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he move toward democracy in the Middle East continues in fits and starts. In June, while the coalition tried to lure Iraqi Sunnis into the political process, the insurgency in Iraq — and Afghanistan — seemed stronger than ever, and the surprising outcome of a presidential election in Iran demonstrated the persistent power of the clerical

establishment. Meanwhile, as Israel and the PNA geared up for a Gaza pullout, Egypt prepared for its own presidential election and Saudi Arabia showed its hand in shaping Lebanon’s political landscape.

T h i s M o n t h ’ s H i g h l i g h t s : I n E v e r y I s s u e : • Bombs and Ballots in Iran • Trends, Stats and Indicators • Appealing to the Sunnis in Iraq • Noteworthy Events • Al Assad Strengthens His Hold • Elections and Killings in Lebanon • Putting the House of Saud in Order

T


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BE x e c u t i v e S u m m a r y

ombings and elections swept through the Middle East in June, leaving much of the region in disarray and the international community off balance. All eyes were on Iran, where a rare spate of bombings occurred across the country days before the presidential election. Then the clerical elite pushed former Iranian president Ali Akbar

Hashemi Rafsanjani aside and brought hard-line candidate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to power. The global reaction was massive and mixed, ranging from enthusiasm for Iran’s hardened stance against the United States to legitimate fears over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear ambitions.

In the Levant, the much-anticipated Lebanese elections concluded with significant gains by the anti-Syrian opposition. Syria, meanwhile, kept its hold over the Lebanese government through its links with the Shiite groups Hezbollah and Amal, and because of its ability to exploit the fractures in the anti-Syrian opposition. At the same time, Saudi Arabia fought for its place at the table in hopes of becoming the major foreign player in Beirut. The election season in Lebanon was marked by two political killings with similar modus operandi, raising the question of who would be the most likely and capable suspect with either an interest in protecting the incumbent regime in Beirut or in destabilizing the regime in Damascus.

While no elections are scheduled for July, the coming month will be explosive. As negotiations intensify in Iraq to co-opt Sunni nationalist guerrillas into the political process, the insurgency on both the jihadist and nationalist fronts will pick up. The main focus for July, however, will be in the Israeli-Palestinian theatre, where Israel will make final preparations for its historic withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and West Bank. The right-wing settler movement has had months to prepare for the pullout and will seek — perhaps violently — to ensure that any Israeli government will think twice before forcing future withdrawals from the Palestinian territories.


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J u n e : T h e M o n t h i n R e v i e w

B o m b s a n d B a l l o t s i n I r a nJune was an electrifying month in Iran — bombs blew up across the country, and the outcome of the presidential election caught the international community by surprise.

Ahead of the June 17 election, pragmatic conservative cleric Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani seized the early momentum in the eight-way presidential race by seeking the middle ground between the hard-liner and reformist camps. He made repeated overtures to the United States and indicated that, as president, he would seek to improve the chilly relations between Tehran and


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Washington and strike a deal over Iran’s nuclear program. Rafsanjani failed to achieve the 50 percent vote necessary to win outright and entered a June 24 run-off against the surprise runner-up, the hard-line ex-mayor of Tehran Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

The hard-liners painted America as the enemy, seizing upon allegations that the United States backed bombings that occurred June 12-14 in Ahvaz, Tehran and Zahedan. Dark-horse Ahmadinejad won the apparent blessings of the clerical regime and trounced Rafsanjani in the June 24 run-off, amidst political violence and allegations of massive vote fraud. The Guardian Council, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei — disapproving of Rafsanjani’s courtship of the United States — decided to thwart any moves to change Iranian foreign policy and instead backed Ahmadinejad, a vehement critic of the United States.

Ahmadinejad, the first non-cleric to be elected president of Iran, is a religious hard-liner with significant populist appeal. On June 29, he vowed to export the 1979-vintage Iranian revolution to the rest of the world, despite the moderate statements he made immediately after his election. Ahmadinejad also has promised to distribute Iranian oil revenues to the population, a move which has some investors worried about the future of foreign investment in the country’s oil production.

A p p e a l i n g t o t h e S u n n i s i n I r a qIn Iraq, the Shiite-dominated parliament continued negotiations with the Sunni minority in an attempt to hammer out a constitution by the Aug. 15 deadline. The Shiite camp, under U.S. pressure, agreed to increase Sunni representation in the constitutional committee to 17 seats, putting them on roughly equal footing with the Kurdish delegation. The United States sees the Sunni tribal leaders as the key to ending the insurgency in Iraq; Washington has continued to push the Shia and the Kurds to incorporate the Sunni minority into the government. If the Sunnis can be co-opted into the regime, the insurgency will be divided between Sunni nationalists/Baathists and increasingly isolated jihadists. Indeed, it would seem that such plans are already in motion. Former Cabinet member Ayham al-Samarie, already known as the intermediary between the Sunni insurgents and the Iraqi

Dark-horse Ahmadinejad won the blessings of the clerics and trounced Rafsanjani in the run-off, amidst political violence and alleged vote fraud


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government, announced June 29 that he was forming a political party to represent the insurgents. June also saw a steady increase in insurgent attacks, despite U.S. pressure on the jihadist and nationalist insurgents in Anbar province. Operation Lightning did not achieve the success initially hoped for by U.S. war planners. Additionally, there has been a spate of insurgent attacks against politicians across Iraq, mostly aimed at prominent Shiites.

P u l l o u t S c r a m b l e f o r I s r a e l a n d t h e P N AIsraeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon continued to move forward with his plan to pull Israeli settlements out of the Gaza Strip and portions of the West Bank, while hinting to his center-right political base that further Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank are not in the cards. Meanwhile, ultra-right Jewish settlers protested the impending pullout by creating new outposts in Gaza. Sharon repeatedly demonstrated his resolve by sending in Israeli soldiers to arrest the settlers and demolish the outposts.

If the Sunnis can be co-opted into the regime, the insurgency will be divided between nationalists and increasingly isolated jihadists


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Sharon hoped to use a flap over Israeli arms sales to China as a bargaining chip to convince the United States to back off of Israel, which would eliminate the need for further land concessions to the Palestinians. The imbroglio erupted when the United States discovered that Israel was planning to sell radar-killing Harpy unmanned aerial vehicles to China. After a June 19 visit from U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Israel announced that the United States would have veto authority over any foreign arms sales by Israel. In return, Sharon received a brief reprieve in American pressure over the settlements issue, at least until after the Gaza pullout, as well as a $1 billion dollar aid package for the Negev and Galilee settlements. In preparing for the pullout, and for Palestinian parliamentary elections set for July, Sharon also has ordered the retargeting of the Palestinian Islamic Jihadist (PIJ) movement. While Hamas has, by and large, abided by the cur-rent cease-fire between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), Sharon has been concerned that PIJ attacks could cause a backlash that would destroy support for the pullout.

PNA President Mahmoud Abbas also engaged in battles with the PIJ and Hamas in June. Abbas is trying to fulfill his part of the bargain by partially cracking down on PIJ and Hamas militancy to ensure that the Gaza pullout goes smoothly. To help focus the PNA government, Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Qurai said June 28 that he wanted to create a temporary national unity Cabinet and put some ministries under a state of emergency until the pullout is complete.

