CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATES 18470 December 13, 1995the President to waive the funding re-strictions if he determined UnitedStates citizens were being held as pris-oners of war in Cambodia by NorthVietnam or the Viet Cong. This amend-ment failed. Believe it or not, theamendment failed by 36 to 54, and Coo-per-Church passed, but only after troopwithdrawal had begun.

Mr. President, while I understand op-position to and disagreement with thePresident’s decision to send Americanground forces to Bosnia, I believe thataction to cut off funds for this deploy-ment is wrong. It is wrong because itmakes our brave young men andwomen bear the brunt of a decision notmade by them, but by the Commanderin Chief.

I will vote against H.R. 2606, spon-sored by Representative HEFLEY, whichwas passed by the House last month.H.R. 2606 prohibits any use of Depart-ment of Defense funds for deploymentof United States Armed Forces on theground in Bosnia participating in theNATO implementation force—unlesssuch funds have been specifically ap-propriated by subsequent law. Therehas been no appropriation for this oper-ation, so the effect would be to cut offfunds to our troops who are on the wayor already on the ground in Bosnia. Ido not believe we should limit thefunds for food, supplies, and ammuni-tion for our troops. It was wrong dur-ing Vietnam, and it is wrong now.

I believe that passing the Hefley res-olution would undermine our troops, aswell as our credibility.

I believe that even at this late date,the Congress can play a constructiverole—supporting the troops by enhanc-ing their prospects for a timely andsafe withdrawal, and ensuring thatthere is a military balance upon the de-parture of our forces.

President Clinton does not have anexit strategy for our troops. Let us beclear: A date is not an exit strategy. Inmy view, it would be irresponsible tosend thousands of American forces inwithout a concrete plan to bring themout. We will be debating that at a latertime.

Furthermore, we need to do what wecan to make certain that the sacrificesbeing made now—by our men andwomen in uniform, by the U.S. tax-payer—are not for nought. It would beinexcusable to undertake this immenseendeavor, only to leave Bosnia, a yearlater, in the same situation it is innow—virtually defenseless and at themercy of its bigger and stronger neigh-bors.

Later today, we will have an oppor-tunity to vote on the Hutchison-Inhofeand Dole-McCain resolutions. Now, weshould speak decisively in support ofour troops and defeat H.R. 2606.

This is not the way to go—cutting offfunds. As I have said, in all the debatesthat I have engaged in, these are therecords of my votes between 1969 and1973. It never seemed appropriate forme, when you had young men like JOHNMCCAIN, a prisoner of war, that we

would cut off funds in the U.S. Con-gress, and I still have that same atti-tude today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Thequestion now occurs on H.R. 2606. Thequestion is: Shall the bill pass?

The yeas and nays have been ordered.The clerk will call the roll.The legislative clerk called the roll.The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.

CAMPBELL). Are there any other Sen-ators in the Chamber who desire tovote?

The result was announced, yeas 22,nays 77, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 601 Leg.]

YEAS—22

BrownCampbellCraigD’AmatoDomeniciFairclothFeingoldGramm

GrassleyGreggHatfieldHelmsInhofeKempthorneKylMurkowski

NicklesPresslerSmithThomasThompsonWarner

NAYS—77

AbrahamAkakaAshcroftBaucusBennettBidenBingamanBondBoxerBradleyBreauxBryanBumpersBurnsByrdChafeeCoatsCochranCohenConradCoverdellDaschleDeWineDoddDoleDorgan

ExonFeinsteinFordFristGlennGortonGrahamGramsHarkinHatchHeflinHollingsHutchisonInouyeJeffordsJohnstonKassebaumKennedyKerreyKerryKohlLautenbergLeahyLevinLiebermanLott

LugarMackMcCainMcConnellMikulskiMoseley-BraunMoynihanMurrayNunnPellPryorReidRobbRockefellerRothSantorumSarbanesShelbySimonSimpsonSnoweSpecterStevensThurmondWellstone

So, the bill (H.R. 2606) was rejected.Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I move to

reconsider the vote.Mr. DASCHLE. I move to lay that

motion on the table.The motion to lay on the table was

agreed to.

f

EXPRESSING OPPOSITION OF CON-GRESS TO PRESIDENT CLINTON’SPLANNED DEPLOYMENT OFGROUND FORCES TO BOSNIA

The Senate continued with the con-sideration of the concurrent resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-ate will now resume consideration ofSenate Concurrent Resolution 35, of-fered by the Senator from Texas, Mrs.HUTCHISON.

Mr. DOLE addressed the Chair.The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ma-

jority leader is recognized.Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unan-

imous consent the Senate resume con-sideration of Senate Concurrent Reso-lution 35 and it be in order for this Sen-ator to offer my Senate joint resolu-tion and that no amendments or mo-tions to commit be in order to eithervehicle.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is thereobjection? The Chair hears none, and itis so ordered.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, let me in-dicate that we now have had our firstvote. We would like to complete actionon the concurrent resolution authoredby Senators HUTCHISON, NICKLES, andothers and then have that vote veryquickly if we can. I know a lot of peo-ple want to talk, but I think it is gen-eral debate. We would also like to havethe vote on my joint resolution, theDole-McCain joint resolution, some-time, hopefully by 6 o’clock thisevening. So that gives us about 5 hoursof debate. We have already had a num-ber of Members, I would say about 20Members, each requesting from 10 min-utes to 15 minutes to 90 minutes.

Now, we are not going to be able toaccommodate everybody, or I hopethey can accommodate us, and I hopewe can, as much as we can, keep our re-marks limited to 5 or 7 or 8 minutes,because if I just add up these requests,this will take us beyond 6 o’clock,probably 7 or 8 o’clock. And I wouldsay as the Republican leader, we aretrying to accommodate the Presidentof the United States. So, hopefully, wewill have cooperation on both sides. Ithink the Senator from Texas wouldlike to have a vote about what, mid-afternoon, on her concurrent resolu-tion?

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President,yes, I would like to vote as early as wecan. I think most people are speakingin general terms so I think midafter-noon. And then I would like to see thefinal vote on yours around 5 so that theHouse could have the opportunity, ifthat is possible.

Mr. DOLE. We will do our best.Mr. DASCHLE addressed the Chair.The PRESIDING OFFICER. The mi-

nority leader is recognized.Mr. DASCHLE. Let me just add to

what the majority leader said. Obvi-ously, a lot of Senators wish to speak,for good reason, about this issue and onthese resolutions. I hope, though, thatwe could accommodate all Senatorswho wish to speak by shortening thelength of our statements to the extentthat it is practical to do so. Obviously,we will have more opportunities oncethe resolution passes to come to thefloor and continue this exchange and tocontinue to express ourselves.

But if we are going to allow everySenator an opportunity to speak, weare going to be constrained somewhatin the time allotted for each Senator.So I hope everyone will bear that inmind and cooperate to the extent it ispossible so that we can have a vote atthe earliest possible time.

I yield the floor.Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, we

need to get aunanimous consent on thenext sequence of speakers. I wish to dothat so that people know how to plantheir afternoon.

This is the second list after the onethat was agreed to earlier, and it wouldinclude Senator DEWINE, then FEIN-STEIN, then LOTT, then BIDEN, then

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S 18471December 13, 1995ASHCROFT, KOHL, HATFIELD, LEVIN,INHOFE, BYRD, FAIRCLOTH, WELLSTONE,D’AMATO, MURRAY, LEAHY, SIMON,BRADLEY, and NUNN, and there will beRepublicans between MURRAY, LEAHY,SIMON, BRADLEY, and NUNN. SenatorMURKOWSKI would be after SenatorBYRD. I ask unanimous consent that weput that order in place so that peoplecan begin to plan. And I urge, but donot ask for unanimous consent, thatpeople hold their remarks to 5 minutesso that everyone will have a chance,with the hope that we would be able tovote around midafternoon on theHutchison-Inhofe resolution and thenaround 5 on the Dole-McCain resolu-tion.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is therean objection? The Chair hears none,and the additional Senators will beadded to the list.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. I thank the Chair.Mr. EXON addressed the Chair.The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under

the previous order, the Senator fromNebraska [Mr. EXON] is recognized.

Mr. President, for the past fewweeks, military and civilian officialsfrom the administration have come toCongress to make the case as to whyUnited States ground troops must be acentral part of the international peace-keeping force that will go to Bosniafollowing the formal signing of theDayton peace accord this Thursday inParis. To date, I have withheld finaljudgment on the advisability of this ac-tion and kept an open mind to argu-ments on both sides of the debate. I lis-tened closely to President Clinton’s na-tional address on Bosnia and have dis-cussed, in both public and privateforum, some of my concerns with mem-bers of his cabinet and top military ad-visers. In addition, I have sought andreceived the advice of my constituentsin Nebraska, many of whom are mem-bers of the Armed Forces or have rel-atives in the services.

I have been impressed by the biparti-san leadership on this issue by Major-ity Leader BOB DOLE and SenatorMCCAIN. I support their bipartisanamendment.

The facts are that the President hasexercised his constitutional authorityto dispatch troops to Bosnia. What wedo by vote here today does not startnor can it stop troop deployment. It’s adone deal whether we like it or not.

I have carefully deliberated on thequestion of blessing or condemning thedeployment of American peacekeepersin Bosnia. I believe there is no moresolemn an action the President cantake or we as Senators can take orvote to endorse the process. The de-ployment of American men and womenoverseas into a potentially harmful en-vironment even though it is advisory,is a legislative action that requiresparticular care and a need for thought-ful introspection that is typically notrequired in the conduct of our day-to-day business. Let no one be under anyallusions, the collective voice of Con-gress on the issue of troops to Bosnia

along with the President’s decision asour Commander in Chief will havegreat historic significance, affectingnot only the short-term prospect ofpeace in the Balkans but also the long-term role of America in NATO and as aworldwide leader.

Some seem to believe that some of uswho have served our country in thepast by being placed in harm’s wayhave some special insight or superiorwisdom or license to be holier thanthou in these decisions. Our wartimeexperience provides us with just that—experience—but not necessarily apriviledged status in reasoned decision-making because of our past valor.

While the perils of participation inthe international peacekeeping force inBosnia are unquestionable, I believe areasonable case has been made for thedeployment of American troops there.

Once the three parties sign the peaceagreement in Paris on Thursday. Forme, the debate boils down to thiscentral question: By risking the safetyof American troops in the next year dowe avoid an even greater threat to ournational security interests and possibleloss of life in the future? That is ajudgment call. There is no certainty.The question is: Will this stitch in timesave nine?

If the United States was to renege onits promise by its President and con-stitutional Commander in Chief to join27 other nations in the NATO-ledpeacekeeping force, I am concerned theconsequences would be dramatic and ir-revocably harmful to the pursuit ofpeace and the furtherance of our secu-rity interests. If the United States doesnot followthrough with its commit-ment to provide one-third of theBosnian peacekeeping force, it wouldbe the end of American leadership inNATO, and likely the end of NATO it-self. NATO has been a stabilizing forcefor peace for 50 years. To pull the rugout from under it now at a time whena peace agreement has been brokeredthat will hopefully end a brutal 3-yearwar filled with ethnic cleansing, rape,mass executions, and torture would beunconscionable. To scuttle the agree-ment now would throw the region backinto the horrific morass of war, guar-anteeing more civilian deaths, morerefugees, more instability in Europe,and the very distinct possibility thatthe fighting will spread and soon en-snare other bordering nations, allies ofthe United States, into armed conflictwith one another. Opponents of thePresident’s policy are fond of delvinginto history to discuss centuries oldanimosities that exist between thewarring factions in Bosnia. Let us notconveniently skip over, however, thelessons of World War I and what hap-pens when one regional ethnic conflict,left unchecked, draws in other nations,which in turn brings still other nationsto arms. European incubation of WorldWar I and World War II eventually costus 522,000 deaths and 875,000 in militarycasualties. Whether or not we like it, itis clear what happens in Europe doesaffect us.

Bosnians, Serbians, and Croatianscame to Dayton because they soughtan end to the fighting. The peaceagreement reached in Ohio is theirpeace, not a peace that the UnitedStates or any other nation is imposingupon them. The Dayton agreement isquite clear about what is expected ofeach of the signatory parties. If theagreement is broken by any of thethree parties, we and the other peace-keeping nations are under no obliga-tion or commitment to remain in thattroubled country. More importantly,the military tasks required of ourtroops in Bosnia have been explicitlyset forth and can be accomplishedwithin 12 months, the 12-month time-frame set by the administration. Ourpeacekeeping troops will be in Bosniato assist in the separation of forcesalong a 4-kilometer demilitarized zoneof separation. We will assist in trans-ferring of territories as called for inthe Dayton agreement. We will bethere to break the cycle of violence andensure that all sides are living up tothe requirements of the Dayton accord.Our ground troops will not be in Bosniaas a police force. They will not beasked to disarm militias or move refu-gees or deliver aid. Nor will they be re-quired to perform many of the civiliantasks set forth in the Dayton agree-ment, such as economic reconstruc-tion, supervising new elections, orbringing about a military force balanceamong the three entities withinBosnia. These tasks will be performedby nongovernmental organizations andother nations. In short, the UnitedStates military mission in Bosnia isnarrow, specific, finite in length, and,most importantly, unencumbered byany limitations on American unit com-manders to preemptively strike at hos-tile forces and otherwise defend ourforces using whatever means necessary.

Secretary of Defense Perry, Chair-man of the Joint Chiefs, GeneralShalikashvili, Secretary of StateChristopher, and AmbassadorHolbrooke have gone the extra mile inmy opinion to spell out as best theycan all the intricacies of our involve-ment in the implementation force.Over many long congressional hearingsthey have detailed how our troops arebeing trained and prepared for mission,how and when the forces will enter theregion and the Tuzla Zone, the stepsinvolved with implementing the mili-tary tasks set forth in the peace agree-ment, the time line for transitioning topeace, and our exit strategy and haveall been spelled out. The administra-tion has been as forthcoming as pos-sible in addressing congressional con-cerns with respect to rules of engage-ment, the additive cost of the oper-ation, the command and control of ourforces, and so forth. The steps alsohave been spelled out that will betaken to bring about a balance of mili-tary power in the region once thepeacekeeping force is withdrawn.

Mr. President, no military operationis risk free. Even during peacetime, we

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATES 18472 December 13, 1995lose scores of men and women eachyear due to training mishaps and otherduty-related accidents. Life in theArmed Forces is inherently dangerous.Like law enforcement and firefighting,they are professionals. The professionof soldier is also a voluntary one, filledwith uncertainty and peril. That is thehistory of service to the United Statesof America. There are no guaranteesabout what will happen in Bosnia inthe next 12 months. With or withoutcongressional authorization, the Presi-dent of the United States, as our Na-tion’s Commander in Chief, has theconstitutional authority to committroops to the multinational operationin Bosnia. He has done that.

Over the past 3 years a large numberof Senators have taken to this floorand given an even greater number ofspeeches deploring the bloodshed inBosnia and the desperate need to dosomething—anything—to end the fight-ing, end the ethnic cleansing, end theraping, end the mass executions. Now,after years of handwriting, a window ofopportunity has presented itself to seethat the ceasefire becomes a peace andthat the peace, in turn, can matureinto lasting stability and the restora-tion of a nation figuratively and lit-erally bled dry. I hope that those sameSenators who called for action are nowready to get behind the President’s pol-icy. The reality is that for this processto succeed, our Nation’s leadership isessential. We cannot simply wish for ahappy ending in Bosnia. If we want theUnited States to continue to be theworld’s preeminent power, if we wantNATO to remain strong and relevantinto the 21st century, if we want to pre-vent the Bosnian war from rekindlingand potentially spreading into neigh-boring countries, then the UnitedStates cannot disengage itself andstand on the sidelines and act as a crit-ic.

Mr. President, preserving stability onthe European continent and strength-ening NATO is in America’s nationalsecurity interests. If it was not, thenwe should bring home the 100,000 Amer-icans we have stationed there, closedozens of bases, and cut our $264 billionnational defense budget by a healthypercentage. But I suspect that thosewho are critical of the President’s pol-icy would squeal loudly over such asuggestion. Well, Mr. President, youcannot have it both ways. If we do notwant to be the leader of NATO, then weshould withdraw our forces and cut ourdefense budget. If we want to stop theslaughter of innocent men, women, andchildren in Bosnia, we must be willingto act, even if it means assuming somerisks. The world’s problems are oftencomplicated. Sometimes it is too muchto expect antiseptic, risk-free solu-tions, because they are unreasonable.The alternative of isolationism is noalternative, in my opinion, and onlyguarantees our Nation greater prob-lems down the road. We are not declar-ing war, we are declaring peace in con-junction with 27 other countries send-

ing in peace-keeping forces at the invi-tation of the previous warring parties.If we were to renege now, Americawould lose its world respect and surelydarken and make more somber otherchallenges in the future that couldcome home to haunt us.

I urge support for the bipartisanamendment offered and led by the ma-jority leader and the Senator from Ari-zona.

Mr. President, I yield back the re-mainder of my time, and I yield thefloor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Underthe previous order, the Senator fromTennessee [Mr. FRIST] is recognized.

Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I rise todiscuss the issue of American troops inBosnia and Herzegovina. I respectfully,but strongly, disagree with the Presi-dent’s decision to deploy U.S. troopsthere. It was the wrong decision. And itis that decision that I will address inthe next few moments.

However, before I do, I want to makeit as clear as possible that I am 100 per-cent behind our troops now that thecommitment has been made and theprocess has begun to deploy them. Iwill support them and their efforts inevery way possible. I will work to seethat their mission is a narrow one, thatthe exit strategy is clearly defined, andthat they return home as quickly andsafely as possible.

There are several unsettling aspectsof the President’s plan to send troopsto Bosnia. They are questions that, inother circumstances, would have beenasked and answered during open andpublic congressional debate. Unfortu-nately, that debate has effectively beendenied to the American people by thePresident’s unilateral action in com-mitting American troops to foreignsoil. But I still think it is important toask these questions because, perhaps ifthey are asked this time, then nexttime they will be answered before wetake action.

The first question: Is this action inthe vital national interest of the Unit-ed States? Vital national interests canbe clearly and specifically defined.They include defense of U.S. territory,support of allies who are threatened,support of treaty obligations, or pro-tection of economic interests, inter-national waters or U.S. citizens in op-erations abroad. In other words, Mr.President, vital national interests areinterests clearly worth fighting anddying for.

I listened to much of the debate yes-terday and today and heard many ofmy colleagues address this very issue.Time and time again, the debate re-turned to the question of whether ourreasons for being in Bosnia would sat-isfy the mother or the father whose sonor daughter is killed there and whoturns to us directly and asks, ‘‘Why?’’

Like my colleagues, I have failed tohear a satisfactory answer. Some saybecause our credibility is at stake. Butis it truly our credibility or perhapsNATO’s credibility? Mr. President, I

believe the two may be very different,particularly in a post-cold-war world.

Others say, because without us therewill be no peace. But where have webeen for the last 3 years, and do wereally believe that we can create peaceamong people who do not want it? Dowe really believe that our presence for12 months—for 1 year—will suddenlymake the warring factions who havebeen at it for nearly 500 years suddenlyforget what they and their ancestorshave been fighting for and live asneighbors peacefully? I do not believeso. Mr. President, the situation inBosnia, no matter how tragic, does notequate to a vital national interest.

A second question: What is Congress’role under the Constitution in the de-termination to send combat troops intoa conflict such as the one we face inBosnia?

Certainly the President has the au-thority to deploy forces in situationsrequiring immediate action, especiallyin situations where vital national in-terests are threatened. But committing20,000 American troops to hostile terri-tory in an action where no vital U.S.interest is at stake, where there is noclearly defined goal or mission, wherethe factions have been warring for cen-turies, where the situation, since theinitialing of the peace agreement, hasclearly deteriorated and where casual-ties, by the administration’s own ad-mission, are certain, in my view, neces-sitated first a full and fair discussionbetween the executive branch and Con-gress. We owe that to the Americanpeople and particularly to the Amer-ican service men and women.

The need for an open debate on thismatter is further highlighted when wefocus on the peace accord that wasreached in Dayton. There are real ques-tions as to whether a bifurcatedBosnian state will survive or, more im-portantly, whether two separate politi-cal entities can function as one coun-try without the constant presence oftroops to keep the peace.

Even if the Bosnian conflict did in-volve the vital interests of the UnitedStates, I am concerned that the under-lying peace agreement is fundamen-tally flawed. Already we have seentowns burned, American flags burned,and demonstrations against the Day-ton accord because this is a forcedpeace. And, Mr. President, the factthat we are sending our troops to sup-port this imposed peace plan with littledebate in Congress and virtually nosupport from the American peopletroubles me greatly.

Third, and perhaps most impor-tantly, how can we prevent this situa-tion from occurring again in the fu-ture? Before that question can be an-swered, we must first understand howwe got to where we are. The slipperyslope upon which we have now em-barked began largely with the end ofthe cold war, when the world revertedto the ethnic, regional and subnationalviolence that characterized it beforethe rise of the bipolar world.

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S 18473December 13, 1995Unfortunately, at that time, America

failed to define adequately the role itwould play. Instead, we began a pat-tern of committing U.S. forces on hast-ily decided and hastily defined mis-sions of peace, of peacekeeping or,tragically, the potential quagmire ofpeacemaking without the advice, con-sent or even the confidence of the Con-gress and the American people.

In each instance, we have seen aPresident obligate funds and scarcemilitary resources and place U.S. liveson the line for missions well outsidewhat can reasonably be called the vitalnational interest. And in each in-stance, rosy administration projectionsand lofty humanitarian goals bear noresemblance to the outcome of the mis-sions. Just look at Somalia and Haititoday. They are sad mockeries of whatwe were promised they would becomeonce the most powerful military in theworld cleaned them up.

So we again face the question, How isit that we ultimately discover such aradical difference between the inten-tions and the outcome and that themission is murkier and the price toohigh?

In each and every instance, this dis-turbing and dangerous precedent hasbeen reinforced, making it ever morelikely that the pattern will be repeatedagain and again, with Congress offeringfewer and fewer objections under itsauthority under the Constitution.

It is very similar to the case wherebyStates’ rights fell by the wayside in thepush for a stronger and ever more pow-erful Federal Government.

In the absence of vital national inter-ests, a lack of clear mission has com-bined with the lack of support of theAmerican people, and we have faced aloss of American life. We have endedthese missions without reaching ourgoals, without achieving any sem-blance of peace and democracy, and atgreat cost to the real mission of ourArmed Forces: To be ready to defend,with overwhelming force and resolve,the real threats to our life, liberty, andwell-being—or those of our allies.Again, Mr. President, we need onlylook toward our recent experiences inSomalia and Haiti.

In each of these instances, UnitedStates and Presidential credibility isoffered as a reason such ill-conceivedinitiatives cannot be opposed. In thecase of Bosnia, the Congress and thepeople are not even given the oppor-tunity to approve or disapprove—butsimply to give our approval and com-ment after the fact. Some argue thatthis is the President’s prerogativeunder the Constitution, but it is not ashining moment in the life of Americandemocracy. We are asking America’sfinest men and women to face possibledeath for a commitment outside of ournational interests.

And finally, Mr. President, will wecontinue to commit our blood andtreasure to every cause which capturesthe moment, and which appeals to ourcollective sense of justice and compas-

sion? Or will we finally define our in-terests and our policies, so that when adangerous situation arises again—andit will—and when our credibility andvital national interests are truly onthe line, we will be fully prepared todefend them.

It’s an unfortunate and dangerouschapter in the life of our beloved de-mocracy, Mr. President, when we aretold it was inappropriate to ask thesequestions earlier, because the matterhad not been settled, and that is inap-propriate to raise them now, becausethe decision has already been made.

At what point do we have the chanceto answer those questions? When theyare placed before us, and when it maybe too late? The question then be-comes, Mr. President: At what pointwill Americans define American inter-ests? I think the time has come to an-swer these questions now—before weare faced with our next Bosnia.

I thank the chair and I yield thefloor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Underthe previous order, the Senator fromNevada is recognized.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, there is aunanimous-consent order already in ef-fect regarding the Senators who willspeak. I ask unanimous consent thatthe next grouping, following me, wouldbe, first, a Republican, and that namewill be supplied by the leader. Afterthat, Senator SARBANES, and then an-other Republican, and after that, Sen-ator KERRY of Massachusetts.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, as Membersof the Senate, the most important andreally solemn votes that we cast arethose which put at risk the lives ofAmerican servicemen and women.

I have long been concerned about theconflict in Bosnia and the potentialUnited States military role in endingthe conflict in Bosnia. Mr. President, Ihave stated on many occasions on thisfloor, and in various places in the Stateof Nevada, that I personally do not be-lieve that U.S. ground troops should becommitted to keep the peace in thiscenturies-old civil war in Europe. Butstill, Mr. President, I recognize that Iam not the Commander in Chief of thearmed services of the United States,nor does the President need congres-sional approval to dispatch U.S. troopson this type of a peace mission.

Mr. President, I am going to supportthe resolution that has been drafted bythe Senator from Arizona, the majorityleader, and the ranking member of theArmed Services Committee, SenatorNUNN. But I say that I support that res-olution, not because President Clintonis in office and is a Democrat. I wouldremind my colleagues, that I stoodhere and was the first Democrat topublicly support the Desert Storm op-eration in Iraq. I was standing here,and I received a call from then-Presi-dent Bush. I was getting ready to speakon the floor. I told him that he did nothave to ask me, I have already agreed.

So I am going to support this resolu-tion because I believe it is the rightthing to do, not because the Presidentis a Democrat. I would do the same fora Republican, as I have shown in thepast.

There comes a time that we in Con-gress, despite our opinions about aPresident’s prerogatives, must lay ourcriticisms aside. I have given plenty ofcriticism on this issue. This is a time,Mr. President, when, despite our opin-ions, we must lay our criticism aside.As I speak, troops are being deployedin Bosnia. As I speak, troops are ontheir way to Bosnia by train and air-plane and other vehicles. Whether thisBosnian peace agreement will be re-corded in the history books as the endof a centuries-old conflict remains tobe seen. In the meantime, the Presi-dent has made his decision, and I nowbelieve all Americans should stand be-hind those whose lives will be on theline in Bosnia.

A number of my colleagues havecited the war in Vietnam in theirstatements in opposition to the deploy-ment in Bosnia. I also would draw acomparison between the two situa-tions, but for a different reason. Thefine young men and women who riskedtheir lives and, in many cases, sac-rificed their lives in Vietnam had toperform their missions in the face ofenormous disagreement at home abouttheir presence overseas. They camehome to protests, and they came hometo anger. We should have learned bynow that dissent at home costs Amer-ican lives, because dissent encouragesthe enemy to kill Americans. Dissentat home costs American lives.

Our colleague, the distinguished sen-ior Senator from Arizona, understandswhat a blow that kind of civilian de-nunciation can mean to our militaryforces. His statements in this Chambergave me great pause, as I pondered thevote I must make relative to my ownpersonal misgivings. I commend Sen-ator MCCAIN, a war hero by any meas-ure, for the work he has done on thisresolution. I understand that in Ari-zona the vast majority of people thinkthe President’s decision is wrong. It isthe same in Nevada. Therefore, it givesme even more pause to think how dif-ficult this was for Senator MCCAIN, buthow right it was for Senator MCCAIN.

I also commend the distinguishedmajority leader for crafting a com-promise that gives congressional sup-port for the deployment of troops, butthat better clarifies and defines theU.S. mission and the criteria that willdetermine its success.

This mission must not fall into thetrap of what is known as mission creep,where an initial goal grows vague andextended. Our troops must go in with aclearly defined and achievable goal andcome out in a timely manner. This res-olution, the McCain-Dole-Nunn resolu-tion certainly does that.

I intend, I think, along with a num-ber of my other colleagues, to closelymonitor the progress of the United

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATES 18474 December 13, 1995States mission in Bosnia, to do itthroughout the year. I look forward tothe return of the American troops—hopefully before the year is out, cer-tainly by the time the year is up.

The commanders of NATO and theU.S. military leaders who trained ourtroops for the mission have takenevery step possible to ensure thetroops’ security, but we know it wouldbe naive to think there will be no cas-ualties and we will all grieve the loss ofeven one American life. But if there isany lesson we learned from Vietnam, itis that we cannot send Americantroops overseas with a denunciation oftheir mission.

I choose now to support the Dole-McCain resolution containing some de-fined parameters for American involve-ment rather than disagree with thePresident’s decision.

I was on the floor earlier today, rightbefore the first vote, when the major-ity leader made a statement. He clear-ly defined the resolution, and he talkedabout heroes. JOHN MCCAIN was one hementioned. He mentioned others. Butit was interesting to note that he didnot talk about himself.

We have in this Chamber some peoplewho have sacrificed a great deal for ourcountry. Senator MCCAIN, of course,was a prisoner of war in Vietnam for 6years, in solitary confinement for halfthat time. We have other people whosacrificed a great deal. Senator JOHNCHAFEE was a hero in the Second WorldWar and the Korean conflict. SenatorHEFLIN saw service in the SecondWorld War. Senator GLENN was a ma-rine pilot in the Second World War, inKorea, and then, of course, was an as-tronaut. We could go on and on withthe list of people who sacrificed a greatdeal who now are serving their countryin the U.S. Senate. But I think it is in-teresting to note Senator DOLE did nottalk about himself. He has sacrificed asmuch as anyone in the service to hiscountry. During the Second World War,he was wounded. He almost died.

So I think the record should reflectthe courage of Senator DOLE in spon-soring this amendment and draftingthis resolution. It would have beenvery easy for Senator DOLE—not onlythe majority leader but a Presidentialcandidate, who likely will be the Re-publican nominee for President nextyear—to have taken the easy way out.Would it not have been easy for him todemagog this issue and to be opposedto Bill Clinton? That would have beenthe easy thing for ROBERT DOLE to do,but he did not do that. It is because ofwhat he did and what Senator MCCAINdid that there are people like SenatorREID of Nevada, willing to swallow,maybe, a little bit of pride, and supportthis resolution about which these twomen, who are certifiable heroes, havesaid: Our troops are on their way there.Some of them are already there. It iswrong not to have this body supportthem in everything that they do whilethey are there.

So I want the record to reflect thefact that Senator DOLE in his state-

ment this morning did not mention hisown name. I understand that shows hu-mility, but I want the record to reflectthat of all the people who served in theU.S. Senate who have records of hero-ism in service in the military, to ourcountry, no record tops that of SenatorROBERT DOLE.

I do not want the men and womenwho go to Bosnia—not to make war butto support a peace—to wonder whetherthe American people support them,whether this Congress supports them,and whether this Senator from Nevadasupports them. I support them.

The holiday season is upon us. Mythoughts and my prayers are with thefamilies who will not be together thisyear because of this deployment. Wehave seen them interviewed on CNNand in other news stories, how they aregoing to spend Christmas away fromtheir wives and children and husbands.I commend the men and women whowill serve this Nation with honor andcourage in Bosnia. I do so with faithand hope in their ability to achievethis mission of bringing peace and sta-bility to Europe.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I have aunanimous-consent request I wouldlike to propound.

I ask unanimous consent to add tothe sequence that has presently beenplaced in the RECORD a RepublicanSenator; following that will be SenatorDODD; after that, a Republican Sen-ator; after that, Senator BRYAN; afterthat, a Republican Senator; after that,Senator DORGAN; after that, a Repub-lican Senator; after that, SenatorGLENN; after that, a Republican Sen-ator; after that, Senator HARKIN; afterthat, a Republican Senator, and afterthat, Senator LAUTENBERG.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.

Under the previous order, the Sen-ator from Pennsylvania, Senator SPEC-TER, is recognized.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, themost weighty factor in deciding how tovote on the Bosnian resolution is thatUnited States troops will be deployedin Bosnia regardless of what Congressdoes, since there are not enough votesto cut off the funding. In fact, the ad-vanced troops are already in Bosnia.Not only is the congressional votenondeterminative, but the debate hasbeen advanced and the votes expeditedin the expectation that there will besome show of congressional support tobolster our troops’ morale. Certainlywe should do that. So that with thetroops on the way and the congres-sional vote nondeterminative, all theCongress can do now is to make thebest of it.

After extensive discussions with myconstituents, my colleagues in the Sen-ate, and executive branch officials, it ismy view that the United States doesnot have a vital national interest inBosnia to justify sending United Statestroops there. When President Clintoncalled me, almost 21⁄2 weeks ago, seek-

ing my support, I asked the Presidentwhat was the vital United States na-tional interest. He responded by com-menting on the widespread killing.

I said I was very concerned about theatrocities, the mass killings and geno-cide, but asked him how that distin-guished Bosnia from Rwanda or othertrouble spots around the world. Presi-dent Clinton then warned about theconflict spreading to other nations ofCentral Europe.

I asked if that posed a securitythreat to members of NATO, whichwould activate our treaty obligationson the principle that an attack on oneis an attack on all. The President saidthat he was not basing the national se-curity interest on a treaty obligationon that issue.

In extended informal discussionswith colleagues, some Senators haveargued that a vital United States na-tional interest arises in a number ofcontexts. For example, some contendthat the stability of Central Europe isvital to U.S. security. Other Senatorshave said that an opportunity to in-volve Russia in the joint action withNATO rises to the level of a vital na-tional interest. Others say that there isa vital United States national interestin ousting the Iranians from Bosnia, sothat the fundamentalists do not gain afoothold in that important region.

Former Secretary of State HenryKissinger articulates a vital U.S. inter-est in the following way.

The paradox of the decision before Con-gress is that, while we have no inherent na-tional interest to justify the sending oftroops, a vital national interest has been cre-ated by the administration’s policy.

Dr. Kissinger continues:If other nations cease to believe our assur-

ances, our capacity to shape events, to pro-tect American security and values will bejeopardized.

The problem with Dr. Kissinger’sanalysis is that it gives the Presidentthe power to create a vital national in-terest by unilaterally making anAmerican commitment without theconsent of Congress in the contextwhere the consent of Congress is nec-essary to bind the United States. Myown judgment is that those consider-ations do not aggregate to a vital Unit-ed States national interest.

U.S. national security is not immi-nently threatened, and we are not theworld’s policeman. It may be that atsome point there will be considerationto the deployment of U.S. troops forinternational moral commitments orfrom some other standard, but thevital national interest context hasbeen that which has traditionally gov-erned the deployment of U.S. militarypersonnel. So far, they are proposed tobe only peacekeepers. But it is a shortdistance from being peacekeepers tobeing in harm’s way, and really, evenbeing peacekeepers is in harm’s way,with the troops that are already therebeing apprehensive about taking a stepoff a tarmac out of concern about step-ping on a landmine.

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S 18475December 13, 1995In 1991 on this floor I had the privi-

lege to participate in the debate on theresolution for the use of force as to thegulf war. I believe that it was indispen-sable that Congress pass on that mat-ter, even though it was a RepublicanPresident, President Bush, who in late1990 said a number of things about dis-patching troops there involving theUnited States without congressionalapproval. But ultimately the Presidentdid bring back the issue to the Houseand to the Senate. And we had debatesabout vital national interest. A num-ber of us were on the floor at thattime—Senator WARNER, Senator NUNN,and others—and comments in themedia were that it was a historic de-bate about what are United Statesvital national interests.

At least, in my own judgment, wehave not seen the establishment of thevital national interest in what we havepresent today in Bosnia. But that is ajudgment call like so many other judg-ments that we have here.

In the absence of a vital national in-terest, it is my judgment that the Con-gress should support the troops, with-out endorsing the President’s policy.Our congressional action should showas much national unity as possibleunder the circumstances and projectAmerican leadership to the maximumextent possible consistent with con-gressional policy not to give the Presi-dent a blank check.

It is obviously going to be a toughwinter and a tough year for our troopsso we should be as supportive as pos-sible where they are concerned.

I am encouraged by the testimonypresented to the Senate IntelligenceCommittee from the executive branch.We convened those hearings in the In-telligence Committee, which I chair.The executive branch officials testifiedthat our troops will be authorized bythe rules of engagement to defendthemselves on their finding of hostileintent rather than hostile action.

That means that our troops will nothave to wait until they are shot at; butthey can take preemptive action ifthey conclude that there is hostile in-tent. The anticipation of hostile actiongives them the discretion to make thejudgment that preemptive action iswarranted.

It is obviously problemsome on U.S.international relationships for the Con-gress to pull out the rug from thePresident’s unilateral commitments toour allies. However, it is fundamentalin our constitutional separation ofpower that the President’s authority inforeign policy and as Commander inChief is limited by Congress’ authorityon appropriations and the declarationof war. And the Founding Fathers wereexplicit in having that kind of a sepa-ration of powers, and that is what weare concerned about here today.

My preference, as I expressed it tothe President in our conversation, wasthat the President come to the Con-gress with authorization in advance ofdispatching the troops to Bosnia. We

have learned from the bitter experienceof Vietnam that the United States can-not prosecute a war, or really any ex-tended military operation, without thebacking of the American people. Andthe first line of that determination isto have the backing of the Congress.The President chose not to do so.

When we take a look at what our al-lies’ expectation has been, or should be,we have to note that repeatedly con-gressional action in opposing PresidentClinton’s Bosnia policy has put our al-lies squarely on notice that the Con-gress might well disavow the Presi-dent’s promises. It was plain on thepublic record that the Congress votedoverwhelmingly to lift the arms em-bargo unilaterally to allow the BosnianMoslems to defend themselves againstSerbian atrocities. In the Senate wehad a vote of 69 to 29. In the House thevote was 298 to 128. All of that requireda Presidential veto. And it was onlyafter those overwhelming votes oc-curred in both Houses of Congress thatthe President’s policy in Bosnia wasactivated.

For a long period of time many of ushad urged the executive branch to un-dertake massive bombing using ourtremendous air power, and we were metwith the response that in the absenceof ground troops the bombing wouldnot be effective. Once that bombingwas initiated, however, quite the oppo-site occurred from what the adminis-tration and the Department of Defenseofficials had predicted, and it broughtthe Bosnian Serbs to their knees. Itbrought them to the bargaining table.And this agreement has been workedout.

But it is in this context of the verysevere disagreement that has been ex-pressed by this Senator—and manyothers on this floor and in the House ofRepresentatives—that the allies, theother party signatory to the agreementin Dayton, have been squarely on no-tice that the Congress might well dis-agree with the President.

The institutional conflicts betweenthe Congress and the President on for-eign policy have a long history. Manyhave challenged the President’s actionsin ordering United States troops tofight wars without congressional au-thorization in Korea and Vietnam. TheWar Powers Act was an effort to estab-lish constitutional balance. But thatWar Powers Act met with little suc-cess.

