12-20 Preparing for War_Final

POINTER, JOURNAL OF THE SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES VOL. 37 NO. 1

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Preparing for War: A Perspective on the Evolution of Warfare and Suggestions for the SAF

by CPT Yap Chin Teck, Daxson

Abstract:

Like any peacetime army, the SAF's foremost task is to be prepared for a future war. While learning from the multitude of currently ongoing confl icts is a viable strategy to staying prepared, the SAF needs to be discerning when it comes to drawing lessons from these confl icts, heeding and adopting only lessons that are relevant to her own context. This paper presents a perspective on the claim that the guerilla tactics and asymmetric warfare waged by insurgents in Afghanistan qualify as “Fourth Generation Warfare,” and uses this to highlight the importance that the SAF draws appropriate lessons from these confl icts. Solutions are also proposed to help mitigate the diffi culty of selecting relevant lessons to absorb into the SAF.

Keywords: Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), Insurgency, Globalisation, Zero-Casualty Warfare, Unmanned Technologies

armies. More ominously for the SAF, state-organised armies are fi nding it diffi cult to engage and defeat an enemy that is largely dispersed within the civilian population, has no tangible Centre-of-Gravity (CoG) and possesses a dubious moral compass that justifi es killing innocents. This is where the concept of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) gains its currency. It holds that modern warfare has evolved through three generations with two important trends. The fi rst is the growing dispersion of forces across

He who intends to build a good instrument of war must fi rst ask himself what the next war will be like.

– General Giulio Douhet, 19281

The foremost peacetime task of any military must be to prepare for a future war. Therefore, it is of existential importance to Singapore to anticipate what the future war will be like as defeat will mean the end of our statehood. What tools or frameworks, then, do we use to think about past warfare in order to predict the future? How should we think about what a future war will be like for the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF)?

One of the main ways that we can prepare for a future war is by studying contemporary confl icts. There are many to choose from: protracted involvements in Afghanistan and Iraq by the US military, the Somali civil war, the South Thailand insurgency and the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict are just a few cases that typify the landscape of battle today. This pattern of confl ict seems to point to the rise of non-state insurgents in confl ict with state

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the battlefi eld, and the second is a shift from head-on attrition warfare to attacking an enemy's CoG wherever that might be.2 The structure of insurgent and terrorist organisations as dispersed, cell-based groups and their use of irregular tactics to defeat the political will of their opponents seem to validate this hypothesis and explain its growing popularity. However, there are problems with using this chronology of modern warfare as anything beyond a tool to spark discussion.

… state-organised armies are fi nding it diffi cult to engage and defeat an enemy that is largely dispersed within the civilian population …

In this essay, I intend to begin by making a balanced assessment of 4GW and caution against its use as an overarching framework for thinking about Singapore's strategic situation. Next, I will put forward a perspective of the evolution and landscape of warfare and highlight a trend in contemporary warfare that is relevant to the SAF. Finally I will conclude with several suggestions for the SAF.

WHAT EXACTLY IS 4GW? One of the fi rst problems that a student of

military strategy will face when studying 4GW is to fi gure out what exactly it means. William Lind fi rst proposed a fourth generation of warfare in 1989 when he wrote a short article about “The Changing Face of War” and sought to predict the future of warfare.3 He identifi ed technology and ideas as two potential drivers of a generational shift in warfare. The analysis of how technology impacts warfare is in the vein of Network-Centric Warfare (NCW)—small, high-tech forces networked together in a knowledge-based system of systems that enables them to act rapidly and decisively.4 His analysis on ideas relates to how a fourth-generation force will not rely on head-on attrition or manoeuvre warfare but rather extend the war beyond the battlefi eld and attack other CoGs in an attempt to collapse the enemy's will to fi ght. Lind argues that it is the potential interaction of these two factors that will render third generation armies

helpless and bring about a qualitative shift in warfare. This picture of 4GW, as originally intended, seems radically different from what we understand it to be today.

