1972 Bureaucratic Politics： A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications

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Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy ImplicationsAuthor(s): Graham T. Allison and Morton H. HalperinSource: World Politics, Vol. 24, Supplement: Theory and Policy in International Relations(Spring, 1972), pp. 40-79Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010559 .

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BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS:

A Paradigmnd SomePolicy mplications

By GRAHAM T. ALLISON and MORTON H. HALPERIN*

D RING the Tet holidayof i968, North Vietnamesetroopslaunchedmassive ttacksn a largenumber f SouthVietnamese

cities.Why?In December,1950, the Chinese Communists ntervened n the

Korean War. Today someSenators aisethe specter f ChineseCom-

munistnterventionn the VietnameseWar. Will Communist hinaintervenenVietnam? pecifically,ftheU.S. weretorenew hebomb-ing of NorthVietnamwith vengeance, estroyinghedikes nd clos-ing Haiphong, and South Vietnamese roopswere to invade NorthVietnam-both unlikely ontingencies-wouldarge unitsof Com-munist hinese roops nter hewar?

In themid-ig6o's,heU.S. puta lidonAmerican trategic eapons:1000 Minutemen,4 Titans, nd 640 Polaris, nd a limited umber f

bombers.Administrationfficialsnnounced hese imits, ecognizingthat heSovietswouldbuildup toa position fparity uthoping hatMoscowwould notgo for uperiority.f in themid-ig6o's SecretaryofDefensehadwanted opersuade he SovietUnionnot todeploy nICBM fleet hatwould seriouslyhreaten .S. forces, ow mighthehaveproceeded?

The first uestion sksfor n explanation; he secondfora predic-tion; thethird ora plan.These are three entral ctivitiesn which

both nalystsf nternationaloliticsndmakers fforeign olicy n-gage. n responseothefirstuestion,most nalysts eginbyconsider-ingvarious bjectiveshattheNorth Vietnamesemighthavehad inmind:forexample, o shocktheAmericanpublicand therebyffectthepresidentiallection; ocollapse hegovernmentfSouthVietnam;tocausea massive prising fmilitaryndciviliansn SouthVietnam,thusbringingotalvictory;rtotakethecities ndkeepthem.Byex-

*Thispresentation

fa bureaucraticolitics pproach

oforeign olicybuildsuponpreviousworksof both authors. pecifically,t takes s a pointofdeparture llison's

"Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," American Political Science Review,LXIII (September I970) and Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis(Boston I971); and Halperin's BureaucraticPolitics and Foreign Policy, forthcoming.Here we focus n the furtherevelopmentf "Model II," recognizinghatorganiza-tions an be included s playersn thegameofbureaucraticolitics, reatinghefac-tors mphasized y an organizationalrocess pproach s constraints,eveloping henotionof sharedattitudes,nd introducing distinctionetween decisiongames"and "actiongames."



BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS 41

amining heproblemshatHanoi faced nd thecharacter ftheactionthey hose, nalysts liminate omeof these imsas implausible. x-planation hen onsistsn constructingcalculationhatpermits s to

understand hy, n theparticularituation, ith ertain bjections,newouldhavechosen o aunch heTet offensive.n attemptingo predictwhether he CommunistChinesewill intervenen the VietnameseWar, and if so, in what fashion,most analystswould consider i)

Chinesenational ecuritynterestsn Vietnam, 2) the likelihood fthecollapseof the NorthVietnamese n the absence f ChineseCom-munistntervention,3) the ontributionfChineseCommunistroopstotheNorthVietnamese fforts,nd (4) indicationsf ChineseCom-

munist ntentions,or example,warnings o theU.S., pledgesto theNorthVietnamese,tatementsbout Chinese nterests,tc.These con-siderations ould thenbe combinedn some ntuitive ashion o yielda prediction.n recommending .S. actions o persuade he Sovietsto stop with rough parity,nd not to pushfor"superiority," anyanalysts ould have focused n Sovietnational ecuritynterests.heywouldthen onsiderAmerican ctions hatwouldaffect hose nterestsin such a waythatdeploying arger trategicorceswouldbe counter-

productive.Characteristicf eachof these hree nswers s a basicapproach:a

fundamentaletofassumptionsnd categoriesorthinkingboutfor-eignaffairs.1his approachdependsprimarilyn theassumption hateventsn internationalolitics onsist fthemore r esspurposivectsofunifiednationalgovernmentsnd thatgovernmentalehavior anbe understoodyanalogywiththe ntelligent,oordinated ctsofin-dividualhumanbeings. ollowing his pproach,nalysts ocus n the

interestsnd goalsof a nation, he alternativeourses factions vail-able, and the costs ndbenefitsfeachalternative.n eventhas beenexplainedwhen theanalyst as shown,forexample,how theTet of-fensivewas a reasonablehoice, ivenHanoi's strategic bjectives.re-dictionsregenerated ycalculatingherationalhing o do in a certainsituation, iven specified bjectives. ecommended lans concentrateon analyzingothernations' trategicnterestsnd waysof affectingtheir alculationsbout he onsequencesfactions.

Let the readerconsider, orexample,how he would explain theSoviet nvasion fCzechoslovakian i968,or NorthVietnamesectivityin Laos and Cambodia.One typically utshimself n theplaceofthenationorthe nationalgovernmentonfronted itha problem ffor-eign ffairsndtries ofigureuthow hemight avechosen he ctionin question. f I had been the SovietUnionfacedwiththethreat f

1 For an elaborationof the argumentof this ntroductory ection, ee Allison, op. cit.



42 GRAHAM T. ALLISON & MORTON H. HALPERIN

Czech liberalization,r theCzech threat o the economy f the Bloc,whatwould have done?Moreover,his s not imply hewaywe reacttocurrentvents.t is thewaymost nalysts, ost f thetime, tructure

theirmost careful xplanationsnd predictions f important ccur-rences n foreign ffairs.Few readerswill findthesimpleassertion f thispoint persuasive.

Obviously here re severalvariants fthisbasicapproach.Obviouslythe approach oes not capture he entire nalysis fthosewho employit.Obviously otall analysts ely n this pproach ll ofthe time.Butas one of us has argued t much greater ength lsewhere, hisframe-work,which has been labelled Model I, has been thedominant p-

proach o thestudy f foreign olicy nd internationalolitics.2Evenanalysts rimarilyoncernedwithdiscoveringausal relations etweenvariables-for xample,between nvironmentalr intra-nationalac-tors-and specific utcomes,when calledupon to explainor predict,display tendencyorely n theassumptionfpurposive nitary a-tions opingwithin he onstraintsstablishedythese ausalrelations.)

This traditionalpproach o nternationalolitics as much o recom-mend t.As a "lens" t reduces heorganizationalnd political ompli-

cations fgovernmentothesimplificationf a single ctor. he arrayof details bouta happening an be seen to cluster roundthemajorfeatures f an action.Throughthis ens,the confused nd evencon-tradictoryactorshatnfluencenoccurrenceecome single ynamic:thechoice f the lternativehat chieved certain oal.This approachpermits quick, maginativeortingut oftheproblem fexplanationorprediction.tserves s a productivehorthand,equiring minimumof nformation.t canyield n informativeummaryftendencies,orexample, y dentifyingheweight fstrategicosts ndbenefits.

But thissimplification-likell simplifications-obscuress well asreveals. n particular,t obscures hepersistentlyeglected actof bu-reaucracy: he "maker" of governmentolicy s not one calculatingdecision-maker,ut rather conglomeratef large organizationsndpolitical ctorswho differubstantiallybout what theirgovernmentshoulddo on any particularssue and who competen attemptingoaffectothgovernmentalecisions nd the ctions ftheir

overnment.The purpose f thispaper s topresentn alternativepproach hatfocuses n intra-nationalactors,n particular ureaucraticolitics, nexplaining ationalbehaviorn internationalelations. he argumentisthat hese actorsreverymportant,nderemphasizednthecurrentliterature,et riticalwhen one is concerned ithplanning olicy. ec-

2For an elaborationof thispoint, see Allison,op. cit.




tion of thispaperpresents healternativepproach:a BureaucraticPoliticsModel.3Our hope is that he frameworks sufficientlyeneralto apply o thebehavior f mostmodern overnmentsn industrialized

nations, hough t will be obvious hat ur primary ase stheU.S. gov-ernment.ectionI suggests owthis pproach anbeapplied o under-standhow one nation nfluenceshe behavior f another. ection IIstates number fpolicy mplicationsf this lternativepproach.

Section

A BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS MODEL

Our purposehere s to outline rough-cutrameworkorfocusingprimarilyn the ndividualswithin government,nd the nteractionamong them, s determinantsftheactions f a governmentn inter-nationalpolitics.What a government oes in any particularnstancecanbe understoodargelys a result fbargaining mongplayers osi-tionedhierarchicallyn thegovernment.he bargainingollows egu-larized ircuits. oththebargainingnd theresultsre mportantlyf-

fected ya number fconstraints,nparticular,rganizationalrocessesand sharedvalues.4In contrastwithModel I, thisBureaucraticoliticsModel sees no

unitary ctorbut rathermany ctors s players-players ho focusnoton a single trategicssuebuton manydiverse ntra-nationalroblemsas well. Players hoose n terms f no consistentet of strategic bjec-tives, ut rather ccording ovarious onceptions f national ecurity,organizational,omestic, nd personalnterests.layersmake govern-

mentaldecisionsnotby a singlerational hoice,but by pulling andhauling. This by no means impliesthat ndividualplayers re notacting ationally,iventheirnterests.)5

The conceptionf national ecurityolicy s "political" esult ontra-dictsbothpublic magerynd academicorthodoxy.ssuesvitalto na-tionalsecurityre considered oo importanto be settled y politicalgames.Theymustbe "above" politics: o accuse someone f "playing

3In arguing that explanations proceed in terms of implicit conceptual models, this

essaymakes no claim thatforeignpolicy analystshave developed any satisfactory m-piricallytestedtheory. n this essay, the use of the term "model" with qualifiers shouldbe read "conceptual scheme or framework."

4 For a review of earlierproponentsof thebureaucraticpoliticsapproach, see Allison,op. cit.

5In order to highlight the distinctivecharacteristics f the Bureaucratic PoliticsModel (BPM), we contrast t with the traditionalapproach. Our argument is not,however,thattheapproachesare exclusivealternatives. he relationshipsbetween theseapproaches is discussed in Allison, op. cit.




politics ith ationalecurity"s a most eriousharge.hus,memoirstypicallyandle hedetailsf uch argainingith velvetlove. orexample,oth orensenndSchlesingerresenthe ffortsf theEx-

ecutive ommitteen the Cubanmissile risis ssentiallys rationaldeliberationmong unifiedroup f quals.6What ublic xpectationdemands,he academic enchantor ntellectuallegance einforces.Internaloliticss messy;moreover,ccordingo prevailingoctrine,politickingacksntellectualubstance.t constitutesossip or ournal-ists,atherhan subject or eriousnvestigation.ccasionalmemoirs,anecdotesn historicalccounts,nd several etailed ase studiesothe ontrary,ost ftheforeignolicyiteraturevoids ureaucratic

politics.Thegapbetweencademiciteraturend the xperiencef partici-

pantsngovernmentsnowhere iderhan t this oint. orthose hoparticipatengovernment,hetermsf daily mploymentannot eignored: overnmenteaders avecompetitive,othomogeneousn-terests;rioritiesndperceptionsre haped ypositions;roblemsremuchmore ariedhan traightforward,trategicssues; hemanage-ment f piecemealtreamsf decisionss moremportanthan teady

state hoices;makingure hat hegovernmentoeswhat s decided-and doesnotdo whathas notbeendirected-ismoredifficulthanselectinghepreferredolution.