President Clinton took the initiativein ordering an invasion of Haiti in theface of overwhelming congressionalresolutions expressing disapproval ofthat Presidential action. Fortunately,it turned out to be a bloodless invasionwhen potential opposition withdrew.

So, Mr. President, our allies havebeen on notice. Depending on futureevents, the Congress may have to as-sert its authority to cut off funding, ifwe conclude that the President has ex-ceeded his authority or has pursued un-wise policies. Those are congressionalprerogatives, and under our constitu-

tional system of separation of powersthey have to be zealously guarded andobserved. But since the President isnot now usurping congressional au-thority to involve the United States inwar, and since the votes are obviouslynot present to cut off funding, weshould make the best of the situationin formulating a resolution to supportthe troops, and demonstrate as muchnational unity as possible.

To the extent possible, the resolutionshould impose the maximum pressureto strengthen the Bosnian Moslemsmilitarily to establish a balance ofpower in that area so that our troopsmay be withdrawn at the earliest prac-tical date. An exit policy from Bosniawill turn on there being a balance ofpower there.

It is critical for the United Statesand its NATO allies to articulate aplan for equipping and training theBosnian Army. Regrettably, the ad-ministration has been reluctant to ar-ticulate such a policy. But, in lettersjust publicized yesterday and today, wemay have those assurances. And thoseassurances and that action ought to besubject to the maximum possible con-gressional power and persuasion.

Arming the Bosnians is critical fortwo reasons.

First, it will help ensure a balance ofpower in the region—a balance thatcurrently favors Serbia and Croatia.

Second, the Bosnian Army must bearmed before the NATO implementa-tion force can leave. As former UnderSecretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz,recently noted, ‘‘Until the Bosnianshave the capability of defending them-selves, it will be impossible for us towithdraw without terrible con-sequences.’’

In addition, we should do our best touse the current situation in Bosnia toestablish important international lawprecedents against genocide, and toprosecute war criminals.

Bosnian-Serb leader RadovanKaradzic and army commander RatkoMladic and others under indictmentshould be brought to trial in the WarCrimes Tribunal. This is a unique op-portunity to follow up on the Nurem-berg precedent and to establish aninternational rule of law.

Since 1989 the United States has beena signatory to the International Geno-cide Convention. The United States hasbeen a leader in instituting the WarCrimes Tribunal.

For years, I have pressed resolutionsadopted by the Congress to set up aninternational criminal court with theprincipal thrust to control inter-national terrorism and drug dealing.

It has been my view that, while it hasbeen impossible to get countries likeColombia to extradite to the UnitedStates, if there were an internationalcriminal court, that might be doable ina practical political context. And wehave yet to be able to put our hands onthe Libyans under indictment for theterrorism against Pan Am 103.

And there again, if an internationalcriminal court were present, it might

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATES 18476 December 13, 1995be possible to have extradition to sucha court if extradition to Scotland orEngland or the United States cannot beobtained. And it is very important forus to press ahead on these prosecutionsunder the War Crimes Tribunal.

In 1993, my amendment was adoptedto provide $3 million to assist the pros-ecutor in gathering evidence againstthose who committed atrocities andmass killings in Bosnia. We shouldpress all parties to the peace agree-ment to make their maximum effortsto bring the war criminals to trial. Myrecent meeting with Chief ProsecutorJustice Goldstone provides encourage-ment that a significant internationallegal precedent can be achieved in thattribunal. International action againstmass killings and genocide would pro-mote an important goal of the law ofnations.

My discussions with Secretary ofState Warren Christopher and NationalSecurity Adviser Anthony Lake pro-vide reassurance on the firm U.S. pol-icy to bring the war criminals to trial.For myself and many others in theCongress, continued support of theBosnian operation would be materiallyaffected by the intensity demonstratedto bring such war criminals to justice.

While I do think it an unwise policyto deploy United States troops toBosnia, I am very much concernedabout the kind of isolationist rhetoricthat we have heard in this Chamber inthe past 2 days. I have consistentlysupported a robust national defenseand a robust foreign policy by theUnited States, an attitude gleanedfrom my earliest days studying inter-national relations as a student manyyears ago at the University of Penn-sylvania.

The United States should not turn toisolationism, but neither should weturn to being the policeman of theworld when there are incidents aroundthe world, and so many of them, with-out having a vital U.S. national inter-est involved. But weapons systems,army divisions, and aircraft carriersare not enough to ensure our security.We must be committed to the notionthat the United States needs to be en-gaged throughout the world diplomati-cally, economically, militarily, and al-ways carefully. We need to use all ourinstruments of national power to shapethe international security environmentin a way that guarantees American se-curity. In my judgment, for the reasonsI have outlined, Bosnia and the Bal-kans do not rise to that level. But bythe same token, we must be careful toresist instantaneous or knee-jerk reac-tions to any use of U.S. military forceeven where we did so in Desert Storm.

Mr. President, these are obviouslymatters of great complexity. We voteon them in a series of resolutions try-ing to exercise our best judgment,knowing that the troops are on theway, whatever we do. We obviously willfollow the matter very closely throughour congressional action in a variety ofcommittees, including the Senate In-

telligence Committee, which I chair, tobring our best judgment to bear on theBosnian situation, to support thetroops wherever we can and to bringthem home as soon and as safely aspossible.

I yield the floor.Mrs. BOXER addressed the Chair.The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.

KYL). Under the previous order, theSenator from California is recognized.

Mrs. BOXER. I thank the Chair verymuch.

I rise today in support of the peace-keeping mission in Bosnia as long as itremains a peacekeeping mission. I alsorise to express my strong support forour men and women in uniform whowill be one-third of the peacekeepingforce.

We are here debating one of the mostdifficult and important decisions toface us as legislators, the deploymentof American troops overseas. The com-mitment of our troops is never an issueto be taken lightly, so I thank theleadership for bringing this issue to thefloor.

I also wish to thank those commit-tees that have held hearings on thisissue over the past few weeks and theadministration witnesses who have an-swered questions openly, candidly, anddirectly. These hearings have provenvery informative and have helped meto reach my decision.

I support the participation of U.S.troops in I-For first and foremost be-cause the mission as spelled out by thePresident and subsequently by the Sec-retary of Defense and the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff is a truepeacekeeping mission. This is not likethe Persian Gulf war when we weresending our men and women off tofight a war. We are sending our menand women to be one-third of a peace-keeping force, keeping the peace as aresult of the Dayton peace accordwhich is supported by all the partiesinvolved.

This is a point I believe must bemade perfectly clear. The major com-batants in Bosnia support this peaceagreement. We are not going to Bosniato force a United States vision of peaceupon them. We are going to help imple-ment their vision, their agreement.

If we were not truly peacekeepers, Icould not support this mission, and ifat some future date the Dayton peaceagreement changes course, I will im-mediately reevaluate my position.

I have listened with great interest toSecretary Perry, General Shalikash-vili, and other military and civilianleaders who have explained the rules ofengagement for our troops in Bosnia.When I was a member of the HouseArmed Services Committee, I realizedhow crucial it is for our troops to havevery clear rules of engagement. I haveseen tragedy occur, and we have lostmen and women in uniform because therules were unclear. In my view, it is es-sential that our troops have the abilityto aggressively respond to threats tothemselves or to their mission. They

must not be required to consult withanyone before responding to a poten-tially life-threatening situation.

On this point, I quote the Secretaryof Defense, William Perry, who said:

If our forces are attacked or if hostile in-tent is demonstrated by opposing forces, ourrules of engagement will permit the imme-diate and effective use of deadly force.

In all of his speeches, the Presidenthas been very clear on this point. Themessage he has sent is clear and unmis-takable: the first enemy that tries toharm our troops will never forget thelesson of the fateful misjudgment ofour power.

So the mission is clear and the rulesof engagement are robust. The finalelement is to assure that our exitstrategy is adequate and, in my view,it is. After close examination, I am sat-isfied on these points.

The administration has publicly stat-ed that our troops will come home inabout a year. I support that kind of atimeframe. Our mission is to keeppeace for about a year, and after thatit is up to the parties to the agreementto sustain it. When we leave, we mustleave with a much more balanced situ-ation in terms of military balance. AndI am pleased that Members of Congresshave talked to the administrationabout this, and have received clear as-surances that when we leave we willnot go back to the status quo. This isvery important.

I want to make it clear that I supportour participation in the peacekeepingforce, not because the President wantsit but because I believe it is the rightthing to do. I know that some have ar-gued we should support deploying ourtroops simply because the Presidenthas committed us and we must not actto undermine the Presidency. However,I take a different view. I believe that asthe President accepts responsibility forhis decision as Commander in Chief, wemust accept full responsibility for ourvote on this matter.

I believe that the Congress has theabsolute right to deny any Presidentthe funds to carry out this or any othermission. In this case, I did not vote todeny the President the funds, and I willnot support the Hutchison amendment.However, the Senator from Texas hasevery right to offer it, and every Mem-ber here has every right to vote for it,just as they had every right to vote forthe prior amendment we just disposedof which dealt with cutting off funds.

So I believe that when I cast a votefor the Dole-McCain-Nunn amendment,I am doing the right thing, and I takefull responsibility for it. I am notducking behind it and saying it is be-cause the President thinks it is theright thing to do. I have not voted withthis President before on the question ofBosnia. I have voted, in fact, againsthim on two other occasions. When Ivote for this, I do not do so as a weakpartner of the executive branch but asa strong partner. If at some futuretime I disagree with the administra-tion policy, as I have done in the past,I will speak out and vote accordingly.

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S 18477December 13, 1995We now have the opportunity to help

bring peace to Bosnia. I believe that aslong as our troops are part of a largerforce, as long as the mission is peaceand as long as we have an approximateexit date, I will be supportive of thismission.

Mr. President, it is a rare moment inhistory that we have a chance to stopa genocide and generations of hatred.It is rare that we have a chance to stopthe spread of war in a region where wehave lost thousands and thousands ofAmericans. Some of our very own col-leagues walk on this floor with thewounds of those wars.

This is not some area of the worldwhere war is unknown. Sadly, it is. Wehave seen war spread. Now, maybe, justmaybe, the President has done some-thing here that will stop a war fromspreading. We do not know that. I maybe back on this floor saying, ‘‘Bringthe troops home. I was wrong.’’

But in the war that I well rememberthat got me into politics, the Vietnamwar, we said, ‘‘Give peace a chance’’ inthose days, and I think ‘‘give peace achance’’ has not lost its meaning inthis circumstance, after generations ofgenocide and hatred. I lost part of myfamily in a genocide.

Now we have a chance to stop it. Atthe minimum—at the minimum—ifthings go reasonably well, when weleave there we will leave there in a waywhere the various parties to this con-flict are at least on a level playingfield, which I think is very, very impor-tant. If there is a pause in the fighting,it may lead to a lasting peace as a re-sult of our participation in this force.

So let us give this peace a chance aslong as it is truly a peacekeeping oper-ation. Let us support our men andwomen who are going over there in atough time, Christmastime. Let us notsend signals of equivocation about thatsupport. Let us support the Dole-McCain-Nunn amendment.

I thank you, Mr. President, and Iyield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Underthe previous order, Senator DOMENICIand then Senator KERREY are to be rec-ognized.

Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-

ator from Virginia is recognized.Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair.I ask unanimous consent that I be

recognized to speak at the time thatSenator DOMENICI was originally to berecognized in the unanimous-consentagreement, and that he take the placethat I had.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Would the Sen-ator from Virginia let me make onemore unanimous-consent request?

Mr. WARNER. Absolutely, Mr. Presi-dent.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, Iask unanimous consent that the namesof Senators HATCH and CHAFEE beadded to the next available Republicanslots, which I believe would followLEAHY and SIMON.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. I thank the Chair.And I thank the Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, beforethe distinguished Senator from Califor-nia leaves the floor, I’d like to say Iwas greatly taken by her closing re-marks. And I think I jotted it down ac-curately. I may be wrong. ‘‘I may beback here on the floor asking that webring our troops home.’’

I say to the Senator, that is preciselywhy I oppose this Presidential decisionto send to Bosnia a third significantelement of U.S. troops—that is, troopson the ground. This Nation experiencedthe problem of Congress acting to with-draw our troops from Lebanon. ThisNation experienced that problem in So-malia. I happened to have been on thisfloor protecting Presidential preroga-tive—at the time we took serious cas-ualties in Somalia, some 18 killed inone day and some 80-plus wounded onthat same day—and I said it is thePresident’s decision as Commander inChief when a military mission is com-pleted and when our forces should bebrought home.

We had a very vigorous battle righthere on the floor of the Senate aboutthat Somalia situation. And it was atough fight to establish the President’sclear right to determine when to bringthose troops home and not rush tojudgment in the sorrow of those severecasualties.

Mrs. BOXER. May I respond?Mr. WARNER. This is what bothered

me. The credibility of the UnitedStates of America will be far more en-dangered if we are faced in 6 or 8months with a decision to bring ourtroops home because of casualties andother unforeseen problems, than if wemake the stand now not to go forwardwith this mission.

Mrs. BOXER. Would the Senatoryield for a very brief moment?

Mr. WARNER. Yes. I do not yield thefloor, but for a question.

Mrs. BOXER. I understand.I just wanted to respond to my

friend. I will, of course, put it in theform of a question. But the deploy-ments that my friend talked about Idid not support. I come here to saythat I think it is worth a try in an areaof the world where we have lost thou-sands and thousands and thousands ofAmericans.

If the Senator believes that there isno chance that this war can spread andthis mission cannot change that and isnot important and is not worth trying,then he should absolutely vote againstthe Dole-McCain amendment. And I re-spect his right.

All this Senator is saying is that Ihave waited, and I believe—and I takefull responsibility for that vote, and Irespect my friend if he comes down onthe other side—in this part of theworld we have an opportunity to makea difference for peace. If it does notwork out, we at least have tried to doso.

I do view it quite differently than inthe other areas that my friend haspointed to. I did not support those de-ployments, I say to my friend.

I guess I did not have a question. Imerely wanted to respond, but I havethe utmost respect for my friend forwhatever conclusion he reaches, and Ihope he would have that same respectfor this Senator if she comes down onthe other side.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I say tomy colleague from California, this voteis a clear vote of conscience, not poli-tics, and each of us has to draw on ourown life experiences, our own bestjudgment and make this tough deci-sion.

Mrs. BOXER. I agree with my friend.Mr. WARNER. I am on the side oppo-

site the Senator from California andwill oppose the President’s deploymentdecision.

Mr. President, I will go into some de-tail regarding my concerns. Indeed,this is one of the most important de-bates that I have been privileged toparticipate in in the recent history ofthe U.S. Senate. Our Nation has experi-enced a gradually growing involvementof its Armed Forces in the tragic civilwar in Bosnia and other contiguousareas in the former Yugoslavia.

Over the past year, U.S. airmen haveflown the majority of the air missionsover Bosnia, and U.S. Navy and MarineCorps personnel stationed in the Adri-atic off the Dalmatian coast have pro-vided a very significant percentage ofthe ships and personnel involved in thenaval operations in that region.

America is heavily committed mili-tarily with its NATO allies and othersat this very moment. There is a mis-conception that we are not involved inBosnia and that we have to go. Wrong.We are there, very significantly, at thisparticular time, and we have beenthere for almost two years.

But now the President has directed afurther and very significant expansionof U.S. military involvement. I creditthe President, the Secretary of State,and others for working out an agree-ment which I do not refer to as a peaceagreement. Nevertheless, it is an agree-ment that has led to a very substantiallessening of the hostilities. It is anagreement that possibly could at somefuture date form the foundation for acessation of hostilities, but I do notfind that condition to exist now.

Therefore, the President has orderedground troops, some 20,000, for actualdeployment to Bosnia and approxi-mately another 14,000 to be deployed tonearby geographic regions as supportand backup forces.

It is interesting, when this missionwas first described by the Presidentback in February 1993, it was alwayssaid that we were going to send in20,000 ground troops. But now we learnthat almost a force of equal size will berequired as backup. That is prudentmilitary planning, but the initial im-pression across the land was of a lessernumber.

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATES 18478 December 13, 1995Ever since this Presidential decision

nearly 2 years ago, I have consistentlyexpressed my concerns. Today, I joinwith many other Senators in express-ing my total disagreement with thePresident. I do so respectful of his roleas President, as Commander in Chief,but I am sure the President recognizesI have a right to express my views andI do so as a matter of conscience.

President Clinton made this decisionon his own, without that level of con-sultation from the Congress that I be-lieve was necessary and might havecontributed to a different decision.

And now the Congress is left withtrying to decide how best, as the elect-ed representatives of the people, we canensure that the voice of the Americanpeople is heard. I am privileged to do soon behalf of many, many Virginianswith whom I have visited and fromwhom I have heard over the pastmonths.

Mr. President, I have always been astrong supporter of Presidential con-stitutional prerogatives in the area offoreign policy—I expressed that in mycolloquy with the distinguished Sen-ator from California—and particularlythe President’s authority as Com-mander in Chief. This very phrase isembodied in our Constitution. As Com-mander in Chief, the President has theright to deploy, send beyond our shoresinto harm’s way if necessary, the menand women of the Armed Forces of theUnited States.

Presidents have judiciously exercisedthat awesome power since the veryformative days of our Republic. There-fore, I do not challenge the constitu-tional authority of the President to de-ploy United States ground troops toBosnia. He has that right under theConstitution. I do, however, challengethe wisdom of President Clinton’s deci-sion to involve this third significantelement of United States forces, name-ly on the ground in the territory ofBosnia.

On the question of constitutional au-thority on this matter, I ask unani-mous consent, Mr. President, to haveprinted in the RECORD following my re-marks a very fine analysis of that issueby Lloyd Cutler, former Counsel to thePresident.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, since

the beginning of the conflict in Bosniain 1992, as I said, I have consistentlyopposed the use of United Statesground troops. Today, we are facedwith the situation of what do we donow, given the President’s commit-ment? My votes today expressing oppo-sition to this Presidential decision goback to the fundamental question:Does the United States have a vital—and I repeat and emphasize the word‘‘vital’’—national security interest atstake in this region of the world, suchvital security interest of a level thatwould justify the added deployment ofUnited States ground troops into a re-gion that we know is fraught with risk?

I see on the floor the distinguishedSenator from Nebraska. I was privi-leged to accompany him to this region,the region of Krajina, in early Septem-ber. We saw with our own eyes the rav-ages of this war-torn region. We lookedinto the faces of the refugees, combat-ants and noncombatants alike. Thiswas the fifth in a series of trips I haveconducted to this region over the yearssince the conflict has started.

I wish to acknowledge, Mr. President,to my colleague, how much I value theopportunity to travel with this distin-guished Senator, a former naval offi-cer, highly decorated, a man whosejudgment and opinion I greatly valueon military matters.

The reason I raise this is that I wishto apply a test to this deployment deci-sion along these lines: Would I be ableto go into the home of a service personwho had been either killed or woundedin Bosnia as a consequence of this pro-posed deployment and explain to a par-ent or a spouse or a child why theirloved one was sent to Bosnia and whytheir sacrifice was justified?

This is a duty I performed earlier inlife as a young Marine officer and againas Secretary of the Navy, and it is notan easy one, Mr. President. I applythat test today.

I could not justify such a sacrifice,given the current situation in that re-gion and the current status diplomati-cally and militarily of all the cir-cumstances surrounding this peace ac-cord.

I have listened carefully to the ad-ministration’s justification for this de-ployment, but I do not find a vitalUnited States national security inter-est at stake in Bosnia that would jus-tify the use of ground troops at thistime in that nation.

I do not want to see further Amer-ican casualties in trying to resolve acivil war, based on centuries-old reli-gious and cultural hatreds, which noneof us understand. I certainly say, ashard as I have studied, and based onfive trips, I do not understand how peo-ple in this civilized age of mankind cantreat one another this way. These arewell-educated people. Yet, they behavein such a manner as to be on the bor-derline of savagery. I cannot under-stand it, Mr. President.

I remember so well a hearing of theArmed Services Committee in theaftermath of Somalia. I remember aCol. Larry Joyce, the father of a youngRanger who was killed in the October3–4 raid in Somalia which I describedearlier. He came before the committeeand he said to the Senators as follows:

Too frequently, policymakers are insulatedfrom the misery they create. If they could bewith the chaplain who rings the doorbell at6:20 in the morning to tell a 22-year-oldwoman she is now a widow, they would de-velop their policies more carefully.

I would hope that the Somalia expe-rience would cause us to more carefullyconsider the policy decisions that putat risk the men and women who servein the Armed Forces.

I have been deeply moved, as hasevery other Member of the Senate, andindeed all Americans, by the sufferingwe have seen in Bosnia as a con-sequence of the hatreds and atrocitiesin that region. I have seen it in theirfaces, in the hospitals we visited and inthe wanton destruction of the homesand properties—homes which are so es-sential for the return of the many refu-gees. Senator KERREY and I witnessed,as we went through the villages, a rowof houses, and one house with the gera-niums out, the fresh laundry hangingout, and the house right next to it wasflattened to the ground—flattened be-cause it was once occupied by a Serb.That Serb had fled this village wherehe or she or the family had lived foryears with their neighbors, but theywere forced to leave in the face of theCroatian military advance. And thelocals destroyed the Serb house—thehouse being a symbol of their hatredfor that individual—and they blew itup, destroyed it, so that it would be ofno use to anyone ever again. We sawthat, as the Senator will recall, in vil-lage after village—a manifestation ofhatred, which we cannot understand.

I remember so well the Secretary ofDefense in his testimony before ourcommittee saying, ‘‘My greatest fear inthis operation is the hatreds among thepeople in the region.’’ That is whatconcerns me. I do not want to see 20,000U.S. troops placed in the middle of this500-year-old sea of hatred.

Mr. President, we have heard Presi-dent Clinton say that United Statestroops are not being sent to Bosnia tofight a war, but rather to help imple-ment a peace agreement. According toa December 2 radio address by thePresident, ‘‘It is a peace that the peo-ple of Bosnia want. It is a peace thatthey have demanded.’’

Yet, I say to my colleagues, most re-spectfully, I disagree with the Presi-dent’s assessment. I think the events ofrecent days, of recent weeks, of recentmonths, have been a harbinger ofthings to come. At the very time IFORis beginning its deployment to Bosnia,Bosnian Croats are burning villageswhich will be returned to Bosnian Serbcontrol—villages which we, the West,will have to rebuild. Reach into yourpockets and take out the funds we aregoing to be asked to contribute to re-build these houses, which have beenwantonly destroyed, not as a con-sequence of troops marching through—in some instances, yes—but largely be-cause of the hatred that exists.

These are not the actions of a peoplewho have embraced a peace. At thispoint, all we can really say is that thethree leaders of this region have donetheir best to work out an agreement.But only time will tell the extent towhich the people will eventually em-brace this agreement.

Nevertheless, the President has madea decision, and it is within his con-stitutional authority. The troops arebeing deployed. Initial elements havealready arrived. We have seen the pride

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S 18479December 13, 1995with which the Marines and othershave unfurled Old Glory on Bosniansoil. We salute them and we say: Oneand all, we in this Chamber unani-mously support our troops.

It has been my privilege to work for17 years on the Senate Armed ServicesCommittee and to visit our troopsmany times throughout the world,wherever they have been deployed—inthe Persian Gulf region, Somalia, andother areas—and to see our troops inaction. So I commit myself unequivo-cally, in the same way I have through-out my entire adult life, to their sup-port.

On that point, I would like to addressan issue which I do not think has beenaddressed by any other Senator todate, and it concerns me greatly. Fre-quently, I have heard a few individualsin high positions, both in the executivebranch and in the Congress of the Unit-ed States, make a statement along thelines that, ‘‘Well, they are volunteers,they can go.’’

Mr. President, we are very proud inour country to have the All-VolunteerForce. It originated, again, when I wasprivileged to be the Secretary of theNavy in the Department of Defense,and it was a direct decision from thethen-Secretary of Defense Melvin R.Laird. Having heard these statementsand becoming greatly troubled, I con-tacted the former Secretary and askedfor his views. For the RECORD I wouldlike to explain how we decided to havethis force. During Vietnam there was agreat strife across this Nation, much ofthat strife directed at force conscrip-tion and the draft, and President Nixonand Secretary Laird said they weregoing to take a risk and initiate theAll-Volunteer Force.

I will read from Mr. Laird’s letter ofDecember 12, 1995. I ask unanimousconsent that it be printed in theRECORD.

There being no objection, the letterwas ordered to be printed in theRECORD, as follows:

MELVIN R. LAIRD,Washington, DC, December 12, 1995.

Hon. JOHN W. WARNER,U.S. Senate,Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR WARNER: The President’sdecision to commit United States militaryforces to Bosnia has brought renewed atten-tion to the high level of patriotism and pro-fessionalism of the women and men whoserve as members of the All-Volunteer Force.

The All-Volunteer Force was institutedduring our service at DoD, yours as Sec-retary of the Navy and mine as Secretary ofDefense. I regard the termination of thedraft and the successful creation of the All-Volunteer Armed Force as the most definingaction taken during my service as Secretary.

At this time of placing American militarypersonnel in harms way, it is well to recallthat the All-Volunteer Force came intobeing to end the inequities of pay and serviceof military conscription and to pay, train,and equip our military forces as profes-sionals. That has been accomplished in largemeasure. Our country has the finest militaryforce in its history. Because they have vol-unteered, as opposed to being drafted formilitary service, does not mean there can be

less of a standard for when it’s in our vitalnational interest to interject them into adangerous environment.

It is important that the genesis for the All-Volunteer Force be a part of considerationfor the justification for deployment of ourmilitary force.

With best wishes and kindest personal re-gards, I am

Sincerely,MELVIN R. LAIRD.

Mr. WARNER. He stated:Because they have volunteered, as opposed

to being drafted for militry service, it doesnot mean there can be less of a standard forwhen it is in our vital national interest tointerject them into a dangerous environ-ment.

That is right on point, SecretaryLaird. You are the father of the All-Volunteer Force. It has worked, andworked beyond our expectations, to thebenefit of this country. I would notlike to see this debate, in any way,erode the proud All-Volunteer Forceconcept that we have today.

The clear implication of those criticsthat use this phrase, ‘‘Well, they arevolunteers,’’ is that we are willing tosend those who serve in the volunteerforce to a foreign land to do missionsand take risks that we would not haveasked of a military draftee. Wrong.This is an atrocious implication. I hopethe Members of this Senate will dispelany idea that, because currently themembers of the Armed Forces of theUnited States are all volunteers, thatthey should be treated with any lessconcern than we have for generationstreated previous members of the ArmedForces, whether they were draftees,Reserves called up, voluntarily or in-voluntarily, whatever the case may be.Once they don that uniform they de-serve no less than the highest concernby the Congress, and indeed the Presi-dent.

Americans willing to ask these vol-unteers to risk their lives in the per-formance of missions that do not fitthe clear test of being in the vital na-tional security interests of this coun-try have to ask themselves a question.When the Congress decided we wouldfill the ranks of our military with vol-unteers—a policy, as I said, that wasinitiated in the latter part of the Viet-nam war, 1972–73—one of the concernsexpressed at that time was that ourmilitary might be viewed as a merce-nary force. Is that now the case?

You will recall from your historythat the concept of mercenaries pre-vailed through much of Europe, in thehistory of the Middle Ages and, indeed,into this century. In fact, Great Brit-ain sent mercenaries to our colonies,often, to try to subjugate us.

Anyway, I believe that every Senatorin this body will agree that while sol-diers, sailors, airmen, Marines, todayare volunteers, they are not merce-naries. So let us put to an end anycomment about, ‘‘since they are volun-teers, they deserve any less measure ofconcern by the Congress.’’ The Con-gress stands, 24 hours a day, 7 days aweek, 12 months a year, as trustees—

trustees to guard the safety and thewelfare of those who wear the uniformand of the families here at home whoawait them.

There are many aspects of this I-FoRdeployment which I find troubling.First and foremost, I do not believe themission of I-FoR has been carefully andclearly articulated. In addition to thespecific military tasks with which I-For is charged in the Dayton accords,there are a list of supporting taskswhich, in my view, will inevitably leadto mission creep and to I-FoR’s in-volvement in implementing the non-military aspects of the peace agree-ment.

For example, I-FoR is called on to as-sist the UNHCR, the U.N. High Com-missioner for Refugees, and otherinternational organizations, in theirhumanitarian missions, to prevent in-terference with the movement of civil-ian populations and refugees, and to re-spond to deliberate violence to life andperson. It is not clear what guidelines,if any, have been given to the com-manders on the ground to help thosecommanders determine when I-FoRshould get involved in these supportingtasks. This must be clarified and themission strictly limited to implement-ing the military aspects of the agree-ment. I think that should be done be-fore another soldier, sailor, airman, ormarine departs to go to that region.

I am also concerned about the admin-istration’s lack of an adequate exitstrategy and an announced time limitof 12 months for this mission. Just an-nouncing that we will leave in 12months is not an exit strategy. Wehave to make sure that there is a bal-ance of military power between thesewarring factions. That balance willserve as a far better deterrent, far bet-ter than anything else we can do.

I salute the distinguished majorityleader, the Senator from Kansas [Mr.DOLE]. I have joined him in the pastyear, in trying to implement the con-cept of assisting one of those factions,the Bosnian Moslems, and bringingtheir level of armaments up to wherethey can possess a deterrent to attack.

I think it is naive to believe in 12months the United States and NATOmilitary involvement will wipe awaycenturies-old hostilities. What I fearwe are facing is a temporary lull in thefighting until the international com-munity withdraws its troops. Then, Iask my colleagues, what will happen tothe credibility of the United States andNATO if this mission ends inconclu-sively, or is possibly even judged to bea failure because the conflict resumesafter we depart?

Remember, remember those picturesof our brave Marines as they left Soma-lia with the people on the shore firingat them as they disembarked in theirsmall craft to go out to a larger Amer-ican warship and return home. I do notforget that. I do not forget those in-stances.

Because of the serious concernswhich I have outlined, I will vote to op-pose this deployment of U.S. ground

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATES 18480 December 13, 1995troops. This was not an easy decisionfor any of us to make but I do it as amatter of conscience. However, if thatfull deployment is to occur and doesoccur, then I will, as I have in everyday I have served in this U.S. Senate,support the troops 100 percent in everyway I know how.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-sent that recent editorials on this situ-ation by the former distinguished Sec-retary of the Navy James Webb, and bya former professional Army officer,Col. Harry Summers, be printed in theRECORD and I yield the floor.

There being no objection, the articleswere ordered to be printed in theRECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Nov. 28, 1995]REMEMBER THE NIXON DOCTRINE

(By James Webb)The Clinton Administration’s insistence on

putting 20,000 American troops into Bosniashould be seized on by national leaders, par-ticularly those running for President, toforce a long-overdue debate on the worldwideobligations of our military.

While the Balkan factions may be im-mersed in their struggle, and Europeans mayfeel threatened by it, for Americans it rep-resents only one of many conflicts, real andpotential, whose seriousness must beweighed, often against one another, beforeallowing a commitment of lives, resourcesand national energy.

Today, despite a few half-hearted attemptssuch as Gen. Colin Powell’s ‘‘superior forcedoctrine,’’ no clear set of principles exists asa touchstone for debate on these tradeoffs.Nor have any leaders of either party offeredterms which provide an understandable glob-al logic as to when our military should becommitted to action. In short, we still lacka national security strategy that fits thepost-cold war era.

More than ever before, the United Stateshas become the nation of choice when crisesoccur, large and small. At the same time, thesize and location of our military forces are influx. It is important to make our interestsknown to our citizens, our allies and evenour potential adversaries, not just in Bosniabut around the world, so that commitmentscan be measured by something other thanthe pressures of interest groups and manipu-lation by the press. Furthermore, with alli-ances increasingly justified by power rela-tionships similar to those that dominatedbefore World War I, our military must be as-sured that the stakes of its missions areworth dying for.

Failing to provide these assurances is tocontinue the unremitting case-by-case de-bates, hampering our foreign policy on theone hand and on the other treating our mili-tary forces in some cases as mere bargainingchips. As the past few years demonstrate,this also causes us to fritter away our na-tional resolve while arguing about militarybackwaters like Somalia and Haiti.

Given the President’s proposal and the fail-ure to this point of defining American stakesin Bosnia as immediate or nation-threaten-ing, the coming weeks will offer a new roundof such debates. The President appearstempted to follow the constitutionally ques-tionable (albeit effective) approach used bythe Bush Administration in the Persian Gulfwar: putting troops in an area where noAmerican forces have been threatened andno treaties demand their presence, thengaining international agreement before plac-ing the issue before Congress.

Mr. Clinton said their mission would be‘‘to supervise the separation of forces and to

give them confidence that each side will liveup to their agreements.’’ This rationale re-minds one of the ill-fated mission of theinternational force sent to Beirut in 1983. Hehas characterized the Bosnian mission asdiplomatic in purpose, but promised, in hisspeech last night, to ‘‘fight fire with fire andthen some’’ if American troops are threat-ened. This is a formula for confusion once acombat unit sent on a distinctly noncombatmission comes under repeated attack.

We are told that other NATO countrieswill decline to send their own military forcesto Bosnia unless the United States assumesa dominant role, which includes sizable com-bat support and naval forces backing it up.This calls to mind the decades of over-reli-ance by NATO members on American re-sources, and President Eisenhower’s warningin October 1963 that the size and permanenceof our military presence in Europe would‘‘continue to discourage the development ofthe necessary military strength Western Eu-ropean countries should provide for them-selves.’’

The Administration speaks of a ‘‘reason-able time for withdrawal,’’ which if too shortmight tempt the parties to wait out the so-called peacekeepers and if too long mighttempt certain elements to drive them outwith attacks causing high casualties.

Sorting out the Administration’s answersto such hesitations will take a great deal oftime, attention and emotion. And doing so inthe absence of a clearly stated global policywill encourage other nations, particularlythe new power centers in Asia, to view theUnited States as becoming less committed toaddressing their own security concerns.Many of these concerns are far more seriousto long-term international stability andAmerican interests. These include the con-tinued threat of war on the Korean penin-sula, the importance of the United States asa powerbroker where historical Chinese, Jap-anese and Russian interests collide, and theneed for military security to accompanytrade and diplomacy in a dramaticallychanging region.

Asian cynicism gains further grist in thewake of the Administration’s recent snubs ofJapan: the President’s cancellation of hissummit meeting because of the budget crisis,and Secretary of State Warren Christopher’searly return from a Japanese visit to watchover the Bosnian peace talks.

Asian leaders are becoming uneasy over aneconomically and militarily resurgent Chinathat in recent years has become increasinglymore aggressive. A perception that the Unit-ed States is not paying attention to or is notworried about such long-term threats couldin itself cause a major realignment in Asia.One can- not exclude even Japan, whosestrong bilateral relationship with the UnitedStates has been severely tested of late, fromthis possibility.

Those who aspire to the Presidency in 1996should use the coming debate to articulate aworld view that would demonstrate to theworld, as well as to Americans, an under-standing of the uses and limitations—in asense the human budgeting of our militaryassets.

Richard Nixon was the last President toclearly define how and when the UnitedStates would commit forces overseas. In 1969,he declared that our military policy shouldfollow three basic tenets:

Honor all treaty commitments in respond-ing to those who invade the lands of our al-lies.

Provide a nuclear umbrella to the worldagainst the threats of other nuclear powers.

Finally, provide weapons and technical as-sistance to other countries where warranted,but do not commit American forces to localconflicts.

These tenets, with some modification, arestill the best foundation of our world leader-ship. They remove the United States fromlocal conflicts and civil wars. The use of theAmerican military to fulfill treaty obliga-tions requires ratification by Congress, pro-viding a hedge against the kind of Presi-dential discretion that might send forcesinto conflicts not in the national interest.Yet they provide clear authority for imme-diate action required to carry out policiesthat have been agreed upon by the govern-ment as a whole.

Given the changes in the world, an addi-tional tenet would also be desirable: TheUnited States should respond vigorouslyagainst cases of nuclear proliferation andstate-sponsored terrorism.

These tenets would prevent the use ofUnited States forces on commitments moreappropriate to lesser powers while preservingour unique capabilities. Only the UnitedStates among the world’s democracies canfield large-scale maneuver forces, repletewith strategic airlift, carrier battle groupsand amphibious power projection.

Our military has no equal in counteringconventional attacks on extremely short no-tice wherever the national interest dictates.Our bases in Japan give American forces theability to react almost anywhere in the Pa-cific and Indian Oceans, just as the contin-ued presence in Europe allows Americanunits to react in Europe and the Middle East.

In proper form, this capability provides re-assurance to potentially threatened nationseverywhere. But despite the ease with whichthe American military seemingly operateson a daily basis, its assets are limited, as isthe national willingness to put the at risk.

As the world moves toward new power cen-ters and different security needs, it is morevital than ever that we state clearly the con-ditions under which American forces will besent into harm’s way. And we should be evermore chary of commitments, like the loom-ing one in Bosnia, where combat units inviteattack but are by the very nature of theirmission not supposed to fight.

[From the Washington Times, Dec. 11, 1995]AFTER THE DOUBTS, SALUTE AND OBEY

(By Harry Summers)When it comes to the Bosnian interven-

tion, ‘‘the proverbial train has left the sta-tion,’’ said Rep. Floyd Spence, South Caro-lina Republican, chairman of the House Na-tional Affairs Committee. But that did notmean he agreed with that deployment. ‘‘I be-lieve we will all eventually regret allowingAmerican prestige and the cohesion of theNATO alliance to be put at risk for aBosnian peacekeeping operation.’’

Many senior military officers would pri-vately agree with his assessment. But now isnot the time to publicly express theirdoubts. Before a decision is made, the dutyof a military officer is to speak up and ex-press any reservations about a proposedcourse of action. But once the decision ismade, the duty is then to salute and obeyand wholeheartedly support the task athand.

And that support especially includes keep-ing their doubts to themselves. Commandinga rifle company in the 2nd Armored Divisionin 1965, my executive officer, Lt. ThomasE.M. Gray II, had grave reservations aboutour emerging Vietnam policy. Expressingthose concerns in a Troop Information lec-ture, he was surprised when the soldiersturned on him with a vengeance. Many werealready alerted for Vietnam, and they want-ed to believe in what they were being orderedto do. They had their own doubts and fearsto contend with, and what they needed fromtheir leaders was reassurance that the taskwas both necessary and doable.