In fact, COL Dr. Frans Osinga can identify at least six 4GW authors, “all describing the phenomenon at various moments in slightly different terms, referring to emerging incidents, and expanding the meaning of the concept by the inclusion of some new elements gleaned from those incidents in the process.”5 This gradual, retrospective shifting of the goalposts makes it hard to give the concept credit for predicting the future. At present, the concept is used to characterise any asymmetric or irregular confl ict and it claims that modern warfare has evolved through three iterations culminating in the nation state's loss of its monopoly to wage war:

The fi rst generation of modern war was dominated by massed manpower and culminated in the Napoleonic Wars. The second generation, which was quickly adopted by the world’s major powers, was dominated by fi repower and ended in World War I. In relatively short order, during World War II the Germans introduced third-generation warfare, characterized by maneuver.

That type of combat is still largely the focus of U.S. forces ... [4GW is an] evolved form of insurgency [that] uses all available networks—political, economic, social, military—to convince the enemy’s decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefi t.6

MISREADING HISTORYThis reading of modern history implies that

these developments occurred linearly with each generation of warfare evolving as a direct response to its predecessor and culminating in the 'evolved insurgency' of the fourth generation.7 If we are to accept the logic of evolution between the fi rst three generations, that of increased dispersion and improved technology, then surely the fourth generation should more closely resemble the technocratic vision of NCW.8 The claim that guerilla tactics is the 4G response to 3G manoeuvre warfare seems like an attempt to make history fi t the concept.



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First, insurgency as a way of waging war features prominently even in our 'modern’ era, pre-dating the so-called second and third generations of warfare. The Latin American Wars of Independence (early 19th century), the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71), the fi ght for independence by the American colonies were all classic examples of insurgency. Second, even if we accept that such a grand theory necessarily generalises to the dominant form of warfare, it is hard to make the link between 3G and 4G warfare. The Taliban and terrorist organisations in general have been using asymmetric tactics against militarily superior forces for centuries as a rational choice based on their strengths and limitations. They have superior local knowledge but do not have the fi repower or manpower to fi ght a conventional confl ict. It would be false to belatedly label their strategy as a response to WWII manoeuvre warfare.

This gradual, retrospective shifting of the goalposts makes it hard to give the concept credit for predicting the future.

4GW is also “guilty of trying to create too much coherence among disparate events, incidents, localized developments and factions.”9 Most terrorist or insurgent organisations actually have very specifi c local grievances and limited geographical reach. Their motivations might be similar but communication and coordination between such groups, especially in cooperating against western states, are mostly exaggerated.10 When we attempt to model human activity such as war, we must take into account the fact that different actors will necessarily react, learn and anticipate in different ways. This means that while developments between the same actors may be predictable and linear to a certain degree, general statements about the evolution of military strategy cannot be extrapolated from a small sample of cases. It is more probable that the development of the landscape of warfare is uneven, dynamic and highly contextualised. This means that in most cases, the SAF must be very careful which parts of the debate on 4GW to heed and adopt. We must make a clear distinction between insights, so as to allow us to better understand other confl icts and insights that are relevant to our context.

IS 4GW REALLY NEW?Throughout history, terrorists, guerrillas and

non-state actors have always sought to erode the enemy's will to fi ght rather than destroying his means to fi ght. It is tempting to view WWI as nothing more than attrition warfare; however this overlooks the fact that the ultimate aim of battles such as the German offensive on Verdun in 1916 or their air raids on London in 1915 was to symbolically destroy the enemy's will to resist. Indeed this idea of striking at the enemy's will is a cornerstone of military strategy. Military theorists from Sun Tzu to Douhet have always emphasized understanding the adversary's psychological capacity to resist as key to defeating him.

