14 J. Allan Hobson and Edward Pace-Schott’s Response: Commentary by Margaret Gilmore and Edward Nersessian (New York)

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J. Allan Hobson and Edward Pace-Schotts Response:Commentary by Margaret Gilmore and EdwardNersessian (New York)Margaret M. Gilmore M.D.

a& Edward Nersessian M.D.

b

a120 East 75th Street, New York, NY 10021

b72 East 91st Street, New York, NY 10128, e-mail:

Published online: 09 Jan 2014.

To cite this article:Margaret M. Gilmore M.D. & Edward Nersessian M.D. (2000) J. Allan Hobson and Edward Pace-SchottsResponse: Commentary by Margaret Gilmore and Edward Nersessian (New York), Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary

Journal for Psychoanalysis and the Neurosciences, 2:2, 202-211, DOI: 10.1080/15294145.2000.10773306

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2/11

J.

Allan Hobson

and

Edward Pace-Schott s Response

Commentary by

Margaret

Gilmore

and

Edward Nersessian (New York)

Gilmore-Nersessian

For the second issue

of

Neuro-Psychoanalysis Dr.

J

Allan Hobson provided the target paper on the neuro

regulation and neurophysiological processes

of

sleep

and dreams. This target paper was followed by formal

commentaries on the target paper prepared by three

experts in the field

of

sleep and dreaming, Drs.

M

Solms,

Braun, and M. Reiser. As Hobson s paper

and those respondent papers dealt not only with neuro

physiological findings but also with aspects of Freud s

psychological theory

of

dreams, the editors

of

the jour

nal decided that a brief summary

of

Freud s dream

theory would help orient those readers

of

the journal

who might be less familiar with psychoanalytic con

cepts to the discussion. Therefore, they asked us to

write a brief and somewhat simplified synopsis

of

Freud s psychoanalytic theory

of

dreams. The editors

planned to place the synopsis as the first paper in the

journal so that it could serve as a general orientation

for the reader. However, at the urging of Dr. Hobson,

who was concerned that readers might misread the

summary as a target paper, the editors elected to place

it at the end

of

the interchange, as an appendix.

We, the authors

of

the brief synopsis, were aston

ished that Hobson and Pace-Schott chose to give such

prominence to our little summary in their response to

the commentaries. Our surprise was partly the result

of

the fact that our summary was not prepared as a

response to the commentary

on

Hobson s target paper,

but only

as

an outline

of

Freud s theory. We are

pleased that Hobson chose to address our summary in

such detail, and in his

hold

no punches style, as he

has given

us

the opportunity to respond to his target

paper and his commentary. It is our hope that our

response will further the discussion between neuro

physiologists and psychoanalysts.

Contributions to the Neurophysiology of Sleep

and Proposals for a Model of Dream

Formation

We appreciate Hobson s careful neurophysiological

and neurochemical research establishing the reciprocal

Margaret

M

Gilmore, M.D.,

is

an Assistant Course Instructor in

Psychoanalysis, the New York Psychoanalytic Institute; Assistant Clinical

Professor

of

Psychiatry, Cornell Medical Center, New York.

Edward Nersessian, M.D., is Training and Supervising Psychoanalyst,

interaction between acetylcholine stimulation and ser

otonergic and noradrenergic inhibition in the pons in

REM sleep generation (Hobson and McCarley, 1977;

Hobson, 1999). We also recognize his courage in pro

posing his activation-synthesis model for dream for

mation based upon those findings (Hobson and

McCarley, 1977; Hobson, 1999). In addition we ad

mire the flexibility in model building that Hobson has

demonstrated by amending his original activa

tion-synthesis hypothesis to incorporate new data

from neurochemical studies of transmitters, brain im

aging, and brain lesion studies. We applaud his will

ingness to acknowledge an unexpectedly prominent

role

of

the limbic system (Hobson, 1999, p 157)

during sleep following instigation of REM, as well as

his willingness to address data indicating that lesions

of the deep frontal lobes impair dreaming (Hobson

and Pace-Schott, 1999).

However, we are deeply dismayed at Dr. Hob

son s refusal to openly acknowledge the major change

in his dream model from his original activation-syn

thesis model in which he viewed dream content as

vacuous (Braun, 1999) to his present model in

which he suggests that

salient memories

n

emo

tions serve as the primary shaper of dream plots

rather than playing a secondary role (Braun, 1999,

p

196). As Braun notes, in his new model Hobson

acknowledges an active participation of forebrain

mechanisms in dream generation-not simply a sec

ondary senseless response to chaotic brainstem

events (Braun, 1999, p 196).

What happened to Hobson s original activa

tion-synthesis hypothesis in which the forebrain pas

sively synthesized images in response to the activity

of the oculomotor system or vestibular system which

had been activated by the automatic firing

of

the brain

stem? Let us compare the two models

of

dream forma

tion: In the original activation-synthesis model the

cortex was passively receiving information from the

eye movements and then synthesizing the visual imag

ery appropriate to them. An hypothesis is that the

oculomotor activity is generated at the brainstem level

and that the cortex is then provided with feed-forward

New York Psychoanalytic Institute; Clinical Associate Professor of Psy

chiatry, Cornell University Medical College, New York.


3/11

Ongoing Discussion: Hobson

and

Pace-Schott

information about the eye movements (Hobson and

McCarley, 1977, 1338).