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S 18481December 13, 1995Like Jesus’ centurion, a soldier is ‘‘a man

under authority,’’ and when his civilian andmilitary leaders say go, ‘‘he goeth.’’ Despitehis misgivings, Lt. Gray himself went toVietnam and was tragically killed in actionwhile serving with the 1st Infantry Divi-sion’s 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry. Like Lt.Gray, many others served in Vietnam, andwill serve in Bosnia as well, despite their pri-vate reservations.

One who did so in Vietnam was Vice Presi-dent Al Gore, and on the day of the presi-dent’s address, the vice president invited sev-eral of us to the White House for a briefingon Bosnia. In the course of our talk, hecalled attention to a Nov. 27, 1995, New YorkTimes article headlined ‘‘Commanders SayU.S. Plan for Bosnia Will Work.’’ But thosecomments may not be as telling as he be-lieved. They may well reflect only the tradi-tional military reluctance to undermine sol-diers’ confidence and morale on the eve of ahazardous operation.

Whether the military commanders haveprivate misgivings about the Bosnian oper-ation is not knowable, but what is becomingclear is the lengths they have gone to ensurethat the military mission was limited to do-able military tasks.

Until recently, according to press reports,the military operation was to include notonly the ‘‘peacekeeping’’ task of keeping thewarring parties separated, but the‘‘nationbuilding’’ task of rebuilding theBosnian political and economic infrastruc-ture and also the job of training and equip-ping the Bosnian Muslim military to bring itup to par with its enemies.

At our White House meeting, the vicepresident took particular pains to disavowany such ‘‘mission creep.’’ The‘‘nationbuilding’’ notion that led to suchgrief in Somalia will not be a U.S. militarymission, he said. That will be a task for theEuropeans, specifically the OSCE, the Orga-nization for Security and Cooperation in Eu-rope, which has several ongoing missions inthe area. Training of the Muslims, originallysaid to be a task for the U.S. Army’s 10thSpecial Forces Group, will now be done bythird-party nationals. And the vice presidentcategorically ruled out any manhunts forwar criminals, such as the one that led tothe disaster in Mogadishu.

To their credit, the senior military leadershave done their best to limit the mission todoable tasks. But the one thing they havenot succeeded in doing is resolving the issueof military casualties. This is an issue ofmajor concern, and at the vice president’sbriefing and later in the presidential addressto the nation, it was emphasized that theBosnian operation is not risk free, and thatcasualties will occur.

But casualties per se are not the limitingfactor. It is whether those casualties are dis-proportionate to the value of the mission. InWorld War II, the value was national sur-vival, and we willingly paid more than a mil-lion casualties in its pursuit. In Somalia, thevalue was never established, and 16 becametoo many. The task for President Clinton isto establish the value of what we are tryingto do in Bosnia as the basis for the costs inboth lives and treasure that such an oper-ation will entail.

If the polls are correct, that value has notyet been established. And if that task re-mains undone, then even one casualty mayprove to be too many and Mr. Spence’s warn-ing will prove to have been only too correct.

EXHIBIT 1[From the Washington Post, Nov. 26, 1995]OUR PIECE OF THE PEACE—SENDING TROOPS

TO BOSNIA: OUR DUTY, CLINTON’S CALL

(By Lloyd N. Cutler)After months of sustained effort, the Clin-

ton administration has succeeded in nego-

tiating a peace agreement among the threewarring ethnic factions in Bosnia. The agree-ments initialed in Dayton would require usand our NATO allies to place peacekeepingunits of our armed forces in Bosnia for ayear or more. This raises once again the big-gest unresolved issue under the U.S. systemof separate executive and legislative depart-ments: Is the constitutional authority toplace our armed forces in harm’s way vestedin the president or in Congress, or does it re-quire the joint approval of both?

President Clinton has said he would followthe precedent set by George Bush before the1991 Desert Storm invasion and seek a con-gressional expression of support before com-mitting American units to the enforcementof the Bosnian peace agreement. But he hasalso asserted the constitutional power to acton his own authority, just as Bush did. Thistime, it is Republican congressional leaderswho are challenging a Democratic presi-dent’s view that the president can lawfullyact on his own, but, more typically it hasbeen Democratic Congresses challengingpresidents of either party.

During the coming debate, Congress wouldbe wise to bear in mind, as it did five yearsago, that the world will be watching how theone and only democratic superpower reachesits decisions, or whether it is so divided thatit is incapable of deciding at all. Congressneeds to recognize that we cannot have 535commanders-in-chief in addition to thepresident and that some deference to presi-dential judgments on force deployments is inorder. That is especially true when, as inKorea, Iraq and Bosnia, the president’s pro-posed deployments are based on United Na-tions Security Council resolutions that wehave sponsored and on joint decisions withour allies pursuant to treaties Congress haspreviously approved.

In the case of Bosnia, the argument forcommitting U.S. forces to carry out a peaceagreement is a strong one. All of us are re-volved by the ethnic cleansing and otherhuman rights abuses that the various fac-tions have committed. These abuses are like-ly to continue if the peace agreement is notformally signed in mid-December as nowscheduled, or if it is signed but not carriedout. If the war goes on or soon resumes, itmay well spread to other parts of the formerYugoslavia and to the rest of the Balkans,still the most unstable region of Western andCentral Europe. Any widening of the Balkanwars could well spread to Eastern Europeand the Middle East and pose a substantialpotential threat to U.S. national security.

Some foreign forces are needed to separatethe contending armies and to control thestanding down of heavy weapons. Under ourleadership, and only under our leadership,NATO is ready to supply the necessaryforces. The stronger the forces, the betterthe chance that they will not be attackedand that they will accomplish their mission.All these reasons argue for a significant U.S.military commitment, now that a promisingpeace agreement has been reached.

In 1991, the Democratic Congress narrowlyapproved President Bush’s decision to re-verse the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, thusmooting the issues of whether the presidentcould have acted alone. Today, the Repub-lican congressional leadership, while sound-ing somewhat more conciliatory than in re-cent weeks, is challenging President Clintonto make his case for the proposed deploy-ment. This war powers question has come uprepeatedly since the 1950 outbreak of the Ko-rean War, when President Truman commit-ted our forces without first seeking congres-sional approval, but has never been resolved.

In foreign and national security policy, asin domestic policy, neither Congress nor thepresident can accomplish very much for very

long without the cooperation of the other.This is so for both constitutional and prac-tical reasons. The Constitution gives Con-gress the power to ‘‘declare war,’’ but bothCongress and the president share the powerto raise armies and navies and to raise andappropriate funds for their maintenance anddeployment. Only Congress can enact suchmeasures, but it needs the president’s ap-proval or a two-thirds majority of bothhouses to override his veto. Only the presi-dent can negotiate treaties, but he needs atwo-thirds vote of the Senate to ratify them.The president’s separate powers are limitedto receiving ambassadors, serving as com-mander-in-chief of the armed forces andfaithfully executing the laws. If as com-mander-in-chief he orders our armed forcesinto a combat situation, he still needs con-gressional approval to finance such a com-mitment over an extended period of time.

Before the United States became a super-power, disputes over the authority to com-mit our forces rarely arose. We had few occa-sions to deploy our military units abroad,much less commit them to conflict. Armies,navies and news of battle traveled very slow-ly. Air forces and long-range missiles did notexist. There was plenty of time after learn-ing of a threatening event for the presidentto deliberate with Congress about the properresponse. Occasionally, presidents commit-ted us unilaterally, as in our attacks on theBarbary pirates in Tripoli in Jefferson’stime, but it was rare for Congress to claimthat its own prerogatives were being usurpedby the president.

Since World War II, all this has changed.As commander-in-chief of the democratic su-perpower, presidents now deploy our armedforces all over the world. We can attack, orbe attacked, within moments. On numerousoccasions, presidents have committed ourforces to armed conflict, sometimes of a sus-tained nature as in Korea and Vietnam,without asking Congress to declare war. InVietnam, as it had in Korea, Congress ini-tially supported the president’s initiativesby appropriations and other measures. Butas the duration and scope of our military ac-tions in Indochina escalated, an increasinglyrestive Congress enacted the War PowersResolution over President Nixon’s veto. Theresolution laid down a series of rules that re-quire a president ‘‘in every possible in-stance’’ to ‘‘consult with Congress’’ before hecommits our armed forces to combat or toplaces in which hostilities are ‘‘imminent.’’It also requires the withdrawal of thoseforces if Congress fails to adopt an approvingresolution within 60 days.

President Nixon and all subsequent presi-dents have challenged the constitutionalityof these prescriptions, but the SupremeCourt has never accepted a case that wouldresolve this dispute and is unlikely to do soin the near future. When presidents ‘‘con-sult’’ with Congress before committingforces, they are careful to avoid saying theydo so ‘‘pursuant to’’ the War Powers Resolu-tion; they say they do so ‘‘consistent with’’the resolution.

There are obviously situations where mod-ern technology makes advance consultationwith Congress impractical—most notably thecase where our sensor equipment indicatesthat a missile attack has been launched onthe United States or our NATO allies, orwhere speed and secrecy are key factors, asin the rescue of American hostages or repris-als against a terrorist act abroad.

But presidents have continued to commitour forces to armed conflict or situationswhere conflict was clearly ‘‘imminent,’’whether or not split-second timing was im-perative. President Ford, for example re-sponded forcefully to an attack on a U.S.vessel (the Mayaguez) off the Cambodia

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATES 18482 December 13, 1995coast; President Carter launched a militarymission to rescue our hostages in Iran; Presi-dent Reagan put our forces into Lebanon,the Sinai, Chad and Grenada and orderedbombing attacks on Libya; President Bushsent troops into Panama, Liberia, Somalia,Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq.

As for President Clinton, he has alreadyordered our forces into Somalia, Rwanda,Haiti and Macedonia and has authorized ourair units to enforce the U.N. no-fly zone overBosina itself.

Moreover, in the 22 years since the WarPowers Resolution became law, Congress hasnever undermined these presidential uses offorce by action (or inaction) in a way thatwould have blocked the mission or requiredwithdrawal within 60 days.

All this does not mean that Congress mustcede the power to make national security de-cisions to the president. Congress success-fully forced Johnson and Nixon to limit andfinally to terminate the undeclared VietnamWar. Congress successfully stopped Reagan’scovert sales of weapons to Iran and his cov-ert and overt military aid to the contras. Asthese examples show, presidents cannot ef-fectively exercise their separate constitu-tional powers over national security and for-eign policy over an extended period withoutthe cooperation of Congress. That is whyClinton, like Bush in 1990, has invited Con-gress to express its views before our forcesare committed to support the peace agree-ment in Bosnia.

A week ago Friday, while the Dayton nego-tiations were still going on, House Repub-licans passed a bill that would bar the ex-penditure of any funds to sustain U.S. forcesin Bosnia. Fortunately, the Senate is un-likely to follow, and even if it did, a presi-dential veto would be difficult to override.But the House Republicans who launchedthis preemptive strike would do better toemulate former Republican congressmanDick Cheney.

In 1990, when we had a Republican presi-dent and Democratic majorities in bothhouses of Congress, Cheney was the sec-retary of defense. As he said before we en-tered the Gulf War, ‘‘When the stakes haveto do with the leadership of the Free World,we cannot afford to be paralyzed by an intra-mural stalemate.’’ The decision to act, henoted, ‘‘finally belongs to the president. Heis the one who bears the responsibility forsending young men and women to risk death.If the operation fails, it will be his fault. Ihave never heard one of my former [congres-sional] colleagues stand up after a failed op-eration to say, ‘I share the blame for thatone; I advised him to go forward.’ ’’

This does not mean that Congress must ap-prove the president’s proposed commitmentswithout change. For example, following theLebanon precedent, Congress could requireits further approval if the forces were notwithdrawn within, say, 18 months, a periodthat expires after the next elections. Thepresident and Congress have the sharedresponsiblity of finding a solution thatshows we can function as a decisive super-power and as a responsible democracy at thesame time. The public expects no less.

It may be too late to help in the Bosnia de-bate, but there is one change in our processfor making national security decisions thatought to be adopted. The National SecurityCouncil (NSC), the statutory body created toadvise the president on national security af-fairs, consists entirely of officials in the ex-ecutive branch. When the NSC takes up is-sues related to the potential commitment ofour forces, the president could invite the at-tendance of the speaker, the majority andminority leaders of the House and Senateand the chairmen and ranking members ofthe national security and foreign policy

committees of each house. Since the NSCrole is purely advisory, no separation-of-pow-ers issues would arise. In this way Congress,in its own favorite phrase, would be effec-tively consulted before the takeoff, ratherthan at the time of the landing. The coopera-tion on national security issues that the na-tion wants and expects might still elude us,but the president would have done his partto carry out George Shultz’s admonitionthat trust between the branches must beWashington’s ‘‘coin of the realm.’’

Several Senators addressed theChair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-ator from Nebraska is next to be recog-nized under the previous order.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Will the Senatorfrom Nebraska yield for a unanimousconsent request?

Mr. KERREY. I am pleased to yield.Mrs. HUTCHISON. I ask unanimous

consent Senator SNOWE be sequencedfollowing Senator BRADLEY in speakingorder.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Nebraska is recog-nized.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, first,the Senator from Virginia just gavevery eloquent testimony, not just tothe U.S. abilities in the past to accom-plish good things, but the risks con-tained in them.

I did have a great honor to be able totravel with the Senator from Virginiaearlier this year, to Zagreb and downto Split and down to Knin in theKrajina Valley where the Croatianforces had succeeded in driving, bysome estimates, close to 200,000 mili-tary and civilian personnel from thatvalley. It was very clear to me that Iwas in the presence of a man who un-derstood, not just that particular re-gion as well as any, but understood thegreat value and importance of weAmericans leading where we can anddoing what is possible to make theworld a safer and better place. I havemany of the same misgivings the Sen-ator from Virginia just expressed and Iknow that, in expressing opposition tothe resolution and the deployment, inhis own statement just now he wantsthis mission to be successful. He wantsthis operation, this NATO operation tobe a success.

I also must say——Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish

to thank my distinguished colleague.We will travel together again to otherplaces in the world on behalf of ourArmed Forces.

I will be pleased to hear the Sen-ator’s remarks.

Mr. KERREY. I look forward to thetravel. I learned a great deal in a rel-atively short period of time from thedistinguished senior Senator from Vir-ginia. I look forward to having achance to travel and learn again.

The goal of any policy, particularly aforeign policy, I presume and hope, issuccess. But, in a complex and confusedconflict, such as this one, which hasfestered for centuries, success is ex-tremely hard to define. The civil war in

the former Yugoslavia is the con-sequence of a very confusing sequenceof events that very few people under-stand fully. Yugoslavia itself was anintricate construct of religions and na-tionalities. Even the future con-sequences of U.S. inaction now are notimmediately clear. Also, there hasbeen considerable disinformation putout by all sides in the conflict, to jus-tify the claims that all sides have tothe status of being a victim.

The international solution comingout of the Dayton agreement is not ex-actly simple either. A NATO force, in-cluding non-NATO units and even Rus-sian units, is to separate the partiesalong a meandering 600-mile boundaryline and then oversee the restoration ofcivilian government functions inBosnia.

Meanwhile, the European Commu-nity and international donors put to-gether a financial program to rebuildBosnia’s infrastructure. The plan mayor may not be brilliant, but it cer-tainly is not simple.

So it is not surprising, Mr. President,that well-informed citizens—and I amthinking in my case of Nebraskans whoI had the honor of visiting with thisweek to discuss this policy—do notfully understand the Bosnian case.

As I indicated earlier, I had the op-portunity to travel to the former Yugo-slavia, have attended hours of briefingsin the intelligence community, andhave visited the National MilitaryJoint Intelligence Center in the Penta-gon the last two Fridays. I must say Ido not fully understand this problem,either.

Mr. President, I do understand thatAmerican leadership has already madeit better. My response to those who de-spair of improving this tangled regionis that from the moment of PresidentClinton’s decision last summer to leadthe way to a solution, the formerYugoslavia has become a more peacefulplace. Bosnia is now a safer place forits inhabitants.

Mr. President, it was only last sum-mer that the only access to Bosnia’scapital, Sarajevo, was over the dan-gerous Mount Igman road. Three Amer-ican diplomats were killed in July onthat road. The airport was closed.Sarajevo’s very life was at risk frommortar attacks, from snipers, and fromthe cutoff of the energy and food onwhich life depends.

Then came the United States com-mitment to lead, AmbassadorHolbrooke’s full-court press, and todayBosnians are safer as a consequence. C–130’s now land at Sarajevo. Sarajevans’daily brushes with death are over, wepray forever. Energy and food deliv-eries are resuming, Mr. President. I amdescribing the indicators of success—success we have already achieved.

The distinguished Senator from Vir-ginia earlier indicated, and I thinkquite properly, a test that all of usshould apply to an operation, to a mis-sion of this kind. That is, would we beable to go into the home of a family

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S 18483December 13, 1995who had lost a loved one in a conflictand tell them what their loved one hadaccomplished? Was it worth their sac-rifice?

Mr. President, you would, I think, behard pressed not to be able to go intothe homes of the three diplomats whogave their lives to secure peace inYugoslavia and not be able to say that,thanks to their bravery in July, beingwilling to run the risks associated withtravel to Sarajevo at the time, that asa consequence of their bravery we nowhave peace in that city.

There are many people who are plan-ning trips there and lots of travel goingon there. Mr. President, there has beena tremendous success accomplished al-ready.

Last August when I visited Yugo-slavia, Sarajevo was judged so dan-gerous that the administration saidthat I and the delegation that I trav-eled with should not go there. We couldnot get to the capital of the countrywhich is at the heart of this problem.Today, not only is Sarajevo accessible,but Tuzla, where our troops will be sta-tioned, is accessible as well. Already,several congressional delegations havetraveled there in the past few weeks tosee for themselves the conditions ourtroops will face. That access is thefruit of policy success.

But success in any enterprise, Mr.President, is temporary unless you arewilling to secure it and to build on it.The Dayton agreement provides formilitary forces to enforce separation ofthe parties and to ensure compliancewith the agreement. If all the partiescomply with the agreement, successwill be achieved and a peaceful, secureBosnia will not just be a possibility butan odds-on likelihood.

Mr. President, given what has hap-pened in Bosnia and what could happenwithout the decisive impact of Amer-ican leadership, I contend this would bea highly successful outcome, one inwhich all Americans could take greatpride.

Mr. President, much has been said—Ihave listened to many colleagues, and Ihave heard, particularly on talk radio,concern expressed—about PresidentClinton as Commander in Chief. Firstof all, let it be said that Mr. Clinton,our President, is the architect of thispolicy and he is the Commander inChief of our Armed Forces. As the dis-tinguished majority leader has cor-rectly stated, we only have one Presi-dent, one Commander in Chief. OurArmed Forces have a high level of goodorder and discipline. They recognizethat fact. They will follow the ordersthe President gives them. They willproceed to the places named in his or-ders.

When we do our constitutional dutyof debating deployment such as thisone, we should not say or do anythingwhich might separate the ArmedForces from their properly constitutedchain of command. A resolution of thisbody declaring support for the troopsbut opposition to the action the Presi-

dent has ordered the troops to takecould have very negative consequencesfor the morale of the Armed Forces aswell as for the outcome of the mission.

A statement by one Senator such asI read in this morning’s New YorkTimes to the effect that this Senatorhas spoken to soldiers at a military in-stallation and said, ‘‘They’re with me.They’re mixed. They know I’m forthem and I’m trying to keep themout,’’ is not helpful. The troops arewith their Commander in Chief andwith no one else, regardless of the out-come of this debate.

There is also a good deal of talk, asI said, on talk radio criticizing BillClinton’s right to deploy Americanforces and his ability to commandthose deployed forces because he didnot go to Vietnam.

I will address this topic, Mr. Presi-dent, head on. Having not served, Imust say, can be a handicap for peopleserving as Commander in Chief of themilitary, no two ways about it. Thereare parts of a job you grow into, and Ibelieve strongly that the President hasreally grown as a Commander in Chief.He inherited Somalia from the Bushadministration, and as Commander inChief of the Somalia operation, BillClinton has experienced the humantragedy of being the leader when Unit-ed States casualties occur. He has notflinched from hard talks with the fami-lies of casualties that occurred on hiswatch. Those talks are a sobering andmaturing experience for any com-mander, even a President. He is notnaive or starry eyed about what he isordering young Americans to do.

There is another aspect of Presi-dential service that must be consid-ered, particularly as we engage in thiskind of debate. Bill Clinton may nothave been in combat in Vietnam, but ina very real way he, like all his prede-cessors, is experiencing combat now.He is experiencing the daily dangerwhich, unfortunately, is part of his job.His residence has been attacked twice.He suffered the loss of a friend andally, Prime Minister Rabin. He knowsfirsthand every day the sense of an un-known but ever present threat to yourlife and the life of your family, whichis an essential part of combat. In thissense, too, he has matured a lot. Thejob has that effect on people.

In the final analysis, though, themost important tool that the Presidentbrings to being Commander in Chief isthe fact that he is properly sworn. Heis the duly elected President of theUnited States of America. Mr. Presi-dent, that is all it takes. Every Amer-ican soldier, every American sailor,every American airman and marinemust understand it.

As far as a national interest, Mr.President, it does fall to the Presidentof the United States to define the Na-tion’s vital interests and then act todefend them. Such interests are atissue in the former Yugoslavia. Themost important one, in my judgment,is the stability of Europe.

We have learned in this century thatwe ignore European instability at ourperil. Twice we have made the mistakeof thinking Europeans, with theirmoney and sophistication and long ex-perience as countries, could maintaintheir own stability. Twice we have hadto send millions of our soldiers to fightin Europe to correct the mistake andto lead Europeans into stable, peacefularrangements with each other. Theremay come a time when Europeans cando this all by themselves, but theYugoslavian experience of the past 4years shows that time is not yet here.

At the end of World War II, Americadetermined to shore up the stabilityand security of Europe. Former friendand foe alike were a shambles, com-munism was a growing force in Euro-pean domestic politics, and the SovietUnion showed both the ability and theinclination to incorporate all the con-tinent into his family of satellitestates.

To our farsighted leaders of the pe-riod, a crisis was apparent. They re-sponded with a decisive commitment ofAmerican leadership. They organizedan alliance of the United States, Can-ada, and 13 European countries, an alli-ance with a simple but breathtakinglyopen-ended commitment, an attack onany member was an attack on all. Inother words, we would go to war to de-fend any NATO member. With the im-plementing vision of the first SupremeAllied Commander, Dwight D. Eisen-hower, the NATO alliance began arecord of achievement that climaxednot a year later but 40 years later withthe fall of the Berlin wall and the col-lapse of Soviet communism.

Whenever we give speeches aboutwhat we are proud of in America’s ac-complishments since World War II, webrag, and very properly so, about ourvictory in the cold war and the U.S.leadership of NATO which made vic-tory possible. Mr. President, our com-mitment in 1949 was not totally as-sured of success. Far from it. And ourcommitment was not accompanied by acongressional requirement for an exitstrategy. In 1949 our leaders acted bold-ly to leverage American leadershipinto an alliance with a good chance ofsuccess. Today, with a new situation inEurope, we face a requirement to actagain, boldly, to restore and maintainEuropean stability. Again, NATO is theinstrument of choice. If we do not act,instability will spread more broadly ina region in which major European pow-ers have historic interests and have notshrunk from war to advance those in-terests. If we do not use NATO as ourinstrument, this alliance will not beavailable to continue its 40 year role asthe guarantor of a peaceful, stable Eu-rope.

It was not so long ago that our majorEuropean allies were usually at eachother’s throats. NATO created a frame-work of defense cooperation in whichshared interests outweighed rivalries.Today NATO expansion carries the po-tential to extend the same cooperation

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATES 18484 December 13, 1995into Eastern Europe and I hope, even-tually, Russia and other former SovietStates. I cannot think of a better wayto lock-in the benefits of the end of thecold war. But without NATO as a vi-brant, capable organization, it will nothappen. NATO cannot be such an orga-nization without U.S. leadership. Mr.President, stability in Europe and thecontinued viability of NATO are ourvital interests, and they are at issuetoday in the Balkans.

We have other lesser, but importantinterests there. We have an interest ina peaceful, stable, Russia which cooper-ates with us and with NATO on defensematters and with which we can sharemutual confidence. The deployment ofRussian units to the I-FOR under Unit-ed States command provides a poten-tially priceless opportunity to buildsuch a relationship. Also, we have aninterest in developing a better rela-tionship with the Moslem world. Mos-lems have clearly been the underdog inthe Yugoslav war, and American lead-ership to preserve and secure a Bosniawhich is again safe for Moslems willhave positive effect on United Statesrelations with the Moslem world. Itwill show the truth of our nationalcharacter, which is we seek justice andfairness and do not play ethnic favor-ites.

DRAFT A RESOLUTION TO SUPPORT SUCCESS

What we vote today matters. Weshould not hamstring our commanderswith requirements that make successharder to attain. When we require theadministration to supply armaments ofthe highest quality to one of the com-batants, the highest quality being thebest the United States has in its ownarsenal, or when we pass a resolutionwhich sets an artificial time limit onan operation which should only bebounded by accomplishment of the as-signed task, we are placing handicapson Admiral Smith’s ability to accom-plish the mission. I know none of uswants to do that. Once our troops arecommitted, all of us wants them tosucceed.

I must also add my concern aboutCongress declaring U.S. creditability tobe a strategic interest. We may be issu-ing an open-ended invitation to Presi-dents present and future to make uni-lateral commitments and require Con-gress to support them on the fuzzybasis of credibility. The stability ofEurope is reason enough for this oper-ation, in my view.

Mr. President, I have been to brief-ings at the Intelligence Committee andhave spent the last two Friday after-noons at the National Military JointIntelligence Center at the Pentagon,trying to learn all I can about this mis-sion and the intelligence support ourcommanders will be getting. I am im-mensely proud to have a military thatcan do a mission like this—to go intodifficult terrain in tough weather con-ditions and be able to provide its ownsupport and security while being pre-pared to engage any or all of three con-tending armies. I am proud of the work

our national and military intelligencecommunities have done and are doingto support our troops with the best in-telligence available, and also supportthe NATO and foreign forces in theI-FOR. No one else in the world coulddo this, except the United States. Weare doing it, as I said, to protect vitalinterests. We are doing it in a goodcause.

If all the parties to the Dayton agree-ment abide by it, our leadership will bebrought peace to the Balkans. Moreimportantly, we will have extended theguarantee of European stability towhich we have been committed, inNATO, since 1949. If we lead with thevision of our post-war predecessors, wecan achieve success in Bosnia.

Mr. President, finally, let me pointout what should be obvious. The suc-cess that has been achieved thus farhas been a success of the President ofthe United States committed toachieve peace in the Balkans, but asuccess that has been put together bydiplomats, by politicians, some electedand appointed leaders, not just of theUnited States but of all three of thenations in the Balkans. And if successis to be the end goal, and if we are toachieve that success, the military canonly do part of it. In order for the mili-tary to be successful, we political lead-ers are going to have to do the hardwork of making certain that all theparties adhere to the agreement thatwe expect them to sign in Paris tomor-row.

I believe there is a good chance ofsuccess—of further and continued suc-cess—a chance of success that is worththe risk that we take, the risk of livesand the risk of capital in the Balkans.

I hope that the debate about this res-olution—a nonbinding resolution thatdoes not necessarily impact the Presi-dent—I hope that the President hearsthroughout all of this debate perhapssome criticism. But even critics haveto grudgingly, I hope, acknowledgethat there is peace in the Balkans, thatyou can fly to Sarajevo, that childrenand civilians in Sarajevo markets donot worry on Sundays—as they didwhen I was there on the 28th of Au-gust—that 120-millimeter rockets andmortars were going to rain down onthem and take their lives. That fear isgone today. The fear of sniper attack isgone.

If the standdown of forces occurs inthe first 30 days and in the next 45 daysand the next 180 days, if we can juststand down the forces, the UnitedStates of America will continue to beable to say that we are saving lives.There are people alive today in Sara-jevo that would not have been alivewere it not for leadership of the Presi-dent of the United States and the peo-ple of the United States backing thatPresident.

I hope we understand and appreciatethe great success that only the UnitedStates of America could achieve underthe leadership of Bill Clinton. I hopethis debate does not cloud that success,

and I hope this debate does not preventand make more difficult a continuationof our efforts to build upon that suc-cess.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the

Chair.The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GOR-

TON). The Senator from Texas.Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I

ask unanimous consent that SenatorLOTT be traded in speaking order forSenator DOMENICI, who would be next,and also that Senator KASSEBAUM beadded after Senator NUNN in the speak-ing order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-

ator from Mississippi.Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I thank the

distinguished Senator from Texas foraccommodating my schedule and al-lowing me to change the order of thelist of speakers. I also want to thankher for her leadership in this area. It isnot easy. It takes a lot of courage, andthe Senator from Texas has done an ex-cellent job on this issue. I support herresolution because it best reflects myviews on this issue.

This resolution expresses oppositionto the decision to put United Statestroops on the ground in Bosnia, andalso it says that we support our troops.Certainly, we all do, whether they arein the Continental United States oranywhere around the world. This reso-lution is simple. It is direct. It is to thepoint. And, I agree with it. I oppose thedecision to send U.S. ground troops toBosnia.

Conversely, I intend to oppose theresolution by the distinguished major-ity leader, and the Senator from Ari-zona, Senator MCCAIN. They have doneexcellent work on their resolution.They have improved it considerably.But it still has language that to me—leaves the impression that a vote infavor of the resolution equates to au-thorizing, or agreeing with the decisionto deploy ground troops. It does notsay exactly that, but it still has lan-guage that gives me discomfort in thatarea.

I also have difficulty with our put-ting United States troops on theground—supposedly as neutral I-Fortroops between the Serbians, theBosnians, and the Croats on the otherside—all while the United States leadsan effort to train, equip, and arm theBosnians. That is a precarious positionfor U.S forces. I think that is a veryimpractical arrangement. You cannotappear to be, or try to be neutral whileyou are in fact leading an effort totrain one party of the three factions in-volved. So I have not been able to getthat problem worked out in my mindwith the language that is before theSenate in the resolution by SenatorDOLE.

Mr. President, in 1921, Oliver WendellHolmes wrote:

A page of history is worth a volume oflogic.

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S 18485December 13, 1995Without an understanding of history,

it is easy to repeat the mistakes of his-tory, and it is in that context of his-tory that we must carefully reviewPresident Clinton’s decision to sendUnited States ground troops intoBosnia.

On November 21, 1995, President Clin-ton announced that an agreement hadbeen reached in Dayton, OH, an agree-ment which he believed would securepeace in the former Yugoslavian Re-public of Bosnia. According to him, keyto its success would be participation of20,000 American military personnel onthe ground. Without American involve-ment, the President suggested therewould be no peace and U.S. leadershipof NATO would suffer, perhaps to thepoint of rendering NATO useless. Butthe President’s dire warnings must notbe simply conceded under the assump-tion that he is right. The decision tosend United States troops to Bosniashould not be reached because of feareddiminution of United States leadershipin the world or of NATO.

The fundamental decision should bebased on answers to two simple specificquestions: Are vital United States na-tional security interests under threatin Bosnia? Do we have an effective exitstrategy?

Before going further, I want to saythat the President deserves credit forcreating a negotiating frameworkwhich brought together the leaders ofthe warring parties and for fostering anenvironment of serious work to bringpeace to war-torn Bosnia.

But the decision to deploy UnitedStates troops to Bosnia is much morecomplex than just simply affirming apeace agreement negotiated in Dayton.Much more must be considered beforeour troops are deployed en masse.

Before addressing the two immediatequestions regarding this decision,though, whether to deploy the troops,we must understand the history ofBosnia, if for no other reason than togain some sense of the potential suc-cess or failure of that Dayton agree-ment.

In his second State of the Union Ad-dress in 1862, President Lincoln coun-seled the Congress to remember thatwe cannot escape history. That samecounsel applies to the strife-riddenBosnia.

The former Yugoslavia found itsbirth in 1918 as the Kingdom of theSerbs, the Croats and Slovenes unitedunder the reign of King Alexander. In1929, the country was renamed Yugo-slavia, but the recent civil unrest inBosnia can be traced much furtherback than that. The deep hatred andanimosity of the Serbian, Bosnian, andCroatian peoples was not born fromtheir forced union in 1918. It reachesback to the mid-1300’s when the Otto-man Turks subdued the Serbian state.

History is clear that death, civilstrife, and general mayhem betweenthe Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians wasprolific between the mid-1300’s untilTito solidified his control of Yugo-

slavia at the close of World War II. Inmost cases, the hostility between theparties was based on religious and cul-tural divisions and the leadership ofthe day, whether it be King Alexanderor Tito, used these religious and cul-tural hatreds as tools to suppress, tocheck, and to trump the national aspi-rations of each of the parties in the re-gion. The result was nearly continuousbloodshed between the three warringfactions.

This backward, bloody, and ugly his-tory led British Prime Minister Ben-jamin Disraeli to tell the House ofLords in 1878 these words, which are ap-plicable to today’s situation. He said:

No language can describe adequately thecondition of that large portion of the Balkanpeninsula—Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina andother provinces—political intrigues, con-stant rivalries, a total absence of all publicspirit—hatred of all races, animosities ofrival religions and absence of any control-ling power . . . nothing short of 50,000 of thebest troops would produce anything likeorder in these parts.

That was in 1878. If it would havetaken 50,000 troops then, how manytroops would it take today?

When King Alexander was assas-sinated in 1934 by Croatian extremists,Yugoslavia began to split apart at theseams. Why was King Alexander assas-sinated? Well, in 1929 he tried to createan autonomous Serb, Croat, andSlovene government under a unifiedfederalist structure called Yugoslavia.While one central government was toremain under his leadership, the threeparties would achieve independence.

The Dayton agreement—at its fun-damental base—seeks to resurrectmuch of King Alexander’s failed plan of1929. But instead of creating three sep-arate states under one central govern-ment, the Dayton agreement seeks tocreate two parts, the Croat-BosnianFederation and the Serbian Republic,all under one central government.

Just as President Lincoln said, ‘‘Wecannot escape history,’’ neither canPresident Clinton escape the history ofYugoslavia, nor can any of us afford toignore it. Based on this history, it islikely—and unfortunate—that therewill be no peace in Bosnia with or with-out United States troops on the groundto support it.

No international troop presence onthe ground in Bosnia will restore peaceto a region which has forgotten peace,does not remember peace, and does notforgive past violations of peace. UnitedStates troops should not be squanderedon such a prospect.

Yes, we all hope for peace, but thepeace must be achieved in the heartsand minds of the people there who havebeen warring for centuries. Americacannot impose it with military troops.

The United States has a history, anoble history, and a heritage born fromwar in search of peace. Ours is a noblehistory and heritage, but this heritageshould not and does not commit us toblind military commitments, the goalof which is to right historical wrongsor impose tranquility where tran-

quility does not exist or has not ex-isted for over 600 years.

War is an ugly, gruesome undertak-ing. War should not be pursued orwaged for mere political expediency orhumanitarian gains.

Now, there are those who will saythere is not war here; this is a tenuouspeace. Yes, but how long will it be thatway? As I pointed out, one of thethings that worries me is if we go insaying we are neutral but acting in apartisan way supporting one faction,how long will that peace hold?

While we must be good at wagingwar, not all wars are fit for the UnitedStates to come in and solve the prob-lem. Why must we always be the onethat sends our troops in, no matterwhere it is around the world, when wedo not have a vital national securityinterest? The United States shouldonly participate militarily on theground in places in which U.S. inter-ests are clear and understandable.

I have looked long and hard to findUnited States vital security interestswhich are under threat by the civilstrife in Bosnia. I have not found any.The United States does have vital secu-rity interests in Central and WesternEurope, but the civil war in Bosniadoes not threaten these interests.Therefore, we should not go. That isthe fundamental hurdle that I cannotgo over.

If our vital security interests dictatethat we should place troops in harm’sway, then we must go. We should andwe will. We will be prepared to fight forour vital national interests and win.We should go, though, as combatantsprepared to fight, to do whatever isnecessary, but only if our vital secu-rity interests are required.

The President has talked about ro-bust rules of engagement.

But he has not clearly and specifi-cally outlined his commitment and in-tent to respond disproportionatelyshould U.S. troops come under attackor siege. If our troops go, there must beno limits. If Serb forces take hostages,or others, or attack U.S. patrols, thePresident must be willing, committedand intent on taking the conflict to thesafe haven of other countries that areinvolved, specifically Belgrade.

I have not heard this commitmentfrom the President, nor do I read thislevel of commitment as his intent.Anything less will sentence U.S.ground personnel to a hunkered-down,bunker existence suffering casualtiesin disparate hit-and-run attacks. U.S.personnel would become targets, plen-tiful and ripe.

We have made that mistake in thepast. We made it in Somalia. And weshould not repeat it. It may not happenimmediately. Maybe it will not happenin the cold, snowy winter months afterwe first arrive. But it would, I think,happen sooner or later. And the priceof American lives should not be set solow for a goal so distant from our ownvital security interests.

As President Clinton announced hisintention to send U.S. troops to

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATES 18486 December 13, 1995Bosnia, I pulled out his National Secu-rity Strategy, a document that thePresident presented to the Congress inJuly 1994. Under the section addressingpeace operations, on page 14, it says:

Two other points deserve emphasis. First,the primary mission of our armed forces isnot peace operations; it is to deter and, ifnecessary, to fight and win conflicts inwhich our most important interests arethreatened. Second, while the internationalcommunity can create conditions for peace,the responsibility for peace ultimately restswith the people of the country in question.That is what President Clinton had to sayjust in July of 1994—only 17 months ago.

The President’s own national secu-rity strategy does not warrant sendingtroops into this area. Bosnia does notrepresent a conflict in which our mostimportant interests are threatened, norhave the people of former Yugoslaviaassumed the responsibility for peace.

The second issue which must be con-sidered prior to sending troops is thequestion of identifying a clear, defini-tive exit strategy. How will we knowwhen the mission is completed and it istime to leave? We have been told ayear, or was it about a year? Will it be14 months or 15 months? How muchwill it cost? We were told, well, $1.5 bil-lion. And then we were told, $2 billion.We all know it will be $4 billion or $5billion.

The President said the U.S. missionin Bosnia will be ‘‘clear, limited, andachievable.’’ But I have not heard ar-ticulated the most important point:How will we know the mission has beenachieved so that we will know it istime for us to leave? If we do not havea clear, identifiable exit strategy, wewill be suspect to expanding our reasonfor going. New missions will be added,like we have seen in other instances.Success will be harder to identify.