A l A s s a d S t r e n g t h e n s H i s H o l d Syrian President Bashar al Assad gambled that the 10th Baath Party conference in Damascus would allow him some room to maneuver on the international stage and demonstrate the strength of the Alawite-Baathist regime to the Syrian public. Al Assad used the conference, held June 6-9, as a platform to promise token economic and political reforms to tame domestic dissent. He also made a bold move against the United States, reportedly test-firing two SCUD missiles in early June.

Al Assad’s shrewdness has paid off both at home and abroad — at least for

Sharon hoped to use a flap over Israeli arms sales to China as a bargaining chip to convince the U.S. to back off


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the time being. At home, al Assad managed to divest himself of political liabilities with a Cabinet reshuffling, although some results of the move caught even him by surprise. For instance, Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam threw al Assad off balance June 6 when he tendered his resignation.

Internationally, despite U.S. pressure on al Assad’s regime to stop meddling in Lebanon’s affairs, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice confirmed June 24 that Syria would not be subject to regime change at gunpoint, as was the case in Iraq. While Rice had less-than-flattering things to say about the Syrian regime, Damascus got a clear message on U.S. intentions, something sorely lack-ing before the Baath conference. Although the United States was still concerned with militants crossing over from Syria into Iraq and with the continued assassinations of prominent anti-Syrians in Lebanon, al Assad managed to solidify his control in June. E l e c t i o n s a n d K i l l i n g s i n L e b a n o nLebanon’s anti-Syrian Future Tide Movement — led by Saad al-Hariri, the son of slain former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri — won 36 seats in the last round of Lebanon’s parliamentary elections June 19, giving the opposition a majority of 72 out of 128 seats. Future Tide’s electoral victory marked the ascendancy of Saudi Arabia to the position of chief sponsor of Lebanon, while Syria struggled to retain influence through gains made by the Shiite groups Hezbollah. Maronite Christian leader Gen. Michel Aoun picked up 14 seats, while Nabih Berri retained his position as speaker of Parliament. Fouad Siniora, a close ally of al-Hariri and Saudi Arabia, was elected prime minister.

The June 21 assassination of George Hawi, the former leader of the Lebanese Communist Party, and the June 2 killing of anti-Syrian journalist Samir Qaseer put pressure on President Emile Lahoud to resign. While it is not clear who was behind the Hawi killing, Lahoud could have been cleaning house of people with access to dangerous information. There is also the possibility that Rifaat al Assad may have been attempting to destabilize

The U.S. secretary of state confirmed that Syria would not be subject to regime change at gunpoint, as was the case in Iraq

Future Tide’s electoral victory marked the ascendancy of Saudi Arabia to the position of chief sponsor of Lebanon


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his nephew’s regime in Damascus by ordering the killings.

Toward the end of June, Hezbollah, bolstered by the election of a hard-liner in Iran, increased attacks on Israel in defiance of recent calls by U.K. Foreign Minister Jack Straw for the group to disarm.

P u t t i n g t h e H o u s e o f S a u d i n O r d e rThe kingdom of Saudi Arabia continued to put its house in order in June, preparing for the imminent demise of King Fahd bin Abdel-Aziz and attempting to strengthen its ties to the United States. On June 28, Saudi Arabia announced a new most-wanted list of 36 militants with al Qaeda connections, including suspects of Saudi, Chadian, Moroccan, Kuwaiti and Mauritanian descent. The Saudis also included a $1.87 million incentive for Saudi locals to provide information that would aid in capturing the militants or thwarting attacks. The announcement of the list was a move to reaffirm to the United States that the kingdom was prepared to cooperate with American counter-terrorism initiatives. It also suggests that renewed clashes between Islamist militants and security forces will likely occur in July.

The long-time Saudi ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar bin Sultan bin Abdel-Aziz, allegedly tendered his resignation, although his removal will probably not harm Saudi-American relations. More internal political jockeying for government positions will occur in the coming month; the royal family sees the writing on the wall about King Fahd’s impending death, and preparations are being made to fill vacancies in the Saudi establishment. P r e p a r i n g f o r E l e c t i o n s i n E g y p tAs Egypt continued to prepare for the upcoming multi-candidate elections in September, it released hundreds of Muslim Brotherhood political prisoners in June in an attempt to create an illusion of fairness and openness. These moves came under increased international scrutiny June 20 when U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice publicly criticized Egyptian political practices such as emergency law, arbitrary justice and violence

Saudi Arabia announced a new most-wanted list of 36 militants with al Qaeda connections, including suspects of Saudi, Chadian, Moroccan, Kuwaiti and Mauritanian descent


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against peaceful demonstrators. Rice also said upcoming Egyptian elections must allow unrestricted access for international observers in order to ensure fairness.

K e y I s s u e s

A c t i v i t y i n t h e L e v a n tThe build-up to Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and portions of the West Bank has brought a flood of activity to the Levant. The delay of the pullout has given activist Israeli settlers more time to solidify their resistance movement. At this point, the settlers know they are unable to reverse the disengagement process, but they do have an interest in building a strong enough resistance to get the message across that further withdrawals from Israeli settlements will not be tolerated.

At the same time, Palestinian National Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas faces the daunting task of unifying his deeply fractured Fatah movement to counter Hamas in the upcoming legislative elections. Dissenters within the PIJ and Fatah’s militant offshoot, al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, represent the major threats to Abbas’ attempts to present himself as a leader capable of reining in the Palestinian militancy — something he desperately needs to do in order to push the peace process forward after the Israeli withdrawal is complete.

A S t a l e m a t e d I n s u r g e n c yIraq is caught in a stalemate between moving the political process forward and quelling an intensifying Sunni guerrilla insurgency. The Aug. 15 deadline to submit a written constitution is serving as a catalyst to push both fronts forward; however, the task of creating legitimate Sunni representation in a government dominated by the Shia and Kurds involves a lengthy process of negotiations with Iraq’s Sunni tribal and insurgent leaders. Fearing the loss of guerrilla support from Iraqi nationalists as the negotiations pick up steam, the jihadists are attempting to incite a national uprising between the Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish factions. At the same time, the U.S. strategy is to relieve its own forces in the region by dealing with the Sunni guerrillas politically while pushing the well-equipped Shiite militias to strike back against the jihadists.

A S u r p r i s i n g W i nThe defeat of former Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani by hard-line conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was a surprise to most observers, given Rafsanjani’s senior position over the other candidates and


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ability to attract support from both the reformist and hard-line camps. At the same time, a surge in Iranian nationalism has sprung up in response to the United States’ threatening presence in the region, the protest over Iran’s nuclear program and the Shiite political victory in Iraq. This call for national unity — along with Ahmadinejad’s non-corrupt image, exploited by a smear campaign against Rafsanjani — allowed a non-cleric to win the election with the backing of the clerical regime. The clerical elite apparently felt threatened by Rafsanjani’s repeated overtures to normalize relations with the United States, and opted to create an electoral outcome that would safeguard the establishment.

Because the inner workings of Iran’s political system can be extremely complex, the “reformist” and “hard-liner” classifications must be clarified for the sake of analytical discussion. The hard-liners represent those who support oversight of the elected officials by unelected clerics. Reformists, on the other hand, are wholly against the idea of limitless power based on their religious credentials. Within the reformist camp are those willing to work through the current system, such as former President Mohammad Khatami, and those who want to overthrow the system, such as the student movement that is greatly disillusioned by Khatami’s failed reformist agenda. The interesting thing is that there are clerics who represent both camps, such as Rafsanjani, whom we refer to as a “pragmatic conservative.” The reformist clerics are modernist in their approach to the interpretation of religious texts, while the hard-liners are traditionalists.

