2012-03-08 Fukushima SFEN Paris Presentation - James · PDF fileUS Industry Response Based on direct learningsfrom Fukushima • On site, for direct learnings(INPO‐EPRI, with numerous

l f k hNuclear Energy one year after FukushimaSociété Française d’Energie Nucléaire (SFEN)

March 9th, 2012

Industry Current Statusd it P t i th U it d St tand its Prospects in the United States

James SpinaCorporate Vice‐President OperationsConstellation Energy Nuclear Group

CONFIDENTIAL. PROPRIETARY CENG INFORMATION. DISTRIBUTION/USE PROHIBITED WITHOUT CENG PERMISSION

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US Industry Background

A large and diverse fleet • 104 reactors currently in operation, located on 65 sites, over 30+ states• Several designs: 69 PWR (Westinghouse, B&W, CE) and 35 BWR (GE, with Mark I or II containment)• 10 major fleets but also multiple single station operators• New build projects, with applications for design certification and construction and operation license

Key US industry actors• NSSS Owner’s Groups (PWROG, BWROG): a common forum for technical issue resolution• Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI): speaks one voice on behalf of the industry on policy and regulatory issues• Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI): speaks one voice on behalf of the industry, on policy and regulatory issues• Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) • Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI)

The US fleet has grown and matured from significant external events• Earthquakes: Perry in 1986, North Anna in 2011q y ,• Hurricanes: Hugo at Turkey Point in 1992, Isabel at Atlantic stations in 2003, Katrina at Waterford in 2005, etc.• River Floods: Duane Arnold in 2008, Fort Calhoun and Cooper in 2011, etc.• Recent Tornadoes: Browns Ferry and Surry, in 2011

Industry programs (past and current)I di id l Pl E i i f E l E (IPEEE 1988)• Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE, 1988)

• Station Black Out Analysis (10CFR50.63, 1988)• NRC‐EPRI‐DOE data to reevaluate seismic hazard for Central and Eastern United States (NRC Generic Issue 199, 2006)• NRC regulation following the 9/11 attacks to increase the level of protection at all stations (10CFR50.55, B.5.b)

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US Industry Response

Based on direct learnings from Fukushima• On site, for direct learnings (INPO‐EPRI, with numerous exchanges with TEPCO)• On site and in Atlanta, for long‐term recovery and assistance (INPO‐utilities‐vendors)• INPO Time Line Event Report in November 2011 for Fukushima‐Daiichi• INPO pursuing broader learnings (Organization Effectiveness and time lines at Onagawa and Fukushima‐Daiini)

Immediate examination for adequate protection• Near term actions driven by INPO IER (IER11‐1 and IER11‐2), in March and May 2011• Industry response organized to prevent “distraction” from continued safe operationsIndustry response organized to prevent distraction from continued safe operations

Disciplined, aligned and focused on safety benefits• Priority is given to prevention of fuel damage• Established the Industry Leadership Model and the Fukushima Response Steering Committee• Process based on learnings from Post‐TMI and Post‐9/11 responses• Focused on achieving high safety benefits rapidly and consistently across the US fleet• Focused on achieving high safety benefits rapidly and consistently across the US fleet

Engaged with the regulator• Scope of considerations through the 90‐day report (July 2011) and priorization in 3 Tiers (October 2011)• Regulatory interfaces on technical issues and public meetings• NRC Calendar for Rule Making and Orders

Open to international practices and responses• INPO held a 3 day international workshop in Atlanta, November 2011• INPO assesses Stress Test results and Regional Center configurations

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NRC Regulatory Considerations

Tier 1 Activities (“no undue delay”)1. Seismic and flooding reevaluations (Rec. 2.1)2. Seismic and flooding walkdowns (Rec. 2.3)3. Station Black Out Rule Making (Rec. 4.1) FLEX Operational Strategy4 Mitigating strategies for beyond design basis events (Rec 4 2) FLEX Operational Strategy4. Mitigating strategies for beyond design basis events (Rec. 4.2) FLEX Operational Strategy5. Reliable hardened vents for Mark I and Mark II containments (Rec. 5.1) Containment Strategy6. Spent Fuel Pool instrumentation (Rec. 7.1)7. Integration of emergency procedures rulemaking (Rec. 8.0) Severe Accident Mgt / EP8. Enhanced Emergency Preparedness staffing and communications (Rec. 9.3) Severe Accident Mgt / EP