Hobson proposed that two other examples

of

such

passive forebrain synthesis of dream content occurred

when the forebrain responded to the activity of the

vestibular system, which had been activated by the

brainstem firing, and when the forebrain responded to

the motor atonia

of

sleep, which had also resulted from

brainstem activation. This model of dream content for

mation, a model based upon strict biological determin

ism, led Hobson to propose that such typical dream

contents as that in which a person experiences motor

inhibition (the person as a whole cannot move or can

not move some part of his body), or in which the

person experiences himself as flying, occur as a result

of the forebrain's providing content in response to the

activation of motor paralysis or to the activation of

the vestibular system during REM sleep (Hobson and

McCarley, 1977).

First, we would like to point out that Hobson

seemed unaware in proposing his model for motor in

hibition in dream content that Freud in The nterpreta-

tion reams (1900) had made the same suggestion

with regard to manifest dream content in which motor

inhibition occurred; that is, in dreams with motor inhi

bition content perhaps the mind was using its aware

ness of the motor paralysis of sleep to create manifest

dream content. However, Freud went

on

to ask the

next logical question If this is so, why does not every

dream represent some motor paralysis since there is

almost always motor paralysis during sleep? Does not

the fact that this paralysis occurs in only some dreams

represent that some selection has occurred in what

will be represented in the dream (Freud, 1900) Why

does Hobson's sleeper not dream of flying or motor

inhibition in every dream? Freud answered this ques

tion by suggesting that during dreaming, the psycho

logical mind selected only those perceptions of brain

or body functioning during sleep that were useful to

the expression of psychological states. Whether Freud

was right or wrong in his proposed answer to the ques

tion

of

why motor inhibition appeared only in some

dreams, the point is, the question must be asked and

Hobson did not ask it. It is our argument that

if

Hobson

had asked the question, and he still wanted to maintain

his biological determinism, then the question would

have led him to search for more complex brain func

tioning during dreaming.

In their 1999 activation-synthesis model

of

dream content, Hobson and Pace-Schott claim: We

have always emphasized our own clinical interest in

dreams as the transparent syntheses of current con-

3

cerns, past conflicts and cognitive-emotional style

(p. 206). In addition, they state what the brainstem

does is set the forebrain stage for dreaming (p. 218).

We quote these statements for two reasons: first to

point out Hobson's refusal to openly acknowledge his

rejection

of

his first activation-synthesis model

of

dream formation, which regarded dream content as

random, as wrong (see below); and second to empha

size that this new activation-synthesis model, which

attributes a much more active role for the limbic sys

tem and forebrain in the shaping of dream plots, opens

the door to the possible importance

of

psychological

(including emotional and thinking) influences upon

dream formation. As for the first point of Hobson's

refusal to admit his error and his rewriting of the his

tory of his belief in the importance of dream content

in revealing current psychological concerns and past

emotional conflicts, we would like to remind Hobson

and Pace-Schott of their statement that if we are to

have a scientifically respectful dialogue we expect our

psychoanalytic colleagues to be able to say that, of

course Freud was probably wrong about most, if not

all, of his dream theory (Hobson and Pace-Schott,

1999, 218). We respectfully suggest that Hobson

apply this requirement to admit to errors in his own

research and theories But we have a more important

reason for making our comparison between the earlier

and later activation-synthesis models of dream forma

tion. The second activation-synthesis model, which

includes the activation

of

the brainstem and, in addi

tion, the activation

of

the limbic, paralimbic, and basal

areas of the forebrain, and a relative deactivation

of

prefrontal areas during REM, provides a much more

complex portrait of brain functioning during REM

than did the first activation-synthesis model. While

this complex portrait does not preclude Hobson's in

sistence on biological determinism, the activation of

the limbic, paralimbic, and basal forebrain areas would

also not be inconsistent with a theory

of

dream forma

tion that includes contributions from psychological in

put (emotions, memories, thoughts) into the causation

of

dream content. In this way, the second model

of

brain functioning during REM differs sharply and im

portantly from the first model. In the first model, there

was no possibility for any areas

of

the brain other than

the brainstem to contribute to the activation

of

other

brain areas. Thus, Hobson argued that since there

could be no psychological mind in the brainstem, then

there could be no psychological mind that contributed

to instigation

of

dream content. However, in the sec

ond model

of

the brain functioning during REM sleep,

the existence

of

activation in the limbic, paralimbic,


4/11

204

and basal forebrain areas raises the possibility that

psychological events might make contributions to

dream formation.

In summary, we find Hobson and Pace-Schott to

be very careful neurophysiological researchers and

their neurophysiological results regarding brainstem

activation during REM sleep to be compelling evi

dence for the importance of the brainstem activation

of REM sleep. We appreciate Hobson s masterly over

view of the state of information on brain functioning

during sleep and welcome these findings, which ad

vance our understanding

of sleep and dreaming. How

ever, we object strenuously when they extrapolate

from these neurophysiological results to propose a

model

of

dream formation (a psychobiological phe

nomenon) that is based on the apriori assumption that

only neurophysiological events can be causative in

dream formation. We object to their scientific method

ology when they

select

only their own interpretation

of the neurophysiological data (that

if

certain brain

areas are activated during dreaming then this activa

tion must

c use

the dream content). They then exclude

alternative hypotheses; for example,

if

certain brain

areas are active during dreaming this may reflect not

only the impact of brain activation on dream content

but also the possibility that some of these areas of

brain activation reflect psychological functioning dur

ing sleep, which may, in turn, influence which areas

of brain are activated during dreaming sleep. Further

more, we object to their biased stance in their treat

ment

of

psychological data gathered from patients

dream reports and the relevance of this data to under

standing the emotional salience

of

dreams. While Hob

son and Pace-Schott accept the psychological data that

they have, a priori, decided to be relevant the pa

tient s conscious dream report and some associa

tions they reject as unscientific all psychological

data gathered by the psychoanalytic method (see be

low for discussion

of

biological reductionism).