Swept aside with the election of Ahmadinejad, the reformist camp remains highly disorganized and fractionalized. This raises the question of whether — and when — a viable opposition force can be expected to take to the streets in Iran. Though a strong resistance movement might not take root immediately, the spark is definitely there to incite an organized protest to destabilize the regime, now that the hard-liners have supreme control over the entire political system. The regime will closely monitor the domestic atmosphere to detect any potential uprising.

While the Iranian regime worked to stabilize tensions at home over the electoral upheaval, Ahmadinejad’s win sparked an array of interesting reactions across the globe. While Israel and the United States are revising their strategies to show less restraint in containing the Iranian nuclear threat, Russia could not be more pleased to see Washington thrown off balance. The Syrian regime led by President Bashar al Assad is also eager to


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congratulate the new president and receive solid backing to stand up against the United States, but must play it safe to avoid provoking further wrath from Washington.

T h e M o n t h A h e a d :F o r e c a s t s f o r J u l y

H i g h l i g h t s : • Striking the Jihadists and Co-opting the Sunnis • Damage Control in Iran • Gaza Pullout Continuing Apace • Pressure on Syria and Stability in Lebanon • Challenging Mubarak • Growing Militancy and Afghan-Pakistani Tension

S t r i k i n g t h e J i h a d i s t s a n d C o - o p t i n g t h e S u n n i sIn Iraq, keeping military pressure on the jihadists and conducting political negotiations with the Sunnis will take center stage in July. The Iraqi and U.S. governments will make it appear as though they can meet the Aug. 15 constitutional draft deadline, though the likelihood of their doing so is actually slim. The attempt to co-opt Sunnis into the government and scale back the insurgency will take a considerable amount of time and negotiation. Moreover, several contentious issues, including Kurdish autonomy in the north and the expressed role of religion, need to be hammered out within this time frame, which makes it likely that the Shiite-led government will seek a six-month extension of the constitutional-draft deadline. However, Baghdad and Washington will not reveal any postponement of the deadline until the last possible moment to avoid fueling the insurgency even further.

The negotiations between U.S. and Iraqi forces and insurgent leaders will intensify in the coming month, and greater effort will be made to bring the Sunnis into the political arena, thereby dividing the insurgency and stripping the jihadist network of its support base. Meanwhile, the jihadists will attempt to foment a civil war between the Sunnis and Shia to sustain the insurgency and distract U.S. forces. However, the jihadists will not likely succeed in this attempt.

The Iraqi and U.S. governments will make it appear they can meet the constitutional dra� deadline, though the likelihood is slim


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Operation Lightning, the first effort of U.S.-backed Iraqi troops to secure Baghdad, will expand in its second phase to encompass a 38-mile radius around the capital. This will likely cause an increase in violence. In Anbar province to the west, U.S. and Iraqi forces will continue offensive operations against insurgent safe havens and operations bases as part of an ongoing campaign to keep military pressure on jihadist and nationalist insurgents in the area.

U.S. military commanders claim to be close to locating and capturing al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Several arrests of high-ranking members of al-Zarqawi’s network have been captured in recent weeks, and could be providing information that will lead to the militant leader’s capture. As efforts progress to incorporate the Sunnis into the political process, the jihadist insurgency will become increasingly exposed, making al-Zarqawi’s position ever more vulnerable.

Insurgent attacks by Sunni nationalists and jihadists have increased despite U.S.-led coalition offensives and Operation Lightning. These attacks will likely


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continue in the form of jihadist suicide attacks on civilians and Iraqi security forces, and nationalist attacks on political targets as the political process progresses.

D a m a g e C o n t r o l i n I r a nIran is now in damage-control mode to mollify any backlash in the domestic and international arenas following the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president. To appease former President Ali Akbar Hash-emi Rafsanjani — who was completely sidelined by the clerics and suffered a humiliating defeat to an obscure hard-line candidate — the clerical regime in Tehran will attempt to convince him that the presidency is a powerless position anyway and that he already enjoys immense control in his positions as a member of the Guardians Council, as deputy chairman of the Assembly of Experts and as chairman of the Expediency Council. The clerical regime is fully aware that it gambled on inciting domestic dissent by bringing a hard-liner to power, and it will mollify the reformist camp by portraying Ahmadinejad as more of a pragmatist on social reforms.

Now that the hard-liners have completed their consolidation over the political system, frustration within the reformist camp could spread to those reformists who remain wedded to the system, leading to an organized and potentially viable resistance movement down the road.

Meanwhile, Iran will seize the opportunity to maintain a defiant stance against the United States and call for national unity in rejecting the “Great Satan.” Inwardly, Tehran will play a safer game, since it knows that Israel and the United States will show a lot less restraint in the coming months when dealing with Iran’s nuclear program. Iran will try to keep the nuclear talks going with a faltering European Union in order to buy time and keep the Israelis from taking direct action against the Islamic Republic. To sustain the talks, Iran will signal to the Europeans that Ahmadinejad’s win has not altered the status quo regarding the nuclear issue, and will be more willing to compromise when the EU presents Iran with a packaged deal of incentives to curb its nuclear program at the end of July.

The spate of bombings before the election indicates that Iran is likely facing an internally instigated threat supported by foreign elements. However, if

Tehran will try to keep the nuclear talks with the EU going to buy time and keep the Israelis from taking direct action


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the foreign elements in this case are jihadists attempting to bring the United States and Iran into an open conflict, there is a strong possibility of more attacks in the coming month.

G a z a P u l l o u t C o n t i n u i n g A p a c eThe Israeli-Palestinian theater will intensify this month as the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, which will likely begin in mid-August, inches nearer. The Israeli settler movement will use July to ratchet up its resistance campaign and stage organized demonstrations to thwart attempts by the Israeli security forces to enforce the withdrawal. Though settler activists are likely to come close to crossing the line in violent incidents with Israeli forces and Palestinians, settlement resistance is unlikely to throw off the disengagement plan.

Wild-card Palestinian militant groups such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad and al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade probably will stage attacks. Hamas, however, will largely commit to the cease-fire as it looks toward the legislative elections — which will likely take place after the withdrawal — to increase its political clout.

As Palestinian National Authority President Mahmoud Abbas attempts to rein in Palestinian militant factions in order to move the disengagement process forward, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon will make public overtures to show that the withdrawal will be followed by the consolidation of Israeli settlements in areas such as Negev and Galilee. After bending to U.S. pressure to suspend military sales to China, Sharon will expect the United States to reduce pressure against settlement expansion, allowing him to secure domestic support for the withdrawal — support that recent polls indicate is dropping by the day.

P r e s s u r e o n S y r i a a n d S t a b i l i t y i n L e b a n o nSyrian President Bashar al Assad will cautiously use the political rift in Iran to secure backing in his campaign to stand up against U.S. pressure. Damascus will use its renewed diplomatic channels with Iraq to deal indirectly with the United States and demonstrate to the Iraqi government that it will cooperate in sharing intelligence to contain the Iraqi insurgency. To contain recent

Though se�ler activists are likely to come close to crossing the line, se�lement resistance is unlikely to throw off the disengagement


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divisions within his regime, al Assad will be sure not to let outgoing Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam out of the country once he approves his resignation. If Khaddam attempts to leave Syria, there is a strong chance he may be “eliminated” by the regime to prevent him from leaking sensitive information.

