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(c) crown copyright

Catalogue Reference:CAB/23/95 Image Reference:0005

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(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT'

S E C R E T. COPY NO. -

C A B I N E T 41 (58)Meeting of the Cabinet to be held, at 10, DowningStreet,S.W.I. on WEDNESDAY, 21st SEPTEMBER,1938,at 3:0 p,m.

AGENDUM.THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION: CENTRAL EUROPE:CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

(Reference Cabinet 40 (38))Statement by the Prime Minister.

(Signed) E.E. BRIDGESSecretary to the Cabinet,

Richmond Terrace, S.W.I.21st September, 1958.

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S E C R E T . COPY NOC A B I N E T 41(58).CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at10,Downing Street, S.W.I., on Wednesday,21st September, 1938, at .3.0 p.m e

P R E S E N Tt-The Right Hon. Neville Chamberlain, M.P.,Prime Minister. (in theChair).

The Right Hon.Sir John Simon,C C S . I . ,C C V . 0 . , O.B.E., K.C., M.P.,Chancellor of the Exchequer.The Right Hon.Lord Maugham,Lord Chancellor.The Right Hon.The Viscount Halifax, K.G.,C C S d . , G.C.I.E., Secretaryof State for Foreign Affairs.The Most Hon.The Marquess of Zetland,G.C. S.I. G.C.I.E.,Secretary of State for India.The Right Hon.Sir Thomas Inskip C.B.E., I C C ,M.P.,Minister for Co-ordinationof Defence.The Right Hon.L. Hore-Belisha, M.P.,Secretary of State for War.The Right Hon.John Golville, M.P.,Secretary of State for Scotland.The Right Hon.

W.S.Morrison, M.C., K.C., M.P.,Minister of Agriculture andFisheries.The Right Hon.Walter Elliot, M.C., M.P.,Minister of Health.The Right Hon.E.L. Burgin, M.P.,Minister of Transport.

Mr,E.E. Bridges, M.C

The Right Hon.The Viscount Hailsham,Lord President of the Council.The Right HoiioSir Samuel Hoare,Bt. C C S , I . ,G.B.E.,C.M.G. M.P., Secretaryof State for Home Affairs.The Right Hon.The Earl De La Warr,Lord PrivySeal.The Right Hon.Malcolm MacDonald, M.P.,Secretary of State for theColonies.The Right Hon.A. Duff Cooper,D.S.O. M.P.,First Lord of the Admiralty..The Right Hon.Sir Kingsley Wood, M.P.,Secretary of State for Air.The Right Hon.Oliver Stanley, M.C., M.P.,President of the Board of Trade.The Right Hon.

The Earl Stanhope, K.G., D.S.C,M . C ,President of the Board ofEducation.The Right H 0 n oErnest Brown, M . C , M.P.,Minister of Labour.The Right Hon.The Earl Winterton, M.P.,Chancellor of the Duchy o fLancaster.

Secretary

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THE PRIME MINISTER asked the Secretaryof State for Foreign Affairs to give a resumeof events during the last twodays QTHE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFIAIPSreminded his colleagues that, when the Cabinet hadmet on Monday, they had been waiting for the replyfrom the Czechoslovak Government.,

On Tuesday morning an unofficialstatement had been issued to the effect that theCzechoslovak Government proposed to accept the jointBritish and French proposals. Messages receivedfrom Paris at about the same time indicated thatconsiderable pressure was being brought to bear onthe French Government, whose position had appearedsomewhat insecure-.