Scientific Differences with Hobson

and

Hobson

and

Pace-Schott

As scientists, we have four major disagreements with

Hobson s form of biological reductionism and its ram

ifications in his data gathering and theory building.

First, in his model of the mind-brain, causation is a

one-way street from brain to mind: brain functioning

determines psychological phenomena and psychologi

cal phenomena cannot determine brain functioning.

Second, the dream model relies upon an unsubstanti-

Gilmore Nersessian

ated assumption that there is no unconscious goal

directed mental functioning during sleep. Third, Hob

son deprives mental (psychological) data other than

that which confirms his thesis (conscious dream re

ports and sometimes even those associations are ig

nored see below), and in particular psychoanalytic

data, of any scientific status. Fourth, Hobson ignores

the scientific principle that the data observed depend

upon the method of observation when he claims that

psychoanalytic data are invalid because he does not

observe them in psychotherapy.

We wish to be quite clear here that we are not

objecting to Hobson s data or theorizing

on

the

grounds that the biological and the psychological rep

resent two different domains of study that require two

different sets

of

data and

theory a

model of parallel

dualism (Reiser, 1999). Rather, we maintain the posi

tion that there is mind-brain, that while these are two

different domains with two different requirements for

data, these domains interact. This model involves

mind-brain interaction (Sperry, 1983) in which the

mind may direct brain functioning and the brain may

direct mind functioning. In this interactionist model,

there is a possibility of finding correlations between

brain activity and mental activity. We wish to distin

guish this mind-brain model from Hobson s biological

reductionism in which the dreaming mind is an epi

phenomenon of brain activity.

As to the first point, Hobson s model for dream

formation claims that all the psychological phenom

ena of dreaming are determined by biological events.

For example, Hobson (1999) states, The loss of ori

entational stability (which is at the cognitive root

of

dream bizarreness) and the loss of self reflective

awareness (which is the basis of the delusion that we

are awake in our dreams) are two related deficits

which could be

c used

by the aminergic demodulation

of the brain in sleep (p. 160). Note also his model

for dream amnesia, Without the aminergic neuro

modulators norepinephrine and serotonin, the mne

monically weak dream trace c nnot be converted into

dre m rec ll (Hobson and Pace-Schott, 1999,

212). Dream amnesia is the result of a weak dream

trace due to a shift in neuromodulation. If this is so,

why do we ever recall dreams or why is there variation

in the clarity with which we recall individual dreams

at different points in time? But more importantly, this

form of biological reductionism is disputed by studies

indicating that psychological states and thoughts can

influence brain functioning. For example, in studies

using positron emission tomography (PET), Pardo,

Pardo, and Raichle (1993) measured cerebral blood


5/11

Ongoing Discussion:

obsonand

Pace-Schott

flow in subjects at rest and again as the subjects imag

ined or recalled sad situations. The investigators found

that there were significant differences in regional

blood flow between the two states (Gabbard, 1994).

Gabbard concludes that one implication of these pre

liminary findings is that psychological influences can

cause neurophysiological changes in the brain (1994,

p

4); Gabbard extends this reasoning to his summary

of

Kandel s experiments on the marine snail indicating

that synaptic connections can be strengthened and

permanently altered through the regulation of gene

expression connected with learning from the environ

ment (p. 4). Gabbard (1994) quotes Kandel in his

statement that

it

is only insofar as our words produce

changes in each other s brains that psychotherapeutic

intervention produces changes in patients minds

(Kandel, 1979).

Our second problem with Hobson s model is that

his biological reductionism eliminates psychological

data s scientific data in the study of the mind or the

brain. We attribute Hobson s statements, such s that

we find Freud s theory to be scientifically un

founded (Hobson and Pace-Schott, 1999) to reflect

Hobson s refusal to accept Freud s psychological data

from patient associations in analysis as valid informa

tion useful to describing dreams and dream mentation.

We ask Hobson: How does he account for Freud s

accurate description of aspects of dream mentation

such s the importance of long-term memory, vivid

visualization, condensation, displacement, plastic rep

resentation, affectively driven plots, regression with

loss of reality testing, and delusional belief in the

dream and dream amnesia? Did Freud make up this

description out of whole cloth or did he derive these

descriptions and models from his psychoanalytic data

garnered from dream analyses? How does Hobson ex

plain Freud s suggestion that there exists two methods

by which the mind can process thoughts, memories,

impulses, and emotions: the primary and secondary

process with the primary process most characteristi

cally observed during dreaming and the secondary pro

cess most characteristically observed in waking

thought?