U.S. pressure against Syria will intensify this month and the Bush administration will make moves to implicate members of the Syrian elite as findings from the investigation of the al-Hariri assassination come to light. On June 30, U.S. President George W. Bush gave the U.S. treasury secretary the authority to seize any U.S. assets of companies involved in the production of missiles or weapons of mass destruction in Iran, Syria or North Korea. The executive order, purposely released prior to the upcoming G-8 summit, will allow Bush to kill two birds with one stone by applying renewed pressure on Iran and Syria while hurting Russia and China. One organization already targeted by the order, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, has bought nuclear reactor materials from both the Russians and the Chinese.

Lebanon will stabilize in July, following a heated month of parliamentary elections. Saad al-Hariri has positioned his close ally Fouad Siniora to assume the premiership and consolidate Saudi Arabia’s influence in Beirut. The real political showdown will be over the presidency; al-Hariri has struck a deal with Maronite leader Gen. Michel Aoun to oust Lahoud and satisfy Aoun’s presidential ambitions. This will undoubtedly worry the Syrian regime, which will attempt to buy off Aoun and delay Lahoud’s ouster. However, al-Hariri’s Saudi-backed plan is likely to win out in this game of political chicken.

Meanwhile, the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah will be emboldened by Iran’s renewed defiant stance against the West and will increase attacks against Israel this month. Though this will bring considerable pressure on the Lebanese government to force the resistance movement to disarm, any such attempt is likely to be unsuccessful given Hezbollah’s militant, political and social backing.

Al Assad will cautiously use the political ri� in Iran to secure backing in his campaign to stand up against U.S. pressure


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C h a l l e n g i n g M u b a r a kWith the September presidential elections on the horizon, Egyptian opposition parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Kifaya will attempt to join forces and put up a single candidate to compete against President Hosni Mubarak. They will face significant opposition; newly proposed electoral laws give the Political Parties Committee, controlled by Mubarak’s National Democratic Party, a great deal of authority to regulate and dissolve parties at its whim. There is also the possibility of small-scale militant attacks in Egypt in July as al Qaeda-linked groups try to take advantage of the new political atmosphere in the country.

G r o w i n g M i l i t a n c y a n d A f g h a n - P a k i s t a n i Te n s i o nMilitant activity in July will increase in eastern and southern Afghanistan, the Pashtun-dominated regions where Taliban have considerable influence. As a result, there will be heightened tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan — Kabul has accused Islamabad of providing support to the jihadist movement. What is interesting here is that only certain elements within the Afghan government are making these charges, and they are careful not to implicate the entire government of Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf. While senior officials in both capitals are trying to work out their differences, second-tier officials are locked in an apparent tit-for-tat showdown. We do not expect matters to go out of hand at the bi-lateral level, but the intensification of Taliban assaults on both U.S. and Afghan military forces will prompt major counter-insurgency operations in the eastern and southern parts of Afghanistan.

On Pakistan’s domestic front, all political forces will be engaged in preparations for the three phases of local elections scheduled for late August and early September. Opposition parties from across the ideological spectrum will try to work out deals on seat arrangements in order to enhance their standing in the municipal polls and consolidate their grass-roots support for the next round of general elections, scheduled for late 2007. On the foreign policy front, Islamabad will try to undo the effects of a major defense pact that neighboring rival India signed with the United States, and

There will be heightened tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan — Kabul has accused Islamabad of providing support to the jihadist movement


J U L Y 2 0 0 5

of and allegations from Kabul that the surge in Taliban activity in Afghanistan is due to support from Pakistan. As time goes by and the final assault on the al-Qaeda leadership believed to hiding somewhere in Pakistan approaches, Islamabad will try hard to offset an increase in pressure from the Bush administration. Therefore, it is quite possible that one or more high-value targets related to the jihadist network in Pakistan will be captured or killed during July.


J U L Y 2 0 0 5

Afghanistan

Algeria

Bahrain

Egypt

Iran

Iraq

Israel

Jordan

Kuwait

Lebanon

Libya

Morocco

Mauritania

Oman

Qatar

Pakistan

Saudi Arabia

Syria

Tunisia

Turkey

UAE

Yemen

n/a = not available

All data are provided by the governments of respective countries, unless otherwise noted.

1 World Bank 13 UN 2 Audi Bank 14 CIA 3 Australian Projection 15 Laborsta 4 Australia 16 Albawaba News 5 Econostats 17 Morocco Times 6 Finance.org 18 WTO 7 USA Today 8 US Estimate 9 Heritage.org 10 MENA 11 Inter-Arab Investments 12 IMF

0.005 proj 2005

66.530 2003 1

9.5 2003

106 ‘03 / ’04

137.143 2003 1

N/A

110.226 2003 1

11.26 2004

41.748 2003 1

18.038 2003 2

25.3 2004 3

53.1 2004 4

1.093 2003 1

26.07 2005 5

28.451 2004

96.96 2004 6

248.5 2004

24.4 2004 7

29.411 2005

300.578 2004

85.1 2004

11.366 total ‘03

26.8 est 2001

31.8 2003 1

.689 2003 1

77.5 (2004)