No definite answer was received fromCzechoslovakia until late on Tuesday evening.About half-past ten he had received from ourMinister at Prague a short resume of theCzechoslovak Government s reply (cee telegramNo.664 fromPrague),

A little earlier a communication had beenreceived from the French Ambassador to the effectthat there was a further concentration of Germantroops on the Czechoslovak frontier. The Frenchwere greatly concerned at thisnews,and thoughtthat it would be difficult for them to maintain theiradvice to the Czechoslovak Government not tomobilise,unless at the same time we continued toput great pressure on ro Benes to accept the jointFrench and British proposals.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairssaid that late on Tuesday night, after consultation

1 0

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with the Prime Minister, he had sent a furthertelegram to Prague (No. 315) urging the CzechoslovakGovernment to reconsider their attitude. Theconcluding paragraph of this telegram had been to theeffect that if, on reconsideration,- the CzechGovernment felt hound to reject our advice, theymust of course he free to take any action they thoughtappropriate to meet the situation that mightthereafterdevelop

Telegram No 0 670 had now been received fromPrague. This telegram contained a personal andpreliminary message from Dr. Hodza^s PrivateSecretary to the effect that the CzechoslovakGovernment accepted the French and British proposalsand that an official reply would be sent as soon aspossible.

In the meantime, we were running a considerablerisk that the situation would get out of hand, if stepswere not taken to confirm the date for the resumptionof the Prime Minister s conversations with Herr Hitler.On Tuesday, the German Government had become somewhatrestive as to the failure to fix the date and time forthe Prime Minister s return. Sir Nevile Hendersonhad reported that the position might get out of handunless the date of the Prime Minister s visit wasdefinitely fixed. He had temporised for half a day,but Sir Nevile. Henderson had returned to the charge andhad stated that Herr Hitler had made arrangements to gofrom Berchtesgaden to Bad Godesberg and wanted earlyconfirmation of the arrangements. Herr Hitler hadproposed that the meeting should be definitely fixedfor Thursday morning.

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It had been felt that the situation madeit necessary to fix a definite date, and a message hadtherefore been sent late on Tuesday agreeing to theresumption of the conversations on Thursday. This hadinvolved some risk, in view of the uncertainty as to theattitude of the Czechoslovak Government. But the positionin this respect was somewhat eased by recent telegramsfrom Prague.

In reply to the Secretary of State for Air, theForeign Secretary said that he had received a visit fromthe Hungarian Minister last night on the subject ofminorities.. The Hungarian Minister had said that Hungary sclaim was overwhelming, and that they had behaved withgreat moderation, for which they should not be penalised...

The Foreign Secretary said that he had repliedon the lines that His Majesty s Government were at presentengrossed in other problems. That, however, did not meanthat any claim which the Hungarians might make would notbe given due consideration, if it were raised at theappropriate time. For the time being he took note ofthe Hungarian Minister s statement (See telegram No.67 toBudapest).

The Polish Minister was coming to see himthat evening in regard to the Polish claim, and he proposedto reply on the same lines. Itwas.noticeable that thePoles were somewhat more truculent and that statements hadbeen made to the effect that, unless their claim for thereturn of Teschen was immediately recognised, theirrelations with the Czechoslovak Government would becomestrained.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he had nothing.toadd to the Secretary of State s resume of events, except

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perhaps to call attention to telegram No-668 from Prague,w i indicated that the Czechoslovak Government hardlyanticipated that their first answer to the French andBritish proposals would be accepted, and expected thatfurther pressure would be brought to bear upon them.

There were certain matters which were likelyto arise at an early stage of his conversation withHerr Hitler, and he welcomed the opportunity ofdiscussing them with his colleagues.OTHER The question of minorities in Czechoslovakia,.MINORITIES.other than the Sudeten Germans, had been mentioned in hisfirst talk with Herr Hitler, and the latter had said thathe was not interested in them. If Herr Hitler maintainedthat attitude, these minorities should not present anyimmediate difficulty. But representatives of Hungaryand Poland had both visited Berchtesgaden in the lastfewdays,and we had no very precise account of whathad passed. It was possible that Herr Hitler would nowsay that, since his first meeting with the Prime Minister,he had been approached by these other two countries;that their position in regard to minorities was the sameas Germany's; and that he could not reach a settlement onthe Sudeten German question unless the position of theHungarian and Polish minorities in Czechoslovakia wasalso settled. He did not think thatHerr*Hitler waslikely to take up this attitude. Nevertheless, he hadto consider what answer should be made to such a demand.