Third, we argue that Hobson s formof biological

reductionism leads him to the assumption that during

sleep there is no unconscious mental functioning that

could impact the brain states. Hobson makes this as

sumption despite evidence of thinking during sleep

derived from sleep laboratory studies in which patients

were awakened during NREM sleep and reported

thoughts. Also, is Hobson unaware that Freud also

proposed that there were thoughts during nondreaming

5

sleep and that dreams represented only one form of

thinking during sleep? Our point here is that even

when faced with data indicating that thoughts occur

during sleep, Hobson is not considering the possibility

of thoughts during sleep as impacting brain function

ing. He is

asserting

that brain states determine psycho

logical states. If the only data that Hobson will accept

as scientific is the biological data, then how can there

be any place in his model of

the dream (a psychobio

logical phenomenon) for psychological data or deter

minants? We argue that this is circular reasoning.

For our fourth disagreement with Hobson s sci

entific approach, we would like to remind him of the

principle that the data observed depend very much on

the method

of observation. Let us look at this principle

as it applies in regard to his claims about the transpar

ency of dreams. To most psychoanalysts, many aspects

of

the reported dream are

s

transparent as we assume

they are to Hobson. However, the psychoanalyst uses

the psychoanalytic method

of

observation (distinct

from psychotherapy) for data collection: the patient s

free associations to elements

of

his or her dream con

tent are considered valid psychological data about the

dream elements. The psychoanalyst listens to the pa

tient s free associations, as one

of

us did to the

green dream, and finds that other associations to

particular dream events pour forth. For example, in

the

green

dream the patient s associations to the

reported dream point to the connection between the

patient s present sexual longings (his memory

of

wish

ing to call J.) and his present sexual prohibition by

his own conscience (neither mother nor wife actually

prohibit his phone call: they only prohibit his phone

call in the patient s mind), and the memories from

childhood of gratified incestuous sexual activities pro

hibited by mother. None of these associations is pres

ent in the reported dream. These thoughts and feelings

are all derived from the patient s associations to the

recalled dream. In the reported dream, all the patient

does is experience danger as he sees himself in a green

room with an unidentified woman. Only in his associa

tions does he link the green room to the upstairs apart

ment, which in childhood was the site of his satisfied

sexual curiosity and longings. If the psychotherapist

does not listen to the

patient s

associations and as

sumes he, the psychotherapist, understands the trans

parent emotional meaningof the dream, then naturally

that is the understanding at which the psychotherapist

and investigator will remain. We argue that there is a

scientific error involved in this approach to the data.

There is a refusal to acknowledge the principle that

the data that are observed are determined by the


6/11

206

method of observation. This is the same error that a

man observing a cow with his naked eye makes when

he asserts that only the gross anatomical cow that he

observes exists and that the cow is not made up

of

cells. When another man observes parts

of

the cow

with a microscope and proclaims the existence

of

cells,

the first man denies the existence of cells because he

cannot observe them with his naked eye and refuses

to use a microscope.

At this point we would like to continue to address

the scientific standing of Hobson and Pace-Schott s

approach to the green dream. or us the anxiety

(or terror) is primary, not secondary, and the object

or quality with which it was associated can be almost

anything (Hobson and Pace-Schott, 1999, 207;

emphasis added). We would like to point out to Hob

son and Pace-Schott that it is the patient who had the

dream and not them. Thus the psychological data, just

as the biological data on brain state, to be considered

must come from the patient, not from them. According

to the psychoanalytic method of observation, it is not

to their (Hobson, Pace-Schott, or the analyst s) associ

ations that the analyst looks in an attempt to under

stand the meaning to the patient of his dream but to the

patient s associations. The patient does not mention

terror: whose association is this? Whose dream is it

anyway? The patient says nothing about terror, but he

does give multiple associations to the events of the

previous day, to his present and past sexual excite

ments, to his memories

of

childhood sexual play and

the places in which it took place, to his mother, to his

associations of green to his mother and to his mother s

angry prohibitions of incestuous sexual activities. It is

our argument that, in this instance, Hobson and Pace

Schott s claim that

the

object or quality with which

it [this anxiety] was asociated can be almost anything

represents their refusal to accept the patient s associa-

tions his dream as the scientific data in the realm

ofpsychology to which the scientist must account. The

scientist is not free to disregard the patient s associa

tions (after all it is the patient who has had the dream)

and assert by biological data that the object or quality

with which the anxiety can be associated

can be al-

most anything.

We think this example represents in a nutshell

Hobson s refusal to use psychoanalytic data as im

portant information in trying to understand the mean

ing of the psychobiological event

of

the dream to the

patient. Furthermore, this is a good example of Hob

son s refusal to acknowledge the importance of the

method of observation in the determination of the data

to be employed in theory building. Hobson and Pace-

Gilmore Nersessian

Schott refuse to use the patient s free associations or

the analytic method (microscope)

of

observation.

We would like to add here that Hobson s claim

that psychoanalysts think all dreams must be transfer

ence dreams is a creat ion of Hobson s. This claim is

not a finding of Freudian analysis. By the way, was

such a claim made about the green dream?

