2006 Criminal Law Case Digests

EVANGELINE LADONGA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 141066. February 17, 2005

Facts: In 1989, spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga became Alfredo Oculam’s

regular customers in his pawnshop business. Sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses

obtained a P9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB)

Check No. 284743, post dated to July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico; sometime in the last

week of April 1990 and during the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained

an additional loan of P12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to

July 26, 1990 issued by Adronico; between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses

obtained a third loan in the amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136,

post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico; the three checks bounced upon

presentment for the reason “CLOSED ACCOUNT”; when the Ladonga spouses failed to

redeem the check, despite repeated demands, he filed a criminal complaint against them.

While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there was no

sufficient deposit or the account was closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks

were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that Oculam should not

encash the checks when they mature; and, that petitioner is not a signatory of the checks

and had no participation in the issuance thereof. The RTC rendered a joint decision finding

the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner

brought the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of

petitioner. 

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner who was not the drawer or issuer of the three checks

that bounced but her co-accused husband under the latter’s account could be held liable

for violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 as conspirator.

Held: The conviction must be set aside. Article 8 of the RPC provides that “a conspiracy

exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a

felony and decide to commit it.” To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy,

the accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of

the complicity. The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in

the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-

conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan. In the present

case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance

of the alleged conspiracy. Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that may be

attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first check was issued. However,

this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal design.

Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive

evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of

the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or

agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent

any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of

the common design and purpose

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANTONIO MENDOZA Y BUTONES

G.R. No. 152589 & 152758. January 31, 2005

Facts: Before us is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by herein accused-appellant of our

Decision dated 24 October 2003 in G.R. No. 152589 and No. 152758. In said decision, we

modified the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Gumaca, Quezon, in

Crim. Case No. 6636-G finding accused-appellant guilty of rape under Articles 266-A and

266-B of the Revised Penal Code and instead, we adjudged him guilty only of attempted

rape. We, however, upheld the ruling of the court a quo with regard to Crim. Case No.

6637-G finding accused-appellant guilty of incestuous rape of a minor under Art. 266-B of

the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 and for this, we sentenced

accused-appellant to suffer the ultimate penalty of death.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness. 

Held: After a thorough review and evaluation of the records of this case, we find no

sufficient basis to modify our earlier decision convicting accused-appellant of attempted

rape in Crim. Case No. 6636-G.There is an attempt to commit rape when the offender

commences its commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of

execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than

his own spontaneous desistance. Upon the other hand, Article 366 of the Revised Penal

Code states: “(a)ny person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon the other

person of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article,

shall be punished by prision correccional.” As explained by an eminent author of criminal

law, rape and acts of lasciviousness have the same nature. There is, however, a

fundamental difference between the two. In rape, there is the intent to lie with a woman

whereas this element is absent in acts of lasciviousness. In this case, the series of appalling

events which took place on the night of 18 March 1998 inside the humble home of private

complainant and of accused-appellant, establish beyond doubt that the latter intended to

ravish his very own flesh and blood. As vividly narrated by private complainant before the

trial court, accused-appellant, taking advantage of the cover of darkness and of the

absence of his wife, removed her (private complainant’s) clothing and thereafter placed

himself on top of her. Accused-appellant, who was similarly naked as private complainant,

then proceeded to kiss the latter and he likewise touched her breasts until finally, he

rendered private complainant unconscious by boxing her in the stomach. These dastardly

acts of accused-appellant constitute “the first or some subsequent step in a direct

movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made.” Far

from being mere obscenity or lewdness, they are indisputably overt acts executed in order

to consummate the crime of rape against the person of private complainant.

