosecutor, appealed the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.The RTC rendered judgment setting aside the Order of the MeTC and directing the said court to proceed to trial. Petitioners Fenequito et al then elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review.The CA however rendered a resolution dismissing the petition. It ruled that the Decision of the RTC is interlocutory in nature and, thus, is not appealable. Petitioners Fenequito filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it.

Issue: (Main issue here is whether the RTCs decision is interlocutory in nature and thus not appealable. SC said it is interlocutory in nature) But for purposes of our discussion, in this case the SC only defined what probable cause is. Held. Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. In the instant case, the Court finds no justification to depart from the ruling of the RTC that the offense charged was committed and that herein petitioners are probably guilty thereof.

BURGUNDY REALTY CORPORATION vs. Reyes G.R. No. 181021

December 10, 2012 (Probable Cause)

Facts: Sometime in 1996, Herein private respondent Josefa "Jing" Reyes offered her services to Petitioner (BURGUNDY REALTY CORPORATION) to be the latter's real estate agent in buying parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, which are to be developed into a golf course. She informed petitioner that more or less ten (10) lot owners are her clients who were willing to sell their properties. Convinced of her representations, petitioner released the amount of P23,423,327.50 in her favor to be used in buying those parcels of land. Reyes, instead of buying those parcels of land, converted and misappropriated the money given by petitioner to her

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personal use and benefit. Petitioner sent a formal demand for Reyes to return the amount of P23,423,327.50, to no avail despite her receipt of the said demand. As such, petitioner filed a complaint for the crime of Estafa against Reyes before the Assistant City Prosecutor's Office of Makati City. (Defense) Reyes, while admitting that she acted as a real estate agent for petitioner, denied having converted or misappropriated the involved amount of money. She claimed that the said amount was used solely for the intended purpose and that it was petitioner who requested her services in procuring the lots. According to her, it was upon the petitioner's prodding that she was constrained to contact her friends who were also into the real estate business, including one named Mateo Elejorde. She alleged that prior to the venture, Mateo Elejorde submitted to her copies of certificates of title, vicinity plans, cadastral maps and other identifying marks covering the properties being offered for sale and that after validating and confirming the prices as well as the terms and conditions attendant to the projected sale, petitioner instructed her to proceed with the release of the funds. Thus, she paid down payments to the landowners through Elejorde. Meanwhile, Reyes received information that her sub-broker Mateo Elejorde had been depositing the involved money entrusted to him under his personal account. On March 28, 2000, through a board resolution, petitioner allegedly authorized Reyes to institute, proceed, pursue and continue with whatever criminal or civil action against Mateo Elejorde, or such person to whom she may have delivered or entrusted the money she had received in trust from the firm, for the purpose of recovering such money. Thus, Reyes filed a complaint for the crime of estafa against Mateo Elejorde. After a preliminary investigation was conducted against Reyes, the Assistant Prosecutor of Makati City recommended that respondent be indicted of the crime of Estafa defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code. Thereafter, an Information for the crime of Estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) was filed against Reyes. Undeterred, Reyes filed a petition for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), but it was dismissed by the Secretary of Justice. Aggrieved, Reyes filed a motion for reconsideration which was later on granted by another Secretary of Justice, Raul Gonzalez. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by the Secretary of Justice in a Resolution dated December 14, 2006. Eventually, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA. The latter, however, affirmed the questioned Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice.

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA in a Resolution dated December 20, 2007, petitioner filed the present petition; ISSUE: WON CA seriously erred in not finding that the DOJ Secretary, Raul Gonzalez Capriciously, Arbitrarily and Whimsically disregarded the evidence on record showing the (existence) of Probable Cause against Private Respondent for ESTAFA under Art. 315 (b) of the RPC. HELD: It must be remembered that the finding of probable cause was made after conducting a preliminary investigation. A preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a case. Its purpose is to determine whether (a) a crime has been committed; and (b) whether there is a probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. The Court need not overemphasize that in a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. The complainant need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties' evidence. Precisely, there is a trial to allow the reception of evidence for both parties to substantiate their respective claims. A review of the records would show that the investigating prosecutor was correct in finding the existence of all the elements of the crime of estafa. Reyes did not dispute that she received in trust the amount of P23,423,327.50 from petitioner as proven by the checks and vouchers to be used in purchasing the parcels of land. Petitioner wrote a demand letter for Reyes to return the same amount but was not heeded. Hence, the failure of Reyes to deliver the titles or to return the entrusted money, despite demand and the duty to do so, constituted prima facie evidence of misappropriation. PETITION GRANTED.