Hobson and Pace-Schott asked us (p. 207) why

the patient would need to disguise or symbolize his

mother s disapproval of his temptations or would we

think that if the patient simply dreamt tha t he was

talking to his mother and she explained concern about

his impulsiveness that he would awaken. Our answer

is that now it is not his mother s disapproval or his

own internal disapproval that must be disguised. What

the patient must disguise is his satisfaction of his sex

uallongings: the patient defies his mother and his con

science in his dream and returns to the scene in

childhood in which he defied the prohibitions and

gained sexual satisfaction. The dream protects the pa

tient s sleep only to the degree to which the dream

represents the patient s present sexual longings as satis

fied in a sufficiently disguised form. Sexual excite

ments left over from the previous day are making

demands on the sleeper s mind that he find satisfaction

for them. These demands leave the sleeping patient in

the situation of either having to awaken to find sexual

satisfaction in the present or, if Freud were right, to

maintain sleep by dreaming of sexual satisfaction and

thus trying to delude himself that these demands have

been satisfied. As we said in our report, we agree

with Hobson and Pace-Schott, this dream fails and the

patient awakens. His sleep is not protected.

For another example

of

Hobson and Pace

Schott s unscientific approach to building models for

dream formation, let us focus on their reaction to the

issue of the dream as guardian of sleep. Despite Hob

son and Pace-Schott s assertion that psychoanalysts

do not question their theory,

Mark

Solms (1999) cor

rectly reported that this psychoanalytic proposition

has never been tested and suggested clinicopathologi

cal studies. Hobson s argument for his disagreement

with the thesis that the dream might act as the guardian

of sleep underscores the non-data-driven assertions

that he makes. He and Pace-Schott state,

We

have

grave doubts about (i) the philosophical assumptions

of the hypothesis (how can a dream, which is a psy

chological experience, serve a physiological func

tion?), (ii) its intrinsic validity (dreaming might have

many other functions or even be an epiphenomenon),

and (iii) its testability (p. 220). Is it beyond Hobson

and Pace-Schott s consideration that a psychological


7/11

Ongoing Discussion: Hobson

an d

Pace-Schott

event (a dream) could influence a neurophysiological

event such as brain functioning during sleep? Could it

be that a psychological phenomenon (dreaming) could

have an impact on the neurophysiology? (See above

for a more detailed description and critique of Hob

son s specific form of biological reductionism.) Or is

questioning the intrinsic validity of something the

same as asserting that it is true, without testing it?

Is psychological data by its nature unscientific and

inadmissable?

Let us look at another example of Hobson and

Pace-Schott s lack of scientific approach to data as it

occurs in their discussion of dream amnesia (Hobson

and Pace-Schott, 1999). Allen Braun (1999) raises

doubts about their strictly biological model for dream

amnesia by noting the observable fact that dream am

nesia is atypical and variable. In response, Hobson

offers the frequency

of

his own waking recall

of

dreams (a study with a sample size of one, no controls,

and which disregards data from other sleepers ) as

proof that dream amnesia must be only biologically

determined and that the psychological model

of

re

pression has been disproved

Hobson an d Pace-Schott as Psychotherapists

Let us address our reactions to Hobson and Pace

Schott as psychotherapists. Hobson and Pace-Schott

assert (p. 207) that as psychotherapists they have two

principles in regard to work with dreams: one, that

dreams are characterized by transparent emotional sa

lience, and two, that all dreams are hyperassociative.

Well, we could not agree more and are pleased that

dreams are no longer the meaningless epiphenomena

of the activation-synthesis model of Hobson and

McCarley (1977). However, we feel compelled to tell

Hobson, if he has certain principles that he applies to

the clinical work and case reports of others, then he

should also apply them to himself. When he makes

assertions about how he understands dreams as a psy

chotherapist, why not offer the reader one

of

his cases

with all the requirements for an unedited clinical re

port, controls, and an alternative explanatory model

that he demands of us in a brief synopsis? Where is

his clinical data to support his assertions?

In this same section

of

comments, Hobson and

Pace-Schott then claim to be not only psychotherapists

but psy hodyn mi psychotherapists. What do Hobson

and Pace-Schott mean by dynamic conflict but only

conscious conflict? If they are psychodynamic psycho

therapists, why don t they understand the patient s

7

reasons for disguising from himself the connection be

tween his present sexual longings and the gratified

but prohibited (then by mother, and now by his own

conscience) incestuous activities

of

childhood? Per

haps Drs. Hobson and Pace-Schott assume Freud s

ideas to be mythology because they refuse to consider

the possibility

of

unconscious mental processes affect

ing conscious experience?

Hobson

an d

Pace-Schott s Questions to

Gilmore

an d Nersessian

We find it necessary to begin this section by offering

a more detailed description of the Freudian model of

dream formation. We hope this more detailed sum

mary will clarify some of the answers that we offer

to the questions Hobson and Pace-Schott have posed

for us. As will become evident, we think that some of

the questions Hobson and Pace-Schott ask are derived

from a misunderstanding of Freud s theory of the mind

and dreaming.

Freud proposed the psychological construct of the

mind, or what he called the mental apparatus, as the

mental functions that developed to serve the function

of

satisfying bodily and emotional demands in such a

manner as to be both gratifying of the person s needs

and consistent with the offerings and limitations of the

external environment. The mental apparatus received

input from the external world through sensory percep

tions and input from the internal bodily world from

the internal bodily perceptions and emotions. Freud

proposed that the mind had two processes available

for handling these internal and external perceptions

and their demands for mental wor

the primary and

secondary process.

Th e

dreaming mind employed the

more archaic primary process. The primary process

handled a demand by rapidly recalling prior experi

ences of gratification (memories) and presenting them

to the mind as present experiences (i.e., as hallucinated

present realities). The primary process was character

ized by visual memory processing, lack of verbal rep

resentation of the perception or demand, lack of

rational thought and logic, and lack of reality testing.