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The Prime Minister said that, if Herr Hitlermade any such demand, he proposed to say that it wasinconsistent with what the Ftlhrer had said to himat his first interview, when he had asked him(the Prime Minister) to deal with the particularproblem' of the Sudeten Germans. His attitudewould be that the settlement of the Sudeten Germanquestion could not be made dependent upon thesettlement of other quite different questions which didnot concern Herr Hitler. If Herr Hitler still adheredto the attitude that he must have an immediate settlementof the Hungarian and Polish Minority questions thePrime Minister proposed to say that he was unable to *proceed further on the matter, and must return home toconsult his colleagues,

THE SECRETARY OP STATE FOR HOME AFFAIRSthought that this issue would be a test of Herr Hitler'ssincerity. He thought that the Prime Ministershould stand firm by the line of action which heproposed.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRSsaid that he would like to make quite clear what hemeant by giving consideration, at a later date, tothe claims on behalf of the Hungarian and polishMinorities. The claims on behalf of these Minoritiesinvolved the revision of the Treaties concerned, andArticle 19 of the Covenant made provision for suchrevision. There was a good deal to be said for therevision of the Treaties by proper methods, providedit was not linked up with threats. He -agreed that thePrime Minister should refuse to yield to pressurefrom Herr Hitler to agree to an immediate settlementof these other Minority questions.

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The question of Minorities was also linkedup with our proposed guarantee. In guaranteeingthe boundaries of Czechoslovakia the ForeignSecretary said that he did not preclude considerationof the revision of those boundaries in a proper manner.The guarantee was directed against unprovokedaggression.

THE SECRETARY OP STATE FOR THE COLONIESsaid that he was in agreement with the Home Secretary.He thought that if Herr Hitler pressed for animmediate settlement of these claims it would showthat his interests lay not in the German race butin an attempt to dominate Europe.

In the course of discussion generalagreement was expressed with these views.

THE HOME SECRETARY said that he had verylittle sympathy with the claims now being putforward by Hungary and Poland. Before the warno nation had treated their Minorities worse thanthe Magyars and since the war none had treated theirMinorities worse than the Poles.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he agreed withthe views expressed by his colleagues. When hesaid that if Herr Hitler persisted in the linesuggested he would find it necessary to consulthis colleagues he had it in mind that circumstancesmightarise such as the necessity for giving a warningin Prague which might make it necessary for him toplay for time.

The Cabinet agreed with the courseproposed by the prime Minister. /

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THE PROPOSED THE PRIME MINISTER said that there were two mainGUARANTEE,questions to be considered in regard to-the proposedguarantee, First, should the guarantee be joint orseveral? Secondly, which Powers should he guarantors?

In regard to the first question, examination onlystrengthened the case against a several guarantee.Every nation, except ourselves, might run out and leaveus to bear the whole burden. The guarantee was againstunprovoked aggression . Who was to determine whether

a particular case constituted unprovokedaggression ?If each of the guarantor Powers was to decide thisquestion for itself, then each of the guarantor Powerswould in effect have the right to determine whether theguarantee operated in a particular case.

It was therefore felt that the right plan was tohave a joint guarantee, and to provide for a meetingof the guarantors to decide in any particular casewhether unprovoked aggression had taken place,

ThQ inclusion in the guarantee of a provision on theselines had a considerable bearing on the question of whichPowers should become guarantors. The. idea first putforward had been that Germany should be one of thejoint guarantors; but if that course were adopted,and if Germany took the view that in a particular casethe aggression had been provoked, this would enableher.to exercise a free veto on the operation of thejoint guarantee, and to make it ineffective. We didnot,however, wish to leave Germany out of the picture,and it was therefore proposed to invite Germany tosign a separate pact of non-aggression with Czechoslovakia.

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Germany being thus excluded from the Jointguarantee, what other Powers remained? It wasproposed that the joint guarantors should consistof Prance, ourselves and Russia,, The PrimeMinister referred, in this connection, to the pro-vision in paragraph 6 of the joint message from theFrench and British Governments (Telegram No. 300)to the effect that it was proposed to substitutea general guarantee against unprovoked aggressionin place of existing Treaties which involved recip-rocai obligations of a military character. TheTreaties between France and Czechoslovakia andbetween Russia and Czechoslovakia both involvedreciprocal obligations, and it was proposed that theFrench should invite Russia to follow France sexample and to modify her Treaty with Czechoslovakiato conform with the arrangement now proposed. Itwas possible that Russia might refuse to agree to thisarrangement, but she should be invited to do so.