Furthermore, the notion that ideological, global, and total war is a recent development is false. World War II featured a total war fought between nation-states based on ideological grounds. The argument that only the future of warfare will involve all elements of a nation's power—political, economic, social and military is bankrupt as this was already the case in all three preceding ‘generations’ used by 4GW advocates—the Napoleonic Wars, WWI and WWII.11

To be fair however, there is some truth to the idea of a new “evolved insurgency.”12 It is to be expected of any intelligent enemy to maximise any

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advantage and globalisation affords many benefi ts. It gives any insurgent group increased mobility, reach and access to an adversary's political will, bringing targets previously out of reach, such as civilian populations, onto the newly defi ned battlefi eld. LTA Edward Wee makes this argument well in 2005 when he outlines the “interactions, ironies and implications” of globalisation with transnational terrorism.13 While it is arguable whether this interaction necessitates a qualitative change in counter-insurgency tactics amounting to a generational shift, labelling this as 4GW risks obscuring and discarding analyses that have already been made.

If we view the rise of insurgency warfare as the evolution of guerilla tactics made possible by the advent of globalisation, then the issue is analytically simpler because there is a growing literature on counter-insurgency, peacekeeping and terrorism to consult. However, if we stay within the somewhat narrow tradition of 4GW, we risk overlooking solutions or comparable past events. There is a tendency for theories of war and strategy to “remove themselves from the realities of the historical record [which makes them] not only increasingly irrelevant but can at times positively dangerous.”14 More importantly, we must make the proper assessment of what variant of 4GW is relevant to Singapore's strategic context. Simply saying that asymmetric warfare is the predominant mode of warfare on the global stage does not mean that it is of strategic relevance to the SAF.

… the SAF must be very careful which parts of the debate on 4GW to heed and adopt.

Advocates will argue, though, that 4GW has given us sensible policy prescriptions and this is a point I readily concede. CPT Gareth Wong pointed out in 2006 several important areas that the SAF must beef up.15 First, the SAF has to master the information domain, and be cognizant of the impact that the mass media has on strategic outcomes. Second, he emphasizes the importance of studying the “cultural norms, values, institutions and modes of thinking in a given society that will help to shed light on the tactical, operational and

strategic psyche of any group.” Third, knowing that the enemy intends to defeat our will to fi ght, it is only logical that efforts be made to increase the resilience of the Singaporean society to a protracted and deadly confl ict. Finally, CPT Victor Ong, in 2008, suggested an increased need for the military to work with other arms of the government.16 If all elements of national power are to be harnessed, then surely the actions of various ministries must be coordinated.

These recommendations can all be seen as important counterweights to the heavily technocratic discussion on NCW and their relevance to the SAF's transformation journey is farther illuminated in light of the failure of the Rumsfeld Doctrine of digital war in Afghanistan and Iraq.17 It may well be the case that 4GW is a more effective vehicle for explanation than the existing literature on insurgency, and that it sparks discussion along the right lines. But in going forward, we must take care to be analytically rigorous in order to make policies that have fi rm foundations in logic and reality.

A COHERENT PERSPECTIVE

Therefore we ought to understand the landscape of warfare as a collection of actors with different characteristics, capabilities and motivations. These differences necessarily affect and determine the ends, ways and means of any confl ict.18 It is helpful to borrow the mental model of game theory and complex systems in thinking about how interactions between actors, nation states or otherwise, play out in the dynamic, non-linear system that is warfare. There is similar emphasis on the importance of processes such as reaction, learning and anticipation in predicting the form and substance of interactions between actors. We must also make an analytical distinction between exogenous and endogenous factors, i.e. factors that are external to the workings of the model and factors that are dynamically affected by choices and actions of the various actors. For instance, globalisation or technological advancements would be examples of exogenous factors that affect the capabilities of all actors and possibly change the nature of interactions.

Within this perspective then, the macro-evolution of warfare is really just the aggregation of the changes in each individual, a (mostly) independent



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interaction. Seen in this light, we would seldom expect to see a cohesive evolution of warfare since the weak linkages between disparate actors and regions make each confl ict highly contextual. Therefore in looking back on history, this casts a new light on supposed generational shifts in warfare— are we looking at the same actors? Did we overlook cases to the contrary? Did these shifts occur as a simultaneous response to a previous mode of war or did they result from an exogenous factor, such as the Industrial Revolution, for example?