The awake mind employed the more advanced second

ary process. The secondary process was characterized

by putting the demands into verbal form, associating

these verbal symbols with memories for prior relevant

experience, categorizing these memories and putting

them into verbal thoughts, which could then be treated

with logic, and searching the data from incoming sen-


8/11

8

sory perceptions for possibilities for satisfaction avail

able in the external world.

In The Interpretation

reams Freud asserted

that the mind continued throughout sleep to respond

to demands placed upon it by the body and its internal

perceptions and also by some weakened perceptions

received from the extern al world. He prop osed that

while this mental processing took place th roug hou t

sleep, that at some points there was an upsurge in

some appetitive demands from within the body. This

upsurge in appetitive demands from the sleeping body

made upon the sleeping mind coincided with a weak

ness in the mental apparatus characterized by severely

decreased executive functions of the mind secondary

process functions) and severely decreased reception

of sensory information from the external world

to

the

mind blocking of sensory input from the external

world). He also stated that this appetitive upsurge and

weakening of the executive functions

of

the mental

apparatus was usually accompanied by a motor paraly

sis. Freud proposed that manifest dreams were the re

sult of the mental apparatus responding to these

demands by processing them with primary process

mechanisms.

From the d ata he g athered from d ream analyses

on adults, Freud hypothesized that frustrated appeti

tive longings from the p rev iou s day, when they were

reenforced by earlier, more primitive, and unsatisfied

appetitive demands, made demands

of

sufficient inten

sity to require that the mental apparatus respond with

some gratification. In order that the sleeping mind at

tempt to satisfy these demands in the awake mi nd s

usual secondary process manner, including rational

thoughts leading to rational motor actions in reality,

the mind would have to awak en its executive mental

functions, its executive control over motor actions, and

its conscious perception of sensory information from

the ex tern al world. Thus, in ord er to try to satisfy the

d emand by processing it in its usual adult seco ndary

process manner, the sleeping mind would have to

awaken.

Again, from the data he gathered from the pa

tient s associations to dreams, Freud hypothesized the

following process for the formation of a dream. Dur

ing sleep, the mental apparatus registered the upsurge

of an intense appetitive demand in a verbal secondary

process manner. Freud suggested that the intense ap

petitive demand was capable of obtaining verbal rep

resentation from the executive function of the mind

during sleep because although the executive functions

were severely weakened during sleep, there was still

some weak executive functioning available. Actually,

ilmore Nersessian

he suggested that the amount of available executive

mental functioning p robab ly v aried throu gh ou t the

sleep cycle according to the varying level of con

sciousness

of

the patient. Freud further suggested that

the weakened executive functionof the secondary pro

cess also had the capacity to reject this now verbal

demand as unacceptable for psychological reasons for

further representation and treatment by the secondary

process. He labeled the executive function responsible

for this rejection the censor. Next, the sleeping mind,

in response to the blocked access to secondary pro

cess, treated this now verbal appetitive demand

through a different, more archaic and primitive mode

of

handling demands. Freud labeled this archaic mode

the

primary process

and it handl ed a deman d by rap

idly recalling prior experiences of gratification mem

ories) and presenting them to the mind as present

experiences; that is, as hallucinated present realities.

Thus, the sleeping mind employing primary process

tried to co nv in ce the d reamer that his app etitiv e de

man d was b eing satisfied and thus there was no need

to awaken.

Freud suggested that the primary process was

characterized by affective-driven motivation; visual

rather than verbal memory representation; and rapid

recall

of

multiple different memories of experiences

of gratification. These memories could be associated

easily o n the basis of one shared characteristic or af

fective tone displacement) and could easily be com

bined into one image or one composite image

condensation), and be presented as a present experi

ence in which the dreamer believed delusionally loss

of reality testing). The primary process lacked the ver

bal encoding, categorization of memories, verbal

thinking in thoughts, and logical treatmentof thoughts

that characterize the secondary process. Freud claimed

that the primary process treated words and thoughts,

not as symbolic representations with specific mean

ings, but as concrete objects that could be chopped up

an d asso ciated with o ne another, like any other co n

crete object such as a chair or a person on the basis

of

a single characteristic such as their accompanying

sound. Thus the word

nun

could be substituted by the

associated word none not o n the basis

of

shared defi

nition

of

the symbolic meaning of the word but only

on the basis of the sound of the word. Or the word

nun

could be associated by sound to

none

an d then

represented in plastic visual manner by an empty con

tainer none). Thus, the words expressing the appeti

tive demand, when subjected to treatment by the

p rimary process durin g d ream fo rmatio n, wou ld be


9/11

Ongoing Discussion: Hobson and Pace Schott

chopped up or associated on the basisof similar sound

or represented in plastic forms in the dream content.

