ASSESS THE IMPORTANCE FOR MIDDLE EAST POLITICS OF THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

It could be suggested that of all the Arab-Israeli wars which have resulted from cultural and religious divisions, the Six Day war of June 1967 has most influenced the political environment of the Middle East region. In this essay it is my intention to examine the both the political and socio-economic repercussions of this conflict, firstly by analysing briefly the background and causation factors which led to hostilities in 1967, and secondly the implications of the conflict for the major political actors in the region. The six day war was essentially the result of a crisis, which escalated into a pre-emptory war launched by the State of Israel against the front line Arab states i.e. Egypt, Jordan and Syria before they could start the war on their own terms. The political environment shows several key factors which attributed to the commencement of war in 1967. The First factor is that of the nature of the Arabs political leadership. During the course of the 1960's all of the front line states acquired military governments, such as both Iraq and Syria in April and February of 1966 respectively 1 Meanwhile, on one hand Egypt had been controlled by the military under Nasser since 1952, and although Jordan did not have a military government per se it could be suggested that King Hussain possessed a grasp of military thought, having been educated at Sandhurst Military Academy in Great Britain. This I would suggest allied with Israel's "siege mentality" led to a consensual view between Arab leaders that a military solution to the problem of Palestine was a possibility. Having decided upon a means, it could be suggested that the choice of tool was to lead to the conflict breaking out. Arab strategists decided to look towards the guerrilla wars in the developing world, and their effects, such as against the Americans in Vietnam, and decided to use the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), created by Egypt, as a guerrilla organisation to overthrow the Israeli's, or to create conditions for an Arab war of liberation 2 To this end the Arab states provided equipment and training for Al-Fatah to conduct terrorist attacks, escalating in 1967 leading to the Israeli government adopting a policy of reprisal raids against Al-Fatah and PLO bases in Jordan and Syria. This led in turn to an escalation with Syria launching artillery barrages in retaliation for over flights of their territory. Intense Arab diplomacy led to defence agreements between Egypt and Jordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia provided troops which were moved to assist in the fighting, leaving the Israeli's little apparent choice but to attack first, at which point the Arab agreements collapsed allowing the Israelis to deal with their enemies one by one as in previous wars, leading to a spectacular Israeli military victory 3 For the Israeli's the war gained them the territories of the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank of the River Jordan (Comprising Samaria, Judaea, and east Jerusalem), and control of the strategic Golan heights in the North. The State of Israel also gained an influx of nearly one million Palestinians through capture of the lands, displacing some half a million Palestinians 4 The Arab states suffered a stinging military and political defeat, leading to the spokesman for the Arab world, President Nasser to offer his resignation, stopped only by public demonstrations. For Jordan, the only gain from the six day war was by having its refugee problem greatly exacerbated by Palestinians from the West Bank. Having discussed briefly the 1967 conflict and its background, it is now my intention to turn to the second part of my analysis of the effects of this conflict on the politics of the region after the Six day war of 1967. For the Al-Fatah movement within the PLO, whose exploits helped precipitate the six day war, greater authority within the organisation resulted, catapulting the faction into the position of providing leadership. The ascendancy of Al-Fatah it could be suggested arose from the fact that of all the liberation groups, they had the superior equipment and more importantly organisational effectiveness. The PLO in the wake of the conflict saw that in order for their to be a settlement, they themselves would have to fight, as the combined political might of Egypt, Jordan and Syria had resulted in failure, negated by the superior organisational ability of the Israelis.