SALVADOR D. FLOR VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 139987. March 31, 2005

Facts: Information for libel was filed before the RTC, Branch 20, Naga City, against the

petitioner and Ramos who were then the managing editor and correspondent, respectively,

of the Bicol Forum, a local weekly newspaper circulated in the Bicol Region. It states: On or

about the 18th day up to the 24th day of August, 1986, in the Bicol Region comprised by

the Provinces of Albay, Catanduanes, Sorsogon, Masbate, Camarines Sur, and Camarines

Norte, and the Cities of Iriga and Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this

Honorable Court under R.A. No. 4363, and B.P. Blg. 129, the above-named accused who

are the news correspondent and the managing editor, respectively, of the local weekly

newspaper Bicol Forum, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without

justifiable motive and with malicious intent of impeaching, discrediting and destroying the

honor, integrity, good name and reputation of the complainant as Minister of the

Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization and concurrently Governor of the

Province of Camarines Sur, and to expose him to public hatred, ridicule and contempt,

write, edit, publish and circulate an issue of the local weekly newspaper BICOL FORUM

throughout the Bicol Region, with banner headline and front page news item read by the

public throughout the Bicol Region “VILLAFUERTE’S DENIAL CONVINCES NO ONE”. The

trial court found the petitioner guilty. The Court of Appeals likewise upheld the decision of

the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the questioned news item is libelous.

Held: No. Libel is defined as “a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or

defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending

to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural person or juridical person, or to

blacken the memory of one who is dead.” The law recognizes two kinds of privileged

matters. First are those which are classified as absolutely privileged which enjoy immunity

from libel suits regardless of the existence of malice in fact. The other kind of privileged

matters are the qualifiedly or conditionally privileged communications which, unlike the

first classification, may be susceptible to a finding of libel provided the prosecution

establishes the presence of malice in fact. The exceptions provided for in Article 354 of the

Revised Penal Code fall into this category. The interest of society and the maintenance of

good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment

on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of

its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile

and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience.

Rising superior to any official, or set of officials, to the Chief Executive, to the Legislature,

to the Judiciary – to any or all the agencies of Government – public opinion should be the

constant source of liberty and democracy.

NORMA A. ABDULLA versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 150129 April 6, 2005

Facts: Convicted by the Sandiganbayan in its Crim. Case No. 23261 of the crime of illegal

use of public funds defined and penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, or

more commonly known as technical malversation, appellant Norma A. Abdulla is now

before this Court on petition for review under Rule 45. Along with Nenita Aguil and

Mahmud Darkis, appellant was charged under an Information which pertinently reads:

That on or about November, 1989 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Jolo, Sulu,

Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused:

NORMA A. ABDULLA and NENITA P. AGUIL, both public officers, being then the President

and cashier, respectively, of the Sulu State College, and as such by reason of their positions

and duties are accountable for public funds under their administration, while in the

performance of their functions, conspiring and confederating with MAHMUD I. DARKIS,

also a public officer, being then the Administrative Officer V of the said school, did then

and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without lawful authority, apply for the

payment of wages of casuals, the amount of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00),

Philippine Currency, which amount was appropriated for the payment of the salary

differentials of secondary school teachers of the said school, to the damage and prejudice

of public service .Appellant’s co-accused, Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both

acquitted. Only appellant was found guilty and sentenced by the Sandiganbayan in its

decision. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended appellant’s

sentence by deleting the temporary special disqualification imposed upon her. Still

dissatisfied, appellant, now before this Court, persistently pleas innocence of the crime

charged.

Issue: 1) Whether or not there was unlawful intent on the appellant’s part.

2) Whether or not the essential elements of the crime of technical malversation is present.

Held: The Court must have to part ways with the Sandiganbayan in its reliance on Section

5 (b) of Rule 131 as basis for its imputation of criminal intent upon appellant. The

presumption of criminal intent will not automatically apply to all charges of technical

malversation because disbursement of public funds for public use is per se not an unlawful

act. Here, appellant cannot be said to have committed an unlawful act when she paid the

obligation of the Sulu State College to its employees in the form of terminal leave benefits

such employees were entitled to under existing civil service laws. There is no dispute that

the money was spent for a public purpose – payment of the wages of laborers working on

various projects in the municipality. It is pertinent to note the high priority which laborers’

wages enjoy as claims against the employers’ funds and resources. Settled is the rule that

conviction should rest on the strength of evidence of the prosecution and not on the

weakness of the defense. Absent this required quantum of evidence would mean

exoneration for accused-appellant. The Sandiganbayan’s improper reliance on Sec. 5(b) of

Rule 131 does not save the day for the prosecution’s deficiency in proving the existence of

criminal intent nor could it ever tilt the scale from the constitutional presumption of

innocence to that of guilt. In the absence of criminal intent, this Court has no basis to

affirm appellant’s conviction. 2. The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation

for salary differentials of secondary school teachers of the Sulu State College in RA 6688.