Another point to be emphasized is the fact that

in Freud s model of dream formation the motivation

for censorship derived from the censor (the weakened

executive function

of

the secondary process) but the

mode of censorship derived from the manner of pro

cessing the demand or from the primary process treat

ment

of

the demand (primitive archaic function). Thus

the motivation for censorship is correlated with the

censor and secondary process but the modeof censor

ship is the result

of

primary process nonverbal func

tioning. We wish to emphasize this point because

whether Freud was right or wrong, Hobson is fre

quently confused in his understanding of this point in

the theory. Hobson assumes that the censor (an execu

tive function

of

the mind and thus secondary process

in Freud s model) is responsible for

creating the bi-

zarreness

of

the dream mentation and then questions

how this can be possible

if

the forebrain (the seat

of

executive mental functions) is relatively deactivated

during REM sleep and dreaming. In Freudian dream

theory, the dream bizarreness is a product of the pri

mary process mode

of

treatment of the appetitive de

mand. The secondary process censor is responsible

only for lending the demand verbal representation and

then blocking the demand s access to further second

ary process treatment by the sleeping mind.

As an aside we would like to mention here that

Freud described all

of

these bizarre characteristics

of

dream mentation (vivid visualization, condensation,

displacement, concrete treatment of words, regression

to delusional experiencing, and lackof reality testing)

in The Interpretation reams We are puzzled why

Hobson when making the same descriptionsof dream

mentation never cites Freud s descriptions (Hobson

and McCarley, 1977; Hobson, 1999). Perhaps this

lapse in recall or reading can explain Hobson and

Pace-Schott s claim that t he problem, as Solms must

recognize, is that if disguise-censorship is explicitly

renounced (as we think it should be), there is really

nothing left to the Freudian dream theory (Hobson

and Pace-Schott, 1999). What has happened to Freud s

elegant descriptions of primary process dream menta

tion (including vivid visualization, affective motiva

tion, condensation, displacement, lack of reality

testing and delusional belief in the dream) and of sec

ondary process mentation as characteristic of awake

mind functioning? What has happened to Freud s

claim for the emotional salience

of

dreams; and to his

claim for the importance of early memories to dream

content; and to his proposition that the sleeping mind

2 9

continues to think throughout the night but only some

times does this

thinking

take the form

of

a dream?

Were these observations and proposals, which are all

part of Freud s dream theory, complete mythology so

that if dream censorship is disproved then nothing is

left

of

Freudian dream theory?

To continue with Freud s model

of

dream forma

tion. Freud proposed that mind continued to make

modifications to dream material throughout its awak

ening from sleep and often throughout the following

day. He based this hypothesis on his observation that

patients continued to make changes in their reported

dreams when asked to repeat them or when they spon

taneously repeated them. Freud suggested that as the

mental apparatus awakened and gained access to more

secondary process functions, the awakening or awake

patient added secondary process comments such as

This

is only a dream or rearranged dream content

in more narrative sequential order secondary revi

sion in order, if necessary, to further disguise the

gratified but prohibited dream event. Freud pointed

out that in these instances, the awakening or awake

mind employs the secondary process in a defensive

manner (as contrasted with the primary process contri

butions to dream formation that result in more bizarre

dream content). Now the awake or awakening patient

can employ his increasingly available secondary pro

cess functions, including repression (forgetting or the

ability to ignore unacceptable mental content), to de

fend the awake patient from recognition

of

his having

satisfied the prohibited appetitive demand during

dreaming sleep.

If

successful in his secondary process

defense, the patient will repress his awareness

of

the

appetitive demand and forget his dream. Thus, Freud

explains dream amnesia by the ability

of the secondary

process executive functions of

the awake mind to ig

nore the unacceptable appetitive demands.

Finally, we wish to emphasize that Freud s model

of

dream formation includes a dynamic balance be

tween the appetitive drive and its prohibition and dy

namic balance between primary and secondary

process treatment

of

this appetitive demand. Freud

proposed that the sleeper passed through different lev

els of consciousness throughout the night (and daytime

also for that matter), and that perhaps the primary and

secondary processes corresponded to different levels

of

sleep-wakefulness.

Now for Hobson s and Pace-Schott s questions.

As for their first question regarding stimulus dis

charge, our definition of psychic stimuli as the appeti

tive demand should help to clarify the confusion raised

by our use of the word stimulus in our previous synop-


10/11

2

sis. We are referring to a psychological stimulus and

not to an electrical neurochemical stimulus Their

question is simply why do we need psychological solu

tions to psychological stimuli? Why can t we have a

purely physiological sleep maintenance model? Our

answer is that there probably is a physiological sleep

maintenance function, but the evidence from analytic

dream interpretations is that there is also a psychologi

cal sleep maintenance function that comes into play

when psychobiological demands arising during sleep

threaten to prematurely disrupt sleep. In these in

stances, dreams help maintain sleep by misleading the

sleeper into believing that these demands have been

satisfied, at least temporarily.

As for the answer to their second question regard

ing the biological correlates in brain functioning for

the mental phenomena of primary process, we think

Drs. Hobson and Pace-Schott are in a much better

position as expert neurophysiologists and researchers

to answer the question about possible brain activity

site correlations. However, perhaps the limbic lobe

regional activation and posterolateral cortical activa

tion in combination with the relative defrontalization

of REM sleep, to which Hobson and Pace-Schott

(1999) attribute dream bizarreness, are correlates?