What attitude would Herr Hitler take to theproposal that these three Powers should be jointguarantors? He had said that he regardedCzechoslovakia as a spearhead in German territory.It was a fair answer to this to say that in futureCzechoslovakia would not be entitled to sign anyTreaties with reciprocal military obligations^. ThePrime Minister asked? however, what line he should takeif Herr Hitler objected to Russia guaranteeingCzechoslovakia against unprovoked aggression. Sofar as he could see, such a guarantee was unobjec-tionable from Herr Hitler s point of view, unless heintended to commit an act of unprovoked aggressionagainst Czechoslovakia and wished to destroy it,

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The Prime Minister therefore proposed that ifHerr Hitler raised objection to Russia being one ofthe joint guarantors he should refer the matter tothe Cabinet before reaching a decision.

The Prime Minister next dealt with the possibilityof other Powers being guarantors. For many reasonshe would have liked to have included Italy. The Berlin-Rome axis might not always be as strong as it wasto-dayo Again it must be remembered that we weredealing with individuals whose actions were affected byvarious motives; and for many reasons it might havebeen helpful to have brought Signor Mussolini into thepicture. But the same reasons which told against theinclusion of Germany in the joint guarantee we?re in hisview decisive against the inclusion of Italy.

The inclusion of other neighbouring Powers had alsobeen considered for example Poland Hungary andRoumania. There was something to be said for theinclusion of these Powers but having regard to theirminority questions their inclusion in the presentguarantee must he thought be ruled out.

The Prime Minister therefore proposed that thejoint guarantors should be Prance this country andRussia if she was willing and that Germany should beinvited to sign a separate pact of non-aggression withCzechoslovakia.

THE SECRETARY OP STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS thoughtit might be desirable to consider two further questions.First whether it was desirable to include Yugoslaviaand Roumaniao These countries had no minority

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questions which directly affected Czechoslovakia.Their inclusion was however open to the disadvantagethat the larger the number of Powers included theless effective an instrument the joint guarantee mightbecome.

The second point was whether it was possiblewhile not including Italy in the position of one of thejoint guarantors to include her in some secondarycapacity so as not to leave her out of the picturealtogether.

In the course of the discussion which ensued therewas general agreement in favour of including Russiaas a guarantor.

THE HOME SECRETARY pointed out that if theguarantee had to be implemented Russia might provideuseful help that it was a mistake to take action whichtended to put Russia out of Europe and that the inclusionof Russia would be helpful from the point of view ofcertain sections ofpublic opinion in this country. \

On the free veto point the LORD CHANCELLORpointed out that a joint guarantee could be drafted insuch terms that if one of the. joint guarantors committedan act of aggression the remaining Powers should actas though the Power which had committed the aggressionwas not a guarantor i.e. the vote of the aggressorPower would be disregarded.

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It was pointed out, however, that the act ofaggression might he committed, not by Germany, but bysome other Power, say Hungary, and that Germany mighttake the view that Hungary 1s action did not constitutedunprovoked aggression. To meet a contingency of thiskind it was suggested that provision might be madefor majority decisions. Circumstances might, however,arise in which such a provision would operate againstthis country; that is to say, that this countrymight find itself in the minority, out-voted by thevotes of other countries. It was impossible forthis country to put itself in a position in whichwe should not have the last word on the issues ofpeace and war..

It was also pointed out that, in the eventof aggression by Germany against Czechoslovakia,.Prance,Russia and this country were the threecountries which could most effectively put a curbon Germany 1 ambitions, and that there was thereforemuch to be said for having these three Powers onlyas joint guarantors.

As regards the argument that Germany mightthink that some slur was put upon her by failureto include her as a guarantor, it was pointed outthat there was almost certainly no prospect ofpersuading Germany to sign a document which was alsosigned by.Russia. Germany s dislike of multilateralpacts was also referred to.