The third element of the crime of technical malversation which requires that the public

fund used should have been appropriated by law, is therefore absent. The authorization

given by the Department of Budget and Management for the use of the forty thousand

pesos (P40,000.00) allotment for payment of salary differentials of 34 secondary school

teachers is not an ordinance or law contemplated in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.

Appellant herein, who used the remainder of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00)

released by the DBM for salary differentials, for the payment of the terminal leave benefits

of other school teachers of the Sulu State College, cannot be held guilty of technical

malversation in the absence, as here, of any provision in RA 6688 specifically appropriating

said amount for payment of salary differentials only. In fine, the third and fourth elements

of the crime defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code are lacking in this case.

Acquittal is thus in order.

ENRIQUE “TOTOY” RIVERA Y DE GUZMAN VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 138553. June 30, 2005

Facts: On May 6, 1993, in the Regional Trial Court at La Trinidad, Benguet an information

for direct assault was filed against petitioner, allegedly committed, as follows: That on or

about the 20th day of March, 1993, at Tomay, Shilan, Municipality of La Trinidad, Province

of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-

named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, employ

force and seriously resist one Lt. EDWARD M. LEYGO, knowing him to be a policeman, by

then and there challenging the latter to a fistfight and thereafter grappling and hitting the

said policeman on his face, thus injuring him in the process while the latter was actually

engaged in the performance of his official duties. The trial court convicted petitioner of the

crime of direct assault. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of conviction

rendered by the trial court.

Held: Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by

any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for

the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and

sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack,

employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents,

while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance.

Unquestionably, petitioner’s case falls under the second mode, which is the more common

form of assault and is aggravated when: (a) the assault is committed with a weapon; or (b)

when the offender is a public officer or employee; or (c) when the offender lays hand upon

a person in authority. In any event, this Court has said time and again that the assessment

of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is best undertaken by the trial court,

what with reality that it has the opportunity to observe the witnesses first-hand and to note

their demeanor, conduct, and attitude while testifying. Its findings on such matters, absent,

as here, of any arbitrariness or oversight of facts or circumstances of weight and

substance, are final and conclusive upon this Court and will not to be disturbed on appeal.

FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE- ESSENTIAL REQUISITES FOR COMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE

CONRADO CASITAS VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No.152358, February 5, 2004

Facts: Early in the morning of August 25, 1994, Romeo C. Boringot was awakened by his

wife Aida, the latter having heard somebody shouting invectives at her husband, viz: “You

ought to be killed, you devil.” So Romeo stood up and peeped to see who was outside.

When he did not see anybody, he proceeded towards the road.

Upon passing by a coconut tree, he was suddenly hacked at the back with bolo which was

more that 1 foot long. He looked back at his assailant and he recognized him to be

appellant Conrado whom he knew since the 1970’s and whose face he clearly saw as light

from the moon illuminated the place. Appellant went on hacking him, hitting him in

different parts of the body, including ears and the head. While hitting him, appellant was

shouting invectives at him. Appellant also hit him with a guitar causing Romeo to sustain

an injury on his forehead. All in all, he sustained 11 wounds.

Petitioner invoked self-defense. The trial court rejected petitioner’s plea of self-defense and

convicted him of frustrated homicide.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner acted in self-defense.

Held: The petitioner was burdened to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, the

confluence of the three essential requisites for complete self-defense: (a) unlawful

aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable means used by the person defending

himself to repel or prevent the unlawful to repel or prevent the unlawful aggression; (c)

lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. By invoking self-

defense, the petitioner thereby submitted having deliberately caused the victim’s injuries.

The burden of proof is shifted to him to prove with clear and convincing all the requisites of

his affirmative defense. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not the

weakness of that of the disbelieved after the petitioner admitted inflicting the mortal

injuries on the victim. In this case, the petitioner failed to prove his affirmative defense.

The number, nature and location of the victim’s wounds belie the petitioner’s claim that the

said wounds or the victim were inflicted as they duel with each other.

Witness for the petitioner testified that the wounds sustained by petitioner could not have

been caused by bolo.

Petitioner never surrendered voluntarily to the police and admitted that he had injured the

victim. This would have bolstered his claim that he hacked the victim to defend himself.

The petitioner did not do so.

BIGAMY; ELEMENTS, EFFECT OF DECLARATION OF NULLITY OFSECOND MARRIAGE

ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY; PENALTY

VERONICO TENEBRO VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004

Facts: Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The

two were wed by a judge at Lapu-Lapu City. The two lived together continuously and

without interruption until the later part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he

had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on Nov. 10, 1986. Tenebro

showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking

this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared

with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain

Nilda Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes

whether the latter was indeed married to the petitioner. Villareyes confirmed in

handwritten letter that indeed Tenebro was her husband.

Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. During trial, Tenebro

admitted having married to Villareyes and produced two children. However, he denied that

he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony

took place. He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the

allotment from his office in connection with his work as a seaman. The trial court found him

guilty of bigamy.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of the crime of bigamy.

(2) What is the effect of declaration of nullity of the second marriage of the petitioner on

the ground of psychological incapacity?

Held: (1) Yes, petitioner is guilty of the crime of bigamy. Under Article 349 of the Revised

Penal Code, the elements of the crime of bigamy are: (1) that the offender has been legally

married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her

spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil

Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or

subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The prosecution sufficient

evidence, both documentary and oral, proved the existence of the marriage between

petitioner and Villareyes.

(2) A second or subsequent marriage contracted during subsistence of petitioner’s valid

marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio

completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage

contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of

this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for

bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the RPC criminalizes “any person who shall contract a

second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or

before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment

rendered in the proper proceedings”. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate

that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage

during the subsistence of a valid marriage. 

KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM 

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ABDILA SILONGAN, ET. AL.

G.R. No. 137182, Apirl 24, 2003

Facts: On March 16, 1996, businessman Alexander Saldaña went to Sultan Kudarat with

three other men to meet a certain Macapagal Silongan alias Commander Lambada. They

arrived in the morning and were able to talk to Macapagal concerning the gold nuggets

that purportedly being sold by the latter. The business transaction was postponed and

continued in the afternoon due to the death of Macapagal’s relative and that he has to pick

his brother in Cotabato City.

Then at around 8:30 PM, as they headed to the highway, Macapagal ordered the driver to

stop. Suddenly, 15 armed men appeared. Alexander and his three companions were

ordered to go out of the vehicle, they were tied up, and blindfolded. Macapagal and Teddy

were also tied and blindfolded, but nothing more was done to them. Alexander identified all

the abductors including the brothers of Macapagal.

The four victims were taken to the mountain hideout in Maguindanao. The kidnappers

demanded P15, 000,000 from Alexander’s wife for his release, but the amount was reduced

to twelve million. The victims were then transferred from one place to another. They made

Alexander write a letter to his wife for his ransom. But on several occasions, a person

named Mayangkang himself would write to Alexander’s wife. The two other victims

managed to escape but Alexander was released after payment of ransom. The trial court

convicted Macapagal and his companions of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with

Serious Illegal Detention.

Issue: Whether it is necessary that there is actual payment of ransom in the crime of

Kidnapping.

Held: No, it is necessary that there is actual payment of ransom in the crime of Kidnapping.

For the crime to be committed, at least one overt act of demanding ransom must be made.

It is not necessary that there be actual payment of ransom because what the law requires is

merely the existence of the purpose of demanding ransom. In this case, the records are

replete with instances when the kidnappers demanded ransom from the victim. At the

mountain hideout where Alexander was first taken, he was made a letter to his wife asking

her to pay ransom of twelve million. Also Mayangkang himself wrote more letters to his

family threatened the family to kill Alexander if the ransom was not paid.

ESTAFA; TRUST RECEIPTS LAW

EDWARD ONG VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 119858, April 29, 2003

Facts: Petitioner Edward Ong, representing ARMAGRI International Corporation

(ARMAGRI), executed two trust receipts acknowledging receipt from the Solid Bank Corp.

of goods valued at P 2,532,500 and P 2, 050,000. In addition, he bounded himself to any

increase or decrease of interest rate in case Central Bank floated rates and to pay any

additional penalty until the trust receipts are fully paid.

When the trust receipts became due and demandable, ARMAGRI failed to pay or deliver the

goods to the Bank despite several demand letters. The trial court convicted Ong of two

counts of estafa for violation of the Trust Receipts Law.

Issue: Whether the appellant is guilty of two counts estafa for violation of the Trust

Receipts Law.

Held: Yes, he is guilty for failure by the entrustee to account for the goods received in trust

constitutes estafa. The Trust Receipts Law is violated whenever the entrustee fails to: (1)

turn over the proceeds of the sale of goods, or (2) return the goods covered by the trust

receipts if the good are not sold. The mere failure to account or return gives rise to the

crime which is malum prohibitum. There is no requirement to prove intent to defraud.

The Bank released the goods to ARMAGRI upon execution of the trust receipts and as part

of the loan transactions of ARMAGRI. The Bank had a right to demand from ARMAGRI

payment or at least a return of the goods. ARMAGRI failed tom pay or return the goods

despite repeated demands by the Bank.

It is well-settled doctrine long before the enactment of the Trust Receipts Law, that the

failure to account, upon demand, for funds or property held in trust is evidence of

conversion or misappropriation. Under the law, mere failure by the entrustee to account for

the goods received in trust constitutes estafa. The Trust Receipts Law punishes dishonesty

and abuse of confidence in the handling of money or goods to prejudice the public order.

The mere failure to deliver proceeds of the sale or the goods if not sold constitutes a

criminal offense that causes prejudice not only to the creditor, but also to the public

interest. Evidently, the Bank suffered prejudice for neither money nor the goods were

turned over the Bank.

PARRICIDE; ELEMENTS

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PO3 ARMANDO DALAG

G.R. No. 129895, April 30, 2003

Facts: Armando Dalag, a member of the Philippine National Police, was lawfully married to

Leah Nolido Dalag. They had three children. Their marriage was far from idyllic. Their

covertures were marred by violent quarrels, with Leah always at the losing end. Each time

the couple had a quarrel, she sustained contusions, bruises and lumps on different parts of

her body.

On August 15, 1996, Armando was drinking when Leah admonished him not to do so. Leah

was then banged on the wall by Armando. Then he pushed and kicked Leah on the left side

of her body which caused her to fall on the ground. Even as Leah was already lying

prostrate, Armando continued to beat her up, punching her on the different parts of her

body. Leah then fled to the house of Felia Horilla but Armando ran after her and herded

her back to their house. Leah fell again to the ground and lost her consciousness. The trial

court convicted Armando of parricide.

Issue: Whether the trial court correctly convicted the accused.

Held: Yes, the trial court correctly concluded that the injuries sustained by Leah that

caused her death were the consequence of the appellant’s deliberate and intentional acts.

The crime of parricide is defined by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code thus: Any person

who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his

ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be

punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

The prosecution is mandated to prove the following essential elements: (1) a person is

killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother

or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other

descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The prescribed penalty for the crime

is reclusion perpetua to death. The key element in parricide of a spouse, the best proof of

the relationship between the accused and the deceased would be the marriage certificate.

STATUTORY RAPE; INFORMATION; TIME NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BENJAMIN HILET

G.R. No. 146685-86, April 30, 2003

Facts: Sometime in 1998, ten-year old Richelle Cosada was told by appellant Benjamin

Hilet, the common law husband of her mother not to go to school and watch the house. At

about 10 AM, while her mother was out selling fish, Richelle saw appellant sharpening his

bolo. Moments later, appellant dragged her towards the room and raped her. She kept the

afternoon of March 17, 1999. Richelle finally confided to her mother. The latter asked their

neighbor to report the incident to the police. The trial court convicted the appellant guilty

of two counts of statutory rape.

Issue: Whether time is an essential element of statutory rape.

Held: No, time is not an essential element of statutory rape. An information is valid as long

as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and the acts or omission constitutive

thereof. The exact date of the commission of a crime is not an essential element of rape.

Thus, in a prosecution of rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the

occurrence of rape, not the time of its commission.

It is not necessary to state the precise time when the offense was committed except when

time is a material ingredient of the offense. In statutory rape, time is not an essential

element. What is important is the information alleges that the victim is a minor under

twelve years of age and the accused had carnal knowledge of her, even if no force or

intimidation was used or she was not otherwise deprived of reason.

STATUTORY RAPE; INFORMATION; TIME IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LOZADA

Facts: Reynaldo Diaz, a tricycle driver, went to a coffee shop to meet Ronnie Sanchez and

this Sanchez disclosed to Diaz his plan to rob Rosita Sy. Thereafter Belleza Lozada arrived.

They planned to wait Rosita Sy as she would normally leave her drugstore between 10:30

and 11 PM. They have also planned to kill Rosita Sy, upon realizing that Sy would be killed,

Diaz excused himself on the pretext that he would get a weapon but he delayed himself and

the plan was not implemented that night because of the delay. They have agreed to pursue

it the next day. Diaz deliberately stayed away from their meeting place the next day. The

following day, he learned over the radio that a lifeless body of Rosita was found in a remote

area.

Issue: Whether or not all elements of a Robbery with Homicide are present to constitute a

penalty of death.

Held: The SC ruled that all the elements were present. The taking with animo lurid or

personal property belonging to another person by means of violence against or intimidation

of person or using force upon thing constitutes robbery, and the complex crime of robbery

with homicide arises when by reason or on the occasion of robbery, someone is killed. All

these elements have satisfactorily been shown by the prosecution.

“BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME”AS A VIABLE PLEA WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF SELF-

DEFENSE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARIVIC GENOSA

G.R. No. 135981. September 29, 2000

Facts: On or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of

Isabel, province of Leyte, accused Marivic Genosa, with intent to kill, with treachery and

evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,

assault, hit and wound BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard

deadly weapon, which the accused had provided herself for the purpose, inflicting several

wounds which caused his death.

The lower court found the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable

doubt of the crime of parricide and sentenced the accused with the penalty of DEATH.

On appeal, the appellant alleged that despite the evidence on record of repeated and

severe beatings she had suffered at the hands of her husband, the lower court failed to

appreciate her self-defense theory. She claimed that under the surrounding circumstances,

her act of killing her husband was equivalent to self-defense.

Issue: Whether or not the “battered woman syndrome” as a viable plea within the concept

of self-defense is applicable in this case.

Held: No. The court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from

the battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases

of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering

episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering

episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person’s

mind an actual fear of an imminent harm, from her batterer and an honest belief that she

needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer

must have posed probable—not necessarily immediate and actual—grave harm to the

accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter.

Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under

the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly

established.

RAPE; “TOUCHING” WHEN APPLIED TO RAPE CASES

PEOPLE OF TH PHILIPPINES vs. LEVI SUMARAGO

G.R. No. 140873-77, February 6, 2004

Facts: The spouses Vivencio and Teodora Brigole had four children. Two of them were girls

and named- Norelyn and Doneza. Teodora left Vivencio and kept custody of their fpur

children. Then, Teodora and Levi started living together as husband and wife.

Sometime in 1995, Norelyn, who was barely ten years old, was gathering firewood with the

appellant Levi in his farm. While they were nearing a guava tree, the appellant suddenly

boxed her on the stomach. Norelyn lost consciousness. She had her clothes when she woke

up. She had a terrible headache and felt pain in her vagina. She also had a bruise in the

middle portion of her right leg. The appellant warned not to tell her mother about it,

otherwise he would kill her.

The sexual assaults were repeated several times so she decided to tell her sister and

eventually her mother. The trial court found the accused guilty of the crime rape and

sentenced him to death.

Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime charged.

Held: Yes, the accused is guilty of the crime charged. For the accused to held guilty of

consummated rape, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that: 1) there had

been carnal knowledge of the victim by the accused; 20 the accused achieves the act

through force or intimidation upon the victim because the latter is deprived of reason or

otherwise unconscious. Carnal knowledge of the victim by the accused may be proved

either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence that rape had been committed and

that the accused is the perpetrator thereof. A finding of guilt of the accused for rape may

be based solely on the victim’s testimony if such testimony meets the test of credibility.

Corroborating testimony frequently unavailable in rape cases is not indispensable to

warrant a conviction of the accused for the crime. This Court has ruled that when a woman

states that she has been raped, she says in effect all that would necessary to show rape did

take place. However, the testimony of the victim must be scrutinized with extreme caution.

The prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits.

The credibility of Norelyn and the probative weight of her testimony cannot be assailed

simply because her admission that it took the appellant only short time to insert his penis

into her vagina and to satiate his lust. The mere entry of his penis into the labia of the

pudendum, even if only for a short while, is enough insofar as the consummation of the

crime of rape is concerned, the brevity of time that the appellant inserted penis into the

victim’s vagina is of no particular importance.

G.R. No. L-50884 March 30, 1988 –CASE OF COMPLEX CRIMETHE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.FILOMENO SALUFRANIA, defendant-appellant.FACTS: On 7 May 1976, Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman was charged before the CFI of Camarines Norte,with the complex crime of parricide with intentional abortion.  It was alleged that on the 3rd day of December, 1974, the accused Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence on his wife, MARCIANA ABUYO-SALUFRANIA by then and there boxing and stranging her, causing upon her injuries which resulted in her instantaneous death; and by the same criminal act committed on the person of the wife of the accused, who was at the time 8 months pregnant, the accused caused the death of the unborn child,committing both crimes of PARRICIDE and INTENTIONAL ABORTION as defined and punished under Art. 246 and Art. 256, paragraph I, of the Revised Penal Code.  At the trial court, Dr. Juan L. Dyquiangco Jr., Pedro Salufrania testified that,he was called upon by the Municipal Judge of Talisay to examine the corpse of Marciana Abuyo-Salufrania that was exhumed from its grave in which the cause of death was cardiac arrest.

Dr. Dyquiangco testified that after conducting the post mortem examination, he issued a certification thereof (Exhibit "A"); that he issued a death certificate (Exhibit "B") for the deceased Marciano Abuyo-Salufrania, bearing the date of 5 December 1974, made on the basis of the information relayed by a certain Leonila Loma to his nurse before the burial, without mentioning the cause of death; that the cause of death, as cardiac arrest, was indicated on said death certificate only after the post mortem examination on 11 December 1974.  The lower court allowed the son of the accused, Pedro Salufrania, The lower court stated that, by reason of interest and relationship, before Pedro Salufrania was allowed to testify against his father-accused Filomeno Salufrania, after careful examination by the prosecuting officer and the defense counsel under the careful supervision of the court a quo, to determine whether, at his age of 13 years old, he was already capable of receiving correct impressions of facts and of relating them truly and, also, whether he was compelled and/or threatened by anybody to testify against his father-accused.He stated that his father Filomeno Salufrania and his mother Marciana Abuyo quarrelled at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of 3 December 1974, he saw his father box his pregnant mother on the stomach and, once fallen on the floor, his father strangled her to death; that he saw blood ooze from the eyes and nose of his mother and that she died right on the spot where she fell. His brother,Eduardo Abuyo and had refused and still refused to live with his father-accused, because the latter has threatened to kill him and his other brothers and sister should he reveal the true cause of his mother's death.The brother in law and sister of the deceased victim,Narciso Abuyo also declared that after the burial of Marciana Abuyo, the three (3) children of his deceased sisterrefused to go home with their father Filomeno Salufrania; that when asked why, his nephew Alex Salufraña told him that the real cause of death of their mother was not stomach ailment and headache, rather, she was boxed on the stomach and strangled to death by their father; that immediately after learning of the true cause of death of his sister, he brought the matter to the attention of the police authorities .

The CFI found him  guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional Abortion, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased

Marciano Abuyo in the sum of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs. "For unselfish, valuable and exemplary service rendered by counsel de oficio, Atty. Marciano C. Dating, Jr., a compensation of P500.00 is hereby recommended for him subject to the availability of fund.  Since the accused was sentenced to death, this becomes an automatic review before the Supreme Court. 

The defense had for witnesses Geronimo Villan, Juanito Bragais, Angeles Liling Balce and the accused Filomeno Salufrania.Geronimo Villan testified that he was a neighbor of Filomeno Sulfrania whio tried to help him administer a native treatment around 6am in the morning of December 4, 1974, but she died around 7am. Witness Juanita Bragais testified that he was fetched by Felipe Salufrania, another son of Filomeno Salufrania Marciana Abuyo was already dead so he just helped Filomeno Salufrania in transferring the body of his wife to the house of the latter's brother-in—law.Angeles Liling Balce, who claimed to be a former resident she arrived in the house of Filomeno Salufrania at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning Marciana still in a coma lying on the lap of her husband who informed her that Marciana was suffering from an old stomach ailment. The accused admitted that he was that lawful husband of the deceased Marciana Abuyo; that he sent r Juanito Bragais but the latter was not able to cure his wife, that there was no quarrel between him and his wife that preceded the latter's death, and that during the lifetime of the deceased, they loved each other; that after her burial, his son Pedro Salufrania was taken by his brother-in-law Narciso Abuyo and since then, he was not able to talk to his son until during the trial; and that at the time of death of his wife, aside from the members of his family, Geronimo Villan Francisco Repuya and Liling Angeles Balce were also present.Appellant alleges that the trial court failed to determine the competence of Pedro Salufrania before he was allowed to testify. He also questions the competence of Dr. Dyquiangco as an expert witness, and alleges that the findings of Dr. Dyquiangco and the testimony of Pedro Salufrania do not tally. But this contention is without merit. The Court notes, first of all, that appellant did not even bother to discuss his defense in order to refute the massive evidence against him. This is tantamount to an admission that he could not adequately support his version of Marciana Abuyo's death.Lastly, appellant alleges that, assuming he indeed killed his wife, there is no evidence to show that he had the intention to cause an abortion. In this contention, appellant is correct. He should not be held guilty of the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional Abortion but of the complex crime of Parricide with Unintentional Abortion. The elements of Unintentional Abortion are as follows:1. That there is a pregnant woman. 2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion. 3. That the violence is intentionally exerted. 4. That as a result of the violence the foetus dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in its ruling of complex crime with parricide and intentional abortion?

HELD:  According to the Supreme Court,“Trial judges are in the best position to ascertain the truth and detect falsehoods in the testimony of witnesses. This Court will normally not disturb the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, in view of its advantage in observing first hand their demeanor in giving their testimony.  Such rule applies in the present case.The Solicitor General's brief makes it appear that appellant intended to cause an abortion because he boxed his pregnant wife on the stomach which caused her to fall and then strangled her. We find that appellant's intent to cause an abortion has not been sufficiently established. Mere boxing on the stomach, taken together with the immediate strangling of the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show an intent to cause an abortion. In fact, appellant must have merely intended to kill the victim but not necessarily to cause an abortion. The evidence on record, therefore, establishes beyond reasonable doubt that accused Filomeno Salufrania committed and should be held liable for the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. The abortion, in this case, was caused by the same violence that caused the death of Marciana Abuyo, such violence being voluntarily exerted by the herein accused upon his victim. It has also been clearly established (a) that Marciana Abuyo was seven (7) to eight (8) months pregnant when she was killed; (b) that violence was voluntarily exerted upon her by her husband accused; and (c) that, as a result of said violence, Marciana Abuyo died together with the foetus in her womb. In this afternoon, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code states that the accused should be punished with the penalty corresponding to the more serious came of parricide, to be imposed in its maximum

period which is death. However, by reason of the 1987 Constitution which has abolished the death penalty, appellant should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. “

In the present case, the Supreme Court  modified, the judgment appealed from was AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The indemnity of P12,000. 00 awarded to the heirs of the deceased Marciana Abuyo is increased to P30,000.00 in line with the recent decisions of the Court. With costs.