Thisgeneralrientationanbe statedmore harplyyformulationof theBureaucraticoliticsModel as an "analytic aradigm"n thetechnicalense evelopedyRobert . Mertonor ociologicalnaly-sis.7Systematictatementf basic ssumptions,oncepts,ndsuggestivepropositionsillhighlighthe istinctivehrustf histylef nalysis.In formulatingheparadigm, hereverossible, e use words hewaytheyreused nordinaryanguage. utthe ermshat onstitutethis aradigmreofteniven morepecificefinitionor urposesfclarity.

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS PARADIGM

I. BASIC UNIT OF ANALYSIS

Inthinkingbout roblemsfforeignffairs,hatmost articipantsand analystsrereallynterestednareoutcomes-thats, electivelye-limitedtatesf therealworldmportantlyffectedythe ctions f

6Arthur Schlesinger,Jr.,A Thousand Days (Boston i965); see Theodore C. Soren-sen, Kennedy (New York i1965).

7Robert K. Merton,Social Theory and Social Structures (rev. and enl. ed., NewYork I957)-




governments.hus, for xample, heproblem f proliferationormostparticipantsr analysts s: how manynationswill have what nuclearcapabilities t some point n the future.* imilarly, n explanation f

the Cuban missile risismustallow one to understand hy at somepoint, ovietmissileswere no longer n Cuba. The U.S. was publiclycommitted ot to invade Cuba, and all this had been accomplishedwithout uclearwar. The selection f variabless made by the analystor participant ithreferenceo his perception f some problem r is-sue. When explaining, redicting, r planning, n analyst, t leastimplicitly,pecifiesome haracteristicsftherealworld-an outcome-thatfocushis attention.

The basicunit f analysis f the pproach eveloped ere s actions fa government hichwedefine s thevariouscts fofficialsf govern-ment n exercises f governmentaluthorityhat can be perceivedoutsidethe government. ccording o this definition, presidentialannouncementf a decision o bomb NorthVietnam, he subsequentmovement f an aircraft arrier nto a positionnearNorth Vietnam,and the ctualdropping f bombs re actions fa government. here-as a secretpaper sent from the Secretary f Defenseto the Presi-

dentrecommendingombing fNorthVietnam ra private residen-tial decision o bombNorthVietnam re not actions fa government.It is an assumption f theapproach eveloped erethat n order o ex-plain,predict, r plan outcomest s necessaryo identifyhe ctions fparticular overnmentshataffect heoutcome, o treat hese ctionsseparatelyincludinghow one nation's ctions ffectnother) nd inthisway totreat heeventn itsentirety.

In explaining, redicting,rplanning ctions f a government,ne

must dentifyhe actionchannels-that s, regularized ets of proce-dures or roducing articularlasses factions. orexample, ne actionchannel orproducing .S. militarynterventionn anotherountryn-cludes recommendationytheambassador othat ountry,n assess-mentbytheregionalmilitaryommander, recommendationytheJoint hiefs fStaff,n assessmentythe ntelligenceommunityftheconsequencesf intervention,ecommendationsytheSecretariesofState ndDefense, presidentialecision o ntervene,he ransmittalofan orderfrom he PresidenthroughheSecretaryfDefenseand

* More specifically, he outcome might be defined in termsof a set of variables:(a) the number of states that have formallyrenounced nuclear weapons, (b) thenumber of statesthat have announced intentionsto acquire nuclear weapons, (c) thenuclear technologyof various nations, (d) the number of states with a stand-by apa-bility, e) the number of states that have testednuclear weapons, (f) the number ofstatesthat have nuclear stockpiles nd the size of thesestockpiles.




Joint hiefs f Staffo theregionalmilitaryommander,is determina-tionofwhat troops o employ, heorder romhim to thecommanderof those roops,nd theorders rom hat ommander othe ndividuals

who actuallymove nto hecountry.he pathfrom nitiationoactionfrequentlyncludes number f decisions,hat s authoritativeesigna-tions,nternal oa government,fspecificctions o be taken y pecificofficials.hus, a secret ecision ythe Presidento intervene,nd thedeterminationy the regional ommander re bothdecisions, ut apublic nnouncementf eithers an action fthegovernment.

The actionchannelfor major foreign olicydecisions an be use-fully ividednto hat ortionwhich eadstodecisions y senior layers

and thatpartwhich followsfrom hosedecisions. he latter s fre-quently eferredo as "implementation"utwe resisthat erminologyas toorestrictive.any elements f mplementationtemfrom ourcesother handecisions y senior layers. hus,for xample, hepresenceof U.S. troops n theDominican Republic n I965 stemmed romdecision ythe Presidento sendthe Marines o that ountry,uttheactions f the 8,oooMarinesntheDominicanRepublic e.g., thepre-cise positionshat hey ccupied)followed rommuch ower-levele-

cisions s well asfrom ther actors. oreover,many ctions fgovern-ments ccur n the bsence fanyhigh eveldecision. or example,nthe earlierDominicancrisis hat ed to theoverthrowf JuanBosch,Ambassador ohn .Martin's fferoBosch osend ntheU.S. Marineswas notpreceded yanyhigh-levelecision omakethat ffer.8ctionsmayalso be affectedydecisions n other ssues ndby policy, hat s,authoritativespirations,nternal o a government,bout outcomes.For example,Martin'sbehaviorwas influenced y the U.S. policyof

supportingemocraticovernmentsn Latin America.The actions fthe Marines,whentheydid intervene, ere affectedy priorbudgetdecisions. orpurposes fanalysiswe will dentifyheactivityfplay-ersleadingto decisions yseniorplayers s decision games, activitiesleadingto policy s policygames, nd activitieshatfollowfrom, rproceedn the bsence f,decisions y senior layerss actiongames.

Thuswehave defined hefollowingerms: utcomes,ctions,ctionchannels, ecisions, olicy,nd decision ames, olicy ames, ndactiongames.

II. ORGANIZING CONCEPTS

The organizing oncepts f thisparadigm an be arranged s ele-mentsn the answers o three entral uestions: I) Who plays? 2)

8John . Martin, vertaken yEvents (New York1966).




What determines ach player's tand? (3) How are players' tands

aggregatedo yieldgovernmentalecisions nd actions?

A. Whoplays?That s,whose nterestsndbehavior ave n importantefect on the government'secisions nd actions?

In any government,here xists circleofseniorplayersn thena-tionalsecurity olicygame.9This circle ncludes he major politicalfigures,he heads of the majornational ecurityrganizations,nclud-ing intelligence,hemilitarynd, for omepurposes, he organizationthatmanages udgetaryllocations ndtheeconomy. enerally ne oftheseplayerss the chief xecutivefthegovernment. e may havea

disproportionatehareofinfluencen majordecisions. he PresidentoftheU.S., for xample, as a range fboth nterestsnd formal owersthat ethim apartfrom ther layers. ther ndividuals an enter hiscentral ircle, ither n a more egular r a strictlyd hocbasis, ecauseoftheir elationwith the head of the government.rganizationsndgroups an for omepurposes e treated s players, or xample,when(i) the official apers hat merge rom n organizationan be sum-marized s coherentalculatedmoves f a unitary ctor; 2) the ctions

ofthehead ofan organization, hosegoalsaredeterminedargely ythat rganization,anbe treateds actions ftheorganization;nd (3)the various ehaviors f differentndividualmembers f an organiza-tioncan be regarded s coherenttrategiesnd tacticsn a singleplan.

Around thecentral ircleof seniorplayers, here revarious irclesof uniorplayers.n theUnited tates ctorsnthewidergovernmentalgame ("Congressionalnfluentials," embers f thepress, pokesmenfor mportantnterestroups, speciallyhe"bipartisan oreign olicyestablishment"n and out ofCongress,nd surrogatesor achof thesegroups)can enter hegame n a more r essregularized ashion. thermembers f theCongress,hepress, nterest roups, nd publicformconcentric irclesaround the central arena-circles that demarcatelimitswithinwhich thegame is played.

The mix ofplayerswillvarydepending n the ssueand thetype fgame.Action channelsdetermine,n large part,whichplayers nterwhat

games,withwhat

advantagesnd

handicaps.enior

playerswill

dominate n decisiongames.But in actiongameson the same issuequite uniorplayersntheorganization ho arechargedwith arryingout the decisionmay playa majorrole.

9 In the statementof this paradigm we focus primarilyon issues of foreignpolicythat arise as matters of national security.Extension of the argument to other issueareas, e.g., foreigntrade, is straightforward.




B. Whatdeterminesach player'stand? Whatdeterminesispercep-tions nd interests hich ead to a stand?

Answers o the questions What is the issue?" or "What mustbe

done?" are coloredby theposition romwhichthe question s con-sidered.

A player s an individualn a position.Hi' perceptionsnd prefer-ences temboth fromhis individual haracteristicsforexample, tti-tudes haredwithothermembers f the society nd governmentndattitudespecial o himself) nd fromhis position.

The interestshat ffect layers' esired esults an be characterizedunderfourheadings:national ecuritynterests,rganizationalnter-ests, omesticnterests,nd personal nterests.ome elements fnationalsecuritynterestsre widely ccepted, uchas the nterestn theUnitedStates' voiding oreign omination,nd thebelief hat ftheU.S. wereto disarmunilaterally,thernationswould use militaryorce gainstit and its allies with very erious dverse onsequences. ut in mostcases,reasonablemencan disagree n how national ecuritynterestswill be affectedya specificssue.Other nterestsan affectn individ-

ual'sperceptionfthenational ecuritynterest. embers fan organ-ization, articularlyareer fficials,ome to believe hatthehealthoftheir rganizations vitalto the national nterest.10he healthoftheorganization,n turn,s seen todependon maintainingnfluence,ul-fillingtsmission,ndsecuringhenecessaryapabilities. he latter wointerestsead toconcern ormaintainingutonomyndorganizationalmorale, rotectingheorganization'sssence,maintainingr expand-ingroles nd missions,nd maintainingr increasing udgets.While

manybureaucratsre unconcerned ith domestic ffairsnd politicsanddo notask themselvesow a proposed hange npolicy rbehaviorwould affectomestic olitical ssues, ome seniorplayerswill almostalwaysbe concerned boutdomesticmplications. inally, player'sstanddepends nhispersonalnterestsndhisconceptionfhisrole.

Whenan ostensiblessuearises, .g.,when a newweapons ystemsproposed, layerswill come toseequitedifferentaces fthe ssue.Forexample, proposal o withdrawAmerican roops romEurope s to

theArmy threat o itsbudget nd size; to theBudgetBureaua wayto savemoney;to Treasury balance ofpayments ain; to theStateDepartment ureauofEuropeanAffairs threat ogoodrelations ithNATO; tothePresident's ongressionaldviser n opportunityo re-move major rritantnthePresident's elations ith heHill. (Senior

10 For an elaborationof the discussionof organizational interests ee Halperin "WhyBureaucratsPlay Games," Foreign Policy (Spring I971).




players, specially,end o see several aces f the ssue imultaneously.)Giventhefaceof the ssue hathe sees, ach playermust alculatehowthe resolution f this ssuemay affect is interests. his defineshis

stakes n the ssueat hand. In the ightof these takeshe thendeter-mineshis standon the ssue.