… the macro-evolution of warfare is really just the aggregation of the changes in each individual threat set and capability …

All of this makes one subtle but important point: that history, seen simplistically in a linear time dimension, has little to teach Singapore and the SAF. Therefore it is more important to think about the SAF's context in specifi c relation to our constraints, that the macro-evolution of warfare is really just the aggregation of the changes in each individual threat set and capabilities, than to be mesmerized by the multitude of confl icts and discussions that are happening elsewhere in the world. The SAF must be much more selective of the types of confl ict which it studies, ensuring that it lays out precisely how the cases are relevant to its own situation.

ENDS, WAYS, MEANS

Having these same concerns, Dr Jack D. Kem writes about the United States military transformation as “requir[ing] full assessment of the geostrategic context for change, followed by linking the ends, ways, and means of war fi ghting.”19 Similarly, when we think about the SAF's transformation journey, we must be fully cognizant of not just our strategic context, but also clearly lay out the vision for Singapore post-confl ict (ends). Only then can we proceed to think about the concepts (ways) in order to effect said vision, and the resources (means) that we will need to enable these concepts.

The strategic end for any confl ict that the SAF fi ghts must surely include the survival of the state of Singapore—and it must be clear that this matters beyond the notion of military victory. We ought to realise that to recover and sustain the economy after what will surely be a bruising contest, we need to remain full, respected members of the international community. Singapore needs to remain fully plugged into the global economy because trade is our lifeblood. Our strategy for survival since independence has always centred on giving important nations a vested stake in our survival whether it be through our sea and air links, the businesses of their corporations or as a resource on ASEAN matters. Therefore it is paramount that we retain this global citizenship, and not be marginalized with moral condemnation or economic sanctions, by ensuring that in our conduct of war, we adhere to international law. We need to communicate clearly in the run-up to war that military action is the last resort, taken up only in self-defence, and show great discipline when we are compelled to utilise force.

If we can demonstrate our intention to prevent innocent casualties, retain the moral high ground, and uphold the same moral convictions of the developed world, then we not only gain a great deal of good will, but we also win legitimacy in an era where being perceived as 'just' is strategic victory. This legitimacy, reinforced by the news media, increases the likelihood that developed armies and UN forces will come to our aid and that in the event of any post-war internationally mediated negotiation with our adversaries, we would be favourably looked upon.

ON ZERO-CASUALTY WARFARE20

As we highlight this expectation from the international community that responsible actors in war seek to minimise the body count, it is useful to see this decreasing tolerance of death as an example of an exogenous factor because it does not arise in response to actions by other actors, and yet affects the strategic choices some actors make. There is much to discuss in terms of how it affects the way that the SAF operates, and how potential adversaries react and change their tactics based on the SAF being bound by this condition and constraint.



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No statute in international law demands that there be no casualties in armed confl ict. However, public sentiment demands that casualties, whether among members of the armed forces or among the civilian population, should be reduced to the maximum extent possible.21 What this means is that the sensor-shooter engagement loop will have to be lengthened in order to accurately verify the target. In many cases, this may mean making the less sound military decision—to hold fi re rather than risk unnecessary casualties—and this may reduce the operating tempo and lead to lost opportunities to gain military advantage.

This also puts greater demands on the SAF's ability to “[achieve] better, more consistent, and more accurate pictures to guide our military actions.”22 This translates to setting aside more money for the development or acquisition of high-resolution sensors to allow the “rapid deployment of forces armed with real-time intelligence to incisively respond to battlefi eld conditions with a minimum of casualties.”23 Besides reducing civilian casualties, we also need to protect members of our armed forces for the added reason that we have a fi nite and comparatively limited manpower base. One way we can do so is by adopting unmanned technologies in "dull, dirty, dangerous and demanding" mission areas.24 The SAF has already made strides in the deployment of unmanned aerial sensor platforms,

and has prototype unmanned ground vehicles for patrol, re-supply and even close fi re support missions.25 These are combat scenarios that typically incur high casualties and the inherent risk is near impossible to mitigate tactically.