Tier 2 Activities (“Resource or critical skills set limitations”)1. Spent Fuel Pool make‐up capability (Rec. 7.2 to 7.5)2. Complementary to Tier 1 Emergency Preparedness regulatory actions (Rec. 9.3)

Tier 3 Activities (“Further NRC staff study to support a regulatory action”)1. Ten‐year confirmation of seismic and flooding hazard (Rec. 2.2)2. Capability to prevent or mitigate seismically induced fires and floods (Rec. 3)3 Reliable hardened vents for other containments (Rec 5 2) Containment Strategy3. Reliable hardened vents for other containments (Rec. 5.2) Containment Strategy4. Hydrogen control and mitigation inside containment or in other buildings (Rec. 6)5. Emergency Preparedness for prolonged station black out and multi‐units events (Rec. 9.1‐9.2) Severe Accident Mgt / EP6. Emergency Response Data System, ERDS (Rec. 9.3)

Additional Issues 1. Filtration of containment vents (policy issues by July 2012) Containment Strategy2. Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink (Tier 1 and Tier 2, linked with Rec.4.1‐4.2) FLEX Operational Strategy3. Basis of emergency planning zone size (Tier 3)4. Prestaging of Potassium Iodide beyond 10 miles (Tier 3)5. Transfer of spent fuel to dry cask storage (Tier 3)6. Instrumentation for seismic monitoring

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Balances efforts between Protection, Prevention and Mitigation, with a near‐term emphasis on Prevention

Operational Focus and Excellence

Design and Prevention

Improvements

On‐site Preparedness and Response

Off‐site ResponseCapabilities

Long TermRecovery

Protection Prevention & Mitigation

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ToOn‐site coping time T1

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Balances efforts between Protection, Prevention and Mitigation, with a near‐term emphasis on Prevention

Operational Focus and Excellence

Design and Prevention

Improvements

On‐site Preparedness and Response

Off‐site ResponseCapabilities

Long TermRecovery

Protection Prevention & Mitigation

p p p

ToOn‐site coping time

• INPO evaluations• Oversight, NSRB• AP913, SOER10‐2, etc.

• IPEEE (1990s)• EPRI‐SQUG (1990s)• PRA (CDF)Plant modifications:

• EP rule making• 10 CFR 50 (B.5.b) Improvements:Portable Equipment

• INPO Emergency Org. • INPO Emergency Org.

T1

Plant modifications:Seismic retrofitsFlooding barriersSBO diesels, batteriesRCP sealsBWR vents

Portable EquipmentStaffingEP Facilities (EOF)

Pre-FK

• IER11‐4 (SBO)• Hardened Vents (*)• Increased protection from External Hazards

• IER11‐3 (Ops. Fund.)• IER11‐2 (SFP)

• IER11‐1 (readiness)• IER11‐4 (SBO, ERO)• FLEX strategy (*)

• Eval. Filtered Vents (*)• Eval. Regional Centers(*)

• International assistance• Water treatment, etc.

Post-FK

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The Fukushima Response Steering Committee drives the US industry response

EPRI INPO NEI

Fukushima ResponseSteering CommitteeSteering Committee

INPOExecutive Advisory Group

EPRI Nuclear Power Council

NSSSOwners’ Group

NEIAdvisory Committees

Building Block 7

Technical & RD

Building Block 6

Support International Organization

Building Block 2

Lessons Learned

Building Block 1

Existing Plant Performance

Building Block 3

Effectiveness of Industry

Response Plan

Building Block 4

Strategic Communication& Outreach

Building Block 5

Regulatory Response Group

Organization Response Plan & Outreach

M. KorsnickCENG

E. HalpinSTP

W. Webster INPO

W. Webster INPO

R. GamboneINPO

M. PacilioExelon

D. HeacockDominion

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Near‐Term Actions• IER 11‐1: high state of readiness to respond to internal and external events

• IER 11‐2: adequate sensitivity to spent fuel storage and readiness to mitigate events that can challenge spent fuel storage

• IER 11‐3: effectiveness of operator fundamentals and operator training programs