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Some discussion took place on the ForeignSecretary s suggestion that some of the minorPowers should he included as guarantors, say,Yugoslavia and Roumania 0

Reference was made to the existing obligationsbetween the Little Entente Powers. It was feltthat this was a matter which those Powers shouldsettle among themselves and that it need not bebrought up in the discussions with Herr Hitler.

The view was also expressed that any attemptto include Italy with some of the minor Powers,such as Yugoslavia and Roumania, would beresented by Italy.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, whileagreeing with the desirability of includingsome of the limitrophe Powers In the jointguarantee, thought that it would be impossibleto bring this about until the question of theirminorities in Czechoslovakia had been settled.

After further discussion It was agreed thatthe Prime Minister should proceed on the generalbasis proposed, that is to say, that France,Russia and Great Britain should be jointguarantors, and that Germany should be invitedto sign a separate pact of non-aggression.

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to ng m nts Maintaining[f-and Order.?ing theansitionalriod.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he thought thathe might be faced with an immediate difficulty inregard to the arrangements for maintaining law andorder in the period wM c h would elapse until the newboundary had been defined. He thought that HerrHitler would very likely say that it would take sometime to carry out the steps proposed in the Frenchand British proposals and that, meanwhile, law andorder must be maintained. He would almost certainlydemand the immediate withdrawal from the predominantlyGerman districts of the Czech military forces and the,Czech State Police,, It was true that there was alsolocal Gendarmerie, but would they be able to keeporder? If not, what other arrangements could be made?

The Prime Minister said that much thoughthad been devoted to this question. Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin, who probably had more knowledge of the localconditions than any other person in this country,thought that Herr Hitler's intention was to march histroops into the German areas immediately, in order tokeep order. There were obvious political difficultiesto this course, but there was a good deal to be said onpractical grounds for allowing the occupation at an earlydate by regular German troops of those areas in which tb-German inhabitants constituted a very large majority,separate treatment being accorded to the other SudetenGerman districts. telegram had been despatched toDr.Benes asking for his views as to the best methodof maintaining order, assuming that the Czech soldiersand State Police were withdrawn, but making nopositive suggestions. There was a good deal ofevidence for the view that the State Police had acied

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harshly and were personally very unpopular. It would,of course, he an essential condition of any arrangementwhereby certain of the Sudeten areas were occupied byGerman troops that Dr. Benes should concur in the stepproposed. But it was not impossible that he wouldprefer occupation by German troops to occupation by HerrHenlein's Freikorps, who were undisciplined and muchmore likely to act harshly. The scheme outlined alsopresupposed that both Herr Hitler and Dr. Benes shouldissue a declaration emphasising the need for takingsteps to keep order and to improve the atmosphere.

There were other areas where the PrimeMinister thought that occupation by German troops couldnot be contemplated. Thus there were certain areaswhich included industrial centres, and were raciallymixed. In these industrial centres there wereconsiderable numbers of Czech workers who held Leftviews and were -dined to create disorder, and therewere also Communist bands.

In these mixed districts, it would benecessary to have some force to support the localGendarmerie once the State Police and the Czech soldiershad been withdrawn. With this end in view, a numberof alternative schemes had been proposed.

One suggestion was the enrolment of avoluntary Special Constabulary of Sudeten Germans witha corps of international Officers. But Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin'^ view was that the Sudetph Germans were not tobe trusted, and that they might commit outrages onthe people they were supposed to protect. Theinternational Officers would be scattered over large

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Another suggestion had been the employmentof Czech troops. Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin had thoughtthat these also could not be relied upon.

A third suggestion was the employment of aninternational military force. He was afraid thatin practice this would probably mean the employmentof British soldiers since contingents from othercountries would probably not be forthcoming at anyrate in substantial numbers. The Prime Ministermentioned that this force would mainly be required tocontrol five or six industrial towns including TepliceBrux Bo hm Lei pe Reichenberg and Gablonz. If itcould be agreed that these were the areas in whichdisturbances were likely the problem might be reducedto manageable proportions.