66.4 2003 1

26 8

6.8 2004

5.3 2004

2.8 Q1 ‘05

4.5 2003 2

5.7 2004

31.1 2004 4

2.8 2003 1

2.6 2003 1

.744 2004

148.7 2004 6

22.6 2004

17.3 2003

10 2004 9

70.7 2003

4.3 2004

20.3 total ‘03

N/A

2090 2003 1

13970 2003 math

1367 2004

2065.67 2003 1

N/A

16058 2004 math

2115 2004

14885 ’03 / ‘05 math

4008 2004 math

4388 2004 math

1707 2004 math

384 2003 1

10031 ’03 / ‘05 math

38239.00

652 2004 6

10959

1403 2003

2929 2005

4251 2004

19699 2004

558 total 2003

0.08 proj

6.8 2003 1

6 200510

yoy

3.2 2003 1

6.61 2003 1

NA

4.3 2004 12

3.16 2004 yoy

9.9 2003 1

5 2004 11

4.8 2004 4

4 2004 4

4.94 2003 1

6.3 2003

20.5 2004

6.4 2004 6

8.7 2005 10

3 2003

7.6 2005

24.6 2004

4.8 2004

14.12 total 2003

N/A

634 2003 13

517 2003 13

237 2003 13

120 2003 13

N/A

3700 2003 13

623.74 2003 Y

67 2003 13

358 2003 13

700 2003 13

2200 2003 13

214 2003 13

138 2003 13

400 2003 13

1400 2003 13

208 2003 13

150 2003 13

584 2003 13

575 2003 13

480 2003 13

-89 2003 13

N/A

25.4 2004 14

16.136 2001 15

11 2003 15

11.2 2004 14

28.1 2003 15

10.4 2004

15 2004 14

2.2 2004 14

20 2005 16

30 2004 14

11.3 Q1 ‘05 17

20 2004 14

15 2004 14

2.7 2001

8.27 2004 6

9.6 2004

11.7 2003

13.8 2004 14

10.3 2004

0.9 May ‘05

11.5 total 2003

NA

24.5 2003 12

7.6 2003

10.453 ‘03 / ’04

33.788 2003 18

NA

33.8 2004

3.971 2004

8.772 Q1 ‘05

0.405 2005 2

4.3 2003

8.77 2003 18

0.369 2003 1

11.669 2003 18

13.349 2003

12.1 2004 6

96.37 2003 18

8.599 2003

9.478 2005

75.9 2004 9

56 2004

3.765 total 2003

NA

13.3 2003 12

5.9 2003

18.286 ‘03 / ’04

26.158 2003 18

NA

40.3 2004

7.2556 2004

2.918 Q1 ‘05

2.313 2005 2

11.5 2003

14.231 2003 18

0.822 2003 1

6.575 2003 18

4.4 2003

14.5 2003 6

36.96 2003 18

7.094 2003

12.982 2005

79 2004 2003 9

39.8 2004

3.706 total 2003

10 2005 12

3.5 2005 12

3.7 2005 12

7.9 2005 12

15 2005 12

NA

1.1 2004

3.5 2005 12

1.8 2005 12

2 2005 12

1.8 2005 12

2 2005 12

14.2 2005 12

0.6 2005 12

3 2005 12

3.9 2005 6

1 2005 12

4 2005 12

2.5 2005 12

9 2005 12

3 2004

14.2 2005 12

N/A

N/A

N/A

9.350 2004

N/A

N/A

24.554 2005 12

8.519 Mar ‘05

N/A

N/A

22.190 Q4 ’04

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

12.81 2005 12

23.3 2005

9.0 2003

3.568 2005 12

37.859 2005 12

18.640 2004

2.857 Jan ‘03

GDP

bil

lions

USD a

t 200

4 mar

ket p

rices

Popu

latio

n mi

llions

GDP

per

cap

ita

curre

nt US

D at 2

004 m

arke

t pric

es

GDP

gro

wth

%

chan

ge fr

om ye

ar pr

eviou

s

Inco

min

g FD

I co

ntrac

ted bi

llions

USD

Unem

ploy

men

t % Ex

ports

billio

ns US

D

Fore

ign

Curr

ency

Res

erve

s

billio

ns US

D

Impo

rts

billio

ns US

D

Infla

tion

CPI %

chan

ge fr

om m

onth

previo

us

T r e n d s , S tat s a n d I n d i c at o r s

Afghanistan

Algeria

Bahrain

Egypt

Iran

Iraq

Israel

Jordan

Kuwait

Lebanon

Libya

Morocco

Mauritania

Oman

Qatar

Pakistan

Saudi Arabia

Syria

Tunisia

Turkey

UAE

Yemen

n/a = not available



0.005 proj 2005

66.530 2003 1

9.5 2003

106 ‘03 / ’04

137.143 2003 1

N/A

110.226 2003 1

11.26 2004

41.748 2003 1

18.038 2003 2

25.3 2004 3

53.1 2004 4

1.093 2003 1

26.07 2005 5

28.451 2004

96.96 2004 6

248.5 2004

24.4 2004 7

29.411 2005

300.578 2004

85.1 2004

11.366 total ‘03

26.8 est 2001

31.8 2003 1

.689 2003 1

77.5 (2004)

66.4 2003 1

26 8

6.8 2004

5.3 2004

2.8 Q1 ‘05

4.5 2003 2

5.7 2004

31.1 2004 4

2.8 2003 1

2.6 2003 1

.744 2004

148.7 2004 6

22.6 2004

17.3 2003

10 2004 9

70.7 2003

4.3 2004

20.3 total ‘03

N/A

2090 2003 1

13970 2003 math

1367 2004

2065.67 2003 1

N/A

16058 2004 math

2115 2004

14885 ’03 / ‘05 math

4008 2004 math

4388 2004 math

1707 2004 math

384 2003 1

10031 ’03 / ‘05 math

38239.00

652 2004 6

10959

1403 2003

2929 2005

4251 2004

19699 2004

558 total 2003

0.08 proj

6.8 2003 1

6 200510

yoy

3.2 2003 1

6.61 2003 1

NA

4.3 2004 12

3.16 2004 yoy

9.9 2003 1

5 2004 11

4.8 2004 4

4 2004 4

4.94 2003 1

6.3 2003

20.5 2004

6.4 2004 6

8.7 2005 10

3 2003

7.6 2005

24.6 2004

4.8 2004

14.12 total 2003

N/A

634 2003 13

517 2003 13

237 2003 13

120 2003 13

N/A

3700 2003 13

623.74 2003 Y

67 2003 13

358 2003 13

700 2003 13

2200 2003 13

214 2003 13

138 2003 13

400 2003 13

1400 2003 13

208 2003 13

150 2003 13

584 2003 13

575 2003 13

480 2003 13

-89 2003 13

N/A

25.4 2004 14

16.136 2001 15

11 2003 15

11.2 2004 14

28.1 2003 15

10.4 2004

15 2004 14

2.2 2004 14

20 2005 16

30 2004 14

11.3 Q1 ‘05 17

20 2004 14

15 2004 14

2.7 2001

8.27 2004 6

9.6 2004

11.7 2003

13.8 2004 14

10.3 2004

0.9 May ‘05

11.5 total 2003

NA

24.5 2003 12

7.6 2003

10.453 ‘03 / ’04

33.788 2003 18

NA

33.8 2004

3.971 2004

8.772 Q1 ‘05

0.405 2005 2

4.3 2003

8.77 2003 18

0.369 2003 1

11.669 2003 18

13.349 2003

12.1 2004 6

96.37 2003 18

8.599 2003

9.478 2005

75.9 2004 9

56 2004

3.765 total 2003

NA

13.3 2003 12

5.9 2003

18.286 ‘03 / ’04

26.158 2003 18

NA

40.3 2004

7.2556 2004

2.918 Q1 ‘05

2.313 2005 2

11.5 2003

14.231 2003 18

0.822 2003 1

6.575 2003 18

4.4 2003

14.5 2003 6

36.96 2003 18

7.094 2003

12.982 2005

79 2004 2003 9

39.8 2004

3.706 total 2003

10 2005 12

3.5 2005 12

3.7 2005 12

7.9 2005 12

15 2005 12

NA

1.1 2004

3.5 2005 12

1.8 2005 12

2 2005 12

1.8 2005 12

2 2005 12

14.2 2005 12

0.6 2005 12

3 2005 12

3.9 2005 6

1 2005 12

4 2005 12

2.5 2005 12

9 2005 12

3 2004

14.2 2005 12

N/A

N/A

N/A

9.350 2004

N/A

N/A

24.554 2005 12

8.519 Mar ‘05

N/A

N/A

22.190 Q4 ’04

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

12.81 2005 12

23.3 2005

9.0 2003

3.568 2005 12

37.859 2005 12

18.640 2004

2.857 Jan ‘03

GDP

bil

lions

USD a

t 200

4 mar

ket p

rices

Popu

latio

n mi

llions

GDP

per

cap

ita

curre

nt US

D at 2

004 m

arke

t pric

es

GDP

gro

wth

%

chan

ge fr

om ye

ar pr

eviou

s

Inco

min

g FD

I co

ntrac

ted bi

llions

USD

Unem

ploy

men

t % Ex

ports

billio

ns US

D

Fore

ign

Curr

ency

Res

erve

s

billio

ns US

D

Impo

rts

billio

ns US

D

Infla

tion

CPI %

chan

ge fr

om m

onth

previo

us


J U L Y 2 0 0 5


Afghanistan

Algeria

Bahrain

Egypt

Iran

Iraq

Israel

Jordan

Kuwait

Lebanon

Libya

Morocco

Mauritania

Oman

Qatar

Pakistan

Saudi Arabia

Syria

Tunisia

Turkey

UAE

Yemen

n/a = not available



0.005 proj 2005

66.530 2003 1

9.5 2003

106 ‘03 / ’04

137.143 2003 1

N/A

110.226 2003 1

11.26 2004

41.748 2003 1

18.038 2003 2

25.3 2004 3

53.1 2004 4

1.093 2003 1

26.07 2005 5

28.451 2004

96.96 2004 6

248.5 2004

24.4 2004 7

29.411 2005

300.578 2004

85.1 2004

11.366 total ‘03

26.8 est 2001

31.8 2003 1

.689 2003 1

77.5 (2004)

