(1956) West German Susceptibility to Soviet Moves

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    WEST GERIMN SUSCEPTIBILITY TO SOVIET MOVESPart I - General Reactions

    PNCLASSffTOReport No, C-3Series No. 5September 10, 195^

    RESEARCH STAFFOFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRSAMERICAN EMBASSY

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    I^'

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    TABLE OF CONTENTS

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    IKTRODUCTIOMThe present study is concerned with West German

    susceptibility towards recent Soviet moves and maneuversin the international field. It presents the reactionsof the rank and file West German population towards issueswhich lie between "the East" and "the West,"

    This report is labelled Part I because it containsa straight-forwai-d presentation of v/^t German reactionsto the questions asked. Their general appraisal of the"new look" in Soviet foreign politics, evaluation of thedestruction of the Stalin myth, as v^ell as their views ofthe Bui ganinKrushchev junkets and Soviet cultural offensiveare interesting in themselves - as well as being lengthyenough - and warrant a separate report.

    Part II of this study will primarily be concernedv/ith an experimental analysis of the role which exposureto USIS media plays in West German acceptance of theseSoviet approaches. It will also contain all population-breaks used in both parts of the study,

    Intei'viewing for the study was done between May 24thand June 2nd, 195^ and consisted of a strict probabilitysample encompassing 1,843 cases representative of the WestGerman population 18 years of age and older. Field workwa,s conducted by DIVO - Gesellschaft fuer Markt- undMeiniuigsforschunf: m.b.H., a German siirvey organizationworking under contract with the Research Staff*

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    S U M M A R Y

    Section 1; RGlation3 _ with the East and WestAs has been repeatedly shown in the past two year's, a majority

    of tho T/ost German population v/ould put Germany on the side of theWest rather than the East. The more than four out of ten people,however^ ".vho answer "neither side" or "no opinion" on furtherquestioning are found to be mainly concerned vfith the militaryaspects* Only one out of ten might actually be considered ahard-coi"e neutralist.

    The Communist powurs are considered fully as successful latelyas the V/estern powers, with the Comiirunists' biggest success seen intheir Par Eastern policy.

    The .'.'est Germans seem uncertain over the efficacy of the "policyof strejiG'th." Those in favor of it say that it is the only way todeal with tho Russians, while those desirinj a new approachadvocate "negotiations and concessions."

    Large majorities favor expanded cultural and economicrelations with the Soviet Union,

    Section 2; ReunificationWhen ascribing blame for Germany's failure to achieve

    reunification^ the tendency is to either blame Russia or "both sides,"Hardly anyone blames the West or the United States exclusively,

    A majority is unaware that the Russians have ever expressedtheir basic approatval of the reunification of Germany, v/hile onlyone-fourth believe that Bonn-Pankow negotiations would result inreunification, a majority want the V/est German Ambassador in lioscowto enter into negotiations with the Russians* They do not believe,that reunification will actually be achieved in this manner either^however, it reflects their desire to see "something" done.

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    S_ec 1: ion 3? General Appraisal of Latest Russian Folici es;

    While a slight plurality saj/s the Russians have become moroconciliatory lately, this is less than the majority which thought soafter Stalin's death in 1955. More than half of the people believethat the recent changes were not caused by the \7estern policy ofstrength. Indeed they believe that these changes are more indicativeof fiussian strength than weakness*

    The '.Test German population seems to be pretty well aware of thedestruction of the Stalin myth, although opinion is divided over itsmeaning.

    The effectiveness of the Bulganin-Krushchev visits can be seenin the fact that only small minorities see suspicious motives behindsuch visits. However, while there is considerable uncertainty overthe sincerity of the Russian offers of economic aid to countries inAsia, such aid is considered a threat to the national independenceof the country which accepts it.

    The Russians' "(jultural offensive" is a big question mark to theWest Germans, Only one out of five shows an understanding of theterm, and only one person out of a hundred has first-hand knowledgeof such activities here in Germany. The possible danger to the Y/estfrom the "cultural offensive" is to be seen in the small numbers see-ing motives unfavorable to the k7est in these activities, and in thesubstantial minority which believes that people will form a betteropinioia of the Russians because of it.

    Among those purposely favorable descriptions of Russian movespresented to respondents, the only ones not rejected ;vere 1) the viewthat the cultural offensive was merely a Russian attempt to impart abetter understanding of Russian culture, and 2) the statement thatthe Russians would agree to reunification if all-Gei'many does notjoin a Western military alliance.

    Section 4 Geiaeral DisarmamentWest German opinion holds that Russian and American interests

    in a general disarmament are the same - namely, both have little orno actual interest in it I

    To the overwlielming majority disarmament is not seeii as particularly "?*advantageous for either the East or the Y/est. Z'

    "^" iii -

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    Section 1 ; Relations with the East azid West

    OVER HALF STILL OU THE SIDE OF THE T/VEST . .

    .

    Given the choice over half (54>^) of the West German populationthinks that Germany should side with the West - as against 1 per centwho would rather have Germany side with the East. Almost a third(319^) are of the opinion that at the present time V/est Germany shouldise on neiti^er side Comparison with trend figures reveals that thispattern of replies has remained constant over the past two years,

    "At the present tiiao, do you personally think thatWest Germany should be on the side of the West, onthe side of the East, or on neither side?"Y/est Germany

    Sept '54 June < 55 May 156(605) (626) (1845)

    Side of the .Vest 58^ 52^ 54*5Side of the East 1 1 1Neither side 50 55 5IDon't know 11 I4 14

    ONLY ONE OUT OF TEH GERMAKS FOUITD TO BE REAL IHDUTRALIST ...All t.hose either indicating a nevitral position or voi(rLng no

    opinion on the previous question (45^^ of the population) were askedanother query as to their understanding of neutrality. It appearsthat about half of this group (21% of the entire sample) conceive ofGerman neutrality only in the military sense whereas 11 per centwish Gerraaay to have absolutely no dealings with cither side. Theymay justifiedly be called "hard-core neutralists."

    "At the present time, do you personally think thatWest Germany should be on the side of the West, onthe side of the East, or on neither side?"

    IF "neither side" or "Don't know" ;"Do you mean to say wo should only stay out of militaryalliances or would you prefer that V/est Germany haveno dealings with either side, neither in the political,economic or cultural sectors?"

    West Germany(T843)

    Stay out of militaryalliances only 21^Have no dealings witheither side 11Ho opinion 13Wo

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    GOMvfUinST FO'.iERS COITSIDERED FULLY iiS SUCCESSFUL AS 7/ESTSRlT POvffiRS ..Almost equally large proportions of the West German population

    feel that the Communist powers or the //estern powers were more success-ful in world politics lately (275!^ and 24fi respectively), while 18 percent credit an equal share of success to the two competing blocs ofnations. Over the years, there has been considerable fluctuation ofopinion on this question, as might be expected, with changing worldconditions. It should be noted that during the past year the Communistpovi/ers are considered to have gained success to the same extent as theV/estern po/ers have lost it, i.e. by 9 per cent,

    "If you look at the political situation in the worldas a T/hole, ".vhich side has had more' success lately:The Communist powers or the V/estern powers?"

    V/est GermanyApril Dec Nov June Aug Sept June June1951 1952 1955 1954 1954 1954 1955 1956(791) (786) (635) (599) (902) (605) (626)(1843)

    Qfo 26^0 59^ 55^ 18^ 27?^46 29 17 22 33 2423 18 20 17 25 1823 27 23 26 26 31100^ 1005S ioof^ ^oofo ioo'yo Too^ 1005^!

    " Coni^rary to what one might expect, practically the same proportion."of those who see the Communist powers more suocessful want Gei-many to sidewith the V/est (555^) S'S is to be found among those who see the Westernpowers more successful (53^) I't appears, however, from the cross-tabulation of results (see below) that there are more neutralists amongthose who think the Communists were more successful lately (405^^) than isto be found among those who think the V/est was more successful (29^),

    "At the present time, do you personallythink that V/est Germany should bo onthe side of the V/est, on the side ofthe East, or on neither side?"

    Side of Side of Neither No ilo. ofthe '//est the East side opinion cases

    "If you look at the politicalsituation in the world as awhole, which side has had moresuccess lately: The Gormnunistpowers or the Western powers?"G omnunis t po'.versV/s stern powersBoth the sameUndecided

    * Less than one half of one per cent.

    Communist powers

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    LEADING COIttiUillST SUCCESS SEEN IN EFFECTIVENESS OF FjiR EAST POLICY ..Most of the examples of Communist success cited concorn foreign

    policy measures of the Communists (50^) The effectiveness ofCommunist foreign policy in the Far East is the one example mentionedmost often (^2'yo) as an instance of Communist success* Other leadinginstances are: The destruction of osturn control over former colonics(5f')> expansion of Communist sphere of influence (5?^)> ''i^^i greaterdiplomatic skill (5!/j)

    "If you look at the political situation in the worldas a whole, v^hich side has had more success lately:The Communist powers or the '//estern powers?"

    IF "Communist povjcrs" ;"',7hy are you of this opinion? In what respect havethe Communist powers had more success?"

    Summary Table l/est GermanyV/ith Respect to Foreign Policy (5^5^)

    The Communist powers' Far East policyis more effective 12^^The East was able to destroy or at least"kVcakon Western colonial rule 5The Cormnunist sphere of influence keepso::tending 5The Communists are more skillfuldiplomats ' 5The Communist powers have entered intocontact with other countries(visits abroad) 3

    Y/ith Respect to Fi^-hting Strength ( Zfo)The fighting power of the Communistcountries (their war and economicpotential) has grown

    With Respect to Economic Affairs ( lyo)The Communist powers have extended their

    trade relationsV/ith Respect to Domestic Policy ' ( 1^)

    Conditions in Russia have improvedOther Answers ( 1^^)No Opinion/No Answer ( 1^)

    Some respondents gave more than one answer.