Suggestive ropositions

i. There are important ifferencesetween a) governmentalys-temsnwhichmanyplayersnthe entral ameholdtheir ositionse-cause ofpoliticalnfluencend aspire o theposition f chief xecutiveof thegovernmentnd (b) governmentalystemsn whichmostcen-

tralplayershaveno thought fbecoming hechief xecutive.n theformer,mostplayers' ersonal nterestn remainingn thegameandadvancing oward hetop frequently ominates heir tand on mostissues.

2. Beyond hecircle f senior layers, ertain ndividualsviz.,non-careerofficials nd those n organizationswithoutorganizationally-definedmissions) re oftenmotivatedythedesire oparticipateer e.Theseindividuals re ikely o take tands hatpermit hem o get nto

thegame.3. There are important ifferencesetween a) governmentalys-

tems hat rerelativelylosedto expressionsf interestnd pressuresfrom utside hegovernmentalame and (b) governmentalystemsthat arerelativelypenas a result felections.n the atter, uch fac-tors s dependencypontheapproval racquiescencef a wider ircleof individuals,nd vulnerabilityo pressures romthiswidercircle,force layers o a larger onceptionftheirnterests.

4. Organizationalnterests eighmoreheavilyn thefull set of in-terestsfsomeseniorplayers han n others. n theU.S. governmentthere eemsto be a rough spectrumf suchweights romgreater olesser, or xample, heChiefof Naval Operations,o theSecretaryfDefense, o theSecretaryfState, o the President'special AssistantforNationalSecurity ffairs.

5. Organizational nterests re oftendominatedby the desire tomaintain

heautonomyf theorganizationnpursuingwhat ts mem-bers view as the essence ftheorganization's ctivity,.g., flying ortheAirForce.

6. Even, ndperhaps articularlyncrises,rganizationsompete orroles ndmissions.

7. Organizations arely ake stands hatrequire laborate oordina-tion withother rganizations.




8. Mostplayers,speciallyenior layers,ave very ighdiscountrate: hat s, shortime orizonn any ssue. layers hose tandsreheavilynfluencedy rganizationalnterests,speciallyareerists,ften

have a much onger imehorizon egardinghe nterestsf theor-ganization.

C. How are theplayers' tands ggregated o yielddecisions nd actionsof a government?

We considerirstowplayers'tandsggregateoproduce oliciesanddecisionsy eniorlayers;econd, e consider owpolicies,eci-sions, nd other actorsroduceovernmentalctions.

i. Policy and decisiongames.Sometimesn issue rises ecauseplayer ees omethinghathe wants o change, ndmoves.Most often,however, hegameis begunbythenecessityhat omething e done,eithern response o a deadline e.g., theannualbudget)or an event(external rdomestic).Whenhe becomes warethat gamehas be-gun,each playermustdetermine is stand nd thendecidewhetheroplay if he hasa choice)and if so, how hard.These decisions equirecalculation often mplicit)aboutbothresources nd reputation. e-

sources re finite nd fungible,.g., ime nd senior layers' eputationwiththe President. eputation ependson one's trackrecord, husplayers onsider heprobabilityf success s partoftheir take.

Decision games do notproceedrandomly, ut rather ccording ofixed ules.Typically,ssues rerecognizednd determined ithin nestablishedhannelforproducing olicies rdecisions.Wherea dead-lineorevent nitiateshegame,that riggernfluenceshe selection ftheactionchannel. n mostcases,however, here re severalpossiblechannelsthroughwhichan issuecould be resolved.Becauseactionchannels tructurehegameby pre-selectinghemajor players, eter-mining heusualpoints f entrancentothegame, ndby distributingparticular dvantages or achgame,playersmaneuver oget the ssueintothechannelthattheybelieve s most ikely o yield thedesiredresult.

Each player's robabilityf successdependsupon at leastthree le-ments:bargaining dvantages,kill and will in using bargaining d-vantages,nd otherplayers'perceptionsf thefirst wo ingredients.Bargaining dvantages temfrom ontrol f implementation,ontrolover nformationhat nablesone to define heproblem nd identifythe vailable ptions, ersuasivenessithother layers including lay-ers outsidethebureaucracy) nd the ability o affect therplayers'objectivesn other ames, ncluding omestic olitical ames.




What emerges rom hegame is also importantlyffectedycon-straints,n particular y the routines f organizationsn supplyinginformationnd options, nd by the sharedvalues within hesociety

and thebureaucracy.The game consists f each player ngaging n variousmaneuvers oachievehis desiredresults. ome playersdevelop sophisticatedlans,thoughmost players eem to plan very ittle.All players an trytochange ther layers' tands y arguments.

The resolutionf an issue an be a policy, decision,r the voidanceof a decision.Decisionsmay be very eneral r quitespecific.n somecases, eniorplayerswill have no choice aboutwhowill carry ut the

action.But in other ases, he rulespermit choiceof implementers.For example,negotiations ithforeign overnmentsre usually thedomain ftheforeign ffice; utthey anbeassigned oa special nvoyof the head of government,r to the intelligenceervices. ombingmissionsmustbe assigned o the military,uttheremaybe a choicebetween ervices rwithin Service, .g.,between heNavy,SAC, orTAC. Monitoring unctionsmaybe assigned o an organization ithan interestn the ction, utwithno capabilityo carry t out.

2. Action ames.The actions f a governmenthat ffectn outcometypicallynclude largenumber f distinct lements. or example, e-centU.S. governmentctionswhich ffecthe spread f nuclearweap-ons include: theState Department'sffortso gain adherence o theNon-Proliferationreaty; Presidential ffers f guarantees o non-nuclear ations gainst uclear lackmail;AtomicEnergy ommissiontests f nuclear xplosives orpeaceful urposes whichprovide con-venient hield ornon-nuclearowers' evelopmentfnuclear evices);

withdrawalf U.S. forces rom heFar East (whichmay ncrease heconcern f someJapanese r Indians about theirnationalsecurity);statementsytheAEC aboutthe greatprospectsorpeacefulnuclearweapons (which are designed o influence EC budgets); an AECcommissioner'srgument,n theabsence fany higher eveldecision,to a Brazilian cientistbout thegreatvirtues fpeacefulnuclear x-plosives;and theU.S. government'sefusal o confirm r denythereported resence fnuclearweaponsaboardshipscalling n foreignports.As this ist uggests,ctions hat ffect utcomesmaybe impor-tantlyffectedy policies boutthat utcome, ydecision amesaboutthat utcome,ndbydecision ames bout ther utcomes. ctions hataffectutcomesmayalsobe actionsn theabsence fhigher evel deci-sionsdesigned o affectn outcome,maneuversn decisiongames,orroutine ehavior forganizations.




To treat he ctions f a governmenthat ffectn outcome, heana-lystneeds to separate ut thesevarious trands f actionand provideexplanationsor ach.Obviouslymost ctions re an amalgam f everal

strands.If the action s in fact result f routine ehavior f organizations,oneneedsto explain he organizationaltandard perating rocedures(SOP's) thatproduced hatbehavior.1"f the action s a maneuverna decision rpolicygame,oneneeds to identifyhe game and explainwhythemaneuverwas used. f the actionwas takenwithout high-level decision, ne must dentifyhe circumstanceshatpermittedheplayer hat eewayand explainwhat ed the player o take thatstep.

If the ction esultedrom policy r a decision ame unrelated o theoutcomebeing analyzed,one must dentify he relevant ecisionorpolicy ame and providen explanationor hedecision nd theactionthat ollowed. inally,fthe ction lows rom relevant ecision ame,one needsan explanationf that ctiongame.

Actiongames,whichfollow rom ecision ames,do notproceed trandom. he decision hat riggershegame and therules f thegameassignthe actionto a player nd pick the action channel.However,there re ikely o be several ub-channels.layerswillmaneuverogetthe ssue ntothechannel hey elieve ffershebestprospectsorget-ting the desired esult.

As in decisiongames,players' robabilitiesf successdepend upontheirpower. n thiscase, bargaining dvantages tem from:formalauthority,ontrol ver the resources ecessaryo carry ut theaction,responsibilityor arryinguttheaction, ontrol ver nformationhatenables one to determinehefeasibilityf the action and its conse-quences,control ver informationhat enables seniorplayers o de-termine hether hedecisionsbeing mplemented,ndpersuasivenesswithotherplayers, articularlyhoseresponsible or mplementation.Action s alsoaffectedytheconstraintsmposed ythe tandardper-atingproceduresf arge organizations.

In somecases,players esponsibleor mplementing ecisionswillfeel bligatedo mplementhe pirits wellasthe etter fthedecision.

Even in suchcases,the actionmaydiffer romthe actionthatthesenior layers houghtwould result rom heir ecision. his is inpartbecause actions re carriedout by large organizations ccording oexisting outines,n partbecausedecisions o notusually nclude anexplanationf whatthe action s intended o accomplish,nd in part

I' For an elaboration of the discussion of organizational routines, programs andSOP's, see Allison, op. cit.




becausewhen pecifyingetailsunior layersmaydistorthe ction.In most ases, layers ill feel hat hedecisioneaves hem onsid-

erable eeway n implementation.layers ho supportedhedecision

willmaneuverosee t mplemented.heymaygo beyondhe piritifnot he etterf he ecision.hosewhoopposed he ecision,rwhooppose the action,will maneuver o delay implementation,o limitimplementationothe etter utnot the pirit, r eventohave thedeci-sion disobeyed.

The characterizationf decisionand action games capturesthethrust f the bureaucratic olitics pproach. f problems f foreignpolicy arose as discrete ssues, nd decisions nd actionswere deter-

mined ne gameat a time, his ccountwould suffice.utmost issues,"e.g., Vietnamor the proliferationf nuclearweapons, mergepiece-meal over ime, ne ump n one contest, second n another. undredsof ssues ompete orplayers' ttentionvery ay. Each player s forcedto fixuponhis ssues or hatday,deal withthem n their wn terms,and rushon to thenext.Thus thecharacter f theemergingssue, ndthepace at which the game is played, onverge o yielda collageofgovernment ecisions nd actions.Choicesby one player e.g., to au-

thorize ctionbyhisdepartment,o makea speech, rtorefrainromacquiring ertainnformation), ecisions nd "foul-ups" e.g., pointsthat re not decidedbecausethey re not recognized, aised too late,or misunderstood)re pieceswhich,when stuck o thesame canvas,constitutections elevant o an outcome.

Suggestive Propositions

About Decisions

i. Decisionsofa governmenteldomreflect singlecoherent, on-sistentetof calculationsboutnational ecuritynterests.

2. Decisions ydefinitionssign pecificctions ospecificlayers,utthey ypicallyeave considerableeewayboth boutwhich ubordinatesshouldbe involvednd what pecificctions houldbetaken.

3. Decisionstypicallyeflectonsiderableompromise. ompromiseresultsrom needtogain adherence, needtoavoidharming tronglyfeltnterestsincluding rganizationalnterests),ndtheneedtohedgeagainst hedirepredictionsfother articipants.

4. Decisions rerarely ailored o facilitatemonitoring. s a result,seniorplayers avegreatdifficultyn checking n the faithfulmple-mentationfa decision.