A successful exit strategy cannot bedriven by a time limit as the Presidenthas suggested and as, quite frankly,the Congress has sought. Is it just thatwe will stay 1 year, wait for theBosnians to be sufficiently trained andequipped, and then leave? I do notthink that is what was intended, butperhaps that is the real exit strategy.It must be constructed with the inten-tion of leaving behind a locally sup-ported peace that does not require anopen-ended commitment of U.S. troops.Once again, the history of the regiondoes not lead to any rational conclu-sion that is what would happen.

I do not believe that the Americanpeople are willing to support a pro-longed occupation by U.S. troops inBosnia, and we will have one if no clearexit strategy exists.

In the Persian Gulf we had a clear,measurable, and definite exit strat-egy—expel Iraq from Kuwait. Manypeople think we should have gone fur-ther. I am not one of them, because,you see, we had a strategy. It was toremove Iraq out of Kuwait and thenleave, period. No one disputes the re-sults of the gulf war.

This is not the case in this presentsituation. Under the President’s own

National Security Strategy, he ac-knowledges that successful peace oper-ations can only be sustained when theresponsible parties want peace. Onceagain, the history of the region doesnot lead anyone to believe that theleaders of Serbia or Croatia and Bosniawant peace at all costs. And this planwill not grow the seeds for such a de-sire.

I urge my colleagues to look at theproposed settlement map. As I under-stand it—and there has been some dis-agreement and controversy aboutthis—but there will be some repatri-ation of displaced Serbs into Croatian-held territory. Maybe we will not beactually doing that, but as I under-stand the agreement, we will be respon-sible for protecting them and at leastin some ways assisting in this oper-ation.

How do you think the Croatians willreact to this repatriation? Approv-ingly? Or the Bosnians when people ofSerbian descent are repatriated toBosnia? Do not forget that this currentconflict started when the Serbs decidedthey wanted to exterminate theBosnian people from territory theyconsidered theirs from centuries be-fore.

I just do not believe this plan willwork. If it could work, it could workwithout U.S. ground troops on theground. King Alexander tried it 68years ago. He paid the price with hislife at the hands of a Croatian loyalistand extremist. If we try it, Americanswill die in a faraway land, one steepedin hatred and one in which we have novital security interests under threat.

The United States should not resignitself to rubber stamp this decision—one based on noble intent, yet ill-con-ceived. The President has tried to ex-plain the logic of deploying U.S. troopson the ground in Bosnia, but only onepage of the history of this troubled re-gion explains why we should not go.

I urge my colleagues to vote for theHutchison resolution and against theDole-McCain resolution.

Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed theChair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-ator from Texas.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, Iask unanimous consent that SenatorMACK be added in speaker order afterSenator SARBANES and Senator JEF-FORDS be added after Senator KERRY ofMassachusetts.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN addressed theChair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-ator from California.

Under the unanimous-consent order,the next speaker on the Democraticside was to have been the Senator fromVirginia.

Does the Senator from California askunanimous consent to change thatorder?

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Yes. It is my un-derstanding that for the time being Iam taking his place.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the Chair.Mr. President, I have really come full

circle on the question of whether ornot to send U.S. troops to Bosnia to tryto keep the peace. I must say I was ini-tially very skeptical. I believed thatyou could not keep a peace that thepeople in Bosnia do not want kept. Andin the earlier meetings of the ForeignRelations Committee I was not con-vinced by the arguments presented bySecretaries Christopher and Perry andthe Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff.

But as events have developed, I havecome to the conclusion, after attendingevery classified briefing and every For-eign Relations Committee meeting,that the President’s policy is the onlyway to stop this war and prevent itsspread. I believe there is far greaterrisk in doing nothing and seeing thespread of this war than there is indoing something and trying to bringabout a just peace.

The Dayton peace agreement wouldnot have been reached without U.S.leadership, and it will not be success-fully implemented without our leader-ship either.

I have also become deeply convincedthat the United States has a moralmission here, that the cause is nobleand the cause is just. Today one-half ofthe people of Bosnia are either dead orhomeless. Rape has become an instru-ment of war. Atrocities have been com-mitted that have not been seen sinceWorld War II. This must end. Peoplehave had enough of war.

The United States is being asked es-sentially to provide one-third of thepeacekeeping forces. The other day Iwas visited by the new British Ambas-sador. He pointed out to me that GreatBritain is going to provide 16,000troops, a nation far smaller than ours;13,000 in Bosnia itself and 3,000 in Hun-gary and Austria.

He also said, ‘‘Know this. If the Unit-ed States goes, we go, too. We in GreatBritain and in Europe look at you asthe leader of NATO.’’ If NATO is tofunction, the United States must leadand perform. And I believe that is es-sentially the way it is today, whetherwe like it or not.

At our most recent Foreign RelationsCommittee hearing on December 1, Iwas deeply impressed with the argu-ments put forward by Secretary Chris-topher, Secretary Perry, and GeneralShalikashvili. They laid out not onlythe rationale for our involvement but aclear and well-defined plan for carryingout our mission.

Some of the opponents of this policyare making the argument that they op-pose the policy but they support thetroops to carry it out. In fact, theHutchison resolution that we will bevoting on shortly says exactly that.But as I listened to these arguments, Imust say that to me they strike me asa figleaf at best and disingenuous atworst.

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S 18487December 13, 1995We all support our troops. That goes

without saying. But what message dowe send to our troops if we send themoff to do a job and in the same breathdeclare that the job that they aredoing is illegitimate? How can you say,‘‘I condemn the mission you are beingsent to do, but I support you in doingit’’? Will our troops really believe theyhave our support if this is what theCongress of the United States says?

Some have raised the specter of a re-peat of Vietnam in Bosnia, but the realrepetition of Vietnam would be to sendUnited States troops to carry out amission without supporting that mis-sion. Some of my colleagues haveasked: ‘‘Does anyone believe we arereally going to stand by our young menand women that we are going to sendto Bosnia?’’ Well, I certainly am, thePresident is, the full force of the Unit-ed States military is, and I believe thatthe Senate will in the long run as well.

In my view, the Hutchison resolutionundercuts the troops. It says it sup-ports the troops, but it is designed togive the President a back door to pullthe rug out from under them. Insteadof giving lukewarm support to thetroops by questioning the wisdom oftheir job, we should unify behind thepolicy and commit to giving our troopsevery advantage, all the equipment andall the support they need to carry outthe mission successfully.

We cannot have it both ways. If wesupport the troops, we should supportthe policy.

I have had an opportunity to reviewthe Dole-McCain resolution, and I sup-port it and I support it strongly. Iwould like to set aside some of themyths that I think have been raised bythose who are opposed to it.

The first is the myth of the intracta-ble nature of the conflict. There aresome who appear to have bought intothe argument of ultranationalists onall sides. Yes, there have been wars forhundreds of years in the Balkans, butthere has been a history of war andbrutal atrocities in Britain, in France,in Germany. Today these nations areat peace.

As the distinguished Senator fromOhio pointed out yesterday, we hadPrime Minister Shimon Peres on thefloor of the House yesterday speakingabout the long history of violence inthe Middle East. That goes back to theCrusades, and even beyond. Conflicthas been endemic to the Middle Eastfor centuries, but today peace is begin-ning to take hold.

What about Northern Ireland? Thatconflict has gone on for a long time aswell. But I do not think anyone herewould suggest that the Middle East orNorthern Ireland are beyond help anddoomed to an eternity of conflict, andI do not think we should come to theconclusion that the only way of life inBosnia is a way of death and atrocitiesand the spread of the war.

The fact is that there is now an op-portunity for peace, perhaps the onlyopportunity that we will have. If we

fail to take this opportunity, this warwill surely spread to Kosovo, to Mac-edonia. It then involves two NATO al-lies— Greece and Turkey—and then itinvolves the rest of Europe, and Europehas always been a vital interest to theUnited States. Our men and womenhave fought two wars on the EuropeanContinent because of that interest.

There is also the myth that there isno clear and defined mission, and Iwould like to debunk that.

Some of my colleagues have com-plained that this operation is not clear,and that it is not achievable. But ifyou listen to the President, to Sec-retary Christopher, to Secretary Perry,to General Shalikashvili, to GeneralJoulwan, and to others in our military,it is clear that this mission, in fact, isclearly defined. As a matter of fact,General Joulwan said yesterday heshould know within the first 3 monthswhether the mission can succeed ornot.

There is a clear exit strategy. Ourtroops are not being asked to go toBosnia to engage in all sorts ofnationbuilding activities. The militarymission and the goals are explicit, andthey are limited. We will not be en-gaged in civilian policing. We will notbe engaged in refugee resettlement. Wewill not be engaged in civilian recon-struction. We will not be engaged inelection monitoring.

The President and NATO leadershave been quite clear. Our forces inBosnia will monitor the military as-pects of the peace agreement, the ces-sation of hostilities, the withdrawal offorces to their respective territories,and the lines of demarcation. They willmonitor the redeployment of forces andheavy weapons to designated areas andthe establishment of zones of separa-tion. That is the mission.

I want to speak about the one part ofthe Dole-McCain joint resolution thatdoes concern me, and that is the partthat appears on page 4 and speaks tothe balance of power. A major portionof this effort is to see that when theUnited States pulls out in approxi-mately 1 year, there is a defensive bal-ance of power so that the Bosnians, ifneed be, can defend themselves. Thiscan be a deterrent to future wars if itis carried out correctly. However, itcannot become the launching point forradical Islamic fundamentalism on theEuropean Continent, and I want tostress that.

The Dole-McCain resolution veryclearly describes periodic reports onthe armaments provided to theBosnians that the President will maketo this Congress, and I think that is ex-tremely important. I think every Mem-ber of this body should be militant inseeing that destabilizing weapons donot go into this area and that the bal-ance of power that is achieved is a de-fensive balance of power. I think thatis extraordinarily important, and Ithink it has to be clearly stated.

There is another myth about the lackof U.S. interests in the region. People

have said, ‘‘You know, many of ourcitizens can’t recognize Bosnia on amap. We don’t want to send our peoplethere. They may die. We have no majornational interest in the area.’’ And Ithought this originally. But I believethe United States does have an interestin a safe, secure, and stable Europe.The United States does have an inter-est in assuring that this conflict doesnot spread and become the third gen-eral European war of this century.

The United States does have an in-terest in supporting our NATO alliesand assuring that NATO can continuein its role guaranteeing European secu-rity.

Because of World War II and becauseof the threat of Communist aggressionfrom the Soviet Union, the NATO alli-ance was set up to provide peace andstability for the NATO nations, andthis Nation has always been in theleadership of that effort. We have madethe commitment to it throughout theyears, and the reason we have done sois because of the failure of Europe inWorld War I to protect itself, in WorldWar II to protect itself, and, I am sorryto say, that same failure we see theretoday. You see, very few strong Euro-pean leaders are willing to come for-ward and say, ‘‘We will tackle this jobalone because it’s on our back door.’’

Now, we can be repelled by this, wecan be reviled by it, we can view itwith dismay and with some shock, butit is the real world out there, and,therefore, this is where the credibilityof the NATO alliance comes in. TheUnited States is critical to the successand survival of the NATO alliance.

As the British Ambassador said tome 2 days ago, ‘‘We will be there aslong as the United States is. If theUnited States leaves, Great Britainleaves.’’ Period. The end. That, to me,spoke volumes of the importance ofU.S. leadership. There was no Europeancountry that could effect the peace. Ittook the United States of America toeffect the peace. So I believe we havean interest in reaffirming our own posi-tion as the global leader of the freeworld and protecting that leadershipand that freedom.

I believe the United States has amoral interest in ending crimes againsthumanity. I, myself, could have beenborn in Eastern Europe, in Poland. Iwould never have been privileged tohave a good life had that been the case.Well, the same circumstances arepresent today in Bosnia. I rememberall during the 1940’s, when people weresaying, ‘‘How could we not have re-sponded?’’ ‘‘How could we not haveknown?’’ ‘‘How did we not know thatthese boxcars were traveling through-out Europe and turn a deaf ear to whatwas happening?’’

It is moral. It is just. It is noble. Weare not asked to fight a war. We areasked to give peace a chance.

Thank you, Mr. President. I yield thefloor.

Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed theChair.

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATES 18488 December 13, 1995The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-

ator from Texas is recognized.Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President,

Senator HATFIELD is on his way to thefloor, and he is next in line to replaceSenator DEWINE in the order. I wantedto take this opportunity until he getshere to answer what several Senatorshave said on the floor—most recently,the Senator from California, and beforethat, the Senator from Connecticut—regarding people who would supportmy resolution, who are in full supportof the troops, though they have ques-tions about this mission.

I think it is very important thatevery one of us in this body give toeach other Member the right to have avote of conscience. And there are manyof us who do not think this is the rightmission, but who are going to go fullforce to support our troops. In fact, webelieve we are supporting our troops inthe most effective way by opposing thismission because we think it is thewrong one.

I do not question anyone’s motives,or how they feel, if they vote againstthe Hutchison–Inhofe resolution. But,by the same token, I think it is impor-tant that those who are going to sup-port the Dole-McCain resolution andthe Hutchison–Inhofe resolution—thatit be known that they, too, are doingwhat they think is right.

It is a tough decision for anyone tovote to put troops in harm’s way. Andif someone decides that they can bestsupport the troops by opposing thePresident’s decision, I think that ev-eryone knows, or should know, thatthat is the right of every Senator todo.

There have been other missions inthe history of this country, in whichthe people have been good people, sup-ported by America, well equipped,given everything they need to succeedin their mission, but nevertheless thesame people in America have notagreed with the mission.

I think the mission in Vietnam wascertainly controversial. But the peopleof this country loved and revered thepeople who went to Vietnam from ourArmed Forces and fought there for ourcountry. So I do not think there is anyquestion whatsoever that you cannotsupport a mission and support thetroops fully. I think that each of us hasthe ability to make this decision forourselves.

As I have said, I think it is incum-bent on a Member of Congress to makethis decision. It is a constitutional re-sponsibility that we were given by theFounders. They did not want it to beeasy to send troops into a foreign con-flict. That is why they put Congress inthe power to declare war. I do notknow that our Founders had eventhought about peacekeeping missionsand the nuances that we would have ondeclaring war. I do not think theythought about a Commander in Chiefsending our troops into what is talkedabout as peace, but which, in fact, issending our troops into military con-

flicts. I think they would have envi-sioned that Congress should authorizea peacekeeping mission that the Presi-dent and the Secretary of Defense andthe Chairman of the Joint Chiefs havesaid is going to put troops in harm’sway, where there may be casualties,and I believe our Founders would havewanted authorization by Congress.

They did not want it to be easy tosend our troops into harm’s way. Thatis why they made it the decision ofCongress to declare war, while theCommander in Chief would run the op-eration. The Commander in Chief doeshave the right to run the military.There is no question about it. But it isvery clear in the Constitution thatCongress should be consulted and au-thorized any time our troops are sentinto harm’s way.

I was holding the floor for the distin-guished senior Senator from Oregon,who has now arrived. I yield the floorto him for his comments.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-ator from Oregon is recognized.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, onThursday, the leaders of the warringparties in Bosnia and Herzegovina willformally sign a peace agreement thatwas initialed last month in Dayton,OH. This formal signing will pave theway for the deployment of the 60,000-strong NATO peace implementationforce.

Congress has a role to play in makingdecisions about the use of U.S. troopsin hostile situations. In fact, we havean obligation to our constituents toraise questions about any mission thatwill lead to our troops being put inharm’s way.

After the Vietnam war, Congress in-sisted that it have a partnership rolewith the President in future conflicts.So the Congress passed the War PowersAct. Under this act, the President re-tained the power to dispatch troopswhen there was an emergency. Butwithin 60 days of the deployment Con-gress had to take action to specificallyauthorize the deployment, tell thePresident to bring the troops home, orto continue to evaluate the situationafter another 60 days extension. It wasintended to force Congress to take ac-tion, to participate in the decision.

Unfortunately, Congress has foundways to avoid taking action. Since1965, Congress has voted only twice toauthorize the deployment of UnitedStates troops and, in recent years, wehave voted on nonbinding resolutions,in some cases, and we have allowedtroops to be deployed in the PersianGulf, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti,without authorizing legislation. We areabout to do so again today.

During the course of this debate, theSenate will have the opportunity tovote on three different measures relat-ing to the use of United States forcesin Bosnia. We have already completedthe first one. The President has re-quested congressional authorization,but has said that he intends to deployU.S. troops with or without that au-thorization.

Of course, he would like to have Con-gress’ support. The Senate’s consider-ation of these measures will provide uswith the opportunity to participate inthe debate. However, do not be misled.With the exception of the measurepassed by the House that we have de-feated today, the other two resolutionswhich we will consider, and likely pass,are not legally binding.

Mr. President, I want to reflect forjust a moment on some very interest-ing history on Vietnam. Many who canrecall during that war period, Membersof the Senate, particularly, wouldstand before the television cameras forthe evening news and wring their handsabout how awful this war was and whyit should not continue. But at no timeduring that period was any Member ofCongress willing to take responsibility.All they wanted to do was to criticizethe President. I have a feeling thatthere is a reluctance over the last fewyears, since we passed the War PowersAct, for Congress to stand up and takeresponsibility. It is much easier tocriticize the President, whether Repub-lican or Democrat, than to assume apartnership role, as provided under theWar Powers Act.

Let me say that while I know thatthe President is sincere in his attemptto bring peace to Bosnia, I find it hardto believe that anyone can define a suc-cessful military mission which will en-sure a lasting peace in the region.

The ethnic struggles which have ledto war in Bosnia and Croatia are theresult of more than 800 years of hatredand mistrust. How are we going tochange the course of history in oneshort year? In my view, this is an im-possible and unrealistic military mis-sion.

I will go back to school-teachingdays and say I hope that people wouldtake the time to read one very briefsynopsis of the history of this region ofthe world. Robert Kaplan’s ‘‘BalkanGhosts’’ is a very straightforward trea-tise on the history, and the impossibil-ity of this kind of a mission I wouldapply to that history. Read the history.We do so little reading, we do so littlereflection on how we got to where weare and what were the forces that madethat possible in our own country, letalone an area of the world that is prob-ably one of the least understood areasof the world from either political, eco-nomic, social, or cultural history.

During the last 31⁄2 years we haveseen more than 50 partial and generalcease-fires signed in this region withthese contestants, these parties. Allhave been broken within several weeksof their signing. My dear colleagues,they have been doing this for 800 years,lying to one another, not meaningwhat they were doing, because of thatdeep hatred that they have. To see thishappening here, even in our own daywe do not seem to be taking much les-son from it.

In addition, we have seen three pre-vious peace agreements come and go.Given this history, it is impossible for

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S 18489December 13, 1995the President to promise he can pro-tect U.S. troops. No one can guaranteetheir safety if the peace agreementfalls apart.

The Dayton peace accord calls for theimmediate transfer of peacekeepingcontrol from the U.N. peacekeepingforces to the NATO peace implementa-tion force. The approximately 20,000U.N. peacekeepers in Bosnia will be re-placed by 60,000 heavily armed troopsunder NATO command.

Mr. President, this is not a peace-keeping force. This is an army. Itproves that we are trying to solve a po-litical dilemma, a religious dilemma, acultural dilemma, with military troopsrather than through diplomacy and ne-gotiation.

One must only look at the peaceagreement to see this. The primarymission of this course will be to imple-ment the military aspects of the peaceagreement. This includes monitoringand enforcing the requirements thateach entity promptly withdraws theirforces behind a zone of separationwhich will be established on either sideof the cease-fire line, and that within120 days each entity withdraws allheavy weapons and forces to barrackareas.

However, under the agreement, thecurrent warring armies will continueto exist. Each entity is permitted tomaintain their army. The NATO forceswill be made up of enough firepower to,in the President’s words ‘‘respond withoverwhelming force’’ to any threats totheir safety or violations of the mili-tary aspects of the agreement.

This does not sound like a peacekeep-ing mission to me, and it should not bepromoted to the American public as apeacekeeping mission.

Furthermore, while the agreementcalls for the parties to enter into nego-tiations before the Organization for Se-curity and Cooperation in Europe onfuture arms and heavy equipment re-strictions, the agreement also con-tradicts that arms control goal by lift-ing the international arms embargo onBosnia, Croatia, and Serbia.

Now, get this. We are not only send-ing our troops in there and lettingthem maintain their own troops; weare saying we are going to lift the armsembargo so that they can look forward,after 180 days, to getting into an armsrace, escalating their military equip-ment, their arms.

The agreement states that no sidemay import arms for 90 days after theagreement enters force. There is this180-day restriction, I repeat, on the im-portation of heavy weapons, mines,military aircraft, and helicopters.After that, all bets are off. In fact, ad-ministration officials have indicatedthat, if necessary, the United StatesGovernment will begin rearming theBosnian army as early as next summerin an effort to bring a balance of powerbetween the warring factions.

In other words, arms beget arms, vio-lence begets violence. And we are goingto continue this worldwide arms mer-

chandising that we have been doingwith such efficiency during and eversince the Cold War.

In addition to equipping theBosnians, the United States will alsoprovide necessary training. The agree-ment sets a precedent that militaryarms must be maintained to achievestability in the region. In my view, thiswill only lead to an unfettered armsbuildup and further undermine ourability to bring lasting peace to the re-gion.

The arms embargo was not a successto begin with. At the same time wenow go through that charade, to thinkwe are going to do something to reducethe arms. We should be pushing to getthe region disarming; disarming, notrearming.

There is no question that the war inBosnia has had a terrible human toll.More than 140,000 Bosnians have beenkilled during the conflict. Another 3.6million refugees and internally dis-placed persons have been created bythis action and have had to flee theirhomes. Although the peace agreementincludes provisions allowing refugeesto return to their homes, it is unclearhow many will be willing or able to re-turn. And we see in the news of thesacking, the burning of those homesthat are being vacated for the transferof population.

Cases of ethnic cleansing continue tocome to light as mass graves are un-covered near the so-called safe havensthat have been overrun by the BosnianSerb Army.

No side to this conflict has cleanhands. I can assure you that during thetime that this was happening, therewere some of us who were raising thequestion of choking off the arms, chok-ing off the arms that were flowingdown the Danube from our allies, fromour friends—from Greece, from France,from Italy, from Germany. And whoknows what kind of arms out of ourcountry were in a third-party transfer?We never did try with great effort tostop the flow of arms, even under theembargo. Now we are going to lift thepretense of an embargo in order tomake them much more available andaccessible.

In order to end this human tragedy,we must take away the means to makewar. A successful peace will be one thatincludes a strategy to diminish thewar-making capability of all sides tothis conflict. It is amazing how we canorchestrate 25 countries of the worldfor a common purpose to fight a warfor oil, but somehow we do not find ourability to orchestrate our allies for thecause of peace, or to disarm an overlyarmed area of the world that is a greattrouble spot.

During the course of congressionalconsideration of the war in Bosnia, wehave failed to take the steps necessaryto limit the war-making capability.The only votes that the Senate hastaken since the war began in 1991 havebeen to unilaterally lift the arms em-bargo. I have opposed these resolutions

in the past because I felt that liftingthe arms embargo would only lead tomore bloodshed. Those who supportedthe lifting of the embargo did so be-cause they felt, if we arm the Bosnians,they would be able to defend them-selves, thereby doing away the need forU.S. troops to become involved in theground war.

Rather than joining with our alliesto secure and enforce the embargoagainst all warring parties in the re-gion, we could only see military mightas the solution to the complex prob-lem. How many people do we have tokill in actions of war to realize thetotal fallacy of that thesis? We now saywe are going to send more troops in.We are talking about injecting our owntroops into the war—and that is whatit is, because there has been no peacereached yet. As I said before, we aregoing into Bosnia with an army and weare going to force the peace. This is dif-ferent from the traditional notion ofpeacekeeping missions, such as theones we have seen in countries likeKorea and others.

I do not take this deployment light-ly, nor do my colleagues. American sol-diers will likely be killed during thismission in Bosnia. We have to acceptthat reality. Our brothers, sisters,wives, husbands, and children will be atrisk. In Bosnia and Croatia there arenearly 6 million landmines in theground. These hidden enemies pose thegreatest risk to our troops. In fact,landmines have become the leadingcause of casualties in Bosnia of peace-keeping forces.

Even though the peace agreement re-quires all sides to participate in identi-fying and removing these mines, thereality is that little information existsabout the layout of the minefields scat-tered throughout Bosnia. As we haveseen in Cambodia and Afghanistan,mine removal is a tedious task whichtakes years. Landmines in Bosnia en-danger not only our troops and peaceimplementation forces, but also civil-ians who are trying to return home andrebuild their lives.

I will not support any resolution thatexplicitly or implicitly gives the Sen-ate’s support for United States troopinvolvement in Bosnia. While I willwholeheartedly support our troopsonce they are there, not under theirown doing, under the Commander inChief, I cannot and will not endorsethis military mission.

We must bring a lasting peace toBosnia, but we must do so by limiting,not increasing, the war-making capa-bility of all sides in the conflict. In myopinion, the mission outlined by thePresident fails to meet this basic re-quirement. I yield the floor.

ORDER OF PROCEDURE

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, what Iwant to do, if we can—I know there aresome people who still want to talk. Iknow the Senator from Texas wouldlike to have a vote on her amendment.I would like to have that vote, if wecan, at 4 o’clock.

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATES 18490 December 13, 1995I have just been on the phone with

the President. He would like to havethe vote as early as possible. I knowthe House is involved in debating reso-lutions over there. I know some of ourcolleagues have yet to speak, but therewill still be one additional resolution;that is the Dole-McCain-Nunn-Lieberman, and others, resolution. Sopeople could still speak in general de-bate.

It seems to me there is no reason notto vote on the amendment by the Sen-ator from Texas. There is no use mak-ing a request if it will be objected to.Does the Democratic leader think wecan proceed on that basis and still haveplenty of time for debate?

Mr. DASCHLE. I have consulted witha number of our colleagues on this sideof the aisle, and many of them feelvery strongly about their need to speakprior to the time they will be calledupon to vote on either measure. Theywould prefer to give one speech ratherthan two.

In my urging to limit Members toone speech, and hopefully to keep thosespeeches to a minimum length, I willhave to accommodate them and theirinterest in speaking and being pro-tected in their opportunity to speakprior to the time that they would becalled upon to vote.

I am compelled at this point to ob-ject to the scheduling of the vote priorto the time that they have had the op-portunity to speak.

My preference would be that we haveboth votes back to back to accommo-date the speeches, and I think we canget some cooperation in limiting thelengths of time, if that can be done.

Mr. DOLE. Certainly this Senatordoes not have any problem with backto back—anything that would expeditethe process. I think most people havespoken with reference to one or two ofthe amendments. I do not know howmany more speakers are on this side.Some have spoken a number of times.

I think if we limit our speeches toone per Member, or at least two perMember, that would help some. Maybewe can have a back-to-back vote atsome time.

How much more time do you think itwill take on your side?

Mr. DASCHLE. A lot of our col-leagues are not willing to commit to atime limit yet. We are working on get-ting at least an agreement that every-body speak just once and then hope-fully limiting their time for speaking.

At this point, I am not able to givethe leader any specific estimate as tothe amount of time we need.

Mr. DOLE. I do not make the re-quest, then, because the Democraticleader has obviously not been able togive me the consent, so there is noneed doing that.

In the meantime, we will try to see ifwe cannot find some consensus, someagreement here, where we could haveback-to-back votes at some reasonablehour.

We have how many speakers leftnow?

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, if Icould answer, I think there are at least20 people signed up to this point.

I was, of course, hoping that the dis-tinguished minority leader might beable to put a time agreement together,and then I think we could gauge thelength of the speeches a little more andperhaps reach a conclusion, and I as-sume that everyone would like to dothis before the President leaves at 6o’clock or so.

Mr. DOLE. I think there is a phoneon the plane.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. I am sorry to hearthat.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.THOMPSON). The Senator from Virginia.

Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, I ask unan-imous-consent the Senator from Flor-ida, Senator GRAHAM, be added in thenext Democratic slot on the list ofspeakers.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Will the Senatorfrom Virginia yield for a unanimousconsent request to add Senator HELMSin the next available slot?

Mr. ROBB. I am happy to yield.Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I

ask unanimous consent Senator HELMSbe added in the next available Repub-lican slot.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Virginia.Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, we cannot

and should not attempt to act as theworld’s policeman. But that eminentlysensible acknowledgment of the limitsof U.S. power cannot and should notdeter us from acting when it is theUnited States and only the UnitedStates that can end aggression andbloodshed, or in this case the genocidethat has already claimed the lives ofover 200,000 human beings and left over2 million as refugees.

I understand the concerns and reti-cence of many of our colleagues, indeedmost of the American people. Calls inmost congressional offices remainoverwhelmingly against putting UnitedStates ground forces in Bosnia. Butwithout U.S. leadership, there would beno peace. The Europeans tried noblybut in vain. The fighting did not stopuntil the United States led NATO inthe air and led the diplomatic effortswhich culminated in the initialing ofthe agreement in Dayton and the finalsigning that will take place tomorrowin Paris.

Without U.S. leadership and activeparticipation on the ground, the peacewill end and the carnage will continue.We now represent the last, best hope tobring the war in the Balkans to a close.

Are there risks? Certainly there arerisks, serious risks. Of course there aresome risks to our troops even in nor-mal training exercises. But I believethe risks are even greater if we fail tohonor this commitment. I do not relishputting our troops at risk in thebarrens of northeast Bosnia.

But for each of us, I would suggestthat there are some risks—something

that we consider so important that weare willing to work, that we are willingto risk dying for it. I think, for exam-ple, we would all agree that we woulddo whatever it was necessary to do inorder to protect immediate members ofour family. But there are also largerrisks that are worth dying for—as aNation worth putting our troops atrisk for. I have seen some of theserisks. I have seen war. I have had menliterally die in my arms in combat. Ihave written letters and talked to theparents of those who have lost theirlives under these circumstances. It isnot easy. But the cost of freedom ishigh. Yet, it is a price that I believethat we have to be willing to pay.

We cannot shrink from the role thatonly the United States of America canplay in making peace work in farawaylands when America is now the onlynation with the capacity to lead thiseffort to a successful conclusion. Noone supports the atrocities which haveoccurred daily in Bosnia. But the ques-tion we face is whether the lives ofAmerican service men and servicewomen are worth risking to stop it.And I believe that risk is appropriate.I believe we have a moral responsibil-ity to act.

In that vein, I was struck by ElieWiesel’s comments this morning whenhe said, ‘‘We in the United States rep-resent a certain moral aspect of his-tory. A great nation owes its greatnessnot only to its military power but alsoto its moral consciousness.’’ He wenton to say ‘‘What would future genera-tions say about us, all of us, here inthis land, if we do nothing?’’ And I re-member his deeply-felt plea to thesame effect some 21⁄2 years ago at thededication of the Holocaust Museumwhen he turned and urged PresidentClinton to stop the war in the Balkans.

Mr. President, doing nothing rep-resents an abdication of our respon-sibilities as the leader of NATO and thelarger community of nations. Doingnothing increases the likelihood of alarger war in Europe. Doing nothingamounts to tacit acceptance of moreslaughter in Bosnia.

The Prime Minister of Israel, ShimonPeres, yesterday at a joint session ofCongress was eloquent and powerful insaying to us

You enabled many nations to save their de-mocracies, even as you strive now to assistmany nations to free themselves from theirnondemocratic past. You fought many wars.You won many victories. Wars did not causeyou to lose heart. Thanks to the support youhave given, and to the aid you have rendered,we have been able to overcome wars andtragedies thrust upon us, and feel suffi-ciently strong to take measured risks towage our campaign of peace.

Mr. President, we now stand alone asthe only country capable of restoringorder and a sense of hope in Bosnia andHerzegovina. The American imprima-tur carries enormous weight among thecommunity of nations. We can andshould seek to spread the word of peaceto places like the Middle East, and Ire-land—and, yes, Bosnia—that have

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S 18491December 13, 1995known the language of violence andwar for too long.

Mr. President, these war and peacedecisions are difficult, and they reachdeep into our emotions. I believe ourFounding Fathers were wise to vest inthe President the responsibilities ofbeing the Commander in Chief of ourArmed Forces while providing Congresswith the power of the purse and the ex-clusive right to declare war.

We have only one President at atime, and he has acted in his capacityas Commander in Chief. Were we in hisshoes we well might have taken 100 dif-ferent courses of action in the Senate,and perhaps as many as 435 differentcourses of action in the House. Indeed,I have long urged more assertive actionby the United States for several years.

But, Mr. President, it is the Presi-dent of the United States who is ulti-mately responsible for this decision,and the American people and ulti-mately history will hold him account-able. His choice to deploy troops toBosnia may not be popular with theAmerican people. But you cannot leadby following the polls, and for this Icommend his courage.

The President has made a choice infavor of leadership over isolation—infavor of standing shoulder to shoulderwith our allies instead of abandoningthem, in favor of morality rather thanallowing the crimes against humanityto continue. I applaud his choice tograpple with these problems and toseek a comprehensive solution. He de-serves enormous credit for taking onthis cause of peace and freedom that isso ingrained in our American way oflife.

I happen to have a very high level ofconfidence in our troops who are thebest led, best trained, and most power-ful fighting force that the world hasever known. When they have success-fully completed their limited missionin Europe, there is clearly going to bemore to do with respect to a residualforce. And, in that respect, I believethat Europe will step up to its respon-sibility at the appropriate time.

In the same context, Mr. President, Iwould like to salute our majority lead-er, BOB DOLE, and Senator JOHNMCCAIN in particular, who have risenabove whatever partisan gain mighthave accrued to them by taking a dif-ferent course of action, to join thePresident in leading the country tosupport our troops—just as I waspleased to help lead the effort and sup-port our troops, and support PresidentBush when he asked for our help in thegulf war.

Mr. President, I believe the Presidentof the United States has made a strongcase for U.S. leadership. Absent Amer-ican participation peace will fail in theBalkans, and ongoing war will havecontinued to threaten our national se-curity interests.

Mr. President, I believe our securitydepends on joining with our allies intimes like this, and I urge my col-leagues to do what I believe in this

case is the right thing to do. And thatis to support the deployment and tosupport our troops in the commitmentthat the President of the United Statesacting in his capacity as Commander inChief has made there and on our behalf.

With that, Mr. President, I ask ourcolleagues to vote against the resolu-tion which would be a resolution of dis-approval, and vote for the bipartisaneffort that the majority leader and oth-ers have sponsored to support our ac-tions, notwithstanding some of theirown reservations, so that our troopscarrying our flag will know that theyhave our backing when they are placedin harm’s way.

With that, Mr. President, I thank theChair. I yield the floor.

Mr. DOMENICI addressed the Chair.The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-

ator from New Mexico.Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, how

much time has been reserved for theSenator from New Mexico?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Thereare no time limits.

Mr. DOMENICI. I will try to finish in8 minutes. Would you notify me when Ihave used 7?

Mr. President, fellow Senators, firstof all, I think everybody knows of mygreat support for Senator DOLE. I am,for the most part, at his side in all thebattles that are fought in the Senate. Icherish that relationship very, verymuch. I am also fully cognizant, atleast as cognizant I can be, of the Com-mander in Chief concept that is dis-cussed here so eloquently by many whoknow more about it than I and by peo-ple like the distinguished Senator fromVirginia, who understands it from thebattlefield.

Mr. President, I have heard otherSenators talk about the derivation ofthat constitutional power of the Com-mander in Chief. I heard one of the elo-quent Senators last night, SenatorCOHEN, describe it in a way that I willrepeat very briefly. Between the Con-gress and the President, the exercise ofthis constitutional power is somewhatlike a race—whomever gets there firsthas this power. If Congress, 6 monthsago, would have enacted an appropria-tions bill prohibiting United States in-volvement in Bosnia and prohibitingthe expenditure of funds for that pur-pose, then it would be illegal to spendthese funds. There would be no con-stitutional issue because the Com-mander in Chief would have no author-ity to spend any money.

The power of the purse strings and ofusing the taxpayers’ money to pay forevents, whether they are here or over-seas, is that of the Congress. If thePresident decides to involve our troopsin an issue such as this, in a commit-ment such as this, and the troops aredeployed before congressional action,then it is said that we must supportthis decision because he had the inher-ent power as Commander in Chief.

Now, I do not want any misunder-standing as far as this Senator is con-cerned. There is no one in the Senate

that I take a back seat to in terms ofsupporting the defense of our Nation,and I have had a lot to do over the last15 years with how much we spend ondefense, not necessarily the details, buta lot to do with the total that wespend. I have come down for the mostpart on the side of spending more rath-er than less. We must have the bestequipped force rather than take anyrisks. We must pay our All-VolunteerArmy enough so that it remains an all-volunteer army in the concept origi-nated under the Nixon administration.They must be paid with some parity tocivilian jobs so we get and keep thevery best.

All of this is said by this Senator tosuggest that I want a very strongAmerican military. I am proud of thefact that when we send our military toget involved in the world, they do theirjob. As far as our soldiers are con-cerned they always come out of it, withfew exceptions, as being good people, ifyou can do that and have war. We area good nation and we have good mo-tives, and, with few exceptions, that ishow we behave.

But, Mr. President and fellow Sen-ators, in spite of these inherent powers,we are each elected as a Senator fromour State. American men and womenare going to be assigned to a foreigncountry in large numbers—20,000,maybe 25,000—to accomplish a mission,and I believe paramount to all of thesevarious powers is my right as a Sen-ator to express myself either in favorof it or opposed to it.

I am opposed to the involvement ofthe 20,000 American troops with 40,000from other countries, mostly the coun-tries that were formerly NATO. Nowwe have expanded NATO’s role and wehave a few countries involved thatwere not part of NATO. I believe it ismy right to say I do not think this isthe right thing to do.

Now, nobody should doubt that thisview is going to lose and that theAmerican troops are going to go there,and nobody should doubt that oncethey are there they will find this Sen-ator agreeing to pay to keep themthere and keep them the very best.When our generals say you need moneyto make sure they are as safe as pos-sible, I will be right here among thefirst and the clearest saying I am forit.

I am expressing myself, fortunately,before the troops are there. There is asmall contingency there. And let meeven say that my remarks might noteven be addressed at them because thatis a small contingency. They are there,and I do not want to see anything hap-pen to them. But this issue I am ad-dressing is— should we put 20,000 Amer-icans there to maintain the peace?Frankly, I think it is a mistake almostany way that I look at it. We are pow-erful, and if we go there, people willthink we are powerful. If we go there,Europe will think it is great. They willsay, America is leading again.