HEIRS OF THE LATE NESTOR TRIA vs ATTY. EPIFANIA OBIAS

G.R. No. 175887 Nov. 24, 2010

WHO MAY CONDUCT P.I. FACTS:

On May 22, 1998, at around 10:00 AM at the Pili Airport in Camarines Sur, Engr. Nestor Tria, Regional Director of the DPWH, Region V and

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concurrently Officer-In-Charge of the 2nd Engineering District of Camarines Sur, was shot by a gunman on his nape while waiting to board his flight to Manila, then causing his death. The incident was investigated by the NBI. Eventually, NBI recommended to the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur the indictment of Roberto Obet Aclan y Gulpo, Juanito Totoy Ona y Masalonga and Atty. Epifania Fanny Gonzales-Obias, for the murder of Engr. Tria.

During the preliminary investigation conducted

by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, respondent filed her Counter-Affidavit denying involvement in the killing of Engr. Tria and that the NBI has not established prima facie the existence of conspiracy as to implicate her in the death of Engr. Tria.

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur issued a resolution directing the filing of an information for murder against Aclan and Ona but dismissing the case for insufficiency of evidence as against Atty. Epifania Obias. Petitioners appealed to the DOJ. On January 25, 2000, then Justice Secretary Serafin Cuevas issued a Resolution modifying the resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor and directing the latter to include respondent in the information for murder filed against Aclan and Ona. Respondent, Aclan and Ona filed a MR of the DOJs resolution. The MR was denied. In the meantime, the information charging Aclan and Ona has already been filed with the RTC of Pili, Camarines Sur. Upon request however, the venue was transferred to the RTC Quezon City. In October 2001, the prosecution filed with the RTC Quezon City a Motion to Admit Amended Information to include respondent as one of the accused for the murder of Tria.

Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the

DOJ. The DOJ denied it on the ground that pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 1266, as amended by Memorandum Circular No. 58, appeals to the OP where the penalty prescribed for the offense charged is reclusion perpetua to death, shall be taken by petition for review. Respondent filed a MR but the same was denied. The DOJ opined that the proper procedure is the filing of an appeal or petition for review with the OP and not before the DOJ. Hence, the case was considered closed and terminated. Respondent later on filed a notice of appeal before the OP.

On January 28, 2002, the RTC QC issued an

order admitting the amended information which includes respondent. The latter then filed with the RTC a MR with Prayer for the Suspension of the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest.

In his Order dated March 24, 2004,

Presidential Assistant Manuel C. Domingo granted respondents motion for reconsideration and reversed the DOJ resolutions. The OP concluded that there was no interlocking circumstantial evidence of respondents acts before, during and after the killing of

Engr. Tria that would establish conspiracy among Aclan, Ona and respondent to commit the crime. Accordingly, the case against respondent was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Petitioners filed a MR which was denied by the OP. Before the CA, petitioners filed a petition for mandamus/certiorari under Rule 65. CA denied the petition. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the non-referral by the OP to the DOJ of the motion for reconsideration of respondent, in the exercise of its discretion, violated petitioners right to due process. No. HELD:

Petitioners argument that the non-referral by the OP to the DOJ of the appeal or motion for reconsideration filed by the respondent had deprived them of the opportunity to confront and cross-examine the witnesses on those affidavits belatedly submitted by the respondent is untenable. Under the procedure for preliminary investigation provided in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, in case the investigating prosecutor conducts a hearing where there are facts and issues to be clarified from a party or witness, [t]he parties can be present at the hearing but without the right to examine or cross-examine. They may, however, submit to the investigating officer questions which may be asked to the party or witness concerned. Hence, the non-referral by the OP to the DOJ of the motion for reconsideration of respondent, in the exercise of its discretion, did not violate petitioners right to due process.

We reverse the OPs ruling that the totality of evidence failed to establish a prima facie case against the respondent as a conspirator in the killing of Engr. Tria. To begin with, whether or not respondent actually conspired with Aclan and Ona need not be fully resolved during the preliminary investigation. The absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and involves evidentiary matters. The same is better left ventilated before the trial court during trial, where the parties can adduce evidence to prove or disprove its presence.

Preliminary investigation is executive in

character. It does not contemplate a judicial function. It is essentially an inquisitorial proceeding, and often, the only means of ascertaining who may be reasonably charged with a crime. Prosecutors control and direct the prosecution of criminal offenses, including the conduct of preliminary investigation, subject to review by the Secretary of Justice. The duty of the Court in appropriate cases is merely to determine whether the executive determination was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless made with grave abuse. We find no such grave abuse when the Secretary of Justice found probable cause to charge the respondent with murder in conspiracy with Aclan and Ona.