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    OOlClffiNTS IN DETAIL .."If you look at the political situation in the worldas a whole, which side has had more success lately:The Conmunist powers or the V/ostorn powers?"

    IF "Communist powers" :"Y/liy arc you of this opinion? In what respect havethe Communist powers had more success?"

    West GermanyWITH RESPECT TO. FOREIGN POLICY (50^)The Communist powers' Far East policy ismore offoctive : 1 29&"The most important Asian nations, such as China, Indiaand Indo-Ghina have "become friends of the Russians*"

    " Considering the developments in Indo-China, in Indiaand other countries, it can't be denied that theCommunist powers have had more success lately,"

    "Because the Communist powers are more unscrupulouswhen advancing upon an objective. Take the methods theyuse in China, and now thoy use the sane approach inIndia.""Thoy have helped India, China, Japan and Pakistan outof their dileniaa. But once these countries are deeplyindebted to them, the Communist powers will seizecontrol over those nations."

    "I'm thinking of the outcome of the war in Indo-China.""They've got the upper hand in Korea."

    The East was able to destroy or at least weakentlQstern colonial rule ; 5"The obsolete colonial policy of the Western powerspaves the way for Communism. The success of theCommunists in the Wear East proves it.""With help from the Communist side many colonies becamefree countries."

    "The Cora.:ranist powers won Morocco over to their side.""Because they succeeded in stirring up the coloredpeoples so that they made war against the whites."

    The Comavaiist sphere of influence keeps extending ; 5"The Communist powers have broadened their influencein all parts of the world."

    "The Communists are gaining ground everywhere.""The Communists seize power in one country after theother,""The Communists have formed active organizations inall European countries,"

    (Cont'd on next page)

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    (Cont'd fron lorucoding page) West GermanyThe Coninunists are nore skillful diplomats ; 5^"Russian diplomats are r.iore activo llobody everknows what their next mov will be.""The Russians slowly, but stubbornly approach theiraims, which nobody except themselves, knows. They neverlose sight of them."

    "Russian politicians have greater freedom of action. Forinstance, Bulganin on an official visit abroad can makebinding dcoisions on the spot if the situation demands it,while Wostern diplomats have to return to their homelandsand ask their parliaments for approval.""Communist policy is more flexible. Communist politiciansare quicker in adjusting to new situations."

    The Communist powers have entered into pontact withother ooun'trica (visits abroad) > 5"On their visits abroad leading Communist politicianshave won friends by concluding treaties with thorn,"

    "The fact that so many Eastern politicians get invi-tations from foreign governments makes me think so,""Thinking of the trips of the Russian leaders, you can'thelp calling then successful."

    V/ITH RESPECT TO FIGKTING STRENGTH ( 2?S)The fighting power of the Communist countries (their warand economic potential) has grown ; 2"iis far as rear!.iament is concerned, the Russians have donemuch to catch up with the V/ost*""Russia has increased its power by making other countriesits satellites."

    WITH RESPECT TO ECONOMIC AFF/.IRS ( 1$^)The Goumunist powers have extended their trade relations :"They have established trade relations with many countries.They have even made inroads on markets dominated by thei7est.""The have increased their influence on the Asian andAfri can marke ts

    WITH RESPECT TO DOMESTIC POLICY ( l/o)Conditions in Russia have improved ;"The Russian government has eased the stress on itspeople,""Life has becoiae easier for the Communist workers.Large-scale mechanization has been introduced, even inChina,"

    (Cont'd on next page)

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    (Contd from precGding page) West GermanyOTHER AiTSVffiRS ^ ^'^"^ ."Sportsmen from the Eastern countries have beatentheir Y^estern counterparts."

    "If you follow the developments in the world overthe radio, you'll come to the conclusion that theEast is making greater progress than the West."

    NO OPINIOI0ro ANS'rfER 5^

    Some respondents gave more than one answer.

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    LEADING VffiSTERK SUCCESS SEEN IN WEST'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPlffiNT ,..The advanced state of economic affairs receives the largest

    single number of mentions (65^) as a success of the Western pov;ers,while the strongthcning of Western defense follov/s with 4 pcr cent,

    "If you look at the political situation in the worldas a vi/hole, v/hich side has had iTiore success lately:The Communist powers or the Western powers?"

    IF "Western powers" ;"Why are you of this opinion? In what i>3spect havethe Western powers had more success?"

    Summary Table West GermanyV/ith Respect to Fpreign Policy ( Qfo)

    The Y/est enjoys a better reputationin the world than the East ^foThe Communist idea is less and lessattractive to the world 2

    The Western powers advocate the causeof peace 1Western politicians are more capablethan their Eastern counterparts 1The \7est has forces the Russians tonegotiate and to yield 1

    'With Respect to Econonio Affairs ( ffo)The economic development of the West is

    more advanced than that of the East 6The economic aid program of theWestern po\jers is effective 1

    Yfith Re spect to Fighting Strength ( 4^)v'/'ostern defense (its v/ar and economicpotential) has been strengthened

    V/ith Respect to Domestic Tolicy ( 2^)In the Western countries there is truedemocratic freedom

    Other Answers ( 3^)No Opini on/No Answer ( 3^)

    Some respondents gave more than one answer.

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    COJOffiKTS IN DETAIL ..."If you look at the political situation in the worldas a wholo, which side has had more succoss lately:The Communist powers or the 'Jestern powers?"

    IF "\/estcrn powers" t"\/hy are you of this opinion? In v;hat respect havethe Western powers had more success?"

    V/est GermanyWITH RESPUCT TO FOREIGN POLICY (The West enj oys a better reputation in the worldthan the East ;"The -.ostcrn powers enjoy high prestige with all nations,and they entertain connections to all places.""The United States has won the sympathy of all highlydovelopod nations,, Russia will never achieve suchsuccess*"

    "Because the Western standpoint is more willinglyaccoptcd by people throughout the world."The Coanunist idea is loss and lees attractive tothe worldi"The fact that the Commiinists lost votes in Europeancountries makes ne think so.""Communist influence is decreasing everywhere in theworld.""Though Russia does everything in its power, Communistideas don't gain ground in the West."

    The ./estcrn powers advocate the cause of peace ;"The Western powers have done a lot for the preservationof peace."

    "If the ./estcrn powers wouldn't be so devoted to peace,a third world war would have broken out years before."

    We stern jp olit ic ians are norc capable than theirEastern counterparts i"As far as I know, the leaders of the Western govern-ments arc more capable than the functionaries of theEast,""The i/estcrn powers are more efficient. They getthings organized,"

    The t/est has forced the Russians to negotiateand to yiGld>"The V/estern powers finally exerted some pressure onthe Russians, thus getting them to compromise,"

    "At negotiations the 'Western powers have been moresuccessful lately,"

    (Cont'd on next page)

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    (Cont'd from preceding page) .Vest GermanyWITH RESPSCT. TO ECONOMIC AFFAIRS ( 7?)Tho econorax e developinent of the ,/est is more advancedthan that '~of the "East 6^"Tho econonic situation of the West is stable. You cannotsay the sauo of the economy of the East*""The economic situation is far better in the West thanit is in the East,""Western nations are more advanced in the economicfield than the East. Hunger is uniaiown in V/esterncountries.""People in the Western countries arc better off thanpeople in the East.""Sufficient jobs are available in the Western countries*The average person is in a position to feed his family*If you load a modest life, you can get along fine."

    The oconomi o aid program of the ;7estern powersis effoctivQ 1"The Western powers have attained great success throughtheir economic aid program.""Through their aid programs they have won the friend-ship of j-iany nations."

    WITH RESPECT TO FIGHTING STRENGTH ( 4/^>)Western defense (its war and econonic potential)has been Gtrongthcned;"The Westei-n j>owGrs have succeeded in building up astrong bulv/ark against Russia," "I think it's because of NATO. This organization re-presents an efficient safeguard against the East,""The Western bloc has gained in po\;er with West Germanyas a strong partner,"

    }VITH RESPECT TO DOMESTIC POLICY ( 2?^) /In the V/c stcrn countries there is true democratiofrecdon t"The Western nations are democracies where the individualenjoys personal freedom,"

    "Life is easier in a free world than in an enslavedcountry,"

    "People in the West live more freely than people in thoEast/'

    OTHER ANSTffiRS . ( 3?^)"Because ',/ostern propaganda is more effective.""The Russians talk big, but do little.""They simply are more successful, there is nodoubt about it."

    NO OPINION/NO ANSVfflR L-Ml Some respondents gave more than one answer,

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    PUBLIC DIVIDED OVER ADHERENCE TO POLICY OF STRENGTH ...The question of continuing the policy of strength towards

    Russia finds the largest segment of the \/Qst Gernan populationunable to take a stand (45?^ are undecided). Among that portionwith an opinion, slightly more (51^) would rather maintain apolicy of strength towards the Russians than pursue any otherpolicy (26^o)

    "If it were up to you, would you continue thepresent policy of. strength towards Russia, orwould you prefer to adopt a different policy now?"West Germany

    Adhere to present policy "^"ifoAdopt different policy 26No opinion 4?

    IQOfo

    THOSE FAVORING A POLICY OF STRENGTH SAY IT IS THE ONLY WAY TO DEALmTd THE RUSSIANS . .Alraost hc.lf of those who wore in favor of the policy of strength

    explain their stand with reference to the fact that this is simplythe only vaj to deal with the Russians (l5/^-) The past effective-ness of the policy of strength and the "belief that it will keep theRussians from an act of aggression are arguments each of which iscited by an additional 5 per cent.

    "If it were up to you, v/ould you continue thepresent policy of strength towai'ds Russia, orwould you prefer to adopt a different policy now?"