66.4 2003 1

26 8

6.8 2004

5.3 2004

2.8 Q1 ‘05

4.5 2003 2

5.7 2004

31.1 2004 4

2.8 2003 1

2.6 2003 1

.744 2004

148.7 2004 6

22.6 2004

17.3 2003

10 2004 9

70.7 2003

4.3 2004

20.3 total ‘03

N/A

2090 2003 1

13970 2003 math

1367 2004

2065.67 2003 1

N/A

16058 2004 math

2115 2004

14885 ’03 / ‘05 math

4008 2004 math

4388 2004 math

1707 2004 math

384 2003 1

10031 ’03 / ‘05 math

38239.00

652 2004 6

10959

1403 2003

2929 2005

4251 2004

19699 2004

558 total 2003

0.08 proj

6.8 2003 1

6 200510

yoy

3.2 2003 1

6.61 2003 1

NA

4.3 2004 12

3.16 2004 yoy

9.9 2003 1

5 2004 11

4.8 2004 4

4 2004 4

4.94 2003 1

6.3 2003

20.5 2004

6.4 2004 6

8.7 2005 10

3 2003

7.6 2005

24.6 2004

4.8 2004

14.12 total 2003

N/A

634 2003 13

517 2003 13

237 2003 13

120 2003 13

N/A

3700 2003 13

623.74 2003 Y

67 2003 13

358 2003 13

700 2003 13

2200 2003 13

214 2003 13

138 2003 13

400 2003 13

1400 2003 13

208 2003 13

150 2003 13

584 2003 13

575 2003 13

480 2003 13

-89 2003 13

N/A

25.4 2004 14

16.136 2001 15

11 2003 15

11.2 2004 14

28.1 2003 15

10.4 2004

15 2004 14

2.2 2004 14

20 2005 16

30 2004 14

11.3 Q1 ‘05 17

20 2004 14

15 2004 14

2.7 2001

8.27 2004 6

9.6 2004

11.7 2003

13.8 2004 14

10.3 2004

0.9 May ‘05

11.5 total 2003

NA

24.5 2003 12

7.6 2003

10.453 ‘03 / ’04

33.788 2003 18

NA

33.8 2004

3.971 2004

8.772 Q1 ‘05

0.405 2005 2

4.3 2003

8.77 2003 18

0.369 2003 1

11.669 2003 18

13.349 2003

12.1 2004 6

96.37 2003 18

8.599 2003

9.478 2005

75.9 2004 9

56 2004

3.765 total 2003

NA

13.3 2003 12

5.9 2003

18.286 ‘03 / ’04

26.158 2003 18

NA

40.3 2004

7.2556 2004

2.918 Q1 ‘05

2.313 2005 2

11.5 2003

14.231 2003 18

0.822 2003 1

6.575 2003 18

4.4 2003

14.5 2003 6

36.96 2003 18

7.094 2003

12.982 2005

79 2004 2003 9

39.8 2004

3.706 total 2003

10 2005 12

3.5 2005 12

3.7 2005 12

7.9 2005 12

15 2005 12

NA

1.1 2004

3.5 2005 12

1.8 2005 12

2 2005 12

1.8 2005 12

2 2005 12

14.2 2005 12

0.6 2005 12

3 2005 12

3.9 2005 6

1 2005 12

4 2005 12

2.5 2005 12

9 2005 12

3 2004

14.2 2005 12

N/A

N/A

N/A

9.350 2004

N/A

N/A

24.554 2005 12

8.519 Mar ‘05

N/A

N/A

22.190 Q4 ’04

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

12.81 2005 12

23.3 2005

9.0 2003

3.568 2005 12

37.859 2005 12

18.640 2004

2.857 Jan ‘03

GDP

bil

lions

USD a

t 200

4 mar

ket p

rices

Popu

latio

n mi

llions

GDP

per

cap

ita

curre

nt US

D at 2

004 m

arke

t pric

es

GDP

gro

wth

%

chan

ge fr

om ye

ar pr

eviou

s

Inco

min

g FD

I co

ntrac

ted bi

llions

USD

Unem

ploy

men

t % Ex

ports

billio

ns US

D

Fore

ign

Curr

ency

Res

erve

s

billio

ns US

D

Impo

rts

billio

ns US

D

Infla

tion

CPI %

chan

ge fr

om m

onth

previo

us

Afghanistan

Algeria

Bahrain

Egypt

Iran

Iraq

Israel

Jordan

Kuwait

Lebanon

Libya

Morocco

Mauritania

Oman

Qatar

Pakistan

Saudi Arabia

Syria

Tunisia

Turkey

UAE

Yemen

n/a = not available



0.005 proj 2005

66.530 2003 1

9.5 2003

106 ‘03 / ’04

137.143 2003 1

N/A

110.226 2003 1

11.26 2004

41.748 2003 1

18.038 2003 2

25.3 2004 3

53.1 2004 4

1.093 2003 1

26.07 2005 5

28.451 2004

96.96 2004 6

248.5 2004

24.4 2004 7

29.411 2005

300.578 2004

85.1 2004

11.366 total ‘03

26.8 est 2001

31.8 2003 1

.689 2003 1

77.5 (2004)