THE MINISTER OP LABOUR reminded the Cabinetthat it was at Reichenberg that the Sudeten Germanshad first raised their banner in 1918 and thatdifficulties might be anticipated if this centre wasoccupied by an international force.

Continuing THE PRIME MINISTER said that wemight be faced with the possibility that some suchscheme as this would be called for. He had thereforeconsulted the Secretary of State for War and the Chiefof the Imperial General Staff as to whether they couldspare troops. Much would depend on the number oftroops required. The Chief of the Imperial GeneralStaff had said that if a Division was required itwould mean that one of the two Divisions of theIntermediate Contingent would not be available fordespatch to any other scene of operations. Further

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the employment of British troops in this area wouldinvolve certain obvious risks, and this was not atask which we should undertake lightly or willingly.

It was to be hoped that the number of troopsrequired might be found to be less than was expected,say, not more than 5,000. In the War Office viewit would be three weeks before British troops couldreach Chechoslovakia. It would not be possible todespatch a force of this size without calling upSection A Reservists 0

The Prime Minister said that he did not askthe Cabinet to reach any final decision on the schemewhich he had outlined. He wished, however, to putbefore them the scheme, which, on present information,seemed to have the best chance of acceptance. Everyendeavour would, of course, be made to persuade othercountries to join in sending contingents, if thedespatch of an international force proved to be necessary.

There were two other measures which l othoughtshould be taken in order to help in the preservation oforder. The first was that Herr Hitler should agreeto the immediate disbandment of Herr Henlein's Freikorps.He had some doubts whether this was a genuine body, orwhether it had not been created for the purpose of stirringup trouble. However that might be, if the jointFrench and British proposals were accepted thereseemed no ease for the continuance of the Freikorps.

He .also thought that the number of Britishobservers should be considerably increased as soonas possible.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS saidthat telegrams had been despatched to certain minorPowers (Sweden, Holland and Yugo-Slavia) sounding themas to their willingness to send contingents to the proposed International Force,

In reply to a question by THE SECRETARY OF STATE FORSCOTLAND, he said that he was not altogether happy atthe suggestion of employing French forces in proximityto German troops, He had held over the suggestion ofsending an invitation to Italy, Opinion at the ForeignOffice had been opposed tothis,mainly on account of thetone of Signor Mussolini s speech on Sunday last,

THE MINISTER FOR CO-ORDINATION OF DEFENCE was Infavour of asking for quite a small contingent from Italy,

THE MINISTER OF HEALTH agreed that the employment ofan international force was desirable, but he thought itwould be very difficult to allow German forces over thefrontier before any part of the proposed internationalforce had reached Czechoslovakia. He appreciated thatthe Prime Minister s proposal was conditional on Dr,Benes inviting German troops over the frontier, but herather doubted whether Dr. Benes would issue such aninvitation. He was also afraid of the reaction onpublic opinion. It was true that the regular Germantroops had behaved better than the Nazis in Austria,Nevertheless he was afraid that there might be considerable excesses. He asked whether an internationalforce could not control all the areas concerned. Hewas also afraid that the arrival of German troops in theGerman areas might have a disastrous effect on the mixedpopulations in the limitrophe areas,

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THE PRIME MINISTER said that the arrangement proposeddepended for its success on the spirit in which it wascarried out. If Herr Hitler was satisfied with the generallines of the agreement proposed, he hoped that he would nowexercise a restraining influence,,

THE PRESIDENT OP THE BOARD OP TRADE said that theproposal to allow German troops to cross the frontierfilled him with great anxiety. He thought it was essentialto convince people that German rule did not start beforethe frontier had been delimited, and those people who sodesired had had an opportunity to leave the transferredareas. ffAgain, he was not too happy about the proposalthat British troops should be sent to Czechoslovakia.He thought that we should be represented as having givenaway Czechoslovakia s case and then sent troops to ensurethat the proposals were carried out. He thought that,if Herr Hitler showed goodwill,it should be possiblefor the Czechoslovak authorities to maintain order witha largely increased force of observers, reporting tointernational headquarters. He thought that if theGerman troops were allowed to march in, the last chance ofthe plan being accepted by public opinion in this countrywould be destroyed.