5. Decisions hatdirect ubstantialhanges n action ypicallyeflecta coincidencef (a) a deadlinefora President r seniorplayers hat




focuseshem n a problemndfuels he earch or solutionnd b)the nterestsf unior layersommittedo a specificolutionndinsearch f a problem.'2

About Actions

i. Presidentialecisions ill be faithfullymplementedhen: aPresident'snvolvements unambiguous,is words re unambiguous,hisorders widely ublicized,hemenwhoreceivet have ontrolfeverythingeeded o carryt out, nd thosemen have no apparentdoubt fhis authorityo ssue hedecision."3

2. Majornewdeparturesn foreignolicy ypicallytem rom ome

decisionycentral layers. utthe pecificetails fthe ction akenaredeterminedn arge art y tandardperatingrocedurendpro-grams xistingn the rganizationst the ime.

3. Ambassadorsnd field ommanderseel essobligedofaithfullyimplementecisions ecause hey ypicallyavenotbeen nvolvednthedecision ame. hey eel hey now etter hat ctionsne houldwant rom notherovernmentnd how togetthose ctions.

4. The argerhenumberfplayers ho an ct ndependentlyn an

issue, he ess the government'sctionwill reflect ecisions f thegovernmentnthat ssue.

5. Where decisioneaves eeway or heorganizationhat s im-plementingt, hat rganizationill ct o astomaximizets rganiza-tionalnterestithin onstraints.

III. CONSTRAINTS

Thefactorsighlightedn thismodel ssume ceterisaribuslause.

Other eatures,reated ere s constraints,ias the outcome f thebureaucraticolitics ame. or some lasses f governmentalehavior(e.g., hedetail haracteristicsfthebehaviorf arge rganizations),these ther actors aybe more mportanthan hose mphasizedytheBureaucraticoliticsModel. ndeed,what s described ere s an"organizationalonstraint"asbeen laboratedlsewhereyoneofusas an alternativeodel.'4 he issue f typology,hat s,whatfactorsweighmost eavilyorwhat lasses f outcomes,s a centralssue orfurtheresearch.

12 For this propositionwe are indebted to Ernest R. May.13 This proposition is drawn from Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power (New

York i960).14 See Allison's "Model II," op. cit. The discussion of organizational constraints

draws heavily on thataccount.




A. Organizational onstraints

The game amongplayers and organizationsonsidered s players)proceedswithin context. large partof that ontext s the existing

configurationf largeorganizations,heir stablished rograms ndstandard peratingrocedures orperformingarious unctions.heseorganizationaloutines re especiallymportantn determiningi) theinformationvailableto the central layers,2) the options hat thesenior layers onsider, nd (3) the actualdetails f whatevers doneby thegovernment.

How does informationbout mostnationalproblems ecomeavail-able to members f a government? or example,how did the U.S.government ecomeaware of the Soviet constructionf missiles nCuba in i962? For themost art, nformations collected nd processedby argeorganizations.n the Cuban missile risis, heexistenceftheCIA and Air Force,with existing apabilities nd processes, ieldedU-2 flight verCuba according o a pattern hatdiscoveredhemissilesin the secondweek ofOctober.

The menuof alternativesefined y organizationsn sufficientetail

to be liveoptions s severelyimited n bothnumber nd character. hecharacter fthealternativesvailableto a leader (i.e., the location fthe set of alternativesn the universe fpossible lternativeselevantto hisobjectives) iffersignificantlyrom hecharacter f alternativespresented y a team of fivedisinterestedxperts. he differences afunction f the configurationf established rganizationsnd theirexisting oals and procedures. hose alternativeshat are built intoexisting rganizational oals (e.g., incrementalmprovementsn each

militaryervice'srimary eapons ystem)willbe adequate i.e.,com-pare favorably iththe experts' ist, thoughwith less sensitivityocost). However,alternativeshatrequirecoordination f severalor-ganizationse.g., multi-serviceilitary perationsrweapons ystems)and alternativesn areasbetween rganizationse.g., weaponsthat renotrepresentedya majorservice omponent) relikely o be inade-quate.

Actionaccording o standard perating rocedures nd programs

does not constitutear-sighted,lexible daptation o "the issue" (asit is conceived yan analyst).Detail and nuanceofactions y organi-zations are determinedhiefly y organizational outines. tandardoperatingprocedures onstitute outinesfor dealing with standardsituations. outines llowlargenumbers findividuals n low organi-zational evels o dealwithnumerous ituationsayafter ay,without




much thought. ut thisregularized apacity or dequateperformanceispurchasedtthepriceofstandardization.pecificnstances, articu-larly ritical nstances hat ypically o not have "standard" haracter-

istics, re oftenhandled sluggishly r inappropriately. program,that s, a complexcluster f standard perating rocedures,s rarelytailored o the specific ituationn whichit is executed.Rather, heprogram s (at best) the most ppropriate fprogramsn the existingrepertoire.ince repertoiresre developedbyparochial rganizationsfor tandardcenarios hat heorganization as defined,heprogramsavailable ordealingwith particularituationreoftenll-suitedo t.

B. SharedAttitudesPerceptionsf ssues r argumentsboutthe national nteresto not

begin b initio.Beneath hedifferenceshat uelbureaucraticoliticssa foundation f shared ssumptionsboutbasicvaluesand facts. heseunderlying ssumptions re reflectedn various ttitudesnd imageswhichare takenforgranted y mostplayers.

Sharedattitudesnd imagesprovide ommon nswers o suchques-tions s: Who aretheactualor potential nemies f theUnitedStates?

Whatare theirntentionsndcapabilities?Who areour friends?Whatare their apabilitiesnd intentions?What influenceshebehavior fothernations?Amongthe attitudesnd the mages hathaverecentlyprevailedn theU.S. bureaucracyre:

. The UnitedStates houldact to haltthespreadof Communism.

. Only forcewilldeter he Chinesefrom ggression.

. The lossof American old toforeignentral anks s a threat oU.S. prosperitynd shouldbe avoided.

* The capability or assureddestructions necessaryo detertheSovietUnion.

. Europeanunifications desirable.

. Good relations ithJapan reimportanto U.S. securitynterests.

Most participantscceptthese mages.Their idea of the nationalinterests shapedby these ttitudes,nd their rgumentsre based onthem.Mostparticipantsend to interprethe actions f othernationsto makethemconsistent ith held images, ather han reexaminingbasic views.Even those n the bureaucracy ho do not share ome orall of thesevalues and imagesare inclined o act and to argue as ifthey elieved hem.Theydo thisbecause o do otherwise ould makethem uspect y othermembers fthebureaucracy.




Section I

INTERACTION BETWEEN NATIONS

How does the behavior fone nation ffect hatof another?Most analysts f internationalolitics pproach hisquestionby ap-

plying version f Model I to the behavior f each nation.This ap-proach eads them to treatthe interaction etweennationsas if itresulted rom competition etween wo purposive ndividuals. achnation's ctions re seen to be an attempt o influence he actions ftheother y affectingts trategicalculus. he behavior feach nation

is explained s a reaction o thebehavior f the other.Considerhow analystswho take this approach xplain arms races.NationA buildsmilitaryorces or hepurpose f nfluencingationB.If t fears hatnationB is strongernd hencemaybe temptedoattackorto exploit ts militaryuperiority,ationA will increase hesize ofitsown forces. ationB, observinghisbuildup, ndfearful f the n-creased trengthf nationA, in turn ncreasests own forces.

The Bureaucratic oliticsModel suggests n alternativenswerto

thequestion f how one nation'sbehavior ffectshebehavior f an-other. xplanation ocuses rimarilyn processes nternal o eachna-tion.The actions fa nationresult ot from n agreeduponcalculusof strategicnterests,ut rather rompulling and haulingamong n-dividualswithdifferingerceptionsnd stakes.These arise not onlyfromdifferingonceptions fnational ecuritynterest ut also fromdifferingomestic, rganizationalndpersonalnterests.he influenceofone nation's ctions n another esult rom he ctions'mpact n the

stands, r on thepower of playersn decision r actiongames n theother ation.

From this lternativeerspective,heexplanationfan "armsrace"is tobefound rimarily ithin ach nation-in particularntheprocessbywhicheach oneprocuresnddeploysmilitaryorces.At any giventime omeplayersn nationA will takestands n favor f increasingdefense xpendituresnd procuring articularweapons systems. heinterestshat ead them o these tandswill bediverse. areer fficersnthearmed ervices,orexample,will seek additional undsforforcescontrolledytheir ervices. ther players' tandswill be affectedytheir erceptionsf how particular ecisionswill affect he influenceofparticular layers.Actions yanother ationwill be interpretedythose eeking dditionalweaponsto enhance heir rgumentsnd in-fluence. heseactionswill affect ecisionsoincrease efense pending




if hey ffecteniorlayers'erceptionsfwhat s necessaryor ationalsecurityr of what s necessaryo promoteheir thernterests.

Model analysisan berelied ntopredicthefact hat large n-

crease n nation 's defense udget illproduce n increasen nationB's defense pending.ut the size of that ncrease nd,evenmoreimportantly,he pecificharacteristicsfweapons urchased ith heincreaserebetterxplained r predictedy theBureaucraticoliticsModel.n general, odel is more sefulor xplainingctions herenational ecuritynterestsominate, here hared alues ead to aconsensusn what henational ecurityequires,nd where ctionsflow ather irectlyrom ecisions.hebureaucraticoliticsmodel s

more seful here heresdata nthenterestsfplayersndthe ulesofthegame,where rganizationalnddomesticnterestsredominate,or where newishes o treat hedetails f action.

The BureaucraticoliticsModel uggestsnumberfpropositionsabout heway ctions fone nationffecthe ctions f another. eshall ttempto formulatehese ropositionsxplicitly.utbeforere-sentingropositions,t should e usefulo considerna more eneralmannerheprocessfnationalnteractionsit ooks hroughhe ensofbureaucraticolitics.

The BureaucraticoliticsModel's mphasis n intra-nationalroc-esses tems otonly rom hefact hatndividuals ithin ations othe cting, ut lsofrom heobservationhat he atisfactionf play-ers' nterestsre obe found verwhelminglyt home. oliticaleadersof a nation ise ndfalldependingn whetherhey atisfyomesticneeds. ndividualsdvance n thebureaucracyhen theymeet he

standardsetby politicaleaders rbycareeradders. rganizationsprosperr decline ependingn domesticupportn that ureaucracyand beyondt-but within henation. hesestrugglesre whatpre-occupy layersn foreign-policyureaucracies.hreats o interestsfrom ival rganizations,rcompetingolitical roups,refarmorereal han hreatsrombroad.

This snot osay hat layersonothavenationalecuritynterests.No leaderwantsoseehisnationttacked,ndfew esireo send heir

soldiersff ofightndistant ars. ome eadersre committedo aconceptionfworld rder. omeplayersave widerange f nterestsbeyondheborders fthenation. venwhenplayersre concernedaboutnationalecuritynterests,owever,hey relikely o seethebattlessbeingwonor ostmainlyt home. hishasbecome truismoftheVietnam ar, ut t s true or ther oliciess well.For Presi-dentHarry . Trumanheproblemf theMarshall lan was how to




get Congress o establish heprogramnd votethe funds,not how toget European governmentso take the moneyor use it wisely.ForPresidentwightD. Eisenhowerheproblem f arms ontrolwas how

to get imaginative roposals romhis associates. or planners n thePentagon,hedrive o get theforces ecessary odefend henation sstymied, ot by foreign overnments,ut by rivalservices, he Secre-tary f Defense, nd the President.