• IER 11‐4: improve margin and coping in light of a loss of all AC power and developIER 11 4: improve margin and coping in light of a loss of all AC power and develop prevention and mitigation strategies

Strategic Focus Areasg1. FLEX: Prevention strategies for Station Black Out / Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink

2. Primary Containment Strategies

3. Severe Accident Management Guidance / Emergency Preparedness

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FLEX Operational Strategy

C i i f i f i C

Regardless of initiating event, set of diverse and FLEXible tools and processes, to secure critical safety functionsDevelop preplanned contingencies and provide unit‐specific coping timeStandard assumptions and solutions, with regional centers consistent with the station coping time

Component Description PWR function BWR function Comments

High Capacity Pumps (Diesel Driven) •SG makeup•SFP makeup•CST refill

•RPV makeup•SFP makeup•CST refill

•1 per reactor•1 additional per site•Purchase by March 31st 2012

High Pressure Pumps (Diesel Driven) •RPV make up•Boron injection

Not needed •1 per reactor

•Portable Diesel Generators Sets•Cables for Connecting Portable Generators

•Control room lighting•Communications gears•Emergency response•Portable ventilation loads

•Control room lighting•Communications gears•Emergency response•Portable ventilation loads

DC Power Supplies •Critical Instruments•AOV operations (if req’d)

•Critical Instruments•AOV operations (SRVs and containment valves)

•Site specific, as per IER11‐4•Purchase by March 31st 2012

containment valves)

Portable Ventilation Fans •Habitable conditions•Battery H2 room control•Equipment operability

•Habitable conditions•Battery H2 room control•Equipment operability


Diesel Generator Fuel Transfer Pumps & Hoses •Resupply of portable generators and pumps

•Resupply of portable generators and pumps

•Site specific, as per IER11‐4

Portable Air Compressors •AOV (SG Atm Steam Dump) •AOV operations (SRVs andPortable Air Compressors •AOV (SG Atm. Steam Dump) •AOV operations (SRVs and containment valves)

Suction, Discharge Hoses, Suction Strainers, Fittings •Connection to water source and injection points

•Connection to water source and injection points

•Purchase by March 31st 2012

Emergency Response (Gear, Phones, Radios, Support) •Offsite & Onsite comm.•Food, water and other

•Offsite & Onsite comm.•Food, water and other


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Containment Strategies

Engaged an in‐depth evaluation of Primary Containment Strategies

BWR Reliable Hardened Vents:• BWR Mark I and II containments shall have reliable hardened vents to

remove decay heat and maintain control of containment pressure. The hardened vents should be accessible and operable under a range of conditions (prolonged SBO, inadequate containment cooling).(p g , q g)

• Full implementation completed no later than end of 2 fuel cycles or December 31st 2016, whichever comes first.

BWR Venting Strategies:• Evaluate venting strategies that would allow for early venting (before fuel

RCIC ECS• Evaluate venting strategies that would allow for early venting (before fuel

damage) from dry or wet wells to allow for continued water injection and core cooling. Evaluation by the BWROG.

Filtered Vents:P li i f BWR ill b d h NRC C i i J l

Dry Well• Policy issues for BWR will be presented to the NRC Commission on July

2012.

Wet Well

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Severe Accident Management / EP

Severe Accident Management Guidelines and Procedures• Integrate the FLEX and Containment Strategies in the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) and in the Severe

Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs).

• Ensure consistency between EOPs, SAMGs and EDMGs (Extensive Damage Management Guidelines).

• EPRI to address severe accidents and beyond design natural events, building on the post‐TMI improvements of EOPs and the Post‐9/11 improvements of EDMGs.

• BWROG and PWROG to develop generic guidelines• BWROG and PWROG to develop generic guidelines.

• Operators to develop site‐specific procedures.