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY feared that if theGerman army was allowed to enter part of Czechoslovakia,it would end by their overrunning the whole country.

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The.German army would put forward various pretexts,such as that it was necessary to throw out anoutpost line, or for the troops to make a furtheradvance to restore order; and they would not stopuntil they were in Prague. He thought that theaction taken by Herr Hitler in the last few days(as exemplified by the attitude of the Press, theraising of Herr Henlein s Freikorps, and theminorities question) showed that Herr Hitlerhad not acted up to his word to the Prime Minister,Pending the fixing of the boundary by an International Commission, the areas concerned shouldbe administered by some form of internationalcontrol. He thought that the Prime Ministershould indicate to Herr Hitler that if he madeany further demands we should go to war with him,not in order to prevent the Sudeten Germans fromexercising self-determination, but to stop HerrHitler from dominating Europe. In such an eventthe United States of America would come in onour side : and Germany, notwithstanding someinitial successes, would be faced with ultimatedefeat,

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTERsaid that, as Chairman of the Inter-GovernmentalCommission on Refugees, he had information of theappalling treatment accorded to minorities inAustria. We were under an obligation to

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secure fair treatment for the people in the Sudeten-Germanareas who did not wish to he transferred to the Reich. Hewas afraid that there was a great deal of innate crueltyin the German race.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he would probably be facedwith a statement by Herr Hitler that thousands of people hadbeen turned out of their homes by Czechoslovak oppressionand that they must be allowed to return as soon as possible.He would be asked what solution he could put forward.

THE SECRETARY OP STATE FOR AIR said that he thoughtthat Germany might be asked to look after these refugeesfor the time being. It would be a shock to public opinionif German troops were allowed to enter Czechoslovakiaimmediately.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he had no intention ofmaking any suggestion in this sense to Herr Hitler. Theposition was that Herr Hitler was certain to demand theimmediate withdrawal of the Czech Army and of the CzechState Police. It might be that Herr Hitler would besatisfied that if these steps were carried out therewould be no disorder and that there was no need for troops.But this seemed to him to be a very large assumption

THE PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF TRADE referred to Heaction which the Nazis had taken in Austria. He thoughtthat if the Germans were allowed to send troops into thepredominantly German areas the minority of non-Germansand the minority of Germans who did not wish to beincorporated in the Reich would be exposed to ill-treatment.

THE MINISTER OF LABOUR suggested that the arrival ofGerman troops might prejudice the fixing of the boundary.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES thought thatevery possible effort should be made to ensure that BritishTroops if required could be despatched as soon as possible.

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He would be very unwilling to see German troops allowedto enter Czechoslovakia before the arrival of the proposedinternational force.

THE SECRETARY OP STATE FOR WAR said that if the Cabinetdecided to send troops they would be sent as expeditiouslyas possible. He thought that the difficulties involved inthe despatch of troops had been very fairly stated by thePrime Minister. It was clear that if the troops were sentthey w-uld he exposed to certain risks.

THE PRIME MINISTER read a further telegram received fromthe British Ambassador at Berlin (Bo.498),bearing on theproblem of law and order. Sir Nevile Henderson suggestedthat a measure of control coulfjfc be entrusted to the SudetenGermans when the State Police and Czechoslovak troops hadbeen withdrawn. This,however, was directly contrary toMr.Ashton-Gwatkin 1s view.