But the question is, leading what?What are we trying to do? And is there

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATES 18492 December 13, 1995a real, bona fide probability that whatwe are trying to do will not work? Ihappen to know less than most aroundhere about what went on in that coun-try for the last 600 years. But I doknow something. I do know that theonly times these people have lived to-gether in peace and harmony in mod-ern times were two events in history:One, when the Germans occupied it.Clearly we do not intend to keep thepeace among these people who do notseem to want to have peace amongthemselves with an occupancy like Hit-ler’s. I hope we do not, and we are as-sured we do not.

The other peaceful time in modernhistory was the reign of the dictatorTito. The Communists’ most pervasiveway of keeping peace and harmony isblock by block behavior that must beconsistent with the state or somethinghappens to you, right? That is a simpleway of saying you behave or we killyou. This was maybe not like the Nazioccupation, but that also maintainedthe peace.

We are not going to do that. There isno one around suggesting that anyoneis going to do that. And so we havethree new countries born of new bound-aries and we are going to ask of thatleadership, the leadership of thosecountries, what I perceive to be impos-sible. We are going to ask them to do a‘‘Mission Impossible’’—disarm thosewho would cause harm with weapons.How are they going to do that? I do notbelieve they are strong enough, and Ido not believe they will get it done.There will be plenty of guns around forrebels who want to kill each other, whoare angry because they do not belongin that country or their houses are oc-cupied by people they do not want.

We are also asked to be part of mak-ing sure that these countries get a bal-ance of military power amongst them-selves. I am not even so sure that willwork. We have been talking about itfor a long time, but I am wonderingeven if a military balance is reachedthen pull our troops out, that Bosniacould be an even bigger tinderbox andmore war with more killing. So myown feeling is we are sending ourtroops to do something that will notwork, to exhibit our leadership in a sit-uation that we ought not be leading oreven supporting.

Now, obviously, it is easy to get upon the floor of the Senate and talkabout how great America is, and howwonderful our military men and womenare. We can almost envision in ourmind’s eye the great, beautiful sightwhen they arrive and show up with allof our new tanks and all of the Amer-ican flags. It is going to be a greatscene. And believe you me, I am goingto feel very proud, because it is a fan-tastic—a fantastic—accomplishment ofthe people of the United States whoregularly have been paying taxes. Letme mention right now, they are payingabout $270 billion for the defense of ourcountry, so that we can have men andwomen like these that we are sendingthere.

So I close today very simply by say-ing I would not send any more peoplein, and I am voting for the resolutionthat says we do not approve of this. Itis with reluctance that I will voteagainst the Dole resolution when itcomes up because I do not think it isthe right thing to do.

I hope I have explained myself that Iam not trying to pass judgment onthese constitutional powers, be theyinherent or otherwise. I am talkingvery, very simply about what I per-ceive to be my right and my respon-sibility. I express it as best I can hereon the floor. And that is the way I feel.For those who have led this cause, withfar more effort than I, I thank them forit. And I thank the junior Senator fromOklahoma for his leadership.

I do believe we are going to be therefor quite awhile and spend a lot ofmoney. I pray that is all we spendthere, and we do not spend any livesthere. I truly believe it is possible thatwe will lose a lot of lives. But I am notstanding up here saying I am fright-ened singularly of that. I just do notthink we ought to do this. I do notthink it is the right mission for us.And since I feel that way, neither ourtanks nor our resources nor our menand women should be there trying toaccomplish this job. I yield the floor.

Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair.The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-

ator from Georgia.Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, today or

tomorrow the Senate will be voting onthe President’s decision to deploy Unit-ed States military forces as part of aNATO peace enforcement mission inBosnia.

There are many different views ofhow we got to this point. You have myown views on that. I will discuss themat another time. I have already dis-cussed them in the past on numerousoccasions.

But it is my hope that the Senatewill now be able to concentrate itsfocus on the choices that are now be-fore us. There are few things about thecurrent situation that we know; a fewthings that we believe based on reason-able judgments but not certainty; andmany unknowns that are subject onlyto reasonable speculation at this point,even if it is reasonable speculation.

The things that we know are what Iwill try to deal with in a short andbrief set of remarks today.

First of all, we know that PresidentClinton has decided to commit UnitedStates military forces to this missionin Bosnia.

Second, we know that NATO has de-cided to commit the NATO alliance tothis peace enforcement mission. Andwe know that all NATO nations thathave military forces are participating.

Third, we know that several hundredAmerican troops are now on the groundin Bosnia; and several thousand troopswill be on the ground in Bosnia in thenext few weeks.

Fourth, we can debate the constitu-tional power of the Commander in

Chief, as we have many times in thepast and we will again, and we can de-bate congressional responsibility to de-clare war, but we all know that Con-gress has neither the ways nor themeans to prevent this deployment un-less we cut off the funds. We knowthat. It has already been decided by theSenate today that we are not going tocut off the funds. We know that.

Fifth, we know that the Defense ap-propriations bill has passed, beensigned, and the President, like hispredecessors of both parties, will fi-nance the operation out of operationand maintenance funds and then seekreimbursement of these funds nextyear in a supplemental appropriation.

Sixth, we know that if Congress cutsoff the funds at this point, it would re-quire a majority in both Houses to passand two-thirds vote in both the Senateand House to override a certain veto.The Senate rejected this cutoff of fundsdecisively today when we voted on thefirst resolution because I believe theSenators concluded this would have anadverse effect on our own militaryforces, an adverse effect on our allies,an adverse effect on our leadership inNATO and the world, as well as an ad-verse effect on the parties on theground in Bosnia.

The President has decided on deploy-ment. The NATO alliance has decidedon deployment. The United Statesforces are on the way to Bosnia. Whatthen is the congressional role in thisimportant national security decision?

Mr. President, I would like to talk atlength today about some of the con-stitutional challenges we have in termsof determining the role of Congress inthe post-cold war era. I will return tothat subject shortly.

But today we must face a world of re-ality. The cards have been dealt. Theadministration’s actions—startingwith the President’s commitment al-most 3 years ago—and that was a pub-lic and international commitment thatUnited States forces would participatein a NATO force to implement aBosnian peace agreement—have putCongress in a situation in which agreat deal is at stake, including UnitedStates reliability and leadership, butalso including the peace agreement it-self, the ending of the tragedy inBosnia, as well as the future of NATOas an alliance.

We also know that a cut off of fundswill not become law, but passage ofthis type of legislation—followed by aveto and a vote to override, if theHouse passes it or we pass it today—would put our military forces in limboin the middle of their deployment—when they are most vulnerable. To methis is unthinkable and unacceptable.

We also know that the effect of suchaction would erode the value of U.S.commitments around the world andwould increase the danger to U.S. mili-tary personnel in harm’s way that arestationed in dangerous places aroundthe world.

That danger certainly would be anincrease to our military forces whether

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S 18493December 13, 1995in the Korean Peninsula or in Europeor in the Middle East because thegreatest thing they have behind themis United States credibility and thecredibility of our own word.

The bottom line—Mr. President—iftoday Congress found a way to preventthe President from going forward withhis commitment, the damage to Amer-ica and the increased danger to ourtroops in the world is certain. There isreally no doubt about that.

If we do give the President the greenlight and permit the mission to go for-ward in a carefully prescribed manner,the risks are considerable but there isat least a chance of success if thatterm is narrowly and carefully defined.

I will not dwell on the definition ofsuccess in these remarks today. But be-fore the week is out I do want to givea much more detailed presentation in-cluding what I think we should do interms of the definition of success, in-cluding the risk of this operation aswell as the opportunities of this oper-ation.

Mr. President, my main concerntoday however is the message the Sen-ate sends to our military forces whoare about to embark on this NATOmission to Bosnia.

I would like to read into the RECORDand place in the RECORD a letter I re-ceived today. It was dated December 12.It is signed by Michael S. Davison,General, U.S. Army, retired—many willremember General Davison for his serv-ice to our Nation—Andrew J.Goodpaster, General, U.S. Army, re-tired, who also served as the SupremeAllied Commander in Europe as well asthe head of NATO forces, Walter T.Kerwin, General, U.S. Army, retired,who had a very distinguished career inthe Army, William J. McCaffrey, Lieu-tenant General, U.S. Army, retired,William Y. Smith, U.S. Air Force, re-tired, Harry D. Train, Admiral, U.S.Navy, retired, and others.

For those of us who have been herevery long in the Senate, this is a ster-ling list of outstanding military lead-ers that have served our Nation withdistinction. Here is what they say:

DEAR SENATOR NUNN: As American mili-tary forces are being prepared for commit-ment in Bosnia, we believe it is essentialthat they go with a clear understanding thatthey are supported by their country—that is,by the whole American people—in their dif-ficult and dangerous assignment.

Our military forces serving in Bosnia willbe under American command, acting in con-cert with military forces from NATO andother nations that participate in the mili-tary implementation of the Dayton peaceagreement. The mission statement and theNATO chain of command must make it clearthat the military forces are not to be drawninto mission-creep nation-building but are tobe used for tasks military in nature, and willnot be subjected to attempts at micro-man-agement from afar, or to ‘‘dual-key’’ aberra-tions.

Continuing the quote from these dis-tinguished retired military officials.

As our leaders consider our country’s in-volvement in Bosnia, we encourage them tosend a message to our Soldiers, Sailors, Air-

men and Marines wherever they may be (andto all others as well) that our country is giv-ing them its full backing in the accomplish-ment of their assigned mission. We believe itis time to close ranks, support our troops inthe field, and concentrate on helping themdo their job in the best possible way.

And then the letter is signed by thesegenerals.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-sent that the letter be printed in theRECORD.

There being no objection, the letterwas ordered to be printed in theRECORD, as follows:

December 13, 1995.As American military forces are being pre-

pared for commitment in Bosnia, we believeit is essential that they go with a clear un-derstanding that they are supported by theircounty—that is, by the whole American peo-ple—in their difficult and dangerous assign-ment.

Our military forces serving in Bosnia willbe under American command, acting in con-cert with military forces from NATO andother nations that participate in the mili-tary implementation of the Dayton peaceagreement. The mission statement and theNATO chain of command must make it clearthat the military forces are not to be drawninto mission-creep nation-building but are tobe used for tasks military in nature, and willnot be subjected to attempts at micro-man-agement from afar, or to ‘‘dual-key’’ aberra-tions.

As our leaders consider our country’s in-volvement in Bosnia, we encourage them tosend a message to our Soldiers, Sailors, Air-men and Marines wherever they may be (andto all others as well) that our country is giv-ing them its full backing in the accomplish-ment of their assigned mission. We believe itis time to close ranks, support our troops inthe field, and concentrate on helping themdo their job in the best possible way.

MICHAEL S. DAVISON,GENERAL, U.S. ARMY(RET.)

RUSSELL E. DOUGHERTY,GENERAL, U.S. AIR FORCE(RET.)

JOHN R. GALVIN, GENERAL,U.S. ARMY (RET.)

ANDREW J. GOODPASTER,GENERAL, U.S. ARMY(RET.)

WALTER T. KERWIN,GENERAL, U.S. ARMY(RET.)

WILLIAM P. LAWRENCE,VICE ADMIRAL, U.S. NAVY(RET.)

WILLIAM J. MCCAFFREY,LT. GEN., U.S. ARMY(RET.)

JACK N. MERRITT,GENERAL, U.S. ARMY(RET.)

BERNARD W. ROGERS,GENERAL, U.S. ARMY(RET.)

BRENT SCOWCROFT, LT.GEN., U.S. AIR FORCE(RET.)

GEORGE M. SEIGNIOUS, II,LT. GEN., U.S. ARMY(RET.)

WILLIAM Y. SMITH,GENERAL, U.S. AIR FORCE(RET.)

HARRY D. TRAIN, ADMIRAL,U.S. NAVY (RET.)

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I agreewith every word in this letter. I thinkthey are absolutely right on target.

This is where we are today. And this isthe kind of consideration that the Sen-ate must take into account today. Wewill have plenty of time to debate howwe got to this point. But today I thinkwe first and foremost need to considerthe effect of what we do on not onlythe military forces themselves that arein the process of deploying, but ontheir families and on their mission.

Mr. President, I urge the Senatetoday to support—or tomorrow, when-ever we vote—the Dole-McCain resolu-tion. This resolution has been the sub-ject of intense and constructive nego-tiations on a bipartisan basis with aDemocratic working group headed bySenator DASCHLE, Senator PELL andmyself.

The Dole-McCain resolution, as nowworded, has a key paragraph which Ibelieve conveys the kind of support ourAmerican troops and their familiesboth need and deserve. I quote thatparagraph because I think it basicallyfollows almost exactly what these dis-tinguished retired military generalsand admirals have said to us in the wayof advice.

Quoting the paragraph in the Dole-McCain resolution:

The Congress unequivocally supports themen and women of our Armed Forces whoare carrying out their mission in support ofpeace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with profes-sional excellence, dedicated patriotism andexemplary bravery and believes that theymust be given all necessary resources andsupport to carry out their mission and en-sure their security.

Mr. President, that is the heart ofwhat we are going to be voting on. Ihope that our colleagues on both sidesof the aisle will understand the impor-tance of what we are doing, and I hopethey will put the military forces firstand foremost in their minds.

Mr. President, before we vote on theDole-McCain resolution, it is my un-derstanding we will vote on theHutchison-Inhofe resolution. I havegreat respect for both Senators whosponsored this resolution. They are onthe Armed Services Committee, andthey do a sterling job of representingtheir States and representing theAmerican people on this committee.But the Hutchison resolution does notprovide what our troops need. It doesnot provide a sense that the Senatebacks them and their mission. It tellsour military forces, in effect—‘‘Wedon’t agree with your mission. Whatyou’re doing is not important to theUnited States. It’s not importantenough for you to risk your life.’’

These are the people who are going tobe risking their lives. ‘‘It’s not impor-tant enough for you to risk your lifeand neither is the NATO alliance andits mission.’’

‘‘Enforcing the peace agreement inBosnia’’—and this is my paraphrasingof the Hutchison-Inhofe message; theseare not the words. I do not want any-one to think I am quoting the words.This is the effect of those words. ‘‘En-forcing the peace agreement in Bosniais not something we agree with.’’ That

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATES 18494 December 13, 1995is what we are going to be saying im-plicitly if we adopt this resolution.Certainly we will be saying it if weadopt this resolution and do not passthe Dole-McCain resolution. We arealso saying implicitly the President istotally on his own without the backingof the Congress and the American peo-ple.

We go forward and say in theHutchison-Inhofe resolution—again, ineffect, these are my words—‘‘We willpay you, we will equip you and we willwish you well. We don’t agree with themission, we don’t think it’s importantenough for you to risk your life, but weare going to equip you, support you andwish you well.’’

Now, how are our military men andwomen and their families going to feelabout undertaking this kind of missionwhere, indeed, many of them will berisking their lives? I hope not manywill end up being injured or killed. Ihope none. But nevertheless, there is avery serious risk here. We know that.How are they going to feel if we sendthem off on this undertaking with thismessage from the U.S. Senate?

Mr. President, I understand thetemptation of my colleagues to votefor the HUTCHISON–Inhofe resolution. Itgives Senators the ability to say wewere against this mission from the be-ginning but we support our troops. Thisresolution, which will be voted ontoday or tomorrow, may be what someSenators need, but it is not what ourtroops need at this juncture.

It is entirely possible—I hope it doesnot happen—but it is entirely possiblethe Hutchison-Inhofe resolution couldbe agreed to and the Dole-McCain reso-lution could fail. If this occurs, thenour American military will have theworst of both worlds. We will be say-ing, ‘‘Full speed ahead on a risky mis-sion that we don’t agree with, don’t ap-prove of’’—and that is what we aregoing to be saying—‘‘Full speed aheadon a risky mission with the clearknowledge the mission is denounced atthe outset by the U.S. Senate.’’

I urge my colleagues to vote againstthe Hutchison–Inhofe resolution, and Iurge them to vote for the Dole-McCainresolution.

I urge all of those who at this stageare thinking about voting for theHutchison resolution to think verycarefully. It is essential for the moraleof our military forces that we send theclear message of the Dole-McCain reso-lution which says, in effect, ‘‘We maynot agree with the President or how wegot to this point, but we believe thecommitment of U.S. military forces toBosnia is important; it is important toprevent the spread of the conflict, tomaintain United States leadership inNATO, to stop the tragic loss of life, tofulfill American commitments and topreserve United States credibility.’’

There is a different message, a fun-damentally different message that willgo forward if we adopt the Hutchison–Inhofe resolution. If we pass the Dole-McCain resolution, in spite of the clear

concern expressed in that resolutionabout how we got to this point, there isno doubt that the Dole-McCain resolu-tion fully supports the American mili-tary forces and fully supports the mis-sion that they are going to be under-taking.

I want to read again the paragraph inthe Dole-McCain resolution that makesthis abundantly clear, and I hope Sen-ators will concentrate on the differencebetween this language and what is inthe Hutchison–Inhofe language.

The language in the Dole-McCain res-olution says:

The Congress unequivocally supports themen and women of our Armed Forces whoare carrying out their missions in support ofpeace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with profes-sional excellence, dedicated patriotism andexemplary bravery, and believes they mustbe given all necessary resources and supportto carry out their missions and ensure theirsecurity.

Mr. President, in closing, I urge thepassage of the Dole-McCain resolutionso that our military forces and theirfamilies will understand not only thatwe in Congress support them, but thatthe mission they are undertaking andthe risks they will bear are importantto America.

I know there are others waiting tospeak, and I am not going to go intogreat detail, but I do want to say, justin summarizing my prepared remarks,which I will not give today but willgive at a later point in this debate orthereafter, that the Congress of theUnited States needs to take a fun-damental look at the role we are play-ing or not playing in terms of these na-tional security decisions.

Congress must understand—if we donot at this point, we must begin to, andI have understood it for a number ofyears—the War Powers Act does notwork. The longer this outmoded andunworkable legislation remains on thebooks, the longer we will continue theillusion that Congress is playing ameaningful role in the commitment ofU.S. military forces to these types ofmissions.

President Clinton will be viewed bymost in Congress as assuming the fullresponsibility for the fate of the UnitedStates military mission in Bosnia.That is because this commitment byPresident Clinton was made in 1993without consultation with the Con-gress or the congressional leadership.

There is a similarity between thisand the Persian Gulf where the Presi-dent of the United States, PresidentBush then, committed the UnitedStates internationally without an ap-proval of Congress. That is the parallel.We are going to face this situation overand over and over again, where Presi-dents commit internationally beforethey get approval at home.

We have to address this. I think it isin our court. I think it is Congress’ re-sponsibility to make the correction. Anawful lot of this comes from the illu-sion that the War Powers Act maysome day miraculously work. It hasnever worked. It is not going to work.

It is based on the fundamental flawthat assumes that congressional inac-tion can require the Commander inChief to withdraw forces from abroad.Congressional inaction will never, everforce a Commander in Chief to with-draw forces. The only way we can dothat is by cutting off funds, and weneed to recognize this.

No President will or should allowU.S. forces to be withdrawn from amilitary mission because of simplecongressional inaction. I think, Mr.President, it is time to repeal the WarPowers Act and replace it with legisla-tion that is realistic and workable. Wemust find a way to create regular, full,and comprehensive consultation be-tween the President and the Congressbefore the President makes concretecommitments and before U.S. troopsare committed to harm’s way.

We do not have that mechanism now.We do not have the consultation takingplace in a timely fashion, and that hasbeen true both in Republican and inDemocratic administrations.

So I hope out of this we will beginlooking at the War Powers Act andbegin to make changes to correct it.

I see that the Senator from Delawareis on the floor. He and I and SenatorBYRD, as well as Senator WARNER andseveral other Republicans, severalyears ago sponsored a revision of theWar Powers Act. I hope our colleagueswill begin to think along those linesbecause it is leading us down the prim-rose path of having a law on the booksthat supposedly involves Congress inthese decisions when, by the time Con-gress gets involved, the internationalcommitment has already been madeand the choices are regrettably lim-ited.

I yield the floor.Mr. ASHCROFT addressed the Chair.The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-

ator from Missouri is recognized.Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I ap-

preciate the debate that has been un-dertaken here in the U.S. Senate andthe remarks of individuals who are sin-cere on both sides of this question. I dothink, however, that in characterizingthe resolutions upon which we will bevoting, it is important to understandthe wording of the resolutions and totake them for their face value.

The distinguished senior Senatorfrom Georgia has sought to character-ize the resolution of SenatorsHUTCHISON and INHOFE as being onewhich would not signal to the troopsthat we really support them. I wouldlike to read section 2, which is entitled‘‘Expressing Support for United StatesMilitary Personnel Who Are De-ployed.’’ The wording is simple,straightforward, and unmistakablyclear:

The Congress strongly supports the UnitedStates military personnel who may be or-dered by the President to implement thegeneral framework agreement for peace inBosnia/Herzegovina and its associated an-nexes.

It seems to me that that is a veryclear and generous statement. It is an

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S 18495December 13, 1995honest statement by the U.S. Senate,which allows that even if we disagreewith the President—and many of usdo—when such a deployment is made,in the words of the resolution, we willstrongly support the military person-nel who are ordered by the President toimplement the particular missionwhich has been designated. In thiscase, it is to implement the generalframework for peace in Bosnia andHerzegovina and the associated an-nexes.

Today, Mr. President, the UnitedStates again finds itself faced with theconflicting demands of a confused andchaotic world. Today’s debate carriesthe name of ‘‘Bosnia,’’ but it is a de-bate that this Congress has faced nu-merous times before—it is just thename that has changed.

At stake and at question are the spe-cific terms, conditions, and reasons fordeploying U.S. troops, and the natureof U.S. foreign policy generally. Theseare not small or trivial matters—notfor the President or for those of us herein the Congress, not for the military,and certainly not for the families ofAmerica’s service men and women, whoare preparing for deployment inBosnia.

Like all Americans, I want to see anend to the killing and cruelty thathave come to define the daily existenceof millions of people in Bosnia. Theatrocities committed by all parties areso heinous as to offend all of our con-sciences and to fire within us justifi-able outrage. That these horrors cometo an end is not a point of debate; thatthe United States has a special respon-sibility in the world, as the only super-power, is likewise not a matter of gen-uine debate.

But today’s debate is much more nar-rowly focused—it is a debate about aso-called peace plan—brokered by theUnited States, agreed to by the war-ring parties, signed in Dayton—andwhether that plan warrants the in-volvement and possible deaths of U.S.ground troops in the Balkans. I believethat until the Clinton administrationcan clearly and convincingly answerwhy, how, and under what conditionswe ought to be involved, I cannot sup-port the President’s decision to deployAmerican soldiers to enforce the peaceagreement.

In any deployment of U.S. groundtroops, I believe that we must meet atleast a five-part test. I will state theparts of that test again today, just as Ihave consistently over the course ofthe last year.

First, I think we have to identify thevital U.S. national interests. It has tobe a security interest. It has to be aninterest which is important to the con-tinuing existence of this country.

Second, we need to outline clear U.S.military and policy objectives.

Third, we need to construct a time-table and strategy for achieving thoseobjectives.

Fourth, we need to develop an appro-priate exit strategy; and,

Fifth, we really need to gain the sup-port of the American people for thepolicy initiatives and the military ob-jectives in any deployment.

What we determine to be our vital in-terests is dynamic. A geographical re-gion that might be vital to our inter-ests at one time may not be at anothertime. Technology might change. Broad-ly defined, ‘‘vital’’ U.S. interests aredefined as being those interests thathave a direct political and economic ef-fect on the Nation. They ought to havean interest about our capacity to sur-vive and succeed as a nation. Threatsto strategic assets, to shipping lanes,to our strategic allies, and threats toour traditional sphere of influence,similarly represent ‘‘clear and presentdanger’’ to the United States. Lessclear is the nature of humanitarian in-terest, and how and when such inter-ests are considered vital U.S. nationalinterests.

Despite the protestations of membersof the Clinton administration, it is thisfinal category that I believe we aredealing here. In the course of the pastfew weeks, I have had the opportunityto hear from a number of the archi-tects of the Dayton accord—Secretaryof State, Warren Christopher; Sec-retary of Defense, William Perry;Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,General John Shalikashvili, and chiefnegotiator Richard Holbrooke. Theirexplanations of why we should be in-volved, in my judgment, lacked credi-bility. Their rationale has never in-cluded a valid explanation of how vitalU.S. national security interests are atstake in the Balkans at the close ofthis century.

On the one hand, they have said thatwe have a risk of an expanded full-scaleBalkan war that could domino its wayall across Europe. Such assertions flyin the face of fact. Secretary Chris-topher has stated that a major reasonthe peace agreement was reached isthat the warring parties are sufferingfrom battle fatigue. This is an internalconflict that has raged for years, stem-ming from differences which have di-vided people for centuries. If the fight-ing factions are war weary, then whatevidence is there to suggest that thepotential for the war to spread is immi-nent or greater now than it has been inthe past?

We have seen some 30 cease-fire inthis region before, which begs the ques-tion, is this the cease-fire of the cen-tury or a cease-fire of the season, withanother long winter’s nap? While thethreat of another massive Europeanwar makes for good headlines, baselessthreats make for lousy public policy.

The President has argued that ourcontinued leadership in NATO is atstake here. He believes that it is a vitalU.S. interest to prove ourselves over-seas. U.S. perception and leadershipoverseas are clearly vital. The questionthat no one has answered, however, ishow the deployment of U.S. groundtroops will help.

The only response I have been giventhat comes close to answering this

question is that U.S. ground troopsmust be deployed in order to vindicatethe President because in a speech 2years ago, he made a promise to sendtroops. Retreating from that promisewould somehow signal a failure in hisleadership. Well, very frankly, weshould not put American lives on theline just to rescue an outdated Presi-dential promise.

Following the gulf war, world percep-tion of our resolve—of our determina-tion to get things done—was clear, theUnited States meant what it said andacted accordingly. Since that time,world perception has taken a dramaticturn for the worse. Our foreign policyobjectives have been unclear, and ourresolve has been uncertain. Before wedeploy U.S. troops anywhere in theworld we must determine whether ourvital national interests must be atstake.

I am confused about the explanationsby the administration which allegethat this indeed involves a set of vitalinterests because when you ask the ad-ministration about the deployment,they say that the deployment will befor 1 year. The achievement is not of avital interest. The achievement here isa time of duration. If these interestsare so vital, if they are critical to thesuccess and survival of this country inthe next century, why is it that theyare only critical for a year, and we willleave whether or not we will achievethem in a span of a year?

The idea this is a deployment for aterm of days rather than for theachievement of vital and specific inter-ests is an idea which shakes andthreatens the very foundation of theallegation that there are vital interestshere. I guess there is the questionabout whether the United Statesshould be a world policeman that im-poses her morality on the world. TheUnited States is the world’s only super-power, and that role carries with it re-sponsibilities no other nation has.These responsibilities include the re-sponsibility to use our forces judi-ciously. We should not decide to deployU.S. troops simply because we can. Weshould not exercise military prowess toconquer a mountainous civil war mere-ly because it is there. We should not bea 9–1–1 on call to respond to everyworld dispute or civil disturbance. Wemust recognize that it is possible tosquander our power and our resourcesby misusing them.

Mr. President, according to the ad-ministration, we have an expirationdate but we have no achievement strat-egy. Why deploy ground troops in thefirst place if we are going to pull themout whether or not anything is accom-plished?

There is a related issue about thisagreement that troubles me. It has todo with the assignment of our soldiersthat they are being asked to under-take. There are some components ofthe Dayton accord which really elevatevalues in which we do not believe. Weshould ask ourselves, under the Dayton

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATES 18496 December 13, 1995accord, will we be going abroad withour troops to enforce things and valueswhich are not things that we are will-ing to support or that we respect athome? As a matter of fact, are wegoing there to support or reinforcethings which we abhor at home? Wouldwe be going there to enforce a type ofethnic de facto segregation that we arefighting against at home? Is it possiblethat we are deploying America’s sol-diers to fight for values of ethnic isola-tion that run contrary to America’svalues? Are we asking our troops to de-fend territorial lines among ethnic fac-tions which were gained through offen-sive atrocities? Are we validating eth-nic segregation of the parties to pro-mote peace, when our Nation painfullylearned that it is only ‘‘united westand, divided we fall.’’

For generations we pursued an inter-national strategy of promoting demo-cratic values. I think we have to askourselves, is that what we are doinghere? There are a lot of nuances anduncertainties about foreign policies.This is not one of them. We fightabroad for our interests and our values.We must not agree to work for some-thing that is both not in our vital na-tional interests, but contrary to ourvalues.

Let me just say in conclusion that Ibelieve that we must make sure thatthe deployment of our troops is notmerely the appetizer and that the maincourse becomes massive foreign aidthat is felt as an obligation of thiscountry and Congress as a result ofhaving had the deployment of ourtroops on the soil of a foreign nation.All too frequently, we feel that wemust follow our troops after a deploy-ment has been concluded, with an out-break of nation building and infra-structure construction and resourceswhich are beyond the ability of our cul-ture to afford for ourselves—certainlynot within our capacity to provide foreveryone around the world.

There is a substantial expense in thiswhole operation that is going to take$2 billion out of our defense budget thisyear, and there will be requests for ad-ditional money to support this deploy-ment. Frankly, it will hurt—it willhurt our ability to provide defense inother areas.

I am convinced that we have to becareful not to weaken our ability to de-fend strategic vital national interestswhere they occur around the world bydeploying our troops in areas which donot have clear objectives, where thereare no strategic vital national inter-ests, or where those interests are notclearly outlined and where our com-mitment is not for the achievement ofa specific objective but it is for a termof days.

Mr. President, I intend to vote infavor of the Hutchison resolution be-cause I believe that it is appropriatefor us to indicate to our troops thatwhen they are deployed we will providethem with all of the resources nec-essary for their security and success.

But that Hutchinson resolution, co-sponsored by a number of other Sen-ators, including the leadership of thejunior Senator from Oklahoma, Sen-ator INHOFE, also provides an oppor-tunity for Members of this Senate toexpress their disagreement with the de-cision of the President to deployground troops in Bosnia. I believe thatis the appropriate position for this Sen-ate to take. I urge other Senators to doso. I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.ABRAHAM). The Chair notes the list Ihad indicated Senator BIDEN had spo-ken before Senator ASHCROFT, so theSenator from Wisconsin would be inorder.

Mr. KOHL. I yield my position toSenator BIDEN, and I will speak afterSenator INHOFE, if that pleases theChair.

Mr. CHAFEE. Senator INHOFE and Ihave switched off, so I am taking theplace of Senator INHOFE. I will followSenator BIDEN.

Mr. KOHL. I ask unanimous consent,if I yield to Senator BIDEN, that I mayspeak after Senator CHAFEE.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.

Mr. KOHL. I yield to Senator BIDEN.Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I think a

little bit of immediate past history isimportant for us to recall here.

With regard to whether or not thispolicy that has been pursued in this ad-ministration relative to Bosnia andHerzegovina was a sound policy or not,it is the same policy that was pursuedby the Bush administration. The Bushadministration set a policy in motionthat said we would support an armsembargo against the Bosnian Govern-ment, as well as others, and that wewould not use air power to relieve thegenocidal actions of the Serbs.

To my great disappointment, al-though there were faint efforts tochange that policy by attempting toconvince our allies to lift the embargo,the truth of the matter was this ad-ministration did not change the posi-tion.

Some of us, as long ago as the last 4months of the Bush administration, ar-gued loudly, if not persuasively, thatthe Bush policy was an incorrect pol-icy. We argued that we should lift thearms embargo. In addition to that, weargued that we should supply weaponsto the Bosnian Government which atthat time was a multiethnic govern-ment made up of a council of Presi-dents, roughly divided in thirds amongMoslems, Croats, and Serbs withinBosnia, and a Bosnian Army made upof Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, andBosnian Moslems. We even passed theso-called Biden amendment throughboth Houses of the United States Con-gress that authorized the President ofthe United States to seek a lifting ofthe embargo and to transfer up to $50million worth of weaponry, off theshelf, to the Bosnian Government.That was in the last months of theBush administration.

I—and I do not say this to speak towhat I did or did not do, but to mark ithistorically—I, after Senator MOY-NIHAN, was one of the few people whowent to Sarajevo, went to nearSrebrenica, went to Tuzla, went to Bel-grade, went to Zagreb, met withKaradzic, met with Milosevic, met withUNPROFOR, met with the Croatianleadership, came back and wrote a re-port, and was debriefed by the Sec-retary of State and the President. Thereport called for lifting the arms em-bargo and using air power to strike atthe Serbian genocidal undertakings.

Back then, I—and I was not the onlyone in the world community—I cameback and pointed out that this wasraw, unadulterated genocide. The Serbshad set up rape camps, a policy explic-itly designed to take Moslem women,primarily, into camps, rape them, havethem carry the children to term, inorder to intimidate and pollute theMoslem people in Bosnia. Everyonesaid that was not going on; this wasnot 1937 or 1938 or 1940. But now, no onequestions it occurred.

I remember coming back—after goingup through Mount Igman and over themountains into a place called Kiseljakand going through villages—and say-ing, ‘‘There are graves.’’ You could ridethrough a village in the mountains andsee three or four homes in a row,pristinely kept, window boxes withflowers. The next home, a hole in theground. The next home, perfectly kept.After that, two holes in the ground ora chimney sticking up. And graves atthe end of the town road.

I was told by our own people as wellas the French, God bless them, and theBrits, that these folks are all the same.They are all bad guys. They are all likethis. They have all been doing this forall of the last 4 centuries—which is his-torically inaccurate and was inac-curate in terms of what was takingplace at the time.

I remember when we watched on tele-vision—the Senator from Arizona and Ispoke to it on the floor that night—when they overran Srebrenica. Youcould actually see U.N. soldiers sittingthere with their blue helmets and hatson top of tanks, watching the Serb con-querors take the women and childrenand send them in one direction andtake the able-bodied men and sendthem in the other direction—for exter-mination. This was not because theywanted segregated prison cells. Theytook them to the woods, they dugholes, they shot them, they droppedthem in the holes, they poured lye ontheir bodies and bulldozed the dirt overthem.

We were told no, that is not happen-ing.

Now we have satellite imaging thatuncovers this—surprise. Surprise. ‘‘Oh,my Lord this is happening.’’

The reason I bother to say this, be-cause I know you all are tired of hear-ing me saying it for the last 3 years, isto make one very important point.One, with all due respect, I do not

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S 18497December 13, 1995think the President has accuratelymade. And that is, what is our interestin Bosnia? Is there a vital interest? Or,as my friend from Missouri said, ‘‘Doesthis action represent our interest andour values?’’

If this does not represent our inter-ests and our values, then nothing thathas happened since the end of WorldWar II represents our values. Howmany in this Chamber, like me, havegone to Holocaust memorial events andheard the refrain, ‘‘Never again.’’Never again? On the same continent, inthe same proximity, the same deathcamps—it is happening again. And ithappened again.

This time it was not Jews. It was pri-marily Moslems. In 1935 and 1937 and1939 and 1941 and 1943, had it beenCatholics like me, or Protestants, likemany in here, who were being taken todeath camps, the world would haverisen up years earlier. But it was not.It was Jews. And we all turned a blindeye, as a world.

I respectfully suggest, were it notMoslems this time who were in therape camps, were it not Moslems whowere being exterminated as part of thisnew phrase ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’, thatthe world would have behaved dif-ferently. I wonder how many of us everthought, as students of World War II oras participants in World War II, thatwe would ever serve in the Senate andhear the phrase, openly used by oneparty in a conflict, ‘‘ethnic cleansing.’’Ethnic cleansing. Is that not an anti-septic term?

And notwithstanding the fact onlythe Serbs used the phrase, I kept hear-ing on this floor that, ‘‘They are all thesame. They are all the same.’’

There have been atrocities commit-ted by Moslems and by Croats. Butthey have not set up rape camps. Theyhave not set up death camps. Theyhave not mass murdered as part of acoherent plan for people, based upontheir ethnicity and their religion. Thatis called genocide—genocide. That iswhat it is. And now, even in our moveto state what our vital interest is, thisadministration and others who supportit are afraid to use the word. We aretold we are not taking sides.

I am here to take sides. Milosevic,the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, is awar criminal. He is no better thanHimmler. He is no better than Goeb-bels. He is a war criminal. Karadzic isa war criminal.

I might add that the leader of Serbia,Milosevic, is also a war criminal, al-though he is the only one not indictedso far.

So I hear people stand here and say,‘‘What is our interest? What is our in-terest?’’ Our interest is that history re-peated itself.

Let me be presumptuous enough togo on a little more to what I think thenext history lesson will be. The Sovietempire has collapsed—the good news.The bad news is that all of the ethnichatreds, all of the ethnic fighting, allof the atrocities that occurred 100

years ago and 40 years ago are now un-covered again. There are 25 millionRussians living outside the border ofRussia, in the Ukraine, in the Balticcountries, in Kazakhstan. There is warin Armenia, in Georgia, and almost allof it is based on ethnicity.

What is the message we send to theworld if we stand by and we say we willlet it continue to happen here in thisplace but it is not in our interest? Wedo not fear that it will spread? I amnot here to tell you that, if we do notact, it will spread and cause a war inEurope—tomorrow or next year. But Iam here to tell you that within thedecade, it will cause the spread of warlike a cancer, and the collapse of theWestern alliance. What is so importantabout the Western alliance? NATO forNATO’s sake so that we can beat ourbreast?

What I am about to say is going tocause me great difficulty if I am re-elected and come back here as theranking member or chairman of theForeign Relations Committee. But Eu-rope cannot stay united without theUnited States. There is no moral cen-ter in Europe. When in the last twocenturies have the French, or the Brit-ish, or the Germans, or the Belgiums,or the Italians moved in a way to unifythat continent to stand up to this kindof genocide? When have they done it?The only reason anything is happeningnow is because the United States ofAmerica finally—finally—is under-standing her role.

So we do have a national interest.Our national interest goes well beyondthe genocide that will spread like acancer. I will not take the time, be-cause others wish to speak, to explainwhat the rest of it is. But I do in mylonger statement which I will put inthe RECORD.

But there is a second question itseems to me after first asking what isthe national interest of the UnitedStates. Once you establish that there isa national interest—and I believe thereis one—then, is the proposed action bythe President the one that can meetthat national interest? I respectfullysuggest this is not the best one. If thePresident and the administration andthe last administration, in my view,had the gumption, they would havetold our European allies that we arelifting the arms embargo.