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GERLIE M. UY and MA. CONSOLACION T. BASCUG, complainants, vs. JUDGE ERWIN B. JAVELLANA,

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, LA CASTELLANA, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, respondent.

A.M. No. MTJ-07-1666. September 5, 2012.* (Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 05-1761-MTJ)

The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not provide for a preliminary investigation prior to the filing of a criminal case under said Rule. A criminal case within the scope of the Rule shall be commenced in the following manner: SEC. 11. How commenced.The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information; Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio. The complaint or information shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and of his witnesses in such number of copies as there are accused plus two (2) copies for the courts files. If this requirement is not complied with within five (5) days from date of filing, the case may be dismissed. Facts: This administrative case arose from a verified complaint1 for gross ignorance of the law and procedures, gross incompetence, neglect of duty, conduct improper and unbecoming of a judge, grave misconduct and others, filed by . Atty. Uy and Atty.bBascug of the Public Attorneys Office against Presiding Judge Erwin B. Javellana of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), La Castellana, Negros Occidental. Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug alleged the following in their complaint among others: First, Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. (a) In Crim. entitled People v. Cornelio, for Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana issued a warrant of arrest after the filing of said case despite Section 16 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure; (b) In Crim. , entitled People v. Celeste, et al., for Trespass to Dwelling, Judge Javellana did not grant the motion to dismiss for non-compliance with the Lupon requirement under Sections 18 and 19(a) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, insisting that said motion was a prohibited pleading; (c) In Crim. entitled People v. Lopez, et al., for Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana did not apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and, instead, conducted a preliminary examination and preliminary investigation in accordance with the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, then set the case for arraignment and pre-trial, despite confirming that therein complainant and her witnesses had no personal knowledge of the material facts alleged in their affidavits, which should have been a ground for dismissal of said case.

Judge Javellana asserted that he was not grossly ignorant of the rules of procedure and explained his actions in particular cases:

(a) In People v. Cornelio, Judge Javellana issued a warrant of arrest for the two accused charged with Malicious Mischief in the exercise of his judicial discretion, and the necessity of holding the accused in detention became evident when it was revealed during trial that the same accused were wanted for Attempted Homicide in Crim. Case No. 04-096; (b) In People v. Celeste, et al., Judge Javellana insisted that referral of the dispute (involving an alleged Trespass to Dwelling) to the Lupong Tagapamayapa was not a jurisdictional requirement and the Motion to Dismiss on said ground was a prohibited pleading under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure; (c) In People v. Lopez, et al. another case for Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana reiterated that a motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and added that he could not dismiss the case outright since the prosecution has not yet fully presented its evidence. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its report dated January 2, 2006, found Judge Javellana liable for gross ignorance of the law or procedure when he did not apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure in cases appropriately covered by said Rule. Issues: 1.WON the judge was correct in issuing a warrant of arrest against the accused charged with malicious mischief? 2. WON referral to Lupon is jurisdictional 3. WON preliminary investigation is required in

Summary Procedure cases? Held: 1. No. The crime of malicious mischief is committed by any person who deliberately causes damage to the property of another through means not constituting arson. There are special cases of malicious mischief which are specifically covered by Article 328 of the Revised Penal Code. Without any showing that the accused in People v. Cornelio and People v. Lopez, et al. were charged with the special cases of malicious mischief particularly described in Article 328 of the Revised Penal Code, then Article 329 of the same Code should be applied. If the amounts of the alleged damage to property in People v. Cornelio and People v. Lopez, et al., P6,000.00 and P3,000.00, respectively, are proven, the appropriate penalty for the accused would be arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods which under Article 329(a) of the Revised Penal Code, would be imprisonment for two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) months. Clearly, these two cases should be governed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Judge Javellanas issuance of a Warrant of Arrest for the accused in People v. Cornelio is in violation of Section 16 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, categorically stating that [t]he court shall not order the arrest of the accused except for failure to appear whenever required. Judge Javellana never claimed that the accused failed to appear at any hearing. His justification that the accused was wanted for the crime of attempted homicide, being tried in another case, is