    IF "Adhere to present policy" z"Why would you continue the policy of strength?"V/est Germany

    Only through a policy of strength can one get anywherewith the Faissians i"If you want the Russians to give in, you }iave to forcethem to do so,""Because only power can impress the Russians."

    "If we discontinue the present policy of strength, theRussians will think they can lead us by the nose.""v.'e mustn't show any weakness because the Russians willat once turn it to their advantage."

    "The Russians would interpret yioldingncss as weakness.""Otherwise they would treat us badly."

    (Coiat'd on next page)

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    (Cont'd from preceding page) West GermanyA policy of strength has proved to bo effective so far; 55o"Our foreign policy has proved to be all right, Y/e havbeen quite successful in this field.""This policy has turned out very well. Russia gave innow and then.""A policy of strength is the most successful policyof all,"

    "The results of this policy have been of advantage tous up till now,"

    li policy of strength protects us from attacksfrom the East ; 5"A policy of strength will prevent Russia from launching awar of aggression,""Because then the Russians will abstain froia a war outof fear.""Otherwise i/e'd be gradually swallowed up by the East,""If we arc strong, we can fael nore safe from the Easternperil."

    One cannot trust the Russians ; 2"The Russians don't lay their cards upward on the table.""One can't trust the Russians, They are wily,""You never know what the Russians are up to, I don'tthink the Russians are honest."

    A policy of strength contributes towards the pre-servation of peace ; '"I would continue this policy of strength because ithelps to preserve peace,""Only if the East lives in permanent fear of the V/ostcan war be prevented,"

    A policy of strength contributes towards thereunification of Germany;"This policy of strength should even be consolidated.The more consistent it iS| the sooner the reunificationproblem can be settled,""Because otherwise Russia won't give in and permitfree elections,"

    Other answers ;"Because otherwise another party, one that sympathizeswith Communism, night get on top,""ViAiat else can we do? i7ith no military power behindus, we can't but make the best of a bad bargain.""It would be foolish for \/est Ger/aany to face the hugecontinent of Russia alone,"No opinion/lio answer ;

    Some ros^jondents gave more than one answer.

    1

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    "NEGOTIATIONS, CONCESSIONS AND PEACE" ADVOCATED BY THOSE INEiiVOR OF A DIFFEllENT POLICY ...

    The bulk of those favoring the adoption of a policy differentfrom the policy of strength (1.9^^ out of 265^) suggest that negotiations,and concccsions should form the basis for the policy toward Russia -an attitude that the Soviets would undoubtedly like to sec spread,

    "If it were up to yoU| would you continue thepresent policy of strength towards Russia, or;vould you prefer to adopt a different policy now?"

    IF "Adopt different policy" ;"";i'hich other policy would you prefer?"

    West QermaigyA policy based on negotiations, concessions, and peace t 19?""I prefer skilled diploraacy and negotiations.""I Y^ould prefer a policy pivoting on negotiations,mutual guarantees and concessions.""I prefer peaceful co-existence.""I want a more yielding attitude - a policy that showsmore consideration for the fate of our brothers behindthe Iron Curtain.""I'm for a policy of peace and more readiness tonegotiate,""I'm for a policy of appeasement"

    A policy aiming at disarmament ; T"A mutual agreement on disarmament would serve us betterthan a policy of strength."

    "I would insist on general disarmament,"Neutrality t "^"I prefer a policy that is based on neutrality.""A policy of strict neutrality is my choicei,"A policy furthering economic cooperat ion: 1"I give preference to a policy that brings about traderelations with Russia,""It would be a good thing to enter into trade relations withthe Russians."

    Other answers ; 5"I would prefer the .policy of the Social Democrats sincethey fight for freedom.""Our policy towards Russia should be as inscrutable asthat of the Russians."

    "The individual nations should come to an agreement onwhat kind of policy is to be adopted towards Russia."

    No opinion/No answer ;

    Some respondents gave more than one answer.

    2

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    M/.JORITIES FAVOR EXPANDIiTC CULTURAL iilTO ECONOMIC RELATIONS'v/ITH RUSSIA .,,

    'vYhatevex reserve the Germans hold vis-a-ris Russia as 'thefountain head of Communism, majorities would like to sco certainrelations Ijotween the two countries expanded. Almost six-tenths(58^) say that cultural relations should be expanded, as against16 per cent who say they should not be expanded, 'ivith regard toeconomic relations^ a still greater percentage favors an expansionof such relations (66^). Only 15 per cent voice the opinion thateconomic relations between Germany and Russia should not bo expanded.

    "In your opinion, should West Germany expand itscultural relations with Russia, or not?""And how about the economic sector: ShouldWest Germany, in your opinion, expand itseconomic relations with Russia, or not?"

    West GermanyCultural Economicrelations relations

    Expand 58^ 665^Not expand 16 13No opinion 26 21

    lOOfo iQOfo

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    Section 2; Reunification

    ON OPEIT qUERY 'RUSSIA' AlID 'BOTH SIDES i ECiUALLY BLMIED FOR COILTINUED DIVISION OF GERIIANYT-wo different approaches were employed to find out who is "blamed

    by the Germans for the division of their country. In an open (un-structured) answer situation three out of ten Gerraans {2S^/o) reportedthat the division of the country is due to the Soviets' attitude onthe subject. It is noteworthy, however, that an equally largeproportion of the population put the blaae on both East and T/est (29^),while a substantial minority (9/0 felt that the reason why theircountry is not yet reunited lies with the Germans themselves, bethey citizens of the T/estern or Eastern parts of the country. Only2 per cent blame the \T9st exclusively for Germany still being divided.

    "Y/hat ' s the reason, in your opinion, for East and'.Test Germany not yet being vmited?"

    Svimmary Table

    O

    Russia is to blameRussia is not willing to negotiateRussia is to blame (general oomnents)Russia still seeks world revolutionEast Zone follows Russian ordersRussia fears a strong, unitedGermany

    Both East and \7e3t are to blameThejr are both unyieldingBoth are uninterestedBoth are to blame (general comments)Yalta and Potsdam AgreementsOther comments

    U.S. or the West is to blameU.S. or the V/est is to blame(general comments)The V.'est is not willing tonegotiateOther comments

    Germany is to blameFederal government policy barsreunificationFault of Germans in East and WestOther comments

    There are other political and economicreasonsThe competeing ideologiesEconomic reasons (general comments)Other comments

    No opinion/no answerLess than one half of one per cent.Some respondents gave more than one answer.- 14 -

    West Germany(29^;0

    522

    (29^9I6^b8511

    ( 2^0

    ( r/o)

    ( af.)

    lo

    *1

    f*

    13

    122^104^b

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    COmffillTS IIT DETAIL"IThat's the reason, in your opinion, for East andV/est Gernany not yet being united?"

    RUSSIA IS TO BLAl.IERussia ie not uilling to negotiate ~ is notinterested ;"The Russians are to 'blane for it. They do notconsent to negotiations,""Russia alv/ays enploys evasions. It has no genuineinterest in a reunification of Gernany,""The Russians aluays draw "back at negotiations.""The Russians are still interested in exploiting theEast.""The Russians are not inclined to return anyterritories i/hich they once get under their control,"Russia is to "blane (general cocmonts) ;"The Russians and only the Russians are the onesto "blane,""The CoLinunists are rosponsi"ble for this,""Russia is the only one to blano,"Russia still seeks world revolution ;"The o"bstinacy of the Soviets \7ho cling tothe ideology of a world revolution is the naino"bstacle to a reunification of Gernany."The Russians v/ant to rule the ^7hole worldoEast Zone follo^73 Russian orders ;"The East Zone governnent only follows Russianorders,

    "It is partly the fault of the East Zonepopulation for the Russio,ns have influenced thenconsidora'bly already."

    Russia fears a strong united Gernany ;"The Russians are afraid of a strong Gernany,""Russia is to "blane for this because it fearsa united Gernany,"

    West Gernany

    Wo

    BOTH EAST AlID Y.Ti;ST ARE TO BLMIEThey are both unyielding, they cannot cone toan agrocnont ;

    (29'/0

    "Unfortunately, neither the Russians nor theAnericans are willing to give in,""Reunification is held up by the unyieldingnessof the East and the Most,""It's the fault of the U.S. and Soviet Russia bocauGOthey don't cone to terns.""Contrasts between East and Y'est are very pro-nounced and neither side is ready to conpronisc,""There is a lack of cooperation. East and T.'ostshould establish friendlier relations."

    (Cont'd on next page)

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    (Cont'd fron prcoecling page)T/ost G-ornany

    Thoy are Taoth not intcroatod in rcunifioatlon ; 8^"In ny opinion, the forncr allies have only littleinterest in our being reunified.""Germany is unable to achieve reunification by it-self, and neither the I]ast nor the Vest is reallyinterested in it""It's the \7holo situation. In ny opinion, neitherRussia nor the Y/est is interested in reunification,""It's the lack of good will on the part of the Eastand the \7ost. Thoy both are disinterested inreunification."Both are to blanc (general conraents) ; 3"It's the East's and the T.'est's fault.""Probably the Russians and the Anericans o.re toblane for it,"Yalta and Potsdan Agreenents bar reunification ; 1"The Potsdan Agreenont is the cause of it. It allshould have been straightened out long ago,"

    "It's the Yalta Agreonent,"Other connents ; 1"Because America and Russia fear a strong Gemany,""It's because thoy fear each other,""Because they have not yet exploited us sufficient-ly."THE U.S. OR THE Y/EST IS TO BLAMEThe U.S. or the ;/est is to blane . . (gonoralcoiunentsTl"It's the fault of the Anericans,""In ny opinion the YJest is nainly responsiblefor this."