66.4 2003 1

26 8

6.8 2004

5.3 2004

2.8 Q1 ‘05

4.5 2003 2

5.7 2004

31.1 2004 4

2.8 2003 1

2.6 2003 1

.744 2004

148.7 2004 6

22.6 2004

17.3 2003

10 2004 9

70.7 2003

4.3 2004

20.3 total ‘03

N/A

2090 2003 1

13970 2003 math

1367 2004

2065.67 2003 1

N/A

16058 2004 math

2115 2004

14885 ’03 / ‘05 math

4008 2004 math

4388 2004 math

1707 2004 math

384 2003 1

10031 ’03 / ‘05 math

38239.00

652 2004 6

10959

1403 2003

2929 2005

4251 2004

19699 2004

558 total 2003

0.08 proj

6.8 2003 1

6 200510

yoy

3.2 2003 1

6.61 2003 1

NA

4.3 2004 12

3.16 2004 yoy

9.9 2003 1

5 2004 11

4.8 2004 4

4 2004 4

4.94 2003 1

6.3 2003

20.5 2004

6.4 2004 6

8.7 2005 10

3 2003

7.6 2005

24.6 2004

4.8 2004

14.12 total 2003

N/A

634 2003 13

517 2003 13

237 2003 13

120 2003 13

N/A

3700 2003 13

623.74 2003 Y

67 2003 13

358 2003 13

700 2003 13

2200 2003 13

214 2003 13

138 2003 13

400 2003 13

1400 2003 13

208 2003 13

150 2003 13

584 2003 13

575 2003 13

480 2003 13

-89 2003 13

N/A

25.4 2004 14

16.136 2001 15

11 2003 15

11.2 2004 14

28.1 2003 15

10.4 2004

15 2004 14

2.2 2004 14

20 2005 16

30 2004 14

11.3 Q1 ‘05 17

20 2004 14

15 2004 14

2.7 2001

8.27 2004 6

9.6 2004

11.7 2003

13.8 2004 14

10.3 2004

0.9 May ‘05

11.5 total 2003

NA

24.5 2003 12

7.6 2003

10.453 ‘03 / ’04

33.788 2003 18

NA

33.8 2004

3.971 2004

8.772 Q1 ‘05

0.405 2005 2

4.3 2003

8.77 2003 18

0.369 2003 1

11.669 2003 18

13.349 2003

12.1 2004 6

96.37 2003 18

8.599 2003

9.478 2005

75.9 2004 9

56 2004

3.765 total 2003

NA

13.3 2003 12

5.9 2003

18.286 ‘03 / ’04

26.158 2003 18

NA

40.3 2004

7.2556 2004

2.918 Q1 ‘05

2.313 2005 2

11.5 2003

14.231 2003 18

0.822 2003 1

6.575 2003 18

4.4 2003

14.5 2003 6

36.96 2003 18

7.094 2003

12.982 2005

79 2004 2003 9

39.8 2004

3.706 total 2003

10 2005 12

3.5 2005 12

3.7 2005 12

7.9 2005 12

15 2005 12

NA

1.1 2004

3.5 2005 12

1.8 2005 12

2 2005 12

1.8 2005 12

2 2005 12

14.2 2005 12

0.6 2005 12

3 2005 12

3.9 2005 6

1 2005 12

4 2005 12

2.5 2005 12

9 2005 12

3 2004

14.2 2005 12

N/A

N/A

N/A

9.350 2004

N/A

N/A

24.554 2005 12

8.519 Mar ‘05

N/A

N/A

22.190 Q4 ’04

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

12.81 2005 12

23.3 2005

9.0 2003

3.568 2005 12

37.859 2005 12

18.640 2004

2.857 Jan ‘03

GDP

bil

lions

USD a

t 200

4 mar

ket p

rices

Popu

latio

n mi

llions

GDP

per

cap

ita

curre

nt US

D at 2

004 m

arke

t pric

es

GDP

gro

wth

%

chan

ge fr

om ye

ar pr

eviou

s

Inco

min

g FD

I co

ntrac

ted bi

llions

USD

Unem

ploy

men

t % Ex

ports

billio

ns US

D

Fore

ign

Curr

ency

Res

erve

s

billio

ns US

D

Impo

rts

billio

ns US

D

Infla

tion

CPI %

chan

ge fr

om m

onth

previo

us


J U L Y 2 0 0 5


Afghanistan

Algeria

Bahrain

Egypt

Iran

Iraq

Israel

Jordan

Kuwait

Lebanon

Libya

Morocco

Mauritania

Oman

Qatar

Pakistan

Saudi Arabia

Syria

Tunisia

Turkey

UAE

Yemen

*Closing Rates

Beginning

42.785

75.370

0.3770

5.8224

7,900.0

1,529.4

4.4227

0.7135

0.2921

1,510.0

1.3556

8.9670

263.50

0.3850

3.6391

59.601

3.7505

52.510

1.2963

1.3720

3.6732

183.20

Low

42.785

72.730

0.3770

5.8033

7,900.0

1,514.8

4.4192

0.7101

0.2920

1,508.0

1.3458

8.9670

263.50

0.3850

3.6390

59.580

3.7503

52.510

1.2963

1.3470

3.6731

183.20

High

42.785

76.906

0.3771

5.8827

7,900.0

1,551.7

4.5779

0.7136

0.2923

1,514.0

1.3795

9.1571

263.50

0.3867

3.6425

59.820

3.7508

52.510

1.3271

1.3880

3.6745

183.20

End

42.785

73.520

0.3770

5.8530

7,900.0

1,536.9

4.5779

0.7134

0.2921

1,514.0

1.3767

9.0600

263.50

0.3850

3.6390

59.751

3.7504

52.510

1.3251

1.3470

3.6731

183.20

Regional Currency Rates


J U L Y 2 0 0 5

N o t e w o r t h y E v e n t s

June 1, PAKISTAN/TURKEY: Pakistan and Turkey agree to cooperate in trade and defense and on international issues.

June 1, PNA: Palestinian National Authority President Mahmoud Abbas undergoes unscheduled heart surgery in Amman

June 2, LEBANON: Lebanese newspaper columnist Samir Qaseer dies when a bomb destroys his car outside his home in the Ashrafiyeh neighborhood of Beirut. June 3, INDIA/NEPAL: India offers to help Sri Lanka redesign its air-defense network.

June 3, INDIA/PAKISTAN/KASHMIR: Separatist leaders make an historic first visit from Indian-administered Kashmir to Kashmir’s Pakistani region.

June 4, PNA: Palestinian National Authority President Mahmoud Abbas delays legislative elections that were set for July 17.

June 5, IRAN: Iran conditionally agrees to extend its suspension of uranium enrichment as part of the Paris Agreement through the end of July.

June 6, EGYPT: Egypt rules out international supervision of Egypt’s September elections despite U.S. pressure.

June 6, IRAQ: Radical Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr says that he will stay out of Iraqi politics as long as the country remains occupied.

June 6, MAURITANIA: Mauritania blames al Qaeda-linked militant Islamists for a deadly June 4 attack on a military base in the Sahara Desert.

June 6, SYRIA: Syrian President Bashar al Assad opens the 10th congress of the ruling Baath Party in Damascus.

June 6, SYRIA: Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam resigns.

June 7, INDIA: L. K. Advani, president of India’s Bharatiya Janata Party, resigns.


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June 7, IRAQ: Former Iraqi Electricity Minister Ayham al-Samarie says the political wings of two of the main Iraqi insurgent groups are ready to open talks with the government. June 7, LEBANON/ISRAEL: The Lebanese army responds with anti-aircraft fire to four Israeli warplanes violating Lebanese airspace.

June 7, PNA/BRITAIN: British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw says the British government will not deal with Hamas until the Palestinian militant group eliminates two major points from its charter: destruction of the state of Israel as a goal and violence as its modus operandi. June 8, IRAQ: Iraq’s Kurdish President Jalal Talabani defends a Shiite militia that Sunni leaders accuse of involvement in killing Sunnis.

June 8, IRAQ: Leaders of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs say they want 25 seats on the parliamentary committee in charge of drafting the new Iraqi constitution.

June 8, MOROCCO: Morocco grants a license for the first time to an Islamist political party, allowing it to operate legally in the North African kingdom. June 9, IRAQ/EU: British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and other senior EU officials pay a surprise visit to Baghdad to meet with transitional President Jalal Talabani.

June 9, TURKEY: Turkey’s militant Kurdistan Workers’ Party announces plans to launch a “pipeline war” against the recently inaugurated Baku-Tbilisi-Cey-han oil pipeline.

June 10, INDIA: Lal Krishna Advani of India’s opposition Bharatiya Janata Party says he will continue as the party’s leader after stepping down June 7 over criticism for comments he made about Pakistan’s leader. June 10, IRAN: Iranian presidential front-runner Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani says that Iran opposes nuclear negotiations “being dragged out for no reason” but that it would be “positive” if the United States worked with the European Union to broker an agreement. June 10, IRAQ: Iraq’s Sunni minority rejects a compromise offer by Humam Hammoudi, leader of the Shiite-controlled constitutional committee, that would have given the Sunnis a total of 15 seats on the committee.