Emergency Preparedness• Extend the scope of Emergency Preparedness, including multi‐unit scenarios, extended loss of all AC power and

addressing impeded access to the units• Establish off‐site response capability and regional centers

• Assess station staffing through time motion studies

• Improve means of communications under adverse conditions

• Strengthen training on Severe Accident scenarios

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NRC Regulatory Considerations

Overall timeline

E bli h R i l C

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016Flex Equipment Purchased FLEX Equipment on Site

ExtendedLossof all ACPower

Proposed Rule Issued Final Rule Making

FLEX

ELAPDec‐16: Effective Date

Establish Regional Centerse qu p e t u c ased FLEX Equipment on Site

NRC policy issues on filters

Fuel Cycle 2Fuel Cycle 1

BWR Design Principles

Interim GuidanceMar‐12: NRC Order

Hardened Vents

Completion

FiltersI d t St t Filt

BWROG and PWROG Guidance

Industry Strategy on Filter

SAMGs BWR and PWR Site‐Specific Implementation and Training

Complete Multi‐Unit Staffing AssessmentEP Implement Improvements (staffing, communications., etc.)

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Constellation Energy Nuclear Group

CENG:

Unit Type Model COD / 60y Power (MWe)

Nine Mile Point 1 BWR GE‐2 / Mark I 1969 / 2029 610

Nine Mile Point 2 BWR GE 5 / Mark II 1988 / 2046 1140

R.E.Ginna: Emergency Operating FacilityR.E.Ginna: Emergency Offsite Facility

Nine Mile Point 2 BWR GE‐5 / Mark II 1988 / 2046 1140

R.E.Ginna PWR Wes – 2 loop 1970 / 2029 585

Calvert Cliffs 1 PWR CE – 2 loop 1975 / 2034 850

Calvert Cliffs 2 PWR CE – 2 loop 1977 / 2036 850

Past and Current Efforts:• IPEEE (Examination for External Events)

• PRA (Probabilistic Risk Assessment)

SBO d i t t i (Di l )

R.E.Ginna: RWST anchor seismic retrofit

• SBO and coping strategies (Diesels)

• High Temperature RCP seals

• Hardened vents for Mark I containment

• B5b equipment and plant security (staffing)

• Off site Emergency Operating Facilities (EOF)

R.E.Ginna: SFP pump anchor seismic retrofit

• Off‐site Emergency Operating Facilities (EOF)

B5b Pump : Extensive Damage ManagementR.E.Ginna : TSC Air Cooled Diesel (750 kWatt)

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CENG Post‐Fukushima Response

CENG initiated plant verifications in March 2011, put in place a project team in April 2011 and launched actions consistent with industry and Tiers 1 recommendations.CENG took this initiative to:

• Identify the scope of the overall project• Establish existing margin for external events• Secure the services of specialty vendors• Establish a leadership role for the industry’s post‐Fukushima activities

Actions already undertaken: • Performed seismic walkdowns (seismic margin on selected equipment, validation of retrofits, etc.)• Performed flooding walkdowns (vulnerabilities for beyond design flood levels or high precipitation scenario)• Determined coping capability under an extended loss of AC power and proposed 120 corrective actions• Procured necessary portable equipment consistent with the FLEX strategyProcured necessary portable equipment, consistent with the FLEX strategy• Engaged scoping engineering for plant modifications such as hardened vents on Mark II containment, spent fuel

pool instrumentation, etc.

Way forward:• Complete deployment of FLEX strategy by end of 2012 (training, maintenance, procedures, storage facilities)• Define and implement plant modifications to increase level of protection (by end of 2016): RCP High Temperature• Define and implement plant modifications to increase level of protection (by end of 2016): RCP High Temperature

Seals, batteries and additional protected water supplies for R.E.Ginna, reliable and hardened vents for NMP units 1 & 2, seismic and flooding retrofits for the fleet, etc.

• Improve Emergency Response for multi‐unit scenario and beyond design events• Engage industry for setting up regional centers and off‐site capability (by end of 2016)

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Summary

The US industry post‐Fukushima response is a coordinated, fleet wide effort to secure significant safety gains, based on direct learnings from FukushimaFukushima.

Strategy:• A high priority for activities that prevent fuel damage and maintain containment integrity

• Covers Protection Prevention and Mitigation strategiesCovers Protection, Prevention and Mitigation strategies

• Focus on activities providing the maximum safety benefit in the shortest time

• Consistent with international responses and agendas (short term – 2012 and long term – 2016)

CENG has taken early actions consistent with US industry and regulations and remains pro‐active.

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Documents

2012-03-08 Fukushima SFEN Paris Presentation - James · PDF fileUS Industry Response Based on direct learningsfrom Fukushima • On site, for direct learnings(INPO‐EPRI, with numerous