    The Uest is not willing to negotiate - does notwant reunification ;"In ny opinion, a reunification of Germany isbeing prevented mainly by the Y/'^.stern powers.""They use the wrong policy. The Y/estern powerstoo, should give in a bit,"

    Other connents ;"The Anericans are to bo blamed for this.They left us at the nercy of the Russians.""In ny opinion, reunification has not beenachieved yet because the Y'cstorn pov/ers havenot been firn enough with the Russians."

    * Less than one half of one per cent,

    (Cont'd on next page)

    ( 2^0

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    (Cont

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    MAJORITY BL/J.IE I TIIE E.IST < Y.'HElI CIIOOSIIIG BSr-.^ElT EAST LITDUEST ...To 0, closod-ond approach asking yhother East or West was

    chiefly to "blane 52 per cent responded by blaning the East forthe fact that there are still two Gernanys today. Again sone-what over a quarter (2?/^, as conpared with 29 per cent inresponse to the open-end question) attribute an equal share ofthe blane to the East and the Uest. Only one in twenty Gernans(55a)thinks the West is uainly to blane.

    "In your opinion, who is chiefly to blane forGernany still being divided, the V.'est or theEast?"

    T/est Gernany

    West . 3f^East " 52Both equally to blane(volunteered) 27ITo opinion 16

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    OHLY Ol-TE OUT OF SIX SAYS RUSSIAIIS HAVE "PPROVED- OF REUIIIFICATIOII. . .

    The va,st najority of the V/ost C-ernan population is unav/crcthat the Soviet leaders have publically expressed their fundanontalagreenent with the thesis of Gernan reunification, T,lien askedwhether the Russia,ns have ever expressed their ha^ic approval ofthe idoG, only one out of six (165j) said they had^ while an out-ri;ht najority a,nswered that they had not (53^j).

    "As far as you know^ have the Russians ever ex-pressed thoir basic approval of reunification, orhaven't they?"Y/95t Gcruany

    Yes, they have . IG]^ITo, they haven't . 55IIo opinion 31100^

    In follov7ing up this query to see whether tliose who saidthat the Russians had approved of reunification could say where,or when this happened or who had said it, it was found that onlyone person out of fourteen (75^ in the population) really couldgive specific answers.

    "Can you tell ne when or where this happened, orwho expressed this?"

    Svirjnary Table

    Sj)Gcific ansv;ers (75^^);^t the Four Power Conference inGeneva in 1955 4/^Bulganin, Krushchev 1During Adenauer's Moscow visit 1At the Berlin Confcronce in 1954 1Stalin *

    General ansv;ers ( 5/^)On other or not stated occasions 5/^

    IIo opinion/lTo answer ( 7/j )19$^^' Less than one half of one per cent.Q Sone respondents gave norc than one answer.

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    comiEiTTS III det;-il ..."As far 0.3 you knou, have the Russians ever ex-pressed their basic approval of reunification,or haven't they?"

    IF "Yes, they have" ;"Can you tell lue v/hen or where this happened,or T;ho expressed this?"

    V.'cst GernanySPECIFIC iJISV,"ERS ( T/o)At the Four Power Conference in Geneva in 1955 ? 45^"This happened at the Four Pov/er Conference in Geneva,""On the occasion of negotiations in Geneva.""1955 in Geneva."Bui iTanin , Krushchev ; 1"Bulganin and Krushchev said so on the occasion ofsone official visit abroad,""It was Bulganin who said so."Durinf? .Idenauer's visit to Moscow in 1955 ' 1"They said so when Adenauer visited Moscow."On the occasion of Adenauer's visit to Russia."At the Berlin Confcronoo in 1954 ' 1"This happened about l-g- years ago during thePour Power Confcrenoo in Berlin.""At the conference in Berlin,Stalin: *"It \:cD Stalin vho varnod Gcruqny to join the IIATO,aa this vould render the rounixioation of GoruanyOTon noro difficult-""Stalin said so at cono party rally,"

    e:]iii:rj-ii .uts-.vers ( 5^)On other or not speoiflcally stated occagjons ; 55S"They say so in every propaganda speech - on theoccasion of the 1st of May celebrations, forinstance."It v/as nontioned when denands v/ere raised fordiscussions between the East and the '..'est Geraangoverni-.ents. "

    ITO OPIlTIOlT/iTO .INSV.fER ( 7^019pG* Loss than one half of one per cent.G "^oae respondents gave aorc than one ansv/or.

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    ONE OUT OP rOUR BELIEV3S REUITIFICATIOII COULD BE ACHIEVED THBOUGHBOiW-P;JTKO',; P..RLEYS . . .

    Slightly nore than a quarter of the West G-ernan population (27/^)is of the opinion that the reunification of Gernany could be achievedin exactly the v/ay which is "being suggested "by the East, i.e.through negotiations hetyeen the Federal Govornnent and the Pankowgovernnent. Less than a najority, alnost half of the people {A6fo) fhowever, think that this road would not lead to reunification.

    "The Russians have repeatedly stated that a reuni-fication of Gernany can be brought about onlythrough negotiations bet?/een the \,'est Germangovernnent in Bonn and the East

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    As to T/hat \7ould be tho outoono of such negotiations, halfof the people (51'^) a,gain take an optinistic viow by saying thatthey v/ould bring the reunification problen nearer to solution.'while one fifth of the people {ZCP/j) think that this v;ould not bethe case, an even larger seguent (29/j) is uncertain i;hat the out-coae v/ould be,

    "Do you believe such negotiations v;ould bring usnearer to G-ornan reunification, or don't yovxthink so?"

    Uest GrorpanyYes, would bring us nearer 51/^ITo, v/ould not bring us nearer 20ITo opinion 2^

    1005$

    IJlOm THOSE F..V0EI1IG iTEC-OTI.'JTIOlIS, THERC IS OlILY LITTLE HOPE HKIJSREUillFICATIOH ".'OULD .ICTU.'.LLY EE ..CHIEVEB ...

    Fortunately, the subject of the Gernan Anbassador's possiblenegotiations over reunification v;as not restricted to the two generalquestions just presented. Had that been the case, tho reader nightbe uisload into thinking that the T."eat Gornans believe reunificationcould be achieved if only their anbassador would open talks inMoscow,

    Those individuals who felt the Gernan Anbassador either shovildor should not negotiate were also asked why they thought he shoulddo that

    Even though a najority had replied that the Gcruan jViubassadorshould negotiate with tho Russians on the question of Gernan reuni-fication only a ninority of 11 per cent express their confidencethat reunification might indeed be achieved that way. The greatbulk merely feels that something has to be done no matter howslight chances for success nay actually be. Negotiations, intheir opinion, nay at least clarify the situation.

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    COIIEIIIS IIJ DETAIL

    "In your opinion, should the Gornan Antasscdor inMosco\7,. I.!r Haas, negotiate directly v/ith theRussians on the question of Gernan reunificationat the present tiuo, or shouldn't he?"

    IF "Yes, he should negotiate" ;"For v/hat reasons shovild he negotiate?"V/eat Gomany

    ITo stone luust "be left unturned ;"Even if hope for success is only slight, noopportunity shoii.ld he ignored,""Something has to be done, after all. Talking alonewon't help.""Sone initiative fron the side of the yect Gernangovernment v;ould do no harn,""negotiations between Mr. Haas and the Russians\/ouldn't raake things v/orse,""Even if conpotent results can't be achieved with-out the Big Four agreeing, such negotiations wouldat least serve to establish contact between thetwo nations.""Only initiative can lead us out of this ness."

    22^y^

    Reunification nay be achieved ;"Direct negotiations nay help to achieve our ob-jective, ""The rcvuiification prbblon covild then be settledwithin a shorter period of tine.""negotiations will evontxir.lly pave the way forrefugees to go back to their homeland.""Because as a result of such negotiations wepossibly can return to our homeland,"Direct negotiations offer a greater chance of success ?"Direct negotiations v/ith i.Ioscow may tu.rn out morefruitful since the East Zone leaders are just puppets,'"He lives on the spot so that it is easier for hinto achieve something than for somebody else.""Direct negotiations have alv/ays proved to be mostsuccessful.

    (Cont'd on next page)

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    (Cont'd fron preceding page)Y/e st Geraany

    It is the aain task of the Gernan ixubassadorin Moscow ; 5/"^"To bring about negotiations is what Mr, Haas hasbeen sent to lioscov; for, and for what he is paid.""Because otherwise his assignment to Moscow v/oiildhave no meaning,""He has been comiissioned to contribute towardreunification, which is the dominating concornof the 'i.'est German government,"

    Negotiations nay help to clarify the situation ; 4"In order to find out where we stand.""Ve should coue to an agreement, at last^ one wayor the other.""They can't put us off any longer."

    ITegotiations on reunification are a Gorman concern ; 2"It is up to us Germans to act.""The Big Powers have no interest in reunifyingGemany , anyway ,

    ITegotiations prevent war ; 2"ITegotiations are better than v/ar,"ITegotiations v:ould prevent war,"Other answers ; 3".lustria also achieved results through negotiations,""Ec could prepare final negotiations between thebig statesmen.""Reunification can only be achieved with Russianconsent,"Ho opinion/lTo answer ;

    Q Some respondents gave more than one ansv/or.585^

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    REPUS:.L TO ITSGOTI/.TE I.L-.IIILY B.ISDD Oil GDITEIL^L DISl^RUST OFnussi-Uis ... . .

    The lar:7GSt ^roup of those who v/ould not liko to sgg .l;.iba,ssadorHacs iiGC'otir.to with tho P.iissians feel that it is sinply useless totalk with the Soviet authorities on the natter (6^j). Others thinkthat such negotiations arc just not the Anhassador's jo"b (2'/i) orthat the present uooent would not be v/ell chosen for such necotiations

    "In your opinion, should the Gernan Anhassador inI.ioscow, llr. HaaB> ne-jotiato directly with theRussians on the q^uostion of Gernan reunificationat the present tine, or shouldn't ho?"