The Al-Fatah movement, radical and newly empowered it could be suggested proceeded to test the limits of its power, mounting a terrorist campaign into Israel, and in the Fourth Palestinian National Charter of 1968, they sought to adopt the "armed struggle" to liberate Palestine through terrorism 5 Ultimately for the PLO, the six day war can be shown to have been the radicalism, catalyst in the development of the "armed struggle" shaping the PLO strategy for the next two decades. For the front line Arab states, and Egypt in particular the 1967 conflict was a severe political setback. In Egypt, President Nasser's aspirations for a United Arab Republic were dashed, Egypt realising its was militarily reliant upon the Soviet Union. It could also be suggested that Nasser in his final years was less bellicose towards Israel adopting the concept of 'what has been lost by force, will not be returned by force' 6 This concept however did not successfully influence his successors decision to consider peace until conflict occurred once more in 1973. For the Syrians, the war afforded the President an opportunity to consolidate the political environment, purging disloyal officers through the convenient excuse of poor performance in the war. The loss of the strategic Golan Heights proved to be a matter of pride for the Syrians, and an Israeli refusal to surrender them without a peace accord sowed the seeds of justification for future Syrian aggression in the context of the Arab-Israeli dispute. The Jordanians on the other hand also suffered the loss of territory, that of the West Bank and more importantly the old city of Jerusalem, whilst fleeing Palestinians swelled the refugee camps. At first the Jordanians accepted this, playing host to the PLO training camps, which led it could be suggested to a persistent political problem for King Hussain. With the Israeli policy of retaliation, any PLO cross-border attacks on Israel would be met by a reprisal attack against PLO facilities inside the Kingdom of Jordan, creating the potential for another crisis, like the escalation which led to the six day war. This was coupled with the radical PLO and the plethora of terrorist groups, who after setbacks in their terrorist campaign, decided to aid an assassination attempt against the King, turning Jordan into a Middle Eastern Hanoi for liberating Israel from. The failure of this attempt led to the King's loyal Bedouin troops attacking many of the guerrilla camps inside Jordanian borders. In conclusion for Jordan the 1967 wars made political support for either Middle East peace initiatives with Israel, or support for Palestinian Liberation attempts highly precarious. Amongst the Gulf states, only Iraq suffered sufficient unrest to result in a coup, led by the Baath party, directly attributed to failure in the war. The Gulf states however, began to recognise their economic power, and the power over oil supplies as a new tool in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The formation of OAPEC in January 1968, a scant six months since the war, aimed to represent "the special interests" of the Arab oil-producing countries 7 It could be suggested that by including Nasser's Egypt and an aggressive Syria, this organisation had the potential to be used as a political tool in a future development of the conflict, particularly when coupled with the upheavals occurring in the Gulf oil industry, with states gradually gaining control of their resources from western TNC's. Having examined the change and political haemorrhage resulting from the 1967 war in the structures of Arab politics, it is now my intention to analyse the implications of military success upon the State of Israel. The war had been an unqualified military triumph, resulting in Israeli confidence being at an unprecedented high. The state had solved its security problems with the capture of the Golan Heights, and the securing of its borders by controlling the Gaza strip and the West Bank. In November 1967 the international community passed United Nations resolution 242, in effect setting an agenda for negotiations, involving as pre-conditions the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, and for the Arabs to recognise the existence of the State of Israel. For the Israelis, withdrawal as a prelude to negotiations was anathema at the time. Moshe Dayan the war leader advocated retention of the territories, causing a split in Israeli politics over whether