This is not a Vietnamization pro-gram. The Vietnamese and South Viet-nam were not sure where they wantedto be, North or South. That is why itnever worked.

The Bosnians know where they wantto be. They want to be free. They willfight for themselves, and all they haveever asked for is lifting the arms em-bargo.

Prime Minister Silajdzic came aftermy first visit to Bosnia. I had him inmy office and 12 of my colleagues—verygood men and women came, Democratsand Republicans. The word was then, ifwe lift the embargo, it is just going tomake it worse for those poor folks and

more are going to get killed. One of myRepublican colleagues, who is very in-formed on policy, and a Democraticcolleague at my conference table askedthe same thing of Silajdzic. Silajdzicsaid something I will never forget aslong as I live.

He looked at this Senator, and hesaid: ‘‘Senator, at least do me thehonor and the privilege of letting mechoose how to die.’’

‘‘Senator, do not send me food to fat-ten me and my family in the winteronly to be assured that I will be killedwith the full stomach. Give me a weap-on. Let me defend myself, and have thegood grace to let me choose how todie.’’

He then went on to add, ‘‘I am notasking for you to send a single Amer-ican troop. I am not asking for you tosend a single American. I am askingyou to lift this immoral embargo.’’

That is what should have been done,as a student of history of the Balkans—I suspect that I have read as much asalmost anybody here, at least I havetried my best, and I have gone theretwice and I have spoken with everyoneI could. During the last two Balkanwars, the only time they ended waswhen all parties concluded that theycould not achieve any more on theground than they could at the peacetable.

But events have overtaken us. Andthe event that has overtaken us iscalled Dayton. I say to my friends herein the Senate, the part that I do notlike about being Senator is when Presi-dents do not get it right, and we do notget to make the best choice. We get tochoose among bad choices.

It is that old thing about the Hob-son’s choice. Two bad choices is nochoice at all. The best choice is to liftthe embargo, provide air cover, waitwhile it is being done, and let theBosnian Government establish itselfbecause Serbia has already lost.Milosevic has no interest in continuingbecause he is a pariah in the Westerncommunity. Have the War Crimes Tri-bunal go forward and let it be settled.But we did not do that.

We have one of two choices now: One,we participate with a better than evenchance. We provide enough time for theBosnian Government to get the phys-ical wherewithal and economicstrength to defend themselves, andthen we leave. Two, we do not partici-pate at all, which means nothing hap-pens because the Europeans have nocenter on this issue. Nothing will hap-pen except the embargo will be on, thegenocide will continue, our interestwill be badly damaged, and the cancerwill spread. My son may not go toBosnia today, but he may be in easternGermany in 8 years. My grandchildrenmay not be in Bosnia today but theywill be in Europe fighting a war 15years from now.

So given the choices, I support thisresolution. I support it because we dohave a vital national interest, and wedo have a moral rationale for our en-gagement.

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATES 18498 December 13, 1995If we thought we had a moral inter-

est, a national interest in restoring theEmir of Kuwait to the throne—restor-ing the Emir of Kuwait to the throne,God bless his soul—to send 500,000troops there, tell me, tell me why wedo not have a moral interest in stop-ping what was international aggressionby Serbia crossing the Drina River intoa U.N.-recognized country and partici-pating in genocide?

In Kuwait we had a single example ofone young woman who was raped andbeaten, which turned out not to betrue, to enrage people about the awfulthing Saddam Hussein was doing. Andhere we have mass graves. I have vis-ited with BOB DOLE a hospital in Sara-jevo. Do you know who was in the hos-pital? Seven children. Do you knowwhy there were only seven children?Because the Serbs sit in those hills andthey have as a campaign of terror, themaiming of children. Walk with methrough Sarajevo’s streets and seedraped across the roads blankets andsheets. I thought it was a Lower EastSide in 1919 of New York.

I asked why. Do you know why theyare there? To take over the line of firefrom Serbian snipers shooting children.We pretended it did not happen. AskBOB DOLE.

We stood beside a beautiful raven-haired child who looked at us as wespoke. And the neurosurgeon said,‘‘The reason she is not turning is shehas no sight. He turned her head. Thebullet had gone through the back ofher head, severed the optic nerves, andcame out the other side.

There were seven children in thathospital. Nobody else. It was a plannedcampaign by Mladic and the Serbs toterrorize the Moslem community.

So let me tell you. If your moral cen-ter is oil, I understand you. If yourmoral center is humanity, there is nocomparing the restoration of the Emirof Kuwait with the ending of genocidein Bosnia.

But there is only one exit strategy, Isay, Mr. President, there is only one.

I hope the President, with all due re-spect, means it. That we will not beable to leave unless—what BOB DOLE,Joe BIDEN, Joe LIEBERMAN, and a wholebunch of others insist be in this resolu-tion—the Bosnian Government isarmed and prepared to defend itself.That is the ticket home for Americans.

There is a moral reason for this.There is a U.S. interest. It is not thebest way to do it, but, as Senators, weonly get to choose among the bad waysoffered to us. It is worth doing.

In this Christmas season, as I saw offthe first group to go to Bosnia fromDover Air Force Base, the only thing Icould think to say is ‘‘thank you;watch where you walk—there are amillion landmines—and God bless you.I am telling you, you are doing some-thing right but you are being put in aposition that is not the one you shouldhave been put in in order to accomplishit.’’ It is a hell of a way to send themoff, but we have no choice, it seems to

me, to meet our moral obligation andour national vital interest.

Mr. President, after nearly 4 years ofindifference, half-measures, nationalpolicies of European governments pur-sued in the garb of international peace-keeping, and other sophistries devoidof moral content, the western worldhas finally been moved to put an end tothe murderous fighting that has leftBosnia and Herzegovina in ruins.

While the dilly-dallying has gone on,more than a quarter-million Bosniansof various ethnic and religious affili-ation have been killed, and an addi-tional 21⁄2 million persons—over halfthe total population—have been drivenfrom their homes.

But, Mr. President, numbers alonecannot begin to convey the savagery,the barbarity, the depravity that hasreigned in this small balkan country.

There have been wars since time im-memorial, many on a larger scale thanthe war in Bosnia. There have been ref-ugee flights in other countries thatdwarf the Bosnian numbers.

This century has seen the JewishHolocaust, the Armenian Genocide, themurderous collectivation of Ukraine,and the killing fields of Cambodia. So,Mr. President, I suppose cynics mightsay that we have become hardened tothe unspeakable.

Yet what has happened in Bosnia andHerzegovina not only has had compo-nents of the other horrors the 20th-cen-tury, it has actually added a diabolicalnew feature: The unprecedented, cen-trally planned campaign of mass rapethat the Bosnian Serbs have used as acalculated weapon of terror designed todemoralize Bosnian Moslem commu-nities.

Mr. President, why was this allowedto happen? To help answer this ques-tion, let me offer a piece of counter-factual analysis that I have deliveredbefore on this Senate floor:

‘‘What if’’ a Moslem-dominatedBosnia-Herzegovina had attacked apeaceful orthodox Christian Serbia,carried out barbaric atrocities againstSerbian civilians, and then proudly an-nounced that its policy of ethniccleansing had been successful—wouldChristian Europe then have sat idly by,conjuring up excuse after excuse fornot halting the cruel and cowardly ag-gression?

Mr. President, I think the answer isself-evident.

European Jewry was yesterday’s vic-tim. The Bosnian Moslems are today’s.If we let the barbarism in Bosnia stand,who knows who will be tomorrow’s?

Now at last, thanks to the belated—nonetheless, praiseworthy—leadershipof the United States, we stand on theverge of a massive international effortdesigned to put a stop to the depravity,to try to restore a modicum of normal,civilized life to that sorry land.

I fear that the chances for successare a long-shot. But Mr. President,make no mistake about it: if the Unit-ed States does not continue to lead thiseffort, the chances for even a sem-blance of peace in Bosnia are zero.

And yet the choice is not an easyone. Like almost every other decisionconcerning foreign policy that a U.S.Senator has to make, our choice aboutwhether to support President Clinton’sdecision to deploy 20,000 Americantroops to Bosnia as part of the inter-national peace implementation forceknown as I-FoR is a reactive one.

The U.S. Congress rarely gets to for-mulate policy. We cannot, and shouldnot, write arms control treaties orother international agreements. Mostof the time we are asked to react toproposed solutions that are far fromideal, perhaps not even the best. Butoften these solutions, however riskythey may be, are nonetheless betterthan not acting at all.

That is exactly how I feel about theproposed deployment of U.S. troops inthe I-FoR. For more than 3 years, sinceSeptember 1992, I have been calling forlifting the illegal and unjust arms em-bargo against the Government ofBosnia and Herzegovina, the victim ofSerbian aggression, no matter whatour European allies think about such adecision.

Concurrently, I have called for strik-ing from the air at the offending Serbswhile the Bosnian Government wasbuilding up its own military strength.

Finally, I have advocated makingclear to the Government of Serbia thatit would suffer massive air strikes uponits territory across the Drina River ifit increased its assistance to theBosnian Serb aggressors.

Moreover, the Biden Amendment,which I introduced in 1992, and whichwas successively approved by Congressin 1993 and 1994, authorized assistanceto Bosnia through a drawdown of up to$50 million of Defense Departmentweapons stocks and other militaryequipment. This year’s foreign oper-ations conference report has increasedthis figure to $100 million. As soon asthe President receives and signs theforeign operations appropriations bill,he will be able to use this source anytime upon termination of the arms em-bargo.

Up until 1 month ago this policy thatI proposed remained, I am convinced,the best option open to the UnitedStates. It would have created the con-ditions of military parity in Bosnia andHerzegovina that are essential formaintaining a lasting peace.

Then came the talks at Wright-Pat-terson Air Force Base. The peaceagreement that emerged from thosetalks is not perfect—no internationalagreement ever is—but we have to dealwith the situation now at hand.

Let me take this occasion to con-gratulate Secretary of State Chris-topher and his negotiating team fortheir tireless efforts that achievedwhat no one else had been able to ac-complish for 31⁄2 years: a multilateralagreement that offers the only realpromise of ending the worst bloodshedin Europe since World War II. It is ahighly significant achievement, whichbrings great credit to the UnitedStates of America.

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S 18499December 13, 1995Yet Secretary Christopher, Secretary

of Defense Perry, and GeneralShalikashvili would be the first to addthat the Dayton Accords are still onlya building block for the structure ofpeace for the former Yugoslavia, whichremains to be put into place.

Let me underscore that the involve-ment of American ground troops in thepeace enforcement effort—the solutionless preferable than the lift-and-strikepolicy I have consistently advocated—in no way lessens the necessity ofequipping and training the BosnianFederation’s army in order to allow itto defend itself when all foreign peaceimplementation forces leave. The bi-partisan resolution specifically men-tions this point.

So I would like also to be perfectlyclear that if the administration hadnot assured that this equipping andtraining would take place—if not byuniformed U.S. military personnel,then by contractors—I would not sup-port the participation of U.S. groundtroops in the I-FoR. Third countriesmay, of course, also contribute weap-ons and training to the Federation, buta failure of Americans to take the leadin this effort would quite simply be aprescription for a prolonged involve-ment of our ground forces in Bosnia, apolicy which the American people willnot countenance.

President Clinton’s outstanding tele-vised speech to the Nation went a longway toward explaining to the Americanpeople the rationale for, and mission ofour troops in the I-FoR. I do not takeissue with any of the President’s argu-ments.

Above all, I would emphasize to thosewho wish to restrict America’s involve-ment abroad that the choice facing usis not between a risky foreign missionand the status quo. If the United Statesdoes not participate in—or more pre-cisely, lead—the I-For, I am convincedthat the war will re-ignite, escalate,probably spread, and open the door fora radical destabilization of southernEurope. And that most assuredly is inour vital national interest to prevent.

Finally there is the issue of Amer-ican leadership in NATO and in thelarger community of civilized nations.I have long criticized some of our Euro-pean allies, first for their utilization ofthe purposefully hamstrung U.N.peacekeeping operation in order not totake the militarily resolute measuresthat could have stopped the Serbs intheir tracks in 1991, and second fortheir obstinate unwillingness to allowNATO—principally American—airpower to cripple the Bosnian Serb warmachine.

It took the massacre in the Sarajevomarket at the end of August and thewithdrawal of the hobbled Europeanpeacekeepers, for us finally to overruleour timorous European friends.

Yet, Mr. President, the President ofthe United States has given his pledgeof American troops; the United Stateswas the driving force in crafting theDayton accords; and our credibility as

the leader of NATO is on the line.Bosnia has revealed strains withinNATO that must be addressed, but thisis not the time to exacerbate the ten-sions. Moreover, France has just re-en-tered the alliance’s integrated militarycommand, a sign that a successful op-eration in Bosnia may bode well for astronger NATO in the future.

Some of the opponents of our in-volvement have trotted out the clichethat the United States cannot be the‘‘world’s policeman.’’ Well, of coursewe can’t solve every crisis everywhere.But as President Clinton said in histelevision speech, that obvious factdoes not mean that we cannot helpanywhere.

The slaughter, rape, and destructionin Bosnia and Herzegovina should be anaffront to the sensibilities of everyAmerican. The I-For mission at thevery least will give the brutalized peo-ple of that land a last chance to stopthe killing and to re-enter the worldcommunity.

For all these reasons, then, our par-ticipation in the operation is vital.There are, however, serious risks asso-ciated with sending our troops toBosnia, and it is incumbent upon theadministration to explain how we areplanning to minimize them. Theserisks include:

Millions of lethal mines, which willprobably be hidden by snow for severalmonths;

The brutal Balkan winter that makesdriving hazardous;

Irregular forces, foreign extremists,and other rogue elements that mayspecially target American troops; and

The likelihood that an armed, hostileBosnian Serb populace in several loca-tions could both harbor attackers andengage in disruptive activity itself.

From administration testimony inhearings before the Foreign RelationsCommittee, I am satisfied that theseconcerns have been thoroughly ana-lyzed, and counter measures developedto the fullest extent possible.

Last Friday at 5 o’clock in the morn-ing, I went to Dover Air Force Base inmy State of Delaware to personally saygood-bye to a detachment of our troopsas they embarked for Bosnia. They areas fine a group of American men andwomen as has ever represented theArmed Forces of this country. Everypossible precaution must be taken tolessen the threat to their person asthey carry out their duties in Bosnia.In this regard, I emphasize that the ro-bust rules of engagement for our troopsmust not be altered under any cir-cumstances.

In larger terms, I believe that thecriteria for the mission’s success and aresponsible exit strategy must be delin-eated even more clearly than has al-ready been done. For example, is theabsence of serious conflict after 1 yearsufficient progress to warrant a dec-laration of mission accomplished?

Stated more precisely, will we with-draw our ground troops after precisely1 year even if the envisioned demo-

cratic institutions of the Bosniancentral government are not yet func-tioning? If so, will other internationalunits remain for a longer period?

My own belief is that the I-For mis-sion should be limited to creating thebasic conditions for democratic insti-tution-building to take place. Theremust be no mission creep for our mili-tary forces.

Yet if the civilian aspects of theagreement do not proceed, then theAmerican troops and their inter-national colleagues will have served invain. Hence, a premium must be put oncoordinating the mission of the Amer-ican military force with the work ofthe international civilian agencies pre-paring to implement the electoral, ref-ugee, and humanitarian aspects of theDayton accords.

But it may well be unrealistic to ex-pect construction of a working democ-racy in 365 days or less. Therefore,plans must be drawn up immediatelyfor a ‘‘follow-on’’ force to remain inBosnia after the United States troopsleave. My strong feeling is that thisforce should be led by our EuropeanNATO allies, augmented by units ofEuropean neutrals with experience inpeacekeeping operations.

Finally, let me repeat once again theabsolute necessity of creating a bal-ance of military strength on theground so that when the internationalpeacekeepers are withdrawn, the fed-eration of Bosnia and Herzegovina willnot be vulnerable to renewed attack.

The peace settlement is far from per-fect. There is no guarantee that it willbe implemented. The involvement ofAmerican ground forces means—al-though I pray I am wrong—that casual-ties and fatalities are likely to occur.

But, as I have indicated, we live in ahighly imperfect world. To do nothingwould be to invite larger problems inthe future that would require a muchriskier and bloodier American involve-ment.

If the conditions I have outlined aremet: retention of very robust rules ofengagement for our troops; no missioncreep for our troops; but close coordi-nation of the I-For with internationalcivilian efforts in Bosnia; a UnitedStates lead in coordinating arming andtraining the army of the federation ofBosnia and Herzegovina; and a finelydrawn set of criteria for mission suc-cess.

Then I believe that President Clin-ton’s policy deserves the support of theCongress. The President has promisedto meet these conditions. Therefore, Iwill vote for the bipartisan resolution,and I urge my colleagues to do thesame.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-ator from Rhode Island.

Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I sup-port the Dole-McCain resolution whichauthorizes the participation of U.S.military forces in what is known as theI-For, the NATO implementation force.The purpose of this is to monitor thepeace agreement in Bosnia.

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATES 18500 December 13, 1995The Dayton peace agreement and

this NATO deployment represents, inmy judgment, the only opportunity toachieve a long-term peace in Bosniaand with it a more stable Europe. Thatis a very important point, Mr. Presi-dent—a more stable Europe, which is amatter of profound interest to theUnited States.

The Senate’s vote on the Dole resolu-tion involves the question of what rolethe United States should play in Eu-rope and throughout the world as weapproach the 21st century. Let us justtake a brief look into history, if wemight. It was an assassination in theBalkans, in Sarajevo itself, that trig-gered World War I, a conflict intowhich the United States was reluc-tantly drawn. Indeed, we stayed out ofit for nearly 3 years.

At the conclusion of that devastatingwar, the United States made a veryconscious decision, and that was towithdraw from any involvement in Eu-ropean security affairs. From 1919 until1942, the United States remained alooffrom Europe, even though World War IIraged for 21⁄2 years during that period.Yet, inevitably, we were dragged intothat war, the most costly of all wars interms of lives and treasures.

We have now learned that the UnitedStates, the world’s lone superpowerand the undisputed leader of the NATOalliance, simply cannot withdraw fromEuropean security matters, nor shouldwe. Our active engagement in Europefor the past 50 years since the end ofWorld War II has brought enormousbenefits to us, to the Europeans, and tothe world at large. Western Europe hasenjoyed peace, it has enjoyed freedom,it has enjoyed democracy, and it hasenjoyed economic success ever sincethe end of that war.

This has largely been due to U.S.leadership in NATO. Our leadership hasassisted in bringing about the fall ofcommunism and the liberation of East-ern Europe. But despite these suc-cesses, Europe today is not free of warand bloodshed and instability. We needto look no further than the war thathas raged in the Balkans for the past 3years. Others have spoken about it, andsometimes we forget these statistics:250,000 people have lost their lives inthat conflict, and more than 2 millionpeople have been displaced or are refu-gees. This war has the potential to spillover into the rest of Europe.

The history which I just touched onhas taught that maintaining a free,democratic and peaceful Europe is verymuch in our interests, in our securityinterests, and deployment of the NATOforce in which the United States pro-vides one-third—not one-half, not two-thirds, but one-third—of the troops willhelp ensure the type of Europe wewant: A Europe that is free, that isDemocratic, and that is peaceful.

I would ask, Mr. President, those whooppose this deployment to answer thisquestion. If we, as part of NATO, can-not lead an effort to try and end thewar in Bosnia, then why should we be

members of NATO? Let us forget thewhole thing, at least our participationin it. It seems to me that helping toend destabilizing military conflicts in-side the borders of Europe such asBosnia represents is the type of respon-sibility NATO should undertake in thepost-cold-war world.

May I remind my colleagues that theimplementation force includes manynon-NATO forces—not just the NATOforces, but others—that share our in-terest in securing peace in the Balkans.

Those opposing this resolution, theDole resolution, also argue that U.S.troops will be at a risk of being drawninto nonmilitary activities and mayalso suffer needless casualties.

To this I say, take a look at the Day-ton peace agreement. Unlike some re-cent failures—we have had them in thisNation, particularly if you think of So-malia—where United States militaryroles were not entirely clear, theBosnian deployment plan and the ad-ministration’s pledges are very specificabout what our troops will and will notdo. I am reassured by this part of thewritten statements.

In addition to its own self-protection,the mission of our force is to overseeand enforce implementation of themilitary aspects of this peace agree-ment. Now, what are we talking about?We are talking about cessation of hos-tilities, withdrawal to agreed lines,creation of a zone of separation, returnof troops and weapons to their encamp-ments. Civilian authority such as theUnited Nations, not our troops, will beresponsible for many of the non-military aspects that are envisioned bythe agreement.

Now, what are we talking aboutthere? Overseeing elections, conduct-ing humanitarian missions, helping ci-vilians move about, acting as local po-lice forces. You can be sure that Con-gress and the American people aregoing to be watching carefully. We aregoing to be monitoring this to see thatour troops do not engage in any activi-ties for which we are not responsible.

I do not want to suggest, Mr. Presi-dent, that sending United States mili-tary forces to Bosnia is without risk.Regrettably, we may well suffer casual-ties, as is often the case in military op-erations such as in the Balkans. Butplease remember that the UnitedStates and the 25 other nations aresending a force totaling 60,000 groundtroops, forgetting those that are in theair or on the waters. This is an over-whelming numerical advantage overany group or faction that would chal-lenge our authority.

I would also point out that unlikeformer United Nations peacekeepingmissions in Bosnia, we will be com-pletely prepared to defend ourselves.This is a mission in which if we areshot at, we are going to reply with bul-lets and shells.

Mr. President, the rest of the worldlooks to the United States to be a lead-er in promoting peace and democracy,and this is certainly the case in the

Balkans where the three signatorieshave authorized our intervention. If aUnited States-led NATO force can helpsecure peace in Bosnia, it will make anenormous contribution to world secu-rity.

On the other hand, Mr. President, ifwe abdicate our responsibilities to ourNATO allies, it will send a clear and Ibelieve very troubling signal that theUnited States has once again retreatedinto Fortress America. It will showthat we are not there when a difficultjob has to be done. That is not a signalwe can afford to send. So, therefore, Iurge my colleagues to support the de-ployment of United States troops toBosnia and to vote for the Dole-McCainresolution.

I further would urge a vote againstthe Hutchison amendment, which, inmy judgment, sends a very confusingmessage. It says, on the one hand, toour troops, we do not think you shouldbe in Bosnia, but nevertheless we sup-port you. I do not think that is thekind of message I, for one, would liketo receive if I were risking my life oron a mission of this nature in Bosnia.The message, again, seems to say weare for you, but you should not bethere. I do not find that a message ofmuch comfort or encouragement, inmy judgment.

So therefore, Mr. President, I hopethat my colleagues would support theDole-McCain amendment.

I thank the Chair.Mr. KOHL addressed the Chair.The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-

ator from Wisconsin.Mr. KOHL. Thank you, Mr. Presi-

dent.Mr. President, the question of send-

ing American men and women on adangerous mission, whether it be tofight a war or, as in this case, tostrengthen a fragile peace is always adifficult one. A healthy debate hasbeen carried on across the Nation, andit is clear that Americans are reluctantto send U.S. forces in harm’s way.

While I share that reluctance, my re-luctance does not stem from a sense ofisolationism; but rather, I am reluc-tant to commit our troops when thesituation on the ground is so tenuous.I understand that the combatantsthemselves have asked us to help themimplement the Dayton accords; how-ever, I remain skeptical about theircommitment to peace. I questionwhether the presence of a large NATOforce will be enough to overcome thedaunting challenge of national recon-struction facing all the Bosnian people.And, given the deep hatreds that existthere, I wonder how realistic it is forus to think that once United Statestroops leave Bosnia the peace will hold.

At the same time, what are our alter-natives? I agree that the situation onthe ground may have been different ifthe President had heeded Congress andlifted the arms embargo. However, asone of our colleagues pointed out to merecently, even if the administrationhad agreed to lift the arms embargo

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S 18501December 13, 1995and the Bosnian Moslems had been bet-ter armed, there still would have beenthe need for a peace accord, and wewould still be facing the difficult ques-tion of whether to send in UnitedStates ground forces to guarantee thepeace.

After 4 years of anguish over theatrocities in Bosnia, I believe we havea responsibility to try to end this war.We cannot turn our backs on the inno-cent men, women, and children whohave lived through the unspeakableatrocities committed by all sides. Wecannot turn down a request that isprobably the last and best opportunityto end this harrowing civil war.

At the same time, we cannot allowemotion to sway our decisionmakingabout sending United States groundtroops into what until now has been awar zone. We would all like to see anend to the bloodshed in Bosnia, and anend, for that matter, to bloodshed ev-erywhere. But, it is disingenous to saythat we are sending ground troops toBosnia out of a sense of moral respon-sibility that we must police the entireworld. We have already determinedthat neither do we have the desire northe means to be the world’s policeman.

Recognizing we are not the world’spoliceman does not mean that thereare no circumstances under which weshould send U.S. troops abroad. If weare to take advantage of winning thecold war and retaining our capacity toshape events in this changing era, thenwe must demonstrate leadership and bewilling to take risks for peace. The dif-ficult question is, when should we takethese risks?

I have always held that any deter-mination to commit U.S. troops abroadshould meet four criteria:

One, there must be a clear and com-pelling issue of national interest.

Two, the benefits must outweigh thecost of endangering American soldiers.

Three, there must be an establishedplan of action—including plans fortroop withdrawal.

And, four, there must be support andinvolvement of the international com-munity.

Unfortunately, without the starkblack and white of the cold war toguide our foreign policy, it is less clearwhen our vital national interests are atstake. The world has become a farmore complicated place, and there ismuch disagreement over whether thereis a vital national interest at stake inBosnia.

Some say this is a European problemand we should leave it to the Euro-peans to solve. Indeed, the Europeansrealize that they have more at stakehere than we do. That is why they aresupplying the majority of the forcesand why they are providing most of thefunding and technical support for thecrucial task of rebuilding Bosnia.

Then, why could not this be a Euro-pean-led mission with American sup-port? Frankly, the Europeans havebeen indecisive and unable to do thison their own. Yet, if this civil war

rages on, it poses a serious threat toEuropean stability. Just as that possi-bility poses a threat to our Europeanallies, it also threatens us.

That is why America must assumethe mantle of leadership. The futurestability of Europe is, and always willbe, in our national interest. We havefought two major wars in Europe, andin the 50 years since the end of WorldWar II we have committed U.S. troopsand resources to the defense of Europeand to the leadership of the NATO alli-ance. Because of our ties to Europe—historically and economically—it is inour interest for NATO to be strong andit is in our interest to continue to leadNATO.

That said, do the potential benefitsof this mission outweigh the costs?There are many ambitious—I mightsay overly ambitious—goals laid out inthe Dayton accords: The return of refu-gees, the negotiation of arms controlagreements, the prosecution of warcriminals, and the reconstruction ofcivil institutions. I am pessimisticabout the prospects for realizing manyof these nation building goals in theshort term.

Nonetheless, I believe there is still apotential benefit to participate in astrong peacekeeping force. The omi-nous warnings of many opponents ofthis mission belie the fact that theNATO Implementation Force is notembarking on a combat mission, nor isit a mission to impose a peace. This isnot Somalia. Furthermore, our troopswill not be leading the nation buildingefforts. This is not Haiti. This missionis in response to a direct request by thecombatants to help them implement apeace agreement that they negotiated.The greatest and most achievable goalsof this mission are strictly militarygoals: Separating the forces and creat-ing an environment for the continuedcessation of hostilities. And 1 year maynot be enough time to rebuild Bosnia,but we cannot underestimate the po-tential of a 1-year breathing period tolay the groundwork for a more stablepeace down the road.

How do these benefits measure upagainst the potential costs? There hasbeen a strong consensus in the UnitedStates that sending ground troops atan earlier date would have been toorisky and not worth the cost. Are wenow risking the same entanglement weso assiduously avoided by sending inground forces to implement this shakypeace? As peacekeepers, will our troopsbe a lightening rod for some of themore controversial provisions of thepeace agreement many in Bosnia arenot sure they want?

Over the past few weeks, I have ex-plored these and other issues related tothe risks. I have met with the NationalSecurity Advisor, and yesterday withthe Secretary of State, the Secretaryof Defense, the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff, the Vice President, andwith the President himself to expressmy concerns directly, and to listen totheir responses.

I have come to believe that it is mostunlikely we will become entangled in afull-scale war. We are participating ina NATO operation to implement apeace agreement painstakingly nego-tiated over several weeks. The Daytonaccords set forth clear military goalsfor the implementation force. Ourtroops have a limited mission—limitedin the specific tasks designed tostrengthen the peace and limited in itsduration. We have made no commit-ment to stay on should the peace fail.And, should all out war break out be-fore the year is up, then we surely willleave. Contrary to the views of some ofmy colleagues, I believe that SecretaryPerry and General Shalikashvili haveestablished a clear plan to action and aclear exit strategy.

In the unlikely event that our troopsbecome targets, we have learned fromearlier mistakes: Our troops will bewell armed, will be sent to Bosnia insufficient numbers, and will be operat-ing under the right rules of engage-ment, allowing them to defend them-selves fully.

To be sure, we can never eliminateall the risks. Even under the best ofcircumstances, Bosnia is a dangerousplace. On balance, however, I believethat this mission is worthwhile.

Can we state with certainty that ourefforts will pay off, and that the war isover? Unfortunately, it is too early totell whether the conditions in Bosniaare really ripe for peace. But, that doesnot mean we should not proceed. If thisdiplomatic effort fails it will be a fail-ure of the Croatians, the Moslems andthe Serbs to take advantage of theinternational commitment to helpthem implement the peace. Only timewill allow us to test their commitmentto the peace accord. In the meantime,we cannot afford to turn our backs onthe most serious diplomatic agreementto date.

Mr. President, I am disappointed thatthe majority leader has been compelledby members of his party to have threeseparate votes on Bosnia. Either wesupport this policy or we do not. It istoo easy to say that the President hasmade his decision, that he has commit-ted U.S. forces, and then take no re-sponsibility for the mission but stillvote to support the troops.

In this case, I believe that the Presi-dent has demonstrated leadership. Hehas acted in our national interest, andhe has done so cognizant of the risksthe men and women of our ArmedForces will face. Now that the Bosnianpeople have taken a step toward peace,we have the chance to do somethingconcrete, specific and finite to helpbring this bloodshed to an end. And soI say, let us do it.

Mr. President, I will be votingagainst the Hutchison resolution andin favor of the Dole resolution.

I yield the floor.Mr. FAIRCLOTH addressed the

Chair.The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-

ator from North Carolina.

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATES 18502 December 13, 1995Mr. FAIRCLOTH. Mr. President, at

the outset of my remarks on Bosnia, Iwant to state for the record my totalsupport for our men and women in uni-form deployed in the Balkans. I knowthey will serve the Nation with honorand distinction. I commit to themtoday that I will make every effort toprovide for their safety, to make everyavailable resource for their defense andto work hard and look forward to theirsafe return home.

Let me say that I have lived my en-tire life in a small eastern North Caro-lina town that is surrounded by FortBragg, Camp Lejeune, Seymour John-son Air Force Base, and Cherry PointMarine Base. My whole life, I have lit-erally been surrounded by people whoare strongly committed to serving ourNation and our Commander in Chief.

I am confident that the bravery ofour soldiers deployed in Bosnia andtheir respect for their commanding of-ficers will serve as an example and aninspiration to all Americans. While Ihave nothing but praise to offer for ourtroops, I come to the floor to voice mystrong opposition to the President’s de-cision to deploy United States forces inBosnia.

Despite repeated requests by Con-gress and the American people, theClinton administration has yet to showa compelling national security interestwhich would justify the commitment ofUnited States ground forces in Bosnia.In fact, President Clinton’s Bosniastrategy over the past 3 years has beenan incoherent jumble of vacillatingpolicies.

As a candidate, Bill Clinton criti-cized the policies of the Bush adminis-tration and advocated a forceful inter-ventionist role for the United States.Once in office, President Clintondithered while the Balkan situation de-generated into a brutal, dehumanizingethnic civil war. Much of the tragedywe see in Bosnia occurred on PresidentClinton’s watch.

Without consulting Congress, Presi-dent Clinton entered into an agreementto commit U.S. ground forces. He hasnot come before a joint session of Con-gress to explain his policies on thisissue. Rather, from the Oval Office,President Clinton delivered a televisednational address and then boarded AirForce One bound for Europe. It struckme as though he was more eager to col-lect congratulations in European cap-itals than to explain his Bosnian policyto Congress and the American people.

Despite this absence of Presidentialleadership, a rejection of the Clintonadministration’s troop deploymentplans does not mean a rejection ofAmerican involvement in the Bosniapeace process, nor a retreat into isola-tionism.

The United States has played a sig-nificant role in Bosnia, and we shouldcontinue to do so. United States mili-tary commanders provided leadershipto NATO in advocating the use of air-strikes to break the Bosnian Serb mili-tary advantage, while the Clinton ad-

ministration dallied with the UnitedNations.

In the end, the administration failedto take a leadership role in convincingthe United Nations to lift the arms em-bargo which would have allowed theBosnian Moslems to defend themselvesat a much earlier date and might havealleviated the need for our groundforces there at any time.

We brought the warring factions tothe peace table, and we have an inter-est in seeing that the peace agreementis implemented, but we do not—we donot—have a vital national security in-terest, which is the only thing whichwould justify putting at risk the livesof 20,000 American soldiers and ma-rines. The President was wrong tomake this commitment, and Congresswill be wrong if we endorse it.

Some believe that President Clin-ton’s hastily concluded decision onground forces will demand congres-sional approval in order to preserveinternational respect for the Office ofthe Presidency. I disagree. Respect forthe power of the Presidency is pre-served and enhanced when the holder ofthat high office has led the Nation to-ward a consensus on military interven-tion before troops are deployed. BillClinton has turned Presidential leader-ship on its head. He is trying to builda national consensus after having com-mitted U.S. forces. This is not leader-ship.

On the ground, our troops will faceoverwhelming logistic hurdles. In addi-tion to arriving at the height of theharsh Balkan winter, our troops willface 6 million landmines coveringmuch of Bosnia. The exact whereaboutsof many of these mines is unknown andtheir detection will not be easy, asmany are made of plastic.

The infrastructure of Bosnia has beendevastated by years of war. Thebridges, roads, and railroads which re-main usable are simply not capable ofsupporting the weight of M1–A1 tanksand any other heavy armaments. Mostexisting airstrips have been seriouslydamaged.

Clearly, we will have to spend mil-lions of taxpayers’ dollars, Americantaxpayers’ dollars, in infrastructure be-fore we can begin to adequately policethe so-called peace agreement. Once webegin that effort, we will then spendbillions more on military equipmentand personnel. How much will this lat-est effort in nation building cost? Andthat is what we are doing, nation build-ing. Some estimates are as high as $100million a month. I suspect that prob-ably is not high enough.

Further, I have written to the Clin-ton administration requesting informa-tion about its plan to start supplyingforeign aid to Bosnia. I have not yet re-ceived a response.

We have an opportunity to avoid re-peating the tragedies of Lebanon andSomalia. Now is the time to use ourtechnological superiority to spareAmerican lives. Many of those who op-posed our investment in advanced mili-

tary hardware and cut defense spendingwould now lay aside that advantage.Now is the time for the U.S. Air Forceand the Navy to take the lead in en-forcing this peace agreement, whichgrows less certain by the day. It is sim-ply a bad policy to put U.S. groundforces between enemies who have beenfighting each other for over 600 years,and that is how long this battle hasbeen going on. One year of Americantroops will not end it.

President Clinton stated that ourtroops will fight fire with fire. How-ever, this pledge is useless when it isimpossible to distinguish between aSerb, a Croat, and a Moslem.

Mr. President, it is not impossible toidentify a vital national security inter-est. The invasion of Kuwait and our re-sponse provides a textbook example ofhow to do it. It should be clear to allAmericans that President Clinton hasyet to measure up to the standards ofDesert Storm. Until he does, I will con-tinue my strong support and respectfor our troops by opposing the Presi-dent’s decision to deploy ground troopsin Bosnia.

I yield the floor.Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms.

SNOWE). The Senator from Michigan isrecognized.

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, as amember of the Armed Services Com-mittee, I have spent a great deal oftime analyzing the risks involved inthe United States joining the NATO ef-fort or not joining the NATO effort.There are risks both ways. I have con-cluded that the risks of not acting, notjoining the NATO effort, are greaterthan the risks of acting with our NATOallies, and I will, therefore, support theDole resolution.

The risks of acting are clear, and in-clude the risk of casualties from mines,from accidents on the road, possiblyfrom snipers. Those risks are real, andI think the American public should befully aware of what those risks are. Ashard as we have tried to reduce thoserisks—and the Joint Chiefs and thecommanders have made an extraor-dinary effort to reduce those risks inevery way possible, through trainingand equipment and in other ways—those risks are there and they are real.

But there are risks of not acting tojoin our NATO allies. Those risks ofnot participating with NATO are alsovery real and, in my judgment, aregreater than the risks of joining. Therisks of not acting, of not participatingwith NATO, include the risk of a peaceagreement falling apart because ofNATO’s absence. That, in turn, couldlead to a wider and more dangerouswar, with continued killing, ethniccleansing, rape, and other atrocities,more civilian refugees and humani-tarian catastrophe in Bosnia, Croatia,Slovenia, Serbia, but also possibly inKosova and Albania and Macedonia,and even possibly in Greece and Tur-key.

The effects could be felt beyond theregion as well. Of great importance

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S 18503December 13, 1995here—and this is something which I donot believe has been given enough at-tention—is that Russia is now willingto participate with the United Statesand our NATO allies in the peace im-plementation force in Bosnia. In fact,Russia is willing to place their troopsin Bosnia directly under an Americancommander. That would be historic co-operation with long-term benefits forEuropean security and for world secu-rity.

But if this agreement falls apart andthe war widens because we do not par-ticipate with NATO, and we knowNATO will not carry out this operationwithout the United States, NATOwould be weakened and fractured, andthe United States and Russia could bepulled to opposite sides in a Europenewly divided.

Hardliners in Russia would balk atworking with the United States andwould gain political points domesti-cally in upcoming elections. So, in ad-dition to the region becoming inflamedagain, in addition to the United Statespotentially being dragged into a wid-ened war in Europe, just as we havebeen dragged in twice before this cen-tury, we could see a Russia becomemore threatening to Europe and toUnited States interests, precisely whenNATO is fractured and less able to dealwith that newly threatening Russia.