It is not that ctions f othernations o notmatter, utrather heymatterf and whenthey nfluenceomestic truggles. player's ffortsto accomplishhis objectives-whethero advance domesticpoliticalinterests,rganizationalnterests,ersonalnterests,r national ecurity

interests-areometimesffectedy whathe andother layers ome tobelieve bout heactions fothernations.A German hancellor hosedomestic osition ependsupon his reputation or beingable to getwhat the FederalRepublicneeds from he UnitedStateswill be con-cerned boutAmerican ctions hat ead his colleagues nd opponentsto concludeWashington o longer istens o him.An American ecre-tary f DefenseorPresidentwho wishes o cutdefense pendingwillsee thathisposition equires oviet ctions hatpermithim to argue

that henation's ecurityanbeprotected ithreduced orces. StateDepartment fficial ho believeshis government'security equiresEuropeanunification ill fear hathiseffortsogettheUnitedStatesto promote his cause could be undercut y CommonMarkettradepolicies, incethese ffern opportunityorothers opointto thead-verse conomic onsequencesfEuropeanunification.inceactions yothernationscan affect he standsplayers ake,and thereby ffect

decisionsnd

actions,we mustconsiderhow actions f othernations

enter nto the processof decisionbargaining nd how theyaffectactions.

Manynations redoingmanythings t anygiventime.Not all oftheseforeign ctivities ecomerelevant o decisionor actiongameswithin nation. hose thatdo aretheactions eported ythenation'sforeign ffice r intelligence rganizations,r by seniorplayersdi-rectly.ntelligence rganizationsre not perfect nd neutraltrans-

mission elts. heynoticewhat theirmages f theworld eadthem othinkwill be importanto seniorplayers.They report ventsandopinions ccording o established roceduresnd in waysdesigned oprotectheir wn organizationalnterests.eniorplayersnoticewhatmayhelp themor their pponents nd relatemainly o theformer.If a new interpretationf anothernation'sactionscomes to be ac-cepted mongseniorplayers,omeplayerswill see newopportunities




to seekdecisionsr actions. thers ill see threatso ongoing ctionsor desired ewones; till thers illbeunconcerned.

Reportsfthe ctionsfother ations illnever e more han ne

ofmanynfluencesndecisionsnd actions. owever, henplayersare venly ivided,rnew ction uggestsomany substantialhangeinanticipateduturections,hese eportsfanother ation's ctionscanbe decisive. he Japanesettack n PearlHarbor,otake n ex-treme xample,ffectedheperceptionsfmanyAmericansboutwhetherhenationalecurityequired merican orces oengagenwar gainst apan. he Soviet BMdeploymentaywellhave ippedthebalance nthehard-foughtmericanontroversyverwhethero

deploynABM.Presidentyndon ohnson'sstimatef the ffectfnotdeployingn American BM systemn his reelectionrospectsmayhavebeen ubstantiallyhanged ythepossibilityhathecouldbecharged ith ermittingn "ABMgap."'5

When he ctionsfonenation re ffectivenchanginghe ehaviorof second,henewactionsrarely hatwas ntendedyanyplayerin thefirst ation. hangesn standswill eadtodesiredhangesnaction, hichn turnwillproduce esiredhangesn theaction fanother ation nly:when clear ignal s sent, hen omeonen theother ation lready ants o take hedesired ction ndtheactionincreaseshat layer'snfluence. oreoften,heeffectsremarginalor unintended.

Propositions boutNational nteraction

i. The actionsfnationA that ppear o an outside bservero bedesignedo nfluencehe ctionsfnation will nfact ea combina-tion f: (a) routineatternsfbehavior;b) maneuversndecisiongames hat re ncidentallyisible o other ations r deliberatelyis-ible, ince o beeffectiveheymustppear obea "signal"; c) actionsbyplayersnthe bsence fdecisions;d) actionsollowingdecisiongamenot elatedo nfluenceation ; aswell s (e) actions ollowinga decisioname elatedo nfluencingation .

2. Reportsnd interpretationsf these ctions rovided o senior

players yparticipantsn nationB (in theForeignOfficend In-telligence) hargedwithobserving,eporting,xplainingnd pre-dictingctionsfother ations, illbeaffectedy a) theperceptualtendenciesf all individuals;b) theuse ofModel analysis r (c)even fnot, he ackofrequiredata ndunderstanding;nd (d) the

15 On the ABM discussionsee MortonHalperin, "The Decision to Deploy the ABM,"World olitics, xv October 972).




standard perating roceduresnd interestsf these rganizations.A. Theseplayershare heperceptualendenciesf all individuals.

Thismeans, or xample,hat

(i) New nformationillbefittednto heirxistingttitudesndimages;(2) Reportshat houldeadto a changen planswillbe distorted

so as to "save heir heory";(3) Cluesthat ignal significanthange n theprobabilitiesf

events illbe lost n the urroundingoise.'6Examples: vidence f a Japanesettack n PearlHarborwas ex-

plained way.'7 ne seniormilitaryfficerrged hat heUnited tates

proceed o nvade uba even fterheSoviets greed o remove heirmissiles."8

B. Because hese layers seModel they end o assume hat heactions ere: i) designed ndexecuted,n effect,y a single ndi-vidual; 2) designedarefullyo nfluenceheir ation; 3) designedwith world iew iketheirwn;and (4) designed ithout egardtothedomesticnd bureaucraticoliticsf nation .

Examples:KhrushchevarnedKennedyfthedifficultye hadduring he Cubanmissile risis fconvincingis associateshat nAmerican-2whichrossednto ovieterritoryasnot n indicationthat heUnited tates asabout oattack.19he Americanntelligencecommunityersistsnpredictingoviet orce tructuren thebasis fModel analysis.20

C. Even fthey mploy bureaucraticoliticsmodel heywill ackdataandunderstandingf nuancesf whatdetermineshe ctions fnation .

Examples: othn theSuezcrisis f 956 andtheSkyboltrisis fi96i, senior layersn the British nd American overnmentsre-quently isreadhemeaningfactions ecauseheyacked nunder-standingfthenuancesfhowtheotherystem orked.2'

D. Standardperatingroceduresnd interestsillaffect hat sreported.

(i) Standardperatingroceduresill eadtodelaysnd to selec-

tions ifferentromwhat enior layers ould hoose.Forexample: heproceduresfthe ntelligenceommunityed to16 See Roberta Wohlstetter, earl Harbor (Stanford i962).17 Ibid.18 Robert ennedy, hirteen ays (New York 969), ii9.19For examples fromtheCuban missilecrisis, ee Allison,op. cit.20 This pointhas oftenbeenmade byA. W. Marshall.21 On Suez and Skyboltsee Richard E. Neustadt,Alliance Politics (New York I970).




a considerableelaybetweenhetime videncef SovietmissilesnCuba enteredhesystemnd the time his vidence eached eniorplayers.

(2) Standardperatingroceduresnd nterestsay ead to dis-guisingnternalureaucraticisagreementsnd thewithholdingfbadnews.

(3) Informationillbepresentedo as to mplyn action ecom-mendation.

For example: resident isenhower as toldduring heChineseattackon the offshoresland of Quemoy in I958 that the fall ofQuemoy ouldhave onsequences orefar-reachingndcatastrophic

than hosewhich ollowed"hefallofChina.Thisreportlearlyig-naled he ctionavored.22(4) Information-gatheringndreportingrocedures illbe de-

signed oprotecthe nterestsf ntelligencegencies,uch s topro-tect he olesndmissionsf heCIA inrelationootherrganizations.

(5) Proceduresillalsobedesignedoprotectheorganizationalinterestsf a parentperatingrganization.

Forexample: ccordingo a formerefense ntelligencegency(DIA) analyst, IA estimatesoncerningietnamwerewrittenoas nottoundercutheaction ecommendationsf theU.S. MilitaryCommandernVietnam ndtheJointhiefs f Staff.23

3. Theabilityfsenior layersnnation topursueheirnterestswillbeaffectedythe ctions fnationA only o the xtenthat heactions fnationA, sreportedytheForeign ffice,ntelligencendother enior layers,ffecta) who s in power nnation , (b) thepowerofparticipantsnnationA,or (c) these atter articipants'er-ception ftheir ationalecuritynterests.

Examples:residentyndon ohnson ayhavebelievedhat ovietdeploymentfanABMwouldhurt ischances f reelectionn i968.Kennedy'sailureo getSovietmissiles emovedromCubawouldhavereduced is influencen theAmericanovernment.residentJohnsons reportedo have believedhatgetting is GreatSocietylegislationhroughongressequired hathenotpermitouthViet-

namto fallto communism.he NorthKorean nvasion f SouthKorea hanged residentarry . Truman's iewofwhethertwasimportantoAmericanecurityokeepSouthKoreanon-communist.

4. IfactionsynationA do affectplayern B's ability o pursuehis nterestse willat a minimumeportnthe ction ndinterpret

22 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace (New York i965), 692.23 Patrick J.McGarvey, "DIA: Intelligence to Please," Washington Monthly, i (July

I970) .




it so as toadvance tands reviouslyaken.f the nterpretationf theaction cceptedymost enior layersffectshe alculationf whatstandwould dvance is nterests,heplayer ill hange is tandnd

seek oadvance is nterest ithoutffectinghe ctionsf nationA(if this anbe done)or by ffectingation 's actionsfnecessary.Examples:When heNorthKoreans nvaded outhKorea n I950

State ndDefense ere plit nthedesirabilityf n early eace ettle-mentwithJapan. efense avoreddelay ecause asesn Japanwererequired.efense rguedhat heKoreanWar demonstratedheneedfor ases ndhence trengthenedhe ase or elayingigninghe eacetreaty.tate rguedhat ecause fthe ttack, apaneseoncern ould

maketpossibleonegotiatease ightsfterPeaceTreaty. ence heUnited tates houldmove uicklyosign PeaceTreaty.24Presidentohnsonidchange is tand nddecide odeployn ABM

inresponseothe oviet BM deploymentnordero cancel hepos-sible ffectf theSovietABM on the 968 election. ypreventingn"ABMgap" ssue hishange ccomplishedts urpose ithouteed ocause particularoviet eaction.n theother and, ecretaryfDe-fenseRobertMcNamara's roposal orSALT talks o preventhe

American BM deploymentependedna Sovietwillingnesso par-ticipaten negotiations.

5.Changesnthe tands foneormore articipantsnnation mayaffecthe ctions f nation . Butthe hangen behaviorfB is un-likelyobe welldesignedosecurehe ction ynation which s de-sired y ny ingle articipant.his s because:a) thegeneratorfaproposal illnotput orwardn optimumignal; b) the ecision illdeviaterom he roposalf ny ingle layer;nd c) the ctions illdeviateromhedecisions.

5.i The generatorfa proposalor ction esignedoaffecthebe-havior fnationAwillnotputforwardnoptimumignal.

5.1.i Even f player'snlyntereststodesign signal oaffectheactionsfnationA he is likelyodo a poor ob because a) heusesModel or (b) heuses BureaucraticoliticsModelbut acks here-quired ata nd understanding.

A. He is ikelyoemploy particularodel frameworkhich s-sumes hat ationA:(i) Willbeheavilynfluencedythebehaviorfhisnation;(2) Is listeningloselyndwith ophisticationndwillunderstand

themeaningfcomplexignals;

24 On Korea, see Glenn Paige, The Korean Decision (New York i968), and Josephde Rivera, PsychologicalDimensions in Foreign Policy (Columbus i968).