    IF "ITo, he shouldn't nef:otiate" ;"For what reasons shouldn't he ne^^otiate?"

    Vi'est GernanyIt is useless to negotiate with the Russians j 6f/j"negotiations with the ^lussians will always turnout a flop. They won't abandon their plans,"

    "',7e wouldn't achieve anything at such negotiations.""Negotiations v/ill be useless, only free electionscan bring about reunification.""Because nothing will be gained by it."

    The present nonent is not opportune ; 2"The tiuo isn't ripe yet for nogotiaticns on thisissuG." ,"The right tiuo hasn't cone yet. Tho Russiansnay bccone norc yielding in the course of tiae.""Because it is useless at the present tine,"

    It his not his task ; 2"He nay enter into contact \/ith the Russians, butho is not in a position to nako final dooisions."

    "Hg nay broach the subject, but ho is not avithorizodto negotiate on the natter,""Negotiations on Gernan reunification do not fallundor his scope, that's a concern of the heads ofgovernnent.

    It is the exclusive concern of the Big Fowors 1"It is the exclusive concern of the four alliesto settle the reunification problen."That is a business of the Eig Fowers."

    (Cont'd on next page)

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    (Cont'd from preoeding page)Y/est Germany

    T/e should not do anythin,? without ourWestern allies ; '^r"Negotiations with the Russians should onlyhe held together with the V/estern Powers."

    "\7e Germans alone should never negotiate withthe Russians,"

    As we are not a powerful nation such negotiationswould he futile ; 1"Such negotiations will be unavailing since wehave no power hehind us.""Not before Germany has grown more powerful willnegotiations with the Russians be of any use,"Other anSTjers ; 2"It is not certain that such negotiationscomply with the wishes of the German people.""The Federal Government wouldn't be able toaccept the Russian conditions,""One man alone can't successfully negotiate withthe Russians on this issue, it needs a v;holedelegation,"

    No opinion/No ansv;er ; , *^15^

    * Less than one half of one per cent, Some respondents gave more than one answer.

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    Section 3^ General Apjjraisal of Latest Rvissian Policies .

    a. HosGow's "New Look"

    LESS TflAIl IvLAJORITY iJO./ TIIIITKS RUSSIANS HAVE BECOiE MOliE GOIICILIATORY ...A battery of five questions was used to get at the overall

    judgment of the eocalled "new look" apparent in Soviet politicssince Stalin" s death. The first question reveals that today only a bareplurality (40^) think the Russian attitude tov/ards the V/est hasbecome more conciliatory. Right after Stalin's death in 1953 smajorit;'- {3^%) thought so. Correspondingly j a third of tho people(35^) i^o'w say the Russians have not become more conciliatory, asagainst a quarter {23'fo) who said the same three years ago.

    "Do you have the impression that the attitude ofthe new Russian government towards the V/est hasbecome more conciliatory recently or not?"

    West Germany

    April 1955 June 1956~~rr^ (1845JHas become moreconciliatory 52^o 40^Not become moreconciliatory 25 * 35Ho opinion 2^ 25100^ 100^

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    RELEASE OF FRISOIfflRS, FOREIGll VISITS OF LEADING RUSSIAN STATESLENAND STRONGER l/ILLINGl>IESS TO NEGOTIATE SEEN AS IMIK EVIDENCE OPMORE CONCILIATORY ATTITUDE . .Those people who thought that the Russians had become more

    conciliatory recently vjere able to cite many different instancesof what they ref^arded as examples. The three leading examples,accounting for more than half of the instances cited v.'ere:

    - Release of prisoners . (135^0- Visits of Russian statesmen to foreigncountries (''05')- Greater willingness to negotiate ("lO^)

    The big denunciation of Stalin was only mentioned by 4 pe^" cent.

    "Do you have the impression that the attitude ofthe new Russian government towards the vfest hasbecome more conciliatory recently or not?"

    IF "Has become more conciliatory" :"Can you think of any signs showing that theattitude of Russia has become more conciliatoryrecently? (Probe: And what about internalaffairs (foreign affairs)?)"

    Summary Table West GermanyForeign Affairg (44/^)

    Release of prisoners 15^The visits of leading Russian statementto foreign countries 10Greater v;illingnoBS to negotiate 10

    Relaxation of border controls 5Exchange of diplomats betweenMoscow and Bonn 2Invitation of iVestern statesmen to Moscow 2Russian efforts towards disarmament 2Invitation to Tito to visit Moscow 1Trade offers to the Yi/est . 1Internal^ Affairs ( 85^)Denouncing of Stalin 4Improvement in the Russian domestic sector 3Relaxations granted in the Soviet Zone 1

    Misc_ellaneous ( 4^)It is Just a maneuver 2Other answers 2

    No opinion/No answer ( 4/)

    i3 Some respondents gave more than one ansv/er.

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    COIvDviSNTS Ii\' DETAIL . . ."Do you have the impression that the attitude ofthe new iiussian government towards the V/est hasiDecorae more conciliatory recently or not?"IF "lias become more conciliatory":"Can you think of any signs showing that theattitude of Russia has become more conciliatoryrecently? (probe: And- what about internal affairs(foreign affairs)?)"

    West GermanyFOREIGII AFPAIRS (44/fc)Release of prisoners ; 1 5^"The release of POVifs and political prisoners is asign of it,""The release of POVk's proves it.""They surely have become more conciliatory^ becauseotherv/ise they wouldn*t have repatriated the POWs.""Persons imprisoned under Stalin were amnestied."

    "An indication of this is their conciliatory attitudeconcer'ning the POW problen which they demonstrated onthe occasion of Adenauer's visit to Moscow,"

    The visits of leadiiif-'; Russian statesmen toforeign countries ; 10"The trips of nussian diplomats to foreign countriesprove it.""The Russian loaders meeting other statesmen is asign of it,""An indication of this is the official visit toEngland," *"They travel abroad in order to get into contactwith other nations.""They often travel abroad and then keep smiling allthe ti':ic."

    Greater willingness .to negotiate ; , . 10"They keep trying to enter into negotiations.""The Russian government has become more tolerant. Theyseek to negotiate with the West.""An indication of this is their conciliatory attitudeas regfbrds negotiations.""Russia is more willing to negotiate."

    "As concerns foreign policy: They try to get into con-tact with the Western nations."

    Relaxation of border controls ; 5"Border controls are no longer as strict as they usedto be,"

    "It's easier now to cross the borders. The big shotstravel around and private visitors are also welcome,""There's no more chicanery to cope vjith when crossingthe border,"

    (Cont'd on next page)

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    (Cont'd from preceding page) West GermanyExchange of diplomats between Moscow and Bonn : 2?S"The fact that Bonn and Moscow established diplomaticrelations is an indication of this.""They sent diplomats to Bonn and \ie sent diplomats toMoscow*"Invitation of Western statesmen to Moscow ; 2"The invitation of V/estern statesmen to Moscow is asign of it, Stalin would never have done that,""Adenauer has been invited to travel to Moscow althoughhe did not invite the Russian leaders to come toGermany,"

    Russian efforts towards disarmament ; 2"The Russians intend to reduce their military forces.They promised to withdraw their troops,""They reduced their army by 640,000 men,"Invitat ion to Tito to visit Moscow j 1"They even invited Tito to come to Moscow, although theyhad condemned him in the pasti""I'm thinking of that Tito affair. He has been rehabili-tated and invited to visit Moscow,"

    Trade offers to the \/est ; 1"Trade offers are a sign of this*""The trade agreements with all Western countries are anindication of this,"

    INTERNAL AFFAIRS - ( Qfa)Penouncing of Stalin ;"An indication of this is that they made Stalin ascapegoat and got him down from his pedestal,""They have condemned Stalinism, Now they are seeking abetter understanding with the other nations,"

    "The whole attitude of the Russians has changed afterStalin's death. They revile him now,"Improvement in the Russian domestic sector ; ["Domestic policy now tends toward introducing demo-cratic practices,""Various relaxations have been granted to the population,""The standard of living has improved in Russia,"Relaxations granted in the Soviet Zone ;"The rigid regime exerted in the Soviet Zone has beenrelaxed,""The standard of living in the East Zone has alsoimproved,

    (Cont'd on next page)

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    (Cont'd from preceding page) West GomanyMISCELLAITEOUS ( ^io)It is just a maneuver ; 2"/$"It isf and always has been, riothin/i- but dccuitfultrickery,""They only want to throw dust in our eyes."Other ansv/ors : 2"There's a cultural rapprochement.""Russian sportsmen participate in yestern sportsactivities and vice versa,"

    NO opinion/n.o ANS'vTER . ( 4/^)607=Q

    Some respondents gave more than one answer.

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    IC&JOEITY THIITKS CHANGES IN SOVIET POLI':ICS v/EEE NOT EPITECTED BYi/ESTERN POLICY OF STRENGTH ...

    Moi-c than half the people (55?^) believe that the recentchanges in Soviet politics are due to the appearance of new leadersand that they were in no ;vay corapelled to shift policies. Only asmall ainority (16^-) entertains the opinion that the V/ostcrn policyof strength has "brought about those changeg. Almost one in ten (8?^),howevGr, says that no changes have occurred at all.

    "Some people say that Soviet foreign policy hasshifted recently. Here are two views concerningthe main reason why the Soviets changed theirpolicy. Do you agree with Mr, A, or vjith Mr. B?(card)

    Mr A . ; I think the main I'sason the Sovietschanged their policy is that the oldpolicies failed because of Westernstrength.