So the failure to participate herecould well sink our efforts to improvethe United States-Russia relationship,to build strong democracies in Europe,to expand NATO, and to integrate Rus-sia into permanent European securityarrangements.

When President Clinton wrote to theSpeaker of the House last month, hehighlighted the costs of not trying tohelp secure the peace efforts of thewarring parties, and this is what hesaid:

Unquestionably, there are costs and risksto all involved in making peace. Peace is theless risky alternative. But there will be nopeace without America’s engagement.

Madam President, I have asked a lotof questions about this mission overthe last few weeks, as a member of theArmed Services Committee. The firstquestion is: Are there important U.S.interests at stake? I believe the answeris yes.

The United States has an interest inhelping the parties establish peace andstability in Europe. We have an inter-est in preventing the war from spread-ing, which also could fracture theNATO alliance and which could putRussia and the United States on oppo-site sides of a renewed and wider war.

The second question I asked: Is themission clear, and is it limited andachievable? The Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff has testified that it is,and the military commanders agree.The NATO mission has three primarymilitary objectives: maintaining theexisting cease-fire, physically separat-ing the warring parties, and overseeingthe division of territory agreed to bythe leaders in Dayton.

Our military leaders have been clearabout what our troops will not do, sothere will not be any mission creep.They will not oversee election security;they will not conduct humanitarian re-lief missions; they will not help civil-ians relocate or act as local police.

Now, there is a fine line between ac-tually performing those tasks, whichU.S. and NATO troops will not do andthat the U.N. agencies and other pri-vate organizations will attempt to do,and helping to create a secure environ-ment, which NATO’s force will do whilethey are there so that those othertasks can be accomplished.

NATO and U.S. military leaders saythat they have sufficient guidance tomake the judgment about that fineline. Our troops will not be directly re-sponsible for disarming the BosnianSerbs or equipping the Bosnian Govern-ment to achieve an equilibrium offorces on the ground. While both ofthose missions are desirable, it is ap-propriate for the NATO force to be ableto maintain its evenhandedness indealing with all of the parties andtherefore to leave those tasks to sepa-rate mechanisms.

The third question I asked: Has therisk to our troops been minimized?Bosnia, even after this agreement, is avery dangerous environment. I havebeen particularly concerned, as havemany of us, about the threat posed bylandmines, which some have estimatedto number 6 million. GeneralShalikashvili has testified last weekthat the troops have received extratraining before deploying to the thea-ter specifically against known hazards,such as landmines and snipers. Theywill be well-armed, equipped with ro-bust rules of engagement that theyneed to protect themselves, and localcommanders will have the authoritythat they need to make decisions aboutusing force without any cumbersomedual-key arrangements.

Secretary Perry testified that theyhave the authorization to use deadlyforce, if necessary, and National Secu-rity Adviser Tony Lake warned that—

. . . if anybody fools with our forces, theywill get hit, hit immediately and very hard,and we expect that any other challenge orthreat to our forces would be intimidated.

In addition, there is a clear chain ofcommand with U.S. commanders at thetop. General Shalikashvili testifiedthat he believes the risk of physicaldanger to be small and that he wouldanticipate more casualties from acci-dents than from hostile action.

The fourth question I asked: Arethere clearly defined conditions underwhich United States forces will not gointo Bosnia? The answer is yes.

We have received repeated testimonythat NATO will not fight its way in.The parties have initialed an agree-ment, and they are scheduled to sign itin Paris tomorrow. Vanguard NATOunits are in Bosnia. We must see evi-dence of compliance with this agree-ment before deployment. Otherwise,General Shalikashvili has testified

that we are not going in. We are notgoing to fight our way in. We are goingthere to help implement a peace agree-ment which the parties want.

The fifth question: Is there a clearexit strategy? Administration officialsare clear that the deployment of Unit-ed States forces with NATO will lastapproximately 1 year, and they havesaid that most of the military tasksthat the NATO force is charged withachieving may be achievable in lessthan 12 months.

There are two key issues here. One iswhether an effective equilibrium offorces can be achieved between the par-ties in such a way that the Bosnianscan defend themselves when the NATOforces leave. There is still a lot ofdoubt about this. The goal is not partof the military mission itself. It is aseparate commitment from the UnitedStates to all of the parties, which all ofthe parties, we are told, have accepted.

Now I remain skeptical, as indeed dosome of the officials who testified be-fore us, that an arms control agree-ment as outlined in the Dayton agree-ment can by itself effectively achievethat equilibrium. Secretary Perry saysthat he believes that the United Statescommitment to assure success of thiseffort to rearm and train the Bosniansif the arms control effort fails, will ac-tually help that arms control effortsucceed.

We will need to watch closely to seeif the parties abide by their obligationsto reduce armaments, working withthe Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. For instance, theyhave agreed not to import any weaponsfor 90 days and any heavy weapons for180 days. If they do not abide by theseaspects of the agreement, the UnitedStates is prepared to assure that armsand training will be provided to theBosnian Government. This must bepremised, of course, on the most reli-able possible assessment of all sides’current military capabilities, and theassessment of what constitutes an ef-fective equilibrium: defensible terri-tory with sufficient armaments. If thearms control agreements are not car-ried out, as Secretary Perry testified,the United States can and will need totry to accelerate the arming effort dur-ing the 12-month NATO deployment pe-riod.

The second key issue on exiting iswhether a secure environment can con-tinue to exist after the NATO forceleaves. Annex 11, signed by the parties,establishes an international police taskforce assistance program to monitor,observe, inspect, advise, and train lawenforcement agencies to improve pub-lic and state security. But that maynot be enough. In addition to the inter-national police task force, full andlasting implementation by the partiesof all aspects of the peace agreementmay require the presence of a smallerresidual military force in the formerYugoslavia for longer than the 1 yearplanned for the NATO implementationforce, and any such residual force

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATES 18504 December 13, 1995should be comprised primarily ofArmed Forces from European nationswithout U.S. Armed Forces.

I believe there should be planning un-derway now for a European residualforce. The President should be encour-aging European nations now to initiatecontingency planning for such a forcethat does not include U.S. ArmedForces to maintain a secure environ-ment for implementation of the peaceagreement after the NATO forces leave.

Mr. President, there is no need towring our hands in this body about nothaving a choice. Some say we have nochoice, that the decision has beenmade. Well, we have three choices, atleast.

Choice 1 is to say there shall be nofunds for these troops. That was thechoice that we voted against earliertoday. But that was a choice. That is aconstitutional capability that we have,if we decided to exercise it, to say thatwe will use the power of the purse sothat these troops would not go toBosnia. By an overwhelming vote, 22 to77, we decided not to use the power ofthe purse, not to use that capabilitythat this Congress has under the Con-stitution to restrict funding in order toprevent troops from going to Bosnia.But it was a choice. We were not in aposition where we were prevented fromexercising that constitutional option.

We have a second choice. We can ex-press an opinion which is in oppositionto this mission, short of using thepower of the purse, but nonetheless anexpression of opinion. That is what theHutchison resolution does.

It seems to me, however, that theHutchison resolution would be a ter-rible mistake and would sap the moraleof our troops terribly. To tell ourtroops that we will support you, we areall for you, as part of the Hutchisonresolution does, to say that the Con-gress supports military personnel whomay be ordered into Bosnia, but we op-pose the decision, is telling thosetroops who are put in a position of dan-ger that we do not support their mis-sion.

Now, if anything will undermine mo-rale of troops, it would seem to me, itwould be saying this to them: No mat-ter how much we say in one paragraphof the resolution that we are behindthe troops—you can say that all youwant, you can proclaim that all youwant in one paragraph—but it runs ex-actly counter and undermines thatmessage to say in another paragraph,you are being sent on a mission whichis wrong. If that mission is wrong, thenthe power of the purse should be usedto prevent it.

It should be one way or the other. Wehave the authority under the Constitu-tion. We chose not to exercise it. Ithink we made the right decision. Butwe had that choice under the Constitu-tion. Having chosen not to exercise apower that this Congress had to pre-vent the troops from going to Bosnia tobe put in a position of danger, it seemsto me now it is totally wrong for us to

tell those troops we are now for youbut your mission is a mistake. If thatmission is a mistake, we should havevoted not to allow it. We cannot haveit both ways and expect our troops,who are being put in harm’s way, to doanything except react in wondermentand amazement that a Congress coulddecide not to restrict the funds, andthen to say in the same resolution weare behind our troops, although themission is wrong.

I hope we will defeat the Hutchisonresolution and adopt the third resolu-tion which will be voted on, the Dole-McCain resolution, which in a qualifiedway, in a very careful way, supportsthe continuation of this mission.

Mr. President, it comes down to this:We have vital security interests in try-ing to help prevent a war in Europefrom resuming and spreading into awider regional war which would prob-ably fracture NATO, which could verywell pit NATO ally against NATO ally.We have an interest in reducing thechance of Europe becoming dividedagain with Russia on the other sidefrom most of Europe, with a Russiathat would be likely, if this peaceagreement failed because the UnitedStates stayed out of the NATO force,to then grow as a threat to the UnitedStates and to our allies. If this peaceagreement falls apart because of Unit-ed States non-participation withNATO, we would be playing into thehands of the most extreme nationalistsin Russia and furthering their electionambitions next year. If this NATOmilitary mission succeeds, Russiantroops for the first time will be underAmerican command, an extraordinarydevelopment in history, and will be agreater part of a European security so-lution, instead of being part of theproblem as they have for so many dec-ades.

U.S. involvement in this NATO forceis essential if the peace agreement ofthe parties has any chance of being im-plemented. This is a chance, a chancethat only the parties can take advan-tage of. But by participating, we wouldalso be giving the parties a chance toend the slaughter and the ethniccleansing and the use of rape as aweapon. For all of these reasons, andhaving answered the questions which Iput to myself in good conscience overthe last few weeks, I have concluded weshould participate in the NATO force,and I hope the Dole-McCain resolutionis adopted.

Mr. President, against all odds andagainst most predictions, the warringparties in the Balkans came togetherand negotiated a comprehensive andcomplex peace agreement. It is not per-fect, and its success is by no means as-sured, but it is their agreement, and asAssistant Secretary Holbrooke testi-fied last week, it goes farther thananyone had reason to hope the partieswould go when they first started.

This agreement represents the bestchance for peace in the region that wehave seen after 4 years of devastating

war. It is still up to the parties them-selves to implement the agreement.The role of the NATO ImplementationForce [IFOR] is to give them thatchance, by creating a secure environ-ment in which the many tasks setforth in the agreement can be pursued.

But if the United States does not par-ticipate in that NATO force, after theparties have signed up to an agreementwe urged upon them, with the expecta-tion that we would participate, thenthe war will resume and probablyspread. More civilians will be killed,tortured, and ethnically cleansed in arenewed war. More refugees will be dis-placed and dispersed throughout Eu-rope. As President Clinton said lastmonth:

If we’re not there, NATO will not be there.The peace will collapse. The war willreignite. The slaughter of innocents willbegin again . . . American cannot and mustnot be the world’s policeman. We cannot stopall war for all time, but we can stop somewars.

There is wide support for this conclu-sion.

President Bush’s former National Se-curity Adviser Brent Scowcroft warnedagainst the risks of this undertaking,but he said that ‘‘the alternative, inmy judgment, is a clear disaster. Toturn our back now would be a catas-trophe. . . . If we don’t go in, a lotmore Americans will die, somewhere,sometime.’’

Former Undersecretary of DefensePaul Wolfowitz testified to the ArmedServices Committee that ‘‘if we go in,there is a modest chance of success. Ifwe stay out there is a real certainty offailure.’’ The cost to important U.S. se-curity interests of a wider and moredeadly war spreading throughout theregion, possibly putting us in directconflict with Russia again after 5 yearsof improving relations, would be enor-mous. It is not just the relevance andusefulness of NATO as an instrumentof European stability that would suf-fer, but United States credibilityaround the globe.

Mr. President, there are indeed rea-sons to be skeptical that the peaceagreement can be fully implemented.The region has seen centuries of his-toric animosities, and 4 years of brutal-ity. There are still territorial disputeswhose final settlement has been putoff. The man who fueled war withdreams of a Greater Serbia, SlobodanMilosevic, now claims to be the guar-antor of the Bosnian Serbs’ compliancewith the agreement.

Resettlement of refugees, guaranteedin the agreement, promises to be ex-ceedingly difficult. We are not surehow many refugees will even try to re-claim their homes, or who will arbi-trate claims of ownership. Even thispast weekend, some Croat forces lootedand burned the homes of a town sched-uled to be returned to Serb control.

Mr. President, I have concluded how-ever that although there are seriousrisks to this mission, the costs andrisks of not acting with our NATO al-lies, would be even greater.

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S 18505December 13, 1995People around the world are watch-

ing the United States at this moment,watching to see whether we will fulfillagain the role of facilitating peace thathas long been our tradition. I recentlyreceived a letter from a old friend ofmine, Eric Osterweil, now living inBrussels, but following our delibera-tions closely. Welcoming the Daytonpeace agreement, he wrote:

I think it is in the strategic interest of theUnited States to ensure that peace reigns inSoutheastern Europe. The risks, if we fail toact, are, I think, far-reaching. They includepotential Russian intervention, a conflict be-tween Greece and Turkey and other disagree-able eventualities. It may be difficult for theU.S. not to be involved in any major conflicton the continent of Europe. To me, the mostpotent argument, however, is that the U.S.has a chance to ensure that peace prevailsover war and life over death.

Mr. President, the most importantvotes we take in the U.S. Senate arethose involving the deployment of U.S.military personnel to dangerous spotsaround the globe. The volunteers whomake up our Armed Forces are dedi-cated, talented women and men whoselives we value and whose service wecherish. The NATO mission beforethem is challenging, but it is doable, asGeneral Shalikashvili has testified,and however individual Senators voteon this resolution, the troops shouldknow that we all stand behind themand we all stand for them.

Mr. President, the Bosnian State out-lined in the Dayton agreements hastwo armies, three administrations, andis surrounded by hostile neighbors. Cana civil society grow out of a land sosteeped in mistrust, anger, and savageconflict? There is no guarantee. Wecannot assure that there will ulti-mately be that successful outcome—only the people who live there andtheir leaders can achieve that. But atleast NATO is acting to give them achance to build a civil society and putwar behind them. That is a missionthat the United States should not un-dermine.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.BROWN). ACCORDING TO THE PREVIOUSUNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT, THESENATOR FROM MAINE IS RECOGNIZED.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, let mesay at the outset, while many of ushave serious concerns with the scopeand the structure of the Bosnian mis-sion, there is no doubt about ourtroops’ ability and competence to carryout the mission that has been assignedto them by the President of the UnitedStates. Like so many times in the past,when they have served our countrywell and they have made us proud, Ihave no doubts about the fact they willbe no different in this mission.

Despite what is being said here thisevening, whether you are for or againstthe proposition that is before us, wewill obviously not change the outcome.The deal, as they say, is done, becausethe troops are being deployed and willcontinue to be deployed, no matterwhat we do here or how we vote.

Congress is essentially faced with aproposition of accepting the Presi-

dent’s position on Bosnia, having comefull circle from ‘‘Mission Impossible’’several years ago, to ‘‘fait accompli’’today. By disavowing any congres-sional role, the President has presentedthis policy no longer as the administra-tion’s policy, but now it is America’spolicy. That clearly places us in a verydifficult position. What we can andshould do today is to use this debate toexpress our reservations and concerns,our support—whatever the case maybe.

Inevitably there are constitutionalconflicts between branches of Govern-ment. Inevitably, we have been in thisrole before, with respect to whether ornot we should assign troops and wheth-er or not the President should come tothe Congress. I happen to think it isvery important to express our concernsto this and future Presidents about thefact that Congress is not playing sucha role before the fact—and not afterthe fact. The fact of the matter is, it isin America’s interests to have congres-sional involvement and participation.It helps the President to advance hisown policy and his own mission. Ithelps to broaden the support if thereare doubts about such a mission. But,unfortunately, that is not what is be-fore us today.

We have also considered other alter-natives with respect to Bosnia. In fact,I can remember as far back as 1993, inthe spring, when I was a member of theHouse Foreign Affairs Committee inthe House of Representatives, we votedon lifting the arms embargo so that theBosnian Moslems could defend them-selves and their families, their prop-erty. And for over 2 years we foughtthat battle, and the administration didnot support us in that endeavor. TheEuropeans resisted this effort as well. Ithink that is part of the Balkan trag-edy, the fact that the Moslems couldnot defend themselves; that they didnot have the arms or the equipment orthe training to defend themselves andtheir families.

Now we are faced with the propo-sition of deploying troops to Bosnia.This should have been the last optionand not the first. We should have ex-hausted all other means and all otherpossibilities before we resorted to de-ploying ground troops.

Back in 1993, it is interesting, the ad-ministration presented its own cri-teria, guidelines for a future mission inBosnia. In fact, Secretary of StateChristopher laid out those guidelines in1993. They said that, in order to deploytroops, four criteria should be met:

First, that the goal must be clearlystated;

Second, there must be strong likeli-hood of success;

Third, there must be an exit strat-egy;

Fourth, the action must win sus-tained public support.

It seems to me the administrationhas fallen far short in meeting some ofthese criteria that the administrationitself has established. But I would like

to take a look at some of those guide-lines tonight and how this agreementfits into the context of the criteria theadministration laid out for such a mis-sion.

First, the goal must be clearly stat-ed. When it comes to the mission of thetroops, I think this Chamber and theAmerican people certainly need toknow what this deployment is or is notabout. We know it is not a peacekeep-ing mission. In fact, it is much of a de-parture from a peacekeeping mission.It is a peace enforcement mission. Thatbeing the case, as the administrationhas suggested, is the goal simply toseparate warring parties for 1 year andthen leave? The administration hassaid yes, and so did witnesses beforethe Foreign Relations Committee. Butat other times the administration ar-gued that we will only achieve successif we succeed in creating a single, uni-tary, multiethnic Bosnian state, asSecretary Holbrooke said after thesigning of the agreement in Dayton,when he said, ‘‘Otherwise, we will havefailed.’’

So, is it a part of our mission to alsocreate a more stable arms balance inBosnia, by ensuring the Bosnian Gov-ernment forces receive the heavyarmor they currently lack? Yes, that ispart of the overall intent of this ad-ministration. But the administrationhas also agreed that the arms buildupwill not occur until we can succeedfirst in pursuing an arms builddown.But there is no such mechanism forthat builddown to occur.

Then we have the arming and train-ing issue. It will certainly be one of thefocuses of this resolution before us thatwill be offered by Senator DOLE. But itstill is not clear what the administra-tion has in mind or how, in fact, it willbe accomplished. The fact is, this couldbe accomplished without even deploy-ing troops to Bosnia. But that, unfortu-nately, is not our option today.

So the arming, the training, theequipping of the Bosnian Moslems willoccur in the face of opposition from ourEuropean allies and the Serbs. It wasso much opposed that it was not even apart of the agreement. Yet it now hap-pens to be, and should be, a very keycomponent of the overall strategy. Be-cause Senator DOLE has been workingon precisely defining this mission now,because it has not been precisely de-fined by this administration, it will re-main one of the key components of thismission. Yet it will have to be done inthe face of overwhelming opposition byour allies and the Serbs. How that willbe done remains open to serious ques-tion.

Is our goal, as well, to facilitate elec-tions? Protect refugees? Undertake re-construction activities? Track downand arrest war criminals? The adminis-tration sometimes argues no. But thenit also argues that these nation-build-ing activities are what will determinewhether or not we have succeeded. So,are these our goals as well? In fact,this case is strengthened by the fact

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATES 18506 December 13, 1995that in the Dayton accords the UnitedStates insisted on granting our forcesthe power to become involved in theseactivities.

To quote from article 6, section 3:Our NATO forces will have the authority

to:A. Help secure conditions for the conduct

of free and fair elections;B. Assist in the accomplishment of human-

itarian missions;C. Assist the U.N. High Commission for

Refugees;D. Prevent interference with the move-

ment of civilian populations and to respondto deliberate violence to life and person.

If our powers under article 6, section3, are not a recipe for mission creep, Ido not know what is.

Second, there must be a strong likeli-hood of success. Is there? Of course,that all depends on the definition ofour mission. And, as I have alreadystated, those goals are somewhat con-fused and vague. I have read the pre-dictions of a wide range of experts onthis subject, and few are truly optimis-tic about the long-term success of thisagreement, whatever the definition ofsuccess may be. There is also a greatdeal of skepticism of the genuine com-mitment of all the parties to thisagreement or to any common vision ofa future for Bosnia.

But, clearly, we are not going intoBosnia with lightly armed troops mon-itoring a peace that has been reachedvoluntarily and in good will by the par-ties themselves. That is what a tradi-tional peacekeeping operation is allabout. But that is not what this is.Rather, we will be moving in with oneof the U.S. Army’s six heavy armoreddivisions, the 1st Armored Divisionwhich served as a cornerstone ofNATO’s defense against the SovietUnion. So, this becomes more like ourdeployments to Beirut in 1983 and So-malia, in 1993, both of which endedwith disastrous consequences, and bothattempted to deploy United Statestroops in the service of so-called na-tion-building activities.

Third, there must be an exit strat-egy.

The administration has said it has anexit strategy by promising to be outwithin a year. But this is an exit time-table, not an exit strategy. It saysnothing about what needs to be accom-plished during that year to permit oursuccessful disengagement. Again, anyviable exit strategy defines our mis-sions and goals. And we still have seenthat remains nebulous at best. How canthe administration legitimately arguethat it has an exit strategy if it cannotclearly define the mission? In fact, Sec-retary Perry said before the ForeignRelations Committee that the exitstrategy will have accomplished thecessation of hostilities, a separation ofwarring parties, and a break in thecycle of violence. But that really doesnot define an exit strategy. What itdoes is define an end date. It defines ex-actly what the state of affairs happensto be at the time in which we depart.But it does not define what we have ac-complished.

As Dr. Schlesinger testified beforethe Armed Services Committee, hesaid, ‘‘We do not really have an exitstrategy because the situation is toomessy. We have an exit hope.’’

Finally, the action must have sus-tained public support. Polls haveshown that there is not strong supportfor this mission to Bosnia. In fact, itshows the opposite. The majority ofthe American people oppose the de-ployment of American troops intoBosnia. We know that could change asthe troops are being deployed and willcontinue to be deployed.

But what is the reason for the con-cern among the American people? Ithink the concern stems from the factthat the administration has yet tomake a compelling case on the meritsof the mission or even to clearly definethe mission itself in terms of our vitalnational security interests. The Amer-ican people need to know—and they de-serve to know—that the mission itselfmerits a military deployment of ourtroops. The American people have theright to know that the parties involvedin Bosnia are committed to self-sus-taining and enduring peace. And at thevery least they should expect thatthese parties will be committed to alongstanding peace. That remains opento a very serious question. And it getsback again to the definition of our goaland mission.

I happen to think that it is very im-portant that whenever we are deploy-ing our men and women to an area ofconflict, when we are putting them inharm’s way, that it is absolutely vitalthat the parties involved are abso-lutely committed to securing a long-lasting peace. I think that all that wehave heard thus far remains open tovery serious question as to whether ornot that will be the ultimate outcome.

So I think that the administrationhas fallen short in meeting its own cri-teria for this mission. But above andbeyond that failure, there is anotherquestion. And that is the unprece-dented nature of this deployment.

It has been said that this is the firsttime NATO has embarked upon a mis-sion outside of the treaty area itself.And there are those who argue in favorof such a mission because they say thatit will serve as a model for futureNATO missions as well as securing thefuture of the alliance. That may betrue. But no one has answered thequestion as to what harm will come toNATO and its prestige if this missionshould fail. And what damage will thatdo to the alliance? If 2 years from nowwe face renewed fighting—which indeedis a serious prospect and consider-ation—and a partition of Bosnia, as somany analysts believe is the most like-ly outcome, in the end what will wehave accomplished? Will it have beenworth the potential loss of Americanlives, if that loss could have beenavoided by employing other meanssuch as lifting the arms embargo?

Mr. President, one cannot help butfeel that if we had pursued and ex-

hausted all other possibilities and al-ternatives, Congress, the Americanpeople, and our troops would not befaced with a situation that has nowbeen forced upon us. But, unfortu-nately, the proverbial train has left thestation.

In the final analysis, this is a missionin which success is in no way clear—whose mission is yet to be defined,whose goals are yet uncertain, andwhose mission does not have the sus-tained support of the American people,and with parties who are not fully com-mitted to peace.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair.The PRESIDING OFFICER. Accord-

ing to the previous order, the distin-guished Senator from West Virginia isrecognized.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thankthe Chair.

Mr. President, of course, there is noaudience—or very little—here on thefloor. But I do not speak tonight to theaudience on the floor. I speak to theaudience that may be listening orwatching through the electronic eye.

I also speak for the RECORD, Mr.President, because a year from now weare going to look back on this debate.Ten years from now we will look backon this RECORD. And this RECORD willstand 100 years; 1,000 years. So I thinkthe RECORD should be made for futureguidance.

(Ms. SNOWE assumed the Chair.)A CONTRADICTORY BOSNIA RESOLUTION

Mr. BYRD. Madam President, oneresolution we are now debating, offeredby the junior Senator from Texas, di-rectly addresses the idea of supportingthe troops and the role which theyhave been asked to play, in what I be-lieve is a somewhat contradictory man-ner. The resolution before us wouldsign the Senate up to supporting U.S.troops in Bosnia without supportingthe mission that they are called uponto perform.

In two simple sentences, this resolu-tion would purport to support U.S.troops while simultaneously undermin-ing the very work they are performing.How can we, as the resolution before usstates, ‘‘strongly support the U.S.Armed Forces who may be ordered bythe President to implement the Gen-eral Framework Agreement for Peacein Bosnia and Herzegovina. . .’’ afterhaving just stated, in the same resolu-tion, that ‘‘the Congress opposes Presi-dent Clinton’s decision to deploy Unit-ed States forces into the Republic ofBosnia and Herzegovina to implementthe General Framework Agreement forPeace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. . .’’?What kind of moral support are ourtroops supposed to find in that? Andwhat kind of resolve does that dem-onstrate to anyone who might attemptto undermine the Bosnian peace agree-ment?

This is a clear flag, Madam Presi-dent, to those who would target ourtroops telling them that, if they targetour troops, we will yank them out of

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S 18507December 13, 1995that mission. So, the mission is under-cut and eroded from the very beginningby our own actions. That is not supportof the troops, to my way of thinking.

This resolution also fails to addressCongress’ Constitutional responsibilityto weigh in on decisions to employ U.S.troops. It is simply silent on thatpoint. With this resolution, we againfail to dip even our toes into the icywaters of a controversial and difficultpolitical decision to risk the lives ofU.S. troops, even in support of what weall hope will be a relativelyunthreatening mission in support of apeace agreement. Because we cannotguarantee that the life of not one U.S.military service person will be lost inthis endeavor, we shy like a skittishhorse from the halter of our respon-sibility.

I say to my colleagues that the livesof three diplomats have already beenlost in this effort, but we do not thinktheir lives were lost in vain, becausewe have reached a peace agreement. Istheir effort, their sacrifices, not worththis effort to see the hard-won peacethrough to the end? There is no betteralternative, and Congress must nowstand up and shoulder its responsibilityto vote on this mission, to support boththe troops and the job they are under-taking.

Mr. President, it is clear from thehistorical record that, until recently,the President has had only limitedpowers as Commander in Chief. Otherthan repelling invasions and protectingU.S. forces, the President’s authorityas Commander in Chief was bound bythe Congressional power to raise andsupport armies and the Congressionalpower to authorize the use of thoseforces in offensive operations. Congressnot only supported the troops as adaily, practical matter, it played an es-sential role in deciding on the cir-cumstances under which troops wouldbe used offensively. President Jeffersonand others recognized and acknowl-edged the limits on their presidentialauthority to order troops into actionsthat were not clearly in defense of U.S.territory and forces.

It is only recent practice in whichCongress has acquiesced greater au-thority to the President to employmilitary forces in offensive or non-tra-ditional operations without specific au-thorization. This has had the effect oftying the use of troops ever more tight-ly with the President in his role asCommander in Chief. I am sorry thatthis is the case, because I believe thatit is a degradation of Congressional au-thority that undermines the delicatebalance of power intended by theFramers, but it is the situation inwhich we find ourselves as a result ofour own Congressional unwillingness toassert our Congressional role.

As Cassius said, ‘‘The fault is not inour stars, dear Brutus, but in ourselvesthat we are underlings.’’

Congress remains proud of its sup-port of the troops in terms of providingrobust, even overblown, defense budg-

ets, but it has failed to exercise its au-thority under the Constitution to di-rect or authorize the use of troops.This was clearly not the intent of theFramers.

How can we reasonably tell troops inthe field that we, the Congress, supportyou, the troops, but we are not willingto support the task you have been or-dered to perform? This is what the res-olution before the Senate says, but thisis a hair that cannot be split. We muststep up to the plate, and support thejob as well as the laborer, or we are notfulfilling our Constitutional role. Ihope my colleagues will not be fooledinto thinking that they can have theircake and eat it, too, by supporting thetroops without supporting the missionthat they have been ordered to per-form.

Suppose I would say to one of mygrandsons, my beloved grandsons, whomight be going off to Bosnia, ‘‘Well,my dear grandson, you know I loveyou; I love you more than life; but I donot support the mission that you areon. I am going to slam the door behindyour back when you leave the house,and you’re on your own!’’

This resolution is a slap in the faceto our troops, telling them that wesupport them, but that their mission isfoolhardy.

What kind of support is that? You areup there on the high dive, troops, andwe support you, but we do not believethere is any water of justification inthe mission bucket you are about todive into. That is not support. Anyonecan see that such a claim amounts to ahollow nut! There is no meat in it!

Let us read what the Apostle Paulsaid in his First Epistle to the Corin-thians. It may be a little old fashionedto bring the Holy Bible in to the Cham-ber, but I am a little old fashioned. Iam not of the religious left or the reli-gious right, but I believe in this holybook. Here is what Paul said:

And even things without life giving sound,whether pipe or harp, except they give a dis-tinction in the sounds, how shall it be knownwhat is piped or harped?

For if the trumpet give an uncertainsound, who shall prepare himself to the bat-tle?

So likewise ye, except ye utter by thetongue words easy to be understood, howshall it be known what is spoken? for yeshall speak into the air.

Madam President, the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution speaks into the air,saying one thing on the one hand andanother thing on the other. We are giv-ing an uncertain sound with this trum-pet. We are speaking into the air. Thenin the words of Paul, ‘‘Who shall pre-pare himself to the battle?’’

This is lighting a candle and puttingit under a bushel. Jesus said, ‘‘Neitherdo men light a candle and put it undera bushel but on a candlestick, and itgiveth light unto all that are in thehouse.’’

This resolution by the able Senatorsfrom Texas and Oklahoma does notgive light to all that are in the house.It puts the candle under a bushel, and

all that are in the house are left indarkness. And worse, this resolutiontells the President—not just this Presi-dent, but all future Presidents—thatyou can do whatever you want, we maynot agree with you, but you can counton us to support the troops. Do whatyou want with the troops, we do notquestion your authority, and count onus to follow up with appropriations andother forms of support to the troopsyou have committed to the field. Thisdangerous precedent allows Congress towash its hands—like Pontius Pilate—ofthe responsibility to authorize the useof troops, to stand in judgment on themission the troops are called upon tocarry out. We can just pass contradic-tory, confusing resolutions to ‘‘supportthe troops’’ in carrying out any Presi-dential whim, without dealing with ourconstitutional responsibility to dealwith politically difficult decisions onhow and when to employ force. I say tomy colleagues, think again, before sup-porting this very unwise and poten-tially dangerous resolution.

Mr. President, now I wish to addressthe resolution by Mr. DOLE and Mr.MCCAIN.

I commend the majority leader, Mr.DOLE, as well as the distinguished Sen-ator from Arizona, Mr. MCCAIN, fortheir resolution. And I commend themfor working with the minority leaderand other Senators on both sides of theaisle to fashion it.

I commend the minority leader andSenator NUNN and Senator PELL andall the other Senators who were on thetask force on the Democratic side whoworked with the words and with theRepublicans in fashioning the finalproduct. It is important from a histori-cal and constitutional perspective. It isimportant as well from a political per-spective. First, if it passes, and I hopethat it will, it provides the politicalunderpinning necessary for the Presi-dent to pursue a military deploymentabroad where there are going to becosts in the billions of dollars, for therisk of casualties certainly exists, andwhere the credibility of the UnitedStates and NATO is at stake.

Second, I believe that the languagefulfills the constitutional requirementthat the Congress authorize or approvethe operation in specific enough detailto draw limits around it. In doing so,the Congress fulfills the exercise of itsresponsibilities that the Framers ex-pected and that has prevailed throughmost of American history.

I think it is important for Senatorsto reflect on our constitutional respon-sibilities in respect to our actiontoday. The question of the actual con-stitutional reach of the President, act-ing alone, and without congressionalauthority to deploy forces into hos-tilities or substantial risk of hostilitieshas become a recurring modern issuebetween Presidents, beginning withHarry Truman and continuing throughto today.

When the Framers began their workat the Philadelphia Convention, exist-ing models of government placed the

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATES 18508 December 13, 1995war power squarely in the hands of theking. The English Parliament hadgained the power of the purse in 1665 tocontrol the king, but the power to goto war remained a monarchical prerog-ative. John Locke’s Second Treatise ofGovernment (1690) spoke of threebranches of government: legislative,executive, and ‘‘federative.’’ The latterconsisted of ‘‘the power of war andpeace, leagues and alliances, and allthe transaction with all persons andcommunities without the common-wealth.’’ The federative power (whatwe call foreign policy today) was ‘‘al-most always united’’ with the execu-tive. Separating the executive and fed-erative powers, Locke warned, wouldinvite ‘‘disorder and ruin.’’

A similar model appeared in theCommentaries written by Sir WilliamBlackstone, the great eighteenth-cen-tury jurist. He counseled that the kinghad absolute power over foreign affairsand war: the right to send and receiveambassadors, make treaties and alli-ances, make war or peace, issue lettersof marque and reprisal, command themilitary, raise and regulate fleets andarmies, and represent the nation in itsintercourse with foreign nations.

These models were well known to theFramers. They knew that their fore-bears in England had committed to theexecutive the power to go to war. Whenthey declared their independence fromEngland, they vested all executive pow-ers in the Continental Congress andproceeded to incorporate that principlein the first national constitution, theArticles of Confederation. Later, dur-ing their learned and careful delibera-tions at the Philadelphia convention,they decided to vest in Congress manyof Locke’s federative powers andBlackstone’s royal prerogatives. Thedelegates emphasized repeatedly thatthe power of peace and war associatedwith monarchy would not be given tothe President. As James Wilson noted,it was incorrect to consider ‘‘the Pre-rogatives of the British Monarch as aproper guide in defining the Executivepowers. Some of these prerogativeswere of a legislative nature. Amongothers that of war and peace.

By the time the Framers finishedtheir labors, the President had beenstripped of the sole power to maketreaties. He shared that with the Sen-ate. He had the right to send and re-ceive Ambassadors, but only after theSenate agreed to his nominations. Hehad no power to issue letters of marqueand reprisal (authorizing private citi-zens to undertake military actions).That power was vested in Congress. Al-though the President was made Com-mander in Chief, it was left to Congressto raise and regulate fleets and armies.The rejection of Locks and Blackstonewas decisive.

The reasoning for this break is setforth clearly in The Federalist Papers.In Federalist No. 69, Alexander Hamil-ton explained that the President has‘‘concurrent power with a branch of thelegislature in the formation of trea-

ties,’’ whereas the British king ‘‘is thesole possessor of the power of makingtreaties.’’ The royal prerogative in for-eign affairs was deliberately sharedwith Congress. Hamilton contrastedthe distribution of war powers in Eng-land and in the American Constitution.The power of the king ‘‘extends to thedeclaring of war and to the raising andregulating of fleets and armies.’’ Un-like the King of England, the President‘‘will have only the occasional com-mand of such part of the militia of theNation as by legislative provision maybe called into the actual service of theUnion’’. No such tether attached to theking.

In Federalist No. 74, Hamilton pro-vided an additional reason for makingthe President Commander in Chief. Thedirection of war ‘‘most peculiarly de-mands those qualities which distin-guish the exercise of power by a singlehead.’’ The power of directing was andemphasizing the common strength‘‘forms a usual and essential part inthe definition of the executive author-ity.’’

Designating the President Com-mander in Chief represented an impor-tant method for preserving civilian su-premacy over the military. The personleading the Armed Forces would be thecivilian President, not a military offi-cer. As U.S. Attorney General Batesexplained in later years, the Presidentis commander in chief not because he is‘‘skilled in the art of war and qualifiedto marshal a host in the field of bat-tle.’’ He is commander in chief for adifferent reason. Whatever soldierleads U.S. armies to victory against anenemy, ‘‘he is subject to the orders ofthe civil magistrate, and he and hisarmy are always ‘subordinate to thecivil power.’ ’’

The Constitution grants to Congressa number of specific powers to controlwar and military affairs: to declarewar; to raise and support armies andprovide and maintain a navy; thepower to make regulations of the landand naval forces; the power to callforth the militia; and the power to pro-vide for organizing, arming, and dis-ciplining the militia. Furthermore, theConstitution vests in Congress thepower to regulate foreign commerce,an area that has a direct relationshipto the war power. Commercial conflictsbetween nations were often a cause ofwar. Guided by history, the Framersplaced that power with Congress.James Madison later remarked: ‘‘Theconstitution supposes, what the His-tory of all Govts demonstrates, thatthe Ex. is the branch of power most in-terested in war, and most prone to it.It has accordingly with studied care,vested the question of war in theLegisl.’’

The debates at the Philadelphia Con-vention include a revealing discussionon Congress’ power to declare war. Theearly draft empowered Congress to‘‘make war.’’ Charles Pinckney ob-jected that legislative proceedings‘‘were too slow’’ for the safety of the

country in an emergency. He expectedCongress to meet only once a year.Madison and Elbridge Gerry rec-ommended that ‘‘declare’’ be sub-stituted for ‘‘make,’’ leaving to thePresident ‘‘the power to repel suddenattacks.’’ Their motion carried.

There was little doubt about thescope of the President’s authority. Thepower to repel sudden attacks rep-resents an emergency measure thatpermits the President, when Congressis not in session, to take actions nec-essary to repel sudden attacks eitheragainst the mainland of the UnitedStates or against American troopsabroad. It does not authorize the Presi-dent to take the country into full-scalewar or to mount an offensive attackagainst another nation.