We must, however, be mindful of a potential side effect as this effort to reduce casualties on both sides may reduce military effectiveness if not communicated properly. There might be a tendency for junior commanders to be overly cautious and lose the initiative in combat. This places more demands on the decision-making ability of leaders at all levels. It is therefore important that we simplify this task by communicating the intended strategic outcome along with inculcating the SAF core values as a guide for decision-making.

Small unit leaders will also be further taxed by the adversary's awareness of our desire to reduce casualties. We would expect an intelligent enemy state to take advantage of our caution and disperse some of their forces, adopting tactics of harassment and ambush, the purpose of which would be to make target verifi cation that much tougher while absorbing our forces into their strategic depth. Once entrenched, it is the SAF's worst-case scenario to be stuck in a tactical stalemate and face fi ghting a protracted war. This, coupled with tactics intended to infl ict deaths rather than achieve victory, is likely to chip away at our psychological resilience.

Gulf Of Aden Deployment



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SUGGESTIONSIt is undeniable that the mass media is more

pervasive than ever, giving it increased infl uence in shaping the perceptions of society. As others have shared, this makes it more important for the SAF to master this new dimension of war.26 But how exactly should we go about doing that? I believe that this battle to win legitimacy in the eyes of the world requires the SAF to be more transparent in our conduct of war, of course while maintaining operational security. In practical terms this would mean conducting daily media briefs about the conduct and progress of the campaign, much like how the US military is currently doing in Iraq. It would also mean giving the local and global media access to the combat zones, and to our commanding generals. This way, we will have greater control over the content and tone of the information that is released as well as create the perception that we are fi ghting a just and legitimate war.

… to win legitimacy in the eyes of the world requires the SAF to be more transparent in our conduct of war …

There is certainly concern that releasing such information gives our adversaries an edge in anticipating our movements and adopting strategies that blunt our stated intentions. Some argue that the NATO bombing campaign of Kosovo was hampered from the outset by Clinton's initial refusal to send ground forces, and in a similar way—if we communicate our strategic intent, our adversaries can choose their actions to greater effect.27 There are no easy solutions to this conundrum, as the balance between the priorities of winning the tactical battle and achieving strategic victory can only be struck when the situation demands it. The need to release more information, however, is unavoidable since the interviews, press releases, news articles, speeches and photos of the confl ict shape perceptions.

Beyond these tweaks in the way we conduct war, there also ought to be reform in the way that we think, study and talk about warfare. In addition to

drawing inspiration from the discourse happening in other militaries, we should also be actively discussing and publishing our combat experiences, especially in Operation Flying Eagle and our deployments in the Gulf of Aden. At present, the effort to educate junior offi cers about our achievements seems scripted and one-sided.28 While we must play up our achievements to domestic and foreign audiences, internally, at least, we must be honest and willing to share about the mistakes made and the lessons learnt. It is more dangerous to hold a consensus opinion that our operations have been unqualifi ed successes.

It is more dangerous to hold a consensus opinion that our operations have been unqualified successes.

There also seems to be a lack of interaction in the literature that is published by the SAF. For instance, the articles in the military journal POINTER or the annual CDF Essay Competition do not reference articles in previous issues. This manner of accumulating knowledge is suboptimal, because each subsequent generation begins their analysis from a blank slate rather than adding to the knowledge base built up over the years. There are a couple of obvious suggestions. In addition to the top prize winners, more essays from each year of the competition should be published in an effort to increase awareness of the breadth and depth of the SAF's collective thinking. Individuals should also be encouraged to engage each other on specifi c contemporary issues in order to advance the organisation's collective knowledge. A simple proxy of the depth of this conversation will be the number of times previous essays are cited, which currently seems very low. This is one way to develop a repository of wisdom and to allow for more original, critical clashes of perspectives.