    Mr. B. ; I don't think the Soviets were inany way compelled to change theirpolicies. It's just that nG\^ leadershave new policies,"

    West GermanyMr. A, 16?t;Mr. B. 55No change in policy

    (volunteered) 8Don' t know 21

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    ONLY OilE IN FIVE BELIEVES IN SINCERITY OF. RUSSIAN NEW LOOK . ,.,A third of the people (53^i) see nothin-- but trickery behind

    the new conciliatory attitvide of the Russians, a device by whichthey wish to lull the vigilance of the west. Others (22/o), whilenot quite as suspicious as that, say the Russians vmnt to gain abreathing spell in the cold war, but have not fundaraentally changedtheir attitude. Only one out of five (205^) seens convinced thatthe Russians are sincerely attempting to establish peaceful relationswith the 'Vest,

    "Three persons are discussing what the reasons forthe conciliatory attitude of the now Russiangovernment raay be, (CiiRD)Herr Schmidt i It' s nothing but deceitful trickerywith which the Russians want to

    lull the vigilance of the V/est.Herr Schulze > All the Russians want is to gain abreathing spell in the cold war,

    they haven't had a change of heart,Herr Hajgr ; The new goveranent of Russia ismaking a sincere effort to bring

    about peaceful relations with the//est.

    Whom would you be most likely to agree with?"We s t Ge fmany

    Schmidt ^trickery) 53?^Schulze (breathing spell) 22Maior (sincere effort) 20No opinion 25100%

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    TEMEITOY TO BELIEVE NEW RUSSi;.N ATTITUDE IS INDICiTIVE OF STRENGTHRATHER TIU.K V/EAKlffiSS ...A Ijare laajority of 'the West Gcrnans seem atle to como to a

    decision as to whother the "new look" indicates weakness orstren;2.'tlT.* Over a third (5^^) were unable to make any answer, andanother jroup (135') e:a.ve a qualified answer begging the issue.

    The largest group among those with an opinion is the one-third(34/') v;ho believe that the new line of the Soviets is' indicative ofstrength. Only half that many {^^'fo) feel that it is indicative ofv;eakness.

    "Do you have the impression tiiat the attitude ofthe nevif Russian government at present is moreindicative of weakness or strength?"West Germany

    Indicative of weakness 17?^Indicative of strength 54ITeither/nor (volunteered andonly if respondent _ insistsafter probing) 11Qualified answer 2Ho opinion 36

    160%

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    13, The Downf^radinf; of Stalin

    HIGH AiTAEEl-IiiiSS OF STiLIW'S EE/ STATUS ...Seven out of ten West Germans proved to be inforraed of the

    anti-Stalin campaign officially initiated early this year. Only 5 percent have the impression that Stalin's official prestige is still"high," while 6 per cent thought that it was "fair,"

    "What prestige does Stalin officially enjoy inRussia at present? High prestige, fair prestigeor low prestige?"

    West Germany

    High prestige YJoFair prestige 6Lo\j prestige 69llo opinion 22

    100foOPIITIOII DIVIDED OVER THE Lffi^'.lTIHG OP THE DESTRUCTION OF THESTALIN IL'L:GE . . .

    V/hen it comes to interpreting the meaning of the anti-Stalin cam-paign, opinion in i/estern Germany appears to he almost equally dividedbetween two possiTjle extremes. Four out of ten (39?'') hold the opinionthat the Soviet aims are still the same ones as during Stalin's life-time, that, in other vi/ords, there hag been no real change in theSoviet system. An almost equally large group (565^), however^ believesthat the renunciation of Stalin is an indication of a change in theSoviet regime tov/ards a more humane and conciliatory form of government,

    " (j-s you may know) At the 20th Congress of the RussianConmiunist Party held in March in Moscow, Mr, Krushchev,the loader of the Russian Communists, in a lengthyaddress spoke against the glorification of Stalin,Among other things, he accused him of having been adictator and liiurderer.Two people are talking about the destruction of theStalin myth, /hich of those two views comes closestto your own opinion? (CARD)

    Herr IJueller ; If the Russians now revile Stalin,They only want to throw dust inour eyes. Actually they pursue thesame objectives as during Stalin's lifetime,

    Herr Schulze t Since Stalin's death many things havechanged in Russia, The regime has becomemore humane, and the new leaders are morewilling to come to an understanding. Therenouncing of Stalin is a clear indi-cation of this,"

    West GermanyMuoiler 59^Schulze 36ITo opinion 25100^

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    Bul;:cniri*'Krushchev Visits Abroad and Aid to jlsia

    Two approaches, the open-end and the closed-end approach,were applied to determine opinions concerning the visits Bulganin andKrushchev had recently made to countries abroad. Both techniquesrevealed that raajority opinion is iiore or less favorable to theseRussian neves.

    ONLY OlE QUARTER SICE SUSPICIOUS MOTIVES BEHIKD VISITS ...

    \ihcn asked to state freely, in their own words, what they thinkis the real purpose behind these trips 59 pc^:" eont use positive orneutral terms to describe the Russian intentions, and particularlystress such things as desire for peace and understanding with othernations {2Cf/o) , Only about a quarter of the respondents (255'j) coneout with negative coLunents, anong which are allusions to deceptive (SJ^)and propagandistic (7^)) motive on the part cf the Soviet loaders.

    'Mr. Bulganin, the Russian Premier, and Mr. Krushchev,the Comraunist Party Chief, have recently visitedseveral foreign countries. In your opinion, ;hat'sthe real purpose of tlioir trips abroad?"

    Summary Table ,-, t. n" West G-ermanyP ositive ox Ileutral Motives (59/^)

    They desire peace and understandingwith other nations 20foThey want to collect information 14They want to win friends and allies 12They want to expand trade relations 5They want to know the V/est 4They enjoy travelling 1They wish to show their new policy 1Other comuents 2

    negative Motives (25'/^)They want to doceiNre the world QfoThey want to make propaganda 7They intend to spy 5One never knows what they are up to 2Tlioy T;ish to impair \/e stern unity 1They want to stall for tine 1Other negative comments 1

    ITo opinion/No answer (26^o)1 08%

    Q Some respondents gave more than one ansv/er.

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    COIC^GIITS liJ DETAIL ..."Mr. Bui ;anin, the Russian premier, and I'.Ir. Krushchev,the Cominunist Party Chief, have recently visitedseveral foreign countries* In your oijinion, what'sthe real purpose of thoir trips abroad?"

    Y/est GermanyPOSITIVE OR iJEUTRAL MOTIVES (595^0They desire peace and understandi ng; with othernations ; 20^-^"They want to achieve a friendly understanding with thewhole \/orld."

    "The Russians want to return the visits foreign states-men paid to their country and want to demonstrate thatthey will leave no stone unturned in order' to preserveworld peace,""They ahominate war and that's why they want to contri-bute towards relaxing existing tensions,"

    "They want to denionstrate to the world that theyhave become more peaceable.""The wc:nt to make the world understand that they arepeople who isill listen to reason.""They strive for a true conciliation between Eastand k/est."

    They wan t to collect information : 1 4'"They want to get an overall idea of how things standin countries outside of Russia."

    "The idea is to get to know people in other countriesand to find out how they feel in order to be able tochart Russian policy accordingly."

    "They want to get an insight into the economic systemsof other countries."

    "They want to find out how people in other countriesfeel about the new Russian government.""V/ell, I guess they want to see for themselves howthings are in other countries and Y

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    (Cont'd fxoin preceding page) V7est GermanyThey v/ant to know the V/cst ; 4^^They v

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    (Gout Id fron preceding page) V/est G-erraany

    They nish to iapair Y/estorn unity i 1?S"They v/ant to separate us from the Western Powers*""They are out to jeopardize and weaken Western unity*"They want to stall for tinie ; 1"Mayhe they want to make up to the others just to ijaintime so that they can develop new tactics,"

    "I can't {jct it out of my head that they are stalling fortime."

    Other ncf;at ive eomacnts ; 1"They want to have a chance to get in touch withCommunists outside of Russia,""They represent themselves as most honorable gentler.ien,"but they only reap distrust, scorn and mockery,"

    NO OPIjION/iIO AilSVv^R (26'^)108^ Some respondents cave laore than one answer.

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    PLUR^'iLITY PICKS POSITIVE OR KEUTRi\L MOTIVi.TION FOR VISITS ...

    Out of four given explanations of the Rvissian motives forthe trips abroad most people (57/^) picked the one referring: to theirdesire to ii;ain information as Bulganin's and Krushchev's doninantmotive. Jinother 12 per cent said that they believed that the Russianswere sincerely attempting to improve their foreign relations. Thusa total of 49 per cent pick positive or neutral descriptions of theRussian motives. Only a fifth of the people (2l5i) accepted the mostnegative statement which said that by these visits the Soviet leaderssought to divert attention from the dark sides of their politicalsystem. The fourth statement saying that the Soviets only haveanti-ViTestern propaganda in mind was selected by 12 per cent. If thoselast tv/o cgroups are added together, we obtain 35 per cent who choosenegative descriptions as the most important motive underlying thoseRussian visits abroad.

    "On this card you find some of the possible raotivogBulganin and Krushchev may have ih mind v/hen visit-ing foreign countries. Please tell me which of thesejjoints do you consider the most iraportant," (CARD)

    West GermanyThey are sincerely attempting to im-prove their rulations with foreign

    countries 12^!^They want to explore foreign feelingin order to be in a better positionto adjust their policies accordingly.. 57They only want to us the opportunityto make anti-'Jestern propaganda 12They want to show their best sides,thus diverting attention from thedark sides of the Soviet system....... 21

    Ho opinion 181

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    COKSIDEPuVBLE UJ'rGEHTAINTY OVER SINCERITY OF RUSSi;JT ECONOMIC AID ...The q-ucstion of the "basic motivation of the Russians in offer-

    ing economic aid to various Asian countries fi-nds the West Germanpuhlic completely unsettled. Approximately four out of ten (59y^)reply "no opinion" to the question of whether the Russians woresincere or not Araonj those with an opinion, there is an almosteven divisiozi - 29/^ say they are sincere, while '^TSjo say that theyare not.