Question number three about the reason an expe

rience must become verbal in order to be in the system

conscious, is a question of definition of the character

istics of the system conscious or secondary process

functioning as described by Freud. He spawned these

confusions by his inconsistent use of the words con-

scious and unconscious Freud s original use

of

the

labels conscious and unconscious were as purely de

scriptive of whether the person was consciously aware

or not of the particular psychological phenomena or

perception. However, in The Interpretation Dreams

Freud used the term the system conscious to denote

the secondary process system of treating appetitive

demands and the system unconscious to denote the

characteristics of the primary process treatment of ap

petitive demands. A characteristic of secondary pro

cess treatment by the mental apparatus was that the

demand be represented by a verbal symbol that would

allow the demand to be specifically categorized, and

thought about logically. Freud claimed that some feel

ings, thoughts, and impulses were treated by the sec

ondary process or

system conscious

but that the

process could take place in a

descriptively unconscious

r preconscious

state of awareness. Thus, a person

could process thoughts with the system conscious, us

ing secondary process mental function but do so in a

descriptively unconscious state of awareness; that is,

Gilmore-Nersessian

be consciously unaware of his thinking. Thus some of

Hobson s premonitions and intuitions may be the re

sult of descriptively unconscious thoughts that are

nevertheless processed by the system conscious and

to which the person only has some feeling awareness.

In question number four, Hobson and Pace

Schott point out that cortical areas known to be in

volved in verbal processing and expression are rela

tively deactivated in REM and NREM sleep and they

ask how could this neurophysiological data correlate

with the Freudian claim that associations to manifest

dream reports reveal that word play and plastic repre

sentation of words contribute to manifest dream con

tent? This word play and plastic representation are

consistent with Freud s model of the dreaming mind

as employing the nonverbal primary process in which

words are treated as concrete things (see explanation

above). The point is that the words are not treated as

symbolic representations of their specific referents but

rather as objects characterized by their sound or im

plied shapes. Thus the Freudian model would predict

a relative deactivation of brain areas correlated with

verbal and executive functions (frontal lobes?) and an

increased activation of brain areas that might correlate

with more primitive primary process functioning in

which words would be treated as things.

Could Freud s hypothesis that there are two

methods by which the mind may treat appetitive de

mands, the archaic primary process and the newer sec

ondary process, be correlated with relative shifts in

activity level in older and newer brain areas? Could

not Freud s hypothesis be correlated with Hobson and

Pace-Schott s physiological claims that the biological

brain in sleep is characterized by a brain state in

which there is selective activation in the pontine brain

stem, the deep mediobasal subcortex, the limbic sys

tem, the paralymbic cortices, unimodal associative

cortices, and the parieto-tempero-occipital-junction

and by selective deactivation

of the dorsolateral pre

frontal cortex (Hobson and Pace-Schott, 1999), p.

219.

The answer to Hobson s question as to why

dreams of convenience are rare in adults is that Freud

concluded from analyzing the dreams of adults that

only when the minor appetitive demands arising dur

ing the night (hunger, thirst, etc.) could gain force by

linking up with more forceful, primitive demands that

remained unsatisfied in daily life due to their prohibi

tion in the civilized person, would the minor appetitive

demand reach sufficient intensity to require some sat

isfaction through dream formation. Otherwise, even

the weakened adult mental apparatus of sleep was ca-


11/11

Ongoing Discussion: Hobson and Pace Schott

pable

of

ignoring minor appetit ive demands. Freud

suggested that dreams of convenience may be more

common in young children who have less developed

secondary process mental capacities and thus when

those processes are further weakened during sleep, mi

nor appeti tive demands may be sufficient to demand

satisfaction with a dream of convenience.

Conclusion

We would like to conclude this commentary by thank

ing Drs. Hobson and Pace-Schott for providing us with

such a thorough review of the present neurophysiolog

ical information on sleep an d dreaming. More espe

cially, we would like to thank them for their trenchant

critique

of

Freudian dream theory, because this cri

tique stimulated our thinking about

mind brain

models

based upon either assumptions aboutmind brain inter

action or mind-brain biological reductionism. This in

creased our curiosity about the results of more recent

PET studies on the brains

of

people that image them

in different psychological situations or when they are

recalling particular types

of

memories. Hobson and

Pace-Schott s tough questions challenged us to clarify

our description

of Freudian dream theory.

Finally, as Dr. Braun (1999) stated, we recog

nized that neurophysiologists and psychoanalysts now

agree on many aspects of dream investigation: the

emotional salience of dreams; the importance of early

memories in dreams; the descriptions

of

characteris

tics

of

manifest dream mentation; the descriptions

of

the differences in the

form

of mentation in dreaming

and waking thought; and the forgetting

of

dreams. The

neurophysiological findings

on

the dreaming brain

raise interesting correlations between

Freud s

model

of dream formation and the neurophysiologist s model

of

brain functioning during RE M sleep. However,

there are also important disagreements between the

psychoanalysts and some

of

the neurophysiologists.

We object to theories that rely strictly upon unproven

and contradicted models of biological reductionism

2

and which reject the scientific validity

of

psychoana

lytic data

and

dismiss the possibility that mental pro

cesses, both conscious and unconscious, may dictate

brain functioning. However, these neurophysiological

explorations are challenging and expand our knowl

edge of brain processes during sleep and dreaming and

we hope these fruitful discussions continue.

References

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J.

Allan Hobson. This

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R. W.

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Margaret M Gilmore M.D.

120 East 75th Street

New

York

10021

Edward Nersessian M.D.

72 East 91 st Street

New York 10128

e mail: [email protected]

Documents

14 J. Allan Hobson and Edward Pace-Schott’s Response: Commentary by Margaret Gilmore and Edward Nersessian (New York)