I believe that any objective readingof this history would lead Senators tothe conclusion that the President’sscope of authority does not include theordering of a deployment into Bosnia,even if a treaty organization such asNATO requested such action by itsmember states.

The Framers empowered the Presi-dent to be Commander in Chief, butthat title relates to responsibilitiesthat are authorized by Congress. Thelanguage in the Constitution reads:‘‘The President shall be Commander inChief of the Army and Navy of theUnited States, and of the Militia of theseveral States, when called into the ac-tual Service of the United States.’’Congress, not the President, does thecalling. Article I gives to Congress thepower to provide ‘‘for calling forth theMilitia to execute the Laws of theUnion, suppress Insurrections and repelinvasions.’’

The title of Commander in Chief wasintroduced by King Charles I in 1639and was always used as a generic termreferring to the highest officer in a par-ticular chain of command. With theeruption of the English civil wars, boththe king and Parliament appointedcommanders in chief in various thea-ters of action. The ranking commanderin chief, purely a military post, was al-ways under the command of a politicalsuperior, whether appointed by theking, Parliament or, with the develop-ment of the cabinet system in theeighteenth century, by the secretary ofwar.

England transplanted the title toAmerica in the eighteenth century byappointing a number of commanders inchief and by the practice of entitlingcolonial governors as commanders inchief (or occasionally as vice admiralsor captains general). The appointmentof General Thomas Gage as commanderin chief from 1763 to 1776 caused thecolonists grave concern, for he pro-ceeded to interfere in civil affairs andacquired considerable influence overIndian relations, trade, and transpor-tation. The bitter memory of his deci-sion to quarter troops in civilians’homes spawned the Third Amendment

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S 18509December 13, 1995to the Constitution. These activitiesand others prompted the colonists inthe Declaration of Independence tocomplain of King George III that hehad ‘‘affected to render the MilitaryIndependent of and superior to theCivil Power.’’

But the colonists had no reason tofear the governors who were given thetitle commander in chief, even thoughthey controlled the provincial forces,since the colonial assemblies claimedand asserted the right to vote funds forthe militia as well as to call it intoservice. In fact, grievances came fromthe governors, who complained of therelative impotence of their positions.The colonists’ assemblies’ (and later,the states’) assertions of the power ofthe purse as a check on the commanderin chief reflected an English practicethat was instituted in the middle of theseventeenth century. By 1665, Par-liament, as a means of maintaining po-litical control of the military estab-lishment, had inaugurated the policy ofmaking annual military appropriationslasting but one year. This practicesharply emphasized the power of Par-liament to determine the size of thearmy to be placed under the directionof the commander in chief.

The practice had a long influence,for, under its constitutional power toraise and support armies and to providea navy, Congress acquired a right thatthe colonial and state assemblies hadto vote funds for the armed forces. Anadditional historical parallel in the Ar-ticle I, Section 8, clause 13 providesthat ‘‘no Appropriation of Money tothat Use shall be for a longer Termthan two Years.’’ The requirement oflegislative approval for the allocationof funds to raise troops underscores theprinciple of political superiority overmilitary command. It also constitutesa sharp reminder that a Commander inChief is dependent on the legislature’swillingness to give him an army tocommand.

The Continental Congress continuedthe usage of the title in 1775, when itunanimously decided to appoint GeorgeWashington as general. His commissionnamed him ‘‘General and Commanderin Chief, of the Army of the UnitedColonies.’’ He was required to complywith orders and directions from Con-gress, which did not hesitate to in-struct the commander in chief on mili-tary and policy matters.

The practice of entitling the office atthe apex of the military hierarchy ascommander in chief and of subordinat-ing the office to a political superior,whether a king, a parliament, or a con-gress, had thus been firmly establishedfor a century and a half and was thor-oughly familiar to the Framers whenthey met in Philadelphia. Perhaps thissettled historical usage accounts forthe fact that there was no debate onthe Commander in Chief clause at theConvention.

President Thomas Jefferson under-stood the limitations of the Com-mander in Chief clause. in 1801, in his

first annual message to Congress, hereported the arrogant demands madeby Joseph Caramanly, the pasha ofTripoli. Unless the United States paidtribute, the pasha threatened to seizeAmerican ships and citizens. In re-sponse, Jefferson sent a small squadronto the Mediterranean to protectagainst the threatened attack. He thenasked Congress for further guidance,since he was ‘‘unauthorized by the Con-stitution, without the sanction of Con-gress, to go beyond the line of de-fense.’’ It was left to Congress to au-thorize ‘‘measures of offense.’’

Jefferson’s understanding of the warclause underwent no revision. Like Jef-ferson, President James Madison wasaggrieved by the punishment and har-assment inflicted on United States ves-sels. In 1812, he expressed to Congresshis extreme resentment of the Britishpractices of seizing American ships andseamen and inducing Indian tribes toattack the United States. Madisoncomplained but said the question of‘‘whether the United States shall re-main passive under these progressiveusurpations and these accumulatingwrongs, or, opposing force, to force indefense of their national rights’’ is ‘‘asolemn question which the Constitu-tion wisely confides to the legislativedepartment of the Government.’’

Following his 1823 announcement ofwhat has become known as the MonroeDoctrine, President James Monroe wasconfronted with international cir-cumstances that seemed to invite theuse of force, but Monroe repeatedly dis-claimed any constitutional power toinitiate hostilities, since, he main-tained, that authority was granted toCongress.

President James K. Polk may wellhave initiated war with Mexico in 1846,when he ordered an army into a dis-puted area on the Texas-Mexico border.But Polk understood the constitutionaldimensions of the war power and of-fered the rationale that Mexico had in-vaded the United States, which, if true,would justify a response by the Com-mander in Chief.

Until 1950, no President departedfrom this understanding of the param-eters of the Commander in Chiefclause. But to justify President Tru-man’s unilateral decision to introducetroops into the Korean war, revision-ists purported to locate in the Presi-dent a broad discretionary authority tocommence hostilities.

Emboldened by Truman’s claim, sub-sequent Presidents have likewise uni-laterally initiated acts of war, from theVietnam war to the incursions in Gre-nada and Panama. But this claim is cutfrom whole cloth. It ignores the originsand development of the title, the clearunderstanding of the Constitution’sFramers, the nineteenth-centuryrecord, and the history of judicial in-terpretation. The Supreme Court hasnever held that the Commander inChief clause confers power to initiatewar. In United States v. Sweeny (1895),Justice Henry Brown wrote for the

Court that the object of the clause wasto give the President ‘‘such supremeand undivided command as would benecessary to the prosecution of a suc-cessful war.’’ In 1919, Senator GeorgeSutherland, who later became an Asso-ciate Justice of the Supreme Court,wrote, ‘‘Generally speaking, the warpowers of the President under the Con-stitution are simply those that belongto any commander in chief of the mili-tary forces of a nation at war. The Con-stitution confers no war powers uponthe President as such.’’

While the Supreme Court has heldthat the President may not initiatehostilities and that he is authorizedonly to direct the movements of themilitary forces placed by law at hiscommand, it has been contended thatthe existence of a standing army pro-vides the President with broad discre-tionary authority to deploy troops onbehalf of foreign-policy goals. Al-though the intrusion of a public forceinto a foreign country may well entan-gle the United States in a war, Presi-dents have often manipulated troop de-ployments so as to present Congresswith a fait accompli. Given the broadrange of war powers vested in Congress,including the authority to provide forthe common defense, to raise and sup-port armies, and to decide, in Madi-son’s words, whether ‘‘a war ought tobe commenced, continued or con-cluded,’’ it seems clear that Congressmay govern absolutely the deploymentof forces outside U.S. borders. As apractical measure, Congress maychoose, within the confines of the dele-gation doctrine, to vest the Presidentwith some authority to send troopsabroad, but there is nothing inherentin the Commander in Chief clause thatyields such authority.

Representative Abraham Lincoln in aletter to William H. Herndon said:

Allow the President to invade a neighbor-ing nation, whenever he shall deem it nec-essary to repel an invasion, and you allowhim to do so, whenever he may choose to sayhe deems it necessary for such purpose—andyou allow him to make war at pleasure.Study to see if you can fix any limit to hispower in this respect, after you have givenhim so much as you propose. If, to-day, heshould choose to say he thinks it necessaryto invade Canada, to prevent the Britishfrom invading us, how could you stop him?You may say to him, ‘‘I see no probability ofthe British invading us,’’ but he will say toyou ‘‘be silent; I see it, if you don’t.’’

The provision of the Constitution givingthe war-making power to Congress, was dic-tated, as I understand it, by the followingreasons. Kings had always been involvingand impoverishing their people in wars, pre-tending generally, if not always, that thegood of the people was the object. This, ourConvention understood to be the most op-pressive of all Kingly oppressions; and theyresolved to so frame the Constitution that noone man should hold the power of bringingthis oppression upon us. But your view de-stroys the whole matter, and places ourPresident where kings have always stood.

We are aware of the now familiar pat-tern of most recent Chief Executives insimilar circumstances of invoking the

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATES 18510 December 13, 1995title Commander in Chief and descrip-tions of him as being the sole organ offoreign relations or chief of adminis-tration to suggest a conclusion of con-stitutional invulnerability. No statu-tory or decisional authority is volun-teered in support of the conclusion.

If Congress is to have the sole au-thority ‘‘to declare war,’’ as the Con-stitution clearly states, then are we tosuppose that, in any military actionshort of a declaration of war, the au-thority reposed in the Congress by theConstitution to declare war is shiftedto another department? Are we to as-sume that any action short of a dec-laration of war, shifts the authorityfrom the Congress to the Executive?

As we have seen, wars can be waged,and have been waged, without a dec-laration by Congress. Such military ac-tions, nonetheless, still constitutewars. The shedding of blood, the takingof lives, the destruction of property,the movement of navys and armies, areall the same, whether done under a dec-laration of war or without such a dec-laration. War is war whether it is a‘‘declared’’ conflict or otherwise. Arewe to imagine that the authority isshifted from the elected representa-tives of the people in such instances tosomeone else, or to some other depart-ment, or to the executive? The lack ofa declaration of war does not make theconflict any less a war than it would bewith such a declaration. The sacrifices,the costs, the ramifications are just asfar reaching in the case of anundeclared war as in the case of a de-clared war. Why then, should we strainour imagination to the breaking pointand pretend that, short of a declarationof war, the authority rests somewhereother than in the legislative depart-ment?

President Clinton has taken the posi-tion that he does not believe that heneeds the authorization or approval ofthe Congress to engage in a major mili-tary deployment in Bosnia, where war-ring parties have signed a peace agree-ment but where flashes of violence andhostile actions are so possible thatNATO and other forces are needed tomake the agreement work. His imme-diate predecessor, Mr. Bush, took asimilar position in regard to his de-ployment of forces to Saudi Arabia todo battle against Iraq in Desert Storm.Nevertheless, both of them requestedthe formal support of the Congress inadvance of their actions. I requestedPresident Clinton on a number of occa-sions to seek the support and approvalof the Congress and the American peo-ple, before committing troops. TheSenate ‘‘authorized’’ Mr. Bush, in S.J.Res. 2 on January 12, 1991, ‘‘to useUnited States Armed Forces’’ againstIraq, by a vote of 52–47.

Again, here today in the Resolutionoffered by the Majority Leader, theSenate is providing clear authorizationfor the President to undertake a spe-cific action, and in this case in some-what more specificity than was thecase with regard to Mr. Bush, and for a

limited time. The operative words arein Section 2, that ‘‘the President mayonly fulfill his commitment to deployUnited States Armed Forces . . . forapproximately one year to implementthe general Framework Agreement andMilitary Annex, pursuant to this Reso-lution, subject to the conditions in sub-section (b).’’ That language fulfills theFramers’ intent, from a constitutionalperspective, for the Congress to author-ize the President to undertake warmaking powers that he would not oth-erwise have.

The emphasis of the authority givenhere today is its limitation in scopeand time. If, in the future, the missionsengaged in by our forces go creepinginto nation-building, to doing the jobof civil authorities for reconstructionor refugee movements, then the Presi-dent would have exceeded his author-ity. I, for one, would certainly be pre-pared to pull the plug on the oper-ation—as I did in the case of Somalia—and cut off the lifeblood of its appro-priated funds, if that kind of back-sliding were to occur. The same is trueif we went beyond ‘‘approximately oneyear’’, language that I insisted be in-cluded in this resolution. Our militaryleaders repeatedly testified that theywere highly confident that the militaryimplementation tasks could easily becompleted within a year, and the Day-ton Accords obligated us to, specifi-cally ‘‘approximately one year.’’ Thus,the resolution holds the parties’ feet tothe time clock. In the interim, theBosnian Muslims should be properlyprepared, from a military standpoint,to defend themselves. Furthermore, weought to be considering putting intoplace a follow-on European-manned se-curity force, if further military secu-rity from the outside appears to beneeded. But, for us, our job is to bedone in ‘‘approximately one year,’’ andthat should be that.

The Constitution divides govern-mental powers into three areas: legisla-tive, executive, and judicial; and dis-tributes them among three co-equalbranches: Congress, President, and thecourts; and provides a system of checksand balances to keep the powers sepa-rate and the branches equal. Underly-ing this scheme of government in thearea of immediate concern is the desireto establish interdependence betweenCongress and the Executive in hopes offostering cooperation and consensus inthe supersensitive areas of national se-curity and foreign affairs.

As Commander in Chief and soleorgan of foreign relations the Presidenthas independent powers, not simplythose conferred on him by statutes.Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,661 (1981), quoting United States v. Cur-tiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,319–320 (1936). At the same time, by vir-tue of its power over the purse andpowers to raise and support armies, toprovide and maintain a navy, and toregulate both, Congress has broad con-stitutional powers implicating na-tional security and foreign affairs. Ar-ticle I, 1, cls. 12, 13, 14.

The separation of powers principle isintended to prevent one branch of gov-ernment from enhancing its position atthe expense of another branch and,thus, disturb the delicate balance ofpowers that the Framers assumed wasthe best safeguard against autocracy.

As Commander in Chief the Presidenthas command of the army and navyand may respond to an attack upon theUnited States. See, e.g., YoungstownCo. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 642 (concur-ring opinion). Also, there is authorityfor the proposition that he may act tosafeguard American lives and propertyabroad. See Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas.111 (No. 4186) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) andSlaughter-House cases, 16 Wall. 36, 79(1872). But see the Hostage Act of 1868,22 U.S.C. 1732, which excludes war fromthe President’s options to obtain therelease of Americans unreasonably de-tained by a foreign government.

On the other hand, aside from hispowers ‘‘to grant Reprieves and Par-dons for Offenses against the UnitedStates . . .’’ and to ‘‘receive Ambas-sadors and other public Ministers’’, thePresident is totally dependent uponCongress for authority or money andusually both to implement any policy.Congress is under no legal obligation tosupply either or both. For example, ithas been said that ‘‘[w]hile Congresscannot deprive the President of com-mand of the army and navy, only Con-gress can provide him an army or navyto command.’’ Youngstown Co. v. Saw-yer, 343 U.S. at 644 (concurring opin-ion).

In the Dole resolution, the authorityto implement the President’s proposedBosnia policy is clearly provided, andin so doing the Senate is accepting re-sponsibility for the action. In doing so,a vital bipartisan political foundationis being provided for the President’s ac-tions, and I think it clearly followsthat the consequence of authorizingthis policy fall upon us here in thisbranch as well as in the Oval Office. Ifit passes, we will be giving substanceto the proposition that politics inAmerica stops at the water’s edge, andthis is as it should be. The Americanpeople should know that the Bosniaimplementation is a national policy,approved through the constitutionalscheme that was intended by the fram-ers.

The Constitution specifies that ‘‘[n]oMoney shall be drawn from the Treas-ury, but in Consequence of Appropria-tions made by Law. . . .’’ This provi-sion has been held to be a restrictionupon the disbursing authority of theExecutive Department, and means thatno money can be paid out of the Treas-ury unless it has been appropriated byan Act of Congress. Cincinnati Soap Co.v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321 (1937).Accordingly, the absolute control ofthe moneys of the United States hasbeen said to be in Congress, and Con-gress is responsible for its exercise ofthis great power only to the Americanpeople. Harrington v. Bush, 558 F. 2d 190,194 note 7 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The power to

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S 18511December 13, 1995make appropriations includes the au-thority not only to designate the pur-pose of the appropriation, ‘‘but also theterms and conditions under which theexecutive department of the govern-ment may expend the appropriation.. . . The purpose of the appropriations,the terms and conditions under which. . . appropriations [are] made is solelyin the hands of Congress and it is theplain duty of the executive branch ofthe government to comply with thesame.’’ Spaulding v. Douglas AircraftCo., 60 F. Supp. at 986.

Mr. President, the Dole Resolutiondoes not provide the appropriationsneeded to carry out the Bosnia oper-ation. This is a policy resolution. Thatwas also the case when we authorizedPresident Bush to make war againstIraq in Desert Storm. In that case, theappropriations were provided later. Inthe same way, the Congress will haveto approve appropriations for theBosnia operation in the near future.

I hasten to point out, Mr. President,that the power of the purse is our ulti-mate hammer, and one which is alwaysavailable, to terminate the operation.If it turns out that the parties to thispiece of geography fail to live up totheir pledge to keep the peace and toprovide for the security of our forces,and the agreement fails, the Congresscan take swift action to terminate ourinvolvement. We have exercised thepower of the purse recently to termi-nate operations and limit them. Thiswas the case in both Somalia andRwanda. So, while I support this Reso-lution and believe it is appropriate andtimely, I would certainly not hesitateto participate in an effort to end theoperation and bring our forces home ifthe parties will not allow it to work.

Although Congress is enacting lawshas to scrupulously avoid even inciden-tal, adverse effects on fully autono-mous presidential powers (e.g., the par-doning power, Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S.333 (1867), it is under no similar con-straints in other areas. The fact that inthe exercise of an acknowledged power,such as powers to fund or to regulatethe Armed Forces of the United States,the Congress may incidentally impingeupon presidential authority as Com-mander in Chief does not render thatexercise a violation of the separationof powers. ‘‘There are indications thatthe Constitution did not contemplatethat the title Commander in Chief ofthe Army and Navy will constitute himalso Commander in Chief of the Coun-try, its industries and its inhabitants.He has no monopoly of ‘war powers,’whatever they are. While Congress can-not deprive the President of the com-mand of the army and navy, only Con-gress can provide him an army andnavy to command. It is also empoweredto make rules for the ‘Government andRegulation of land and naval Forces,’by which it may to some unknown ex-tent impinge upon even command func-tions.’’ Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343U.S. at 643–644 (concurring opinion.)‘‘The Constitution does not subject

this lawmaking power of Congress topresidential or military supervision orcontrol.’’ Id. at 588 (opinion of thecourt).

Although Congress is subject to theConstitution in the exercise of itspower of the purse as in the exercise ofall its powers, e.g., United States v. Lov-ett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), ‘‘[e]ven when thePresident act clearly within his pow-ers, Congress decides the degree and de-tail of its support,’’ Henkin, ForeignAffairs and the Constitution 79 (1972),and ‘‘it is the plain duty of the execu-tive branch of the government to com-ply with the same.’’ Spaulding v. Doug-las Aircraft Co., 60 F. Supp. at 986.

Mr. President, I shall enumerate thedefense and war powers set forth in theConstitution, as bearing on the Presi-dent as Commander in Chief, as com-pared with those that are directed tothe legislative branch.

Section 2 of Article 2 states: ‘‘ThePresident shall be Commander in Chiefof the Army and Navy of the UnitedStates, and of the Militia of the severalstates, when called in to the actualService of the United States.’’

Section 3 of Article 2 states, ‘‘. . . Heshall take care that the laws be faith-fully executed, and shall commissionall the officers of the United States.’’

I find nothing else in the Constitu-tion that would indicate any additionalauthority or power given to the Presi-dent with respect to the armed forces.

On the other hand, there is much lan-guage in the Constitution with respectto the authority and power of the legis-lative branch anent the military. Forexample:

Clause 1, Section 8, Article 1: ‘‘TheCongress shall have power to . . . pro-vide for the common defense . . . of theUnited States; . . .’’

Clause 10, Section 8, Article 1 states:The Congress shall have power ‘‘to de-fine and punish Piracies and Feloniescommitted on the high Seas, andOffences against the Law of Nations;’’

Clause 11, Section 8, Article 1: TheCongress shall have power ‘‘to declarewar, grant letters of Marque and Re-prisal, and make rules concerning cap-tures on land and water;’’

Under Clause 12, Section 8, Article 1,the Congress shall have power ‘‘to raiseand support Armies, but no appropria-tion of money to that use shall bemade for a longer term than twoyears;’’

Clause 13, Section 8, Article 1 states:The Congress shall have power ‘‘to pro-vide and maintain a navy;’’

Clause 14, Section 8, Article 1 states:The Congress shall have power ‘‘tomake Rules for the government andregulation of the land and navalforces;’’

Clause 15, Section 8, Article 1 pro-vides that: The Congress shall havepower ‘‘to provide for calling forth themilitia to execute the laws of theunion, suppress insurrections and repelinvasions;’’

Clause 16, Section 8, Article 1 states:The Congress shall have power ‘‘to pro-

vide for organizing, arming, and dis-ciplining the militia, and for governingsuch part of them as may be employedin the service of the United States, re-serving to the states respectively, theappointment of the officers, and theauthority of training the militia ac-cording to the discipline prescribed byCongress;’’

Clause 18, Section 8, Article 1 states:The Congress shall have power ‘‘tomake all laws which shall be necessaryand proper for carrying into executionthe foregoing powers, and all otherpowers vested by this Constitution inthe government of the United States,or in any department or officer there-of.’’

If Congress is to have the sole au-thority ‘‘to declare war,’’ as the Con-stitution clearly states, then are we tosuppose that, in any military actionshort of a declaration of war, the au-thority reposed in the Congress by theConstitution to declare war is shiftedto another department? Are we to as-sume that any action short of a dec-laration of war, shifts the authorityfrom the Congress to the Executive? Toso suppose, strains credulity to thebreaking point. I prefer to suppose thatthe Framers, being unable to foreseethe various degrees of military actionshort of that which would be takenunder a declaration of war, and, there-fore, they did not attempt to go intoany detail beyond that which would ob-tain in the event of all out war. Obvi-ously, the President has the inherentpower and authority to take action torepeal an invasion, or a sudden and un-anticipated attack on the UnitedStates or its military forces. In suchinstances, the President would have noalternative but to exercise such au-thority, there being no time to consultwith or to secure authorization fromthe Congress, which might not even bein session at that moment. It seemslogical however, to believe that thespecific power to declare war—thatbeing the ultimate circumstance—andsuch declaration having been investedin the legislative branch, anythingshort of the ultimate circumstance,anything short of the declaration ofwar, the responsibility and authorityfor committing the armed forces of theUnited States in an offensive action,the authority would remain vested inthe legislative branch. In other words,the lone authority to declare war beingvested in the legislative branch, any-thing less than a declaration of warwould seem to be reposed for its au-thority in the same source, namely,the Congress. It strains imagination tothe utmost to believe that the author-ity to commit the military forces ofthe nation in an all out war, shiftselsewhere when the military forces ofthe nation are to be committed to alesser action by the military forcesthan that of all out war. The authorityto go to the ultimate limit would seemto carry with it the authority to ex-tend the military action to somethingless than the all out or ultimate actionof declared war.

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATES 18512 December 13, 1995I close by thanking the majority

leader for his leadership and for hisstatesmanship in taking the positionhe is taking in introducing the resolu-tion that we are going to vote on.

Mr. President, I urge that the Senatevote down the resolution offered by thedistinguished Senator from Texas andthe Senator from Oklahoma, Mr.INHOFE, and others, and that the Sen-ate vote to approve the resolution of-fered by Mr. DOLE and Mr. MCCAIN.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-sent to have printed in the RECORD theresolutions on which we will votetoday in the order in which we willvote.

There being no objection, the itemswere ordered to be printed in theRECORD, as follows:

S. CON. RES. —(Purpose: To Oppose President Clinton’s

planned deployment of US ground forces toBosnia)Resolved by the Senate and House of Rep-

resentatives of the United States of America inCongress assembled,

Section 1. That the Congress opposes Presi-dent Clinton’s decision to deploy UnitedStates ground forces into the Republic ofBosnia and Herzegovina to implement theGeneral Framework Agreement for Peace inBosnia and Herzegovina and its associatedannexes.

Section 2. That the Congress strongly sup-ports the US Armed Forces who may be or-dered by the President to implement theGeneral Framework Agreement for Peace inBosnia and Herzegovina and its associatedannexes.

S.J. RES. —Whereas beginning on February 24, 1993,

President Clinton committed the UnitedStates to participate in implementing apeace agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovinawithout prior consultation with Congress;

Whereas the Republic of Bosnia andHerzegovina has been unjustly denied themeans to defend itself through the imposi-tion of a United Nations arms embargo;

Whereas the United Nations Charter re-states the ‘‘the inherent right of individualand collective self-defense,’’ a right deniedthe Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovinawhose population has further suffered egre-gious violations of the international law ofwar including ethnic cleansing by Serbianaggressors, and the Convention on Preven-tion and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-cide, to which the United States Senate gaveits advice and consent in 1986;

Whereas the United States Congress hasrepeatedly voted to end the United Statesparticipation in the international arms em-bargo on the Republic of Bosnia andHerzegovina as the best way to achieve amilitary balance and a just and stable peacewithout the deployment of United StatesArmed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

Whereas the Republic of Bosnia andHerzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, andthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia initialedthe General Framework Agreement and As-sociated Annexes on November 21, 1995 inDayton, Ohio, after repeated assurances thatthe United States would send troops to assistin implementing that agreement;

Whereas three dedicated American dip-lomats—Bob Frasure, Joe Kruzel, and NelsonDrew—lost their lives in the American-leddiplomatic effort which culminated in theGeneral Framework Agreement;

Whereas as part of the negotiations whichled to the General Framework Agreement,

the United States has made a commitmentto ensure that the Federation of Bosnia andHerzegovina is armed and trained to providefor its own defense, and that commitmentshould be honored;

Whereas the mission of the NATO Imple-mentation Force is to create a secure envi-ronment to provide Bosnia and Herzegovinaan opportunity to begin to establish a dura-ble peace, which requires the Federation ofBosnia and Herzegovina to be able to providefor its own defense;

Whereas the objective of the United Statesin deploying United States Armed Forces toBosnia and Herzegovina can only be success-ful if the Federation of Bosnia andHerzegovina is armed and trained to providefor its own defense after the withdrawal ofthe NATO Implementation Force and theUnited States Armed Forces; and

Whereas in deciding to participate in im-plementation of the General FrameworkAgreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Presi-dent Clinton has cited American interests in-cluding maintaining its leadership in NATO,preventing the spread of the conflict, stop-ping the tragic loss of life, and fulfillingAmerican commitments;

Whereas on December 3, 1995, PresidentClinton approved Operation Joint Endeavorand deployment of United States ArmedForces to Bosnia and Herzegovina began im-mediately thereafter: Now therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and the House of Rep-resentatives of the United States of America inCongress assembled,SECTION 1. SUPPORT FOR UNITED STATES

ARMED FORCES.The Congress unequivocally supports the

men and women of our Armed Forces whoare carrying out their missions in support ofpeace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with profes-sional excellence, dedicated patriotism andexemplary bravery, and believes they mustbe given all necessary resources and supportto carry out their mission and ensure theirsecurity.SEC. 2. DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED

FORCES.(a) Notwithstanding reservations expressed

about President Clinton’s decision to deployUnited States Armed Forces to Bosnia andHerzegovina and recognizing that:

(1) the President has decided to deployUnited States Armed Forces to implementthe General Framework Agreement in Oper-ation Joint Endeavor citing American inter-ests in preventing the spread of conflict,maintaining its leadership in NATO, stop-ping the tragic loss of life, and fulfillingAmerican commitments;

(2) the deployment of United States ArmedForces has begun; and

(3) preserving United States credibility is astrategic interest,the President may only fulfill his commit-ment to deploy United States Armed Forcesin Bosnia and Herzegovina for approximatelyone year to implement the General Frame-work Agreement and Military Annex, pursu-ant to this Resolution, subject to the condi-tions in subsection (b).

(b) REQUIREMENT FOR DETERMINATION.—Be-fore acting pursuant to this Resolution, thePresident shall make available to the Speak-er of the House of Representatives and thePresident pro tempore of the Senate, his de-termination that—

(1) the mission of the NATO Implementa-tion Force and United States Armed Forcesdeployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina will belimited to implementation of the militaryprovisions of the Military Annex to the Gen-eral Framework Agreement and measuresdeemed necessary to protect the safety ofthe NATO Implementation Force and UnitedStates Armed Forces;

(2) an integral part of the successful ac-complishment of the U.S. objective in Bosniaand Herzegovina in deploying and withdraw-ing United States Armed Forces is the estab-lishment of a military balance which enablesthe Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina toprovide for its own defense without depend-ing on U.S. or other outside forces; and

(3) the United States will lead an imme-diate international effort, separate and apartfrom the NATO Implementation Force andconsistent with United Nations SecurityCouncil Resolution 1021 and the GeneralFramework Agreement and Associated An-nexes, to provide equipment, arms, trainingand related logistics assistance of the high-est possible quality to ensure the Federationof Bosnia and Herzegovina can provide for itsown defense, including, as necessary, usingexisting military drawdown authorities andrequesting such additional authority as maybe necessary.SEC. 3. REPORT ON EFFORTS TO ENABLE THE

FEDERATION OF BOSNIA ANDHERZEGOVINA TO PROVIDE FOR ITSOWN DEFENSE.

Within 30 days after enactment, the Presi-dent shall submit a detailed report on hisplan to assist the Federation of Bosnia toprovide for its own defense, including therole of the United States and other countriesin providing such assistance. Such reportshall include an evaluation of the defenseneeds of the Federation of Bosnia andHerzegovina, including, to the maximum ex-tent possible:

(a) the types and quantities of arms, spareparts, and logistics support required to es-tablish a stable military balance prior to thewithdrawal of United States Armed Forces;

(b) the nature and scope of training to beprovided;

(c) a detailed description of the past,present and future U.S. role in ensuring thatthe Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina isprovided as rapidly as possible with equip-ment, training, arms and related logistic as-sistance of the highest possible quality;

(d) administration plans to use existingmilitary drawdown authority, and other as-sistance authorities pursuant to section2(b)(3); and

(e) specific or anticipated commitments bythird countries to provide arms, equipmentor training to the Federation of Bosnia andHerzegovina.

The report shall be submitted in unclassi-fied form, but may contain a classifiedannex.SEC. 4. REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON MILITARY AS-

PECTS OF IMPLEMENTATION OFTHE GENERAL FRAMEWORK AGREE-MENT.

(a) Thirty days after enactment, and atleast once every 60 days thereafter, thePresident shall submit to the Congress a re-port on the status of the deployment of Unit-ed States Armed Forces in Bosnia andHerzegovina, including a detailed descriptionof:

(1) criteria for determining success for thedeployment;

(2) the military mission and objectives;(3) milestone for measuring progress in

achieving the mission and objectives;(4) command arrangements for United

State Armed Forces;(5) the rules of engagement for United

States Armed Forces;(6) the multilateral composition of forces

in Bosnia and Herzegovina;(7) the status of compliance by all parties

with the General Framework Agreement andassociated Annexes, including Article III ofAnnex 1–A concerning the withdrawal of for-eign forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina;

(8) all incremental costs of the Departmentof Defense and any costs incurred by other

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S 18513December 13, 1995federal agencies, for the deployment of Unit-ed States Armed Forces in Bosnia andHerzegovina, including support for the NATOImplementation Force;

(9) the exit strategy to provide for com-plete withdrawal of United States ArmedForces in the NATO Implementation Force,including an estimated date of completion;and

(10) a description of progress toward ena-bling the Federation of Bosnia andHerzegovina to provide for its own defense.

(b) Such reports shall include a descriptionof any changes in the areas listed in (a)through (a)(10) since the previous report, ifapplicable, and shall be submitted in unclas-sified form, buy may contain a classifiedannex.SEC. 5. REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON NON-MILI-

TARY ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTA-TION OF THE GENERAL FRAME-WORK AGREEMENT.

Thirty days after enactment, and at leastonce every 60 days thereafter, the Presidentshall submit to the Congress a report on:

(a) the status of implementation of non-military aspects of the General FrameworkAgreement and Associated annexes, espe-cially Annex 10 on Civilian Implementation,and of efforts, which are separate from theImplementation Force, by the United Statesand other countries to support implementa-tion of the non-military aspects. Such reportshall include a detailed description of:

(1) progress toward conducting of elections;(2) the status of return of refugees and dis-

placed persons;(3) humanitarian and reconstruction ef-

forts;(4) police training and related civilian se-

curity efforts, including the status of imple-mentation of Annex 11 regarding an inter-national police task force; and

(5) implementation of Article XIII ofAnnex 6 concerning cooperation with theInternational Tribunal for the Former Yugo-slavia and other appropriate organizations inthe investigation and prosecution of warcrimes and other violations of internationalhumanitarian law;

(b) the status of coordination between theHigh Representative and the ImplementationForce Commander;

(c) the status of plans and preparation forthe continuation of civilian activities afterthe withdrawal of the Implementation Force;

(d) all costs incurred by all U.S. govern-ment agencies for reconstruction, refugee,humanitarian, and all other non-military bi-lateral and multilateral assistance in Bosniaand Herzegovina; and

(e) U.S. and international diplomatic ef-forts to contain and end conflict in theformer Yugoslavia, including efforts to re-solve the status of Kosova and halt viola-tions of internationally-recognized humanrights of its majority Albanian population.

Such reports shall be submitted in unclas-sified form, but may contain a classifiedannex.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I havebeen asked by the leader to make thefollowing request:

I ask unanimous consent that thetime on our side of the aisle be dividedas follows, in the following order:

Senator WELLSTONE, 7 minutes; Sen-ator MURRAY, 9 minutes; SenatorLEAHY, 7 minutes; Senator SIMON, 7minutes; Senator BRADLEY, 10 minutes;Senator SARBANES, 5 minutes; SenatorDODD, 7 minutes; Senator LAUTENBERG,

7 minutes; Senator GRAHAM, 7 minutes;Senator MOSELEY-BRAUN, 5 minutes;Senator KERRY, 10 minutes, and Sen-ator DASCHLE, 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Madam President,I ask unanimous consent that at thehour of 10:15 this evening, the Senateproceed to the final vote on the pend-ing Hutchison-Inhofe concurrent reso-lution without further action or de-bate, and immediately following thevote, the Senate proceed to the finalvote on the Dole-McCain joint resolu-tion on Bosnia, with the time betweennow and 10:15 p.m. this evening to beequally divided between the two lead-ers or their designees.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. I further ask thatthe Senate resume the Bosnia debate,and it be in order for the leader to offerhis joint resolution at a later time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Once again,Madam President, I thank all Senatorsfor allowing us to do this so that everyMember of the Senate who might belooking for a timetable would knowthat the votes do start at 10:15, andthat the time between now and thenwill be equally divided.

I yield the floor.

N O T I C EIncomplete record of Senate proceedings. Except for concluding business which follows,

today’s Senate proceedings will be continued in the next issue of the Record.

ORDERS FOR THURSDAY,DECEMBER 14, 1995

Mr. BROWN. Madam President, I askunanimous consent that when the Sen-ate completes its business today itstand in adjournment until the hour of9:30 a.m. on Thursday, December 14,that following the prayer, the Journalof proceedings be deemed approved todate, no resolutions come over underthe rule, the call of the calendar be dis-pensed with, the morning hour bedeemed to have expired, the time forthe two leaders be reserved for theiruse later in the day, there then be a pe-riod for morning business until thehour of 10:30, with Senators permittedto speak for up to 5 minutes each, withthe following exceptions: Senator MUR-KOWSKI for 15 minutes; Senator JEF-FORDS for 15 minutes; SenatorWELLSTONE, or his designee, for 30 min-utes; and, I further ask that at thehour of 10:30 the Senate turn to the In-terior appropriations conference reportunder the previous unanimous consent.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.f

PROGRAMMr. BROWN. Madam President, for

the information of all Senators, theSenate will begin debate on the Inte-rior appropriations conference reportat 10:30 a.m. There is a 6-hour time

limit. However, all time is not ex-pected to be used, and a vote is ex-pected on adoption of the conferencereport.

The Senate could be asked to con-sider other appropriations matters dur-ing tomorrow’s session, and the Senatemay also turn to the State Departmentreorganization bill.

Therefore, additional votes can alsobe expected.f

ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 9:30 A.M.TOMORROW

Mr. BROWN. Madam President, ifthere is no further business to come be-fore the Senate—

Mr. FORD. I thought we might get aclean CR until January 20, and wecould work out something with the bal-anced budget amendment.

Mr. BROWN. If we can join the two,I am sure we can get that done tonight.

(Laughter.)Mr. BROWN. Madam President, I now

ask that the Senate stand in adjourn-ment under the previous order.

There being no objection, the Senate,at 11:19 p.m., adjourned until Thursday,December 14, 1995, at 9:30 a.m.

NOMINATIONSExecutive nominations received by

the Senate December 13, 1995:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TOM LANTOS, OF CALIFORNIA, TO BE A REPRESENTA-TIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE FIF-TIETH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THEUNITED NATIONS.

TOBY ROTH, OF WISCONSIN, TO BE A REPRESENTATIVEOF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE FIFTIETHSESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITEDNATIONS.

THE JUDICIARY

GARY A. FENNER, OF MISSOURI, TO BE U.S. DISTRICTJUDGE FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI VICESCOTT O. WRIGHT, RETIRED.

f

WITHDRAWALSExecutive messages transmitted by

the President to the Senate on Decem-ber 13, 1995, withdrawing from furtherSenate consideration the followingnominations:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TOM LANTOS, OF CALIFORNIA, TO BE AN ALTERNATEREPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICATO THE FIFTIETH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLYOF THE UNITED NATIONS WHICH WAS SENT TO THE SEN-ATE ON DECEMBER 11, 1995.

TOBY ROTH, OF WISCONSIN, TO BE AN ALTERNATE REP-RESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TOTHE FIFTIETH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFTHE UNITED NATIONS WHICH WAS SENT TO THE SENATEON DECEMBER 11, 1995.