The Prime Minister said that he appreciated the forcethe views expressed by the Cabineto He would not, of

course, start by suggesting the despatch of any troops butonly the despatch of additional observers and the withdrawalof the State Police and of the Czech troops from the SudetenGerman areas. The next line would be to suggest the creationef some international force. If it was not possible toreach an agreement which he regarded as satisfactory, hewould consult the Cabinet again*

The Cabinet agreed to this course.THE PRIME MINISTER then read a further telegram which

had been received from Prague (No. 77)* This telegramreported full acceptance by the Czech Government of the jointFrench and British proposals on the supposition that thetwo Governments would not tolerate German invasion ofCzechoslovak territory, which would remain Czechoslovakia

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CONCLUSIONS.The Cabinet agreed to the following Conclusions

as indicating the general line on which the PrimeMinister would act in his resumed negotiations withHerr Hitler:

(l) That if Herr Hitler adopted the attitudethat he could not reach a settlement ofthe Sudeten-German question unless animmediate settlement was also arrived atin regard to the Hungarian and Polishminorities in Czechoslovakia, the PrimeMinister should say that he was unable toproceed further on the matter and mustreturn home to consult his colleagues.

(2) That, in regard to the proposed guaranteeof the new boundaries of the CzechoslovakState,the Prime Minister should proceedon the following basis,viz,:a That the guarantee is joint and notseveral.(b) That Prance, Great Eritain and Russiaare the joint guarantors.(c That Germany should be invited to signaseparate Pact of Non-Aggression withCzechoslovakia.(d) That if Herr Hitler objected to theinclusion of Russia in the jointguarantee, the Prime Minister should

again refer the matter to the Cabinet,(3) That as regards the arrangements for maintaining law and order during the transitionalperiod a The Prime Minister should first endeavourto reach a settlement on the basis ofthe withdrawal of the Czech Army andState Police from the Sudeten-Germanareas:

(b) That, if necessary, the next stageshould be to propose the creation ofsome international force.(c 171hat if it could be avoided, Germantroops should not be allowed to crossthe frontier, until an internationalforce had reached Czechoslovak territory.(d) That any solution which was adoptedshould,if possible, include the strengthening of the corps of observers.(e) That if the Prime Minister could notconclude a satisfactory settlement onthis matter, he would consult the

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L O R D R U N C I M A N SLETTE R TO T H EP R I M E M I N I S T E R ,

2 . T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R R E P O R T E D T H A T L O R D

R U N C I M A N P R O P O S E D T O W R I T E H I M A L E T T E R R E P O R T I N GO N TH E WO RK OF H I S MI SS IO N AND SETTI NG OUT THEVI EW S WH IC H HE HA D FORM ED. H E HA D SE EN A DRAF TO F T H I S LET TE R, IN AN INCO MPL ETE FORM. HES U G G E S T E D T H A T T H E L E T T E R W O U L D P R O B A B L Y B E F O U N DTO B E SUITAB LE FOR INCORP ORAT ION I N A WH IT E PA PE RD E A L I N G W I T H T H E C Z E C H O S L O V A K P O S I T I O N G E N E R A L L Y ,W H I C H W O U L D H A V E T O B E P U B L I S H E D B E F O R E P A R L I A M E N TM E T *

The C AB IN ET AG RE ED :T H A T L O R D R U N C I M A N ^ L E T T E R T O T HEPRI ME MINI STE R SHO ULD BE INC LUD ED INTHE WH IT E PA PE R WH IC H WO UL D HAV E TOB E P R E S E N T E D T O P A R L I A M E N T D E A L I N G W I T HTHE CZEC HOSL OVAK QUEST ION.

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FURTHER DEFENCEMEASURES.(Previous ReferenceCabinet39(38)).

3. THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY saidthat the previous evening the Foreign Officehad informed him that Italy was moving alarge number of troops to Libya. Afterconsulting the Prime Minister it had been decidedthat the units of the Fleet now in the EasternMediterranean should be concentrated atAlexandria, and that certain cruises in theEastern Mediterranean should be cancelled.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR raisedthe question whether it was now desirable togive effect to any of the other defence measureswhich had been deferred for further consideration.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he understoodthat Departments were going ahead quietly withpreparations which involved no serious riskof publicity. He thought that, for the timebeing, there was no need to take measures suchas recalling officers from leave, which wouldentail considerable publicity.

The Cabinet agreedThat no steps should be takenfor the time being to give effectto the further defence measureswhich had been deferred on theground that they would involveconsiderable publicity.

iehmond Terrace, S.W.I.Slst September, 1938.