(3) Is unaffectedydomestic olitical onstraintsembassy fficialswillgenerally othold to thispoint, orwillsenior layers ornationswhose eaders hey now well);

(4) Shares he mages f theworldwhichhis nation ccepts.For example: a dyingSecretary f StateJohn . Dulles, givinghislastadviceto thenVice President ichardNixonon how to commu-nicatewithSoviet eaders, ssured im that Khrushchev oes notneedto be convinced four good ntentions. e knowswe are not ggressorsand do notthreaten he securityf the SovietUnion. He understandsus.

25

B. Even f participantses BureaucraticoliticsModel he is likely

to lack data and an understandingf nuances about how processeswork n nationA.

For example: British nd American eadersduring the Suez andSkybolt rises ailedto designoptimum ignalsbecausetheydid notunderstandhenuances feachother's ystem. rare ounter-exampleispresentedn a memorandumrepared yRichardNeustadt nhowtoselltheMLF toa new LabourBritish overnment.26

5.I.2 Even if a participants focused nlyon national ecuritynter-

ests, ewillbeconcernedboutother udiences thomeand abroad.Forexample:during he1958 Quemoy risis ulles wanted o make

absolutelylear to the Chinese hatwe woulddefendQuemoy.But hewas inhibited rom ending clear ignalbyhisfear hat therswouldalso hearthewarning. omestic ritics f U.S. policymightuse it toeffectivelyhallengehis policy.And theChineseNationalistsmightuse thewarningsa handle oprovoke clashbetweenheU.S. andtheChineseCommunists.27

5.1.3 A participantho desires osenda signalwillhave other nter-estswhichwill influence isproposal.He will knowthatother udi-enceswill hear hissignal.Their reactionwill alwaysbe taken nto ac-count ndmay,depending nhis nterests,e ofgreateroncern.

Forexample: ecretaryfStateJohn . Dulles, na private onversa-tion where he sought o convey o British rimeMinisterAnthonyEden whattheAmericanposition n Suez was, recognized hatthe

Britisheader, ut of concernrappreciation, ight elephone isoldfriend resident isenhower o report heconversation.his report,

Dulles feared, ould setbackhis effortso establish relationship f

25 Richard Nixon, Six Crises (New York i962), 24I.

26 Richard Neustadt, "Memorandum on the British Labour Party and the MLF,"New LeftReview, LI (September i968).

27 On the I958 Quemoy crisis,see Morton Halperin and Tang Tsou, "United StatesPolicy Toward theOffshore slands," Public Policy,xv (Carnbridge i966).




trust ith hePresident. hus he wasnot very xplicitboutAmericanpolicy.

5.2 The decision f a governmentn a game designed o influence

the behavior fnationA will deviate rom he proposal f any singleparticipant.omeof the disagreementsmong participantshataffectdecisionswill relate o influencinghe behavior f nationA. (a) Par-ticipantsmaydefer nwhat actions ynationA are desirable; nd (b)participants aydiffer n how to induce hedesired ehavior.

For example:at one point n the Suez crisisDulles apparently ro-posed that theUnited States ssurethe British overnmenthat theU.S. wouldassume hefinancial ostofbypassingheSuez Canal ifthis

became necessary. eustadt uggests hatDulles had concluded cor-rectly, eustadt rgues) thatthispromisewould reduce ubstantiallythechanceof the British esortingoforcewithout nyrealprobabil-ity hat heUnited tateswould havetomakegoodonits ommitment.He was unableto convince ecretaryf the TreasuryGeorgeHum-phrey. his was notbecauseHumphrey id notwant ostop heBritish,butbecause Neustadt mplies)Humphrey idnotquiteacceptDulles'complicated xplanation f how the British abinetfunctioned,nd

he didnotwanttoyieldhis control f thefundsnvolved.5.3 Actionswhich followfrom decisionrelatedto affectinghe

actions f nationA will deviatefrom hedecision. n part the devia-tion will be directly elatedto disagreementsbout influencingheactions f nationA, in that a) participants aydiffern whatactionsbynationA aredesirable,nd (b) participants aydiffern how to n-duce thedesired ehavior.

Examples:WhenGeneralDouglasMacArthurearned hatTruman,hopingto end thewar on compromise erms,was aboutto announcepublicly heAmericandesirefor an armisticen Korea, MacArthur,who opposeda compromise, roadcast surrender emand to theenemy. ormerU.S. Ambassador o India KennethGalbraith eportsin his ournalmanyoccasionswhen his actionsdeviated romhis in-structionsecausehe believedhis actionsweremorelikelyto bringaboutthe desiredndian action.28

6. Changes n actionsof one nation will succeed n changing heactions f a secondnation na desired irectionnly otheextent hat(a) theactions fthefirst ation end a clear, onsistent,imple ignaland (b) someparticipantsntheothernationwant, npursuit f theirown nterests,ochangebehaviornthedesiredway, nd (c) this ignalserves o increase he nfluenceftheseparticipants.

28John K. Galbraith,Ambassador's Journal (Boston i969).




For example: theAmerican fforto get theJapanese overnmenttosurrender ithout nvasion fJapan ucceeded nlybecause i) theUnitedStates entJapan omeoftheclearestignals nhistory,nclud-

ingdropping woatomic ombs, estroyingokyowithfire ombing,destroyinghe Japanese leet,nd assembling n invasionforce; 2)

therewas a strong roupwithin heJapanese overnment,ncludingthe Emperor, isprincipal dviser, ndtheForeignMinisterwho hadopposed he warfrom he start nd wanted o surrender;nd (3) theAmerican ignals ncreased hisgroup'ssenseof determinationndwillingness o runriskswhilediscreditingnd demoralizingheir p-ponents.No majorfiguren Japanese uling ircles hangedhis mind

about hedesirabilityfwar with heUnited tates rom hebeginningofthewar tothe end.Thosewhowantedtobeginthewarremainedopposed osurrender.29

7. More oftenhangesnactions yonenationwill haveunintendedand unanticipatedffectsn actions.

Pearl Harborand Skybolt

In the months eading up to Pearl Harbor, competing roups n

Japan ndtheUnitedStatesneededdifferentctions rom achother'sgovernmentn order o accomplish heir bjectives.30n Tokyothosewhoopposedwar with heUnited tates eeded obe abletoshowthatthe UnitedStateswould not nterfere ithJapanese xpansion y cut-ingoff ources fscrap ron, il,and othermaterials. heyalsoneededtheUnitedStates o avoid actionswhichwouldhaveenabled heir p-ponents oargue hatwar withtheUnitedStateswas inevitable.hosewho favoredwar hadquitedifferenteeds.

In theAmerican overnment,roponentsfwarwithJapan ookedforJapanese ctions which would demonstrate hatJapan's objec-tiveswereunlimitednd threatened merican nd British ossessions.Roosevelt,who sought o avoidwar withJapan,had quite differentneeds.He hadtoresist ressures ithin hegovernmentromhosewhowanted ogo to war withJapan.At the sametimehedidnotwanttoso demoralize hemthattheywouldresign r reducetheir ffortsoprepare orthewar withGermanywhich he believedwas necessary.

29 See Robert Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender (Stanford I954), and HerbertFeis, Japan Subdued (Princeton i96i).

30 On Pearl Harbor, see Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York i969);

RobertButow, Tojo and the Coming of the War (Princeton i96i); Herbert Feis, TheRoad to Pearl Harbor (New York i962); JosephGrew, My Years in Japan (NewYork I944); William L. Langer and S. EverettGleason, The Undeclared War (NewYork I953); and Wohlstetter fn. i6). On Skybolt,see Neustadt (fn. 2I).




ThusRoosevelt's urposes equired hatJapan void: i) flagrantiola-tions f nternationalaw, (2) linking p withGermanynwaysthatmade t mpossible o resist rgumentshatwar withJapanwas a part

ofthewar against heFascist lliance, nd (3) threatso theBritishrDutchcolonieswhichcould be seenas a threat o theAllies nEurope.Actions fboth governments ere designedwitha varietyfpur-

poses. Japanesemilitarymovesfolloweddecisions o expand the areaunderdirectJapanese ontrolwithout ny direct nterestn signals otheUnited tates. n the ther and, henegotiatingositions roposed(and in some cases mplemented) y the StateDepartmentwerede-signed, n part, o demonstrateo the President hat negotiatedolu-

tionwas impossible. he stand f theJapanesemilitarynnegotiationsprobably ad a similar urpose.Roosevelt nd Japanese oreignMin-ister ogo proposed ositions esigned o keep open the possibilityfnegotiations ith the hope of reaching settlement.

In this ontext apanmoved ooccupy ll of French ndochina. hisJapanesemovewas not ntended o signal nythingotheUnited tatesor to influence merican ctions.Nevertheless,t was incompatiblewithwhatRooseveltneededfromtheJapanese overnment. e no

longer elt ble to resist hepressuresotake ome ort f action gainstJapan.Resisting leas for total mbargo, e compromised y requir-ing icensingf all exportsoJapan. hosewhofavoredwar, ncludingthenAssistantecretaryfStateforEconomicAffairs ean Acheson,were able to controlmplementationfthisdecision. heydid so byimposing total mbargo n oil shipmentsoJapan.

At thispoint heJapaneseeaders pposed o war didnot have whattheyneededfrom he UnitedStates opursue heir bjective. periodofhigh-levelnd intensive egotiations egan.Those opposedto waron both ides ought opersuade heother idetorescind hebehaviorthatmade t mpossibleoresist ressuresogo to war.Roosevelt, ecog-nizingthat heStateDepartment'snterestsifferedromhis,used hisPostmaster eneral s a negotiatinggent.He also intervened irectlyby dealing personallywiththeJapanese nvoy.The peace party nTokyo,withconsiderableifficulty,ot throughheJapanese overn-

menttwowatered-downffers. lan "A" promised n ultimateJap-anesewithdrawal rom hina.Plan "B" offeredn immediate apanesewithdrawalromouthernndochinanreturn or iftinghetrade m-bargo.However, hose n bothcapitalswho saw war as necessaryrinevitable ere able to resist heproposed ompromises.nd thetwogovernmentsound hemselvestwar.

RichardE. Neustadt's ccount ftheSkybolt risis ells quitedif-




ferent aleofrelations etween llieswith relativelyuccessfulesolu-tion.Nevertheless,hebasicpoints re the ame.

What British rime MinisterHarold Macmillan neededfromthe

UnitedStateswere ndicationshatAmerican eadersheld him n highregard.He was particularly ood at getting romthe United Stateswhatwas in Britain'snterest. e also neededtheSkyboltmissile, incehe had made that symbol f his independent ucleardeterrent. eneeded hedeterrento pursuehis domesticnterests.f he failed o getthese hings rom heUnited tates,Macmillanwas threatenedothbypotential lternativeeaders n the Conservativearty ndby the nextelection.

Kennedy's eedsfromMacmillanwere moremodest.He needed toavoid a demonstrationfbeastlinesso theBritish,rnon-supportortheneedsof a Conservative overnment. ennedy'sneeds stemmedfromhis desire o maintain he active nd enthusiasticupport ftheeastern oreign olicy stablishmenthichwas sympathetico Britainingeneral nd toparticularonservativearty eaders, speciallyMac-millan.He also neededto avoid evidence fextreme iscriminationnfavor fBritainn order opursuehisobjective f mprovingelations

with France. He also neededto maintain semblance f consistencywithhisnon-proliferationolicy.