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totally unacceptable and further indicative of his ignorance of law. People v. Cornelio, pending before Judge Javellanas court as Crim. Case No. 04-097, is for malicious mischief, and is distinct and separate from Crim. Case No. 04-096, which is for attempted homicide, although both cases involved the same accused. Proceedings in one case, such as the issuance of a warrant of arrest, should not be extended or made applicable to the other. 2. Yes. Judge Javellana committed a blatant error in denying the Motion to Dismiss filed by the accused in People v. Celeste, et al. and in insisting that said Motion was a prohibited pleading, even though the case was never previously referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa as required by Sections 18 and 19(a) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. The pertinent provisions of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure read: Sec. 18. Referral to Lupon.Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 where there is no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after such requirement shall have been complied with. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the accused was arrested without a warrant. Sec. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions.The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule: (a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding section. We see no ambiguity in the aforequoted provisions. A case which has not been previously referred to the Lupong Taga pamayapa shall be dismissed without prejudice. A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to comply with the Lupon requirement is an exception to the pleadings prohibited by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Given the express provisions of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, we find irrelevant Judge Javellanas argument that referral to the Lupon is not a jurisdictional requirement. 3. No. The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not provide for a preliminary investigation prior to the filing of a criminal case under said Rule. A criminal case within the scope of the Rule shall be commenced in the following manner: SEC. 11. How commenced.The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information; Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio. The complaint or information shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and of his witnesses in such number of copies as there are accused plus two (2) copies for the courts files. If this requirement is not complied with within five (5) days from date of filing, the case may be dismissed.

SEC. 12. Duty of Court. (a) If commenced by complaint.On the basis of the complaint and the affidavits and other evidence accompanying the same, the court may dismiss the case outright for being patently without basis or merit and order the release of the accused if in custody. (b) If commenced by information.When the case is commenced by information, or is not dismissed pursuant to the next preceding paragraph, the court shall issue an order which, together with copies of the affidavits and other evidence submitted by the prosecution, shall require the accused to submit his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as any evidence in his behalf, serving copies thereof on the complainant or prosecutor not later than ten (10) days from receipt of said order. The prosecution may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after receipt of the counter-affidavits of the defense. Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure only requires that a preliminary investigation be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to the fine. As has been previously established herein, the maximum penalty imposable for malicious mischief in People v. Lopez, et al. is just six (6) months. Judge Javellana did not provide any reason as to why he needed to conduct a preliminary investigation in People v. Lopez, et al. We stress that the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of cases. Judge Javellana cannot be allowed to arbitrarily conduct proceedings beyond those specifically laid down by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, thereby lengthening or delaying the resolution of the case, and defeating the express purpose of said Rule.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

ALEJANDRO C. VALENCIA, Accused-Appellant. G.R. Nos. 94511-13

September 18, 1992

Facts: Arlyn Barredo-Jimenez, her two children,

Annabelle and Samuel, Jr., aged five and three, respectively, and her mother, are residents of 2008 F. Muoz St., Paco, Manila. At about 9:00 p.m. of March 19, 1989, as she was about to eat supper, she noticed Alejandro standing five steps away from the open door of her house and holding a sumpak, a homemade shotgun. Seized with fear, she closed the door. After a few moments, she heard a burst of gunfire. This was followed by cries of pain from her children inside the house. Seeing her children bloodied, she immediately went outside and shouted for help. As she did so, she saw appellant running away, carrying the sumpak. Two

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neighbors assisted Jimenez in bringing the injured children to the Philippine General Hospital.

Early next morning, the three policemen were led by Rolando Valencia to the residence of Sonia Castillo, Alejandros aunt, where he believed was sleeping. The police apprehended appellant there and took him to the Ong Detachment for initial investigation He was indorsed to the police headquarters for further investigation in the evening of March 22, 1989. At 12:20 a.m. of the following day, one of the injured children, Annabelle, died as a result of the gunshot wounds she suffered. The other child, Samuel Jr., who was shot in the right forearm, was discharged from the hospital one week after the incident, but needed two (2) more weeks for healing. On March 30, 1989, two Informations for Homicide and Frustrated Homicide, were filed against Alejandro Valencia. When arraigned, the accused-appellant pleaded "Not Guilty." Trial then proceeded resulting in accused-appellants conviction as above stated.

On appeal, Accused-appellant raised as errors of the trial court, among others in finding that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the defendant-appellant beyond reasonable doubt in spite of the fact that there was allegedly no preliminary investigation, and that no sufficient evidence exists proving his guilt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was unlawfully denied of preliminary investigation. HELD: A person who is lawfully arrested, without a warrant pursuant to paragraph 1(b), Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court 23 should be delivered to the nearest police station and proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. 24 Under said Section 7, Rule 112, the prosecuting officer can file the Information in court without a preliminary investigation, which was done in the accused-appellants case. Since the records do not show whether the accused-appellant asked for a preliminary investigation after the case had been filed in court, as in fact, the accused-appellant signified his readiness to be arraigned, the Court can only conclude that he waived his right to have a preliminary investigation, when he did, in fact, pleaded "Not Guilty" upon his arraignment.

JE T. A.

JE T. A.