J U L Y 2 0 0 5

June 10, SYRIA: The Syrian 10th Baath party congress announces at its conclusion that the 21-member national council will be reduced to 14 ministers, with Abdel Halim Khaddam, Zuheir Masharka and Mustapha Tlass leaving the body. Defense Minister Hassan Turkmani, national intelligence chief Hisham Bakhtiar and Hayssam Satayhi, an adviser to President Bashar al Assad, are added to the Baath party leadership.

June 10, SYRIA: The United States says it has “credible information” that Syrian military intelligence officials are returning to Lebanon to carry out assassinations of senior Lebanese politicians.

June 12, IRAN: A small bomb explodes in Tehran, killing at least one person.

June 12, IRAN: Four explosions target government buildings and officials in Iran’s southwestern Khuzestan, killing at least eight people and injuring 36.

June 13, IRAN: The Popular Democratic Front of Ahvazi Arabs denies responsibility for recent Iranian bombings.

June 13, IRAN: A spokesman for the Iranian Supreme National Security Council says the United States, and possibly Britain, was behind the recent bombing attacks.

June 13, IRAN: Two bombs explode in the southeastern city of Zahedan.

June 13, PNA: Hamas agrees for the first time to form a national unity government if it wins the Palestinian Legislative Council elections.

June 14, EGYPT: Egypt releases 137 members of the Muslim Brotherhood who were arrested during a wave of pro-reform protests across the country. June 14, IRAN: A bomb explodes in the southeastern Iranian city of Zahedan.

June 14, IRAQ: The Iraqi Parliament gives a vote of confidence to the country’s Shiite-led government.

June 14, ISRAEL: Israel “unequivocally” denies reports that it has been spy-ing on the United States.


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June 14, PAKISTAN: Pakistan’s President Gen. Pervez Musharraf says Osama bin Laden is alive and may be in the Pakistani mountains bordering Afghanistan.

June 15, IRAQ: Negotiations reportedly begin between the U.S. and Iraqi governments to draft an amnesty policy towards insurgents.

June 15, ISRAEL: Control of the West Bank town of Jenin is handed over to the Palestinian National Authority as a precursor for the upcoming Israeli withdrawal from areas in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

June 16, IRAN: The militant group Arab Struggle for Liberating Ahvaz claims responsibility for the June 12 bombings in Ahvaz.

June 16, PNA: Low-level European Union diplomats meet with newly elected Hamas mayors to discuss international assistance and the de facto cease-fire with Israel.

June 16, U.S./ISRAEL/CHINA: U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice says U.S. officials are in sharp disagreement with Israel over its sale of mili-tary technology to China.

June 17, IRAQ: Al Jazeera television airs excerpts from a new videotape by No. 2 al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.

June 17, ISRAEL: Israel’s Shinui Party announces it is willing to return to the coalition government provided the Labor Party quits for budgetary instead of political or diplomatic reasons.

June 18, IRAN: Pragmatic conservative Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and hard-liner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad come in first and second place respectively in Iran’s presidential election and move on to a run-off election slated for June 24.

June 19, AFGHANISTAN: Afghan intelligence thwarts a plot to kill U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad.

June 20, IRAN: A group calling itself the Organization of God’s Soldiers abducts an Iranian security agent and threatens to behead him unless the government releases imprisoned members within three weeks.


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June 21, ISRAEL/PNA: A summit between Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Palestinian National Authority President Mahmoud Abbas on the upcoming Gaza pullout fails to resolve outstanding issues between the two sides. June 21, ISRAEL: Israel arrests 52 Islamic Jihad militants in its first big crackdown against militants since a February cease-fire.

June 21, LEBANON: Lebanese Communist Party leader George Hawi is killed by a bomb in Beirut as he travels in his automobile.

June 22, AFGHANISTAN: Afghan and U.S. troops engaging in a search-and-attack mission to destroy militant sanctuaries kill at least 60 Taliban militants and capture 30 in southwestern Afghanistan. June 22, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A U.S. Air Force U-2 reconnaissance aircraft crashes, killing the pilot, while returning to base in the United Arab Emirates after completing a mission in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. June 22-23, IRAQ: A triple car bombing in a mainly Shiite district of Baghdad kills 18 people. Two of the suicide bombers target the offices of radical Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr.

June 23, ISRAEL: The United States, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations jointly say Israel must give Palestinians more freedom to move within and between the occupied territories.

June 23, IRAN: Former chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix says Iran is years away from being able to produce the highly enriched uranium needed for an atomic bomb.

June 24, U.S./SYRIA: U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice says Iraq-style regime change is inappropriate for Syria.

June 25, IRAN: Hard-liner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad wins the presidency of Iran.

June 27, SAUDI ARABIA: Conflicting reports say that Prince Bandar bin Sultan has either tendered his resignation as Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the United States or is on vacation and is expected to return to his position in August.


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June 27, PNA: Palestinian National Security Adviser Jibril Rajub says the Palestinian National Authority has been “engaged in a serious dialogue” with the militant group Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).

June 27, ISRAEL: Jewish settlers opposed to the Israeli pullout from Gaza erect a new outpost at a site near the Gush Katif settlement.

June 28, PNA: Palestinian National Authority Prime Minister Ahmed Qurai announces plans to form a temporary national unity Cabinet to oversee the planned Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.

June 28, IRAQ: Dhari Ali al-Fayadh, a Shiite member of the Iraqi Parliament, is killed when a suicide car bomb explodes near his convoy in northern Baghdad.

June 28, LEBANON: Nabih Berri is re-elected speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, with 90 members of the 128-member body voting in favor of his re-election.

June 30, SYRIA: Syrian security forces order the closure of the al-Atassi Forum for National Dialogue, the country’s sole forum for political opposition.

June 30, ISRAEL: The Israeli government declares a temporary closed military zone in Jewish settlements in Gaza in an effort to prevent ultranationalist opponents of the government’s withdrawal plan from entering the settlements.

J u l y a n d B e y o n d

July 1: Egypt and Israel sign a much-delayed deal for Egypt to supply natural gas to the Jewish state.

July 7: G-8 foreign ministers discuss the Middle East peace process, Iran’s nuclear program and opium production in Afghanistan.

July 7: Palestinian National Authority President Mahmoud Abbas meets with Syrian President Bashar al Assad in Damascus.

July 16: The first phase of Pakistani local elections (review of nomination papers) begins.


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July 28: The Pakistani government announces its 2005-06 trade policy implementing an export policy to control the price of petroleum products.

July 29: The second phase of Pakistani local elections (publication of candidate lists) begins.

C h a n g e s

SyriaOn June 14, Syria appointed a new intelligence chief, Ali Mamluk, previously deputy head of air force intelligence. He replaces Hisham Ikhtiar, who was elevated to a top-level post as head of a newly established national security bureau within the Baath party.

Syrian Lt. Gen. Bahjat Suleiman was transferred June 17 from his post as chief of internal security forces in the general intelligence department to general headquarters. President Bashar al Assad appointed Lt. Gen. Nasif Kheir Bek, chairman of military intelligence’s technical branch, to take Suleiman’s place.

Iraq The Kurdish Parliament in northern Iraq unanimously elected Masoud Barzani president of the region on June 12.

KuwaitThe Kuwaiti government on June 12 appointed Massouma al-Mubarak minister of planning, making al-Mubarak the first female Cabinet member.


J U L Y 2 0 0 5

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Documents

147343 STRATFOR Global Vantage MidEast 7 05