Kennedy's cceptance f therecommendationf Secretaryf De-fenseRobert . McNamaratocancelSkyboltwas in no wayintendedas a signal otheUnitedKingdom. t was not ntended osuggest lackoffriendshiprrespector heBritish overnment,r ts eaders,ranydesire o remove ritain rom tsroleas an independentuclear ower.Nevertheless,hecancellationfSkyboltwas incompatible ith Mac-millan'spursuit fhisinterests.hus,Macmillan's irst opewas thatthedecision ould be rescinded.fthis ailed, e wouldneedsome ub-stitute orSkybolto continuewithwhathe coulddescribe thomeasan independentuclear apability. e alsoneededa demonstrationfAmericanupportfhimanda demonstrationfthewillingnessftheAmericangovernmento respond o his needs.However,Macmillancouldnot,before heNassau Conference,equest olaris.The British

Navywasopposed, s wastheAirForce.The British avywasopposedbecause tfeared diversion f fundsfrom henavy'sbasicprogram(aircraftarriers),ndtheAir Forcewished okeepthe trategiceter-rent olefor tself. othservices ad importantupportersn thebackbenches.More mportant, acmillanwas reluctant ogo tohiscabinetwhereopponents fthe ndependent eterrent ight oin withthoseconcernedbouttheaddedcostofPolaris nddefeat im.




The needs fAmerican fficials eredifferent.he SecretaryfState,Dean Rusk,whomight avefavoredontinuingkybolt, asunwillingtomeddlen the ffairsfhiscolleague, he ecretaryfDefense.Robert

McNamarawas determinedocancelSkybolt; ut he was prepared ogive heBritisholaris s a substitute.e wasunwilling, owever, o dobattlewith heEuropeanistsntheStateDepartment-which ewouldhavehadto havedone to offerheBritish olaris eforehey emandedit.

As a crisis nsuedKennedy ecamedirectlynvolved. e sawthat ftheU.S. governmentersistedn itscurrentourse faction,whathe,Kennedy,needed fromMacmillan would be threatened. acmillan

was prepared ohave a breakoverthe ssue.He demonstratedoKen-nedy hatKennedy ad tochoose etween etting hatheneededfromtheU.K. and othercosts to his interestst home.The compromisewhichensuedgave Macmillanvirtually verythinghat he needed,while onlymarginally ffectingennedy'sdomestic osition.BritaingotPolaris,which ouldbe used ndependentlynmomentsfsupremenational oncern. ennedy ould point o the BritishgreementousePolaris spart fan integrated ATO force. he needsofboth eaders

weremet.Otherplayerswereunhappy. he crisis eceded.The two cases, n their imilaritiesnd differences,llustratehe

utilityfthepropositionsor nalyzing ow thebehavior fonenationaffectshebehavior f another.

In bothcases thekeyevent hattriggeredheserious risiswas notmeant s a signalto theother. he Japanese ccupation fIndochinaand thecancellationf Skybolt othresulted rom ecision amesde-signed o affectther utcomes.AnalystsnWashington, okyo,andLondondid a poor ob ofexplaining hemeaning fthese nd otheractions nd of predicting uture ctions. eniorplayers ttempted ointerpretctions o support tands heyhad previouslyaken.For ex-ample,those n theUnited Stateswho believedwar withJapanwasinevitable ointedwithalarm toJapanese ctions.

In theSkybolt asethe stakes or eaders n bothsideswere argelydomestic.Macmillan nd Kennedy aw dangers o their ower n the

possible hangesn

actions ftheothernation.For

other layers, ar-ticularlyhe armedforces,hefaceofthe ssuewas roles ndmissions.Others awnational ecuritynterestselated oproliferationndEuro-peanunification.n thecase ofPearlHarborthe stakeswerenationalsecuritynterestsfthehighest rder-preventing ar.Actions ftheothernationthreatenedheability f leaders o veto actions fotherplayers, hichthey earedwouldlead towar.




Changesn the ehaviorfeachnationneach risis,t east tfirst,ledtounintendedhangesnthebehaviorfthe ther.his ncreasedthethreat o interestsfsenior layersn both ides.The Japanese

movemade t mpossibleorRooseveltopreventnembargo.heem-bargo,n turn,oweakened hepeacegroupnJapanhatwarcouldnotbe prevented.n theSkyboltase thefirstmove-cancellationfSkybolt-threatenedacmillan'snterestsndalmostedhim oattackKennedy ublicly.hiswouldhaverequiredurthermericanction.The two eaders,meetingn Bermuda, ere bletofind solution.Theywere hen ble to force heir eluctantolleaguesoaccept hatsolution.n this ase theprice f failure ouldhavebeen moren-

tenserisisnd troublesor oth eaders t home.n thePearlHarborcase, he stakesweremuchgreater.ne wonderswhether directmeetingetweenDR and theJapaneserimeMinistermight othaveproducedmutuallyompatibleolution hich achcouldhaveimposedt home.

SectionII

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Wepresentere ome llustrativeolicy mplicationsftheBureau-craticolitics odel nthe orm fpolicy dvice oplayersn theU.S.government,nparticularo senior layers.hepresentationakes heform f precepts ithout videncer elaboration.n some aseswepresentxampleso llustratepoint, r to show hat ome eople e-lieve he ontrary.hese receptsredividednto woparts:I) advice

about he ehaviorfotherovernmentsndthe ffectfU.S.behavioronotherovernmentctions,nd 2) advice bout hebehaviorftheU.S.government.

BEHAVIOR OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS

EXPLANATION OF THE BEHAVIOR OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS

i. Besuspiciousfexplanationshat epend nthe ssumptionhatone anreason ack rometailedharacteristicsf pecificehaviorocentralovernmentntentionsrdoctrine.orexample,n the ovietSS-9deploymentecretaryairdhastestified,hat they regoing ora first-strikeapabilityndthere'sodoubtbout t.""

2. Recognizehatnmost ases hefull ange fbehaviorxhibitedbya governmentas not ntendedyany ingle articipant.n most

31New YorkTimes,March 2, i969, p. i6.




cases, hepolicy nd action ecisions erecompromises.ctualbe-havior eflectsrograms,tandardperatingrocedures,nd interestsof mplementors,s well s the elevantecisions.or xample,Soviet

analyst honeglectedhese actors ouldhave ome oerroneouson-clusionsboutwhy heUnited tateswas deployingn ABM system.Secretaryf DefenseRobert . McNamara'speechn October967laid out theargumentsgainst largeSoviet-orientedBM systemwhile nnouncinglimitedeploymentf ABM's.

3. Press hose harged ith rovidingxplanationsordetailedx-planationsased n a BureaucraticoliticsModel.

4. Recognizehat eaders f other overnmentsayhave uitedif-

ferentmages f theworld, nformation,tc., hat ead them o seeeventsn a dramaticallyifferentight. or xample,hineseombard-ment f he ffshoreslandsn1954 mayhave eflectedear nthepartofsomeChineseeadersfAmericanncirclementuetothe ecuritytreatiesheUnited tateswascurrentlyigning.hisexplanationasnot ven onsideredyU.S. eaders ecause hey new hat he reatieswere efensive.32

PREDICTION

i. Be suspiciousfpredictionsased rimarilyn calculationsboutthenationalecuritynterestsnddoctrinesfanotheration. alcu-lationsf this ortmayproviden appropriateurrogaten thecaseof someproblems,or xample,eterrencefnuclearwarbya stablebalance f error.n most ases uch redictionsillnotbe satisfactory.Forexample,stimatesf Soviet orce osturesavefrequentlyoneastrayor his eason.

2. Askfor bureaucratic-politicalapofthefactorshat an affectanoutcome,ncludingnparticularlist ftheparticipantsnd theirinterests.

AndrewW. Marshall asprovided setofspecificropositionse-lated opredictingoviet orce osture:i) Force ostureor nationisespeciallynfluencedythe rganizationalnterestsndbehaviorfsub-partsf themilitarystablishment.2) Internaloviet ecuritycontrolsver heflow f nformationnd thegeneral rivacyfthedecision-makingrocesseadsto an evenmore ureaucraticallynflu-enced orce osturehan s usual nWesternountries.3) Parts ftheSovietmilitaryureaucracytrive okeeptheir udgetaryharesndarefairlyuccessfulndoing o. (4) The mechanicsf theoperation

32See Halperinand Tsou (fn. 27), and Leon Sigal, "The RationalPolicy Modeland theFormosaStraits risis,"nternationaltudiesQuarterly,iv (June 970).




ofthebudgetary rocess ave a substantialmpact n theformationfforce osture."

PLANNING

i. Ask who in another overnment antsto do what youwant forhis own reasons. f you locatehim, strengthen im. If you do not,despair.

2. Limit claims on other governmentso outcomesreachablebythemwithin widerangeof internal olitics, nder variety fper-sonalitiesnd circumstances.

3. Recognize he ow probabilityf success.

PLANNING WITHIN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

GENERAL PLANNING PRECEPTS

i. Focusonchanging overnmentalction.2. Decide whether change n governmentalctions equires hat

somepolicy rdecision e changed.3. Be awarethat fit does appear necessarydesirable) to change

policy n order to change action, he changein policy n thegreat

majorityf cases s onlya way-stationothedesired utcome nd nottheoutcometself-oftenhepolicy hange sonly nearlyway-station.

4. Realizethat thers, homaydesire ifferentutcomes,mayalsobe planning, nd take their lanning ntoaccount.

5. Be preparedomodify our hoiceofoutcome, ryourdeclaredprediction f the consequences f thatoutcome,n orderto induceothers o cooperate. ake intoaccount, owever, hatthesemodifica-tionsmay (or may not) affect he natureof your game with third

parties.6. Be aware that uchmodificationscompromises)may giverise

to outcomeswhichare lessdesirable han theexisting tateof affairs.Iftheprobabilityfsuchoutcomesssufficientlyigh, hegameshouldnotbe started,r,once started,nded.Withthis onsiderationnmind,review he tate fplayfrequently.

7. In choosing hedesired utcome,onsider owmany hanges nindividual rorganizationalehavior rerequired or tsachievement.

8. Assesswhether esired hanges n behaviorwill be easilyob-served r monitored.esignoutcomeso astoproduce aturalmonitors(but don'tcount n them).

9. Trytodesignoutcomeso as notto affectmajor organizationalinterests,articularlyheautonomyf an organizationr itsability o

33Andrew Marshall, npublished aper.




pursue hat t sees o be the ssence f tsfunction,romotions,olesand missions,nd budgets.

io. Designproposalso that eople an agree ordifferenteasons.

(Use argumentshat ppeal to one side and offend thers nly nprivate.)ii. Plan systematically.ither nternalizer consult n explicit

planning uide. ee Appendix.

INTERESTS

i. Recognizemultiplenterestndfaces"where heytand ependson where hey it").

2. Recognizehat tands n issues redeterminedycalculationsofmultiplenterestsf which ational ecuritynterestsreonly ne.Therefore,nly ncaseswhere ationalecurityrgumentsreclearlydominantrethey ikely ochange player'stance n a particularissue.

3. Recognizehatwhere participants strongly otivatedyor-ganizationalnterests,ewillresistctions hat eem othreatenheautonomyfhisorganizationopursue hatsconceivedobe the s-

sence fitsactivity.or example, oreignervice fficersavecon-sistentlypposed roposals iving heStateDepartmentperationalcontrolf foreignperationseyond epresentation,egotiation,ndreporting,.g.,of foreignid, militaryssistancerograms,ndfor-eign nformationervice.