    "During their visit to India last year, the twoRussian statesmen promised Russian oconoinic aid toAsia in the form of goods, loans and technicalassistance. In your opinion, were they sincereah out this promise, or not?"

    West GermanySincere 29^Not sincere 52No opinion 39100^

    BUT SINCERE OR ?0T - AID TO ASIA CONSIDERED THREAT TONATIONAL INDEPSlfDENCE ...Despite the fact that the nore positive opinions outtVQij;;^hed

    negative ones on the question of the Russian visits abroad almosthalf of the people (47/^) f*^^! that acceptance of economic aidoffered hy Buli^-anin on the occasion of his visit to India wouldendanger the independence of the particular country concerned. Only18 per cent think that Russia's Aid to Asia would not constitute athreat to a nation's independence.

    "In your ojpinion, should the iisiatic countries heafraid that tlxrough accepting; Russian economicaid their independence will be endangered orshould they not fear this?"

    V/est GermanyYes, should fear that independencewill be endan/'ered 47?^No, should not fear thatindependence will be endangered 18No opinion 33166^

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    d The Cultural Offensive

    ONLY Oim FIFTH SHOV/S UIJDEKSTAWDING OF CULTURAL OFFENSIVE . . .

    ^iThile many may be concerned with the Russian 'culturaloffensive' as a device T^hich may penetrate a people's con-sciousness and favorably incline them tov;ard the Soviets andthe Soviet system, as far as the West German population goes^it is almost a question of 'Cultural offensive f what is that?In response to an open question as to what they understood orwhat examples of the cultural offensive they could advance,only one out of five (20j6) in the population showed that theyhad an understanding of what was being discussed. They couldeither cite a correct example (lO^-), give a correct descriptionof what the cultural offensive is (7/^) > or could do both (55^)Thus, to eight out of ten West Germans the topic ('RussianCultural Offensive') meant absolutely nothing.

    "There has been much talk of a Russian culturaloffensive recently. What do you understand bythis? Can you give any examples?"

    Summary TableWest Geraany

    Show Understanding (20^)Correct descriptions given J'foCorrect examples cited 10Both correct descriptions and

    examples 5No Understanding {QOfo)Wrong descriptions given 4Russians have little or no culture 5No opinion/No answer 7^100^

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    COMtffiNTS IN DETAIL ..."There has been much talk of a Russian culturaloffensive recently. V/hat do you understand bythis? Can you give me any examples?"

    i7est GermanySHOW UNDERST.'.iTOING (20/i)Correct descriptions p;vQn i ifo"They try to convey an idea of Russian cultureto other people.""They intend to acquaint us with the fine artsof the East."

    "They now send their artiste to the Vifest,""By that I understand Russian artists givingperformances in the West*"Correct examples cited : lO"The Russian ballet performed in Prance forinstance."

    "I'm thinking of the exchange of theatre ensembles.""They want to make Russian operas known in the 'West.""The visits and return-visits of scientists.""We are swamped by a flood of Russian literature.''Both correct descriptions and examples ! 3"The Russian ballet performances are an effort toget people in other countries acquainted withRussian culture,""They want to prove that Russian culture is justas good as ours. They show Russian films ontelevision."

    NO UNDERSTANDING (90?^)Wrong descriptions given ; 4"In my opinion, they at last want to bringculture into the inner parts of Russia,""It means they turn over a new leaf. They'llchange their economic system."

    "By this I understand more reconstruction work,more progress in economic life."Russians have little or no culture ; 5"I guess their culture is something hardly worthmentioning - it's primitive and poor,""They arc not the ones to tell us what cultureis,""They cannot keep pace with other nations'culture. They have none whatsoever,"

    No opinion/No answer ; Tl100%

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    ONE OUT OF HUNDRED H;.S LE.\RNED OF CULTURAL OFFENSIVE THROUGHACTUAL PARTICIPATION ...

    The bulk of thog who know about the cultural offensivehad learned about It through the press and the radio (l^fo)Only one per cent said they had participated in ths activitiesthemaelves, while another one per cent mentioned friends andacquaintances as the source of their knowledge.

    "There has been much talk of a Russian oultxiraloffensive recently. What do you understand bythis? Can you give any examples?"

    IF examples cited ;"Have you participated in these actiaities your-self, or did you hear of them from friends andacquaintances, or did you learn about them throughpress and radio?"

    West GermanyParticipated myself I5SHeard of activities from friends

    and acquaintances 1Learned about activities through

    press and radio 13No opinion 5Not asked 60100^

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    ONLY ONE OUT OF FIVE ATTRIBUTES NEGATIVE PURPOSES TO CULTURALEPFENSIVE . .

    After having Tjeen roughly informed about the existence of thecultural offensive, all respondents were then asked what purposesthey thought tho Russians are pursuing with this nev/ program, Aplurality (48^) Innocently ascribed purposes either friendly orneutral to the '.Test! Three out of ten (50^') gave no answer,while only about a quarter of the people (225'j) responded negativelyby saying that Russian intentions were more or less hostile to theWest,

    "In your opinion; what purpose do the Russianspursue with their cultural offensive?"Summary Table

    YJest GermanyPositive and IndeterminateITc-'rLvcs 48^^Negative Motives 22No opinion/No answer 30

    1005;'.**

    *" Percentages based on respondents rather than on responses.

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    COMffiNTS IN DET.iIL ...

    "In your opinion, v/hat purpose do the Russianspursue with their cultural offensive?"

    POSITIVE AND INDETERMINATE MOTIVESThe Russians want to denonstrate their cultviralachievements and to prove that they are not in-ferior to the West :"The Russians want to make the other nations under-stand that they aren't as primitive and uncult\iredas it is (;;enerally believed.""They want to demonstrate that culture isn't beingneglected in their country*""People over here mustn't go on believing that theRussians are backwoods yokels."

    "The Russians want to prove that their achievements inthe field of culture measure up to internationalstandards.""They want to demonstrate that they are on a parwith the Y/est in the cultural sector,"

    The Russians want to achieve closer and friendlierrelations with the V/est ;"They want to establish a better understanding withthe West.""They want to get out of their isolation. Only byexchanging cultural values can the Russians hope tobetter themselves.""Perhaps they seek a rapprochement, they do not wantto become completely isolated from the rest of theworld,"

    "If the average person learns how people in othercountries live and act, this serves to prepare theway for getting to know each other and ultimatelyto mutual understanding."

    The Russians want to loarn from the V/est :"They want to conform to the cultural trends whichhave developed in the world outside of Russia.""The leading Russians want to bring their people nearerto the lYcstern way of life,""They want to adapt themselves more to the ways of theV/est and want to become more cultured,""They want to keep up with developments abroad* Forinstance, they want to learn what interests peoplein Germany have,"

    The Russians want to gain sympathy and prestige :"They want to become popular abroad.""They want to demonstrate to people that thingsaren't as bad in Russia as it is generally believed.""They want to demonstrate to the world that the Russiansare likable people.""They want to gain the sympathies of the people over here,"

    (Cont'd on next page)

    V/est Germany(52/0)

    18?S

    12

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    (Cont'd froii preceding page)ITeat Gernany

    The Russians desire a cultural exchani^e ; ^o"They do not have any evil desi{jns, I'n sure.Perhaps they want their artists, nusicians andactors, to perforn abroad, and vice versa,""They v;ant to participate in internationalcultural life, too,""It seeiis to nc their only motive can be tocooperate with the V/est in the cultural sphere,"The Russians ginply want to nake poney ; 2"The Russians want to nake noney over here,that's all,""They want to nake noney, artists want to live,too, after all,""They want to get into touch with other nations.The idea is to export goods and to sell part ofthen in our country,"

    The Russians do not have evil notivos ; 1"It cannot he anything evil. There is nothingto be feared,""I'n sure they pursue peaceful purposes,"The Russians have no definite objective in nind; 1"They have no particular object in nind,""There is nothing specific behind the whole thing,"NEGATIVE MOTIVES (23^)The Russians pursue propaganda purposes ; 11"All they want is to nake propaganda for thatridiculous world revolution of theirs,""They want to proclain the great achievcnents ofthe Connunist regino to the rest of the world.""The idea is to blow their ovm trunpet. But,nind you, they arc wolves in sheep's clothing,V/ith this I do not nean the artists. But evenbehind such a cultural program: are politicalwirepullers,""They are looking for a new nethod to carry onpropaganda,"

    The Russians want to deceive the TJest ; 4"They want to divert people's attention fron theirpolicy,""They want to divert the attention of the \/est fronrearnonent and the danger of war,""They want to pull the wool over the eyes of theWest."

    (Cont'd on noxt page)

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    (Cont'd fron preceding page)Y/est Gernany

    The Russians vmnt to carry on espionage ; 5/^"This cultiiral offensive also has a politicalside. The artists v/ho are sent a^broad areordered to carry on espionage,""A cultural nission is a convenient cloak forspies,"

    "The idea behind the whole thing is to send peopleover to spy,"

    The Russians want to gain a stronger influenceover the V/ost and the rest of the world ; 2"The Russians' only ain is to ruin the 'Jest sothat they can bring the whole territory undertheir control,""In that way the Russians hope to gain an in-fluence over the L'est so that they can suppressthe Y/estem nations later on,""They want to regain the strong internationalposition which Czarist Russia occupied in thepast,"

    The Russians pursue dark objectives - theirnotives certainly are not pure : 2"\lellf I'n not quite sure what to nake of it,but there cannot be any doubt about it thatit's nothing laudable,""Their notives certainly aren't honorable,"

    The Russians pursue some political purpose ; 1"They have sone political objective in tiind,I n sure ,"Maybe such a cultural offensive fits intotheir political designs,"

    110 OPIITION/NQ ;i1IS\7ER (30}^)105^Q Sorae respondents gave nore than one answer.

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    SUBSTANTIAL MINORITY BELIEVES CULTUILIL OFFENSIVE UILL BE EFFECTIVEIN CH:JIGING PEOPLE'S OPINION ABOUT RUSSIA ...