CONCLUSIONThe task of preparing for a future war is more

diffi cult for the SAF because we have not experienced any war, and all the more critical because of our size and population density. Therefore how the SAF



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thinks about warfare and its evolution is vitally important so that we learn the right lessons from the experiences of others and make the right policy decisions. Models, frameworks and analysis made by foreign defence analysts implicitly assuming a different strategic context should not overly dominate what the SAF studies and how we think. We have to be analytically rigorous and generate original analysis based on our role and place in the global system. It is hoped that by adopting a more logical and coherent understanding of warfare based on strategic context, the SAF will ultimately be prepared for the right confl ict.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alberts, David S., John J. Gartska, and Frederick P. Stein. “Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority.” IWS – The Information Warfare Site. 1999. http://www.iwar.org.uk/rma/.

Broache, Anne. “Singapore military offi cials embrace drone aircraft.” Cnet News, 7 August 2007. http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9756395-7.html.

Echevarria, Antulio J. “Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths.” Strategic Studies Institute, November 2005. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/4gw-myths.pdf.

Goh Chin Lian. “No soldiers required for this vehicle: Prototype is among several machines being looked at by SAF.” The Straits Times, 12 February 2005.

Gray, Colin. Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and The Evidence of History. Great Britain: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002.

Hammes, Thomas X. “4th-generation Warfare: Our Enemies Play to Their Strengths.” Armed Forces Journal, November 2004.

Lambeth, Benjamin S. NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment. Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2001.

Lind, William S., Colonel Keith Nightengale (USA), Captain John F. Schmitt (USMC), Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (USA) and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR). “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation.” Marine Corps Gazette, October 1989.

Metzger, Louis S. and Donald R. Erbschloe. “Who's Got the Big Picture? - Single Integrated Air Picture, integration of air reconnaissance systems.” Aerospace Power Journal, Fall 2001.

CPT Ong Yan Zhi Victor, “On Fourth Generation Warfare: Implications to the SAF.” POINTER 35, no. 2 (2009)

COL Dr. Frans Osinga. “On Boyd, Bin Laden, and Fourth Generation Warfare as String Theory.” Air University, 2007. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/boyd/osinga_4gw_boyd_copyright2007.pdf.

Rogers, A. P. V.. “International Review of the Red Cross, No. 837.” International Committee of the Red Cross, 31 Mar 2000: 165-181. http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JQCU.

LTA Wee Wei Sheng, Edward. “Globalisation and Transnational Terrorism: Ironies, Interactions and Implications.” Ministry of Defence, 2005. http://www.mindef.gov.sg/mindef/publications/pointer/cdfessay/past/1stprize2005.html.

White, E.. "The French Revolution and the Politics of Government Finance, 1770–1815." The Journal of Economic History, 1995.

Maxwell, James. Daily Life during the French Revolution. Anderson Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007.

CPT Wong Wei Han, Gareth. “Beyond the Velvet Curtain of Transformation - How the Future of Warfare will be Shaped.” POINTER 33, no. 3 (2007)

Woollacott, Angela. On Her Their Lives Depend: munitions workers in the Great War. University of California Press, 1994.

Yarger, H. Richard. “Towards A Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model.” US Army War College. https://dde.carlisle.army.mil/authors/stratpap.htm.

“Digital War: The Rumsfeld Doctrine.” Business Week, 7 April 2003. http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/.../b3827114 _mz029.htm.

National Coordination Offi ce for Networking and IT R&D. “Large Scale Networking (LSN) Coordinating Group Of the Interagency Working Group (IWG) for Information Technology Research and Development (IT R&D).” March 2001. http://www.nitrd.gov/subcommittee/lsn/lsn-workshop-12mar01/2-1.pdf.

ENDNOTES1. “Future studies & future confl ict studies,” USAF Center

for Strategy and Technology, 8 March 2011, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-futr.htm.

2. The Center of Gravity (CoG) is a concept developed by Carl Von Clausewitz in his seminal work On War. In Chapter Six, Clausewitz defi nes a CoG as "the hub of all power and movement upon which everything depends", indicating targets of great strategic importance that if destroyed will cripple the enemy.