4. Recognizehatplayers ith trong rganizationalnterestsillalsobe importantlyffectedythe mpact fan action f promotionpatterns,oles ndmissions,ndbudgets.

5. These nterests,articularlyhe nterestnroles nd missions,illaffecthese layers' ehaviorn situationshat re regarded y theseniorlayerssmajor ationalrisesnwhichllare bviouslyullingtogether.

Forexample:hecompetitionetween heAirForce ndNavy nreportingnthe ffectivenessfthebombingnNorth ietnam.

INFORMATION

i. Assumehat thers illgiveyounformationhat hey hink illleadyou odowhat hey ant, atherhannformationhat ouwouldpreferohave.

Forexample: rioro theBayofPigs, residentennedyndicatedthat emightancel heplannednvasionromear hatt might e atotal ailure. e was assuredy eaders fthe ntelligenceommunity




that hiswas mpossible.f the ffortoestablishbeachheadailed,helanding orces, hich ad received uerrillaraining,ouldmove othenearbymountains.ennedy as not old hat here as a swamp

betweenhe anding ite ndthemountains,hatess han ne-thirdfthe orce ad anyguerrillaraining;nd no one n the nvasion artywas told that hey houldmove o themountainsf the effort asfailing.34

Anotherxamples providedya formerIA analyst:

From i964-65, when U.S. involvementn Vietnambeganto beconsiderable,ntil ate i966 or early 967, thegenerals n Saigon

worked o buildup U.S. troop trength.herefore,heywantedevery itofevidenceroughto thefore hat ould how hatn-filtrationas ncreasing.IA obligednd alsoemphasizedn allreportshe enemy'sapabilityo recruit orces rom he SouthVietnameseopulation.n i967 a second eriod egan. hehighpriestsfSaigon ecidedhatwe were winning."henthepara-mountnterestecame o show he nemy's educedapabilityorecruitnda slowdownn infiltrationueto ourbombing.he

tunendemphasisfreportsromhe ield hanged adically,ndso didthose utoutbyDIA.

It should otbe concludedhat nyone uppressedvidence. oonedid.ThemilitarynSaigon ent llthe acts ack oWashing-toneventually.uring hebuildup eriod,nfiltrationataandrecruitmentata ame n via GeneralWestmoreland'saily able-gram. ata from ield ontact ith nemy nits ameamid the

moremundaneables r bycourierp to fiveweeks ater. ablesfromWestmoreland,f ourse, ere iven igher rioritynWash-ington.Whenwe startedwinning,"etailedeportsighlighting"body ounts" nd statisticsn howmany illageswerepacifiedwere abledwithWestmoreland'signature;ecruitmenttudieswere ouched rcabledwith hereportsnthefluctuatingriceofrice. t wasalla matterfemphasis.35

2. Do not ssume hat hererenot riticalifferencesntheseval-uationsf nformationimplyecause piece fpaper eportsnani-mous onclusionsf thegroup. or example, IA differencesith

34See Haynes Johnson,Bay of Pigs (New York i964); Schlesinger (fn. 6), andSorensen (fn. 6).

35PatrickJ.McGarvey (fn. 23), 7I-72.




GeneralWestmoreland'svaluationftheTet offensives total efeatfor he nemy erenotreported.36

3. Recognize hat technicalvaluationsnd conclusionsre fre-

quently ased n simple ules f thumb,atherhan ncomplexech-nical alculations.he rules f thumbre often rong. orexample,theoptimumharacteristicsor hefirst enerationf Americanmis-siles, pecifiedy thevon Neumann ommittees destructiveowerofonemegaton,ange f5500miles, ndaccuracy easureds a CEPof5 miles,werebasedrespectivelyn a roundnumber, quarterftheearth's ircumference,ndcompromiseetweenhosewho wereoptimisticndthosewhowere essimisticbout ccuracy.37

4. Don'tassume hat nformationhatyoupasson to other layersispassed n bythemo theirubordinatesrsuperiors.

OPTIONS

i. Recognize hat heoptions resentedillbe basedon thepro-grams nd standard peratingroceduresf the organizationshatgeneratehe ptions.

2. Recognize hat ptionswhich equire ooperationetween wo

independentrganizationsreunlikelyo be advanced yeitherftheserganizations.3. Recognizehat rganizationsend o assert hat n optionsfea-

sible nlyf tpermitshe rganizationonsiderablereedomf ction.Options esignedyorganizationsillbedesignedomaximizeheirfreedomf ction. or example,n 962 theJoint hiefs fStaff erepreparedorecommendhe ntroductionfAmericanroopsnto aosonly f thePresidentssued hem n assurancehatnuclearweaponswould eused fnecessary.38

4. Recognizehat ptionsend obebiased y implisticndunstatedhunchesbout omesticoliticsndbureaucraticolitics.

5. Recognizehat ptions illbedesignednthe asis f he ssump-tion hat ther overnmentsctas singlendividuals otivatedri-marily ynationalecuritynterests.nsome ases his ssumptionillbecomplicatedy ome eel or oreign fficerdomesticolitics.

6. Don'tassume hat articipantsre nfactmotivatedythe rgu-mentshey ut orwardnfavor ftheirtand.

36Ibid.37Herbert York,Race to Oblivion (New York I970), 89.38See Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (New York i967), Schlesinger, op. cit.

and Sorensen, op. cit.




7. Recognize hat he ntensityf a participant'srgumentor posi-tionmaynotreflecthe ntensityf his commitmento that tand.

IMPLEMENTATION

i. Recognize hatpeopledo not feelobliged o implementaithfullya chosen ction.

2. Note that hey ave available number f alternatives,ncluding:implementinghe etter ndnotthe pirit,elay, utright isobedience,as well as overzealousmplementation.

3. Examinewithgreat are the nstructionsivenbyan organizationto tsmembers or he mplementationf somedecision.

4. Locateyourself,rospectiveelpers, nd presumed pponentsnrelation o all actionchannels eadily r possibly vailablefor mple-menting heresults ou want, nd blockthoseyoufear.

5. Recognize hat n the short un,thebehaviormplemented illreflect xisting rganizational rograms nd standard perating ro-cedures.

6. Recognize hat f an organizations forced ochange tsbehaviorit will tendtochangeto another rogram r standard perating ro-

ceduren itsrepertoire,atherhandevise newandperhapsmore p-propriate peratingrocedure.

7. Note that hanging ersonnels more ikely o lead to changingbehavior hanchanging rders o existing ersonnel: ne new ambas-sador oftheright ersuasion)s worth thousand ables.

8. Recognize hatmembers fforeignmissionswill employvariousdevices o increase heirndependencefhomeauthority:

(a) Theywill often ttemptopresentheir overnments ith afait ccom li.

(b) Theywill exploit isits y highofficialsftheir overnmentsbygetting hese fficialsnrecord s supporting ission ositions. heywill thenuse therecord s evidence f a national ommitment.

(c) They will reinterpretr evade unwelcomedirectives romhome,hoping hat he ssuing uthority illbeforgetfulr inattentive.Ordinarily,hesehopeswill be fulfilled.

(d) If authoritiest home nsist n compliancewith unwelcomedirectives,he missionwill warnof"direconsequences,"tc.39

39 rnestMay, unpublishedpaper.




APPENDIX

Planning Guide

I. Whatprecisely o I wantto accomplish?A. First ttempt o predictwhat will occur.B. Plan and implement nly if

i. Disaster appears likely possible);2. Substantialmprovements likely.

C. Identify recisely he outcome seek.D. Why do I seek t?

i. Good in itself iven my values. If so, do I wishto reconsidermy values?)

2. I believe t will lead to a further utcomewhich value. (Ifso,can I state he causal chain so I can retest?)

3. I believe twill lead tobehavior yothergovernments.If so,consider hattheothergovernments nota unitary ctor ndthat ts bureaucracy ill do onlywhat is in their nterestntheir wn terms. nfluence s most ikely o take the form falteringncentivesnd power.Consider lso how reliablemyinformations about the othergovernment.)

E. How likely m I to gettheoutcome s I desire t?i. Withhold udgment until workingout paths to action and

strategy.2. Consider relevantprogramsand standardoperatingproce-

dures.3. Consider nternalnd external iases.

F. How importants thisoutcome ome as compared o others?

II. Alternative athsto action

A. Map out alternative outes o thedesired utcome.

B. Recognize hat change npolicymaybe neither ecessaryorsuffi-cient.

C. Seektochangepolicy nly fi. Necessary o remove n absolutebarrier o changing ction;2. Useful as a hunting icense;3. Necessarygiven my access to those who must perform he

action;4. Likelyto lead easily o a change n action.

D. Considerhowhigh needtogo. (Do not nvolve hePresident n-

lessnecessaryr he is likely o be sympathetic,.e.,unless he has aproblem hismay solve.)E. If seeking change in policy,plot the actionpath from thereto

changes n actions.F. Consider or achpathwhowillhave the action. Is there ny path

in which will have theaction?)G. Specify heformal ctionswhichare necessary.




H. Whatresources o I haveto moveaction longeachpathwithsuc-cess? (Re-judge afterconsidering actics.)Relativeadvantagesofeach path.

I. How will resources xpended to get to one way-stationutcome

affectbility o get to furthertations?J. What additionalnformation illhelp?Can I get t? At whatcost?

III. Framingtactics-maneuversnd arguments-tomovealong a path

A. Identificationfthe participantsnd theirnterests,ncluding hosebeyond heexecutive ranch.

i. Who will inevitablye involved ccording o therules of thegame?

2. Who might eek to play but could be excluded?

3. Who mightnotseektoplaybut couldbe broughtn?4. What are the ikely nterests f thevariousparticipants,hat

faceof the ssue willthey ee,howwillthey efine he stakes?Considerorganization, ersonal, olitical, nd national nter-ests.

5. Who are natural llies,unappeasable pponents, eutralswhomightbe converted o support, r opponentswho might beconvertedo neutrality?

B. How can I lead a participant o see that theoutcomes desireare

in his interests he sees it?C. How can I changethesituation ohave an outcome onflictingess(or not at all) withparticipants'nterestss they ee them?

D. Do I havetheresourcesor hispurpose? f not, an I getothers ouse theirs?

E. What specificmaneuvershould use at whatstages?F. What arguments hould use:

i. In general?2. On a discriminatoryasis?

G. If I mustget a large organization o changeitsbehavior, mustconsider he nterests,tandard perating rocedures,nd programsofthat rganization.

H. Should I tryto bring n players utsidethe executive ranch? fso, how?

I. How can I tell how well I am doing?

IV. Gaugingcostsand benefits

A. Reconsider ll phases fromtimeto time. Specifically:

i. How highup should one seeka decision?2. How should thedecision oughtrelate o thechange desired,i.e., hould tbe a decision o changepolicy, ochangepatternsofaction, r totakea singleparticular ewstep or to stop non-going ction)

3. By whatmeans will the initial decisionwhich is soughtbeconvertedntothedesired ction?




B. Plan of action.i. How to movethe actionto the way-stationnd finaloutcome

desired.2. What maneuvers nd arguments o use on or with the other

participants.3. A timesequence.

C. To whatextents thisprocess onsciouslyuplicated y participantsseeking change?Are some participants ore ikely o plan thanothers?To plan effectively?

D. How is thechoiceof way-stationutcomes nd route ctionmade?

Documents

1972 Bureaucratic Politics： A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications