May 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Labor Law and ProcedureJune 22, 2010Leslie C. Dy Leave a comment Go to comments

Here are selected May 2010 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on labor law and procedure:

Labor lawIllegal dismissal; backwages. The basis for the payment of backwages is different from that for the award of separation pay.  Separation pay is granted where reinstatement is no longer advisable because of strained relations between the employee and the employer.  Backwages represent compensation that should have been earned but were not collected because of the unjust dismissal.  The basis for computing backwages is usually the length of the employee’s service while that for separation pay is the actual period when the employee was unlawfully prevented from working.As to how both awards should be computed, Macasero v. Southern Industrial Gases Philippines [G.R. No. 178524, January 30, 2009] instructs that the award of separation pay is inconsistent with a finding that there was no illegal dismissal, for under Article 279 of the Labor Code and as held in a catena of cases, an employee who is dismissed without just cause and without due process is entitled to backwages and reinstatement or payment of separation pay in lieu thereof. Thus, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: backwages and reinstatement.  The two reliefs provided are separate and distinct.  Golden Ace Builders and Arnold U. Azur vs. Jose A. Talde, G.R. No. 187200, May 5, 2010.Illegal dismissal; doctrine of strained relations. Under the doctrine of strained relations, the payment of separation pay is considered an acceptable alternative to reinstatement when the latter option is no longer desirable or viable.  On one hand, such payment liberates the employee from what could be a highly oppressive work environment.  On the other hand, it releases the employer from the grossly unpalatable obligation of maintaining in its employ a worker it could no longer trust.Strained relations must be demonstrated as a fact, however, to be adequately supported by evidence— substantial evidence to show that the relationship between the employer and the employee is indeed strained as a necessary consequence of the judicial controversy.

In the present case, the Labor Arbiter found that actual animosity existed between petitioner Azul and respondent as a result of the filing of the illegal dismissal case.  Such finding, especially when affirmed by the appellate court as in the case at bar, is binding upon the Court, consistent with the prevailing rules that the Court will not try facts anew and that findings of facts of quasi-judicial bodies are accorded great respect, even finality.  Golden Ace Builders and Arnold U. Azul vs. Jose A. Talde, G.R. No. 187200, May 5, 2010.Illegal dismissal; separation pay. In instances where reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained relations between the employee and the employer, separation pay is granted.  In effect, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable, and backwages. The normal consequences of respondents’ illegal dismissal, then, are reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, and payment of backwages computed from the time compensation was withheld up to the date of actual reinstatement.  Where reinstatement is no longer viable as an option, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service should be awarded as an alternative.  The payment of separation pay is in addition to payment of backwages.The accepted doctrine is that separation pay may avail in lieu of reinstatement if reinstatement is no longer practical or in the best interest of the parties. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement may likewise be awarded if the employee decides not to be reinstated. Golden Ace Builders and Arnold U. Azur vs. Jose A. Talde, G.R. No. 187200, May 5, 2010.Labor procedureJudgment; final and executory. The Labor Arbiter’s decision has long become final and executory and it can no longer be reversed or modified. Nothing is more settled in law than when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable.  The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of law or fact, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land.  The only recognized exception are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no injury to any party, and, of course, where the judgment is void.

Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party.  Final and executory judgments can neither be amended nor altered except for correction of clerical errors, even if the purpose is to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or of law. Trial and execution proceedings constitute one whole action or suit such that a case in which execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings in the execution are proceedings in the suit.

It is no longer legally feasible to modify the final ruling in this case through the expediency of a petition questioning the order of execution.  Judgments of courts should attain finality at some point lest there be no end in litigation. The final judgment in this case may no longer be reviewed, or in any way modified directly or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by the Supreme Court. The reason for this is that, litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result and must frown upon any attempt to prolong controversies. Marmosy Trading, Inc. and Victor Morales vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 170515, May 6, 2010.

May 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Criminal Law and ProcedureJune 21, 2010Dominador Maphilindo O. Carrillo Leave a comment Go to comments

Here are selected May 2010 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on criminal law and procedure

Anti-Graft; causing undue injury. The elements of the offense of causing undue injury under R.A. 3019, Sec. 3(e) are as follows: (1) that the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said public officers commit the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation to their public positions; (3) that they caused undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private

party; (4) that such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and (5) that the public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. In this case, only the first element was proven. The other elements were not. Thus, the presumption of regularity in the performance of one’s function remains unrebutted and enjoyed by petitioners. Anuncio C. Bustillo, et al. vs. People of the Philippines,G.R. No. 160718, May 12, 2010Arrest; estoppel. An accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground, which should be made before arraignment. In this case, the irregularity of the accused’s arrest was raised only in his appeal before the Court of Appeals. This is not allowed considering that he was already properly arraigned and even actively participated in the proceedings. He is therefore deemed to have waived this alleged defect when he submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. People of the Philippines vs. Joseph Amper y Repaso, G.R. No. 172708, May 5, 2010.Arrest; posting of bail. The erstwhile ruling of this Court was that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in the issuance of a warrant of arrest has already been superseded by Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rule of Criminal Procedure.  The principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the legality of the arrest after arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial without previously invoking his objections thereto. Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is a new one, intended to modify previous rulings of this Court that an application for bail or the admission to bail by the accused shall be considered as a waiver of his right to assail the warrant issued for his arrest on the legalities or irregularities thereon. The new rule has reverted to the ruling of this Court in People v. Red. The new rule is curative in nature because, precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb evils in procedural rules. Thus, petitioners’ posting of bail bond should not be deemed as a waiver of their right to assail their arrest. Teodoro C. Borlongan, Jr. et al. vs. Magdaleno M. Peña, et al., G.R. No. 143591, May 5, 2010.Dangerous Drugs;   admissibility of evidence . Non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 will not necessarily render the items seized or confiscated in a buy-bust operation inadmissible. Strict compliance with the letter of Section 21 is not required if there is a clear showing that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items

have been preserved, i.e., the items being offered in court as exhibits are, without a specter of doubt, the very same ones recovered in the buy-bust operation. Hence, once the possibility of substitution has been negated by evidence of an unbroken and cohesive chain of custody over the contraband, such contraband may be admitted and stand as proof of the corpus delictinotwithstanding the fact that it was never made the subject of an inventory or was photographed pursuant to Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165. People of the Philippines vs. Joel Roa y Villaluz, G.R. No. 186134, May 6, 2010.Dangerous drugs; chain of custody. The chain of custody requirement is necessary in order to remove doubts as to the identity of the evidence, by monitoring and tracking custody of the seized drugs from the accused until they reach the court. The procedure and statutory safeguards prescribed for compliance by drug enforcement agencies have not been followed in this case. Failure to comply with the aforequoted Sec. 21(1) of RA 9165 implies a concomitant failure on the part of the prosecution to establish the identity of the seized illegal items as part of the corpus delicti. Although the nonpresentation of some of the witnesses who can attest to an unbroken chain of custody of evidence may, in some instances, be excused, there should be a justifying factor for the prosecution to dispense with their testimonies. The saving mechanism provided by Sec. 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 ensures that not every case of non-compliance will permanently prejudice the prosecution’s case. The saving mechanism applies when the prosecution recognizes and explains the lapse or lapses in the prescribed procedures. In this case, the prosecution did not even acknowledge and discuss the reasons for the missing links in the chain. Taken with the uncorroborated testimony of the policemen involved in the buy-bust operation, these lapses create a reasonable doubt as to guilt of the accused. People of the Philippines vs. Norman Sitco and Raymundo Bagtas (Deceased), G.R. No. 178202, May 14, 2010Evidence; conspiracy. An accepted badge of conspiracy is when the accused, by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and another performing another so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same object. As testified by the police officers, it was Joseph who negotiated with the poseur-buyer, received the buy-bust money and handed the same to Anthony, his brother. Anthony, after receiving the money from Joseph handed the latter the sachet of shabu to be given to PO1 Familara. It was Joseph who delivered the drug to PO1 Familara. Clearly,

there was concerted action between the brothers before, during, and after the offense which ably demonstrated their unity of design and objective to sell the dangerous drug. People of the Philippines vs. Joseph Serrano and Anthony Serrano, G.R. No. 179038, May 6, 2010.Illegal possession of firearms; constructive possession. Evangelista was arrested in Dubai for Illegal Possession of Firearms. In order to secure his release, the firearms as well as the person of Evangelista was surrendered to Capt. Nadurata, the PAL pilot of Flight No. PR 657 from Dubai to Manila on January 30, 1996. Upon arrival in the Philippines, he was arrested and charged with violation of PD 1866, Sec. 1, or illegal possession of firearms. Evangelista, in his petition for certiorari, contends that he is not guilty of illegal possession of firearms considering that from Brunei to Manila, he was never in physical possession of the guns. The Supreme Court ruled that Capt. Nadurata’s possession of the firearm during the flight from Dubait to Manila was for and in behalf of Evangelista. Consequently, Evangelista was in constructive possession of the subject firearms.  The kind of possession punishable under PD 1866 is one where the accused possessed a firearm either physically or constructively with animus possidendi or intention to possess the same.  Animus possidendi is a state of mind which the Court found to be present in the instant case. Teofilo Evangelista vs. People of the Philippines,G.R. No. 163267, May 5, 2010Probable cause; determination. When confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by such resolution, but is required to evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial and should embody such assessment in the order disposing the motion. Ligaya Santos and Robert Bunda vs. Domingo I. Orda Jr., G.R. No. 189402, May 6, 2010.Rape; evidence. The fact that AAA did not immediately reveal that she was raped by appellant does not necessarily impair AAA’s credibility. It is settled that different people react differently to a given situation or type of situation and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. Death threats cannot be taken against the victim. The charge of rape is rendered doubtful only if the delay was unreasonable and unexplained.  In this case, the delay in reporting the sexual assault was reasonable and explained: AAA explained that she did not immediately inform anyone of her ordeal because she was

ashamed and afraid because appellant had threatened to kill her. Thus, her reluctance that caused the delay should not be taken against her.  Neither can it be used to diminish her credibility nor undermine the charge of rape. The People of the Philippines vs. Lito Macapanas y Ecija, G.R. No. 187049, May 4, 2010.Venue;   internet   libel . Gimenez, in behalf of the Yuchengco family, instituted before the Makati Prosecutors’ Office, a criminal complaint for libel against the accused for providing a public forum in the internet, as well as a yahoo e-groups by which the disgruntled plan holders of Pacific Plans Inc. could seek redress for their pecuniary loss under their (plan holders’) policies. The website contained defamatory remarks against the Yuchengco family. Finding probable cause, an information for libel was filed before the Makati Regional Trial Court (“RTC”).  The information failed to state the particular place within the RTC’s jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and first published, or that the offended parties resided in Makati at the time the alleged defamatory material was printed and first published, instead the information alleged where the offended party first accessed the internet-published material. Wonina M. Bonifacio, et al. vs. Regional Trial Court of Makati, et al, G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010.Venue;   internet   libel . The Supreme Court in ruling that the RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over the case stated that venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. The venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published.  The [Amended] Information in the present case opted to lay the venue by availing of the second.  Thus, it stated that the offending article “was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City.” In other words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing and first publication. Wonina M. Bonifacio, et al. vs. Regional Trial Court of Makati, et al, G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010.Venue;   internet   libel . If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in

the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This precondition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to harass. Wonina M. Bonifacio, et al. vs. Regional Trial Court of Makati, et al, G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010.Venue;   internet   libel . The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication. To credit Gimenez’s premise of equating his first access to the defamatory article on petitioners’ website in Makati with “printing and first publication” would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in situations where the website’s author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending website. Wonina M. Bonifacio, et al. vs. Regional Trial Court of Makati, et al, G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010.Venue;   internet   libel .  For the Supreme Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the defamatory article was accessedtherein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed. Wonina M. Bonifacio, et al. vs. Regional Trial Court of Makati, et al, G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010.

May 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political LawJune 11, 2010Vicente D. Gerochi IV

Here are selected May 2010 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on political law:

Agrarian reform; coverage.  Lands acquired by the National Housing Authority for resettlement purposes or housing development are exempt from the coverage of agrarian reform laws.  Such acquisition converts the land by operation of law from agricultural to residential.  The National Housing Authority is not bound to pay disturbance compensation to any

tenant in possession of the purchased land. National Housing Authority vs. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, et al., G.R. No. 175200, May 4, 2010.Agrarian reform; just compensation.  In computing just compensation for rice lands tenanted as of October 21, 1972, the grant of 6% yearly interest under DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994, as amended, must be reckoned from October 21, 1972 up to the time of actual payment of the compensation, and not only up to the time the Land Bank of the Philippines approves payment of the compensation and deposits the amount in the name of the landowner, considering that release of such deposit is still subject to compliance with documentary requirements.  The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land, but also payment within a reasonable time from its taking.  Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Domingo and Mamerto Soriano,G.R. No. 180772 & G.R. No. 180776, May 6, 2010.Commission on Elections;   registration of party coalition .  Comelec may not, through a resolution setting the deadline for registration of political parties, differentiate between political parties, on the one hand, and political organizations and coalitions, on the other.  There is no substantial distinction among these entities germane to the act of registration that would justify creating distinctions among them in terms of deadlines.  Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 8646, dated July 14, 2009, which sets August 17, 2009 as the deadline for filing petitions for registration of political parties, without mentioning political organizations and coalitions, should be understood as covering the latter entities as well.  A petition for registration as a political coalition filed beyond that deadline is time-barred, and the Comelec resolution granting that petition constitutes grave abuse of discretion.Political coalitions, even if composed of registered political parties, need to register separately in accordance with established norms and procedures, if they are to be recognized as such and be given the benefits accorded by law to registered coalitions. Registered political parties carry a different legal personality from that of the coalition they may wish to establish with other registered parties.  If parties want to coalesce with one another without the formal registration of their coalition, they can do so on their own in the exercise of their and their members’ democratic freedom of choice, but they cannot receive official recognition for their coalition.  Liberal Party, etc. et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 191771, May 6, 2010.

Electoral   tribunals; grave abuse of discretion .  The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals is exercised only upon showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the tribunal; otherwise, the Court will not interfere with the tribunal’s exercise of its discretion and jurisdiction.  There was no grave abuse of discretion when the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ordered to continue the revision and appreciation of ballots after the case had been submitted for resolution and when it issued its decisions without the participation of any of the Justices of the Court who were members of that tribunal. Henry “Jun” Dueñas, Jr. vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, et al., G.R. No. 191550, May 4, 2010.Province; requirements for creation.  Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution mandates that the criteria in the Local Government Code must be followed in the creation of a province.  Any derogation of or deviation from those criteria violates the Constitution.  Thus, a law creating a province, which failed to comply with either the population or territorial requirement of the Local Government Code, is unconstitutional.  The Court can pass upon the validity of such law even if the province it created has begun its existence.  Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050, May 12, 2010.Right to information;   duty to disclose .  Comelec has the duty and can be compelled to explain fully its preparations for the May 10, 2010 elections under Section 7 of Article III of the Constitution on the people’s right to information and Section 28 of Article II on the State’s corresponding duty of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest.  Any citizen can file a petition for mandamus if the same is anchored on the people’s right to information.  Teofisto Guingona, Jr. et al. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191846, May 6, 2010.

April 2009 Decisions on Labor  Laws

Backwages. The Court agrees with the NLRC’s conclusion that petitioner is not entitled to backwages. He never bothered to redeem his driver’s license at the soonest possible time when there was no showing that he was unlawfully prevented by respondent from doing so.  Thus, petitioner should

not be paid for the time he was not working.  The Court has held that where the failure of employees to work was not due to the employer’s fault, the burden of economic loss suffered by the employees should not be shifted to the employer.  Each party must bear his own loss. It would be unfair to allow petitioner to recover something he has not earned and could not have earned, since he could not discharge his work as a driver without his driver’s license. Respondent should be exempted from the burden of paying backwages. Bernardino V. Navarro vs. P.V. Pajarillo Liner and NLRC, G.R. No. 164681,   April 24, 2009. Breach of trust. The documentary evidence of petitioner indubitably establishes that respondent committed payroll padding, sold canepoints without the knowledge and consent of management and misappropriated the proceeds thereof, and rented tractor to another farm and misappropriated the rental payments therefor.  These acts constitute willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer – a ground for termination of employment. Bacolod-Talisay Realty and Development Corp., et al. vs. Romeo Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 179563,   April 30, 2009. CBA.  Just like any other contract, a CBA is the law between the contracting parties and compliance therewith in good faith is required by law. HFS Phlippines, Inc., Ruben T. Del Rosario and IUM Ship Management vs. Ronaldo R. Pilar, G.R. No. 168716, April 16, 2009.Due process.  The Court of Appeals correctly held that petitioners did not comply with the proper procedure in dismissing respondent.  In other words, petitioners failed to afford respondent due process by failing to comply with the twin notice requirement in dismissing him, viz:  (1) a first notice to apprise him of his fault, and (2) a second notice to him that his employment is being terminated.   The letter dated June 3, 1997 sent to respondent was a letter of suspension.  It did not comply with the required first notice, the purpose of which is to apprise the employee of the cause for termination and to give him rasonable opportunity to explain his side.   The confrontation before the barangay council did not constitute the first notice – to give the employee ample opportunity to be heard with the assistance of counsel, if he so desires.  Hearings before thebarangay council do not afford the employee ample opportunity to be represented by counsel if he so desires because Section 415 of the Local Government Code mandates that “[i]n all katarungang pambarangay proceedings, the parties must appear in person without the assistance of counsel or his representatives, except for minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their next-of-kin who are

not lawyers.”  The requirement of giving respondent the first notice not having been complied with, discussions of whether the second notice was complied with is rendered unnecessary. Bacolod-Talisay Realty and Development Corp., et al. vs. Romeo Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 179563,   April 30, 2009.Due process; lack of jurisdiction.  The proceedings before the Labor Arbiter deprived David of due process.  MACLU and NAFLU filed their complaint against MAC on 12 August 1993.  Arbiter Ortiguerra’s decision shows that MACLU, NAFLU, and MAC were the only parties summoned to a conference for a possible settlement.  Because of MAC’s failure to appear,  Arbiter Ortiguerra deemed the case submitted for resolution.  David’s resignation from MAC took effect on 15 October 1993.  NAFLU and MACLU moved to implead Carag and David for the first time only in their position paper dated 3 January 1994.  David did not receive any summons and had no knowledge of the decision against him. The records of the present case fail to show any order from Arbiter Ortiguerra summoning David to attend the preliminary conference. Despite this lack of summons, in her Decision dated 17 June 1994, Arbiter Ortiguerra not only granted MACLU and NAFLU’s motion to implead Carag and David, she also held Carag and David solidarily liable with MAC. Armando David vs.. National Federation of Labor Union, et al, G.R. No. 148263 and 148271-72,   April 21, 2009. Hearing.  The guiding principles in connection with the hearing requirement in dismissal cases are:(a)     “ample opportunity to be heard” means any meaningful opportunity (verbal or written) given to the employee to answer the charges against him and submit evidence in support of his defense, whether in a hearing, conference or some other fair, just and reasonable way;

(b)     a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory only when requested by the employee in writing or substantial evidentiary disputes exist or a company rule or practice requires it, or when similar circumstances justify it;

(c)      the “ample opportunity to be heard” standard in the Labor Code prevails over the “hearing or conference” requirement in the implementing rules and regulations. Felix B. Perez, et al. Vs. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company, G.R. No. 152048, April 7, 2009.

Illegal dismissal;   abandonment .  Petitioner insists that there cannot be any illegal dismissal because in the first place, there was no dismissal to speak of, as it was respondent who abandoned his work, after finding out that he was being investigated for theft.  It is a basic principle that in the dismissal of employees, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just cause and failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal is not justified.  Petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proof that complainant was guilty of abandonment. It did not adduce any proof to show that petitioner clearly and unequivocally intended to abandon his job.  It has been repeatedly stressed that for abandonment to be a valid cause for dismissal there must be a concurrence of intention to abandon and some overt act from which it may be inferred that the employee had no more interest to continue working in his job.  An employee who forthwith takes steps to protest his layoff cannot by any logic be said to have abandoned his work.  Otherwise stated, one could not possibly abandon his work and shortly thereafter vigorously pursue his complaint for illegal dismissal. In the instant case, save for the allegation that respondent did not submit him to the investigation and the latter’s failure to return to work as instructed in the 8 February 1999 letter, petitioner was unable to present any evidence which tend to show respondent’s intent to abandon his work.  Neither is the Court convinced that the filing of the illegal dismissal case was respondent’s way to avoid the charge of theft. On the contrary, the filing of the complaint a few days after his alleged dismissal signified respondent’s desire to return to work, a factor which further militates against petitioner’s theory of abandonment. Harbor View Restaurant vs. Reynaldo Labro, G.R. No. 168273,   April 30, 2009. Illegal dismissal; burden of proof. Under the Labor Code, as amended, the requirements for the lawful dismissal of an employee are two-fold, the substantive and the procedural. Not only must the dismissal be for a valid or authorized cause, the rudimentary requirements of due process – notice and hearing – must, likewise, be observed before an employee may be dismissed. One does not suffice; without their concurrence, the termination would, in the eyes of the law, be illegal.As the employer, petitioner has the burden of proving that the dismissal of petitioner was for a cause allowed under the law and that petitioner was afforded procedural due process.  Petitioner failed to discharge this burden.  Indeed, it failed to show any valid or authorized cause under the Labor Code which allowed it to terminate the services of individual respondents.  Neither

did petitioner show that individual respondents were given ample opportunity to contest the legality of their dismissal.   No notice of such impending termination was ever given to them.  Individual respondents were definitely denied due process.  Having failed to establish compliance with the requirements on termination of employment under the Labor Code, the dismissal of individual respondents was tainted with illegality. Iligan Cement Corporation vs. Iliascor Employees and Workers Union-Southern Philippines Federation of Labor, et al., G.R. No. 158956, April 24, 2009.Illegal dismissal; penalty. The worst that respondent committed was an inadvertent infraction.  For that, the extreme penalty of dismissal imposed on him by petitioners was grossly disproportionate.  Taking into account the managerial position he held and the prior warning issued to him for failing to communicate with his superiors, the penalty commensurate to the violation he committed should be suspension for three months. Gulf Air Jassim Hindri Abdullah, et al. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 159687, April 24, 2009.Intra-union dispute.  Pending the final resolution of the intra-union dispute, respondent’s officers remained duly authorized to conduct union affairs. De La Salle University, et al. vs. De La Salle University Employees Association (DLSUEA-NAFTEU),G.R. No. 177283,   April 7, 2009. Labor only contracting. We are not convinced that Vedali is an independent contractor. Petitioner failed to present any service contract with Vedali in the proceedings with the Labor Arbiter.  There is nothing on record that Vedali has a substantial capital or investment to actually perform the service under its own account and responsibility. Petitioner is a mere labor-only contractor because it only supplied workers to petitioner to work at its pier. In a labor-only contract, there are three parties involved:  (1) the “labor-only” contractor; (2) the employee who is ostensibly under the employ of the “labor-only” contractor; and (3) the principal who is deemed the real employer.  Under this scheme, the “labor-only” contractor is the agent of the principal. Iligan Cement Corporation vs. Iliascor Employees and Workers Union-Southern Philippines Federation of Labor, et al., G.R. No. 158956,   April 24, 2009.Liability of corporate officers. Article 212(e) of the Labor Code, by itself, does not make a corporate officer personally liable for the debts of the corporation because Section 31 of the Corporation Code is still the governing law on personal liability of officers for the debts of the corporation.  There was no showing of David willingly and knowingly voting for or assenting to patently unlawful acts of the corporation, or that David was guilty of gross negligence

or bad faith.   Armando David vs. National Federation of Labor Union, et al, G.R. No. 148263 and 148271-72,   April 21, 2009. Loss of confidence. Loss of trust and confidence, as a valid ground for dismissal, must be based on willful breach of the trust reposed in the employee by his employer.  Such breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently.  Elsewise stated, it must be based on substantial evidence and not on the employer’s whims or caprices or suspicions; otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer.  A condemnation of dishonesty and disloyalty cannot arise from suspicion spawned by speculative inferences. Adam B. Garcia vs. NLRC (Second Division) Legazpi Oil Company, Inc. Romeo F. Mercado and Gus Zuluaga, G.R. No. 172854,   April 16, 2009. Loss of Confidence.  Without undermining the importance of a shipping order or request, the respondents’ evidence is insufficient to clearly and convincingly establish the facts from which the loss of confidence resulted.  Other than their bare allegations and the fact that such documents came into petitioners’ hands at some point, respondents should have provided evidence of petitioners’ functions, the extent of their duties, the procedure in the handling and approval of shipping requests and the fact that no personnel other than petitioners were involved. There was, therefore, a patent paucity of proof connecting petitioners to the alleged tampering of shipping documents.  The alterations on the shipping documents could not reasonably be attributed to petitioners because it was never proven that petitioners alone had control of or access to these documents. Unless duly proved or sufficiently substantiated otherwise, impartial tribunals should not rely only on the statement of the employer that it has lost confidence in its employee. Felix B. Perez, et al. vs. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company,G.R. No. 152048,   April 7, 2009. Prescription. Articles 1139 to 1155 of the Civil Code provide the general law on prescription of actions.  Under Article 1139, actions prescribe by the mere lapse of time prescribed by law. That law may either be the Civil Code or special laws as specifically mandated by Article 1148.  In labor cases, the special law on prescription is Article 291 of the Labor Code. The Labor Code has no specific provision on when a monetary claim accrues.  Thus, again the general law on prescription applies – Article 1150 of the Civil Code. Juanaria A. Rivera vs. United Laboratories, Inc., G.R. No. 155639,   April 22, 2009.

Resignation.        Resignation is defined as the voluntary act of an employee who finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service and he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment. Respondent’s resignation can be gleaned from the unambiguous terms of his letter to Captain Cristino.  Respondent’s bare claim that he was forced to execute his resignation letter deserves no merit. Bare allegations of threat or force do not constitute substantial evidence to support a finding of forced resignation.   That such claim was proferred a year later all the more renders his contention bereft of merit. Virgen Shipping Corporation, et al. vs. Jesus B. Barraquio, G.R. No. 178127, April 16, 2009.Resignation. Petitioner voluntarily resigned. Her employer cannot be held liable for constructive dismissal. Gloria Artiaga vs. Siliman University and Siliman University Medical Center, G.R. No. 178453,   April 16, 2009. Security of Tenure. Security of tenure in the career executive service, which presupposes a permanent appointment, takes place upon passing the CES examinations administered by the CES Board. It is that which entitles the examinee to conferment of CES eligibility and the inclusion of his name in the roster of CES eligibles. Under the rules and regulations promulgated by the CES Board, conferment of the CES eligibility is done by the CES Board through a formal board resolution after an evaluation has been done of the examinee’s performance in the four stages of the CES eligibility examinations. Upon conferment of CES eligibility and compliance with the other requirements prescribed by the Board, an incumbent of a CES position may qualify for appointment to a CES rank. Appointment to a CES rank is made by the President upon the Board’s recommendation. It is this process which completes the official’s membership in the CES and confers on him security of tenure in the CES. Petitioner does not seem to have gone through this definitive process.At this juncture, what comes unmistakably clear is the fact that because petitioner lacked the proper CES eligibility and therefore had not held the subject office in a permanent capacity, there could not have been any violation of petitioner’s supposed right to security of tenure inasmuch as he had never been in possession of the said right at least during his tenure as Deputy Director for Hospital Support Services. Hence, no challenge may be offered against his separation from office even if it be for no cause and at a moment’s notice. Not even his own self-serving claim that he was competent to continue serving as Deputy Director may actually and legally give even

the slightest semblance of authority to his thesis that he should remain in office. Be that as it may, it bears emphasis that, in any case, the mere fact that an employee is a CES eligible does not automatically operate to vest security of tenure on the appointee inasmuch as the security of tenure of employees in the career executive service, except first and second-level employees, pertains only to rank and not to the office or position to which they may be appointed. Jose Pepito M. Amores M.D. vs. Civil Service Commission, Board of Trustees of the Lung Center of the Philippines as represented by Hon. Manuel M. Dayrit and Fernando A. Melendres, M.D., G.R. No. 170093,   April 29, 2009 SSS.  The claim for funeral benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended, which was filed after the lapse of 10 years by the therein petitioner who had earlier filed a claim for death benefits, had not prescribed. Soledad Muños Mesa vs. Social Security System, et al., G.R. No. 160467, April 7, 2009.Transfer. Jurisprudence recognizes the exercise of management prerogative to transfer or assign employees from one office or area of operation to another, provided there is no demotion in rank or diminution of salary, benefits, and other privileges, and the action is not motivated by discrimination, made in bad faith, or effected as a form of punishment or demotion without sufficient cause. To determine the validity of the transfer of employees, the employer must show that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee; nor does it involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, privileges and other benefits.  Should the employer fail to overcome this burden of proof, the employee’s transfer shall be tantamount to constructive dismissal.We have long stated that the objection to the transfer being grounded solely upon the personal inconvenience or hardship that will be caused to the employee by reason of the transfer is not a valid reason to disobey an order of transfer.  Such being the case, petitioner cannot adamantly refuse to abide by the order of transfer without exposing herself to the risk of being dismissed.  Hence, her dismissal was for just cause in accordance with Article 282(a) of the Labor Code. Aileen G. Herida vs. F4C Pawnshop and Jewelry Store/Marcelino Florete, Jr.,G.R. No. 172601, April 16, 2009.Unfair labor practice; burden of proof. Petitioner makes several allegations that UST committed ULP. The onus probandi falls on the shoulders of petitioner to establish or substantiate such claims by the requisite quantum of evidence. In labor cases as in other administrative proceedings, substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as sufficient to support a conclusion is required. In the petition at bar, petitioner miserably failed to adduce substantial evidence as basis for the grant of relief. UST Faculty Union vs. University of Sto. Tomas, Rev. Fr. Rolando De la Rosa, Rev Fr. Rodelio Aligan, Domingo Legaspi, and Merecedes Hinayon, G.R. No. 180892, April 7, 2009.

February 2009 Decisions on Constitutional Law and Administrative LawMarch 21, 2009Hector M. de Leon Jr

Here are some of the decisions promulgated by the Supreme Court in February 2009 on constitutional law and administrative law.

Administrative Law1.  Administrative liability.  It is a fundamental principle in the law on public officers that administrative liability is separate from and independent of criminal liability. A simple act or omission can give rise to criminal, civil or administrative liability, each independently of the others. This is known as the “threefold liability rule.” Thus, absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, and vice-versa. The dismissal of the administrative cases against the petitioners will not necessarily result in the dismissal of the criminal complaints filed against them.  Eleno T. Regidor, Jr. et al. Vs. People of the Philippines, et al. G.R. No. 166086-92, February 13, 2009.2. Reorganization.  A reorganization “involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.” It alters the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them to make the bureaucracy more responsive to the needs of the public clientele as authorized by law. It could result in the loss of one’s position through removal or abolition of an office. For a reorganization for the purpose of economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient to be valid, however, it must pass the test of good faith, otherwise it is void ab initio. In the case at bar, petitioner claims that there has been a drastic reduction of plantilla positions in the new staffing pattern in order to address the local government unit’s gaping budgetary deficit. Thus, he states that in the municipal treasurer’s office and waterworks operations unit

where respondents were previously assigned, only 11 new positions were created out of the previous 35 which had been abolished; and that the new staffing pattern had 98 positions only, as compared with the old which had 129. The CSC, however, highlighted the recreation of six (6) casual positions for clerk II and utility worker I, which positions were previously held by respondents Marivic, Cantor, Asor and Enciso.  Petitioner inexplicably never disputed this finding nor proferred any proof that the new positions do not perform the same or substantially the same functions as those of the abolished. Nowhere in the records does it appear that these recreated positions were first offered to respondents. The appointment of casuals to these recreated positions violates R.A. 6656.   Pan vs. Pena, G.R. No. 174244, February 13, 2009.Constitutional Law1. Expropriation.  The National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a complaint for the acquisition of easement right of way over lots of Co in connection with the construction of NPC’s transmission lines. The Supreme Court held that: (a) Republic Act No. 8974 applies applies to properties expropriated for the installation of NPC’s power transmission lines; (b) NPC is liable to pay the full amount of the fair market value and not merely a 10 percent easement fee for the expropriated property; (c) the value of the property should be reckoned as of 27 June 2001, the date of the filing of the complaint in compliance with Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.  National Power Corporation vs. Co, GR No. 166973, February 10, 2009.2. Political question.  The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to hear the so called Moscow incident effectively asks the Court to inquire into a matter that is within the full discretion of the Senate. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question that, in Tañada v. Cuenco, was characterized as a question which, under the Constitution, is to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. Pursuant to this constitutional grant of virtually unrestricted authority to determine its own rules, the Senate is at liberty to alter or modify these rules at any time it may see fit, subject only to the imperatives of quorum, voting and publication. It is not for the Supreme Court to intervene in what is clearly a question of policy, an issue dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of the Senate’s action.  Sps. PNP Director Eliseo D. Dela Paz, et al. Vs. Senate Committee., G.R. No. 184849, February 13, 2009.

3. Dual citizenship.  Dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from running for any elective local position.  Cordora vs. Comelec, et al..R. No. 176947, February 19, 2009.