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3. William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale (USA), Captain John F. Schmitt (USMC), Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (USA) and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR), “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” Marine Corps Gazette (October 1989): 22-26.

4. David S. Alberts, John J. Gartska, and Frederick P. Stein, “Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority,” IWS — The Information Warfare Site (1999), http://www.iwar.org.uk/rma/.

5. COL Dr. Frans Osinga, “On Boyd, Bin Laden, and Fourth Generation Warfare as String Theory,” Air University (2007): 1, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/boyd/osinga_4gw_boyd_copyright2007.pdf.

6. Thomas X. Hammes, “4th-generation Warfare: Our Enemies Play to Their Strengths,” Armed Forces Journal (November 2004): 40-44.

7. Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Fourth-Generations War and Other Myths,” Strategic Studies Institute (November 2005), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/4gw-myths.pdf

8. Ibid., 14.

9. Osinga, op. cit., 18.

10. Osinga, op. cit., 18.

11. E. White "The French Revolution and the Politics of Government Finance, 1770–1815," The Journal of Economic History (1995): 244; James, Maxwell, Daily Life during the French Revolution (Anderson Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007), 211; Angela Woollacott, On her their lives depend: munitions workers in the Great War (University of California Press, 1994), 90.

12. Hammes, op. cit.

13. LTA Wee Wei Sheng, Edward, “Globalisation and Transnational Terrorism: Ironies, Interactions and Implications,” Ministry of Defence, 2005, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/pointer/cdfessay/ past/1stprize2005.html

14. Gray, Colin, Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and The Evidence of History (Frank Cass Publishers, 2002).

CPT Daxson Yap is currently a Mission Commander in 165 SQN. An Air Warfare Offi cer (GBAD) by vocation, he previously served as a Platoon Commander in 18 DA Bn. CPT Daxson holds a BSc (1st Class Hons) in Mathematics and Economics from the London School of Economics and Political Science, and an MA in Statistics from Columbia University, USA. CPT Daxson is a recipient of the SAF Overseas Scholarship.

15. CPT Gareth Wong Wei Han, “Beyond the Velvet Curtain of Transformation - How the Future of Warfare will be Shaped,” POINTER 33, no. 3 (2007).

16. CPT Ong Yan Zhi Victor, “On Fourth Generation Warfare: Implications to the SAF,” POINTER 35, no. 2 (2009).

17. “Digital War: The Rumsfeld Doctrine,” Business Week, 7 April 2003, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/.../b3827114_mz029.htm.

18. H. Richard Yarger, “Towards A Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model,” US Army War College: 6-8, https://dde.carlisle.army.mil/authors/stratpap.htm.

19. Ibid.

20. A. P. V. Rogers, “International Review of the Red Cross No. 837,” International Committee of the Red Cross (31 March 2000): 165-181, http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JQCU.

21. Ibid.

22. Louis S, Metzger and Donald R. Erbschloe, “Who‘s Got the Big Picture? - Single Integrated Air Picture, integration of air reconnaissance systems,” Aerospace Power Journal (Fall 2001).

23. National Coordination Offi ce for Networking and IT R&D, “Large Scale Networking (LSN) Coordinating Group Of the Interagency Working Group (IWG) for Information Technology Research and Development (IT R&D),” March 2001, http://www.nitrd.gov/subcommittee/lsn/lsn-workshop-12mar01/2-1.pdf.

24. Anne Broache, “Singapore military offi cials embrace drone aircraft,” Cnet News, 7 August 2007, http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9756395-7.html.

25. Goh Chin Lian, “No soldiers required for this vehicle: Prototype is among several machines being looked at by SAF,” The Straits Times, 12 February 2005, H6.

26. CPT Gareth Wong, op. cit.

27. Benjamin S Lambeth, NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2001), 44.

28. This is the author's opinion.


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12-20 Preparing for War_Final