Dayan should resign over his statements, creating a rift in policy over the occupied territories which has persisted until today, even in the climate for peace between Israel and the PLO, political demonstrations occur in support of keeping the territories continue involving figures such as Benjamin Netanyahu, an important member of the Knesset. The status of the territories has caused Israel further problems. On the 27th June 1967, the occupied territories, and then on the 28th Jerusalem also were placed under Israeli legal jurisdiction. For the Gaza Strip and the west Bank however, a problem in their legal status soon arose. Were these areas now captured territories under temporary Israeli administration in accordance with Resolution 242 ? or were Israeli laws applicable to them as annexed territories? The result of this dilemma was that the PLO claimed that the Palestinians were entitled to rights in accordance with section IV of the 1949 Geneva Convention, guaranteeing them certain civil rights. The Israelis on the other hand viewed the occupied territories as actually liberated lands, and that Israeli jurisdiction was a natural consequence. The annexation view in the Israeli psyche can be reinforced by the large land purchases in the West Bank by Israelis and the subsequent building of settlements in the territories which are not distinguished on Israeli maps from the state itself 8 The 1967 war for the State of Israel could be seen as a short term unifying force, as well as providing a potential long term force for destabilisation. Israeli confidence in their own superiority led to them misreading the signals in 1973 rendering them victim to a surprise Arab attack at Yom Kippur. The Israeli decision to retain ambiguously the occupied territories has provided a hostile Palestinian contingent inside Israel providing a persistent internal-security problem which has persisted in varying forms until the present. In summary the Six Day war of 1967 was a traumatic defeat for the front line Arab states, committing some to future aggression in order to redress Israeli gains, such as Syria, or to seek peace in the future such as Egypt's case. The war dampened Arab nationalism, with Radio Cairo's broadcasts not having the same radicalising effect that they had prior to the war. The Israelis as shown previously secured all their long term security objectives in the conflict leaving them little inclination to negotiate them away, damaging their international status to an extent. However, the influx of Palestinians now under Israeli control were to prove a persistent internal-security problem for security conscious Israel, the Intifada of the late 1980's, rather than providing a civil disobedience crisis, has cost Israel between 1.5% and 2.0% of GNP to provide manpower to police the territories 9 To conclude, the main beneficiaries of the 1967 conflict were the PLO, and the Al-Fatah faction who by virtue of their expertise gained control of the PLO, and through their activities came to represent in mainstream international politics the aspirations of the displaced Palestinian people of the Middle East. For the Superpowers in the context of the cold war, the 1967 conflict saw only tangible Soviet arms supplied to the Arabs. The re-armaments of the late 1960's and early 1970's were to be matched in Superpower competition by arming and diplomatically supporting Israel, leading to the 1973 war, which was close to a proxy conflict, with each side being supported logistically by one of the Superpowers, and the peace resulting after the Yom Kippur war it could be suggested resulted from literal "combat fatigue", Israel alone having been at war some eight of its first twenty five years of statehood, and harassed by terrorist attacks for most of the remaining time, constant reminders for the Israeli people of the Arab-Israeli conflict. FOOTNOTES (1) Mostyn T, Major Political Events in Iran, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula 1945-1990 (Facts on File 1991) pp. 95-96. (2) Laqueur W, The Road to War 1967 (Camelot Press 1968) p. 46. (3) Zeigler D W, War, Peace and International Politics, 2nd edition (Little Brown & Co. 1981) p. 75. (4) United Nations (1990) The United Nations and the Question of Palestine p. 27. (5) Cobban H, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (Cambridge University Press 1984) p. 46. (6) see Shalaby E (1992) “Egypt's Foreign Policy 1952-1992 some personal reflections” in Security Dialogue Vol. 23. No. 3. p. 107. (7) Op. Cit. (Mostyn 1991) p. 104.

(8) see Roberts A (1988) “Decade of illusions: The status of the Israeli-occupied territories over 21 years” in International Affairs Vol. 64. No. 3. (Summer 1988) p. 348. (9) see Peretz D (1990) “The Intifada and Middle East Peace” in Survival (September/October 1990) Vol. 32 No. 5. p. 395. BIBLIOGRAPHY Cobban H, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (Cambridge University Press 1984). Laqueur W, The Road to War 1967 (Camelot Press 1968). Mostyn T, Major political events in Iran, Iraq and the arabian peninsula 1945-1990 (Facts on File 1991) Schools Council History 13-16 Project, Arab-Israeli Conflict (Holmes McDougall 1977) pp. 46-50. United Nations (1990) The United Nations and the Question of Palestine. United Nations (1991) The Question of Palestine 1979-1990. Zeigler D W (1981) War, Peace and International Politics, 2nd Edition (Little Brown & Co. 1981). International Affairs Vol. 64. No. 3. (Summer 1988). Security Dialogue Vol. 23. No. 3. Survival Vol. 32. No. 5.