    The "Test Gernans are not so sure that the Russian culturaloffensive nay he an effective device to turn puhlic opinion in itsfavor, for there is considerahly less than a najority saying either'yes, people will forn a better opinion of Russia* or 'no, theywon't'

    Throe out of ten V'est Gernans (31/5) "believe that people vailforn a hetter opinion about Russia because of the. cultural offensive,whereas only sli;htly nore, four out of ten (415?^)/ say that thiswill not be the case.

    "Generally speaking, do you believe that people overhere v/ill forn a better opinion of Russia because ofthis cultural offensive, or don't you think so?"

    Yes, will forn better opinionNo, will not forn betteropinionNo opinion

    Y/est Gernany

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    6, Extent of AeTreenent V/ith Russian Moves

    FIVE OUT OP SEVEII FAVOILIBLE DESCRIPTIONS OF RUSSIAN MOVES REJECTED ...In order to get a sunnary picture of T/est Gernan opinions con-

    cerning tho latest Russian noves in the political field, respondentswore approached v/ith a nunber of statenents to v/hich they wore askedto indicate whether they 'believed the assertion to "be correct or notEach statement suggested a favorable ain for those Russian novesThis T/as purposely done in order to ovorcone the expected resistanceto anything labelled as a Russian nove and thus obtain uaxinunacceptance of the given connents

    "Please tell ne how you feel about each of the followingopinions: Do you believe that these assertions arecorrect, or not?" (C..RD)V/est Gernany

    Not NoCorrect correct opinionA - The Russians will agree to thereunification of Gernany providedall-Gornany does not join a Y/esternmilitary alliance 35^ '5% JtQffo, * , 100^$B - Uith their visits to foreigncountries Bulganin and Klirushchevneant to denonstrate their good

    will to live in peaco with theworld 26 43 31C " The destruction of the Stalinnyth shows that the Soviets arc toridding their political systen of

    the inhiinanities which had beconethe Tv.le under Stalin 2? 56 57

    D - The Russians grant ocononic aid tothe Asiatic countries because theyreally want to help then 11 54 55E - Russian disarnanent proposp.ls ainat achieving a relaxation oftensions in the world and ' ' ' "guaranteeing peace 15 49 56F - The sole ain of the cultuxalexchange recently initiated by the

    I^ussians is to inpart to othernations a better undez'standing ofRussian culture 40 26 54

    G - Through the dissolution of Conin-forn, the Connunist informationagency, the Russians have denonstratedthat they no longer seek to bringabout a Connunist revolution inother countries 8 51 4^

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    V/hile, by and large | people tended to disagree with the state-nents, there are three points vihich should "be noted. One - asignificantly large proportion of the people could not nake up theirnind ahout the statenents (fron JO^j to 41^). Two - the exceptionsto the tendency to disapprove of the statenents are those whichrefer to the cultural offensive (where a plurality {AQP/o) thoughtit correct that the Russians sole ain was to inpart a better under-standing of Russian culture); and the belief that the Russianswould agree to a reunified > neutral Gernany (as nany thought thisto be correct as disagreed - 355^ each). Three - the only twostatenents to which actual najoritiea disagree are those v/hichsaid that the Coninforn was dissolved because the Russians nolonger seek ^onnunist revolutions in other countries (51/^) orthat Russian econouic aid is being offered Asian countries be-cause the Russians really want to help then (54/j)

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    Section 4; General Disarinaaent

    Juxtaposition of the results nakes it strikingly clear that thepatterns of opinion concerning Russia's and America's interest in ageneral international disarmament are almost identical for bothcountries - 17 per cent think that the Russian interest is either'very great' or 'great', and exactly that figure think the sarae ofthe American interest in disarmament. The slight difference in thepercentages of tliose v/ho say that liussia and America have only aslight' or 'no interest whatever' in the matter (58^5 and 55a' respec-tively) is only a reflection of the minute difference in those saying'no opinion'

    "How great, do you think, is the actual Russianinterest in a general international disarmament,very great, great or slight?""How great, do you think, is the actual Americaninterest in a general international disarmament,very great, great or slight?"

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    As can be seen in the follov7ing tables the majority of those \7hosaid that Russia has either 'vary c^^eat or 'great interest' indisarmament attribute only 'slight' or 'no interest' in the matterto the U, S., while those v;ho attributed favorable motives to theU.S. T;ere similarly negatively inclined tov/ards the Russians,

    "How great, do you think,is the actual Americaninterest in a generalinternational disarmament,very groat, great, orslight?"

    Very great/greatSlight/no interestwhateverllo opinion

    "Hov/ great, do you think, is theactual Russian interest in ageneral international disarma-' mont, very great, great orslight?"

    Slight/noVery great/ intorqst Nogreat v;hatovcr opinion(314) (1062) (467)

    42$^^ 16^0 Jjo

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    ;jvIONG THOSE SESIiTG RUSSIA IlTTEllESTED III DISARIIAJ.IEITT DISHOIIESTIIOTIVES Alffi ALSO DI3CERIIED ...

    That minority in the population v/hich said that the Russianshad 'great* or 'very great' interest in a general disarmament wereasked why they thou/^-ht the Russians had so much interest, Fully athird of the reasons given why the Russian interest in a generaldisarmament is 'very great' or 'great' indicate the belief thatthe Soviets only plan to get the hotter of the V'est in the longrun by means of such a disarnanent. The t\70 reasons given in thisconnection indicate the belief that what the Reds really wish is tobo able to carry on armament secretly and thereby become the strongestmilitary power after all {Y/j) f and that a general disarmament vrouldonly strengthen the Russian position politically (5/^)

    "How great, do you think, is the actual Russianinterest in a general international disarmament,very great, great, or slight?"

    IE "Very great" or "Great" ;"\71iy do you thinl:, the Russians are interestedin disarmament?"

    Sxiximary TableT/est Germany

    Honest Motivos (15?^)Russia docs not want another war ^faRussia wants to channel v/ox-kersand funds into its peace-tineconomy 5Russia fears the militarysuperiority of the Vest 2Other reasons 3

    Di shonest liotivcs ( G^o)Russia wants to secretlycarry on rearnanont 5A general disarmament \70uldstrengthen Russia politically 3

    IIo opinion/no answer ( I'^j)G Some respondents gave more than one ansv/er.

    227JG

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    COiaiEilTS III DETAIL ..."Hot/ {proat, do you think, is the actual Russianinterest in a general international disarnanent?"IF "Very i^roat" or "Great" ;"Vfhy do you think > the Russians are interested indisarnauont?"

    \Te3t GernanyHOITEST LIOTIVES (15/'^)Russia does not \7ant another van %o"The Russians are not interested in having anotherv/ar. They sincerely want peace.""They are just as disinterested in having anotherwar as wo are ,"Because as a v/orker's state Russia does not wantanother war,""The Russians are strictly against the use of atonicT/eapons and that's v/hy they want to disarn,"

    Russia wants to channel v;orkers and funds into itspeace-tine oconony ; 5"The %ssian industry needs nanpower if the standardraf living is to be raised,"

    "They need workers for their agriculture andindustry,""They v;ant to release nanpov/or for reconstructionprojects,"Rcarnanent is too expensive."Russia fears the nllitary superiority of the West ; 2"They fear that the Anericans will got too nuchof a start over then in nuclear research,"

    "".'el, that's quite obvious. The Russians thennoed not be afraid of us any nore."Other reasons ; 3Bojause Russia has other tasks in its ownland. It's afraid of a revolution,""Russian nen do not want to bocone soldiersagain,"Uith nuclear weapons being developed, therecruitment of soldiers is not so importantany nore,"

    (Cont'd on next page)

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    (cont'd fron pi-eceding page)Xlcst Geruany

    DISHONEST MOTIVES ( 6^)Russia v/ants to socretly carry on rcaraanont ; yfo"The Russians are interested in rearnanent becausethey t/ant to secretly ream and "be superior.""Russia v/ants all nations to disarm with theintention of carrying on rearnanent on thesly.""They are only interested in the Most gettingdisarmed. V.'hile they thensclves don't eventhink of stringing along.

    A general disarnament v/ould strengthenRussia politically ; 3"The nore the other nations disarm, the morethe Russians can do what they please afterwards.""By this the Russians \/ant to jockey themselvesinto a more favorable position.""They want to diminish the power of the V/est,"

    HO opihioii/ho ;jisv,Ti;R C l^j )

    G Some respondents gave more than one answer.

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    ONLY HONEST MOTIVES ASCRIBED TO /JffiRICAII INTEREST IN DISARl,liUENT ..All of those who thought that the Anerican intorost in dis-

    arnanent was 'very great* or 'groat' explain this "by ascribingstraightforward aotives to the ^Inoricans, The nain reason givenT/as that Anerica just does not want another war (85^0) The sanefeeling is indicated hy those 4 per cent who say that Anerica pre-fers to apply her econonic resources to peace-tine industry.

    "How great, do you think, is the actual /tnericanintorost in a general international disarnanent,very great, groat, or slight?"IF "Very groat" or "Great" ;"V.Tiy is Anerica interested in disarnancnt?

    Sunnary TahleWest Gomany

    Honest Motives (l?/^)Uaarlott doos act want another ar Q'foAnerica wants to channel nanpower

    and funds into its peace-tineindustry 4Anerica fears the nilitary superiorityof the East 2Anerica then oould dininish its arnedforces, and give up its policy 1Other reasons 2

    No opinion/No ^ answer ( Isj)

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